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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: USSR General [1981-1983] (1)
Box: 26
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https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/9/2005
File Folder
USSR GENERAL 1/5 [1981-1983]
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
26
YARHI-MILO
2602
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9841 MEMO
ODOM TO BRZEZINSKI RE EAST-WEST
8 9/3/1980 B1
RELATIONS: A FORMULA FOR U.S. POLICY
IN 1981 AND BEYOND
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
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310406Z JAN 81
4 1/31/1981 B1
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8 2/9/1981 B1
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9842 MEMO
PIPES TO ALLEN RE ANNIVERSARY OF
1 2/12/1981 B1
SOVIET INVASION OF GEORGIA
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6/25/2009
F2006-114/7
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USSR
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NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
947 Stonehill Lane
Los Angeles, California 90049
September 20, 1977
S.U
Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director, Net Assessment
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear Andy:
Here is the letter to you that Herb never finished. He started
it at home probably during the first week of July and dictated
the last part of it to me on July 8th at the hospital. He was
not able to cover all the points he had in mind and, of course,
he never read it through. I am passing it along just as it was
left--a very rough draft.
I am also including a transcription of some notes I found in the
same folder that may indicate some of the points he did not get
to.
Best regards,
Jody
Joan Goldhamer
JG:tl
Enclosures: as noted (2)
July 1977
Dear Andy:
After completing my last two studies I sent you a letter discussing
their implications for U.S. policy. My present study is a longterm
undertaking whose significance for U.S. policy will be treated in my
final chapter, which, unfortunately, is still some time off. For
this reason I want to outline in the interim a few points that seem
to deserve special attention today. They can equally well be derived
from an understanding of the basic principles of political action or
from a comparison of U.S. and Soviet pronouncements and political
behavior although the materials of my study have lent a force to my
convictions that they might not otherwise have had. My aim here is
simply to express these convictions--not to argue or "prove" them.
I think you probably will be aware of the sort of considerations
that have led me to them. To some extent the points below overlap
with those made in my previous letter.
1. (a) A stimulus to aggression to which insufficient attention is
often paid are the images that the potential aggressor has of his
prospective victim. These images may vary from being relatively well
defined to being vaguely formulated beliefs. In either case they may
exercise a strong influence in shaping military-political decisions
which often depend on intuitions as well as clearcut calculations,
and on the nature of the enemy rather than on his forces.
(b) When images of the potential victim view him as lacking in
such qualities as will, discipline, determination, courage, sacrifice
and as being subject to anxiety, inconsistency, hesitation and similar
handicaps, the incentive to exploit or attack the potential victim is
greatly increased.
(c) The U.S. and the West as potential victims of political and
military aggression by the Soviet Union generally seek to reduce their
anxieties on this score through qualitative and quantitative improvements
in their forces. This tends to disregard or give insufficient emphasis
to the role of Soviet images of them. The U.S. and the West forget that:
"Number itself importeth not much in armies, where
the people are of weak courage; for (as Virgil says)
it never troubles a wolf how many the sheep be."
(Francis Bacon)
Today it seems likely that an increased ability on the part of the U.S.
and Western Europe to shape Soviet views of their will to resist
political and military aggression and of their moral strength might
have a greater deterrent effect than improved military capabilities.
3
2
The latter are by no means to be slighted, and indeed force improvements
may favorably affect Soviet images of the Western spirit provided they
are accompanied by what appear to the Soviets as independent indi-
cations of the West's spirit of resistance. Otherwise Virgil's maxim
is operative and the marginal gain from force improvements is likely--
from a deterrent standpoint--to be small.
(d) Paragraph (c) above implies the need for a program to affect
the images that Soviet leadership has of U.S. and Western political-
military leadership, of various economic, administrative and official
elites, and of the masses, insofar as these images bear on attributes
relevant to deterrence (see, e.g., 1(b)).
(e) A program for such a purpose can only in part be specified
in advance. (Points 2 to below deal with some aspects of such a
program. Most recommendations must be made in broad terms whereas
success depends very much on the specific form in which events occur
and the recommendations are to be executed. The general recommendations
are not sufficiently specific to provide the guidance required for day-
to-day execution. Perhaps the only way one could adequately provide
the necessary instructions for future action would be to make a critique
of U.S. political-military behavior and pronouncements as they occur
day-to-day. In this way the reader might, if this were carried on over
a sufficiently long period, say six months or a year, become sensitized
to what is being recommended in a way and to a degree that general policy
recommendation statements cannot convey.
2. It is imperative that the S.U. perceives Western leaders, elites and
masses, but especially the leaders, as being confident and calm with
respect to their future. This does not mean seeming to have a foolish
disregard for difficulties and problems but nonetheless seeming un-
perturbed by them. U.S. leaders should avoid statements indicating they
are "surprised" by actions of their antagonist or "disappointed" by them. **
Indications of anxiety should be avoided. [To be expanded.]
