Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
118565262
label
Election (1)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
118565262
contentType
document
title
Election (1)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
137
collections
Records of the White House Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Michael Deaver's Political Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
118565262
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1985-12-31
year
1985
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1981-01-01
year
1981
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
64c0de5b681b7e09
ocrText
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Deaver, Michael: Files
Folder Title: Election (1)
Box: 68
To see more digitized collections
visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
The President has seen
OKMA
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
Hill
TO:
John B. Connally
DATE:
Wednesday, September 21, 1983
RECOMMENDED BY:
EDWARD J. ROLLINS
PURPOSE:
To discuss the 1984 Senate race in Texas.
BACKGROUND:
A long time Lyndon Johnson protege, Connally served as
Secretary of the Navy in the Kennedy Administration.
He was elected Governor of Texas in 1962. He did not
seek re-election in 1968.
Connally was named by Richard Nixon to be Secretary of
the Treasury in 1971. He headed up the Democrats for
Nixon effort in the 1972 campaign.
Connally switched to the GOP in 1973, the same year
that he was indicted on bribery charges. He was ac-
quitted.
Apart from his abortive run for the presidency in 1979-
80, Connally has been with the big Houston law firm of
Vinson and Elkins in recent years.
TOPICS OF
1. The President will want to discuss the upcoming
DISCUSSION:
senate race in Texas. Who does Connally feel is
ahead in the 3-way race for the GOP nomination?
The announced candidates are Representative Phil
Gramm, Representative Ron Paul and businessman
Robert Mosbacher, Jr.
The three candidates for the Democratic nomination
are Representative Kent Hance, 1978 Democratic
Senatorial nominee Bob Krueger, and State Senator
Lloyd Doggett.
2. The President may want to seek Connally's advice
on Hispanic concerns. As governor, Connally was
widely hailed for his sensitivity to the Hispanic
population. Connally was the first Texas governor
to appoint Hispanics to a number of top positions.
His office telephone number is 713/651-2222.
DATE OF
SUBMISSION:
September 21, 1983
ACTION
Kethirisit's Phil Grame If Slem. nominee is
avrilable
THE WHITE HOUSE
Bil weigone
WASHINGTON
June 6, 1983
and then then or
gonce this he tue keep m
MEMORANDUM FOR OUTREACH STRATEGY GROUP
posted.
FROM:
MICHAEL K. DEAVER M
SUBJECT:
Meeting Follow-Up
The follow-up items and action requests from the June 3 meeting
are as follows:
1.
Contact Governor Deukmejian for some good Hispanic
suggestions. (Rollins)
2.
Produce a list of 20 most admired Hispanics. (Wirthlin)
3.
Set up Personnel meeting to review list of 10 Hispanics
worthy of placement -- not later than June 20.
(Herrington)
4.
Set up a meeting with Administration Hispanics.
(Fuller)
5.
Check with R. Walker regarding Hispanic business
leaders. (McManus)
6.
Set up a meeting with RNC regarding general operation
and also Hispanic contacts. (Rollins)
7.
Look into projects for Mrs. Reagan involvement.
(McManus)
8.
Produce a list of Hispanic sports celebrities.
(McManus)
9.
Look into ways to work with Hispanic media. (Gergen)
a.
Translate RR's radio show for Spanish language
edition. (Gergen)
TARGET STATES
The following swing states should be the focus of our atten-
tion in the next few months. The number of electoral votes for
each state is in parentheses.
WEST
MIDWEST
SOUTH
EAST
California (47)
Illinois
(24)
Texas
(29)
New Jersey
(16)
Washington (10)
Ohio
(23)
Florida
(21)
Connecticut ( 8)
Colorado
( 8)
Missouri
(11)
N.Carolina (13)
Oregon
( 7)
Wisconsin
(11)
Virginia (12)
New Mexico
( 5)
Iowa
( 8)
Tennessee (11)
Louisiana (10)
Alabama
( 9)
Kentucky ( 9)
S.Carolina ( '8)
Mississippi(7)
Other states not mentioned are either considered safe or not
probable win states at this time.
TARGET GROUPS
1. WOMEN
All regions; Protestants, and middle-aged married Catholics
2.
BLUE COLLAR
Southern states and Ohio, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri,
Connecticut, Iowa, Oregon, New Jersey, Washington, Arizona
and New Mexico
3. HISPANICS
Cubans in Florida, Mexican-Americans in Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona, Colorado, California and New Jersey
4.
SOUTHERN WHITES
Especially lower income/blue collar
5.
WHITE NON-UNION PROTESTANTS
Northeast and Midwest; low to moderate incomes
6.
SENIOR CITIZENS
Florida, Arizona, Iowa and Missouri
TARGET ISSUES
Economy
The President must continue to position himself to receive full
credit for the economic recovery. As the economy comes back, the
Democrats will no longer have it as a political issue. The President
must remind the public how bad things were when he took over, take
credit for recent economic improvement, and continue to be optimistic
about the future. He should stick to themes such as "Economic growth
means more working Americans," or "We must re-tool and re-train
America for the '80's."
The economy will be the paramount issue for 1984. We must be
prepared to persuasively answer the question in 1934, "Are you better
off now than you were four years ago?" in the affirmative. We will
also have to address the fairness issue more effectively.
Leadership
The President is still viewed as a strong leader by most Ameri-
cans, and this is a theme we need to build upon for re-election.
The image of a strong, steady leader who can continue to guide
this country to peace, progress and prosperity will help win the
support of not only our base constituencies, but also the non-ideol-
ogical voters (29 percent of the total) who are attracted by and
vote on the basis of their perceptions of performance, charisma, in-
cumbency and leadership.
Foreign Policy/National Security
We are making steady progress in this area. Our own accomplish-
ments coupled with the irresponsible statements coming from the
liberal Democrats indicate that we have the opportunity to do well
with this issue in 1984. Consistency, caution and concern are key
watchwords for 1984. The President can carefully explicate the dangers
facing us, demonstrating at the same time that his policy of peace
through strength has provided America with both.
Education
Most Americans express deep concern about the quality of educa-
tion in this country. A majority of parents feel that education has
deteriorated in the past decade and that their children are not re-
ceiving as good a basic education as they did.
A "back to basics" theme would have widespread appeal among most
Americans. Also, the public overwhelmingly supports voluntary prayer
in public schools. The President should continue to push this initia-
tive.
Other issues, such as tuition tax credits, should be boosted
before targeted audiences.
The recent final report of the National Commission on Excellence
in Education lends great intellectual support to the President's ef-
forts to redirect the Department of Education toward an agenda for
achievement in our public schools. An important aspect of this effort
is competency testing for teachers and students.
Crime
Americans rate crime as the domestic problem they are most con-
cerned with, after the economy.
They believe judges are too soft in issuing sentences to
criminals.
A majority expect crime to increase over the next year.
An overwhelming majority feel homeowners should be allowed
to use force against burglars breaking into their homes.
A majority of Americans favor the death penalty for those
convicted of premeditated murder.
The President need merely advocate the same policies in 1983-84
that he did ten or twenty years ago to establish himself as the
candidate who is tough on crime.
The public doesn't necessarily want another LEAA program. Tough
speeches before law enforcement groups will go a long way.
The public's concern that judges aren't tough enough gives the
President the opportunity to showcase some of his more conservative
judicial appointments.
The President's Task Force on Drugs is another example of a
vehicle to get the President out front on an issue of major concern
to most Americans.
The President should continue to visit law enforcement agencies
and express his support for their work. He should seize these oppor-
tunities to promote his anti-crime package.
NATIONAL THEMES VS. REGIONAL TARGETED THEMES
In spite of the fact that the major media follows the President
wherever he goes and makes a national news story out of most Presi-
dential events, the President from time to time needs to focus his
remarks on activities of smaller, but more supportive, audiences.
The recent speech to the National Rifle Association was a perfect
example of effective "narrowcasting."
While it is true that most Americans support gun control, their
support is lukewarm. The 2.8 million members of the NRA, however, are
motivated and organized. The gains we make in courting these single-
issue voters far exceed any potential losses we could suffer among the
rest of the population over this issue.
Several other issues that the President supports are not popular
among the public-at-large. He must target the specific constituencies
to maximize his gains and minimize his losses when he addresses these
issues. Abortion and tuition tax credits are examples of views held
by the President that need special, receptive audiences.
