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Matlock Chron June 1984 [06/15/1984-06/20/1984]
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Matlock Chron June 1984 [06/15/1984-06/20/1984]
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron June 1984
[06/15/1984-06/20/1984]
Box: 5
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: lov
File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/15-6/20]
Date: July 29, 1999
Box 90887
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
1. Memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re Soviet military
6/15/84
P1/F1
[4826], 1p R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2*12
2. Memo
Peter Rodman to the Secretary, re a reordering, 3p
6/11/84
P1/F1
R 7/7/00 NLSF95-0742 #13
3. Memo
Matlock to McFarlane, re Shultz meeting, 1p
6/19/84
P1/F1
R 10/17/05 M02-011 # 19
P5
4. Talking
re summitry (with notations), 1p
nd
P1/F1
Points
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #14
5. Memo
same text as #3, 1p
6/19/84
P1/F1
R 10/17/05 M02-011#19
P5
6. Talking
same text as #4 (no notations), 1p
nd
P1/F1
Points
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #15
7. Memo
McFarlane to the President, re Shultz meeting, 1p
nd
P1/F1
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #16
8. Talking
re summitry, 1p
nd
P1/F1
Points
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2#17
9. Memo
Matlock to McFarlane, re Dobrynin on summitry
6/19/84
P1/F1
[90701], 1p R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2#18
10. Memo
Same as #3
6/19/84
P1/F1
R 10/17/05 M02-011
11. Talking
re summitry, 1p
nd
P1/F1
Points
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2#19
12. Memo
McFarlane to the President, re summitry and next
nd
P1/F1
steps (with notations), 5p
P5
R 10/17/05 MOZ-011#20
13 Memo
McFarlane to the President, re summitry and next
nd
PT/F1
steps, 3 p
P5
R 10/17/05 MDZ-011#21
14. Memo
same text as #9 (with notations) [90701], 1p
6/19/84
P1/F1
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2# 20
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
[(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of
the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: lov
File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/15-6/20]
Date: July 29, 1999
Box 908875
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
15. Memo
same text as item #9 (with different notations), 1p
6/19/84
P1/F1
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #21
16. Memo
Matlock and Cobb to John Poindexter, re Mitterrand
6/20/84
P1/F1
1982 Memeon [4936], 1p
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2#22
17. Memo
James Rentschler to William Clark, re Mitterrand visit
3/11/82
P1/F1
and the record [90158], 2p
PS
D. 10/17/05 M02-011#22
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
[(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of
the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer CAS
Box Number
5
FOIA M02-011
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1984 (6/15-6/20)
DATE 3/22/2007
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
3 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ MVH 3/17/08 1 6/19/1984
MEETING (#19)
5 MEMO
SAME AS ITEM 3
MVH 3/17/08 1 6/19/1984
10 MEMO
SAME AS ITEM 3
mVH 3/17/08 1 6/19/1984
12 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT MVH RE 3/17/08 5 ND
SUMMITRY (#20)
13 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT MVH RE 3/17/08 3
ND
SUMMITRY (#21)
4826
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
June 15, 1984
INFORMATION
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
Soviet Military few Priorities
NLS F95-074/2712
JACK MATLOCK
BY LOJ , NARA, DATE 10/24/00
SUBJECT:
Jeremy Azrael has called my attention to a most interesting
interview which appeared in Red Star, May 9, by Marshal Ogarkov,
Chief of the Soviet General Staff. He prepared a memorandum for
Secretary Shultz, a copy of which is attached at Tab I, and I
believe you will find his observations of interest.
First, Ogarkov's comments on nuclear war are entirely consistent
with our conviction that the Soviet General Staff is not fearful
of an imminent U.S. first strike. Although the interview is
directed at a military audience, and therefore would be expected
to convey an air of confidence, his categorical statements that
nuclear war makes no sense comes very close to an explicit
endorsement of MAD. It is particularly interesting in this
regard that he does not dwell on the alleged threat of the
Pershing II's and GLCM's in Europe.
A second striking feature is his treatment of ET. The emphasis
he gives it implies that he sees developments along these lines
as his greatest future worry.
It would be foolhardy to attach too much significance to a single
statement. But this one is indeed food for thought. As Jeremy
points out, one of the questions it raises is whether we may not
have more leverage in vigorous pursuit of ET in the conventional
area than in the strategic nuclear area. Going somewhat further
afield with speculation, one can also read in Ogarkov's treatment
a recognition that the Soviet economy cannot support competition
across the board and may have to make some agonizing decisions on
priorities. This could mean that the Soviet military may not be
as rigid in opposing strategic arms reduction as many assume.
Even if this should be the case, however, we should understand
that the most likely reason will be a desire to have more resources
available for ET.
I have asked the Agency to be alert for any further commentary in
Soviet military literature which reiterates or supports Orgakov's
themes.
Attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum "A Reordering of Soviet Military
Priorities?"
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
June 11, 1984
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S
CONFIDENTIAL
TO:
The Secretary
FROM:
S/P - Peter W. Rodman PMR
SUBJECT:
A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?
On May 9 (Victory Day), the Soviet military newspaper, Red
Star, published a lengthy and authoritative interview with
Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff
(relevant section attached). U.S. commentary on this interview
has focussed on the relative moderation of Ogarkov's
anti-American rhetoric. A not unrelated, but much more
distinctive and noteworthy feature of the interview is its
questioning of long-established Soviet military priorities.
Unlike virtually all other recent Soviet commentaries on
defense matters, the Ogarkov interview does not dwell on the
threat posed by the deployment of Pershings and GLCM's and the
modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. On the
contrary, Ogarkov describes our continuing nuclear buildup as
"senseless," since the already existing "overkill" capacity on
both sides has made it "impossible to destroy the enemy's
systems with a single strike." No matter how destructive an
initial attack, the victim will "inevitably" retain enough
weapons for "a crushing retaliatory strike -- a strike
inflicting unacceptable damage."
It would be unwarranted to conclude on this basis that
Ogarkov has been converted from a proponent of nuclear
war-fighting (the long-established Soviet military doctrine) to
a proponent of mutual assured destruction. But he has gone out
of his way to discount the military significance of the alleged
U.S. quest for nuclear superiority. Although he refrains from
saying so directly, it clearly follows from his argument that
there is no compelling need either to cap the U.S. nuclear
buildup through early arms-control agreements or to respond to
that buildup through nuclear countermeasures. Despite new U.S.
programs, a continuing nuclear standoff can be taken for
granted.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2#13
Ogarkov's insouciance about a U.S. first-strike threat is
accompanied by obvious concern about an adverse shift in the
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00
conventional balance. He argues at length that conventional
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
weaponry is on the threshhold of a technological revolution
that will radically transform current methods of waging war.
Furthermore, he clearly implies that the U.S. has built a
considerable lead in conventional modernization, thereby
threatening to deprive the Soviets of a long-standing and
potentially decisive competitive advantage. In Ogarkov's
judgment, this is a threat that must be addressed "right now"
-- with such urgency and concentration that other established,
priorities are bound to suffer.
Ogarkov concedes that certain risks inhere in such a
reordering of priorities, but he insists that these risks are
manageable and can and must be run. Without quite saying so
explicitly, he clearly takes it as a given that the Soviet
military does not and will not have the resources both for a
crash program in conventional weaponry and for a significant
buildup of its nuclear capabilities. If this is regrettable,
it is nonetheless a fact of life, a reflection of what Ogarkov
describes as "an objective law discovered in his time by
Frederick Engels" -- to wit, that "nothing depends on economic
conditions as much as the Army and Navy." Fortunately,
however, the unattainable is unlikely to prove indispensable.
While Ogarkov clearly does not view the existence of a stable
nuclear balance as a guarantee against the outbreak of a
conventional war (the gravamen of his entire argument is
precisely the contrary), his case nonetheless rests on an
assumption that the current period is a period of relative
security.
Ogarkov has been a leading contributor to Soviet efforts to
generate a war-scare (something he probably finds useful, among
other things, in pressing his overall budgetary claims). But
in this particularly authoritative statement to a professional
audience, he suggests that it is possible to concentrate
resourses on the development and testing of necessarily
uncertain emergent technologies and weapons systems because it
is a time of peace -- and is likely to remain so for some time
to come. In consequence, there is no justification for not
reordering priorities. War is not a clear and present danger,
and attempts to argue the contrary within military circles are
nothing more than poorly disguised expressions of illegitimate
inter-service rivalry. More generally, they reflect precisely
the sort of "conservatism and inertia" that must be "resolutely
overcome" by leaders who appreciate Engels' further "discovery"
that innovations in military affairs often have to be imposed
"almost forcibly and against the will of the military command."
If this reading of Ogarkov's interview is correct (and it
is one in which Jeremy has considerable confidence), there are
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
a number of implications that are worth bearing in mind and
exploring further:
--
The Soviet military is far from monolithic and may
presently be divided by particularly intense
inter-service rivalries.
--
Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet
high command faces -- and is more-or-less resigned to
facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems
and mission priorities.
--
The Soviet high command does not believe that the risk
of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is
particularly high.
--
The Soviet high command may not be as eager to cap the
U.S. strategic buildup through a START agreement as we
often suppose.
The Soviet determination to match us nuclear missile
for nuclear missile in a continuing cycle of
deployments and counterdeployments may be shakier than
we often assume.
--
Within the Soviet high command support for nuclear
arms control may be strongest among conventional force
commanders who are eager to cap Soviet nuclear
programs and increase spending on conventional
modernization.
--
Pressing ahead with our conventional arms
modernization programs may be one of our most
effective means for limiting the modernization of
Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces.
--
The Soviets may be on the verge of conventional force
modernization programs that will tip the conventional
balance even further in their favor unless we in fact
justify their apprehension and exploit our
technological advantages in the field of conventional
weaponry.
Attachment:
As stated.
Drafted: S/P:JAzrael
yea
CONF IDENTIAL
Ogarkov Interview
PM081625 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 84 First Edition PP 2-3
[Interview with MSU N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and
USSR first deputy defense minister: "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History
and the Present Day" - first paragraph is editorial introduction]
[Text] The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 is being cele-
brated widely and solemnly in our country today. On the eve of this great and resplen-
dent holiday, the editorial office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked Marshal of the Soviet Union
N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense
minister, to answer a number of questions connected with the defense of socialism's
gains.
Question: It is nearly 40 years since the Great Patriotic War. What changes have
taken place in military matters in that time, and how are they taken into account in our
military building, in the training of troops and fleets?
Answer: In his time,F. Engels discovered an objective law: "Nothing depends on economic
conditions as much as the Army and Navy. Armaments, personnel, organization, tactics,
and strategy depend, above all, on the level of production achieved at a given moment
and on the means of communication," and "successes of technology, the moment they have
become usable and have been applied in practice in military matters, have immediately --
almost forcibly, and often against the will of the military command - caused changes
and even revolutions in the methods of waging war."
In present-day conditions, this law is manifested with particular force. In the postwar
years, several generations of weapons systems and combat hardware have already suc-
ceeded one another.
What do the basic changes in military matters consist of today?
First, the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons, which has continued over
several decades, has led to radical qualitative changes in the conditions and potential
for the use of these weapons. The stockpiles of nuclear ammunition and various means
of delivery that the sides created have reached such a size and quality that they are
sufficient to destroy all the important targets on enemy territory many times over in
short space of time.
III. 9 May 84
R 19
USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
For instance, in just one salvo (launch) of strategic (not counting battlefield)
nuclear forces, the United States could today use about 12,000 nuclear charges with
a total yield hundreds of times greater than ithe yield of all the explosives and
ammunition used by all states throughout the 6 years of Werld War II. With the
deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, this potential of U.S.
strategic nuclear forces will further increase. You do not have to be a military man
or a scientist to realize that a further buildup is becoming senseless. Nonetheless,
this buildup is continuing, through the fault of the United States.
As a result, a paradox arises: On the one hand, it would seem, a process of steadily
increasing potential for the nuclear powers to destroy the enemy is taking place, while
on the other there is an equally steady and, I would say, even steeper reduction in
the potential for an aggressor to inflict a so-called "disarming strike" on his main
enemy. The point is, with the quantity and diversity of nuclear missiles aiready
achieved, it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike.
A crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor, even by the limited quantity of
nuclear charges remaining to the defender -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage -
becomes inevitable in present conditions. The calculation of the strategists across
the ocean, based on the possibility of waging a so-called "limited" nuclear war, now
has no foundation whatever. It is utopian: Any so-called limited use of nuclear facili-
ties will inevitably lead to the immediate use of the whole of the sides' nuclear
arsenal. That is the terrible logic of war. Their arguments about the possibility
of a so-called "limited nuclear strike without retaliation" against the enemy's main
centers and control points are even more groundless. Such arguments are pure fantasy.
Put together, all this substantially changes both the conditions for the outbreak
of modern warfare and the potential for waging it.
