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Alexander P. Butterfield's Files
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RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
3
Memo
Butterfield to Haldeman
5/16/1972
B
5
Letter
Chief Justice to Haldeman
8/5/1972
F
7
Report
Central Intelligence Bulletin [portion]
9/23/1972
B
8
Memo
Butterfield to the President
9/17/1969
B
11
Memo
Kissinger to the President
11/5/1970
B
12
Notes
"Let us talk..."
n.d.
B
13
Notes
1240 AM "Churchill..."
10/3/1972
B
COLLECTION TITLE
BOX NUMBER
WHCF, SMOF, Alexander Butterfield
17
FOLDER TITLE
[Miscellaneous Sensitive Materials] [2 of 3]
PRMPA RESTRICTION CODES:
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and returned private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
DEED OF GIFT RESTRICTION CODES:
DOG Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S. GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
15
Report
Vietnam and Cambodia
n.d.
B
22
Cable
Kissinger to the White House
10/22/1972
B
24
Notes
P Notes [photocopy]
11/27
B
COLLECTION TITLE
BOX NUMBER
WHCF, SMOF, Alexander Butterfield
17
FOLDER TITLE
[Miscellaneous Sensitive Materials] [2 of 3]
PRMPA RESTRICTION CODES:
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and returned private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
DEED OF GIFT RESTRICTION CODES:
DOG Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S. GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 12, 1969
ME MORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN
Subject: Note from the President (Action Item)
An article in the latest issue of the "New Republic" discusses
the recent hearings on the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
and contrasts Senator Dirksen's "clowning performance" with
Ted Kennedy's "cool and clever handling" of both himself and
the situation. The article's author, TRB (Dick Strout), goes
so far as to say (about Kennedy), "If we had been political scouts,
and had never heard of his brothers, we'd have made note of him."
The President suggests that you and the 5 o'clock group get
something out on how "very amateurish" Teddy was when he
(the President) briefed the leaders on the Safeguard System.
blst
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
cc: Mr. Keogh
Mr. Klein
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
June 10, 1969
PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN
The President read in a recent news summary that many of his
critics complain about the Administration's not being "as open
as promised." 11 His only comment, addressed to you, appears
below:
"John -- Tell Herb and Ron to ignore this kind
of criticism. The fact of the matter is that we
are far too open. If we treat the press with a
little more contempt we'll probably get better
treatment."
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
cc: Mr. Klein
Mr. Ziegler
PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
3
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
April 10, 1969
ME MORANDUM FOR:
MR. EHRLICHMAN
Subject: Notes from the President (Action item)
The President would like for you to get together with the 5 o'clock group
and come up with a way to put EMK "squarely on the spot". (For example,
he favors student demonstrations yet opposes actions intended to deal
with them.)
Additionally, the President wants the 5 o'clock group to see to it that
Teddy's support of all-out integration and bussing is widely publicized.
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
cc: Mr. Keogh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
5
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
FROM:
H.R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT:
Future Plans
The President has requested that you forward to him an
indication of your personal plans or preferences regard-
ing your possible service in the next Administration.
This should be done by memorandum and forwarded directly
to my office by no later than Friday, November 10. This
should accompany your pro forma letter of resignation to
become effective at the pleasure of the President.
Between now and December 15, please plan on remaining
on the job, finishing first-term work, collecting and
depositing Presidential papers, and making plans for
next term. This should not be considered a vacation
period.
Regardless of your future plans, you should put together
a basic book about your current assignment. It should
be divided into four sections as follows:
A. How you define your current assignment.
What is its objective?
B. What is its current status? Where does
it stand?
C. Where should it go? What are the oppor-
tunities for improvement in accomplishing the
objectives of your assignment?
D. How should it get there? What are the
steps to fulfilling the objectives?
This should be as comprehensive as possible -- and should
cover the full range of your responsibilities. This project
should be completed by December 15.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
7
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
8
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
8
00/50/19
June 19, 1969
ME MORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
There are 22, 354, 000 U. S. blacks in America,
which is 11. 1% of our 200 million (plus) population.
(This comes from three reliable sources.)
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
January 16, 1970
ME MORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE:
Sanitization of the EOB
Recalling your word of caution to me that a sweeping order to take
down from EOB walls all pictures of past Presidents -- coming on
the heels of your December 24th walk-through -- might well be taken
as "Presidentially-directed", I did not move on this project until
after your departure for San Clemente. However, on New Year's
day I made my own inspection of EOB offices occupied by White
House Support Staff personnel and less than a week later spoke to
Bill Hopkins about general policy on the matter, his views, etc.
