Conversation with Mr. Dulles

Memorandum of conversation on the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs operation.

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SECRET EYES ONLY. MR. DULLES (The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.) QUESTION: Was there any doubt about the requirement for military action against Castro? MR. DULLES: There was no doubt as far as I can recall in the mind of anyone including the White House, State, Defense, and ourselves, as to the need for action against Castro, and the feeling was that probably military action was the only kind of action that could be effective. QUESTION: In your own mind, how did you evaluate the probability of success? MR. DULLES: I realized the operation was a risky one; that you could not insure success; but I rated reasonably high, certainly 50% or over, the probability of being able to effect a beachhead and to hold it for a considerable period of time. QUESTION: What was your estimate of the possibility of an uprising following the invasion? MR. DULLES: I never gave a great deal of weight to the idea of a large popular uprising. I viewed it in this way: that if one had the beachhead and the airbases, we would then be able to resuppiy pockets of reslatance in various parts of Cuba, thereby getting arms in the hands of a great many anti- Castro people. I don't believe in popular uprisings by unarmed people when you have a military force in being, such as the militia. I did not rate the militia very highly as an organized fighting force. It was, however; entirely effective against unarmed civilians I never felt that we should call for an uprising or that we should expect or desire an immediate popular uprising. I had had a great deal of experience during the war in France when I was working with the French underground, and I remembered how hard we had tried to keep the French from waging frontal battles against the Germans; they would do it from time SECRET EVES ONLY ULTRANSENSITW