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Correspondence – April 1982 (7)
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66327848
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Correspondence – April 1982 (7)
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Records of the White House Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Michael K. Deaver's Correspondence Files
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 21, 1982
TO:
MRS. ELIZABETH DOLE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR PUBLIC LIAISON
FROM:
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
SUBJECT:
Letter From Hosea L. Williams - 4-6-82
Attached correspondence from Mr. Hosea L. Williams
is forwarded for your information and response.
Thank you.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 21, 1982
Dear Bob:
Thanks for the Thooey's. I had my first
can of beer this Saturday and it was as
good as I had remembered it.
The next chance you have to come to
Washington, let's sit down and talk about
some of the things you mentioned in your
letter.
In the meantime, thanks for everything you
are doing down there.
Sincerely,
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff
The Honorable Robert Nesen
United States Embassy
Canberra, Australia
dictate
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
4/6/82
Dear mike,
I want to thank you again for doing what
you did for me while I was in Washing ton
last month,
I enjoyed your lunch with Bill Clark & Jim
Baker.
I was hoping we would have had a were. moretime
also Thanks for the visit with the Fres little
to talk - But I know how fusy your
Chase monhallan - and also had a long visit with
I had spent the previous Tues. in n.y.c. at
former Pres. Nexon. He is certainly behand the President
100% in what he is doing. He said to me Though - you
must not Stay in avetralia more than 1/2 to 2 yrs."-
you should come taok here k help the Pre. He needs
Ne said That is where he made his mistake".
people he can trust all the way & I know you are one
about that time This has been a great appointment
mike I know That I will He ready To return at
the experience in Forign affairs & Dealing with other
you't has been invaluable. But with my past exporinal
35 years Business - 23 years many - 30 years Police
national, State, country etc. - Experience with state doget.
Defence Dept. I believe I could he of greathelp in an
are advisory Capacity atleast part-line. maybe as
President. know I could do a lot on special Problems-
an ambrosedor I at Torge and/or Special assist. to the
about what is going on in negards to china now. I
and would be glad to help. I'm really worried
trust they will get it would out.
change your I understand your problem- bat
I also worry ats. about your leaving -d hope you can
both the Pris. $ namey need you there body, I know.
I hope we can have more time to discuss This on my
next visit to Washing ton. I feel so storngly that'f we
don't makethis change in the way america has been
going, and do it under Does. Beacon, our charce is
gone I fortoer I know he will do every thing he can,
said also. he is 100% behind what the President is doing
A. 70rd in calif. on my way back He also
I sent your australions Beer back on the V.P,
to Pre. the advance Team Plane. To you & Bill Clark also
you requested though.
Pres. Hope you enjoy it. They don't make the Pibar
as ever.
Bod.
P.S. the W.H. Rid teller yesterday from Jock Countinenche regarding
ride Reception back of with Cathl. Deseption June 25th, maybe Ican get
the angus meeting here at that time. IT would surve he
a al Haig no he will be returning from
nice To attend.
International
Office of the Director
Communication
Agency
United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547
Bronk
USICA
APR 2 1 1982
Dear Mike:
Public pressures overseas against current U.S. security
policies are likely to be more intense this spring than at any
time in the past decade. As President Reagan's trip to Europe
approaches, USICA has been developing a public affairs campaign
partially directed at countering negative European sentiment
towards the U.S. on the nuclear arms reduction issue.
Enclosed is a copy of the USICA-produced chronology of "U.S.
Arms Reduction Initiatives from 1946-1982," which has been
distributed to all of our 200 posts abroad to be used as a
resource document. The chronology is also being drawn upon by
various government officials in the preparation of a number of
upcoming policy speeches.
A mass distribution pamphlet on the same subject is being
prepared in English for release to European posts prior to the
President's trip. The pamphlet, a narrative with pictures,
will be translated into French and Spanish and released
worldwide shortly after the President's trip. Our Wireless
File has been carrying overseas a variety of items on arms
control policy.
The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
The White House
- 2 -
The success of our public affairs efforts depends greatly on
the degree of cooperation between USICA and other members of
the foreign affairs apparatus during the early planning
stages. I am happy to say that interagency cooperation and
sensitivity to the public affairs aspect of foreign policy has
increased steadily.
I look forward to your continued cooperation on future public
affairs efforts.
Sincerely,
Charles Z. Wick
Director
A Chronology of United
States Arms Reduction
Initiatives, 1946-1982
April 1982
UNUMA
USICA
A Chronology of United States
Arms Reduction Initiatives, 1946 - 1982
Introduction
On September 11, 1945, the U.S. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, wrote
President Harry S. Truman a proposal for international control of atomic
bombs:
"If the atomic bamb were merely another though more devastating
military weapon
it would be one thing
But I think the bomb
instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man
over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit
into the old concepts
it really caps the climax of the race
between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his
psychological power of self-control and group control -- his moral
power
Stimson proposed and the President authorized approaches to the Soviet
Union and Western Allies to seek controls over atomic weapons, to use the
benefits of nuclear research "for commercial or humanitarian purposes."
This led to a study and report, the "Acheson-Lilienthal Report, made
public in March 1946, that called for the creation of an international
authority that would hold a monopoly over nuclear research and development.
This in turn led to a plan presented at: the United Nations by American
advisor to Presidents and elder statesman, Bernard Baruch.
The United States had begun an enduring search for a world at peace.
This chronology describes the most important milestones in that search.
It is comprehensive but not all-inconclusive; for the search by this nation
has extended into far-flung avenues. The American effort ranged from the
early scrapping of its war machine and the return of millions of Americans
to civilian status in a matter of months, to the ongoing effort to grapple
with the nuclear genie, to the exploration of ways to prevent more esoteric
and equally odious forms of warfare.
It is vital to understand the historical context of the chronology. The
United States was scarcely affected by the devastation of World War II.
America possessed unchallenged economic, technological and military power.
The world knew the immense power of atomic weapons. American officials
- 2 -
were aware of Soviet research on nuclear weapons, yet felt confident of
American strength, and willing to give up the nuclear advantage in order
to prevent a nuclear arms race. Despite repeated disappointments, this
nation has persisted for the past 36 years.
The negotiation process with the Soviet Union has not been easy. Frequently
the United States has been confronted by sweeping Soviet proposals with
superficial appeal that left out important safeguards, or were in fact
highly prejudicial to Western interests and security.
Throughout the past three decades, the United States has emphasized a
step-by-step approach, based on scientific and technological research, and
sensitive to the concerns of the USSR and other states. The United States
has also always stressed the need for verification, believing that without
such measures no arms control measure could be trusted. The Soviet Union
has often resisted this approach because of Soviet suspicion of any outside
presence within the USSR -- a fear not shared by the United States and West
European nations. At times, moreover, American desires for verification
provided the pretext for the Soviets to slow or cease negotiations or
portray the U.S. as the reluctant partner. Quiet diplomacy has not always
won global appeal, but it serves the long-range purpose of achieving meaning-
ful results.