I couched my pitch to Hopkins in terms of my surprise discovery
...
i.e. learning that civilian government employees, unlike military
personnel, do on occasion display pictures of past commanders or
commanders-in-chief on (Federal) office walls. I took time to
elaborate on the fact that the taking down of pictures of former
chiefs, in offices or other official business environments, is only
a gesture of common courtesy to new chiefs -- a gesture of "pledged
loyalty" with no disrespect whatever intended for those who have
served and moved on. Bill Hopkins knew all of this, of course, so
was naturally understanding of the position I was taking. I asked
him to make a detailed check (not telling him of my earlier check)
which he did prior to your return to Washington. Here is a recapitula-
tion of results:
-- Of 35 large and small offices occupied by White House Support
Staff personnel, 6 displayed photographs of one or more former
Presidents in addition to your own.
27 offices (including the 6 mentioned above) displayed your
picture.
-- 8 offices displayed no pictures of U.S. Presidents.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
The office which you mentioned to me specifically -- the one
in which you noticed 2 pictures of President Kennedy -- is
supervised by Edna Rosenberg, a civil servant at the GS-9
level, who has the distinction of having served on the White
House Staff longer than anyone else
....
41 years this coming
March 7th. I have checked her file very carefully and found
that the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the
Civil Service Commission's Bureau of Personnel Investiga-
tion, the State Department and its Passport Office, the CIA,
the Secret Service, and the FBI have all rendered continual
reports to the effect that she is a "completely loyal American
whose character, reputation, and associations are above
reproach.' Born in 1902 here in Washington, D. C., she
has remained single all of these years, and lives now with a
sister (Miss Janette Rosenberg) in Silver Spring, Maryland.
- One of the Kennedy pictures bore a personal
inscription of good wishes to the personnel of
that office, and undoubtedly for that reason had
been retained and displayed by those who work
there.
-- Using to best advantage the fact that your new official photo-
graphs have just been printed and made accessible to Federal
offices and employees, I instructed Bill Hopkins to see to it
that every office supervisor received one and in the process
of hanging it on the wall took all others down ... "in accordance
with normal policy".
-- On January 14th the project was completed and all 35 offices
displayed only your photograph.
The second half of this project -- i.e. to ensure across-the-board
loyalty of all White House Support Staff personnel even if we find it
necessary to "abolish current office arrangements and start over
from scratch" -- is underway; but I cannot yet report results. I
am in the process of screening personnel records and within 2-3
days will be ready to suggest possible courses of action to Bob
Haldeman.
2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
11
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
12
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
13
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 29, 1971
DAN RATHER
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
Rather has been a regular complainer that the White House correspondents,
rather than anchor men, should be the ones doing the annual interview of
the President. Further, he has been a "hawk" among the press corp
arguing for more conferences and tougher questions. Hence, Rather will
be under tremendous pressure to be tough on the President; and his
questions likely may have a sharp edge to them. He will be further under
scrutiny by his fellows who will hail him as their hero if he puts the
President to a truly tough test. This, coupled with his normal disposition,
makes me think that he will attempt to make this an adversary proceeding.
Working in the other direction is a) his awareness that he sometimes
comes off as too aggressive and therefore badly, and b) surprisingly
enough his wife's insistence that he not appear as aggressive and combative
as he customarily does.
But a good deal more sharp exchange than the Smith show seems in the cards.
RADIO COMMENTARY -- Rather's thrice-weekly commentaries on radio
generally cover the big story of the day. Since September the economy,
the Presidential summits, and politics have gotten about equal time --
with Vietnam and various domestic matters generally close behind. Very
often, Rather will take note of the political implications of a Presidential
action or decision or visit, no matter what the subject. Presidential trips
are called "non-political political trips.' And on domestic runs, Rather
will go out of his way to point up the motorcade timing and routes for the
crowds, etc.
INDIA-PAKISTAN -- A likely area of questions. Rather indicated that
the White House had favored Pakistan and that the President was irritated
by the way the Soviets won, and then rubbed it in. He wondered why we did
what we did. Was it pique at Indira? Perhaps Kissinger's affinity for
the Pakistanis and disdain for Ghandi? Yahya's help in arranging the PRC
mission?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
-2-
This was called, claims Rather, by many US diplomats as the Adminis-
tration's worst foreign policy defeat, one of the few under the President.