The White House must develop the capacity to operate on two tracks
at once. The overall message must be general and noncontroversial,
while specific communications can be targeted and tailored to single
issue supporters.
Optimism
The President is and must continue to be a symbol of hope and
optimism to the American public. Ronald Reagan has a unique ability
to portray the best side of an issue.
His message should be that America is on the mend, that inflation
is down, unemployment is down, the stock market is up, and so is the
American spirit. With President Reagan in the White House, we will
enjoy peace, prosperity and progress.
An additional benefit of a strong climate of optimism will be
better candidate recruitment in 1984 and higher levels of campaign
enthusiasm and contributions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are some concrete steps we can take to improve our standing
with the populists--in terms of symbolism and issues.
A. Symbolism
As we plan our populist strategy, we should remember that populists
appreciate honesty, cander, and straight-forwardness. They loathe hypocrisy,
condescension, and pretense. Our strategy must be carefully planned and
be consistent to avoid these pitfalls. Below are some specific suggestions:
1. The President could do the play-by-play for a pro baseball or
football game. How many people know that the President is a
former sportscaster? The President's image would be boosted
immeasurably if he were to show off his microphone expertise
alongside populist heroes such as Curt Gowdy or Frank Gifford.
2. Many presidents (though not lately) have thrown out the first
ball at the beginning of the baseball season. This is a tradi-
tion which could easily enough be revived. Perhaps the President
could be with Jim Brady if the Bear throws out the first ball
for a Chicago Cubs game again.
3. The President could go to a stock car race. Although stock car
racing is neglected by the media, it is one of the nation's
biggest spectator sports. And those spectators are almost 100%
populists.
4. The President could host a group of football or baseball stars--
former and current--over to the White House. It is just as
important to invite retired stars, as populists are old as well
as young. We cannot over-emphasize the importance of sports to
the populists. Sports like baseball and football are literally
as American as apple pie. Sports--team and individual--epitomize
valuable characteristics such as discipline, hard work, and per-
severance. The President's connection with sports has been
neglected. The public should be reminded that the President is
a former athlete and sportscaster, and that he still enjoys
watching a game on TV as much as the next guy.
5. The President could ask the 50 Reagan-Bush State Chairmen to
each designate one blue collar worker to come to the White House
and tell President Reagan what he or she thinks he ought to know.
6. If this program worked well, it could be repeated indefinitely.
For example, the Reagan-Bush Chairmen could each choose an
entrepeneur from their state who has recently started a small
business that provides jobs. Additionally, the Chairmen could
each select a farmer, working mother, Social Security recipient,
outstanding student, star athlete, etc.
7. Populists like to see the chasm between themselves and the elite
narrowed. We could narrow that gap overnight by inviting some
of the hundreds of thousands of Americans who write to the
President each year to actually come visit the White House and
talk to him in person.
8. Also in the interest of narrowing the gap between the government
and the governed, we should give some serious thought to accepting
some of the myriad invitations to conventions, parties, weddings,
baptisms, etc. that the President gets each year.
9. The President is personally the greatest conservationist since
Teddy Roosevelt. Not since TR has there been a president who
spent so much time in the great outdoors. Not only does the
President spend as much time as he can on his ranch, but he
actually works with his hands when he's out there. Perhaps the
President could invite others to come along. They could be rodeo
champions, working cowboys, or perhaps "dudes" who would like
to try "roughing it" for a few days. Our one "in house" rodeo
champion is Malcolm Baldrige. Perhaps the President could do
the announcing at an event where the Secretary performs.
10. No other president, no matter how beloved by the Sierra Club, can
claim the same level of genuine familiarity and affinity with out-
door life. The President may want to stop at a national park some
time to make this point in person. He might say that people can
honestly differ over the nuances of environmental policy, but that
people who say that Ronald Reagan is out to damage the environment
are not being honest.
11. An event could be arranged at the White House for "blue collar
environmentalists, " those non-granola eating working class
Americans who drive their pickups and RV's into the country to
hunt, fish, boat, etc. Perhaps they could all drive to the White
House in their pickups and campers to discuss issues of common
concern with the President.
12. The President could stress "blue collar environmentalism" in a
speech to the National Rifle Association. Its members have a
great interest in pragmatic environmental policy. Also, their
political clout is much greater than most people realize, viz. the
defeat of the California gun control initiative. Recall that
Ronald Reagan was the first candidate the NRA ever endorsed. How-
ever, the current pro-Reagan leadership of the NRA is being
seriously challenged by forces allied with Michigan Democrat John
Dingell. An appearance by the President at an NRA fundraiser would
greatly strengthen the pro-Reagan incumbents.
13. The President could greatly advance his education agenda and help
himself with the populists if he spoke to a conservative education
group, such as the PTA or the National Association of School Boards.
2
The President might also consider speaking at a high school or
grammar school commencement. There is no reason why the school
has to be large. Surely we can find a traditionally-minded public
school which never lost sight of the three R's and still graduates
achievers without huge expenditures or frills.
14. Since nationalistic themes appeal to the populists' patriotism,
the President might consider an event marking the anniversary of
some great battle or treaty, preferably dating from the Revolu-
tionary War. Another important date on the horizon is the 40th
anniversary of D-Day, which comes up on June 6, 1984.
15. The President should seize the opportunity to emphasize his
continuing commitment to human rights in the captive nations of
Eastern Europe. He could meet with Cardinal Cooke of New York,
and participate in a candlelight vigil for Solidarity, Soviet
Jews, imprisoned Pentecostals, etc.
16. The President has great communication skills. He could utilize
them to the fullest to a sympathetic audience if he were to do
a question-and-answer show over a nationwide hookup of FM
country music radio stations. The advantage of radio is that
the market is so segmented that we can seek out and find the
precise populist audience we want.
17. The President could also lend his stature to a charity telethon,
such as the Jerry Lewis telethon for muscular dystrophy. A
Presidential appearance would certainly generate record contri-
butions.
18. The President's philosophy and that of voluntarist groups like
the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts are very much in tune. We should
keep this in mind as we weigh the numerous invitations that pour
into the White House every day.
19.
The family has a special place in American life. The President
is a son, husband, brother, father, and grandfather. All Americans
enjoy celebrating holidays, birthdays, and reunions. They are
showing increasing interest in their "roots." The President is
uniquely qualified to explain to his fellow citizens how his
vision for America speaks to their concerns and aspirations and
how his policies address those concerns and aspirations. By word
and deed, the President can help the families of America celebrate
their unity and their diversity.
20.
After the family, the greatest American social institution is the
neighborhood, or community. From the Mayflower Compact, through
quilting bees, all the way to Mothers Against Drunk Driving,
Americans have seen the necessity, and the desirability, of uniting
to achieve common goals. As the President draws attention to the
diversity of American neighborhoods, he should devote careful
attention to the unique sounds, sights, words, and foods of each.
3
Particular attention should be given to ethnic foods. The
President eating pizza or munching on a gyros is always worth a
spot on TV or a picture in the newspaper.
21. Work is what built this country. Incentives and rewards for pro-
ductive work are central to the President's Economic Recovery
Program. The President can visit high schools where the workers
of the future are being trained, and he can visit the high tech
factories where the products of the future are being produced.
Just as importantly, the President can visit the older workplaces
of smokestack America, where he can offer his assurances that
the heavy industries that built this country will not be left
behind.
22. To have peace, we must have strength. This is the essential
message of the Administration's national security policies.
The President must cut through the noisy rhetoric of our opponents
and remind the American people of the bottom line: America is at
peace. Populists in particular feel strongly that we must not
only have peace; we must have peace with honor. Populists don't
want any more Irans. They are less worried about America being
loved than they are about America being respected. The President
can "humanize" our national defense policies and bring the issue
down to "human scale" by visiting with ordinary soldiers and
sailors. After meeting with those who are bearing the burden of
our freedom today, he can meet with those who have borne it in
the past: veterans and their dependents.
B. Issues
We have to remember that populists are in sympathy with us mostly on
cultural and nationalistic issues, i.e. social and foreign policy. On
economic issues the populists tend to side more with the Democrats. The
economic issues we should stress with the populists are:
1. Jobs. Populists are still loyal to the WPA/CCC-type programs that
gave jobs to their fathers and grandfathers. They would rather be
working in the private sector, but they consider public works em-
ployment to be better than nothing--and much better than welfare.