The chronology does not show the steady buildup and modernization of Soviet
forces of all types while the USSR preached the virtues of detente.
Also, not shown by the chronology, but important to note, is that from the
mid-1970s the American public has become increasingly worried about the
growth and modernization of Soviet forces, and wholeheartedly supports the
"dual-track" approach of improving Western security while renewing arms
reduction efforts.
In sum, the chronology is a document of continuity, hope, disappointment,
ingenuity, patience and perseverence. It offers hope that in time and
despite the growing complexity and danger of modern weapons, we can achieve
the traditional American ideal of peace and security.
HIGHLIGHTS OF INITIATIVES FOR ARMS REDUCTION
BY THE UNITED STATES
June 14, 1946 - The Baruch Plan for controlling atomic weapons
April 16, 1953 - President Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" proposal
December 8, 1953 - The U.S. "Atoms for Peace" plan
July 21, 1955 - The U.S. "Open Skies" proposal
January 14, 1957 - Comprehensive U.S. proposal for force limitations
October 25, 1958 - The unilateral suspension of U.S. nuclear tests
June 27, 1960 - U.S. proposal for phase-out of different types of
forces
September 25, 1961 - President Kennedy's call for comprehensive
disarmament
April 18, 1961 - U.S. three-step comprehensive disarmament proposals
July 25, 1963 - The Treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere
January 21, 1964 - U.S. proposal for a verified freeze of nuclear
delivery vehicles
August 17, 1965 - U.S. draft for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty
March 18, 1969 - The U.S. initiates study of a ban on nuclear weapons
on the seabed
November 17, 1969 - Beginning of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
between the United States and the Soviet Union
November 25, 1969 - U.S. renounces first-use of chemical agents and
all methods of biological warfare
November 24, 1974 - The U.S. and USSR agree, at Vladivostok, to a
formula for limiting strategic arms
May 26, 1975 - The U.S. and USSR sign SALT I documents
April 13, 1976 - The U.S. proposes the prohibition of further
production of chemical weapons and reduction of existing stockpiles
March 1977 - Secretary of State Vance proposes major nuclear arms
reductions to the USSR
November 18, 1981 - President Reagan's initiative for arms reduction
and world peace
A CHRONOLOGY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES
ARMS REDUCTION INITIATIVES, 1946-1982
June 14, 1946. Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. representative on the UN Atomic
Energy Commission, submits detailed U.S. proposals for international
control of atomic energy. The "Baruch Plan" proposed "the creation of
an International Atomic Energy Development Authority, to which should be
entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy,
starting with the raw material" and including direct control of all
potentially dangerous atomic activities and licensing of all other
atomic activities. The Authority was to be empowered to send officials
into states to conduct comprehensive inspections for violations of the
treaty. Decisions of the Authority were not to be subject to veto in the
Security Council. The Baruch plan emphasized the fundamental U.S.
position that establishment of international control of atomic energy
should precede the prohibition of national atomic forces.
January 20, 1953. President Eisenhower, in his first inaugural address,
states that the United States stands ready to engage with any and all
others in a joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust
among nations and thus to make possible drastic reduction of armaments.
The sole requisites for undertaking such efforts, he continues, are
that, in their purpose, they be aimed logically and honestly toward
secure peace for all, and that, in their result, they provide methods by
which every participating nation will prove good faith in carrying out
its pledge.
April 16, 1953. In his major "Chance for Peace" speech, President
Eisenhower proposes that nations set limits on the portion of total
production of strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes.
National military and security forces might be restricted in size either
by a numerical limitation or by an agreed national ratio between states.
The President suggests that the resulting savings be applied to a fund
for world aid and reconstruction. He calls for the conclusion of an
armistice in Korea and the solution of outstanding political problems in
Indochina, and Malaya, as well as the Austrian Treaty, peaceful unification
of Germany and Korea, and the restoration of independence to the nations
of Eastern Europe.
December 8, 1953. President Eisenhower presents to the United Nations
General Assembly his "Atoms for Peace" plan, calling for the creation of
an international atomic-energy agency which would receive contributions
from nations holding stocks of nuclear materials and would utilize them
for peaceful purposes. The President also welcomes the General Assembly's
resolution of November 28 suggesting a Disarmament Subcommittee.
- 2 -
February 18, 1954. At the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union agree to an
exchange of views on disarmament or reduction of armaments, as recommended
by the United Nations General Assembly.
August 30, 1954. President Eisenhower signs the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, authorizing the exchange with other countries of information for
the peaceful use of atomic energy, and supporting the development of
commercial nuclear power.
May 26, 1955. The first comprehensive report of Harold Stassen, the
Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament is presented to the
President. It stresses the extreme importance of providing against
surprise attack, the absolute necessity of stipulations for an effective
inspection system in any agreement, and the role of an aerial component
and of scientific instruments and photography in such a system.
1. Nuclear Weapons: Neither American nor foreign scientists are
able to devise methods for accounting completely for all past production,
and the margin of error in known methods is beyond acceptable limits;
there is no method that could search out clandestine weapons; the
solution is control of the atom bomb, not visionary, unenforceable
"elimination."
2. The United States should accept only rigidly reciprocal
proposals.
July 21, 1955. Meeting with the Heads of Government of France, the U.K.
and U.S.S.R., President Eisenhower makes his "Open Skies" proposal at a
meeting in Geneva. The proposal would protect nations against military
buildup and surprise attack. He proposes that the Soviet Union and the
United States agree immediately to exchange blueprints of their military
establishments and to furnish each other facilities for aerial reconnaissance,
in order to provide against surprise attack and as a beginning of a
comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament.
(In a letter to President Eisenhower, September 19, 1955, Soviet Premier
Bulganin, criticized the "Open Skies" proposal for not including overseas
bases and not covering the broader need for reducing araments and
blanket elimination of nuclear arms. However Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov later recognized the genuineness of the U.S. proposal.)
October 11, 1955. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Bulganin, asks
that the Soviets study further his "open skies" proposal and states the
willingness of the United States to accept a Soviet proposal for ground-
control teams if the Soviets accept aerial inspection. (Bulganin, in a
letter to the President, September 19, 1955, had raised objections to
the "open skies" proposal and advocated a control-post system proposed
by the U.S.S.R. on May 10.)
- 3 -
March 1, 1956. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Bulganin, adds to
his "open skies" proposal a statement that the United States is prepared
to work out with other nations suitable and safeguarded arrangements SO
that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world
will no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons.
The President indicates that this idea might be combined with his
proposal of December 8, 1953, to furnish nuclear materials to an inter-
national agency which would utilize them for peaceful purposes.
March 21, 1956. The United States presents to the U.N. Disarmament
Subcommittee a proposal for a demonstration test area of "open skies"
inspection. The United States also proposes immediate exchanges, for a
test period, of technical missions for purposes of preliminary study of
methods of control and inspection.