(Overall, Rather has been quite positive on the Administration's foreign
policy, saying that "the potential for brilliance is there. ")
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION -- We get rapped regularly for our
"inability to count", i.e. Court nominees, foreign aid, UN on Taiwan.
The "errors" by the Attorney General, i.e., Court choices especially
(were the "six" a smokescreen) are rapped by Rather, and the credibility
damage to the nation's institutions.
Rather repeatedly refers to Kissinger as RN's Vest pocket Secretary of
State -- and the President may be asked about the enhanced position of
the National Security Adviser vis a vis the Secretary of State.
Rather also notes that the President is attracted to "strong men", i.e.,
AG, Connally, Yahya, De Gaulle, Franco, Tito.
Another possible question the President may be asked about Mr. Hoover's
future. Will he be held on indefinitely?
CHINA-- Rather wondered if the President was so concerned about Taiwan's
seat in the United Nations, shy was Henry Kissinger in Peking when the
vote was cast? Did the loss of that vote reduce the importance of the
President's diplomatic victory in announcing the Peking trip?
INDOCHINA -- The President's strategy and Hanoi's effort to push public
opinion against the President are at stake.
What connection is there between the President's PRC trip and the
--
NVA offensive in Laos and their increased air resistance?
--
The achievements of Vietnam, if there are any, will be in what
might have been, had we not fought there.
--
Vietnam is the hardest war to understand in our history; and the
verdict on RN's handling of it is still out.
--
Would John F. Kennedy have received more credit had he done
what RN has in Vietnam?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
-3-
POLITICS -- Dan has talked about both the McCloskey challenge and the
conservati ve opposition to the President. Several references have been
made to the Republican Party's fund-raising ability. He has indicated
that the President's campaign is already underway and building. The
President's Chicago salute was seen as the opening gun of the campaign.
The replacement of Hardin was "one of the oldest political games in town."
RN is told every time he comes to the Midwest that the farm economy is
hurting the GOP, although the WH is said to have ignored this through 1970.
Thus, Democrats have usual leverage on the farm vote. Was Butz's
confirmation a victory or "re-election campaign albatross?"
VICE PRESIDENT -- In my view a likely question here for these reasons.
He has spoken of the weakness of the Vice President, used anecdotes to
detail it; elevated Ed. Brooke as a potential choice. He is down on the
Vice President's harsh tone, and anti-youth impression and anti-media
approach -- as he sees it. Close friends of his say he approaches things
like a liberal Democrat, is turned off by language such as that in RN's
veto of Child Care and OEO, and RN's Welfare Amendments Statement of
yesterday. He is concerned about polarizing rhetoric; and the President
may get a "lower our voices" question, because of this particular concern
of Rather's.
Since Rather has done the Brooke thing, and was there for RN's black
V.P. comment, he may head in this direction with a question.
SUMMITS -- Rather wonders about RN's present summit policy compared
with his past wariness about summits.
On the Pompidou visit, Rather made perhaps his most noticeable goof of
the past several months. He portrayed the President as "sobered if not
down-right shaken" after negotiating with the Frenchman; Pompidou on the
other hand was "smiling, confident" after the French "victory" in the
Azores. RN looked grim, glum. Had hard time talking straight. Looked
nervous, fatigued, not at all like any sort of diplomatic victory was gained.
Heath reportedly was shocked by what the British saw as RN's "cavalier"
attitude in international economics. Heath allegedly saw India-Pakistan as
worst RN performance of them all.
ECONOMY -- Rather says the 1st Quarter of 1972 will be the best indicator
of where the economy is going. Hypoed Christmas sales aren't enough.
Thus, the uncertainty remains.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
-4-
Also, the President may be asked, given Rather's reports about his
charging inflation of 1968 to unbalanced budgets and huge deficits.
OTHER DOMESTIC ISSUES --
--
RN's speech praising Hoover last July was the kind of speech the
President and Wallace gave in 1968.
--
Domestic programs are ambiguous, lack progress, why?
--
Why does this nation, the most advanced of all, not have the
best medical care available for all citizens? See potency in
the health issue in the 1970s.
--
Rather was first to report RN's upcoming June address on the
drug problem, a "national emergency."
Of further interest -- a sign in Rather's office:
"Do your best to be correct and fair, and never forget how
often you fail."