The gas tax legislation and now the jobs bill will both put blue
collar, hard hat Americans back to work. We should not hesitate
to take credit for these bills.
In the future, we should continue to emphasize the job creation
aspects of all our economic policies. Populists want to hear "jobs,
jobs, jobs" over and over again.
2. Housing. Closely related to the jobs issue is housing. Construc-
tion workers tend to be populists, but they are pro-Republican.
The key to making them happy is putting them back to work, and the
key to putting them back to work is lowering interest rates. We
should always mention how many Americans will be able to afford new
4
homes--and how many jobs will be created in the construction of
those homes-thanks to our success in lowering interest rates.
The foreign policy issue we should emphasize with the populists is:
1. National Defense. Populists are hawks. Long after much of the
elite had abandoned our cause in Vietnam, the populists continued
to stand up for America's national honor. Populists still wear
American flag decals on their hardhats. They still say: America-
love it or leave it.
We should continually stress nationalistic themes in our communi-
cations. We should emphasize that America is once again respected
around the world, thanks to President Reagan's defense buildup.
We can point out that there have been no more Irans and Afghanistans
since President Reagan's inauguration.
We believe that the social issues listed below serve to reinforce our
strength with the populists while not jeopardizing our overall coalition:
1. Education. Americans are deeply concerned about deteriorating
standards and discipline in our schools. President Reagan has
already addressed these concerns, with programs and proposals to
improve computer literacy, to direct special aid to science and
math instruction, to eliminate counterproductive school busing,
promote tuition tax credits, and so on.
The President can continue to press for educational reforms. He
can push for higher teacher competency standards, for more job-
oriented instruction, and further advances in high technology
training. At the same time, he can continue to stress the im-
portance of basic instruction, school prayer, and morality.
2. Immigration. Just about everyone agrees that the current situa-
tion is out of hand. Populists are not racists because they want
to regain control of our borders. They worry about their jobs and
that traditional American values and institutions are being eroded.
3. Crime. In terms of politics, the issue comes and goes. But in
terms of victims, the problem gets worse and worse. Populists
lean toward no-nonsense justice that puts cops on the streets and
crooks in jail.
5
ACTION ITEMS
Efforts must be made to identify the President with the
working man and his interests.
The President must stress, in every speech that he makes
and at every meeting, that the Economic Recovery Program
is working and that the Administration's Number One goal
is getting Americans working again.
JOBS! JOBS! JOBS!!
The President should make appearances at key ethnic events,
and speak to family values and jobs. This will show a
sensitivity to the blue collar ethnics.
The President should appear with small groups of workers
at a union hall or factory as a forum to explain key
Administration programs.
Whenever traveling, the President should try to meet
local Catholic Bishops or church leaders.
The President should increase the frequency with which
he attends Sunday services. Consideration should be
given to having visiting church leaders hold services
at Camp David. (Religion and fear of its decline are
important to blue collar ethnics.
The President should go to retirement homes in blue
collar neighborhoods and discuss Social Security and
family-related issues.
Get the President meeting with working people!
Harley-Davidson Factory -- tariff decision saved
their jobs
Shipyard workers -- The Navy's 600 fleet program is
creating thousands of jobs. Attend a
keel-laying ceremony
Textile Mill -- Administration has saved jobs
Meet with Teamsters
Meet with Working Women
Consult with labor on labor-sensitive appointments
Invite local and friendly international Labor leaders
to White House functions -- State Dinners, briefings, etc.
The President, when on the road, should invite five or
six local Labor leaders for breakfast, lunch or short
meeting.
The GOP Presidential Coalition of 1984
won about hhe
all 60P have won.
*
A successful strategy for the reelection of President Reagan in 1984
will require three things:
1. A clear analysis of what happened in 1980,
2. A map of the political groups and states that can be
assembled into a majority coalition in 1984,
3. A course of action that will actually bring them together
in November, 1984.
*
When analyzing the various groups in the electorate that night be
assembled to provide the President with a majority in 1984, it is best
to look at them by demographic group, geographic region or ideological
group and not by their current attitude toward the President. By using
relatively stable demographic or ideological groups, it will enable us
to track our success or failure at bringing these voters into a Reagan
coalition. Whereas, segmenting and analyzing the electorate in terms
the Reagan's performance rating or thermometer rating would yield groups
of approvers or disapprovers whose composition would change over time.
Because of changing attitudes toward Reagan, we would be looking at very
different groups and not able to track our success or failure with our
target groups.
There are various ways to look at coalitions:
*
Simply look at that group of states that can be assembled
to produce 270 electoral votes.
*
Look at the electorate in terms of popular vote by
demographic group, by ideological group, and by the
special, and often important, constituent groups within it,
i.e., women, Blacks, farmers, blue collar workers, etc.
In the last six Presidential elections (1960-1980), the Republican share
of the popular vote has ranged from a low of 39% to a high of 61%,
averaging approximately 48%. President Reagan captured 51.7% of the
popular vote; a figure which does not strikingly distinguish Reagan from
the average. Restated, 48.3% of the vote was non-Reagan. Indeed,
Reagan achieves an absolute majority in 25 states and fell below 50.5%
in the remaining 25 states and the District of Columbia.
*
In terms of states, there are twenty states, all within President
Reagan's 1980 coalition, that virtually always vote Republican and yield
157 electoral votes. He also won ten additional states that have always
voted Republican, except for either religious (Kennedy) or regional
(Carter) reasons. These states yield 134 electoral votes and when
combined with the twenty base Republican states, produce 291 electoral
votes, or enough to win.
*
The important point to make at the beginning of this exercise is that
1984, in its most basic elements, will be very similar to the Republican
strategy of winning Republican Presidential campaigns since 1952
including Reagan's 1980 coalition. Regardless of whether we are dealing
with a coalition of states or a coalition of voters within the national
electorate, winning Republican coalitions have been very similar. They
have been largely assembled by maximizing the Republican and
-1-
conservative base vote, which 36%-38%, and then adding the 12%-14% it
takes to reach a majority. That 12%-14% can be divided about equally,
half of which are almost always available to a Republican candidate and
the remaining half who are critical to reaching a majority but who do
not have any particular ideological or party tie to the President and
are extremely candidate-oriented.
The Demographic Character of the 1980 Reagan Coalition
*
The most efficient demographic analysis of the patterns and trends to
partisan voting is based on a discrete categorization of the electorate
in terms of region, religion, union membership and race. This yields
for six basic groups and multiple subgroups within the basic six.
1980 Percent
36-38% Conser- watch
Group Size*
Voting Reagan
Buse
1. Northern Protestant
24.5%
68%
6-7% canclidate
2. Northern Union
17.4
44
3. Catholics
16.5
54
ariented
4. Jewish
2.5
35
5. Blacks
10.3
7
6. Southern White
25.9
59
*Group size as of 1980.
*
The regional and social character of the Reagan '80 coalition closely
parallels previous post New Deal GOP coalitions, particularly since
1952.
*
Reagan was weak with many traditional Democratic support groups -- Black
voters, Jewish voters, lower class border Southerners.
*
The most distinctive features of the Reagan vote was a noticeable
improvement over President Ford's performance among Northern Prot-
estants, particularly middle-to-lower class voters. Catholics, also
provide President Reagan with a unique level of support. Indeed, Nixon
'72 is the only other Republican who ran better with Catholics than
Reagan did in 1980.
*
While Reagan also surpassed previous levels of Republican support among
voters from Northern union households, his appeal with the union vote in
'80 has been somewhat overstated. It was Reagan's weakest Northern
group in 1980. The increase for Reagan reflects more of a weakness in
the 1976 coalition than a truly unique 1980 Reagan appeal.
*
The major deficiency or departure from past GOP coalitions occurred with
upper-end "silk stocking" Protestants across the North. Every
Republican candidate since 1960 equalled or surpassed Reagan's 1980
performance. Anderson captures a sizeable 18% of these voters.
One cannot reflect on 1980 without mentioning the "gender gap," which
represents the most global deficiency for Reagan. A weakness with women
operated across all socio-economic groups.