Second, rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the
emergence in the developed countries of automated reconnaissance-and-strike complexes,
long-range high-accuracy terminally guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines,
and qualitatively new electronic control systems make many types of weapons global
and make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the des-
tructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons
of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness. The sharply increased range of conven-
tional weapons makes it possible to immediately extend active combat operations not just
to the border regions, but to the whole country's territory, which was not possible
in past wars. This qualitative leap in the development of conventional means of
destruction will inevitably entail a change in the nature of the preparation and
conduct of operations, which will in turn predetermine the possibility of conducting
military operations using conventional systems in qualitatively new, incomparably
more destructive forms than before.
There is a sharp expansion in the zone of possible combat operations, and the role and
significance of the initial period of the war and its initial operations become incom-
parably greater. A new war, should imperialism unleash it, will certainly be strikingly
different in nature from the last war.
Third, the rapid development of science and technology in recent years creates real
reconditions for the emergence in the very near future of even more destructive and
previously unknown types of weapons based on new physical principles.
III. 9 May 84
R 20
USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Work on these new types of weapons is already in progress in a number of countries,
for example, in the United States. Their development is a reality of the very near
future, and it would be a serious mistake not to consider it right now. This, in turn,
cannot fail to change established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle
and even of the military might of the state.
This is a short list of only the basic changes currently taking place in the means of
armed struggle. They are inevitably exerting their influence on the nature of war and
the role and place of the branches of the Armed Forces in resolving operational and
strategic tasks and on the further development and improvement of forms and methods of
conducting military operations and military affairs as a whole.
All this must unconditionally be the subject of constant and in-depth analysis and
must be generalized and taken into account in the practical building of our Armed
Forces.
In consideration of this, the technical equipping, organizational building, and manage-
ment of our Armed Forces are effected in such a way that they are always ready under
any conditions to deal an immediate counterstrike against any aggressor. This
capability must be guaranteed in all instances. The main component of the combat might
of the Army and Navy and the basic factor in curbing the aggressor are our strategic
nuclear forces, which are in a state of constant high combat readiness. All branches
of the Armed Forces and categories of troops are developing harmoniously with them and
are being equipped with the most modern weapons and combat hardware.
There is also a simultaneous process of honing and improving the system of operational,
combat, and political training of troops and fleets; the procedure for mobilizing and
provisioning them; troop and weapon control systems, and forms and methods of political-
educational and party political work.
The Soviet Armed Forces' might is determined by not only the quantity but also the
quality of their weapons and combat hardware. Our main strength is the Soviet people,
who have an expert mastery of the awe-inspiring weapons entrusted to them by the
motherland. Today, over 93 percent of our servicemen have secondary and higher
education. Almost 90 percent of the servicemen are Communists and Komsomol members,
who are transforming our Army and Navy into an invincible force.
The resolution of the tasks of military building and training of our Armed Forces is
effected on the basis of comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the military-political
situation and the development of the means of armed struggle. Therefore, our military
cadres do not merely copy past experience, they use it creatively and enrich it. They
must constantly improve the training and organizational structure of troops and naval
forces and conduct scientific quests to this end, taking into account the continuous
changes in military affairs and, if necessary, taking justified risks. It is better
to test new forms in peacetime than to seek them in the course of a war. Furthermore,
there would now be no time for this. We military men must, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko,
general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium, points out, "resolutely overcome any conservatism and inertia"; for us in
the military "the slogan of the day must be: From a correct idea, fully armed with
experience, to bold actions!"
III. 9 May 84
R 21
USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
I would like to emphasize that the defense of the socialist motherland is the concern of
every Soviet person a concern of the entire people. In this connection, work to educate
the Soviet people in accordance with revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions and train
reliable and skillful defenders of the motherland, and the active participation in this
work of our party, labor, war, and Army veterans, are of great importance.
The main source of the Soviet Armed Forces' strength and invincibility and an important
condition of their further strengthening and development has always beenand remains the
leadership of the Communist Party and the unbreakable unity between the Army and the
people. The CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee, and our government are doing every-
thing necessary to ensure that the Soviet state's defense potential and its Armed Forces'
combat might are abreast of present-day demands and that no eventuality can take us by
surprise.
The grim years of the Great Patriotic War are receding further and further into the depths
of history. A great deal has changed in the world in the almost 40 years since then.
lowever, time cannot wipe out from the memory of grateful mankind the unparalleled feat
if the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who, in an unprécedentedly fierce confronta-
ion with a perfidious enemy, not only defended the socialist fatherland, but also saved
he peoples of many countries from fascist enslavement. The memory of the millions of
eople who gave their lives for the great victory makes it imperative today to rally
he forces of the world's peoples in the struggle against the perfidious designs of the
orces of imperialism and reaction, against the instigators of a new war. The imperialist
retenders to world domination should not forget that history savagely punishes those
10 ignore its lessons.
ES SENSITIVE 8417266/8417267
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
4831
June 15, 1984
SECRET SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Proposed Presidential Statement for the June 26-27
Smithsonian Meeting on US-Soviet Exchanges
Attached is a draft Presidential message outlining our
efforts to improve our bilateral relationship with the Soviet
Union for use at the June 26-27 meeting at the Smithsonian on
US-Soviet exchanges.
Charles Bruckmley Hill
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By R.Vite NARA, Date 6/21/99
SECRET / SENSITIVE
DECL OADR
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By R.Vitt NARA, Date 6/21/99
SECRET SENSITIVE
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE
Gathered here today is an impressive group of Americans
dedicated to the improvement of the range and quality of our
contacts with the people of the Soviet Union. The Smithsonian
Institution and its Woodrow Wilson Center are themselves
outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and
communication with the world at large. As you know, I am
generally less impressed by what governments can do in resolving
outstanding problems than dedicated individuals giving free range
to their energy and imagination. As I said on January 16, people
don't make wars; on the contrary, their common interests cross
all borders. For this reason, I believe your efforts to improve
with people . D the Soviet Chusin
meaningful people- to people communication is a matter of the
greatest importance indeed
The people of the Soviet Union have impressive energy,
talent, and resources to contribute to the overall betterment of
mankind. We all know that Russian writers, poets, and composers
have made enormous contributions to the development of Western
culture. What American does not think of Tchaikowsky as among
his favorite classical composers, and what would our common
literary heritage be like without Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, or
Pasternak? Our recent commemoration of the Normandy landing
reminds us once again of the incredible courage and sacrifice
SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 2 -
of the Russian people, and the contribution we each made to the
other's efforts when confronted with a common enemy. In the
years since World War II, the Soviet and American governments
have often been on the opposite sides of major issues, but our
people still retain fond memories of the past and understand
clearly the value of communication for the future.
I want to emphasize to you, and to the people and leaders of
the Soviet Union that: Increased communication among the world's
peoples is the trend of the future, an essential ingredient for
social progress and world peace. Genuine dialogue between the
American people and the people of the Soviet Union is necessary
for all of us. In an era of increased global interdependence,
the trend towards Soviet self-isolation and restriction of
contacts can only undermine the future of Soviet science, its
economy, and its cultural development. The Kremlin's current
approach is not healthy for Soviet society or for mankind as a
whole. We hope it will change, and quickly.
All of us here today share a common goal in seeking to reverse
this negative trend. You can -- and I trust you will -- make new
efforts on the people-to-people side. We, for our part, have been
working hard to make progress on a set of issues designed to
facilitate communication between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Those of you at this conference are well aware of some
elements of our agenda and our effort to improve the overall
atmosphere of the US-Soviet relationship.
SECRET / SENSITIVE
- 3 -
-- We have encouraged the Soviets to return to the Geneva
nuclear arms talks, put forth a new Chemical Weapons Treaty
proposal, and advanced new ideas to break the impasse at the MBFR
talks.
-- In Dublin, I noted our willingness to discuss the Soviet
proposal on non-use-of-force in the CDE at Stockholm along with
our proposals to make conflict in Europe less likely.
-- We have sought to engage the Soviets more deeply in
discussions of regional trouble spots, most particularly in
recent months, the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and Southern Africa.
-- And, of course, we continue to make representations on
human rights issues -- on the Sakharovs, on Shcharanskiy, on
Orlov, on other persecuted individuals, on emigration issues, and
on divided spouses. In these discussions, we regularly emphasize
the importance of movement in the human rights area to an
improvement in the overall relationship.
To give a fuller view of our efforts, I would like to take
this opportunity today to provide for the first time a detailed
accounting of the comprehensive program for cooperation and
contacts between our peoples which we have proposed in recent
months to the Soviet leadership.
First, we have completed all the necessary technical
preparations for negotiations on a new exchanges agreement.
This would open the way for official exchanges and encourage
increased people-to-people contact. Our proposal contains
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 4 -
such features as a resumption of the highly popular
exhibitions in the USSR and a proposal for reciprocal
appearances on national television which would allow the
leaders of the two countries to communicate directly with the
people of the other.
Second, we are working with the Soviets on moving to open
consulates in Kiev and New York. The details may yet take
some time, but when completed, a Consulate in Kiev would give
us greatly increased contact with the people of the Ukraine,
the largest non-Russian nationality in the USSR.
Third, we have taken steps to reinvigorate agreements in
force in the fields of environmental protection, housing,
health, and agriculture.
-- Specifically, I have directed EPA Administrator
Ruckelshaus to assume the position of U.S. Co-chairman of
the US-USSR Committee on Environmental Protection. He
is talking with his Soviet counterpart to begin
arrangements for a Joint Committee meeting which would
expand environmental cooperation.
-- Secretary Pierce at HUD has begun preparations for a
meeting of the Joint Housing Committee, the first in over
six years.
-- We are ready to move ahead with a full meeting of the
Joint Agriculture Committee and rejuvenate cooperation in
this vital area with, I hope, private sector participation.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 5 -
-- In the health area, we have informed the Soviets of
our willingness to broaden cooperation under both the
health and artificial heart agreements as soon as the
issue of Mrs. Bonner's need for medical treatment abroad
is resolved.
Fourth, we are in the process of renewing several US-Soviet
agreements that expire this year.
-- We have proposed that our bilateral fishing agreement
be extended for eighteen months, rather than one year, and
are looking at possibilities to increase cooperation
under it.
-- Secretary Baldrige has formally proposed to Soviet
Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev that we extend our
Long-term Economic Cooperation Agreement for ten more
years, hold a experts working group in the near future,
and, if that meeting is successful, then convene a
Cabinet-level Joint Commercial Commission to examine
trade and economic issues.
-- A U.S. Naval delegation went to Moscow earlier this
month to renew the Incidents at Sea agreement for another
three years. This has been a highly successful agreement
that demonstrates clearly the ability of our armed forces
to ensure unnecessary frictions are not introduced into
our military-to-military relationship.
-- And we are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement that
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 6 -
has been quite useful in ocean-going joint research. The
agreement is due for renewal in December and we
anticipate no problems continuing our cooperation in this
area.
Finally, I should note that we are negotiating on or have
proposed steps in several other areas that will improve our
government-to-government dialogue with considerable benefits
for the people of our two countries.
-- We recently concluded another round of Consular Review
Talks in Moscow aimed at improving visa procedures and
facilitating travel between our two countries.
-- We suggested a compromise formula to settle the
exact depiction of the maritime boundary between us in
the Bering Sea.
-- We proposed to the Soviets a joint simulated space
rescue mission in which astronauts of the two countries
would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop
ways to rescue astronauts from malfunctioning space
vehicles.
-- We suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard
and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and
rescue procedures that could be of major value to
citizens of both countries lost at sea.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENS TIVE
- 7 -
-- We have made progress in the talks on upgrading the
Hotline, and we have made proposals dealing with nuclear
terrorist incidents, establishing a Joint Military
Communications Link, and upgrading embassy communications
in both countries.
-- We have also put forward a specific set of steps the
Soviets and we could take along the Pacific air routes to
ensure that the KAL incident never recurs.
-- Finally, I want to mention that I suggested to General
Secretary Chernenko that in addition to our other channels
of communication, we institute regular, high-level
contacts between military personnel of our two countries.
I have enumerated the steps above because I wanted you to
know the scope of the efforts that we are making to improve the
quality of our dialogue with the government and people of the
Soviet Union. We are sufficiently realistic not to expect
immediate results in all our endeavors and, given the current
mood in the Kremlin, even small steps can be difficult. We are,
however, looking to the long-term in our approach. If we cannot
settle all of these issues today, we want nevertheless to lay the
groundwork to convince this and future Soviet leaders of the need
and value of better and more fruitful communications in the
future.
All of us know that broadening genuine communication with a
country as closed and suspicious as the Soviet Union is no easy
SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 8 -
task. There is a natural conflict between the deeply ingrained
American desire for free-wheeling discussions at all levels and
the Soviet penchant for restricting contacts to a few hand-picked
individuals on their side. At the present time, the atmosphere
for contacts is at low ebb. Perhaps because of their own
uncertainities, the Soviet leadership has recently boycotted the
Olympics, reduced emigration abroad to a trickle, increased
controls over mail allowed in, stepped up harassment of tourists,
and even keep Soviets from our ambassador's cultural performances
at his residence in Moscow.