YEAR-END REPORT -- Final Note -- Amazingly, Rather found "fear"
to be the dominant mood of the country at the end of 1971; boys "fear"
being the last to die in Vietnam; others "fear" the high unemployment
rates mean that their job may be next, etc.
As for the President, he said that there is no question but that RN's
popularity is "thin," though higher than last year. RN has sustained
himself with a bombshell a month, but he is treading on quicksand.
Dan wonders if RN has any follow-through after this coming May.
Incidentally, Mike Wallace pointed up the changes that had taken place
since 1968 and got Rather to concede that casualties were down and
troops home, although Dan wondered where the racial situation was
quieter. In the same show, Cronkite accused the Administration of a
"massive campaign.
to undercut the media. "
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
15
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
4. THE SECOND CHOICE IS FOR YOU TO GET IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY
WITH DOBBYNIN AND HAND HTM 1 PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO BRESHNEV
TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT:
-- WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED NEARLY INSUPERABLE OBSTACLES IN
SAISON.
-- ME HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT IMPOSE A SOLUTION
ON OUR ALLIES. HERE YOU WOULD ADD ORALLY THAT, OF COURSE, THE
NOVEMBER 7 CONSIDERATIONS MUST WEIGH VERY HEAVILY.
-- NE ARE HONOR BOUND TO PRESENT OUR ALLIES' OBJECTIONS TO
THE OTHER SIDE.
-- IF THE OTHER SIDE PROVES UNABLE TO MEET THESE OBJECTIONS
WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK OUT A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT
MITH THEM ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.
MS, THEREFORE, PROPOSE A MEETING WITH LE DUC THO IN
PARIS AT ANY TIME OF HIS CHOOSING.
-- THE REST OF THE SCENARIO WITH THE DRV WOULD REMAIN
THE SAME.
-- THE DE BORCHGRAVE INTERVIEW WAS A BREACH OF FAITH AND
TERRIELY EXACERBATED THE SITUATION.
-- If ORDER TO SHOW OUR GOOD FAITH WE WILL STOP OUR BOMBING
OF THE NORTH AND SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE AIR ACTIVITY IN THE
SOUTH WHILE THIS SITUATION IS BEING WORKED OUT.
THE ADVAHTAGES OF THIS COURSE ARE THAT IT MAKES US LEAST
VULNERABLE TO PUBLIC PRESSURE, IS NOST HONORABLE TOWARD
SAIGON, AND IS ONE WHICH WE CAN BEST SURFACE PUBLICLY.
THE MAJOR DISADVANTAGE IS THAT IT MAY RUN US RIGHT UP
AGAINST 0 DEADLINE, AND I HAVE NOT YET FIGURED OUT HOW TO
KEEP HANDI QUIET LONG, ENOUGH IN ORDER TO GET IT IMPLEMENTED. YOU
WOULD SIVE THE SOLEMN ASSURANCE OF THE PRESIDENT TO BRESHNEV THAT THIS
VAS NOT 1 STALL TUG MANEILVER AND THAT ALL PROVISIONS OF THE AGREE-
MENT THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN BILATERAL FASHION WOULD BE DONE
AS SOON AS PPOSSIBLE AFTER THE MEETING WITH LE DUC THO. YOU WOULD
ADD ORALLY TO DOBRYNIN IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE FASHION THE
IMPERATIVE THAT THERE BE NO PUBLIC OUTCRY. IF NORTH VIET-NAM WERE
TO GO PUBLIC WE WOULD HAVE TO STAND BY SAIGON'S OBJECTIONS, WHICH AS WE
HAVE MENTIONED CONCERN PRIMARILY THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIET-
NAMESE FORCES AND THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER ROUND
OF WAR.
5. I KNOW THE PRESIDENT' DEJECTION TO ENDING THE BOMBING. BUT
I DO NOT THINK THEY PRESENT SITUATION. ENDING THE BOMB-
ING WOULD SUPPORT THE PUBLIC PRESSION THAT AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR.
FAILURE TO END IT WOULD ASK MANOI TO ENDURE SEVERAL MORE WEEKS OF
PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF A REFUSAL BY SAIGON TO GO ALONG WITH NW7
AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE DRV MADE ALMOST UNBELIEVABLE CONCESSIONS
OBVIOUSLY I FAVOR THE SECOND COURSE, BUT HAVE OFFERED
ST
ONE TOD INTELLECTUAL COMPLETENESS.
WARN REGARDS.
CLOLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PeR RAC 6/12/108
By MIH
NARA, Date 8/8/16
Doc. 18533 [p. 1 of 1]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
tie
CONFIDENTIAL
January 14, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR ALEX BUTTERFIELD
The President would like you to check to find out who the
woman is in the EOB who has the two Kennedy pictures.
What's her background
is she new, old, someone we
can trust, etc. Please get a report back to me on this
quickly.
Thank you.
Day
H
H.R. HALDEMAN
This has now delayed -
nearly a month about
and he asks -
it once a week
at least.
It
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
Hold
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 16, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE:
Pictures in the EOB
I have just received your January 14th memorandum concerning pictures
in the EOB
and my delay (for nearly a month) in getting certain informa-
tion back to the President.
I remember precisely what the President said when he spoke to me about
this and there was no request for a report back -- only a clear directive
that action be taken. Whereas I am not in the habit of dragging my feet
ever (especially on a matter of expressed priority interest to you or the
President) I did in this case adhere to the President's word of caution
that a sweeping order to bring down all pictures of past Presidents --
coming on the heels of his December 24th "walk-through" -- might well
be taken as "Presidentially-directed",
There are 2 parts to the project: (1) Discreetly institute the proper
"picture policy" and ensure that its merits (indeed its justification)
are clearly understood by all personnel in the Executive Office of the
President, especially GS employees on the White House Support Staff;
and (2) Assign one of our own people to every support office, or in some
other way set up a system which will ensure across-thc-board loyalty of
White House Support Staff personnel
even if it is necessary to "abolish
all offices and start over from scratch. 11 The first half of the project --
admittedly the easiest half -- was begun with my own "walk-through" the
EOB offices on January 1st, less than 48 hours after the President's
departure for San Clemente. It was completed on Jahuary 14th, just 13
days later. The second half of the project is just beginning -- and will not
be done overnight. I am looking at personnel files now, and when I finish
I will recommend to you 1 or 2 possible courses of action
....
that is,
unless you want to stay out of it entirely and give me a full rein.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
Finally, let me say that it was only this past Tuesday when I first
learned from you that the President was asking for a progress report
on this subject. On Wednesday I reported to you by memorandum that
I would have a rundown for you today (January 16th). In that I did not
hear from you, I assumed that schedule was satisfactory; then came
your note expressing impatience, itself delayed by a day and a half.
A written report to the President is attached.
Attachment
overlapped in the mail. you
tad not have gotter thy P.
I seen They your Weds. was out
note. would bugging Problem person me -on wihad was " of
marty to rest. The
report her to to P. set is and all sovry this for
needed
2 H.
1/16/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
pilsot
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CON IDENTIAL
February 9, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ALEX BUTTERFIELD
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN H.
The President thinks that he has discovered the key to our
problem at State dinners and other social functions of
bringing people up to chat with him. He found that Macomber
is absolutely surperb at this and the State Department types,
who are trained in this type of procedure, are far better than
our own staff or the military aides in handling it.
Therefore, he would like to have this responsibility taken over
by Macomber specifically and the State Department types in
general. It still will be your responsibility to develop the list
of people to be brought up and to work out a system whereby
the State Department types can have those people identified
for them. Maybe you can have the social aidesdo this as you
do now. But, use two State Department people, preferably
Macomber and someone else, to actually move the people up
to the President. They have the skill and training for this and
should be given the responsibility.
Dane
Mos writ nemo Luay Lacy-bass
Determined to be an
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
Pin Seri
WASHINGTON
February 22, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ALEX BUTTERFIELD
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN H.
For the time being, hold up on Arthur Burns on any social
invitations, just keep him off the list for a little while.
Check with me in three or four weeks to see if he should be
put back on for something or other. In the meantime keep
him off of Church, etc.
CONFIDENTIAL
Determined™ to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By_WIH NARA Date 8/8/16
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To Then
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
On this day after my reelection I wish to reopen our dialogue
about the draft agreement to end the war.
I must first of all express my deep disappointment over what
I consider to be a dangerous drift in the relationship between
our two countries, a tendency which can only undercut our
mutual objectives and benefit the enemy. Your continuing
distortions of the agreement and attacks upon it are unfair
and self-defeating. These have persisted despite our numer-
ous representations, including my October 29 letter to you.
They have been disconcerting and highly embarrassing to me.