(The U.S.S.R. proposed on March 24 to the Disarmament Subcommittee the
cessation of thermonuclear tests, the removal of atomic weapons from
Germany, the reduction of military budgets, and the gradual reduction of
conventional armed forces over a period of two years to the levels
specified in the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955.)
January 14, 1957. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot
Lodge presents the January 12 memorandum to Committee I of the United
Nations General Assembly. The memorandum sets forth basic policy on
disarmament: Future nuclear production would be restricted to peaceful
purposes under adequate inspection; action would be taken at a later
stage to reduce existing stockpiles and to convert them to peaceful
purposes; when future production is effectively controlled, it will be
possible to limit and eventually eliminate nuclear tests; first-stage
reductions in conventional arms would limit the United States and the
Soviet Union to 2,500,000 men and the United Kingdom and France to
750,000 men; at the same time an effective inspection system, including
aerial reconnaissance and ground control, would be established; further
reductions would depend on major political settlements; space-missile
tests would be inspected, and an international armaments agency would
come into being at once.
(The Soviet Union on April 30, 1957 introduced partial proposals in the
U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee. It accepted the January 14 U.S. force
levels proposal, provided the Western powers agree to the second-stage
force levels proposed by the Soviet Union on May 10, 1955. The Soviet
Union suggested that armaments be cut by 15 percent. During the first
- 4 -
stage of disarmament an international control organ would collect and
analyze "information provided by States" on their implementation of the
program and would operate control posts in the "western border regions"
of the U.S.S.R., the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and the eastern
United States. The use of nuclear weapons would be renounced and tests
halted at an early date. The Soviet Union would still abolish foreign
bases "within one or two years", reduce foreign forces in Germany by one
third, and reduce great-power forces in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.)
August 2, 1957. Secretary of State Dulles presents in the Disarmament
Subcommittee a Western paper proposing a combined system of aerial inspection
and ground control. All territory of the United States, the Soviet Union,
and Canada would be opened for inspection. Alternatively, there might be
an Arctic and Bering Straits zone. If the Soviet Union accepted either of
these zones, there might also be a European zone from longitudes 10°
west to 60° east, bounded on the south by the 40th parallel. The
Western powers are prepared, however, to discuss other proposals if the
Soviet Union agrees to include a significant part of its own territory in
the European zone.
August 21, 1957. The President announces that the United States will be
willing, as part of the United States proposal for a first-step disarmament
agreement, to include a suspension of testing of nuclear weapons for a
period of up to two years under certain conditions and safeguards. These
include Soviet acceptance of the United States position that, within that
period, there will be initiated a permanent cessation of production of
fissionable materials for weapons purposes and installation of inspection
systems to insure performance. The President also states that until such
a first-step arms-control agreement comes into force, the United States
will conduct such nuclear testing as the security of the United States
requires.
(The Soviet Representative in the Disarmament Subcommittee on August 27
attacked the West and accused the United States of designing its inspection
proposals "to contribute to the preparation of aggressive war".)
August 29, 1957. Following consultation with the NATO allies and various
other nations, the four Western powers present to the Disarmament Sub-
committee a working paper entitled "Proposals for Partial Measures of
Disarmament", intended as "a practical, workable plan for a start on
world disarmament." This paper contemplates a convention dealing with
the following subjects: (1) the limitation and reduction of armed forces
and armaments; (2) military expenditures; (3) nuclear weapons; (4) the
control of fissionable material; (5) nuclear-weapons testing; (6) the
- 5 -
control of objects entering outer space; (7) safeguards against the
possibility of surprise attack; (8) an International Control Organization;
(9) movement of armaments; and (10) suspension of the convention. It is
stated that with ratification of such an agreement, followed by honest
observance, this plan would (1) stop all nuclear bamb testing; (2) bring
a halt in production of nuclear-bomb materials; (3) start a reduction in
nuclear-bomb stockpiles; (4) reduce the dangers of surprise attack
through warning systems; and (5) start reductions in armed forces and
armaments.
January 12, 1958. Replying to a letter from Premier Bulganin December 10,
1957 that had proposed a cessation of nuclear tests, President Eisenhower
proposes that an agreement be made to use outer space for peaceful purposes
and to cease nuclear-weapons production. The President also says that in
converting nuclear-weapons stockpiles to peaceful uses the United States
is willing to make a "greater transfer" than the Soviet Union.
(In a letter to the President February 1, 1958, Bulganin stated that the
U.S.S.R. will discuss outer space only if the Western powers agreed to
prohibit nuclear weapons, cease tests, and liquidate foreign bases.)
August 22, 1958. President Eisenhower in a public statement welcomes the
successful conclusion of the Geneva Meeting of Experts and announces that
the United States is prepared "to negotiate an agreement with other
nations which have tested nuclear weapons for the suspension of nuclear
weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control
system on the basis of the experts' report." If this proposal is accepted
in principle by the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, the
President's statement continues, "then in order to facilitate the detailed
negotiations the United States is prepared, unless testing is resumed by
the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and
hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the
negotiations." As a part of the agreement, on a basis of reciprocity,
"the United States would be further prepared to suspend the testing of
nuclear weapons on a year-by-year basis subject to a determination at the
beginning of each year that: (A) the agreed inspection system is installed
and working effectively; and (B) satisfactory progress is being made in
reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control
measures."
(In a Pravda interview on August 29, 1958, Khrushchev stated that the
Anglo-American refusal to discontinue tests at once shows that the West is
really opposed to stopping them. A Soviet note on August 30 accepted the
United States invitation to a conference, but proposed that the conference
be held at Geneva and demanded that it conclude an "agreement on cessation
forever of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons" rather than on their
suspension on a year-to-year basis.)
- 6 -
October 25, 1958. A statement by President Eisenhower reaffirms United
States willingness, in order to facilitate negotiations for the suspension
of nuclear-weapons tests and the establishment of an international control
system, to withhold testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of
one year from the beginning of the negotiations on October 31, 1958. The
President notes that the United Kingdom has similarly declared its willingness
to suspend such tests and that the United States still hopes that the
U.S.S.R. will do likewise.
April 13, 1959. In a letter to Premier Khrushchev, the President offers
an alternative approach to a nuclear-test ban. He proposes that if the
U.S.S.R. still continues to insist on a veto on the fact-finding activities
of the control system regarding possible underground detonations, a
beginning could still be made in putting a testing ban into effect by
doing it in phases, starting with a prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests
in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers. Meanwhile, the negotiations could
continue in an attempt to resolve the political and technical problems
associated with control of underground and outer-space tests.
(In a letter to the President on April 23, 1959, Khrushchev rejected the
President's proposal of April 13 for an immediate prohibition of nuclear
tests at altitudes up to 50 kilometers on the score that it "does not
solve the problem" of a complete prohibition of all nuclear testing and
would, moreover, falsely mislead the public, "since in fact tests would
continue to be carried out underground and at higher altitudes.")