One cloud over all our efforts to improve communications is
the Soviet leadership's treatment of Academician Sakharov and
Mrs. Bonner. As part of their generally defensive mood, they
have gone to extraordinary lengths to cut them off from the
outside world. The actions against the Sakharovs have earned the
deserved condemnation of much of the world scientific community
and forced the National Academy of Sciences to postpone its trip
to the USSR. This is preeminently a people-to-people issue and
it will inevitably affect what cooperation between our two
peoples is possible. I call on the Soviet leadership to relax
their pressures on the Sakharovs, allow them to communicate with
the outside world, and provide them with their basic rights to
seek medical care within or outside the country as necessary.
All of us here today understand only too well the
difficulties before us. However, we cannot only dwell on the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 9 -
problems before us. We must must strive to reach the goal we are
seeking and I am confident that those here at this meeting share
my desire for improved communications with the peoples of the
Soviet Union. I want to wish you well as you seek to formulate
imaginative, but realistic, people-to-people programs that can
increase the level of genuine and meaningful dialogue between our
two peoples. Our task is hard, but I am sure that working
together we can succeed.
Thank you.
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
Please admit the following appointments on
June. 19
, 19
84
for
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
of
NSC
:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
(AGENCY)
BEECHER, William
CARTER, Barry
GARDNER, Richard
GATTI, Tobi
KLEINMAN, Robert
MEYER, Steven
RESOR, Stanley
SCOWCROFT, Brent
SELIN, Ivan
SONNENFELDT, Helmut
LUCK, Edward C.
MEETING LOCATION
Building
OEOB
Requested by Francesca Lapinski
Room No
248
Room No.
368
Telephone
3912
Time of Meeting 1030
Date of request
6/18/84
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (05-78)
PRESERVATION COPY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
me
THE
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
June 19, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin Today
State did not share with me their preparations for the Shultz
meeting with Dobrynin, and I have not yet seen the Shultz memo to
the President. However, I consider the following important for
the meeting:
-- The basic thrust should be to put pressure on the Soviets to
indicate where on our agenda there can be movement in response to
the movement we have already made toward theirs and might make in
the future. No concessions not already made should be signaled
in the absence of some Soviet movement. This includes
specifically the ASAT issue.
-- The summitry question must be covered, but this should be done
preferably without notetakers, and from talking points approved
by the President and in the President's name. To stress the
latter, it would be best if Shultz actually read them off a piece
of paper (which he could then give to Dobrynin). I have adapted
the talking points in your Memorandum to the President for this
purpose.
-- Shultz should stress the anomaly of the Soviet insistence that
we take up new areas (however important) while refusing to
negotiate on others, equally or more important. The tone should
nevertheless be directed at problem-solving: how we might
achieve a balance of benefits to both sides.
-- He should avoid any indication that we are seeking a summit
for its own sake and should not mention the possibility of
Dobrynin meeting with the President in the future.
Attachment:
Tab I - Talking Points on Summitry
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS M02-011 #19
SECRET/SENSITIVE
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 10/17/05
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2
TALKING POINTS ON SUMMITRY
BY LOS , NARA, DATE 10/24/00
The President is concerned that there has been little
progress in the relationship since his January speech, when he
tried to set a course of improvement.
-- The exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an
opening to get our relations on a more positive track.
-- The President is committed to progress in the
relationship, but he senses that Chairman Chernenko, faced with
the history of apparent paralysis in our relations, does not
fully grasp the importance he attaches to improving the
relationship.
-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this
question.
-- The President had not intended to discuss this issue in
public before consulting Chairman Chernenko, but Senator Baker's
unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain his attitude.
He trusts he made it clear that any decision must be a mutual
one, and that he has no intention of playing political games with allowing
the question. issues extraneous to the us-soviet relationship to
impinge upon it.
The President proposes that he and Chairman Chernenko
commit themselves to resolving the problems between us. Let us
see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.
As we do so, issues may emerge which hold promise for a
fruitful agenda at a personal meeting. As the President said at
his recent press conference, he does not believe we have to have
a treaty to sign to have a useful meeting. He understands that
this is also Chairman Chernenko's position.
At the same time, the President recognises that both he
and the Chairman must be confident that, if they meet, they can
achieve something. People in both our countries would expect
this.
-- If Chairman Chernenko agrees, the President would suggest
that they both bear in mind the possibility of developing an
agenda as we discuss the issues.
-- The President has no particular timetable in mind. The
meeting could take place when discussion of the issues would
benefit from a meeting. That could be this year or next year.
-- The President also believes that thought should be given
to the utility of arranging regular, annual meetings of the
Soviet and American political leaders. Such a practice could have
the benefit of providing a mechanism of consultation which is not
dependent on the state of relations or extraneous political
factors. This question could be a subject for discussion at an
initial meeting, or could be considered in advance of one.
-- The President would welcome Chairman Chernenko's thoughts
on these questions.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
June 19, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin Today
State did not share with me their preparations for the Shultz
meeting with Dobrynin, and I have not yet seen the Shultz memo to
the President. However, I consider the following important for
the meeting:
-- The basic thrust should be to put pressure on the Soviets to
indicate where on our agenda there can be movement in response to
the movement we have already made toward theirs and might make in
the future. No concessions not already made should be signaled
in the absence of some Soviet movement. This includes
specifically the ASAT issue.
-- The summitry question must be covered, but this should be done
preferably without notetakers, and from talking points approved
by the President and in the President's name. To stress the
latter, it would be best if Shultz actually read them off a piece
of paper (which he could then give to Dobrynin). I have adapted
the talking points in your Memorandum to the President for this
purpose.
-- Shultz should stress the anomaly of the Soviet insistence that
we take up new areas (however important) while refusing to
negotiate on others, equally or more important. The tone should
nevertheless be directed at problem-solving: how we might
achieve a balance of benefits to both sides.
-- He should avoid any indication that we are seeking a summit
for its own sake and should not mention the possibility of
Dobrynin meeting with the President in the future.
Attachment:
Tab I - Talking Points on Summitry
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS M02-011 #19 M02-011
SECRET/SENSITIVE
BY LOT , NARA, DATE 10/17/05
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#15
TALKING POINTS ON SUMMITRY
IY LOJ , NARA, DATHE 10/24/00 President is concerned that there has been little
progress in the relationship since his January speech, when he
tried to set a course of improvement.
-- The exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an
opening to get our relations on a more positive track.
-- The President is committed to progress in the
relationship, but he senses that Chairman Chernenko, faced with
the history of apparent paralysis in our relations, does not
fully grasp the importance he attaches to improving the
relationship.
-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this
question.
-- The President had not intended to discuss this issue in
public before consulting Chairman Chernenko, but Senator Baker's
unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain his attitude.
He trusts he made it clear that any decision must be a mutual
one, and that he has no intention of playing political games with
the question.
-- The President proposes that he and Chairman Chernenko
commit themselves to resolving the problems between us. Let us
see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.
-- As we do so, issues may emerge which hold promise for a
fruitful agenda at a personal meeting. As the President said at
his recent press conference, he does not believe we have to have
a treaty to sign to have a useful meeting. He understands that
this is also Chairman Chernenko's position.
-- At the same time, the President recognises that both he
and the Chairman must be confident that, if they meet, they can
achieve something. People in both our countries would expect
this.
-- If Chairman Chernenko agrees, the President would suggest
that they both bear in mind the possibility of developing an
agenda as we discuss the issues.
-- The President has no particular timetable in mind. The
meeting could take place when discussion of the issues would
benefit from a meeting. That could be this year or next year.
-- The President also believes that thought should be given
to the utility of arranging regular, annual meetings of the
Soviet and American political leaders. Such a practice could have
the benefit of providing a mechanism of consultation which is not
dependent on the state of relations or extraneous political
factors. This question could be a subject for discussion at an
initial meeting, or could be considered in advance of one.
-- The President would welcome Chairman Chernenko's thoughts
on these questions.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE.
WASHINGTON
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin: Summitry
As you know, George Shultz will be meeting with Dobrynin at 2:00
this afternoon. I believe that it is essential for him to deal
with the summit question, in view of the public attention it has
gotten, and that he should do so in your name.
I would suggest, therefore, that you approve the talking points
attached (adapted from the ones you saw earlier) for George to
give Dobrynin in private on your behalf.
Recommendation
That you approve the talking points attached.
OK
No
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
-
—
NLS F95-074/2 #16
Attachment:
BY nos , NARA, DATE 10/24/00
Tab A -- Suggested Talking Points
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET / SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
TALKING POINTS ON SUMMITRY
-- The President is concerned that there has been little
progress in the relationship since his January speech, when he
tried to set a course of improvement.
-- The exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an
opening to get our relations on a more positive track.
-- The President is committed to progress in the relation-
ship, but he senses that Chairman Chernenko, faced with the
history of apparent paralysis in our relations, does not fully
grasp the importance he attaches to improving the relationship.
-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this
question.
-- The President had not intended to discuss this issue in
public before consulting Chairman Chernenko, but Senator Baker's
unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain his attitude to
the American public. He trusts he made it clear that any decision
must be a mutual one, and that he has no intention of allowing
issues extraneous to the U.S. -Soviet relationship to impinge upon
it.
-- The President proposes that he and Chairman Chernenko
commit themselves to resolving the problems between us. Let us
see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.
-- As we discuss ways to narrow our differences, issues may
emerge which would benefit from discussion at a personal meeting.
As the President said at his recent press conference, he does not
believe we have to have a treaty to sign to have a useful meeting.
He understands that this is also Chairman Chernenko's position.
-- At the same time, the President recognises that both he
and the Chairman must be confident that, if they meet, they can
achieve something. People in both our countries would expect
this.
-- If Chairman Chernenko agrees, the President would suggest
that they both bear in mind the possibility of developing an
agenda as we discuss the issues.
-- The President has no particular timetable in mind. The
meeting could take place whenever it appears that it would be
useful. That could be this year or next year.
-- The President also believes that thought should be given
to the utility of arranging regular, annual meetings of the
Soviet and American political leaders. Such a practice could have
the benefit of providing a mechanism of consultation which is not
dependent on the state of relations or extraneous factors. This
question could be a subject for discussion at an initial meeting,
or could be considered in advance of one.
-- The President would welcome Chairman Chernenko's thoughts
on these questions.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#17
BY not NARA, DATE 10/24/00
SYSTEM II
90701
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
June 19, 1984
INFORMATION
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
NLS F95-074/2#18
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK from
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/24/00
SUBJECT:
Dobrynin on Summitry
John Wallach of Hearst Newspapers called this afternoon to say
that he had just had a fascinating conversation with Dobrynin.
(He went over to talk about his plans to visit the Soviet Union
this summer.) He found Dobrynin, he said, surprisingly upbeat on
summitry. While Dobrynin initially said he doubted a summit
would be possible this year, as the conversation wore on most
things he said were positive. For example, he disputed Wallach's
remark that he supposed August was out because the Soviets take
their vacations then. "Oh no," Dobrynin retorted, "Gromyko is
taking is vacation early this year and will be working in
August.'
Dobrynin went on to remark that with all the talk of quiet
diplomacy, he was surprised that the Administration had not
discussed the summit question with him. But he added that he had
an appointment with Shultz tomorrow, and maybe we were saving the
discussion for then. Dobrynin added that he personally liked the
Baker idea of regular summits, since this would lower
expectations and make everything easier.
Regarding what could be usefully discussed at a summit, Dobrynin
said that they would be interested in ASAT and CTB. When Wallach
suggested that we would doubtless be interested in nuclear arms,
Dobrynin said sure, each side could talk about what it wanted.
When Wallach mentioned in another context the Democratic
Convention, Dobrynin commented that they did not consider it very
important and it was unlikely to get much coverage in the Soviet
Union.
Wallach concluded from all of this that Dobrynin and Shultz would
be discussing agenda tomorrow. I offered no comment other than
to say it was an interesting conversation and thanked him for
filling me in.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
June 19, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin Today
State did not share with me their preparations for the Shultz
meeting with Dobrynin, and I have not yet seen the Shultz memo to
the President. However, I consider the following important for
the meeting:
-- The basic thrust should be to put pressure on the Soviets to
indicate where on our agenda there can be movement in response to
the movement we have already made toward theirs and might make in
the future. No concessions not already made should be signaled
in the absence of some Soviet movement. This includes
specifically the ASAT issue.
-- The summitry question must be covered, but this should be done
preferably without notetakers, and from talking points approved
by the President and in the President's name. To stress the
latter, it would be best if Shultz actually read them off a piece
of paper (which he could then give to Dobrynin). I have adapted
the talking points in your Memorandum to the President for this
purpose.
-- Shultz should stress the anomaly of the Soviet insistence that
we take up new areas (however important) while refusing to
negotiate on others, equally or more important. The tone should
nevertheless be directed at problem-solving: how we might
achieve a balance of benefits to both sides.
-- He should avoid any indication that we are seeking a summit
for its own sake and should not mention the possibility of
Dobrynin meeting with the President in the future.
Attachment:
Tab I - Talking Points on Summitry
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS M02-011 #19
SECRET/SENSITIVE
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/17/05
TALKING POINTS ON SUMMITRY
-- The President is concerned that there has been little
progress in the relationship since his January speech, when he
/SS
NLS F95-074/21F19
NARA DATE 10/24/00
tried to set a course of improvement.
