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Matlock Chron November 1984 (3)
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Matlock Chron November 1984 (3)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron November 1984 (3)
Box: 6
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 11/27/1984
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER (3/3)
FOIA
F06-114/1
Box Number
6
YARHI-MILO
610
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6293 MEMO
MEMO FOR JOHN POINDEXTER RE
2 11/27/1984 B1
MEETING WITH EDWARD FREDKIN
THURSDAY NOVEMBER 29 [13-14]
R
6/23/2010
M125/2
6294 MEMO
MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE
2 11/28/1984 B1
PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO
EASTERN EUROPE [23-24]
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
6295 MEMO
MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
1
ND
B1
QUESTIONS FROM MARVIN KALB (SAME
AS 6288 W/O ANNOTATIONS)[26]
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
6296 MEMO
MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE
1 11/26/1984 B1
QUESTIONS FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM MARVIN KALB (SAME TEXT AS 6288
W/O ANNOTATIONS)[29]
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
6297 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6296 [30]
1 11/26/1984 B1
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
7341 Chron
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 27, 1984
Mattock
Dear Margaret:
Thank you for your letter of September 28 suggesting
that we discuss, during Foreign Minister Gromyko's
visit, cooperation with the Soviet Union in assisting
handicapped citizens. Your proposal was passed to the
Soviet delegation in the meetings we held.
It seems to me that your proposal would be eminently
suitable for inclusion in the activites covered by the
U.S. -USSR agreement for cooperation in health. As you
know, we hope that it will be possible to reactivate
this agreement in the near future. When you begin
discussions with the Soviet Ministry of Health regarding
this agreement, I hope that you could include a proposal
regarding assistance to the handicapped as part of the
joint work plan.
Sincerely,
Bud Robert C. McFarlane
The Honorable Margaret M. Heckler
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
2
7341
SAAN
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
UNITED
WASHINGTON DC 20201
September 28, 1984
Dear Bud,
Enclosed is the proposed paragraph for
the introduction of the handicapped issue in
the Gromyko meetings.
There are 36 million disabled citizens in
the United States, and I am sure many more in
the Soviet Union. As these meetings serve the
goal of general survival, they can also serve
the goal of improving the personal quality of
life and individual survival.
Obviously we can provide extensive elaboration
on the issue of the handicapped, but I thought
a more general statement introducing the issue
and setting up a process of communication between
the two nations would be a wiser beginning.
I hope that this issue can be raised. It
would e fortuitous for both countries. I will
be waiting to hear from you on what discussion
actually occurred on the subject.
Sincerely,
HECKLER
3
7341
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20201
September 28, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
FROM
: Margaret M. Heckler
Secretary of Health and Human Services
SUBJECT
: Technology and the Disabled
Background
A significant segment of the U.S. population -- estimated
at 35 million -- have physical, developmental, mental and/or
emotional disabilities. Recognizing the situation, the
President proclaimed 1983-1992 as the decade of the disabled
with the clear intention of enhancing the quality of their lives
and expanding their job opportunities.
Included in the 35 million are approximately 4 million
seriously disabled whose quality of life and opportunities have
historically been severely constrained. The thrust of the
Presidential Proclamation is clearly aimed at all of the
disabled population including the most severely disabled.
Clearly, one of the major opportunities in this field rests
in the area of technology. In brief, advancing technology can
address this area in two principal ways. On the one hand, it
can be utilized to greatly expand communications thus
significantly extending the knowledge of and (thus) exploitation
of the range of services, medical approaches, local
organizations and job opportunities that presently exist.
Secondly, technology can in and of itself respond to
specific and particular problems of the disabled by providing
"technological solutions" to the disability problems. Light-
weight "portable" wheelchairs were developed from technology
coming out of the NASA Program. Ocular Control Systems are
presently the subject of much discussion. A variety of other
possibilities exist.
To pursue the opportunities inherent in technology vis-a-vis
the problems of the disabled, I have chaired several meetings
under the aegis of the President's Private Sector Initiatives
with people from the aerospace/technology community including
the Tandy Corporation, Boeing, TRW and General Dynamics. We
have also discussed this at some length with Sir Keith Josephs
(Department of Science and Education) and The Honorable Tony
Newton, (Health and Social Services) on my recent trip to
the U.K. There are possibilities for substantial international
cooperation.