-2-
Table 1: Percent Voting Republican
Presidential Election of:
Size
of
Group**
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
Total
100%
50
39
43
61
48
51
Northern White Protestants
"Silk-Stocking"
7%
92
65
82
73
69
65
Middle Class
14
81
54
71
76
64
72
Working Class
6
72
39
58
69
49
62
White South
Border South
Upper End
3
50
49
67
71
65
75
Lower End
2
57
24
42
74
51
45
Deep South
Immigrants
5
82
62
67
84
60
62
Natives-Upper End
8
41
54
50
74
61
61
Natives-Lower End
5
41
31
30
83
46
52
Catholics
Polish and Irish
5
9
24
33
60
46
54
Other Catholics
Upper End
7
18
37
51
66
56
63
Lower End
5
23
22
34
68
37
46
Jews
3
11
11
6
31
27
36
Blacks
11
29
(1)
3
13
5
7
Northern Farmers
1
73
31
61
80
63
73
Northern Union*
19
37
18
45
58
38
44
*Northern White Protestants and Catholics from union households.
**Group size as of 1980.
Note: This is an exclusive categorization of the electorate. Voters are
in only one group. A one in parentheses, e.g., (1), indicates less
than 1 percent.
-3-
The Partisan and Ideological Character of the 1980 Reagan Coalition (a)
*
The 1980 Reagan coalition had a much more pronounced ideological
component than the more recent GOP presidential coalitions. Conserva-
tivesgravitated to Reagan and liberals to Carter. Partisanships and
ideology were the primary motivating factor for a full 72% of the Reagan
voters. Restated, 37 points of his total 51 points were contribued by
voters with either a partisan loyalty or ideological proximity to
Reagan.
However, a significant number of Reagan voters were neither motivated by
party or ideology. Twenty-eight percent (28%) of the Reagan voters or
14 points of his total 51 points were contributed by non-Republicans and
non- conservatives who were more concerned with the issues of
performance and candidate perceptions than the ideological or
programatic differences between Reagan and Carter.
Table 2: Summary of the Partisan-Ideological Character of the Reagan Vote:
1980
Contribution
To Reagan
Vote
Motivation
Conservative Republicans
14%
PARTISAN MOTIVATED
VOTING
Mod./Lib. Republicans
10
Conservative Ind./Dem.
13
NON-PARTISAN/IDEOLOGICAL
MOTIVATED VOTING
NON-PARTISAN/NON-
Mod./Lib. Ind./Dem.
14
IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATED
VOTING
The non-ideological voter was a critical vote. The cutting issue for
these voters revolved around the inability of the Carter Presidency to
govern the country. The perceived failure of Carter to handle foreign
policy and the deterioration of the economy were the central elements
behind their support for Reagan.
*
Labeling the non-ideological voters simply as an anti- Carter vote does
not fully capture the motivation of these voters. Reagan won these
voters not only because they were casting a negative vote against
Carter's Presidency, but also because they trusted the confidence
exhibited by Reagan in what he wanted to achieve as President.
(a) Throughout this section the classification of voters into liberals
and conservatives was done by their belief consistency as measured across
several survey questions covering economic, racial and foreign policy
issues. This is in contrast to a typology which relies on the voters'
self-reports of their ideology.
-4-
*
These voters were not unique to 1980, but represent a vote which
operates in virtually every presidential contest. Obviously, these
voters have no partisan or ideological linkage to Reagan and they as
likely to punish Reagan as they are to reward him.
*
While non-ideological vote was a critical element, the importance of the
ideological base in assembling Reagan's 1980 coalition cannot be
overlooked or taken for granted. Reagan attracted a complex of distinct
and separate ideological voters under the general banner of
"conservative."
*
It is important to recognize that the ideological orientation of the
electorate is not a simple liberal-conservative dichotomy.
An ideological segmentation of the electorate which relies solely on a
voter's self report grossly misrepresents the ideological divisions
within the electorate. The true ideological profile is multi-dimen-
sional embodying issue preferences across economic, social, and foreign
policy issues. Consequently, a multi-dimensional issue strategy is
required to solidify the ideological base of the Reagan vote.
*
The following table displays an ideological segmentation base on the
attitude and belief across a number of economic, racial, and foreign
policy issues. The key point is that the "conservative" vote has three
major components each of which must be appealed to in separate and
unique ways.
Ideological Segmentation of The Electorate
CONSERVATIVE
18%
LIBERTARIAN
13
POPULIST
24
LIBERAL
16
NON-IDEOLOGICAL
29
100%
Reagan Popular Vote Coalition at Mid-Term
*
The non-ideological voter of 1980 was influenced by four negative
issues in 1982 -- (1) unemployment-economic recession, (2) perceived
fairness of the Reagan economic program, (3) the leadership style of
the administration, and (4) defense spending. Together these issues
have rekindled the concerns which led to Carter's dismissal from office
and have brought Reagan's performance and leadership into question.
The importance of the "fairness" issue cannot be overemphasized.
Throughout the 1982 campaign, the perceived fairness of Reagan's
policies was strongly related to the voters' overall assessment of his
job performance.
*
The interaction of these issues and perceptions within the context of
the 1982 elections had three key manifestations. First, it exacerbated
the inherent hostility among many traditional Democratic sectors and
mobilized them against Republicans in 1982 -- union members, liberals,
environmentalists, blacks, and Hispanics. Second, it invited skepti-
cism and increased hostility from women. Third, it pushed the
ticket-splitter, who is essential to a majority Republican coaltion,
into the Democratic column.
*
The full negative impact of these issues and perceptions were blunted
in the short-term by the widespread perception that the Democrats were
responsible for the recession and by the inability of the Democrats to
persuade many voters that Reagan's approach was a total failure and
that they had a better alternative. These perceptions may not last
through 1984.
*
Who has Reagan lost? Although Reagan has lost some support across all
major sectors of the electorate, there has been a disproportionately
large loss among northern white Protestants.
*
There is a fundamental strategic question that this Northern-Protestant
erosion brings forth. Have these voters been permanently scared or
alienated from Reagan and, therefore, must be replaced in 1984? (OR)
Can they be pulled back into the coalition in 1984?
Table 4. Comparison of 1980 Reagan Vote and Mid-Term Reagan Vote by Reg-
ional and Social Groups
Percent
Voting Reagan
Group
(a)
Dif-
Social Grouping
Size
Total
1980
1983
ference
Northern Protestant
(24.5%)
100%
68%
57%
-11%
Northern Union
(17.4)
100%
44
44
- 0
Catholics
(16.5)
100%
54
49
- 5
Jewish
( 2.5)
100%
35
23
(b)
Blacks
(10.3)
100%
7
4
- 3
Southern White
(25.9)
100%
59
54
- 5
Total
100%
51
47
- 4
(a) Reagan VS. Mondale
(b) Not statistically reliable because of small sample size.
1984 Target Groups
Currently, there are four groups of voters who are not supporting Reagan at
the rates needed to build a safe, majority coalition. In most cases they
are voting no different than their traditional partisan profiles would
predict which works to the disadvantage of any Republican presidential
candidate. Those groups are:
Northern white Protestants, particularly those in the North-
east and those with college educations but low-to-moderate
incomes (the "intelligentsia").
Catholics, particularly those who are middle class or live in
the industrial Midwest.
Women - both Protestants and Catholics.
Lower end Southern whites.
Who Reagan has and doesn't have can be summarized as follows for each of
four major groupings of the electorate.
Among Northern White Protestants Reagan is currently strong with the
affluent and the middle class but not with the college educated, moderate
income segment. In addition, lower end Protestants are now moderately
anti-Reagan. The gender gap is a significant 10 points among Northern
Protestants. Regionally, Reagan has good ballot strength with white Prot-
estants in the Midwest and West, but he does no better than a straight
party vote in the Northeast.
Among Catholics Reagan is currently strong with the well educated as well
as the upper income voters, and he is strong with the under 40 year old
Catholics. He is weak with middle class Catholics. The gender gap is a
large 17 points among Catholics -- 8 points of which is due to the greater
Democratic partisanship of Catholic women and 9 points of which is due to
current political perceptions. Regionally, Reagan is strong with Catholics
in the Northeast and in the West, but he does no better than a straight
party vote in the East North Central states.
Among Northern union voters Reagan has the support of one significant
subgroup -- upper income (over $30,000) union families. Educated, middle
class, and lower end union families are all anti-Reagan. The gender gap is
almost non-existent among Northern union members mainly because there is no
pro-Reagan vote from union men. Age and region produce little variation in
union support for Reagan.