-- The exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an
opening to get our relations on a more positive track.
-- The President is committed to progress in the
relationship, but he senses that Chairman Chernenko, faced with
the history of apparent paralysis in our relations, does not
fully grasp the importance he attaches to improving the
relationship.
BY LOJ
--- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this
question.
-- The President had not intended to discuss this issue in
public before consulting Chairman Chernenko, but Senator Baker's
unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain his attitude to
the American public. He trusts he made it clear that any
decision must be a mutual one, and that he has no intention of
allowing issues extraneous to the U.S.-Soviet relationship to
impinge upon it.
-- The President proposes that he and Chairman Chernenko
commit themselves to resolving the problems between us. Let us
see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.
-- As we discuss ways to narrow our differences, issues may
emerge which would benefit from discussion at a personal meeting.
As the President said at his recent press conference, he does not
believe we have to have a treaty to sign to have a useful
meeting. He understands that this is also Chairman Chernenko's
position.
-- At the same time, the President recognises that both he
and the Chairman must be confident that, if they meet, they can
achieve something. People in both our countries would expect
this.
-- If Chairman Chernenko agrees, the President would suggest
that they both bear in mind the possibility of developing an
agenda as we discuss the issues.
-- The President has no particular timetable in mind. The
meeting could take place whenever it appears that it would be
useful. That could be this year or next year.
-- The President also believes that thought should be given
to the utility of arranging regular, annual meetings of the
Soviet and American political leaders. Such a practice could have
the benefit of providing a mechanism of consultation which is not
dependent on the state of relations or extraneous factors. This
question could be a subject for discussion at an initial meeting,
or could be considered in advance of one.
The President would welcome Chairman Chernenko's thoughts
on these questions.
BECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NLS
M02-011#20
SECRET/SENSITIVE
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/17/05
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Summitry and Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations
Your masterful handling of the summit issue in your press
conference last week not only clarified your position for the
American public, but may have created an opportunity to put life
into our dialogue with the Soviets. As you think through our
strategy over the next few months and, specifically, your meeting
with Dobrynin tomorrow, the following thoughts may be helpful.
Summitry
Your position on the desirability of a summit meeting if certain
minimal conditions are met is now clear. Our immediate task is
to explore with the Soviets in confidence whether and how these
conditions can be created -- and in what time frame. As for the
meetings tomorrow with Dobrynin, I would suggest that George
review the issues and leave it to you to deal with the summit
question.
If we are to arrange a successful summit, we must approach the
question with some potential dangers in mind. First, we cannot
totally dismiss the possibility that the Soviets could use a
meeting which is not properly prepared in an effort to embarrass
you, for example by using it to hector and bully, and then
announce that your unreasonableness prevented progress. We
should, therefore, have sufficient guarantee in their prior
behavior that they are serious in attempting to narrow
differences before we commit ourselves to a meeting. This might
take little more than their willingness to agree on a potentially
productive agenda and some moderation of the verbal attacks on
you, but this should be considered the bare minimum.
Second, we must recognize that Chernenko's own political
influence may still be limited. We have little evidence that he
has consolidated his authority in any meaningful way, and unless
he is able to do so, any impact that you could make on him would
have limited affect on Soviet policy. So long as he is
politically and physically weak, his colleagues may balk at
allowing him to run the risk of exposing himself to a meeting
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
with you, where you would clearly have the upper hand in mental
and physical vigor, not to speak of political stature. The other
side of this particular coin is that a meeting could conceivably
be used by Chernenko to enhance his stature at home, and if so,
he and his immediate staff may be attracted by the idea for this
reason alone.
Finally, we must carefully avoid any actions which lead the
Soviets to believe that you need a summit for your reelection.
The political pressures on you are of course evident to them, but
this is all the more reason to avoid seeming to have fixed a
mental deadline or to be particularly anxious over the timing.
If the Soviets conclude that your motivation is largely
political, they either will refuse to play, or will ask an
exorbitant price and be attracted by strategems to embarrass you.
In sum, with this issue, how you go about it will be as important
as what you do.
The Soviet Position
The Soviets have not yet reacted publicly to your press
conference. We should hold our cheers and keep the champagne
corked, but this is not a bad sign. We may be seeing the outward
indications that they are reviewing their apparent earlier
decision not to deal with you this year. At a minimum, they must
be asking whether their public posture of intransigence is still
tenable.
Besides the unusal public silence (following many months of
automatically and systematically condemning everything you
propose), there have been two events which might be straws in the
wind revealing a growing interest on their part:
-- Robert O. Anderson of ARCO, who was in Moscow last week,
reported that his Soviet interlocutors (Arbatov and Vekikhov of
the Academy of Sciences -- both members of the Communist Party
Central Committee) commented on your press conference in a
favorable light and even indicated that a summit before November
might be possible. Just three weeks ago both were travelling
around the U.S. telling all and sundry not only that the Soviets
would not deal with you this year, but that they were likely to
stay in hibernation for another four years if you were reelected.
-- A Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade, who has often been
used to pass accurate information about the Soviet leadership in
the past, asked for a meeting with his American diplomatic
contact and said that in his "personal view" the idea of regular
summits was a good one, and that it might be possible to announce
this year that they would start next year. We have every reason
to believe that he was acting under instructions.
Your and George's meetings with Dobrynin tomorrow should shed
additional light on the Soviet attitude. Dobrynin, however, may
not provide conclusive evidence, since he will presumably be
acting under Gromyko's instructions, and we do not know whether
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
Gromyko's
Dobrynin and Chernenko's views on the subject are identical.
It would be surprising if they were, since we can presume that
Gromyko will attempt to circumscribe Chernenko's freedom of
maneuver in foreign affairs, while Chernenko may well see his
interest served by establishing his own authority. Given the
bureaucratic nature of the Soviet government, these attitudes
probably extend to the two men's personal staffs. When Gromyko
is ascendant, this affects the position of officials in the
Central Committee Secretariat, whose authority and influence
derive from the General Secretary's.
We have some indirect evidence that senior officials on Chernen-
ko's staff have been chafing over what they perceive as their
boss's weakness. Some have spoken disdainfully of Gromyko to
American visitors, calling him "our super hawk." While we
should not base policy on speculations of this sort, we should be
alert to the possibility that Chernenko's men will use the summit
issue to get their man back into the action -- and simultaneously
restore their own influence. In any case, we should continue our
efforts to establish direct contact with Chernenko's people. At
worst, this can do no harm. At best --- if we succeed -- we might
find that their interests and ours coincide on some points.
Chernenko's Letter
It is very negative, and the best that can be said of it is that
it is not at all personal. It was clearly staff written in
Gromyko's shop. While it should of course be answered, our
experience thus far in the correspondence shows that you are not
getting through to Chernenko on the personal level, and perhaps
this cannot be done with letters. They seem to be circulated
through the Soviet bureaucracy, which drafts replies calculated
not to yield an inch, lest the formal record open someone to the
charge of weakness in standing up to the Americans.
I would suggest that your reply to Chernenko's letter be relative-
ly brief, and that it make clear your disappointment that Chernen-
ko seems not yet able to approach the issues in the constructive
spirit which has motivated you, but reiterate your desire to find
a way to make progress on the issues before us. Details on the
issues could be left to oral discussion with Dobrynin -- or
subsequently by Hartman to Gromyko.
If such an approach is what you want, we could probably have a
reply ready for you to give Dobrynin tomorrow, since it would not
require extensive staff work.
Your Meeting with Dobrynin
George Shultz will have met with Dobrynin for three hours before
he brings him by to see you. You might initiate the meeting by
asking for a report on their discussion. This would set the
stage for a discussion of the summit question.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 4 -
I would suggest that you make the following points:
-- There has been little progress in the relationship since
your January speech, when you tried to set a course of
improvement.
-- Your exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an
opening to get our relations on a more positive track.
-- You are committed to progress in the relationship, but
you sense that Mr. Chernenko, faced with the history of apparent
paralysis in our relations, does not fully grasp the importance
you attach to improving the relationship.
-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this
question.
-- You had not intended to discuss this issue in public
before consulting Mr. Chernenko, but Senator Baker's unexpected
proposal made it necessary to explain your attitude. You trust
you made it clear that any decision must be a mutual one, and
that you have no intention of playing political games with the
question.
-- You would propose that you and Mr. Chernenko commit
yourselves to resolving some problems. Let us see how much
progress we can make in narrowing our differences.
-- As we do so, issues may emerge which hold promise for a
fruitful agenda. As you said at your press conference, you don't
believe we have to have a treaty to sign to have a useful
meeting. You understand that is also Mr. Chernenko's position.
-- At the same time, we both must be confident that, if we
meet, we can achieve something. We both would need to explain to
our people what progress had been made.
-- So, if Mr. Chernenko agrees, you would suggest that we
bear in mind the possibility of developing an agenda as we
discuss the issues.
-- You have no particular timetable in mind. The meeting
could take place when the issues are ripe for the two of you to
deal with personally. That could be this year or next year. And
maybe then, there could be agreement to make these things
automatic, every year. That could be an advantage over the long
run.
*****
Besides discussing the possibility of a summit, you might also
consider making two proposals which, if accepted, could provide
some direct access to Chernenko and his staff. For example, you
could suggest that, if progress continues to be slow in official
channels, consideration be given to some informal and exploratory
discussions. For example, someone from each side who is familiar
with the views of each chief of state could meet and discuss the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
issues broadly, confidentially and without commitment. Maybe
they could come up with some ideas which we could check out, and
if they seemed promising, take up officially. You could point
out that we need to find some way to break the stalemate we are
in, and if we feel that we will be committed to every word we
say, this inhibits creative thinking.
The second suggestion with the same objective would be to say
that you are prepared to meet periodically with Dobrynin, if that
is considered useful. You could add, however, that this will be
possible only if your Ambassador in Moscow is granted comparable
access to your counterpart.
If you are comfortable with an approach along these lines, I will
provide more detailed suggested talking points before the
meeting.
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
THE WHITE HOUSE
NLS M02-011*21
WASHINGTON
BY LOJ , NARA, DATE 10/17/05
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Summitry and Next Steps in U.S. -Soviet Relations
Your masterful handling of the summit issue in your press confer-
ence last week not only clarified your position for the American
public, but may have created an opportunity to put life into our
dialogue with the Soviets. As you think through our strategy
over the next few months and, specifically, your meeting with
Dobrynin tomorrow, the following thoughts may be helpful.
Summitry
Your position on the desirability of a summit meeting if certain
minimal conditions are met is now clear. Our immediate task is
to explore with the Soviets in confidence whether and how these
conditions can be created -- and in what time frame. As for the
meetings tomorrow with Dobrynin, I would suggest that George
review the issues and leave it to you to deal with the summit
question.
If we are to arrange a successful summit, we must approach the
question with some potential dangers in mind. First, we cannot
totally dismiss the possibility that the Soviets could use a
meeting which is not properly prepared in an effort to embarrass
you, for example by using it to hector and bully, and then
announce that your unreasonableness prevented progress. We
should, therefore, have sufficient guarantee in their prior
behavior that they are serious in attempting to narrow differen-
ces before we commit ourselves to a meeting. This might take
little more than their willingness to agree on a potentially
productive agenda and some moderation of the verbal attacks on
you, but this should be considered the bare minimum.
Second, we must recognize that Chernenko's own political influ-
ence may still be limited. We have little evidence that he has
consolidated his authority in any meaningful way, and unless he
is able to do so, any impact that you could make on him would
have limited affect on Soviet policy. So long as he is politi-
cally and physically weak, his colleagues may balk at allowing
him to run the risk of exposing himself to a meeting with you,
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
where you would clearly have the upper hand in mental and physi-
cal vigor, not to speak of political stature. The other side of
this particular coin is that a meeting could conceivably be used
by Chernenko to enhance his stature at home, and if so, he and
his immediate staff may be attracted by the idea for this reason
alone.
Finally, we must carefully avoid any actions which lead the
Soviets to believe that you need a summit for your reelection.
The political pressures on you are of course evident to them, but
this is all the more reason to avoid seeming to have fixed a
mental deadline or to be particularly anxious over the timing.
If the Soviets conclude that your motivation is largely political,
they either will refuse to play, or will ask an exorbitant price
and be attracted by strategems to embarrass you.
The Soviet Position
The Soviets have not yet reacted publicly to your press confer-
ence. We should hold our cheers and keep the champagne corked,
but this is not a bad sign. We may be seeing the outward indica-
tions that they are reviewing their apparent earlier decision not
to deal with you this year. At a minimum, they must be asking
whether their public posture of intransigence is still tenable.
Besides the unusal public silence (following many months of
automatically and systematically condemning everything you
propose), there have been two events which might be straws in the
wind revealing a growing interest on their part:
-- Robert O. Anderson of ARCO, who was in Moscow last week,
reported that his Soviet interlocutors (Arbatov and Vekikhov of
the Academy of Sciences -- both members of the Communist Party
Central Committee), commented on your press conference in a
favorable light and even indicated that a summit before November
might be possible. Just three weeks ago both were travelling
around the U.S. telling all and sundry not only that the Soviets
would not deal with you this year, but that they were likely to
stay in hibernation for another four years if you were reelected.