With the meeting that is presently scheduled with the
leaders of the Soviet Union, it strikes me as an excellent
opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to
cooperate in the exchange of technology that would be beneficial
to handicapped people throughout the world. The benefits of
such an exchange of medical technology in assisting the
handicapped would lend itself well to significant cooperative
efforts that would be especially effective to both countries and
perhaps would pave the way for further cooperation in other
areas as we move toward a responsible Arms Control Agreement at
some point in the future.
7341
SECURITY HEIMAN
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20201
USA
P 1: 17
September 28, 1984
Dear Bud,
Enclosed is the proposed paragraph for
the introduction of the handicapped issue in
the Gromyko meetings.
There are 36 million disabled citizens in
the United States, and I am sure many more in
the Soviet Union. As these meetings serve the
goal of general survival, they can also serve
the goal of improving the personal quality of
life and individual survival.
Obviously we can provide extensive elaboration
on the issue of the handicapped, but I thought
a more general statement introducing the issue
and setting up a process of communication between
the two nations would be a wiser beginning.
I hope that this issue can be raised. It
would be fortuitous for both countries. I will
be waiting to hear from you on what discussion
actually occurred on the subject.
Sincerely,
margoret HECKLER
In order to foster cooperation between our respective nations
(USSR/USA) which will apply our joint resources toward achieving
humanitarian goals - it is proposed that the USSR and the USA initiate
discussion between the appropriate ministry (s) / secretary (s) to develop
and through joint effort to assist the handicapped citizenry of our
respective nations.
14/23 1
National Security Council
The White House
System # 1
Package # 7341
aepo
SEQUENCE TO
1
HAS I SEEN
DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson
Bob Kimmitt
r
1
John Poindexter
3
Tom Shull
4
Wilma Hall
5
Bevell/3
Bud McFarlane
6
M
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
ask Burt t N Jon Dove
I = Information
A = Action
Retain A= Dispatch N = No/further Action
cc:
VP
Meese Baker Deaver Other
Should be may seen
COMMENTS
(Date/Time)
Mr
Amb matlock
11/5/84
≤
7.51 who Please answer
Rem's 's question and
then return package
for dispater.
Thank you,
Rosie
7341
MEMORANDUM
add-on
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
November 8, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK for
SIGNED
SUBJECT:
Secretary Heckler's Proposed Paragraph on
Handicapped Technology for Gromyko Meeting
Secretary Heckler, in a letter dated September 28 (Tab II),
suggested to you some wording on assisting the handicapped to be
included in the meetings we held with Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Following receipt of your note on my previous memorandum, I
checked with Rick Burt and learned that he did, indeed, pass the
proposal to the Soviet delegation. Therefore, I have revised
your letter to Secretary Heckler accordingly.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the attached letter to Secretary Heckler.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Reply to Heckler
Tab II
Incoming letter from Heckler
Tab III
Background papers
8650
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
November 27, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK fill
SUBJECT:
Letter from Patricia B. Snyder
Patricia Snyder has written you a letter (Tab II) informing you
of her plans to propose staging an American play in the Moscow
Musical Theater for Children.
Attached is a letter of acknowledgment (Tab I), should you wish
to send one.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Proposed letter of acknowledgment to Patricia
Snyder
Tab II
Incoming letter from Patricia Snyder
0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Patricia:
I appreciated your letter of November 23 in
which you described your plans for taking
Raggedy Ann to Moscow.
This seems a very worthy project and I hope
you are able to bring it to fruition.
Thanks for keeping me informed.
Sincerely,
Robert C. McFarlane
Ms. Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director
ESIPA
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223
ESIPA
2
November 23, 1984
Matteck
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
RCM SEEN 11-26-84
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. McFarlane:
As you will recall, we met last spring in Washington at
Queen Noor's table during the Arab Women's Cultural and Educa-
tional Benefit. Thank you so much for the kind letter you sent
regarding our program.
The purpose of this letter. is to bring you up to date on a new
ESIPA project which you might be interested to learn about. In
September I was invited to meet with Deputy Minister of Culture,
George Ivanov, in Moscow. We discussed an exchange between our
theatre, The Empire State Institute for the Performing Arts-State
University of New York, and a theatre from Moscow and or Leningrad.
Tentatively they will perform in our theatre in 1985-86 and we will
tour to Moscow and Leningrad in 1986-87. It is also possible that
the tour plans might reverse and we would tour in 1985-86 and they
in 1986-87. I have kept Mr. John Zimmerman, the United States Cul-
tural Officer for the Soviet Union, up to date and he has been most
helpful with communications between our Institute and the Ministry
of Culture in Moscow through the diplomatic pouch.