3. U.S. spokesmen should not express optimism concerning the possibility
of reaching agreements or that certain favorable developments will occur
vis-à-vis themselves and the Soviets. These expressions of optimism
convey a sense of considerable need to reach agreements, etc. One
should note that the Soviets tend much more than do we to make pessi-
mistic pronouncements, thus indicating that they can live without these
agreements. As a democracy it is important the U.S. leaders should not
convey to the Soviets a sense that they have to pacify mass opinion and
preferences by optimistic statements.
*
The dictated portion starts here.
**
In the folder with his notes for this letter, Herb had a clipping
from the Los Angeles Times of June 26/77 with the headline "Carter Surprised
by Russ Rights Reaction" and the subhead "Feels His Stand is More of an
Obstacle to Arms Talks Than He Had Thought."
3
4. On the whole one should assume that the Soviet failure to conceal
their only too evident concern over the cruise missile and the human
rights issue indicates that these are powerful instruments in the U.S.
hand, and should not easily be dissipated. One should note that if
the U.S. cruise missile is restricted to a 1500-mile radius this could
give the Soviets a much greater incentive to ensure political control
over Western Europe in order thereby to keep launching points for the
cruise missile beyond this 1500-mile perimeter.
5. It is desirable in deterring Soviet aggression to increase in Soviet
leaders their sense of the incalculability and riskiness of undertakings.
In fact nothing is more striking in military history than the conviction
of one military leader after another that wars, battles and similar
ventures often have unpredicted consequences. A variety of means should
be employed to make this sense of unpredictability--which used to be so
strong in the past--more acute today. One means of doing this, for
example, might be to get a scholar of international repute in military
history to make a study of the role of unpredictability in military-
political affairs. Military history would lend itself to very useful
lessons on this score without the slightest stretching of the truth.
[Here the dictation ends.]
Herbert Goldhamer
Dictated but not read
20 September 1977
JG'S TRANSCRIPTION OF HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON
POINTS TO BE COVERED IN HG'S LETTER TO AWM
.
(1) Non-calculability risk - uncertainty, increase SU appreciation of
(2) Increase SU appreciation of West will, determination (or size of forces)
= Increase of cost to SU
Sheep - Virgil
"
=
" risk to SU
*
Resistance, Terrorism>
all out resistance to
aggression
(3) Increase SU perception of Western self-confidence (cf McN & Laird)
LeMay
(4) Choose
} those things that SU most opposed to
Do
e.g. cruise missile
type of weapon
(5) Give West image of future Days Security and prosperity for both West
The
and SU Parity (?) Party(?)
Poverty
(6) Public statements that developments look hopeful or aren't as bad as
assimistic
they seem, suggest to the opponent the great pressure one is under
(domestically) for a resolution of issues, even at the cost of
çatements
concessions and thus encourage the opponent to hold out for more
pre
esirable
or to play a waiting game to increase this pressure. It is essential
not to give the impression than an agreement must be reached or that
non-resolution will be a great disappointment or disaster.
mg)
(7) Brezhnev Head of State--attempt to approximate Western legitimacy
(cf HG Soviet Soldier)
*
(8) Paper on deception -- criteria
(9) Danger of provoking -- fear
(10) Unwillingness to risk losing - as if backing down in advance is
better than backing down after resistance.
-- 1948
*
Words I am not sure I have read correctly.
CONFIDENTIAL
PA
4988-X
6
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SOVIET GENEM
INFORMATION
September 3, 1980
DECLASSIFIED
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
NLRR F06-114/7 #9841
MEMORANDUM FOR:
WILLIAM E. ODOM ,WO
BY Cis NARADATE 7/7/08
FROM:
SUBJECT:
East-West Relations: A Formula for U.S.
Policy in 1981 and Beyond
I want to offer some perspectives on the current state of East-
West relations and an integrating formula for putting both the
resources and a clear sense of strategic direction into our
policies toward the Soviet Union in the next four years. You
will recognize much of the analysis, but I hope the framework is
helpful for tying rhetoric to actions and programs in a comprehensive
fashion. The inspiration for this memo comes in part from Sam
Huntington's recent paper on U.S.-Soviet relations which he wrote
for Hedley Donovan, but it also stems from my own efforts in
strategic doctrinal changes, the Persian Gulf Security Framework,
and East-West technology transfers. We have accomplished a great
deal over the past three years, and I would like to maintain the
momentum and include additional areas and programs.
The East-West Balance
In early 1977 you told Sam and me to "tell us how we are
doing in the world vis-a-vis the Soviets." PRM-10 Comprehensive
Net Assessment was the reply. It treated military and non-
military categories as well as all major regions of U.S.-Soviet
competition.
1. The military balance was judged as "essential equivalence"
and the trends as adverse. That judgment looks sound in retrospect.
2. In the non-military categories of technology, economics,
diplomacy, and political institutions, the U.S. was ahead although
the critical military-related technology gap was closing in
several areas. In retrospect this judgment has been vindicated.