May 5, 1959. A letter of President Eisenhower to Khrushchev urges technical
discussions on the possibility of banning nuclear tests to a greater
atmospheric height than that mentioned in his April 13 letter. The
President again urges the U.S.S.R. either to accept the control measures
which would make possible a complete ban on nuclear-weapons tests or to
agree to the United States proposal for a partial ban. The President
states that the United States is prepared to explore at Geneva Khrushchev's
proposal for a predetermined number of inspections in the territory of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., but adds that the
number should be related to scientific facts and detection capabilities.
May 14, 1959. At: the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference the Western
powers present "for the consideration of the Soviet Government a peace
plan containing proposals on German reunification, European security, and
a peace settlement. Its parts are all linked together, and it must be
viewed as a whole. This plan, dovetailing the timing of conventional-force
reductions with steps in the reunification of Germany, envisages a gradual
and logical development through three stages of "security" and "reunification"
into a fourth and conclusive stage where "a final Peace Settlement" would
- 7 -
be signed "with a Government representing all Germany." As regards
reduction of armament, the three Western powers and the U.S.S.R. would in
stage II restrict or reduce their armed forces to agreed maximum limits,
such, for example, as 2,500,000 each for the United States and the U.S.S.R.;
and in stage III they would further limit their armed forces, for example,
to 2,100,000 each for the United States and the U.S.S.R., with negotiations
aimed at still further reductions, for example, to 1,700,000.
(A letter from Premier Khrushchev to the President noted "with satisfaction"
United States readiness to study the proposal for a previously determined
number of yearly inspections if there are indications from the control posts
of violations. The U.S.S.R., however, maintained that this determined
number of visits precluded any necessity of voting; the U.S.S.R. agreed that
the number of inspections should not be numerous, but rejected the need for
any study of criteria in determining the number of inspections. The U.S.S.R.
did not object to having the question of the number of inspections reexamined
every two years and agreed to the United States proposal for opening talks
on measures to detect high-altitude explosions.)
August 26, 1959. The Department of State announces that, under a Presiden-
tial directive, the unilateral suspension of nuclear-weapons testing by the
United States, which began on October 31, 1958, and was to continue for
one year, will be extended to December 31, 1959. This decision was taken,
according to the announcement, in the light of the agreed six weeks' recess
announced this day by the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapons Tests.
June 27, 1960. After a long series of proposals and counter-proposals by
the West: and the Soviet Union, the United States introduces a new program
that provides for: prior notification of missile launchings, inspection
of mutually-agreed air bases and launching sites, a nuclear production
cut-off, and initial conventional force reductions in the first stage.
Second-stage measures would include further reduction of nuclear stockpiles
and conventional forces. In the third stage, national forces would be
reduced to levels required for internal order and contingents made avail-
able for an international peace force, and all armaments not required for
these retained forces would be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
The program emphasizes the need for technical studies, effective control
organization, and verification of all measures. Transition from one stage
to the next would require approval by the United Nations Security Council.
(The Soviet-bloc representatives withdrew from the U.N. Ten Nation Disarm-
ament Committee, refusing to remain for the presentation of a new United
States program. In a letter to President Eisenhower, Premier Khrushchev
attacked the Western side for the failure of the Ten Nation negotiations
- 8 -
and said that the Soviet Union has decided to submit the disarmament
question to the United Nations General Assembly. Also on June 27, Foreign
Minister Gromyko formally requested the United Nations Secretary-General
to place the question on the agenda of the General Assembly.)
August 16, 1960. Ambassador Lodge tells the Disarmament Commission that
the United States is ready on a reciprocal basis, to transfer 30,000
kilograms of weapons-grade uranium to peaceful uses if the Soviet Union
agrees to a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military
purposes. He also says that the United States is prepared "EO shut down,
one by one, under international inspection, our major plants producing
enriched uranium and plutonium, if the Soviet Union will shut down equivalent
facilities."
September 23, 1960. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly,
Preasident Eisenhower proposes a series of steps for the peaceful use of
space: (1) Celestial bodies should not be subject to national appropriation
by any claims of sovereignty; (2) there should be no warlike activities on
celestial bodies; (3) subject to appropriate verification, no nation should
"put into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction"; and
(4) there should be a United Nations program of international cooperation
in the peaceful uses of outer space.
(Premier Khrushchev submitted a revised version of the Soviet disarmament
proposal of June 2, 1960 to the United Nations General Assembly. The
proposal called for reduction of Soviet and American forces to 1,700,000
men in the first stage of a three-stage program.)
(Premier Khrushchev told the General Assembly on October 3, 1960 that all
nations yearn for disarmament and that this can not be satisfied by a
control over armaments; that if the Soviet proposals on disarmament are
accepted, it would be ready to accept any Western proposals on international
control; that the Soviet Union agrees in principle that international
armed forces should be created after disarmament, but cannot admit that
Secretary-General Hammarskjold should command them; and that the machinery
of the United Nations must be rebuilt SO that the Secretariat and the
Security Council will reflect the work and interests of the "three main
groups" of capitalist, communist, and neutralist states -- the "Troika"
concept.)
June 29, 1961. President Kennedy proposed to Congress the establishment
of an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
September 3, 1961. In response to Soviet resumption of nuclear tests in
the atmosphere, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan urged the
Soviet Union to agree immediately to an uninspected ban on atmospheric
- 9 -
tests. The Western leaders asserted that existing means of detection were
sufficient to identify atmospheric nuclear tests.
(Premier Khrushchev, in a New York Times interview, declared that the
Soviet Union would not agree to a test ban until general and complete
disarmament had been achieved and France had stopped its nuclear tests.
On September 9 the Soviet Union formally rejected the Anglo-American offer
of an uninspected test ban.)
September 20, 1961. Following intermittent talks, the United States and
the Soviet Union agreed on a joint statement of principles to guide
negotiations for general and complete disarmament. The statement recog-
nized the need for international peace-keeping machinery and international
control, and the possibility of taking partial measures before agreement
was reached on the entire disarmament program. The Soviet Union refused
to accept the U.S. position that verification should apply to forces
retained as well as forces disbanded under a disarmament agreement.
September 25, 1961. President Kennedy presents to the UN a new U.S. plan
for general and complete disarmament, which called upon negotiating states
to seek "the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible
date...and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole
program has been achieved." The President calls for (1) immediate signing
of a test ban treaty, independently of other disarmament negotiations; (2)
ending production of nuclear weapons and preventing their transfer to non-
nuclear powers; (3) preventing transfer of control of nuclear weapons to
non-nuclear powers; (4) barring nuclear weapons in outer space; (5) gradually
destroying existing nuclear weapons and transferring the nuclear materials
to peaceful uses; (6) halting the testing and production of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles and gradually destroying existing ones; (7)
earmarking national forces for call by the United Nations to perform
peacekeeping duties, and improving the operation of the UN peacekeeping
machinery.