To give you a little background, in 1974 I directed a production
of The Wizard of Oz which toured to Moscow under the sponsorship of
The State University of New York and the Soviet Ministry of Culture,
with underwriting from the Chase Manhattan Bank and Finnair. At that
time Walter Stoessel was our ambassador to the Soviet Union. Our per-
formances were received most enthusiastically and prior to our depar-
ture from Moscow we were invited for a return engagement. During the
interim, between 1974 and 1976, our theatre program moved from the
State University of New York Albany campus and was instituted as a
State mandated professional theatre as part of the State University
of New York university-wide programs. Two years ago I was approached
The Empire State Institute for the Performina Arts/SUNY/GNARESPPACC
12
by Natalia Sats, the Director of the Moscow Musical Theatre for
Children, regarding the possibility of an exchange between her
company and our company and was invited to Moscow to discuss the
possibility last spring. Unfortunately our schedule at ESIPA was
so hectic it was impossible for me to get away until September of
this year.
The work that we would take to Moscow would be a new produc-
tion of Raggedy Ann. The book has been written by William Gibson
and the lyrics and score by Joe Raposo. Mr. Raposo has informed
me that he has spoken to Mrs. Reagan about this exchange. As you
may know, Mr. Raposo has written the music for Mrs. Reagan's Foster
Grandparents Program.
We will continue to work through Mr. Zimmerman, but since I
had the pleasure of meeting you last spring and since discussions
between the Soviet Union and the United States are commencing,
I thought I would communicate this information directly to you.
The State University of New York Chancellor, Clifton R. Wharton, Jr.,
to whom I report, is most supportive about this project and we would
all like to see it realized. If you have any suggestions, I would be
most pleased to receive them.
Sincerely,
John Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director
6293
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
91214
13
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONF IDENTIAL
November 27, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER
FROM:
Your Meeting 4m with Edward Fredkin
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Thursday, November 29; 2:00 P.M.
As background for your meeting with Fredkin, you may wish to
review two recent letters I have received from him. The first,
at TAB I, reviews his thoughts on the desirability of encouraging
Soviet interest in greatly expanded use of PC's. This is
presumably what he would like to talk to you about in the main.
As you know, he has also made some efforts with the Soviets in
regard to Sakharov -- in response to a call I made to him on
Bud's instructions after the Sakharov family contacted the Vice
President with a request to do so. His current thoughts on that
problem are in the letter at TAB II. As you will see, he is
primarily concerned with bolstering his credibility with the
Soviets in dealing with the issue. To do this, he suggests that
ability to deliver a visa for Bogdanov -- one of his principal
interlocutors on the subject -- could be helpful.
In case he should raise the latter question during the meeting,
you should be aware of the following. Bogdanov, one of Arbatov's
deputies, is certainly a KGB officer, though his duties seem more
akin to those of the DDI side of the house than those of DDO. He
has been refused a visa a couple of times recently because of FBI
objections, but my impression is that he is not considered a
"hard core" refusal, since there is no evidence that he runs or
plans covert operations. He has, in fact, been a moderately
useful channel in the past for working out visa problems of
American scholars and the like, and is willing to speculate
privately to Americans he knows on internal Soviet developments,
sometimes providing useful insights. (He was, for example,
helpful to Ty Cobb in 1981 in putting him in contact with Central
Committee officials.) For these reasons, we may find it in our
interest to issue a visa to him sometime in the coming months,
but I believe that this would depend on the specific
circumstances of his planned travel. I would recommend against
making any commitment on this score to Fredkin, but it might not
be out of place to indicate that we could be flexible concerning
Bogdanov's visa under appropriate circumstances.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR M08-125/2# 6293
BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10
14
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Regarding Fredkin's efforts on behalf of Sakharov, I believe we
should thank him for his efforts and say that, if any Soviet
proposals should be forthcoming, we will look at them with an
open and sympathetic mind. In the meantime, however, it would be
well to keep that ball in the Soviet court, and avoid specific
advance commitments.
Attachments:
Tab I - Letter from Fredkin of November 15, 1984, regarding
PC's in the Soviet Union
Tab II - Letter from Fredkin of November 15, 1984, regarding his
efforts on behalf of Sakharov
CONFIDENTIAL
11/19/84
15
FREDKIN ENTERPRISES
15 November, 1984
The Honorable Jack F. Matlock
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC, 20506
Dear Jack,
I have been proceeding on the project to introduce Personal
Computers into the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries. I
have witnessed at first hand the dilemma faced by the authorities
in the USSR, as they try to come to grips with the personal
computer and the consequences of its widespread introduction into
the USSR. Many leading persons are in favor of a large program
to move the USSR into this modern age, but many others are very
apprehensive. Some of those who lead the effort to introduce
personal computers are well aware that they are marching down a
path that must inevitably lead to social and economic changes
that are in conflict with the present structure of the country.