-- A Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade, who has often been
used to pass accurate information about the Soviet leadership in
the past, asked for a meeting with his American diplomatic
contact and said that in his "personal view" the idea of regular
summits was a good one, and that it might be possible to announce
this year that they would start next year. We have every reason
to believe that he was acting under instructions.
Your and George's meetings with Dobrynin tomorrow should shed
additional light on the Soviet attitude. Dobrynin, however, may
not provide conclusive evidence, since he will presumably be
acting under Gromyko's instructions, and we do not know whether
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
Dobrynin's and Chernenko's views on the subject are identical.
It would be surprising if they were, since we can presume that
Gromyko will attempt to circumscribe Chernenko's freedom of
maneuver in foreign affairs, while Chernenko may well see his
interest served by establishing his own authority. Given the
bureaucratic nature of the Soviet government, these attitudes
probably extend to the two men's personal staffs. When Gromyko
is ascendant, this affects the position of officials in the
Central Committee Secretariat, whose authority and influence
derive from the General Secretary's.
We have some indirect evidence that senior officials on Chernen-
ko's staff have been chafing over what they perceive as their
boss's weakness. Some have spoken disdainfully of Gromyko to
American visitors, calling him "our super hawk." While we
should not base policy on speculations of this sort, we should be
alert to the possibility that Chernenko's men will use the summit
issue to get their man back into the action -- and simultaneously
restore their own influence. In any case, we should continue our
efforts to establish direct contact with Chernenko's people. At
worst, this can do no harm. At best -- if we succeed -- we might
find that their interests and ours coincide on some points.
Chernenko's Letter
It is very negative, and the best that can be said of it is that
it is not at all personal. It was clearly staff written in
Gromyko's shop. While it should of course be answered, our
experience thus far in the correspondence shows that you are not
getting through to Chernenko on the personal level, and perhaps
this cannot be done with letters. They seem to be circulated
through the Soviet bureaucracy, which drafts replies calculated
not to yield an inch, lest the formal record open someone to the
charge of weakness in standing up to the Americans.
I would suggest that your reply to Chernenko's letter be relative-
ly brief, and that it make clear your disappointment that Chernen-
ko seems not yet able to approach the issues in the constructive
spirit which has motivated you, but reiterate your desire to find
a way to make progress on the issues before us. Details on the
issues could be left to oral discussion with Dobrynin -- or
subsequently by Hartman to Gromyko.
If such an approach is what you want, we could probably have a
reply ready for you to give Dobrynin tomorrow, since it would not
require extensive staff work.
Your Meeting with Dobrynin
George Shultz will have met with Dobrynin for three hours before
he brings him by to see you. You might initiate the meeting by
asking for a report on their discussion. This would set the
stage for a discussion of the summit question.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Chron
SYSTEM II
90701
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
June 19, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK for
SUBJECT:
Dobrynin on Summitry
John Wallach of Hearst Newspapers called this afternoon to say
that he had just had a fascinating conversation with Dobrynin.
(He went over to talk about his plans to visit the Soviet Union
this summer.) He found Dobrynin, he said, surprisingly upbeat on
summitry. While Dobrynin initially said he doubted a summit
would be possible this year, as the conversation wore on most
things he said were positive. For example, he disputed Wallach's
remark that he supposed August was out because the Soviets take
their vacations then. "Oh no," Dobrynin retorted, "Gromyko is
taking is vacation early this year and will be working in
August.'
Dobrynin went on to remark that with all the talk of quiet
diplomacy, he was surprised that the Administration had not
discussed the summit question with him. But he added that he had
an appointment with Shultz tomorrow, and maybe we were saving the
discussion for then. Dobrynin added that he personally liked the
Baker idea of regular summits, since this would lower
expectations and make everything easier.
Regarding what could be usefully discussed at a summit, Dobrynin
said that they would be interested in ASAT and CTB. When Wallach
suggested that we would doubtless be interested in nuclear arms,
Dobrynin said sure, each side could talk about what it wanted.
When Wallach mentioned in another context the Democratic
Convention, Dobrynin commented that they did not consider it very
important and it was unlikely to get much coverage in the Soviet
Union.
Wallach concluded from all of this that Dobrynin and Shultz would
be discussing agenda tomorrow. I offered no comment other than
to say it was an interesting conversation and thanked him for
filling me in.
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
NLS F95-074/2#20
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/24/00
SYSTEM II
90701
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONF IDENTIAL
June 19, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK from
SUBJECT:
Dobrynin on Summitry
John Wallach of Hearst Newspapers called this afternoon to say
that he had just had a fascinating conversation with Dobrynin.
(He went over to talk about his plans to visit the Soviet Union
this summer.) He found Dobrynin, he said, surprisingly upbeat on
summitry. While Dobrynin initially said he doubted a summit
would be possible this year, as the conversation wore on most
things he said were positive. For example, he disputed Wallach's
remark that he supposed August was out because the Soviets take
their vacations then. "Oh no," Dobrynin retorted, "Gromyko is
taking is vacation early this year and will be working in
August."
Dobrynin went on to remark that with all the talk of quiet
diplomacy, he was surprised that the Administration had not
discussed the summit question with him. But he added that he had
an appointment with Shultz tomorrow, and maybe we were saving the
discussion for then. Dobrynin added that he personally liked the
Baker idea of regular summits, since this would lower
expectations and make everything easier.
Regarding what could be usefully discussed at a summit, Dobrynin
said that they would be interested in ASAT and CTB. When Wallach
suggested that we would doubtless be interested in nuclear arms,
Dobrynin said sure, each side could talk about what it wanted.
When Wallach mentioned in another context the Democratic
Convention, Dobrynin commented that they did not consider it very
important and it was unlikely to get much coverage in the Soviet
Union.
Wallach concluded from all of this that Dobrynin and Shultz would
be discussing agenda tomorrow. I offered no comment other than
to say it was an interesting conversation and thanked him for
filling me in.
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLS F95-074/2 #
Declassify on: OADR
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/24/00
To: Walt Raymond
C
Comments
June 20, 1984
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ropaganda effort in the
ted to represent the US
10:
JACK MATLOCK
ly to the Communist
FR:
WALT RAYMOND un
as such.
SUBJ: Vladimov
it convinced everybody,
I have been asked by Langley whether
loubt about what the
we have completed the Vladimov's
:. A skillful use of some
"interview" with Bud McFarlane. Could
you advise me of the status and expected
prepresentation, and some-
time for transmission.
6/22
ons, makes it appear that
Attached is Steve Sestanavit's draft
ismembering Russia. This,
replies to the questions Brunot
n, and makes the Soviet
J think it would he helpful
submitted. They are good, but
of the interests and the
ateful otherwise.
to device a few "follow up questions
iew are designed to refute
and get some hard figures an
doubt.
Sov. milotrength as compared with
ours. (Sov. citizens rarelyst this,
and it illustrates what the
problem view. is from our paint &
ican media and special
and repressive policies
J Lane not yet discussed with Bad.
uation of former Russian
Russian history, tradition,
He might want to make sure
Reagan has called the
publication occurs in the fall,
this mean that Russia
not in mediately. In short, we
THE enemy?
still med more work an the problem Jack
2. The US is spending enormous sums to acquire more missiles,
more warheads, more weapons of every kind. Why? Does the US
feel threatened, and if yes, by whom? Does the US really
intend to use all those missiles against our cities, our
homes and families?
3. Is it true that only the introduction of Soviet troops
in Afghanistan has prevented an American takeover there?
support
Why do the Americans
the Afghan Mudjaheddeen, who kill
Soviet soldiers, but are so excited when the USSR arms the
Salvadoran gerillas, who do not - or not specifically -
shoot at
4903
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
UNCLASSIFIED
June 20, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
Reply to Richard Ase m Allen
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
In his letter of June 19 (Tab III), Richard Allen requested a
letter from the President to the EDU/IDU meeting in Oslo, your
comments on his East-West paper which will be discussed at the
meeting, and also your assistance in including Frank Fahrenkopf
in Brian Mulroney's meeting with the President tomorrow.
A letter to Dick dealing with these points is at TAB I. The
letter for the President's signature is at TAB II and has been
cleared with Speechwriters. Regarding Fahrenkopf, we are
checking on the possibility of having him attend the meeting. I
see no problem in principle.
Recommendation:
That you sign the letter at TAB I and authorize the President's
signature on the letter at TAB II.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Proposed response to Richard V. Allen
Tab II
Proposed letter to Alois Mock for the
President's signature
Tab III
Richard Allen's letter to you, June 19, 1984
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Dick:
I am pleased to send along the President's letter to Mock, for
your EDU/IDU meeting in Oslo. And thanks for the assist with the
drafting -- such thoughtfulness makes our life much easier.
Your East-West paper is right on the mark. I think it does an
outstanding job of explaining Soviet policy and highlighting
those areas which we must get across to public opinion in the
West. I have just a couple of suggestions regarding details:
-- Your reference to the "hotline" talks on page 7 may not be
totally accurate in saying that the Soviets "refused to
sign." There was one technical issue unresolved at our last
session, and we had not agreed on the precise form of the
document. So there was not a finished piece of paper to
sign. Perhaps a better example would be the Soviet failure
up to now to negotiate seriously on the Western proposals
for confidence-building measures in Stockholm, despite
NATO's agreement to consider the Soviet non-use-of-force
proposal if they would.
--
On page 17, lumping Mozambique with Angola and Ethopia may
be slightly misleading, given recent developments in the
former which have reduced Soviet influence.
--
The reference to a recent decline in the growth rate of
Soviet military hardware production (p. 21) might need some
qualification, since recent reports indicate that it may
have begun to rise again in 1983.
--
Finally, in your references to the "Cold War" on page 31, it
might be useful to note that the Soviet definition of
"peaceful coexistence" sounds very much like what we call
the "Cold War," which is one of a number of reasons we
should avoid the term.
These are, of course, the tiniest of nit-picks; I consider the
paper outstanding.
-2-
I am looking into the possibility of including Frank Fahrenkopf
in the President's meeting with Brian Mulroney tomorrow. As you
know, it is sometimes hard to alter the list of attendees, but
we'll do our best.
Warm regards -- and best wishes for your efforts to mobilize
world opinion on the basic East-West issues.
Sincerely,
Robert C. McFarlane
The Honorable Richard V. Allen
Senior Counsellor for Foreign Policy
and National Security
Republican National Committee
905 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Mock:
I am pleased to send my best wishes and personal
greetings to the distinguished party leaders of
the European Democrat Union. I hope that your
meetings will be productive and interesting.
Last year at this time, Vice President Bush
traveled to London to be with you for the founding
of the International Democrat Union. IDU has made
major contributions to the cohesion of democratic
nations everywhere, and your work and that of EDU
will become increasingly valuable in the years
ahead.
I am happy to note that the work of IDU, the EDU
and their counterpart for Asia, the Pacific
Democrat Union, have decided to work extensively
in the substantive areas of foreign and domestic
policies. The institutions of democracy will
benefit from your contributions, and the example
you set will serve as a beacon for others who wish
to follow the democratic path. The challenges
that face us require our collective experience as
democracies and as defenders of liberty.
May your work be rewarded with unbridled success,
and may the IDU, EDU and PDU prosper and grow.
And considering the dedicated men and women who
have assembled in Oslo for the EDU meeting, I am
sure you will.
Sincerely,
The Honorable Alois Mock
President
International Democrat Union
Oslo, Norway
4903
Republican
Please Respond to:
National
905 Sixteenth St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Committee
Telephone: 202/737-2824
Telex:
710-822-1143
Richard V. Allen
Senior Counsellor for
Foreign Policy and National Security
June 19, 1982
Dear Bud:
Herewith the draft text of the proposed letter from
the President to the EDU/IDU meeting at Oslo. If convenient,
I will carry it with me to Oslo (I leave Thursday evening by
way of Manila).
Also enclosed is a copy of my East-West paper which
will be discussed by IDU in Oslo and, shortly, released as a
statement of all twenty-one member parties representing more
than 150 million members. As it is a private draft for the
moment, I'd appreciate having your comments and suggestions.
Finally, as a matter of some urgency, and which I
mentioned in one of our previous conversations: when Brian
Mulroney meets with the President on Thursday afternoon, I
suggest that Frank Fahrenkopf be included in the meeting.
The Progressive Conservative Party is a member of IDU and PDU
with us, and the gesture will not be missed.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
Jouis Richard V. Allen
RVA:ajk
Enclosures
The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican Center: 310 First Street Southeast, Washington, D.C. 20003. (202) 863-8590
IDU
INTERNATIONAL
DEMOCRAT
JUNE 1, 1984
UNION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING COMMITTEE
-
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Secretariat:
32 Smith Square
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN
GB-LONDON SW1P 3HH
SUBJECT: DRAFT OF PAPER ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Telephone:
44 (01) 222-0847
Telex:
8955242 IDU G
Herewith the draft of the paper on East-West relations,
scheduled for discussion in Oslo on July 1, 1984.