Among Southern whites Reagan is strong with the educated and the middle
class. Lower end Southern whites are just mildly pro-Reagan. His weakest
group in the South are senior citizens who are most wedded to their Demo-
cratic voting tradition. Younger voters in the South are strongly pro-
Reagan. The gender gap in the South is relatively mild -- a five point
difference between men and women.
_7_
In summary, the subgroups Reagan has now; the subgroups which are voting
against him; and the subgroups which are presently neither pro or anti-
Reagan beyond party, are:
Reagan Has Now:
High income voters across all groups including union families and
Catholics.
Educated Catholics and educated Southern whites with low-to-moderate
incomes.
Middle class Northern Protestants and middle class Southern whites.
Younger, non-union voters (18-39 year old) in the North and South
and among Catholics. (This support is probably soft.)
Non-union men -- North, South, and Catholic.
No Clear Trend Beyond Party Vote
Educated Northern Protestants with low-to-moderate incomes.
Catholics who are middle class, middle aged, or in the industrial
Midwest.
Northeastern WASPS.
Northern women - WASP, Catholic, and union.
Lower-end, Southern whites.
Voting Against Reagan
Northern union voters with low-to-moderate incomes, including those
with college degrees.
Lower-end, non-union, northern WASPS.
Blacks
Reagan's Current Vote and Non-Party Margin Among Key Demographic Groups
Major Demographic Target Groups
Northern
Northern
Southern
Total
Protestant
Union
Catholic
White
Total
50 (+ 4) *
62 (+ 7)
48 (+ 1)
52 (+ 7)
58 (+11)
Status
High income
66 (+11)
78 (+15)
62 (+12)
59 (+ 9)
62 (+ + 8)
College
58 (+ 7)
57 ( 0)
35 (- 9)
66 (+19)
66 (+17)
Middle class
56 (+ 8)
68 (+13)
40 (- 6)
46 (+1)
60 (+17)
Lower end
44 ( 0)
42 (- 6)
41 (- 3)
46 (+ 6)
48
(+ + 4)
Dem. Groups
17 (-11)
X
X
X
X
Age
Under 40
53 (+ 6)
65 (+11)
51 (+ 1)
57 (+11)
61 (+14)
41-64
48 (+ 2)
59 (+ 2)
45 (+ 1)
48 ( 0)
58 (+10)
65+
46 (+ 3)
59 (+ 8)
46 (- 2)
41 (+ 6)
44 ( 0)
Sex
Men
55 (+ 7)
67 (+13)
49 (+ 2)
61 (+11)
60 (+13)
Women
46 (+ 1)
57 (+ 3)
47 (- 1)
44 (+ 2)
55 (+ 8)
Region
Northeast
49 ( 0)
60 (+ 1)
47 (- 2)
55 (+ 7)
X
E.N.C.
49 (+ 4)
65 (+10)
47 (+ 3)
42 (+ 1)
X
West/W.N.C.
54 (+ 5)
61 (+ 8)
48 (+ 2)
58 (+12)
X
South
49 (+ 6)
X
X
X
58 (+11)
*Reagan's percentage differs from previous tables because the undecided
vote has been removed in order to perform this particular analysis. The
number enclosed in the parentheses is the difference between Reagan's vote
and the expected vote for each group based on their reported party identi-
fications.
-9-
Ideological Segmentation of the Electorate
Type of Issue:
Civic Liberties/
Ideological
Economic Regulation
Social Issues
Foreign Policy
Type*
1. Opposes extensive
Supports traditional
Anti-Communist,
government activity
attitudes
opposes US con-
cern with other "CONSERVATIVE"
countries' prob-
18%
lems
Opposes extensive Supports traditional Mixed
government activity
attitudes
2. Opposes extensive Permissive attitudes Mixed
"LIBERTARIANS"
government activity
13%
3. Supports extensive Supports traditional Mixed
"POPULIST"
government activity
attitudes
24%
4. Supports extensive Permissive attitudes Mixed
government activity
Supports extensive Permissive attitudes "internation-
"LIBERAL"
alist" & not
16%
anti-Communist
5. MIXED
MIXED
MIXED
NON-
IDEOLOGICAL
29%
100%
A REAGAN-REPUBLICAN PROFILE OF THE ELECTORATE
CORE REAGAN
ANTI-REAGAN
REPUBLICANS
MARGINALS
DEMOCRATS
31%
33%
36%
V
ANTI-
PRO-REAGAN
PRO-REAGAN
ANTI-REAGAN
REAGAN
INDEPENDENTS
DEMOCRATS
OTHER
REPUBLICANS
INDEPEN-
DENTS
6%
10%
7%
6%
4%
Age
18-39
50%
49%
37%
51%
50%
40-64
36
38
47
38
36
65 and over
13
13
15
11
15
Sex
Male
50%
47%
47%
42%
39%
Female
50
53
53
58
61
Status*
Lower End
20
22
28
22
33
Middle Class
38
36
21
36
17
Intelligentsia
10
11
3
12
9
High Income
27
20
21
18
23
Democratic Groups
1
9
25
11
17
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
*Blacks, Jews, and Hispanics are included in the "Democratic Groups" category.
A REAGAN-REPUBLICAN PROFILE OF THE ELECTORATE
CORE REAGAN
ANTI-REAGAN
REPUBLICANS
MARGINALS
DEMOCRATS
31%
33%
36%
V
ANTI-
PRO-REAGAN
PRO-REAGAN
ANTI-REAGAN
REAGAN
INDEPENDENTS
DEMOCRATS
OTHER
REPUBLICANS
INDEPEN-
DENTS
6%
10%
7%
6%
4%
Social Groups
Northern Whites
Protestants
30%
19%
23%
31%
26%
Catholics
19
14
16
12
14
Union Members*
14
17
21
17
19
Southern Whites
30
42
19
29
17
Jews
1
3
3
2
2
Blacks
---
3
16
6
13
Other
7
3
3
2
9
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
*Northern whites who are Protestant or Catholic, but in a family with someone who is a union member are
treated as union members.
A REAGAN-REPUBLICAN PROFILE OF THE ELECTORATE
CORE REAGAN
ANTI-REAGAN
REPUBLICANS
MARGINALS
DEMOCRATS
31%
33%
36%
V
ANTI-
PRO-REAGAN
PRO-REAGAN
ANTI-REAGAN
REAGAN
INDEPENDENTS
DEMOCRATS
OTHER
REPUBLICANS
INDEPEN-
DENTS
6%
10%
7%
6%
1980
4%
Presidential
Vote
Reagan
62%
43%
39%
55%
22%
Carter
9
38
36
18
25
Anderson
4
5
2
12
18
Other
2
0
0
1
4
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
1983
Trial Heat
Results
Reagan
75%
60%
37%
49%
16%
Mondale
8
34
46
39
51
Undecided
16
6
17
13
32
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Reagan
67%
57%
40%
32%
9%
Glenn
18
36
43
57
66
Undecided
15
6
17
12
24
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Presidential State Patterns From Eisenhower Thru Reagan
Initial Points
*
Only Delaware has been in all the winning coalitions since 1952. All
other states have been on the losing side at least once.
Only Arizona has always voted Republican. No state has always voted
Democrat; Washington, D.C. has an unblemished Democratic record although
it begins after Eisenhower.
Because of Republican electoral landslides in four of the past eight
presidential elections (1952, 1956, 1972, 1980), almost all the states
have some Republican history and none can be classified as steadfastly
Democratic. Forty-six of the states have gone Republican at least three
times. Three states have gone Republican twice (Arkansas, Georgia and
West Virginia). Hawaii, not eligible for the Eisenhower electoral
landslides, was part of the Nixon landslide.
There have been three close elections in the past eight. These three
elections -- 1960, 1968, 1976 -- act as the most important test of what
are the Republican and Democratic presidential states.
Classification of States by Presidential Pluralities
There are 30 states, totaling 291 electoral votes -- enough for a ma -
jority, which usually vote Republican and can be labeled, presidential
Republican states
Twenty of these states (157 electoral votes) remained Republican in
all three close elections since Eisenhower. (Maine broke pattern in
1968 which can be viewed as a Muskie home-state aberration.) In
fact, the only year they didn't vote Republican was 1964 (except
Arizona, which did). These 20 states have been the Party's Con -
sistent Core. (Listing of these states follows.)