Within the USSR I have come into contact with a whole spectrum of
attitudes. Some take a very hard-line attitude about protecting
the whole panoply of tight central control that the USSR
exercises over information. This control extends to access,
copying, printing, originating and distributing information.
Others want to change, to move in directions similar to what
Hungary has done, where I saw Western papers, magazines and books
freely available, despite the fact that they are forbidden in the
USSR. Those pushing for the introduction of personal computers
are clearly working for the liberalization of the USSR from
within. We have proven over and over again that we cannot
liberalize the USSR by threats and external pressures. It seems
that we have an amazing opportunity to aid those who want to
liberalize that society from within, by simply allowing them to
have their way: they want to flood the USSR with what is the
greatest engine for the American way of life, the personal
computer. In some way, it's as though the USSR had asked us to
send over 1,000,000 American school teachers, along with all the
American textbooks and teaching materials, to teach Soviet
students in Soviet schools! Would we embargo these teachers on
the grounds that such education would aid their war making
abilities?
I had one meeting involving the head of the ministry primarily
responsible for the construction of computers in the USSR. He
was not very happy with being called to a meeting on a Saturday,
and even more unhappy at the subject matter of the meeting. He
assured everyone present that if the country wanted personal
computers, his ministry would manufacture all the personal
FV MASSACHUSETTES 02181 617/237-1022
-2-
14
computers needed; there would be no need for any foreign
assistance. Some personal computers are currently in production,
and others will soon be. Evidently the cooperation of a major
state body with authority over the manufacture of computers is a
necessary step if a factory is to be purchased from the west.
Mean while, a great deal of activity is going on. High level
Soviet delegations have started making visits to the major
European computer manufacturers. They have made inquiries about
both the purchase of personal computers, and about the purchase
of a factory. These companies are starting the preparation of
proposals to the USSR.
There is an absolute and definite bias towards working with the
European companies. The reasons are as follows:
1. They have had good experiences with European companies,
versus bad experiences with US companies, due to export
restrictions being imposed mid-project.
2. The US action and the European reaction vis-a-vis the
pipeline project.
3. The obvious fact that the US is leading and even imposing the
embargo efforts.
4. Great feelings of bitterness towards and mistrust of
President Reagan, which seems widespread and everpresent among
leading Soviet persons.
It has repeatedly been made very clear to me, that they would not
be willing to deal with any US company for part of a personal
computer factory on the basis that the US company had simply
obtained an export license. This is because of experiences where
the US has sometimes withdrawn such a license midway through a
project. They have indicated that in order to be able to rely on
the US as a major supplier on such a project, the US would have
to agree to allow the contracts, once approved by the US
government, to proceed to completion independant of future
changes in US export control policy.
I have found that a major effect of the embargo on current Soviet
users of IBM PC-XTs is not so much to prevent their acquisition
of hardware and software (they can simply have people buy things
in European computer stores and take them home with them) as to
embitter them against the US because they must obtain their
machines by illegitimate means, as though they were criminals.
Currently, the USSR, especially the Academy of Sciences, is most
anxious to purchase personal computer systems on a legitimate
basis. We have discussed the nature of the kinds of
configurations they would like to buy. They are particularly
interested in word processing, spreadsheets and integrated
systems such as Framework or Symphony. They want to buy
assortments of printers and monitors so that they can see which
-3-
can best be adapted to the Cyrillic alphabet. They want to enter
into cooperative arrangements with US software publishers, both
to facilitate the translation of systems into Russian, and to
explore the possibility of distributing Soviet software in the
US.
The US should want to support those who wish to see Soviet
society move in the direction of following the American lead in
using personal computers; allowing for decentralized decision
making, local printing, networking for rapid communication of
memos and papers. American personal computers are designed to
implement and enhance a free society's uses of information. If
the USSR doesn't move in the direction of personal computers,
they will proceed with their current plans to provide
computational facilities through tightly controlled central
computers. In these time shared facilities, each user works at a
terminal connected to a computer that records centrally
everything he does. Central policy determines who has access to
what, what may be printed on the centrally located and controlled
printers and allows everything to be closely monitored.