(The Soviet Union the same day pressed its plan for a "troika" administration
of the UN, rejected by President Kennedy. The Soviet Union proposed eight
points to ease tensions and contribute to disarmament: freezing military
budgets; renouncing use of nuclear weapons; prohibiting war propaganda;
concluding a non-aggression pact; withdrawing troops from foreign territory;
preventing further spread of nuclear weapons; establishing nuclear-free
zones; and reducing the danger of surprise attack. On October 12, Premier
Khrushchev proposed a ban on nuclear weapons for East and West Germany and
disengagement in Central Europe. On October 30, the Soviet Union exploded
a nuclear bomb estimated at 57 megatons.)
- 10 -
April 18, 1962. The United States introduces new disarmament proposals.
Stage one provides for a three-step, 30 percent reduction of nuclear
delivery vehicles and other major armaments, restrictions on arms production,
reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces to 2.1 million, a nuclear production
cutoff and transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses, an agreement
not to transfer nuclear weapons to powers not now possessing them, a
test-ban agreement, advance notification of missile launchings, reports on
military spending, measures to reduce the risk of war, establishment of an
International Disarmament organization, initial peacekeeping arrangements,
and a study of measures to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles.
Stage two provides for a 50 percent cut of remaining delivery vehicles and
armaments, a 50 percent reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces from first-stage
levels, reduction of nuclear stocks, dismantling or conversion of certain
bases, and further peacekeeping arrangements. Stage three provides for
reduction of arms and forces to levels required for internal order, elimin-
ation of nuclear weapons from national arsenals, elimination of remaining
bases (except those needed for retained forces), monitoring of military
research and strengthening of the UN peace force SO that no state could
challenge it. The first stage would take three years. No time limit is
specified for the other stages. Ultimate decisions on timing, etc., would
rest with the Security Council.
(The Soviet Union on April 24 rejected the U.S. proposals. The USSR had
on March 14 proposed a far-reaching set of measures that lacked adequate
verification, suggested an accelerated timetable that could not have been
fulfilled, and would have left the West at a serious disadvantage.)
August 27, 1962. The United States and the United Kingdom introduces two
new draft test ban treaties. The first calls for a comprehensive ban on
tests, enforced by nationally manned control posts under international
supervision and obligatory on-site inspection. The second, offered as a
second-choice alternative, calls for a limited ban ending testing in all
environments except underground, monitored by national means without the
need to establish any international verification machinery.
(The Soviet Union rejected the first U.S.-U.K. proposal and criticized the
second for legalizing underground tests. It proposed an "understanding"
banning underground tests until a permanent solution was found.)
December 12, 1962. At the disarmament talks, the United States introduces
proposals to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or
failure of communication and recommended informal technical talks. The
proposals include advance notification of major military movements,
installation of permanent observation posts at major transportation
centers, exchange of military missions to promote improved understanding,
- 11 -
the establishment of rapid and reliable communications links between major
capitals, the "hot line," and the establishment of an international
commission on reduction of the risk of war.
(On June 20, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the "hot line" agreement.)
June 10, 1963. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union
announce that high-level talks would be held in Moscow in July to seek
agreement on a test ban. In a speech on settlement of cold-war problems,
President Kennedy says the United States would voluntarily suspend nuclear
tests in the atmosphere pending negotiation of a test ban agreement,
provided other countries would follow suit.
July 25, 1963. The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union
initial a treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space
and under water. Underground tests are also outlawed if they result in
spreading radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the state
under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted.
September 20, 1963. President Kennedy tells the Soviet Union that the
United States is prepared to seek agreements to safeguard against accidental
wars and surprise attacks, to control the transfer of nuclear weapons, to
convert nuclear materials to peaceful uses, to ban underground testing
under adequate inspection and enforcement, and to exclude weapons of mass
destruction from outer space. He also proposed a joint U.S.-Soviet moon
expedition.
January 21, 1964. At the 17-nation disarmament talks, the United States
proposes a "verified freeze" of nuclear delivery vehicles; a verified
agreement to halt production of fissionable materials for weapons, and the
reciprocal closing of nuclear production facilities on a plant-by-plant
basis under international verification; the establishment of observation
posts against surprise attack, accident or miscalculation; and agreements
to prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons to states not now controlling
them, to place under international safeguards and inspection all transfer
of nuclear materials for peaceful uses, and to ban all nuclear weapons
tests (including underground tests) under effective verification and
control.
(The Soviet Union proposed reduction of Western and Soviet forces in
Germany, together with establishment of inspection posts to guard against
surprise attack, a nuclear-free zone in Germany, reduction of military
budgets, and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact
powers.)
- 12 -
April 29, 1965. The United States proposes negotiations intended to
prevent the use of outer space and celestial bodies for military purposes.
This proposal follows similar initiatives launched by the Allies since
1959.
August 17, 1965. The United States submits a draft nuclear non-proliferation
treaty to the UN Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee. The draft would
oblige the nuclear weapons powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the
national control of any country not having them. Non-nuclear nations
would undertake to apply International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent
safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.
(The Soviet Union responded with a draft treaty submitted to the UN General
Assembly September 24 that focussed on banning the transfer or emplacement
"directly or indirectly" of nuclear weapons to third states not possessing
weapons. This proposal was directed against the discussions of the Western
Allies of the U.S. proposal for a Multilateral Force, under which the NATO
Allies would have shared in the decision-making, support for and maintenance
of certain nuclear weapons systems of the U.S.)
June 16, 1966. The United States and the Soviet Union submit to the UN
draft treaties regarding peaceful use of outer space. The treaty was
signed on January 27, 1967 and entered into force October 10, 1967.
August 24, 1967. The United States and the Soviet Union submit separate
but identical texts of a draft treaty to the Seventeen Nation Disarmament
Committee on nuclear non-proliferation. Many revisions are considered by
the Committee and changes result from debate in the UN General Assembly.
December 2, 1967. The United States announces that to help allay misgivings
about its own intentions, it would place all nuclear facilities in the U.S.
under treaty safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Administration,
excluding only facilities with "direct national security significance."
July 1, 1968. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union and 59
other countries sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. On July 9
President Johnson submits the treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and
consent. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia dimmed propspects for early
U.S. ratification of the Treaty. Subsequently in February 1969 President
Richard Nixon asked Senate advice and consent of the Treaty, received in
March, 1969.
March 18, 1969. President Nixon instructs the American delegation to the
Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee to seek discussion of what would be
needed for an international agreement prohibiting the emplacement of
weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and pointed out
- 13 -
that an agreement of this kind would, like the Antarctic and outer space
treaties, "prevent an arms race before it has a chance to start."