In my previous communications, and in the presentations of
Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Bunker, we have repeatedly
explained why we consider the draft agreement to be sound;
we continue to believe that it reflects major concessions by
the other side, protects the independence of South Vietnam,
and leaves the political future to the South Vietnamese people
themselves. You are fully informed as well about the mas-
sive resupply movement that is underway to strengthen your
forces before a ceasefire. I have repeatedly given firm
guarantees against the possibility that the agreement is vio-
lated. I have offered to meet with you soon after the agree-
ment is signed to symbolize our continuing support. I will
not recount here the numerous arguments, explanations, and
undertakings that have been made. They all remain valid.
In the light of this record, the charges made by some of your
associates are becoming more and more incomprehensible.
We are in any event resolved to proceed on the basis of the
draft agreement and the modifications which we are deter-
mined to obtain from the North Vietnamese which General
Haig will discuss with you. With regard to these changes in
the agreement, I wish to make clear what we can and cannot
do:
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2
-- With respect to the political provisions, we will weaken
the Vietnamese translation of the phrase "administrative struc-
ture" to make even clearer the fact that the National Council
is in no way a governmental body. As you know, we never
agreed to the North Vietnamese use of the phrase "chinh quyen"
and we will do our utmost to see that the phrase "hanh chanh"
is substituted. In Article 9(f) we will also press for a sentence
that makes clear that the membership of the Council is appointed
equally by both sides. And in Article 9(g) we will attempt to
dilute the already weak functions of the Council. In any event,
as we have explained to you on numerous occasions, it is obvious
that the Council has no governmental authority.
-- With respect to North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam,
we will treat this problem in two ways. First, we will press for
the de facto unilateral withdrawal of some North Vietnamese
divisions in the northern part of your country. Secondly, we will
introduce wording at the end of Article 9 (h) which stipulates that
troops should be demobilized on a one-to-one basis and that they
should return to their homes.
-- With respect to the demilitarized zone, we will press in
Chapter V for specific reference to Article 24 of the Agreement
on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954.
-- In Article 15(d) we will insist on deleting the inadvertent
reference to "three Indochinese countries" and substituting
"the Indochinese states."
-- In addition, we will do our best to obtain as many as
possible of the changes in wording your government suggests
which are of a more technical nature.
We will use our maximum efforts to effect these changes in
the agreement. I wish to leave you under no illusion, however,
that we can or will go beyond these changes in seeking to im-
prove an agreement that we already consider to be excellent.
It seems to me you have two essential choices. You could use
the public support your recent actions have mobilized to claim
the military victory the agreement reflects and to work in
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3
unity with your strongest ally to bring about a political
victory for which the conditions exist. You could take the
political and psychological initiative by hailing the settle-
ment and carrying out its provisions in a positive fashion.
In this case I repeat my invitation to meet with you shortly
after the signature of the agreement, in order to underline
our continued close cooperation.
The other alternative would be for you to pursue what appears
to be your present course. In my view this would play into
the hands of the enemy and would have extremely grave conse-
quences for both our peoples and it would be disaster for
yours.
Mr. President, I would like you to tell General Haig if we can
confidently proceed on this basis. We are at the point where
I need to know unambiguously whether you will join us in the
effort General Haig is going to outline or whether we must
contemplate alternative courses of action which I believe
would be detrimental to the interests of both of our countries.
I hope that you and your government are prepared to cooperate
with us. There is a great deal of preparatory work that needs
to be done, and we believe joint US-GVN task forces should
begin working together so that we will be in the best possible
position to implement the settlement.
It is my firm conviction that your people, your armed forces,
and you have achieved a major victory which the draft agree-
ment would ratify. It is my intention to build on these accom-
plishments. I would like to work with you and your government
in my second term to defend freedom in South Vietnam in
peacetime as we have worked during my first term to defend it
in conflict.
In four years you and I have been close personal and military
allies. Our alliance has brought us to a position where the
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4
enemy is agreeing to conditions which any objective observer
said were impossible four years ago. Our alliance and its
achievements have been based on mutual trust. If you will
give me continued trust, together we shall succeed.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of Vietnam
Saigon
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chun
Redias
ES/ 50/FI
June 2, 1969
PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL
ME MORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
After reading a number of press reports (some which hint and some
which state openly) that CIA is undercutting Secretary Laird and
providing ammunition for ABM opponents, the President addressed,
in the strongest terms, these comments to you:
"Henry - -- (1) Give Helms unshirted hell for this!
(2) We know these reports are at least
1
partly true (via his Georgetown under-
lings).
(3) Tell him to crack down ... and tell
Cushman as well."
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
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ON THE DOCUMENT
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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