Most importantly, it would be such a good thing if the US could
be seen as taking the lead in this area, rather than being
dragged along by our European allies. If, in particular,
President Reagan could be seen as implementing such policies as a
gesture of goodwill, it could have'a very beneficial effect on
the Soviet image of the President, and it could be a small step
towards opening doors to discussions in other areas of mutual
interest.
If the US acts to allow the export of personal computer systems
similar to the IBM-PC-XT, it must be done in a logical way. It
is not just the personal computers themselves that constitute a
personal computer system. Such systems must include software,
hardware and peripherals all designed to work with the personal
computer. An effective policy would involve the granting of
routine and prompt approval to a class of personal computers,
similar to the IBM-PC-XT and to the software, hardware and
peripherals that are available in stores all over the world.
Examples include printers, plotters, telephone communication
modems, memory boards, monitors, keyboards, spreadsheet programs,
word processing software, educational software, etc. If the
accessories and software face an export bottleneck, then the
opportunity will be as effectively thwarted as if the IBM-PC-XT
itself faced a bottleneck. The two should go hand in hand; both
or neither.
Sincerley yours,
dward
Edward Fredkin
Chairman
NOVEMBER 1984 VOL. 9, NO. 12
$3.50 IN UNITED STATES
$4.25 IN CANADA / £2.10 IN U.K.
A McGRAW-HILL PUBLICATION
0360-5280
18
NEW CHIPS
FEATURES:
EXPORTING
Data General/One Preview
TO THE U.S.S.R.
Ciarcia's Voice Recognition
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United States
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HP 150
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PC FORTHs
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
.Office of Export Administration
Spcl
Alt
Washington, D.C. 20230
11
12490 0
440235
FREDKIN ENTERPRISES
15 November, 1984
The Honorable Jack F. Matlock
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC, 20506
Dear Jack,
During my last visit, I wrote and gave to Velikhov and Bogdanov,
a memo that suggested an approach where I had one Soviet person,
someone like a Soviet Jack Matlock, who was willing to interface
with me on issues such as the Sakharov case. The advice I was
given was that I should be patient; that things were happening.
One very good thing was that Bogdanov assured me that senior
officials who had seen my paper or who had spoken to me were all
convinced that I was honestly trying to find a fair way to make
progress. This was very encouraging to me, as just a couple of
days before, a researcher in the Academy of Sciences told me that
he thought that people were very upset with me. The reason he
gave was that someone had been around to ask him many questions
about me. He assumed that as a result, no further progress would
be made in other areas, such as those related to commerce or
science. He also was sure that I would be hassled at customs
when I left the USSR. He was quite wrong on all points.
I don't know exactly what to do next in the USSR. I have been
advised not to press too hard, that I have put some possibilities
into motion and that with time and luck, good things can happen.
The luck seems to be related to a difficult issue. They imply
that a solution cannot be forthcoming while it is being
stridently demanded by the West. They say they will not yield to
pressure. They imply that if the pressure is off, then progress
may occur.
It is my belief that the enormous pressure exerted by the West
has certainly constrained and affected Soviet freedom of action
on the Sakharov issue. Who knows what might have happened to the
Sakharovs if the West had been silent? They have noticed that
the State Department has let up to a great extent, and I believe
that they appreciate that fact. Of course, some cynics may
believe that the Sakharovs are finally being forgotten by the
West.
I believe that the USSR must understand that the restraint of the
State Department is a deliberate policy, subject to reversal;
that it is aimed at giving this situation an opportunity to find
a partial resolution. They must not either wait too long, or
take this as an opportunity to invoke some new repressive
measures. The big problem is that much of what might happen is
15 WALNUT STREET, WELLESLEY HILLS, MASSACHUSETTES 02181
617/237-1022
20
clearly outside of the control of either the governments of the
US or the USSR. Its a good time to tiptoe. If the Sakharovs
manage to do something new that infuriates the Soviet leadership,
then there will not be any progress.
I have basically worked at communicating what I consider to be
the facts. I have found certain people in the USSR who are
willing to listen and to come around to a recognition of those
facts. I was greatly hampered in the begining by not really
understanding their perspective. Now that I do, I no longer fall
into the trap of saying what they expect from an American and of
having to listen to their stock answers.