-
Chairman:
Alois Mock
Vice-Chairmen:
Ulf Adelsohn
Richard Allen
John Atwill
Jacques Chirac
John Selwyn Gummer
Susumu Nikaido
Franz-Josef Strauss
Treasurer:
Allan Lawrence
Executive Secretary:
Scott Hamilton
Private Draft
PEACE AND SECURITY:
The International Democrat Union Assesses East-West Relations
International Democrat Union
The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
Oslo, Norway
June 30 - July 1, 1984
PEACE AND SECURITY:
The International Democrat Union Assesses East-West Relations
Contents
1. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
1
A. The Balance Sheet
2
B. Relations Today
5
2. SOVIET OBJECTIVES
7
A. Western Europe and the Peace Issue
7
B. Problems in Eastern Europe
8
C. Other Regions
11
D. Southwest Asia
11
E. Southeast Asia
12
F. The People's Republic of China
13
G. The Middle East
14
H. Iran
15
I. Central and Latin America
16
J. Africa
17
3. SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
18
A. Endemic Problems
18
B. Consumer Unrest
20
C. Defense Spending
20
4. THE WESTERN RESPONSE: TAKING THE INITIATIVE
22
A. Principles and Objectives
22
B. Arms Limitations and Reductions
23
C. Relations with Eastern Europe
24
D. Relations with The Third World
25
5. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE IDU
27
A. Shaping Perceptions Abroad
28
B. Education At Home
32
IDU DRAFT 6/84
SCFA/RVA:wm:RNC
1. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
The member parties of the International Democrat
Union meet in the Summer of 1984 to assess the status of
relations between East and West, a task that for decades has
preoccupied their leaders and the broad publics they
represent.
Some believe the East-West relationship is now
in a poor and undesirable condition, and as a consequence,
the world has edged closer to confrontation and conflict than
at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.
The dialogue between East and West has become
obstructed; arms control negotiations have been interrupted;
military spending on both sides continues in an upward
spiral; and flashpoints on the periphery of the superpowers
threaten to engulf whole regions in open warfare, while
presenting the possibility of West and East colliding in the
process of assisting allies or client states.
As members of an international organization of
committed democrats, as proponents of the democratic way of
life and the freedoms it guarantees, our understanding of
this complex relationship will have a direct influence on the
shape and context of our policies to affect it. Nothing less
than world peace depends upon the actions we take to
influence the policy process in East-West relations.
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A. The Balance Sheet
As we survey the last twenty-five years of the
relationship between East and West, we find a record that is
ambivalent and mixed. Although the dangers seem more complex
and more numerous than before, it is an undeniable fact that
we have, through collective action and dedicated unity,
avoided serious and direct confrontation and conflict with
the East.
The decade of the 1970s represents for some the
zenith of good relations between East and West, when the
dialogue was so intense and the hopes for the policy of
detente were so high. But even then, when from 1970 to 1976
summit meetings between East and West were so commonplace and
arms control negotiations were in full blossom, the Soviet
Union and its allies gave their complete backing to North
Vietnam in its quest to subjugate South Vietnam, and
ultimately supported the victorious North Vietnamese in the
subjugation of adjacent states. And even then, during the
days of detente, as trade and credits flowed from West to
East,* the Soviet Union probed at the margins of the West,
* East-West trade increased by 300 per cent in the 1970s;
Eastern debt, which financed this trade, expanded from $8
billion in 1971 to $82 billion in 1980.
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concentrating on the Third World, and simultaneously
increasing its already enormous military budget to produce
still more weapons of mass destruction.
As the decade drew to a close, the brutal invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979 rounded out a succession of Soviet or
Soviet-backed conquests: South Vietnam in 1975, Angola in
1975-76, Ethiopia in 1977, Cambodia in 1978. With this
tragic record of systematic conquest, hopes for genuine
detente vanished, and Western leaders reappraised the East-
West relationship to make the necessary adjustments in their
policies.
Beginning in 1980, the Soviet Union encountered
resistance across a broad front. This has been the
inevitable product of Soviet actions, and has given the West
the impetus to restore strength, leadership and seriousness
of purpose in its dealings with the Soviet Union. The active
diplomacy of recent years has worked, and while there have
been strains among the Western countries, such international
difficulties have been less important than the goal of unity
in the face of a mounting threat from the Soviet Union.
Yet the decade of the 1970s, despite the
disappointments and shocks, also produced a series of
agreements between East and West: the successes of Germany's
Ostpolitik; the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin; SALT I;
the U.S.-Soviet "Code of Conduct," a statement of basic
principles; numerous agreements between individual nations
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and the Soviet Union promoting trade, cultural exchange,
scientific and technological exchanges; the beginning of the
talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR); and many
others of importance.
When the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was signed at mid-decade, the
West believed that it had succeeded in codifying an era of
detente in which negotiation has replaced confrontation as a
means of resolving differences between East and West.
By and large, tensions in Europe had been
significantly eased, and a new sense of stability, hope and
cooperation replaced the suspicion and mistrust of earlier
years. Indeed, it was said that the "Iron Curtain" had begun
to disappear, and that once it had vanished, it could never
again be restored.
The increase in economic, cultural and scientific
contacts with Warsaw Pact countries had encouraged
evolutionary trends, in varying degrees, throughout Eastern
Europe. Western concerns for human rights and fundamental
freedoms had been made a legitimate part of the international
agenda. New avenues for the reduction and limitation of
nuclear and conventional arms appeared to have been opened.
Paralleling these hopeful developments, however,
were a series of ominous Soviet undertakings in the military
sphere. In the early 1970s, the USSR achieved parity with
the United States in the area of continent-spanning strategic
nuclear weapons, began an accelerated buildup of its
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conventional and continental-range nuclear capability in
Europe, and acquired a capacity for the projection of power
and military intervention on a global scale. The relentless
pressure that Moscow later exerted on the Polish government
to suppress the legitimate aspirations of its people to
determine their own affairs only sealed the downturn.
The West, it should be acknowledged, was not without
complicity in these events. At times, it exhibited a
peculiar determination to deny that the USSR did not
understand "detente" in the same way as the West understood
the term. For the Soviets, as Marxist-Leninist ideology
makes explicit, "detente" was but a phase in a larger policy
of "peaceful coexistence." As understood in Moscow, it was a
phase during which the USSR, profiting from a "relaxation" of
tensions, could achieve strategic parity with the West,
attract the technology, credits and grain needed to infuse
new life into a stagnant economy, and make "peaceful
coexistence" irreversible by extending Soviet power and
influence throughout the world.
B. RELATIONS TODAY
In the first half of 1983, despite an unprecedented
Soviet propaganda campaign to portray East-West and especially
U.S.-Soviet relations as more dangerous than at any time
since the 1962 Cuban crisis, Moscow and Washington were
cautiously exploring the possibility of a gradual renewal of
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more normal East-West contacts. This movement came to an
abrupt halt in September, however, when an unarmed Korean
civilian airliner was shot down over Kamchatka by Soviet air
defense forces. The USSR's initial silence regarding the
action, and its subsequent attempt to shift the blame for the
tragedy onto the United States, further poisoned the general
East-West atmosphere. Soviet actions since then--perhaps by
design--have not improved the climate:
In November, as NATO proceeded to execute its
1979 dual-track decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear
forces in Europe, the USSR withdrew from the intermediate-
range missile talks in Geneva, suspended strategic arms
reduction talks, and refused to set a date for the resumption
of MBFR negotiations.
In early 1983, in response to Western INF
deployment, Moscow began to deploy extended-range missiles in
the DDR and Czechoslovakia, and later moved additional
submarines closer to the shores of the United States.
In April 1983, the Soviet Northern Fleet
conducted unprecedentedly large naval maneuvers in the North
Atlantic and in the vicinity of Norway in a show of force
designed in retaliation for the INF decision; almost
simultaneously, additional Soviet submarines probed the
Swedish naval base at Karlskrona.
The Soviet Union spoke in blunt language to
Italy, suggesting that Italy would suffer the fate of
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Pompeii, and that Japan would burn in nuclear fires; and said
that the President of the United States was pursuing Hitler-
like policies.
More recently, the Soviet Union announced that it
would boycott the Olympiad in the United States; increased
its harassment of Andrei Sakharov, the dissident Soviet
physicist; rejected a Western proposal for the reduction of
conventional forces in Europe; and refused to sign an
agreement to improve the "hotline" between Washington and
Moscow.
Some in the West appear to have concluded from
recent Soviet behavior that the USSR has turned inward upon
itself, and is now feeding on resentments which could have
long-term implications for East-West relations. This is
probably what Moscow wishes us to conclude.
2. SOVIET OBJECTIVES
A. Western Europe and the Peace Issue
In our view, current Soviet behavior reflects a
tactical decision to persist in a policy which seeks to
reinvigorate the "peace" movement and influence parliaments
in Western Europe, drive wedges between NATO, Europe and the
United States, and seek to influence the outcome of the
election process in key Western countries, including Canada
and the United States.
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Although the trends that Moscow has set in motion
will not be easy to reverse, Soviet actions do not appear to
be genuine reflections of a wider policy of retrenchment.
The Soviet reaction to the initial INF deployment in Europe
did not precipitate the crisis which some in the West had
feared, and which Moscow frequently threatened. It was,
moreover, a carefully controlled reaction which played to
Western media interests, but stopped well short of completely
alienating Western public opinion and the "peace" movement.
And, although Soviet negotiators walked out of the
major US-Soviet arms fora of greatest public concern, Moscow
has kept open a range of multilateral channels of
negotiation, especially those in which West Europeans have a
particular interest. The USSR is playing a full part in the
Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the MBFR
talks in Vienna, and is participating as usual in the UN-
sponsored Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. It appears
that the Soviet leadership has carefully kept open certain
channels that could ultimately provide the circuits to reopen
discussions on a broader scale.
B. Problems in Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, economic difficulties, declining
standards of living, and pervasive nationalist sentiment
have led to tensions between the regimes and the USSR in the
political, economic and military spheres.
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Politically, the East European countries no longer
look to the Soviet Union for guidance or show it
unquestioning obedience. Their independence and freedom of
action continue to be constrained by the Brezhnev Doctrine,
and they must express official support for Soviet positions.
East European leaders, however, increasingly resent
interference from Moscow in their internal affairs and are
inclined to see their primary political challenge to be one
of steering a delicate course between Soviet pressures for
"socialist unity" and, in varying degrees, popular pressures
for political and economic change.
The challenge posed by Solidarity in 1980-81 to the
supremacy of Communist Party rule in Poland, in particular,
shook the foundations of the East besides exposing the
hollowness of the Communist Party's claim to the "leading
role" in society, the events symbolized the failure of
Marxism-Leninism to inspire loyalty in the mass of East
European populations.
In the economic sphere, Soviet supplies of energy,
raw materials and hard currency goods are only partly offset
by East European supplies of machinery and agricultural
produce. In consequence, Moscow persists in pushing for
closer integration within CMEA, both to tighten the economic
cohesion of the Warsaw Pact and to redress the balance of
trade. As was evident at the recent CMEA summit meeting,
however, East European leaders are adept at finding ways of
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resisting being bound more closely to a Soviet economy they
regard as second-rate and simply inferior. In the future,
Soviet inability to subsidize East European economies to the
extent required will increase pressures within those
countries for credits to import technology from the West.
Finally, East European regimes, in varying degrees,
are resisting Soviet pressure for increased levels of
military spending. Activists from church, peace, and human
rights groups in the German Democratic Republic and
Czechoslovakia -- most of them young people -- publicly
opposed the arrival earlier this year of new Soviet nuclear
missiles on their territories. Even the Communist leaders in
those countries hinted at misgivings. Romania openly called
for the withdrawal from Europe of both NATO and Soviet
nuclear forces.
Soviet leaders, understandably, will not publicly
acknowledge the degree of their concern about the direction
events are taking in Eastern Europe. But the "lessons of
Poland" have become a subject of quasi-official debate in the
Soviet Union. Although unlikely to have immediate or perhaps
significant effect, some Soviet party officials do not
disguise their view that the Polish experience should serve
as a crucially important lesson for the USSR, given its own
serious internal economic difficulties and societal strains.
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C. Other Regions
The Soviet Union views the Third World as the main
area of competition with the West. Since the mid-1970s,
Moscow has relied on its recently acquired ability to project
military power over large distances as the main instrument of
a policy to tip the scale in regional contests in favor of
"socialist oriented" states. Diplomatically, it has sought
to convince the neutral and nonaligned that the USSR is their
"natural" ally. More recently, however, Soviet leaders have
spoken as if the economic burden of supporting client states
is forcing them to be more selective in their commitments and
therefore to set some limits to their appetite.
D. Southwest Asia
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979
was a watershed for East-West and US-Soviet relations.