(The Soviet Union on the same day proposed the complete demilitarization
of the Seabed, compared to the U.S. focus on nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. objected that the Soviet proposal
was unrealistic and unverifiable and therefore not genuine.)
October 7, 1969. After several months of negotiations and consultations
with Western allies, the U.S. drafts a treaty with the Soviet Union for
the control of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the
seabed, which is submitted to the UN Committee on Complete Disarmament.
(The treaty was the subject of prolonged discussion and revision in the
United Nations, winning approval on December 7, 1970.)
November 17, 1969. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United
States and the Soviet Union begin in Helsinki and continue to December 22,
to resume in 1970.
November 25, 1969. President Richard Nixon declares that the United
States unilaterally renounces first use of lethal or incapaciting chemical
agents and weapons and unconditionally renounces all methods of biolgoical
warfare. Henceforth the U.S. biological program would be confined to
research strictly on defined measures of defense such as immunization.
The President further instructs the Department of Defense to draw up a
plan for the disposal of existing stocks of biological agents and weapons.
February 14, 1970. The United States extends its ban on biological
weapons to include toxins (chemical weapons produced through biological or
microbic processes).
(At first the Soviet Union and its allies opposed the U.S. proposal, which
was supported by a number of states, but on March 30, 1971, the USSR
reversed its position.).
April 16, 1970. Formal SALT negotiations open in Vienna. Negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union continue for two years.
The Soviets at first insist on including all U.S. "forward based systems,"
intended to protect Europe from Soviet attack, but capable of reaching the
western portion of the USSR. The United States points out the inequity of
such an approach without reference to the varied Soviet medium and inter-
mediate range air and missile systems directed at Europe. Assymetries in
the weapons systems and strategies of the two powers also complicate the
negotiations.
May 20, 1971. The U.S. and the Soviet Union announce their intention in
the SALT negotiations to complete an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement on
Strategic Offensive Arms.
- 14 -
August 5, 1971. The United States and the Soviet Union submit separate
but identical draft texts of an international convention prohibiting the
development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological)
and toxin weapons, and calling for their destruction.
September 30, 1971. After months of exploratory talks and negotiations by
the SALT delegations, the U.S. signs with the U.S.S.R. an "Agreement on
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The agree-
ment covers three main areas: (1) a pledge by both parties to maintain and
improve safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
(2) immediate notification of each other, should a risk of nuclear war arise
from such incidents, or from detection of unidentified objects on early
warning systems or any other unexplained incident involving a possible
detonation of a nuclear weapon; (3) advance notice of any planned missile
launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of
the other party.
The U.S. and USSR also sign an agreement to improve the USA-USSR Direct
Communications Link ("hot line").
April 10, 1972. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union sign
the convention against biological and toxin weapons.
May 26, 1972. The United States and the Soviet Union represented by
President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev sign the
basic documents of SALT I:
(1) A treaty limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems to two ABM
deployment areas SO restricted and located that they cannot provide a
nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one.
(2) An interim agreement limiting competition in offensive strategic
arms and providing further time for negotiations. The agreement essentially
freezes at existing levels the number of strategic ballistic missile
launchers, operational or under construction on each side and permits an
increase in sea-launched ballistic missile launchers up to an agreed level
for each state, only with the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding
number of older inter-continental ballistic missile or sea-launched
ballistic missile launchers.
July 26-27, 1972. U.S. Congress holds hearings on weather and other
environmental modification for military purposes, and President Nixon
orders the Defense Department to undertake an in-depth review of the
military aspects of environmental modification techniques. As a result,
the U.S. Government seeks agreement with the USSR to explore the possibili-
ties of an international agreement.
- 15 -
June 22, 1973. The United States and the Soviet Union agree to make the removal
of the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons a prime "objective of
their policies," to practice restraint in their relations toward each other and
toward all countries, and to pursue a policy dedicated toward stability and
peace.
July 3, 1974. The United States and the Soviet Union sign a protocol that
further limits deployment of strategic defensive armaments to one Anti-Ballistic
Missile site for each country.
July 3, 1974. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign a treaty on the limitation of underground
nuclear weapon tests. The treaty establishes a nuclear "threshold" prohibiting
underground tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons.
October 7, 1974. Negotiations begin between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on a treaty to
govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
November 24, 1974. Meeting at Vladivostok, President Gerald Ford and Soviet
Party Secretary Brezhnev announce agreement on a formula for the limitation of
strategic offensive arms. The leaders agree that:
(1) The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim
Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977. (2)
The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.
(3) Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement
will include the following limitations: (a) Both sides will be entitled to
have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles; (b)
Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs
and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).
(4) The new agreement will include a provision for further negotations beginning
no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible
reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985. (5) Negotiations between
the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating
the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.
August 21, 1975. Following suggestions by President Nixon to Party Secretary
Brezhnev at the Moscow summit in July, 1974, U.S. and Soviet delegates to the UN
Committee on Disarmament table identical draft texts of a convention prohibiting
military or any other hostile environmental modification activities. After
intensive negotiations at the United Nations, the convention is signed May 18, 1977.
March 31, 1976. The State Department and the White House issue an announcement
that the United States and the Soviet Union expect to complete negotiations to
limit peaceful nuclear explosions within the next several weeks. The talks were
an outgrowth of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban treaty limiting weapons tests only.
April 13, 1976. At the Conference of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in
Geneva, the United States proposes that there be an arrangement to prohibit
further production of chemical weapons and to reduce existing stockpiles, as a
first step toward a comprehensive ban.
May 28, 1976. In simultaneous ceremonies in Moscow and Washington, Soviet
party leader Brezhnev and President Ford sign a treaty which sets a ceiling of
150 kilotons on an individual underground peaceful nuclear explosion.
- 16 -
July 29, 1976. The President submits the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
and the 1976 treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification.
July 29, 1976. ACDA Director Fred Ikle asks the Conference of the U.N.
Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva to examine ways to restrict the
international arms trade.
September 3, 1976. The CCD adjourns in Geneva. Among final actions is
the submission of a U.S.-Soviet draft treaty banning environmental warfare,
which would be forwarded to the UN General Assembly.
September 30, 1976. During a visit to the U.N., Secretary of State
Kissinger states that President Ford would soon outline a three-point
program on nuclear nonproliferation, in an effort to see strengthened
international controls on the sale and reprocessing of nuclear fuels.
October 28, 1976. The White House releases an announcement by President
Ford of a new U.S. policy on both domestic and foreign nuclear issues.
Included in the plan are a proposal for an international moratorium on the
export of nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities for three years, and
strengthening the IAEA. It is expected that a proposed U.S. reprocessing
facility in South Carolina might become part of an "evaluation program"
suggested in the President's statement.
November 19, 1976. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, ACDA
Director Ikle proposes that the CCD discuss a ban on radiological materials
as weapons.