I must admit that I could accomplish much more if they were
convinced that I represented something more than just another
person trying to do good. If I can prove effective, then my
ability to be more convincing would be enhanced. A good example
is Bogdanov. He has taken the time to understand my position
better than anyone else. He has implied that he is in touch with
those who can frame policy decisions. On the other hand, I have
no credentials; no portfolio, nor do I desire any. What I would
like, is for them to realize that I have a way to communicate
reasonable suggestions to those in power in the US, and that, on
occasion some of my suggestions result in action. In Bogdanov's
case, if we could figure out a way to get him a visa for a trip
to the US, I would gain a great deal of credibility in his eyes.
That credibility could be put to good use, and would likely more
than compensate for whatever negative aspects are involved in
such a visit.
I think that you are the ideal person in the USA, for me to
communicate with. What I need now is the possibility of gaining
more credibility in the USSR. If it becomes possible for me to
get connected to someone such as Zagladin or Menshikov, then I
would be able to cement that relationship by proving myself
understanding and effective. The best way to accomplish this
would be for you and I to discuss the possible concepts that I
might bring up in some future discussions with a counterpart to
you in the USSR, so that I have an idea in advance of the
probability that a "suggestion" I might make to you, would be
well received in the USA.
What you have seen from me, so far, is all a result of that first
phone call to me. The Sakharov problem is truly a knotty one;
worth working on, but very difficult. I believe that my talents
and contacts can also prove useful and even more productive in
other areas, and I would like to offer to you my services to work
in the interests of better international relations and in
directions that help lead away from conflicts that threaten world
peace.
In spite of my proposal to hold that unusual press conference
with regard to Sakharov, I believe that my ability to accomplish
things is related to both my lack of notoriety and my lack of
official connection to one side or the other. I want to protect
those positions, yet work towards becoming more effective in
accomplishing my goals.
I would like to thank you very much for all your help, but
especially for listening to me. For that, I am very much in your
debt. I implore you to call on me to do any work towards making
this a better and safer world.
Sincerely yours,
Tward Fredhin
Edward Fredkin
Matlock
Chron
MEMORANDUM
8643
22
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
November 27, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
AMAR
TCM
FROM:
KARNA VSMALL/JACK MATLOCK/TY COBB
SUBJECT:
Request from TASS for Backgrounder/Interview
As we discussed some time ago, the Associated Press has an
exchange program with TASS; as part of that, they are bringing
over Sergei Losev, the Director-General of TASS to New York from
December 4-10. Losev made only one request for his stay in the
US and that was to meet with you. Jack Koehler, an Executive
with AP (and strong Reagan supporter) contacted me to try to set
this up.
Coincidentally, the local TASS reporter, Alexander Shalnev, who
engaged in a bit of verbal sparring with Ty Cobb during a brief-
ing last month, put in a request to interview you, or Jack
Matlock. During the exchange with Shalnev, Ty made the point
that the Russian people rarely have an opportunity to read the
views and opinions of members of our Administration, while the US
public often reads the full comments of Chernenko and others (as
printed in the Washington Post, or aired on NBC).
When we first discussed the TASS request, you asked me to get
Jack Matlock's opinion. Jack has suggested two options:
OPTION I:
That you grant an on-the-record interview with
questions provided in advance, with the under-
standing that either Pravda or Izvestia will print
the entire interview, as the Washington Post
printed Chernenko's.
Approve
Disapprove
OPTION II:
That you meet with Losev off the record to explain
U.S. policy and discuss the possibility of information
exchange.
Approve
Disapprove
RECOMMENDATION
That you select either Option I, or Option II.
(NOTE: Wilma has tentatively set aside some time at 1:30 on
December 4 when you might be able to meet with Losev.)
MEMORANDUM
Chron
6794
SECRET
TO JACK
November
28, the 1984
in
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THROUGH:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN NWFM
FROM:
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
SUBJECT:
Proposed Presidential Trip to Easteri Europe
That
Per your suggestion, I have examined the idea of a Presidential
trip to Eastern Europe in early 1985. Such a trip could provide
the following major benefits:
before
Bolster the President's image as a leader committed to Deace
and dialogue.
N
Highlight the continuity of our differentiation policy
1
rem
toward Eastern Europe, building upon the significant progress
made in the last four years.
7.
Prompt the resolution of outstanding bilateral problems
what specifically to
(i.e., human rights, economic matters) and provide a founda
tion for durable improvement in East-West relations.
This trip would also be of major domestic significance
Although
FRG
signs of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations have recently emerged,
it is unlikely that we can make rapid progress. Arms control
negotiations and other bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions will
Allin
probably be a long and arduous process. Visible success in East
West dialogue manifested in a visit to Eastern Europe would serve
space
to relieve pressure from the President while U.S.-Soviet negoti.