Four of the presidential Republican states went for Carter in 1976 as
their only exception -- other than 1964. Carter's regional appeal
explains the behavior of Florida and Tennessee. It was also the
reason for Ohio (southeast portion of the state). Wisconsin is the
other Carter aberration state, and the reason for its deviation in
1976 stems from its rural populism.
Four of the presidential Republican states went for Kennedy in 1960
as their only exception -- other than 1964. Kennedy's Catholicism
explains the behavior of at least New Jersey and perhaps the other
three as well -- Illinois, Nevada, and New Mexico. An unusually high
"machine vote" in Cook County also contributed to the 1960 result in
Illinois.
The next to last Republican Presidential state is Washington. Its
single, significant blemish is 1968. Washington is by itself with
this Republican/Humphrey pattern.
Kentucky completes the presidential Republican states. Its pattern
is most like the four states that defected to Carter in 1976. It has
one other blemish on its record - a slim 700 vote plurality for
Stevenson in 1952; otherwise, it would perfectly fit the Carter
aberration pattern noted for Florida and Tennessee.
The remaining twenty states plus Washington, D.C. present a variety of
patterns. Seven of these states have singular patterns, unmatched by
any other state and lacking much sense other than D.C. 's straight
Democratic pattern. The other fourteen states fall into two groupings:
The Redneck Conservative states (52 electoral votes) -- Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Their
most distinctive feature is that they voted for Goldwater in 1964 or
Wallace in 1968 or both. Nixon carried them all in 1972, Ford lost
them all in 1976, and Reagan carried them all except, understandably,
Georgia in 1980. Other than Louisiana in 1956, these states remained
Democratic during the two Eisenhower landslides.
The Democratic states (138 electoral votes) -- Hawaii, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas.
They joined the two Eisenhower landslides (except Hawaii) and the
Nixon 1972 landslide, but voted Democratic in the close elections in
1960, 1968, and 1976. (Michigan voted for its home state candidate,
Ford, in 1976; nevertheless, it belongs in this group.) In 1980, the
Reagan electoral landslide was great enough to peel away half of
these states -- Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The
other four -- Maryland, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Hawaii -- fell
short of joining the sweep.
The last seven states cut their own individual patterns.
Delaware votes for the winner.
Connecticut, a Catholic state, voted against Carter in 1976 as well
as 1980. It voted for Kennedy in 1960. 1968 was its key test, and
it voted Democratic.
District of Columbia -- solid Democrat.
Massachusetts voted for Eisenhower twice and Reagan in 1980 but was
all Democratic, in between, refusing even the Nixon 1972 sweep.
Missouri voted for Nixon in 1968 as well as in 1972 but failed to
help in the 1960 and 1976 elections. It went for Eisenhower in 1952
but not in 1956. Its history is the most erratic of any state.
North Carolina may be a new Republican state. It went Democratic
from 1952 thru 1964, but has voted Republican three of the last four
times. It is unlike the Redneck Conservative states in that it
eschewed both Goldwater and Wallace.
West Virginia probably could be grouped with the eight Democratic
states which only join Republican landslides. It is even more
resistant than those eight, however -- it turned down Eisenhower in
1952.
Classification of States by Presidential Pluralities
Presidential Elections
Electoral
Dem.
Presidential Republican -
Vote
Ike
Years
New Majority
States the Consistent
Core
'84
'72
'52
'56
'60
'64
' 68
'72
'76
'80
1. Alaska
( 3) ( 3)
--
- -
X
0
X
X
X
X
2. Arizona (except 64:
Goldwater effect)
(7) (6)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
3. California
(47) (45)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
4. Colorado
( 8) (7)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
5. Idaho
(4) ( 4 )
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
6. Indiana
(12) (13)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
7. Iowa
( 8) ( 8)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
8. Kansas
(7) (7)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
9. Maine (except 68:
Muskie effect)
( 4) ( 4)
X
X
X
0
0
X
X
X
10. Montana
( 4) ( 4)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
11. Nebraska
(5) (5)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
12. New Hampshire
( 4) (4)
X
X
X
0
X
13. North Dakota
(3) ( 3)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
14. Oklahoma
( 8) ( 8)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
(7) ( 6)
X
0
X
X
X
X
15. Oregon
X
X
16. South Dakota
( 3) (4)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
17. Utah
(5) (4)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
18. Vermont
(3) (3)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
X
19. Virginia
(12) (12)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
20. Wyoming
( 3) ( 3)
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
TOTAL
(157) (153)
Presidential Republican
States-Carter Aberration
1. Florida
(21) (17)
X
X
X
0
X
X
0
X
(23) (25)
X
X
X
0
X
X
0
X
2. Ohio
3. Tennessee
(11) (10)
X
X
X
0
X
X
0
X
4. Wisconsin
(11) (11)
X
X
X
0
X
X
0
X
TOTAL
( 66) ( 63)
Presidential Elections
Electoral
Dem.
Presidential Republican -
Vote
Ike
Years
New Majority
States-Kennedy
Aberration
'84
'72
'52
'56
'60
'64
'68
'72
'76
'80
1. Illinois
(24)
(26)
X
X
0
0
X
X
X
X
2. Nevada
( 4) ( 3)
X
X
0
0
X
X
X
X
3. New Jersey
(16) (17)
X
X
0
0
X
X
X
X
4. New Mexico
( 5) (4)
X
X
0
0
X
X
X
X
TOTAL
( 49) ( 50)
The Lone Bellweather
1. Delaware
( 3) ( 3)
X
X
0
0
X
X
0
X
The Fearsome Foursome
1. Michigan (except 76:
Ford effect)
(20) (21)
X
X
0
0
0
X
X
X
2.
New York
(36) (41)
X
X
0
0
0
X
0
X
3. Pennsylvania
(25) (27)
X
X
0
0
0
X
0
X
(29) (26)
X
X
0
0
0
X
0
X
4. Texas
TOTAL
(110) (115)
Ike and '72 Landslide States
1. Maryland
(10) (10)
X
X
0
0
0
X
0
0
2. Minnesota
(10) (10)
X
X
0
0
0
X
0
0
3. Rhode Island
( 4) (4)
X
X
0
0
0
X
0
0
4. Hawaii
(4) (4)
--
--
0
0
0
X
0
0
TOTAL
( 28) ( 28)
Redneck Conservative States
1. Alabama
( 9) ( 9)
0
0
B
X
W
X
0
X
X
2. Arkansas
( 6) (6)
0
0
0
0
W
X
0
3. Georgia (except 80:
Carter effect)
(12)
(12)
0
0
0
X
W
X
0
0
4. Louisiana
(10) (10)
0
X
0
X
W
X
0
X
5. Mississippi
(7) (7) 0
0
B
X
W
X
0
X
6. South Carolina
(
8)
(
8)
0
0
0
X
X
X
0
X
TOTAL
( 52) ( 52)
Presidential Elections
Electoral
Dem.
Vote
Ike
Years
New Majority
Mixed Pattern States
'84
'72
'52
'56
'60
'64
' 68
'72
'76
'80
1.
Connecticut
( 8) (8)
X
X
0
0
0
X
X
X
D-2.
District of Columbia
(3) ( 3)
--
--
--
0
0
0
0
0
R-3.
Kentucky
( 9) ( 9)
0
X
X
0
X
X
0
X
Massachusetts
(13) (14)
X
X
0
0
0
0
0
X
4.
5.
Missouri
(11) (12)
X
0
0
0
X
X
0
X
6.
North Carolina
(13) (13)
0
0
0
0
X
X
0
X
R-7.
Washington
(10) ( 9)
X
X
X
0
0
X
X
X
D-8.
West Virginia
( 6) (6)
0
X
0
0
0
X
0
0
TOTAL
( 73) ( 74)
Key:
X
Republican win
0
Democratic win
W
Wallace win
B
Byrd win
D
Democratic pattern
R
Republican pattern
Rank-order of 1980 State Results, 1952-1980 Pattern, and 1984 Assignment
1980 Total Vote
Rep.
Major
Historical
State (elect. vote)
Rep
Other
Vote
Pattern
1984
Utah (5)
73
7
78
Rep.
Reagan
Idaho (4)
67
8
73
Rep.
Reagan
Nebraska (5)
66
9
72
Rep.
Reagan
North Dakota (3)
64
10
71
Rep.
Reagan
Nevada (4)
63
11
70
Rep.JFK
Reagan
Wyoming (3)
63
9
69
Rep.