March 30, 1977. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposes in Moscow that
the two powers agree to substantial reductions of and qualitative con-
straints on strategic arms. At: the same time, the United States presents
an alternative proposal for a SALT II agreement similar to the framework
agreed to at Vladivostok in 1974.
(The Soviet Union summarily rejected the U.S. appeal for significant
reductions in strategic arms, disputing the value of moving away from the
Vladivostok framework and claiming the United States proposal would work
to the disadvantage of the USSR.)
June 18, 1979. President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev end their Vienna
summit meeting with the signing of the second strategic arms limitation
treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. The major provisions
included: (1) A ceiling of 2400 strategic missiles and bombers for both
to be reached within 6 months of entry into force of the treaty, to be
reduced to 2250 by 1981; (2) within the ceiling, no more than 1,320 to be
equipped with multiple warheads or cruise missiles; of those, no more than
- 17 -
1200 land-based, sea-based or air-to-surface ballistic missiles with multiple
warheads; of those, no more than 820 land-based ICBM's with multiple warheads;
(3) Soviets to dismantle 270 missiles to reach the 2250 ceiling; (4) Soviets
to stop production and deployment of the SS-16 missile; (5) both may build
and deploy a single new type of ICBM; (6) on that new ICBM, no more than 10
warheads, no more than 14 warheads on SLBM's; (7) 1972 ABM Treaty remains in
effect; (8) a protocol restricts deployment of land-based mobile ICBM's sea-
launched and ground-launched cruise missiles and ICBM's, carried in aircraft
until after December 31, 1981; (9) an agreement to be monitored by satellites
and other intelligence means; and (10) exchange of letters in which Soviets
agree not to increase production rate of Backfire bomber.
July 10, 1979. After the years of negotiation, the United States and the
Soviet Union present a draft treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons
to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.
November 18, 1981. President Ronald Reagan in a major address proposes a
framework for renewed arms control negotiations that focus on the need for
major reductions in all types of arms - a step forward from Strategic
Arms Limitation (SALT) to Strategic Arms Reduction (START).
As a first step, the President calls for the resumption of bilateral talks
between the United States and Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear
forces. President Reagan announces that the United States is prepared to
cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if
the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The
President comments, "This would be an historic step. With Soviet agreement,
we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war
which hangs over the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on
the moon, would be a giant step for mankind."
President Reagan points out that during the past. six years, while the
United States deployed no new intermediate range missiles, and withdrew
1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads
on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles.
The President proposes the opening of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in
early 1982 with a pledge to make proposals for "genuinely serious nuclear
arms reductions resulting in levels that are equal and verifiable."
President Reagan also calls for efforts to achieve equality at lower
levels of conventional forces in Europe. "The defense needs of the Soviet
Union hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany
today than were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed in Normany
on D-Day," he states. "The Soviet Union could make no more convincing
contribution to peace in Europe -- and in the world --- than by agreeing to
reduce its conventional forces significantly and constrain the potential
for sudden aggression," he adds.
- 18 -
The President calls for renewed efforts by both sides to develop effective
measures that would reduce the danger of surprise attack. He supports a
Western proposal at the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe) for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.
January 30, 1982. Intermediate-range Nuclear Force negotiations between the
United States and Soviets begin in Geneva.
March 31, 1982. President Reagan calls for negotiations between the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. "to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important
breakthrough for lasting peace on earth."
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. History, Documents, Speeches
Barton, John H. and Lawrence D. Weiler, International Arms Control
Issues and Agreements, the Stanford Arms Control Group, Stanford,
Calif., Stanford University Press, 1976.
Cohen, Stuart A., "SALT Verification, The Evolution of Soviet Views and
Their Meaning for the Future," Orbis, Vol. 24: pp 657-83, Fall, 1980.
Donley, Michael B., ed., The SALT Handbook, Washington, D.C., The
Heritage Foundation, 1979.
Feis, Herbert, From Trust to Terror: The Outset of the Cold War,
1945-1950, New York, 1970.
Gray, Colin, The Soviet-American Arms Race, Boston, Mass., Lexington
Books, 1975.
The Heritage Foundation, "US-USSR: Contrasting Views of Nuclear War,"
National Security Record, Washington, D.C., March, 1979.
Labrie, Roger, ed., The SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues 1972-1979,
Washington, D.C., The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1979.
Ikle, Fred C., How Nations Negotiate, New York, 1976.
Payne, Samuel B., Jr., The Soviet Union and SALT, Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press, 1980.
Reagan, Ronald W., Address to the National Press Club, November 18,
1981, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents, week of November 15-21, 1981.
Rostow, Eugene, Address to the United Nations, October 21, 1981.
Rowny, Edward L., "Negoiating With the Soviets," Atlantic Community
Quarterly, V18, No. 3, p 300-309, 1980.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements, Texts and Histories of Negotiations, Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1980 edition.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and National
Security, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament,
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.
- 2 -
U.S. Department of Defense, "Soviet Military Power," Washington, D.C.,
U.S. Government Printing Office, October, 1981.
U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The SALT II Treaty: Hearings;
Executive Report, 5 parts, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1979.
U.S. Superintendent of Documents, Disarmament and Arms Control Subject
Bibliography, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Prinking Office, 1980.
II. Recent Writings on Current Issues
Blechman, Barry M., "Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a Future?"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59: pp 102-25, Fall, 1980.
Burt, Richard, "Reassessing the Strategic Balance," International
Security, Vol. 5: pp 37-52, Summer, 1980.
Coalition for Peace Through Strength, An Analyses of SALT II,
Washington, D.C., 1979.
Ikle, Fred C., "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the 20th Century,"
Foreign Affairs, V51, No. 2, pp 267-285, 1978.
Ikle, Fred C., "What to Hope For, and Worry About, in Salt," Atlantic
Community Quarterly, V15, No. 4, pp 450-459, 1978.
"An Interview with Henry Kissinger," Wall Street Journal, January 21, 1980.
Lehman, John F. and Seymour Weiss with forward by Richard Perle, Beyond
the SALT II Failure, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1981.
Nitze, Paul, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," International
Security, Vol. 4: pp 164-76, Spring 1980.
Pipes, Richard, "Militarism and the Soviet State," Daedalus, Vol. 109:
pp 1-12, Fall, 1980.
Pipes, Richard, "Rethinking Our Nuclear Strategy," Wall Street Journal,
October 12, 1978.
- 3 -
Pipes, Richard, "Soviet Global Strategy," Commentary, Vol. 69: pp 31-40,
April, 1980.
Potter, William C., ed., Verification and SALT: The Challenge of
Strategic Deception, Westview Press, 1980.
Rowny, Edward L., "The Errors of Abiding by SALT's Terms," Wall Street
Journal, March 21, 1980.
Rowny, Edward L., "Let's Get: Back to the Merits of SALT II," Wall Street
Journal, October 3, 1979.