A
ations are ensuing. In fact, it could bolster our negotiating
leverage.
The most ideal time for the trip would be in April 1985, as it
would serve as an excellent prelude to discussions on East-West
trade at the Bonn summit (May 2 - 4). Also, in light of our
present relations with Eastern Europe, it would be appropriate
for the President to travel to Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania.
The current state of U.S! relations with the German Democrati
Republic, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia do not justify their
inclusion in the President's itinerary. Although the President
personal popularity in Poland is extraordinarily high, the
current unsettled state of Polish developments and lack of
substantial progress toward national reconciliation preclude
the
President from visiting Poland at this time.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1#6294
posts.
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11
note
SECRET
-2-
Attached at Tab I is the background paper I have prepared which
depicts the visit's setting, sets forth the overall themes and
objectives, and proposes a broad public diplomacy strategy. At
Tab II, is a brief suggested itinerary.
Don Fortier concurs with the above but suggests the trip be
limited to Hungary and Yugoslavia. He recommends that Turkey be
added to the trip's itinerary.
Jack Matlock concurs in general with the proposal, but feels that
there are also downsides involved in a Presidential visit to
Eastern Europe in 1985. Romania presents the thorniest problem,
since a visit there will be seen by many as an endorsement of a
regime which has close to the worst human rights record in
Eastern Europe. While a visit would reward Romania for its
welcome decision on the Olympics and its independent foreign
policy stance, one wonders whether other, less controversial,
gestures are not available. (It does seem incongruous to deny an
export license for an antiquated disk-drive facility, yet produce
a Presidential visit which, internally and in Eastern Europe as a
whole, tends to signal a seal of approval on Ceausescu's
Stalinist rule.)
Hungary and Yugoslavia present fewer problems, but it would be
unwise to arrange a visit to Hungary without one to another
Warsaw Pact country, and there is no realistic candidate except
Romania. It should also be recognized that a Presidential visit
to Hungary will require an invitation for Kadar to visit here --
a move which will be very controversial domestically.
Yugoslavia is also going through a period of backsliding on human
rights and is beset by other political and economic problems. A
Presidential visit would likely produce heightened Yugoslav
expectations for increased U.S. assistance solving Yugoslavia's
current financial difficulties. Nevertheless, these factors are
probably manageable, and a Presidential visit could be used as
leverage to ameliorate the current Yugoslav crackdown on
dissidents.
In sum, Jack would recommend considering as an alternative to a
trip to Eastern Europe, one to Spain and Portugal -- with perhaps
Yugoslavia also, but without Romania and Hungary. There has not
been a Presidential visit to Spain since Eisenhower's meeting
with Franco and, according to Tom Enders, the Spaniards are
asking why a democratic Spain does not deserve at best equal
attention. A visit to Spain could also be used to win acceptance
of NATO membership and the one to Lisbon to reward one of our
most faithful allies, who often feels unappreciated.
RECOMMENDATION
That you review my background paper, and that we meet to discuss
the proposed Presidential trip to Eastern Europe.
Approve
Disapprove
C
8562 add-on
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
November 30, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK A
SUBJECT:
Questions for the President from Marvin Kalb
As directed, attached at TAB I is a memorandum from you and Larry
Speakes to the President recommending that he not respond to Mr.
Kalb's questions (TAB A).
Small, Kraemer, Menges and Sims 8 concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
TAB I
Memorandum to the President
TAB A
Mr. Kalb's Letter to the President, November 21
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
By
CAS Guidelines, 1997
NARA, Date 6/10/02
6295
CONFIDENTIAL
24
8562
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
LS
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE AND LARRY SPEAKES
SUBJECT:
Questions for the President from Marvin Kalb
Issue
Whether to answer five written questions submitted by NBC
correspondent Marvin Kalb (TAB A).
Facts
Kalb hopes that you will answer his questions -- as Chernenko did
a set of questions he submitted a few weeks ago.
Discussion
-- Some of Kalb's questions are tricky and would be difficult
to answer at this delicate stage of our negotiations with
the Soviets.
--
We feel it is important to shift attention more to private
diplomacy in an effort to get the Shultz-Gromyko meeting off
to a good start. Trading public statements with the Soviets
is likely to undermine the private diplomacy we seek.
RECOMMENDATION
OK
No
That you not respond to Kalb's questions.
-
-
Attachment:
TAB A
Kalb's questions.
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR F06-114/1 #6295 #6295
BY RW NADA
NBC News
NBC Television Stations Division
4001 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.