Subsequent Soviet efforts to crush the proud and determined
Afghan freedom fighters have also severely damaged the USSR's
standing in the Third World. Islamic states, in particular,
sympathize with the insurgent Mujaheddin and their war of
attrition against the more numerous and better-equipped
Soviet troops. The parties of the IDU express their strong
support for, and solidarity with, those Afghans who combine
their struggle for freedom against a brutal and relentless
occupying force from the Soviet Union.
As frequently demonstrated since the death of
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President Brezhnev, the Soviets are masters of encouraging
Western speculation that they are exploring a political
solution to the war in Afghanistan. Thus far, however,
Moscow appears to be sticking to preconditions for a
political settlement that are unacceptable to neighboring
states directly affected, and to a majority of UN-member
states.
The April 1984 campaign in the Panshjir for the
first time featured large-scale bombing by TU-16 Badgers and
SU-24 fighter-bombers in a massive application of force
designed to sweep the valley of insurgents. Like the half
dozen previous Soviet attempts to control the valley,
however, it appears to have been largely unsuccessful. In
consequence, Moscow presumably must either return to small
scale engagements, or combine large-scale operations with the
introduction of the massive numbers of additional troops that
would be necessary to control the insurgency.
E. Southeast Asia
Soviet support for Vietnam in its occupation of
Cambodia and its border conflict with the People's Republic of
China is likely to continue. In return, Moscow gains a means
of containing China and the use of strategic assets,
including a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay that sits astride one
of the world's major sea lanes.
Moscow seeks to separate and intimidate Japan from
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strengthening its close ties with the United States on
security issues, and to press Japanese leaders to abandon
their stand on territorial issues, specifically rejecting
Japan's demand for the return of the Kurile Islands seized by
the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Japanese public
opinion was deeply shocked by the shooting down of the
unarmed Korean Air Lines jetliner, and Soviet behavior toward
rescue and salvage efforts were thought by Japan to be very
distasteful.
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union's need for massive
amounts of capital and construction equipment to support
large-scale projects in the Far Eastern USSR means that the
Soviet leadership will continue its efforts to attract
Japanese investment and technology.
F. People's Republic of China
In dealings with China, Moscow seeks to prevent any
recurrence of tension or hostilities on its eastern borders,
and to frustrate development of any strategy perceived as
designed to encircle the Soviet Union.
The USSR has proposed a declaration of key
principles for Soviet-Chinese relations and a joint draft of
confidence measures. It is unlikely, however, to make
concessions on security issues, as demanded by the Chinese,
or to jeopardize relations with Vietnam and Mongolia by
making a deal with China at their expense.
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In the future, Moscow will focus on "atmospherics"
and seek additional positive changes in the area of trade and
cultural ties. In large measure, the publicity it will
accord the process of normalizing relations with the PRC will
continue to be a function of the state of US-Soviet
relations. Soviet leaders doubtless expect the diplomatic
progress to be slow. But -- with an eye to its effect in the
West, and particularly Washington -- they will seek to foster
the impression that it is proceeding better, and more
swiftly, than is actually the case.
G. Middle East
Since its ouster from Egypt in the early 1970s,
Moscow's aim in the Middle East has been to overcome its
isolation in a strategic area and regain a voice in the
region's diplomacy. Thus far it has combined support for the
Arab cause against Israel with persistent efforts to
undermine Western peace efforts. At the same time, however,
it seeks to avoid being dragged into a Mideast confrontation
at a time, or on a scale, not of its own choosing.
The USSR was publicly humiliated during the 1982
Lebanon War when huge amounts of Soviet armament in the hands
of the Syrians were destroyed by Israeli forces. Since then,
it has rapidly regained and steadily improved its position,
largely through a major military resupply program for Syria
that has included air defense missiles, sophisticated command
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and control equipment, and some 7,000 military experts and
advisers. Under the cloak of the military might of a
resurgent Syrian client, the Soviet Union seeks to displace
Western influence and to gain hegemony in a region already
threatened with conflict and political instability across a
wide geographic front.
Intermittent Soviet statements of support for Syria
pointedly avoid the kind of unambiguous or open-ended
military commitment likely to encourage a final showdown.
Nonetheless, in case of a direct Israeli threat to Syria --
as opposed to Syrian forces in Lebanon -- Moscow may be
persuaded to give its active support in a Syrian
counterthrust. The implications of such a move are ominous.
Although Soviet influence in the area is likely to
remain limited, recent American setbacks in Lebanon, and
general Arab disillusionment with Western efforts to redress
their grievances may provide the Soviet Union an opening for
a challenge to Western influence of the Mideast scene.
H. Iran
Soviet relations with Iran are poor and not likely
to improve even after the Ayatollah Khomeini's death.
Several months ago, Moscow's protestations proved powerless
to save Tudeh Party members from execution. More recently,
some Soviet technical and economic advisers and their
families returned to the USSR. The situation of those
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remaining appears precarious.
Arms deliveries to Iraq have increased, belying
Moscow's public profession of even-handedness on the Iran-
Iraq War. Soviet and Iranian Foreign Ministers recently
conferred in Moscow, apparently on ways to impede the United
States from using the hostilities to increase its military
presence in the region. An Iranian victory giving further
stimulus to Shiite fundamentalism in the area could
undermine conservative Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf.
This would clearly improve Moscow's geopolitical position by
severely weakening that of the United States.
I. Central and Latin America
In Central and Latin America, the USSR seeks low-
risk opportunities to challenge the United States in its own
hemisphere and to divert its attention from areas of more
strategic interest to Moscow. Specific Soviet aims include
backing Cuba militarily and economically, to consolidating
influence in Nicaragua, and forming closer ties with local
Communist Parties and left-wing movements in the area beyond.
The recent US action in Grenada, which the member parties of
IDU have endorsed in their December 1983 meeting at Canberra,
and the memory of the 1962 showdown off Cuba, will make
Soviet leaders especially sensitive to involvements that
might escalate into a direct confrontation with the United
States.
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J. Africa
Recent statements and actions by Soviet leaders
indicate that the USSR remains committed to the regimes in
Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia and is determined to provide
them the military assistance they need to stay in power.
Soviet inability to compete with the West in providing those
countries trade, development aid, and technology on a scale
approaching their needs, will constitute a significant long-
term liability.
In southern Africa, the Soviet Union thus far has
been unable to obstruct the American-sponsored drive for a
diplomatic solution to many of the region's most pressing
problems. Other events, too, suggest the limits of Moscow's
leverage in the area. In mid-February, South Africa and
Angola signed an agreement obliging the Angolans to curb the
activities of South-West African insurgents, in return for
the withdrawal of South African invasion forces. In mid-
March, South Africa signed a non-agression pact with
Mozambique which, like Angola, is a Marxist former Portuguese
colony with close ties to Cuba.
It is not clear whether the Soviet Union will go
along with recent peace moves, or if Cuba will remove its
troops in Angola to end South African incursion and support
for UNITA and pave the way for independence for Namibia. If
Moscow continues a policy of seeking to undermine relations
between governments in power and the Western world, it risks
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demonstrating to regional leaders that, despite its frequent
claims to play a diplomatic role in the area, the USSR offers
neither positive goals nor the prospect of a more stable,
prosperous future.
3. SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
The Soviet economy is the second largest in the
world; it is cumbersome, archaic and irrational in Western
and free market terms, but it is also resilient and is by no
means approaching a collapse. Many of the problems that have
been constraining economic growth in the USSR since the late
1970s, however, are now just reaching the peak of severity.
Inevitably, this will have some impact on Soviet defense and
foreign policies. Whether it will contribute to more
moderate Soviet behavior abroad, or whether it will stimulate
a sense of desperation at the prospect of falling behind the
West in the military competition, remains to be seen.
Therefore, whether we can influence the Soviet leadership in
its basic choices will remain a central task of the non-
Communist world's diplomacy and strategy; we must constantly
probe the closed Soviet system and leadership, making our own
intentions clear while trying to determine theirs.
A. Endemic Problems
The USSR has an enormous endowment of natural
resources and a huge industrial plant. Much of its fuel and
raw materials lie in nearly inaccessible regions, however,
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and are enormously costly to extract and refine. In recent
years "bottlenecks," such as an inadequate transportation
system for both raw materials and finished products, have
contributed to a falloff in industrial growth.
Agricultural production is an intractable, permanent
problem in the USSR. It is hostage to weather conditions in
the Soviet Union to a far greater degree than in most
developed countries, and the constraints on individual
freedom and productivity have been costly to the nation as a
whole. Of the many enigmas surrounding the Soviet Union, the
leadership's inability to feed the population and to harness
the latent riches of the land remains one of the most
striking.
Labor productivity is low throughout the USSR and,
since the mid-1970s, the country has also been plagued by
declining increments to the working-age population. Despite
reform of the educational system to stress vocational
training, the Soviet Union is likely to suffer from a
shortage of skilled labor throughout the decade. Yet another
factor in population growth is the rapid and disproportionate
increase among ethnic minorities throughout the Soviet Union,
leading to eventual problems of cultural and linguistic
tension as these minorities assume numerical importance in
the total population of the Soviet Union.
To these important difficulties must be added the
well-known systemic problems rooted in the USSR's system of
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planning and managing the economy. Externally, the Soviet
Union is also providing support to the stagnating economies
of Eastern Europe; to clients further afield, such as Cuba;
and is fighting a costly war in Afghanistan.
B. Consumer Unrest
Not surprisingly, Soviet economic growth rates in
recent years have been well below the rate achieved during
most of the 1970s. Last year's slight recovery, facilitated
in part by some slight productivity gains from the
"discipline campaign," did not invalidate the general trend.
Total per capita consumption appears to have leveled off, and
the availability of quality foods and nonfood consumer goods
has declined generally. Although Soviet leaders promise
"additional production" of consumer goods, they must also
admit that any improvement in the standard of living will be
slow, and that significant improvement in the lot of the
average Soviet citizen is to be expected only in the distant
future.
C. Defense Spending
Despite the many problems, reliable analyses
estimate that military expenditures in the USSR continue to
rise. The burden of defense--the share of GNP devoted to
defense--remains roughly constant at 13-14%, far in excess of
the legitimate defensive needs of the nation.
In at least one major area, however, procurement of
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military hardware, expenditure appear to have levelled off
since 1976. This suggests that Soviet leaders have already
begun to find resource allocation decisions between civilian
and military needs especially difficult. Any major effort to
accelerate sharply the level of military procurement would
require lower civilian investment and slower economic growth,
or even a fall in per capita consumption. These are highly
undesirable consequences for the Soviet leadership.
An accelerated arms race to develop military
technology across the board would also render the underlying
problems of the Soviet economy particularly acute. This is
especially true now that the Western states have agreed that
in their bilateral economic relations with the East they must
avoid dependence on the USSR for strategic materials, and
must not contribute to the growth of Soviet military
capabilities.
In past decades, Soviet leaders have at times
responded to serious economic difficulties by lowering the
nation's profile abroad and seeking a brief respite from
international tensions; this is the classic Soviet strategy
of "Peredyshka," or "pause," a "breathing space."
The West, however, obviously cannot gamble on the
internal economic problems or temporary distractions of its
adversaries. It must seize the initiative, both in providing
for its defense and in creating the conditions for the
possibility of a more constructive East-West dialogue. Only
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in this way can an active diplomacy, based on clear-cut
perceptions of the future and implemented in accordance with
a long-range strategy, have a significant chance of
influencing Soviet behavior and encouraging a future Soviet
leadership to take steps toward ensuring peace.
4. THE WESTERN RESPONSE: TAKING THE INITIATIVE
A. Principles and Objectives
The Member Parties of the IDU, like the nations they
represent, are committed to the principles of individual
liberty and the rule of law, the peaceful settlement of
disputes, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state. Their objectives are to maintain their
freedoms and way of life, to deter aggression and war, and to
create the conditions for a lasting peace among the countries
of East and West.
The essential condition for achieving these aims is
the maintenance of effective defenses and political cohesion
through cooperation in NATO, with allies and friends in the
Middle East and Asia, and through individual national
efforts. The maintenance of the integrity of Third World
nations, who wish to remain apart from what they perceive to
be the "superpower conflict," is also of primary importance
in maintaining the peace.
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B. Arms Limitations and Reductions
The West must neither cede the "peace" and
"disarmament" issues to the East, nor join in a contest that
manipulates the hopes and fears of millions for propaganda
and narrow purposes of gaining unilateral advantage. Western
publics are justified in their demands that governments be as
tireless in the pursuit of equitable, verifiable arms
agreements, as they are in maintaining military security and
defense.
At the same time, however, the West must resist the
temptation to view arms control as an end in itself, a self-
contained whole, or as the "centerpiece and barometer" of
East-West relations. As Afghanistan has shown, the arms
control process cannot in practice be insulated from what
happens in the larger international sphere. So long as
nations seek to pursue both arms agreements and foreign
conquests, arms control will be a cause of disillusionment
and the erosion of political trust.
The Member Parties of the IDU welcome proposals from
the Soviet Union and the East that offer realistic and
constructive ways of overcoming the obstacles and the
problems now affecting the arms reduction process. Western
states, without exception, are prepared to join with them, at
a time and place of their choosing, to discuss arms
agreements that will reduce the risks of agression and war
and result in significant reductions of weapons and forces.