Rumsfeld, Donald H., "The State of American Defense and Agreements
Reached at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," Orbis, Vol. 23:
pp 897-910, Winter, 1980.
"SALT II: Towards Security or Danger? A Balanced Account of the Key
Issues in the Debate," pamphlet published by The Foreign Policy Association,
1979.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 22, 1982
Dear Ms. Gomer:
Thank you for your letter. I appreciate the time you
have taken to share your views with me.
The Reagan Administration shares your concern for our
nation's elderly. It was good of you to give me your
comments and opinions on the Community Services pro-
gram. You can be sure that your ideas will be brought
to the attention of the appropriate officials.
President Reagan has made the elimination of waste and
fraud in government programs one of his top priorities.
On December 7, 1981, the President received a six-month
action report from his Council on Integrity and Effi-
ciency. It reported to him that from April to
September 30, 1981 the Inspectors General in the depart-
ments and major agencies of the Federal government had
saved the taxpayers over $2 billion through the elimina-
tion of inefficient management, waste, and in some cases,
outright fraud. The President is determined to continue
these efforts to insure honesty in government and restore
public confidence in those who serve the taxpayers.
Again, I want to thank you for your recent message.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
hisness
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff
Ms. Jean Gomer
Apartment 917
2101 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(one)
Gomer
Philadelphia,
DGCC Mr. be ver:
Iheri you for your r nly. Please inform
those Senstors voting for 000m unity Cervices
Bill, namely in our Re whlicen family, that it to just S
enhenced DEBET for Democr tic worke 2
the crumbse E
rivin to outsidersand they 229 asked or 0 giventic
lettergriting to portray their roes. I think even the stamps
are him 08:15 with ederal funus ellocated. The local
May or la Office of Actic, ,nemely her icPhiladel has all
the best are 000 jobs allocated to the Demoratic concressman s
constituent it 1: 8 disgrace 300 westeof Federal funding,
and I am informed that the state (Re lican ) is insnew
to bick un the tob, whit 183 disgrace.
The new program recombende in better-
(no m.nies) timention the prliticens vill notiment any
xrt 07 : it. The adminis "iv) st 70 shoul come from
FED AL employees, or scivil a vice b sis.
/
Sincerely,
Jan Joen omer
1t 1. 3 aisgr C what the FLV programs the Dember
since Johnson has us 00. This makes the Uncent elderly who
worked, loss their benefits. Also the Ressident,
that if he wins, it till b the votes of the middle lo 27
class veniors. The ninevities will NO vor for him, +v n
if he romises them haven. ell him to biton metir his
energy or 1V Y] appoint any 0" them. They think he is 8 devil
The instaful Or Soci ty ruined them and we, have "DIOPY he
price. with It: west fulness and not even
CHAPT)
of the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS. Inc.
April 1982
Miss Jean Gomer
2101 Walnut Street
Apartment 917
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Dear Mr. Deaver:
As a loyal member with mutual interests, being a
Presidential appointee to the White House Conference of Aging,
I hope with your interest, this reaches the President. I am, indeed,
at the grass roots of the elderly and know what is in their minds.
There must be 8 migentic effort on the part of this
Administration to if cm the elde ly who compose a tremendous
amount 0 voting power, the' the Pr sivent is on their side. I agree
1001 with the closing of the Community Services program, wherein
jobs were created for the elderly, but in essence, turned out to
be a politican haven for the Democratic party here in Philadelphia
for their chosen constituents. It was a tremendous waste of
Federal fundsend I hope the State willnot pick un eny tab for the
continuence of this orogram. The wasteful Community Services job program
was under the Department of Aging, created by the past regime.
There should, indeed, be a jbb program on a part time
besisfor the elderly but it should be conducted on a strict
non-political manner, controlled entirely on Federal funding SD
that the hiring process does not get into local Democratic hands
as has been the case in Philadebhis, and those taken were not on
merit in the professional basis, but in accord with the party
incharge. I feel private industry should also be a factor in
this connection.
There is tremendous amount of wasteand freud in the
welfare and food stemp program, and if anyone tells you otherwi e,
they do not know what the situation is. Furthermore, Senator Dole
with his recommendation to investigate the taxeson unearned income
has caused the wreth of seni'r citizens. Why not one word about the
tremendous fraud in welfe{ and those who are, indeed, on welfare
and not even reporting they are Yorking-This is due to the cooperation
of the ultra-11 social service workers, 99% who are of the
minority race, and go along with those applying granting them the
tremendous misused welfare and food stamps. It is those of the
lower middle income elderly, who worked ell their lives, paid taxes,
and not eble to buy steeks, that welfare people are buying with
food stamps - The eme suffering. Thse people should the President
fight for 3nd who will vodefor him. Forget about the minority Troup -
they will not vote for the President. Thisis the candid truth end
I hopeit reaches the earsof the President. I do not wish to see
the Perty lose in 1986. The should be a more strict investigation,
with auded personnel, of what is going on in the viv-away orogr ms,
even it it has to include the F. B.I. and Tr sury Depa tment. The
President has tokeep and regain the support of the lower and middle
income individuals and create jobs for those out of work, espcially
in the elderly. An imbortantissue is that the social secur tv not be
TOUCHED. This is very sensitve.
(oner)
D.S. You can inform the President, withmy own
eyes, I S&W a healthy young black woman
of 28, buy an entire strip of filet mignon
steaks, putting doen $28.00 in food stamps
for the entire strip. This is a disgrece and
unblievable but true. The f: SHOULD BE A LIST
OF CERTAIN FOODS that food stamps sould be allowed
to buy not steaks or other luxury items they are
doing every day with the cooperation of the food
clerks inall chain stores, particularly If
they are of the minority group. They Look the
other way. I recommend food distributions centers
be put up, instead of 'issuingfood stamps. This
would stop some of the wast ful use of monies.
Thus, would monies be ogtained for educati. n
(sch clerships to middle income, suffering)
I also find the moraleof those not working, decent
people, with femilies, is downa terrible low.
The President will not win the election. He
must 6HOW that he intends fully to clean up the
wasteful mess in welfare and full employment for
those who want to work. He must realize, that in
all other countries inthe world, every country rives good
social security to the eluerly end decent nursing homes.
e, are entitled to be treated 25 citizens of the world,
as in other Turopen countries. plus mood medical care.
AMERICA is no exception.
P.O. 11087 EXPORTANT- JAPAN I3 KILLING THIS COUNTRY- IT MUST
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 22, 1982
Dear Charlie:
Thanks for A Chronology of United States
Arms Reduction Initiatives, 1946-1982.
I'm sure we'll be able to use this infor-
mation in the final planning for the
President's trip to Europe in June.
Keep up the good work, and thanks again
for thinking about me.
Sincerely,
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff
Mr. Charles Z. Wick
Director
International Communication Agency
Suite 700 1750 Penna. Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
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