National Broadcasting Company. Inc.
Washington, D.C. 20016 202-885-4598
Meet the Press
November 21, 1984
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
In light of the apparent thaw in Soviet-American
relations, following your re-election, NBC News and I
would be grateful for your responses to these questions.
1. What, in your view, should now be the first
order of business in Soviet-American relations?
2. Under what conditions would you be prepared
to meet with President Chernenko - and when?
3. Chernenko may admire "detente," as it was
practiced in the 1970's; but, if you don't -- and that
seems clear -- what new guiding concept, or framework,
in your view, should now govern the evolution of
Soviet-American relations?
4. Do you believe that a fully-verifiable arms
control agreement is still a realistic goal for U.S.
policy? Or, do you share the view of Kenneth Adelman,
the Director of ACDA, that, given the difficulties of
verification and mutual trust, a more realistic goal
for the U.S. might be, in his words, "arms control
without agreements."
5. As you explore a variety of options regarding
U.S. policy in Central America, do you see, among them,
the possibility of rapprochement with Cuba -- and, under
what conditions?
Hoping to hear from you, I remain,
Very truly yours, limi
harvin
Marvin Kalb
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent
National Security Council
24
The White House
System #
Package # 8562
add- on
11
1460
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson
Bob Kimmitt
/
K
John Poindexter
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
MaHock
2
A
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
cc:
VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Please have funs get Speakes'
initials first.
6296
MEMORANDUM
or
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
8562
CONFIDENTIAL
November 26, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
SUBJECT:
JACK Questions F. MATLOCK for 9am
President from Marvin Kalb
Marvin Kalb has submitted five written questions to the President
-- obviously in the hope that the President would answer as
Chernenko did an earlier set of questions he submitted.
I recommend that these questions not be answered. First, some
are very tricky and precise, responsive answers will be difficult
to formulate at this stage of negotiation with the Soviets.
Second, I believe it important to shift over attention more to
the private diplomacy track, and continuing to trade public
agree
statements undermines this effort.
Karna Small, Bob RAY Sims, Sven Kraemer and Constantine Menges
SK
can
concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That answers not be provided to Kalb's questions.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
CONFIDENTIAL
Letter to the President from me Marvin Kalb
Declassify: OADR
from
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1#6296
RV
oul
4297
MEMORANDUM
30
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
8562
CONFIDENTIAL
November 26, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
SUBJECT:
JACK Questions F. MATLOCK for four
President from Marvin Kalb
Marvin Kalb has submitted five written questions to the President
-- obviously in the hope that the President would answer as
Chernenko did an earlier set of questions he submitted.
I recommend that these questions not be answered. First, some
are very tricky and precise, responsive answers will be difficult
to formulate at this stage of negotiation with the Soviets.
Second, I believe it important to shift over attention more to
the private diplomacy track, and continuing to trade public
statements undermines this effort.
Karna Small, Bob RMS Sims, Sven SK Kraemer and Constantine Menges
cen
concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That answers not be provided to Kalb's questions.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Letter to the President from Marvin Kalb
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1#6297
DV Dr. NADA DATE 2/2/11
31
NBC News
NBC Television Stations Division
4001 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.
National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
Washington, D.C. 20016 202-885-4598
Meet the Press
November 21, 1984
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
In light of the apparent thaw in Soviet-American
relations, following your re-election, NBC News and I
would be grateful for your responses to these questions.
1. What, in your view, should now be the first
order of business in Soviet-American relations?
2. Under what conditions would you be prepared
to meet with President Chernenko - and when?
3. Chernenko may admire "detente," as it was
practiced in the 1970's; but, if you don't -- and that
seems clear -- what new guiding concept, or framework,
in your view, should now govern the evolution of
Soviet-American relations?
4. Do you believe that a fully-verifiable arms
control agreement is still a realistic goal for U.S.
policy? Or, do you share the view of Kenneth Adelman,
the Director of ACDA, that, given the difficulties of
verification and mutual trust, a more realistic goal
for the U.S. might be, in his words, "arms control
without agreements."
5. As you explore a variety of options regarding
U.S. policy in Central America, do you see, among them,
the possibility of rapprochement with Cuba -- and, under
what conditions?
Hoping to hear from you, I remain,
Very harvin truly yours, law
Marvin Kalb
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent
32
ABOARD
AIR
FORCE
ONE
Lind for staffind
to:
Mattecky
Small
$ w/cy me the tackase m to