Reagan
Arizona (7)
61
11
68
Rep.
Reagan
South Dakota (3)
61
8
66
Rep.
Reagan
Oklahoma (8)
61
5
63
Rep.
Reagan
New Hampshire (4)
58
14
67
Rep.
Reagan
Kansas (7)
58
9
64
Rep.
Reagan
Montana (4)
57
11
64
Rep.
Reagan
Indiana (12)
56
6
60
Rep.
Reagan
Florida (21)
56
6
59
Rep.Carter
Reagan
Colorado (8)
55
14
64
Rep.
Reagan
Texas (29)
55
3
57
Dem.
Marginal
New Mexico (5)
55
8
60
Rep.JFK
Reagan
Alaska (3)
54
19
67
Rep.
Reagan
California (47)
53
11
60
Rep.
Marginal
Virginia (12)
53
7
57
Rep.
Reagan
New Jersey (16)
52
9
57
Rep.JFK
Marginal
Ohio (23)
52
8
56
Rep.Carter
Marginal
Iowa (8)
51
10
57
Rep.
Reagan
Missouri (11)
51
5
54
Singular
Marginal
Louisiana (10)
51
3
53
RC
Marginal
Washington (10)
50
13
57
Rep.HHH
Reagan
Illinois (24)
50
9
54
Rep.JFK
Marginal
Pennsylvania (25)
50
8
54
Dem.
Dem.
Michigan (20)
49
9
54
Dem.
Dem.
Alabama (9)
49
4
51
RC
Marginal
Kentucky (9)
49
3
51
Rep.Carter
Reagan
Mississippi (7)
49
3
51
RC
Marginal
North Carolina (13)
49
4
51
Singular
Reagan
South Carolina (8)
49
3
51
RC
Marginal
Tennessee (11)
49
3
50
Rep.Carter
Reagan
Connecticut (8)
48
13
56
Singular
Marginal
Oregon (7)
48
13
56
Rep.
Reagan
Wisconsin (11)
48
9
53
Rep.Carter
Marginal
Arkansas (6)
48
4
50
RC
Marginal
New York (36)
47
9
52
Dem.
Dem.
Delaware (3)
47
8
51
Bellweather
Marginal
Maine (4)
46
12
52
Rep.
Marginal
(continued on next page)
Rank-order of 1980 State Results, 1952-1980 Pattern, and 1984 Assignment
(cont'd.)
1980 Total Vote
Rep.
Major
Historical
State (elect. vote)
Rep
Other
Vote
Pattern
1984
West Virginia (6)
45
5
48
Dem.
Dem.
Vermont (3)
44
17
54
Rep.
Marginal
Maryland (10)
44
9
48
Dem.
Dem.
Hawaii (4)
43
12
49
Dem.
Dem.
Minnesota (10)
43
11
48
Dem.
Dem.
Massachusetts (13)
42
16
50
Dem.
Dem.
Georgia (12)
41
3
42
RC
Marginal
Rhode Island (4)
37
15
44
Dem.
Dem.
D.C. (3)
13
12
15
Dem.
Dem.
Total
51
8
55
Largest Black Populations by State
(b)
(c)
(a)
Blacks as %
Blacks as %
Total
of Voting Age
of Registered
Population
Population
Voters
1.
District of Columbia
70.3%
66.5%
NA
2. Mississippi
35.3
31.2
NA
3.
South Carolina
30.4
27.7
27.8
4.
Louisiana
29.4
27.3
NA
5. Georgia
26.8
23.9
NA
6. Alabama
25.6
22.5
NA
7.
Maryland
22.7
20.1
NA
8.
North Carolina
22.4
19.6
NA
9.
Virginia
18.9
17.4
NA
10. Arkansas
16.3
13.9
NA
11. Delaware
16.1
13.7
NA
12. Tennessee
15.6
14.0
NA
13. Illinois
14.7
12.8
NA
14. Florida
13.8
11.6
11.0*
15. New York
13.7
12.8
NA
16. Michigan
12.9
11.8
NA
17. New Jersey
12.6
11.4
NA
18. Texas
12.0
11.7
19. Missouri
10.5
10.8
(a) Bureau of the Census PC80-S1-1 (May, 1981).
(b) Bureau of the Census P-25 No. 879 (March, 1980).
(c) Latest state reports.
*% of registered Republicans & Democrats only.
1984 Electoral Vote Coalition
1980 State Coalition and Past State Patterns
In 1980 President Reagan received one of the five electoral landslides that
have become the rule rather than the exception over the past eight presi-
dential elections. His 1980 state coalition is far larger than what would
occur in a close election. However, within his 44 state coalition were 20
states, totaling 157 electoral votes, which have almost always voted Re-
publican with the major exception of the 1964 debacle. An additional 10
states in Reagan's coalition, totaling 134 electoral votes, have voted
Republican in presidential elections except when deflected by a strong
religious appeal (Kennedy) or a strong southern appeal (Carter-1976). The
30 presidential Republican states, together, represent 291 electoral votes
more than the 270 majority needed. All thirty of these presidential
Republican states cannot be automatically counted as safe for 1984. They
include states in the industrial Midwest and the Northeast which were as
much anti-Carter as pro-Reagan and, since 1980, they have been scarred by
the recession. More generally, there have been exceptions to the Repub-
lican voting among these states in the past, and exceptions will occur
again.
Reagan's landslide was strong enough to include four large Democratic
states which appeared in previous Republican landslide victories in 1952,
1956, and 1972: Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Except for
home-state candidate Ford in Michigan, these four states have never voted
Republican when the elections were close (1960, 1968, 1976). Reagan's
landslide was not strong enough to capture four Democratic states which had
joined the other Republican landslides: Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, and
Rhode Island.
More important for 1984 was Reagan's near-sweep of the South. Florida,
Tennessee, and Kentucky returned to their, now, long-standing Republican
presidential support, and North Carolina restarted its developing Repub-
lican pattern. In addition, the cotton states, except Georgia, went to
Reagan. This strongly suggests that 1976 was an interruption in their
recent voting history and that the Republican potential seen during the
1964-1972 period can be taken seriously again. While Reagan's margins in
the cotton states were very small, it should be kept in mind that Carter
still had regional appeal in 1980 even if he was not the draw that he was
in 1976.
The groupings of states with similar presidential voting patterns, just
referred to, can be found in the appendix. In order to follow the analysis
of marginal states for the 1984 election, the reader may want to consult
the appendix for a more detailed discussion of state historical patterns
plus a rank-ordering of the 1980 Reagan vote by state.
Republican, Marginal, and Democratic States in 1984
There is no certain way to identify safe and marginal states over a year
before the election. At this point the two most important pieces of
information are retrospective: the sizes of Reagan's state margins in 1980
and the general voting history of each state. Consequently, these initial
assignments place a fairly large weight on historical consistency.
We can still overlay a few assumptions and assertions about 1984 on the
historical state patterns. The key ones are:
Absent in 1984 will be the anti-Carter voting in the North and
the residue of pro-Carter voting in the South that was part of
the 1980 election.
Unemployment in the industrial Midwest and Northeast will be a
significant negative, either in fact or in memory.
There will be extreme racial polarization in 1984.
The Democratic opponent will be a non-Catholic, northerner.
Beginning with the twenty core Republican states, worth 157 electoral
votes, Reagan did very well in almost all of them and he should repeat in
1984. His vote was lowest in Maine (46%) and Vermont (44%) with Anderson
receiving over 10%. These two New England states should be placed in the
marginal column for 1984. (New Hampshire gave Reagan a much higher 58%).
California, for no reason other than its sheer size, must be given priority
over the designated Reagan states for 1984. It has an almost perfect
Republican voting history, and Reagan took it by a large margin in 1980.
Even so, California will be designated "marginal." Oregon (48% Reagan) had
the next lowest Reagan vote in 1980 in this group, but its major party
ratio for Reagan was a fairly strong 56%. The tally to this point is:
Reagan Marginal Democrat
Republican Core
103
54
:
The remaining ten Republican Presidential states, worth 134 electoral
votes, have left the Republican coalition in one of the past three close
elections. Five of them broke ranks for the first time in 1976 but re-
turned to Reagan in 1980. Of the five, Ohio and Wisconsin should be
considered marginal -- Ohio because of recession scars and Wisconsin be-
cause of a progressive streak similar to Minnesota. Florida, Kentucky, and
Tennessee are presidential Republican states when the Democrats nominate
northerners. Florida is the strongest of the three, but all three are
placed in Reagan's column for 1984.