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On specific issues, the IDU supports proposals
leading to
deep reductions in strátegic ballistic missiles
and warheads belonging to the United States and
USSR, and limitations on other strategic systems
to enhance strategic stability.
radical reductions in intermediate-range nuclear
forces, with the ultimate objective of their
complete elimination.
reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional
forces manpower in Central Europe to a common
ceiling.
militarily significant, politically binding and
verifiable confidence and security building
measures designed to increase the transparency
of military activity in Europe, and thereby guard
against the possiblity of surprise attack.
a global, verifiable ban on chemical weapons.
The Member Parties of the IDU express their
satisfaction with the May 1984 statement of Foreign Ministers
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at Washingtonthat
acknowledges: "dialogue can only be fruitful if each party
is confident of its security and is prepared to respect the
legitimate interests of others: military strength alone
cannot guarantee a peaceful future."
C. Relations With Eastern Europe
The Members of the IDU will continue to encourage
the nations of Eastern Europe to assert the individual
national characters reflecting their great cultural and
historical traditions. It is both in our interests and a
part of our human concern for these nations that they evolve
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gradually into more tolerant societies in which basic human
rights are protected and actually advanced. High-level
visits, on political and economic levels, cultural,
scientific and technological exchanges, the free flow of
information and ideas are all appropriate ways in which the
West can respond to evidence that individual regimes in
Eastern Europe are modifying their internal and foreign
policies in ways that will improve relations.*
Trade, too, should be encouraged, with due regard
for commercial and financial prudence and the requirements of
Western security. The issue of trade, inevitably linked with
the transfer of technology and the extension of long-term
financial credits, must at all costs, be a symbol of unity
among the IDU countries, and not a contentious issue
reflecting permanent quarrels.
D. Relations with the Third World
We do not wish the East-West competition to be
extended to other regions of the world, such as Africa and
Central America. We acknowledge that the roots of many Third
*Editorial Footnote:
Recent information concerning the vote of Bulgaria on the
recent attempted assasination of Pope John Paul II should be
weighed in this discussion; there is evidence of growing
support for strong measures to be taken vis-a-vis Bulgaria if
ths information is verified by the Italian tribunal.
IDU DRAFT 6/84
26
World crises are indigenous, and therefore not the product of
East-West confrontation. For large segments of the
populations in the Third World, conditions of life are
intolerable, or nearly so. But we cannot and will not accept
the exploitation of these conditions by hostile outside
forces--specifically, by Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union,
frequently operating in concert with or through other
satellite states and terrorist organizations.
The activities and ambitions of the Soviet Union
make it impossible to divorce completely our concern for the
Third World's need for stability and development from
challenges created by Soviet expansionism whether direct or
indirect.
We do not consider social changes, indigenous
reform, or even indigenous revolution a an security threat
to the West. More often than not, such reforms or revolutions
embody ideas and aspirations we can share and appreciate, and
which are deeply rooted in our own respective traditions and
cultures.
But we do condemn the intrusion of aggressive
outside powers--seeking to exploit local grievances in
various regions of the world in order to expand their own
political influence and military control--as a serious threat
to the balance of power, which has for so long kept the
peace. History and bitter experience teach that piecemeal
advances by aggressors, unchecked and unchallenged, can
IDU DRAFT 6/84
27
ultimately lead to wider conflict and even to war. We will
not acquiesce in Soviet or surrogate advances or threats to
stability and legitimate Western interests.
In relations with the Third World, the IDU
encourages the creation and strengthening of moderate
regional groupings, and will work bilaterally and through
multilateral institutions to promote political, economic, and
social development. We are prepared to recommend and
encourage military assistance to key states in regions of
vital interest that appear vulnerable, and the use of
militarymeans to deter or repulse aggression where no other
remedy appears feasible.
5. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE IDU
The sudden proliferation of modern means of
communication now offers masses of ordinary people in East
and West, North and South, unprecedented access to
information and ideas. Regrettably, this means that
ideologies incorporating a more or less elaborate system of
opinions are not "dead." We may disagree about the
importance of ideology in shaping the perspective of a
nation. No one, however, can examine the political landscape
of our world today without concluding that ideologies
continue to play a major role in forming the political
understanding or, at least, the reflex actions of much of
contemporary humanity.
IDU DRAFT 6/84
28
To some extent, we owe our renewed appreciation of
the central role of public opinion in the development and
implementation of foreign policy to Soviet and other
communist efforts to exploit the freedom of discussion and
independent news media of Western societies for the purpose
of grossly distorting democratic values, principles and
objectives.
This imposes upon the member parties of the IDU a
double challenge. We must insist on our right to influence
Soviet and East European public opinion, and insure that
Western determination to maintain its principles and
objectives is effectively communicated to the leaders of
those countries. At the same time, we must see to it that
our domestic publics, and especially our youth, receive a
continuing education in the basic values of democracy, and in
the political and military measures being taken to defend and
preserve them.
A. Shaping Perceptions Abroad
The new Soviet leadership has pledged continuity
with the policies of its predecessors, meaning that its
underlying approach to the West will continue to be that of a
determined adversary. They, not we, have chosen to define
the relationship in these strident terms. We should be
mistaken, therefore, if we were to anticipate sudden shifts
in Soviet policy toward us.
IDU DRAFT 6/84
29
At the same time, however, in recent months there
have been occasional signs of uncertainty among Soviet
leaders about how best to manage East-West relations. We
would also be mistaken were we to draw premature
conclusions on the basis of such indications.
Soviet leaders, as in the past, will be reluctant to
adopt positions which might appear to have been forced upon
them by outside pressure. We must keep in mind, however,
that their opinions are not as uniform as their public
statements and propaganda would suggest. This should be of
especial concern to the West now that a younger generation of
Politburo leaders ** stands poised to take over from aging
leadership.
The perspective of the future generation of Soviet
leaders is of fundamental importance to us, and the debate
that takes place within its ranks is one in which we will
continue to have an important stake. Attempts to shape that
perspective must become an urgent priority of leaders in the
West, and to that end we must intensify our own internal
process of consultation and coordination.
As the Western alliance continues the process of
consolidation in political and deterrent military terms, some
**Mikhail Gorbachev (53), Grigory Romanov (61) and Vitality
Vorotnikov (58), among them.
IDU DRAFT 6/84
30
Soviet leaders may advance the notion that the West, led by
the United States, is taking steps to alter the military
balance in a way that is both highly dangerous and which may
not be reversed in the future. From this, they may conclude
that the Soviet Union will soon enter a period of great
danger, and that "hardline" policies toward the West, based
on implicit threats and great pressure, should be the
motivating principle of Soviet policy.
The member parties of the IDU have a fundamental
interest in assuring that such a perception does not come to
dominate the thinking of the Soviet leadership. By the same
token, our attempts to convey to the leadership a spirit of
willingness to engage in constructive dialogue need not imply
the surrender of basic principles and positions merely for
the purpose of engaging it in serious discussion of the long
agenda before East and West.
A firm, principled defense of Western positions,
duly taking into account the overriding interests of
preserving peace and safeguarding the interest of other
nations, such as those of the Third World, is the only
reasonable basis on which to engage Soviet leadership.
The experience of recent years has demonstrated to
us that division among the partners of the West can encourage
the Soviet Union to exploit differences within our ranks to
sow seeds of discord and contention. Cohesion and steadfast
determination is more likely to yield positive results,
IDU DRAFT 6/84
31
although to the extent that the West succeeds in maintaining
this desirable approach, to that same extent the Soviet
leadership may appear displeased and hostile.
Somber warnings of a "new Cold War" emanating from
West and East are, we believe, both inaccurate and inadequate
to describe the state of relations between East and West.
Individually and collectively, the member parties of the IDU
earnestly seek to avoid both the form and the content of Cold
War in the context of policy toward the Soviet Union. We
will do well to keep this clearly in mind as we determine the
future course of our relations with the emerging Soviet
leadership.
Because we stand for democratic principles and the
freedoms that only democracy can give and sustain, and
because we have maintained the essential unity of our
partnership for 80 many years, we have succeeded in
demonstrating the superiority of the democratic way. We have
nothing at all to apologize for as we continue along this
path.
Above all, we recognize clearly that this very
success, reflected in the relative well-being of the Western
countries today, may contribute to current Soviet attitudes
toward the West, and may continue to shape the perspective of
the leadership of the future. In this special sense, the
enormous asset of our democratic success stands in stark
contrast to the totalitarian shortcomings of the Soviet Union
IDU DRAFT 6/84
32
and its client states, and will therefore remain as an
irritant in the East-West relationship. As democrats, we
must be mindful of this innate strength, and be careful to
assure that it is never compromised or bargained away.
B. Education at Home
Our most critical task as member parties of the IDU,
however, lies not in shaping perceptions of future Soviet
leaders or even the Third World. Important as these tasks
are, they pale in comparison with the challenge that lies in
the West itself.
The IDU must play a major role in convincing Western
publics--especially the young--that the Western deterrence
and defense posture, which is the guarantee of international
peace and stability, is being achieved on the basis of a
military balance set at the lowest possible level. We must
also not weary of the persistent search for common ground
between East and West, and for verifiable arms control and
arms reduction. For only this will demonstrate to Western
publics that their governments do not pursue deterrence and
military security as ends in themselves, but as the necessary
and legitimate means for the continued enjoyment of our
liberties, our spiritual aspirations, and our chosen way of
life.
In the months and years ahead, the IDU must take the
lead in creating a domestic consensus in its member countries
IDU DRAFT 6/84
33
for the "grand strategy" that emerges naturally from our
traditions and our common achievements, and is firmly
anchored in our highest aspirations. We must reaffirm and
revitalize Western belief in liberal democracy as a
political system and a way of life that is as morally
superior to the Communist alternative--as it so clearly is in
providing for our present and future material wellbeing.
Suggested letter from the
President to EDU and IDU
Oslo, Norway June 1984
The Honorable
Alois Mock
President
International Democrat Union
Oslo, Norway
Dear Dr. Mock:
I am pleased to send my very best wishes and
personal greetings to the distinguished party leaders of the
European Democrat Union. I hope that your meetings will be
productive and interesting.
Last year at this time Vice President George Bush
traveled to London to be with you for the founding of the
International Democrat Union. This important step has been a
major contribution to the cohesion of democratic nations
everywhere, and the work of the IDU and EDU organizations
will become increasingly valuable in the years ahead.
I am particularly happy to note that the work of the
IDU, the EDU and their counterpart for Asia, the Pacific
Democrat Union, have decided to work extensively in the
substantive areas of foreign and domestic policies. The
institutions of democracy will benefit from your important
contributions, and the example you set will serve as a beacon
for others who wish to follow the democratic path. The
contrast between democratic societies and totalitarian
systems is stark, and the challenges that face us in the
future require that we rely on our collective experience as
democracies and as defenders of liberty.
May your work be rewarded with success, and may the
IDU, EDU and PDU prosper and grow through the efforts of
dedicated men and women such as those who have assembled for
these meetings in Oslo.
National Security Council
The White House
I
System #
Package #
4903
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y
Bob Kimmitt
John Poindexter
/
R
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
2
NSC Secretariat
3
A
Situation Room
Staff to Matlock for for
action ASAP Need
letter for President
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Meese Baker Deaver Other
by COB 6/20.
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Bot,
Bud sent Jack mattock a
PROFS note giving him a leads
up on this genetrage of
MSG FROM: NSPBT --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
06/18/84 19:55:27
To: NSGVE --CPUA
NOTE FROM: PAUL THOMPSON
Subject: Forwarding Note 06/18/84 18:30 Note to Jack Matlock
***FORWARDED NOTE***
To: NSPBT --CPUA
EXPEDITE
-VATA
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock
Dick Allen called. As I mentioned earlier he will leave soon to attend the
meeting in Oslo of the IDU/EDU. He would like to carry a letter from the
President to the group. That seems ok to me. He will drop off the draft
tomorrow and a draft of his remarks at the conference on E-W relations. Please
prepare the letter and send it over unless you see a problem. Also let me know
of any problems in his remarks if any. Many thanks.
CC: NSJMP --CPUA
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By L.Vitt NARA, Date 6/21/99
SECRET
4936
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
June 20, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
The
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK/TYRUS COBB
SUBJECT:
Mitterrand 1982 Memcon
We have searched the files (as has the Secretariat) and there is
no record of a memcon from the Mitterrand-Reagan working visit in
March of 1982 here or at State. Interestingly, Jim Rentschler
apparently foresaw a problem developing in this area and sent the
attached memo to Clark regarding the advisability of having a
notetaker there.
On the specific issue of the French pledge on terminating arms
deliveries to Nicaragua, you may have some record in the West
Wing files. However, in the exchange with the French in April
over Cheysson's reputed offer of French assistance to Managua in
Mine-clearing operations, the French tacitly endorsed the
non-transfer of arms commitment by underlining that the Cheysson
proposal did not violate the Mitterrand pledge.
Attachment
cc: Oliver North
Constantine Menges
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#22
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/24/00
SECRET SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
JUNE 20,1984
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER
17- LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.