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दस्तावेज़
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OCR Page 1 of 29NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 8, 1968
To:
Walt Rostow
From:
Robert N. Ginsburgh
Attached is my nine-volume historical project on the March 31st
speech.
Volume 1 contains a preface and the summary account.
Here are the key questions which need to be answered to flesh
out the account:
1. On February 11, the President was thinking of sending
Vance to visit Saigon. That evening, Wheeler informed Westmoreland
that he might be visiting Westmoreland in a few days. On the 13th,
Vance was still under consideration.
- Was the thought that both Wheeler and Vance would
go to Saigon?
-
At what point was General Taylor being considered
an emi ssary?
- When did the President decide that Vance would not
go? the 13th? why?
2. On February 17, the President urgently wished to receive
recommendations from Rusk and Clifford for a program for the most
effective use of airpower a gainst North Vietnam.
- What disspelled the President's sense of urgency?
3. What were the reasons for the President's being initially
upset by General Wheeler's troop recommendations? Unexpected size
of the requirements? Manner of presentation? Defense opposition?
Leaks?
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