Four Republican presidential states deviated to Kennedy in 1960. Reagan
did well enough in New Mexico and Nevada to place them in his column for
1984. New Jersey and Illinois, the other two Kennedy states, are placed in
the marginal list because of the pockets of high unemployment in downstate
Illinois and because New Jersey is simply too big and too heterogeneous to
consider safe.
The last presidential Republican state is Washington which went for
Humphrey in 1968 as its major aberration. Reagan's margin over Carter was
+13% and it is placed in the Reagan column for 1984. The tally:
Reagan Marginal Democrat
Republican core
103
54
--
Other Republican
60
74
--
163
128
0
The six cotton or redneck conservative states, worth 52 electoral votes,
are all placed in the marginal column for 1984. This includes Georgia.
While Reagan received only 41% in Georgia, the home state effect in past
presidential elections is so strong that Georgia's support for Carter is no
surprise, e.g. Maine for Muskie (1968), Arizona for Goldwater (1964), and
Michigan for Ford (1976). Moreover, there are fewer blacks in Georgia than
in Mississippi, South Carolina, or Louisiana. The battle for these six
states may be decided more by the black and white registration drives in
each state than any other factor. The tally:
Reagan Marginal Democrat
Republican core
103
54
--
Other Republican
60
74
--
Redneck conservative
52
--
--
163
180
0
Because of five Republican electoral landslides in the last eight presi-
dential elections, there are only ten states plus the District of Columbia
left with discernible Democratic voting patterns. None of these states has
voted Republican in a close election, except Michigan for Ford, so picking
any of them as even marginal for 1984 should be done with great caution.
Only Texas warrants such a designation at this time. The tally:
Reagan
Marginal Democrat
Republican core
103
54
--
Other Republican
60
74
--
Redneck conservative
52
--
--
Democratic states
--
29
131
163
209
131
Four states remain -- Delaware, Connecticut, Missouri, and North Carolina.
Delaware is the only state left which has a perfect winning record;
Missouri has the most erratic voting pattern of any state in the Union;
Connecticut voted for the Catholic candidate in 1960, against the southern
Baptist candidate in 1976, but failed to vote Republican in 1968; and North
Carolina did not like Ike but has recently gone for Nixon (twice) and
Reagan. Give North Carolina to Reagan, and consider Delaware, Connecticut,
and Missouri marginal for 1984. The final tally:
Reagan
Marginal
Democrat
Republican core
103
54
--
Other Republican
60
74
--
Redneck conservative
--
52
--
Democratic states
--
29
131
Mixed pattern states
13
22
--
176
231
131
In the Reagan column are 176 electoral votes from 24 states that are almost
sure Republican wins unless there was a Democratic landslide. They include
all the western states, except California, plus Alaska, Florida, Kentucky,
Indiana, Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia and New Hampshire.
In the Democratic column are 131 electoral votes from nine states and the
District of Columbia that are almost sure Democratic wins unless there was
another Republican landslide. They include the states Reagan lost in 1980
(except Georgia) plus four that he did win: Michigan, New York, Pennsyl-
vanis, and Massachusetts.
Reagan needs 94 out of the 231 designated marginal electoral votes to reach
a majority. The marginal electoral votes are in:
Northeast
(34)
Connecticut
( 8)
Delaware
( 3)
Maine
(4)
New Jersey
(16)
Vermont
( 3)
Midwest
(69)
Illinois
(24)
Missouri
(11)
Ohio
(23)
Wisconsin
(11)
South
(81)
Alabama
( 9)
Arkansas
( 6)
Georgia
(12)
Louisiana
(10)
Mississippi
(7)
South Carolina
( 8)
Texas
(29)
West
(47)
California
(47)
Out of these seventeen states, California and Texas were two of Reagan's
strongest states in 1980, and they will be less susceptible to the Demo-
cratic jobs rhetoric in 1984. Of course, if Texas votes Republican in 1984
in the absence of a Republican landslide, it will be for the first time.
The last 18 electoral votes will be tough, and setting priorities becomes
very difficult.
The assignments for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia are:
Reagan
(176)
Marginal
(231)
Democrat
(131)
Northeast
( 4)
Northeast
(34)
Northeast
New Hampshire
( 4)
Connecticut
( 8)
Massachusetts (13)
Delaware
( 3)
New York
(36)
Maine
( 4)
Pennsylvania
(25)
New Jersey
(16)
Rhode Island
( 4)
Vermont
( 3)
Midwest
(38)
Midwest
(69)
Midwest
(30)
Indiana
(12)
Illinois
(24)
Michigan
(20)
Iowa
( 8)
Missouri
(11)
Minnesota
(10)
Kansas
( 7)
Ohio
(23)
Nebraska
( 5)
Wisconsin
(11)
North Dakota
( 3)
South Dakota
( 3)
South
(74)
South
(81)
South
(19)
Florida
(21)
Alabama
( 9)
Maryland
(10)
Kentucky
( 9)
Arkansas
( 6)
West Virginia
( 6)
North Carolina
(13)
Georgia
(12)
District of
Oklahoma
( 8)
Louisiana
(10)
Columbia
( 3)
Tennessee
(11)
Mississippi
( 7)
Virginia
(12)
South Carolina
( 8)
Texas
(29)
West
(60)
West
(47)
West
( 4)
Alaska
( 3)
California
(47)
Hawaii
( 4)
Arizona
( 7)
Colorado
( 8)
Idaho
( 4)
Montana
( 4)
Nevada
( 4)
New Mexico
( 5)
Oregon
( 7)
Utah
( 5)
Washington
(10)
Wyoming
( 3)
Assignments of States for 1984 by a Classification of State Presidential
Voting Patterns
Electoral
1984
Vote
Status
I. Republican States
A. Consistent core (20 states)
Seventeen states (see appendix)
103
Reagan
California: too big not to treat as
if marginal
47
Marginal
Maine: small 1980 Reagan vote (46%)
4
Marginal
Vermont: small 1980 Reagan vote (44%)
3
Marginal
B. Republican With Single Aberration
1. JFK states (Religious vote for Kennedy
in 1960)
Illinois: too big not to treat as if
marginal and recession scars
24
Marginal
New Jersey: too big not to treat as if
marginal and in the Northeast
16
Marginal
New Mexico: should be OK
5
Reagan
Nevada: should be OK
4
Reagan
2. Carter States (Regional vote for Carter
in 1976)
Florida: should be OK
21
Reagan
Kentucky: should be OK
9
Reagan
Ohio: recession scars
23
Marginal
Tennessee: should be OK
11
Reagan
Wisconsin: vote for Carter in 1976 is
troublesome
11
Marginal
3.
Humphrey State
Washington: should be OK
10
Reagan
II.
Democratic States
A. Redneck Conservative States
Arkansas
(14% black)
6
Marginal
Alabama
(23% black)
9
Marginal
Georgia
(24% black)
12
Marginal
Louisiana
(27% black)
10
Marginal
South Carolina
(28% black)
8
Marginal
Mississippi
(31% black)
7
Marginal
(continued on next page)
Assignments of States for 1984 by a Classification of State Presidential
Voting Patterns
(cont'd.)
Electoral
1984
Vote
Status
B. Join Republican Landslides Including Reagan's
Michigan: recession scars-auto
20
Democrat
New York: recession scars
36
Democrat
Pennsylvania: recession scars-steel
25
Democrat
Texas: above average Reagan vote in
1980
29
Marginal
C. Join Republican Landslides Except Reagan's
Hawaii: Japanese are Democrats
4
Democrat
Maryland: 20% black plus large Catholic
vote
10
Democrat
Minnesota: too liberal
10
Democrat
Rhode Island: 65%+ Catholics
4
Democrat
D. Solid Democrat
District of Columbia: 67% black
3
Democrat
West Virginia: voted Republican just
twice
6
Democrat
III. Mixed Pattern States
Delaware: only state with a perfect
winning record
3
Marginal
Connecticut: Catholic state, hard to
figure
8
Marginal
Massachusetts: too liberal*
13
Democrat
Missouri: spotty support, hard to
figure
11
Marginal
North Carolina: recent Republican pattern
13
Reagan
*Included among the "eleven Democratic states" in the narrative.