3. In the major regions outside Europe, Soviet prospects
were judged best in Africa and the Persian Gulf region. The
Caribbean was cited but without alarm. In retrospect, the record
is mixed in Africa; Iran as a crisis point was predicted; we were
too optimistic about the Caribbean; and Southeast Asia has been
more volatile than anticipated. In East Asia, our normalization
with the PRC faces the USSR for the first time ever with a China-
Japan-U.S. tie of good relations.
CONFIDENTIAL
September 3. 1986
7
CONFIDENTIAL
2
4. In Europe, PRM-10 emphasized the certainty of political
uncertainty in both Eastern and Western Europe. That judgment
remains valid. The emergence of a more traditional German
Ostpolitik, exploited by Moscow in the traditional manner, signals
growing difficulties in West-West relations, i.e., within the
Alliance. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has given unambiguous
evidence of the strategic interaction between the Persian Gulf
region and European-Soviet relations: Soviet power projection
that affects the oil states of the Persian Gulf tends to reinforce
the accommodationist politicizing forces in Western Europe and
thereby exacerbates U.S.-European relations vis-a-vis Moscow and
the Persian Gulf.
The Transition from Era I to Era II in East-West Relations
Critics within the U.S. and abroad have complained that the
U.S. has not pursued a steady or consistent course in U.S.-Soviet
affairs. The President, in particular, is believed by many to be
responsible for this. It is, in their view, all his fault.
To some extent, the apparent inconsistency is real. Soviet
power projection has been used more extensively in the last few
years than even informed policy and intelligence circles believed
it would be. "Changing" U.S. policy, therefore, has been "catching
up" U.S. policy. Consistent policy outputs are impossible when
the inputs differ substantially from those anticipated.
To a larger extent the inconsistency is only apparent. It
looks that way because the foreign policy and press elites themselves
are split on fundamental assumptions about U.S. foreign policy.
They are awakening to and becoming disturbed by the transition
from the first era in East-West relations -- 1945 to the mid-1970s
(U.S. dominance and Pax Americana) -- to the second era -- the
1980s and 1990s (the nature of which is still being defined, as
Soviet military power makes itself felt). But they are reacting
to this awakening in quite different ways. At least three fissures
divide foreign policy and media elite views, and perhaps even the
broader public, as they assess the incipient realities of Era II.
First, there are fundamental differences over the political
utility of military force. At the strategic nuclear level, some
believe "assured destruction" is enough. Others believe force
balances and capabilities make a political and diplomatic difference.
At the conventional level, some argue that our Vietnam experience
shows that conventional military power is greatly overrated.
Others say that Vietnam proves the importance of using conventional
military power effectively, of not squandering it where our
interests are small.
The second fissure is East-West versus North-South primacy,
between those who view East-West relations as still the cornerstone
CONFIDENTIAL
8
CONFIDENTIAL
3
of U.S. foreign policy and those who believe that North-South
relations rival if not exceed East-West relations for the corner-
stone role.
The third fissure concerns economics -- the growing incongruities
between economic power on the one hand (Europe, Japan, and Saudi
Arabia) and military security responsibilities on the other hand
(the U.S. carries them all). It is only vaguely recognized, but
it has enormous potential to evoke an "isolationist--internationalist"
dichotomy in security policy prescriptions.
These fissures prevent a foreign policy consensus on East-
West relations and mean that in the 1970s, and perhaps into the
1980s, no U.S. policy toward the USSR can have broad and constant
support. The domestic need to accommodate both sides of each
fissure, particularly in Congress for budgets, inevitably creates
the impression, if not the reality, of a wavering U.S. policy
toward the Soviet Union and our allies. Thus, blaming the President
is far from an adequate explanation.
The primary task for U.S. foreign and defense policy in the
early 1980s, therefore, is to complete the transition to Era II
peacefully and to give that era a definition and direction appro-
priate to changed realities. Success will depend in part on
closing the three fissures, and a compelling formula articulated
by the President will help close these. Only their closure will
provide the liberal consensus necessary for a sustained realistic
policy.
A U.S. Policy for Era II
Era II may or may not be dominated by the U.S. A return to
the Cold War is not possible because regaining the military
preponderance of that time is not feasible. Were it feasible, a
Cold War balance would be the best choice because it was a period
relatively secure from general war. A return to detente of the
early 1970s is equally infeasible. The Soviets would demand
higher terms and be no less aggressive in projecting power into
the disputed regions. Even if the Soviet leaders personally
desired a relaxation, the centrifugal forces within the USSR, in
the Warsaw Pact, and in client states elsewhere would make it too
risky. They are trapped in their own expansive dynamic which
limits fundamental choices.
Neither the containment policy nor the detente policy alone is
adequate to deal effectively with the new level of Soviet power. A
more comprehensive approach is essential. The U.S. must neither
rely largely on military power nor passively "contain" Soviet
power. The U.S. must engage the USSR competitively.
CONFIDENTIAL
9
CONFIDENTIAL
4
Huntington defined four elements of a policy toward the USSR
on which "competitive engagement" can be built.
a. Maintenance of military deterrence.
b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.
c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits.
d. Reduction of Soviet influence over client states, bloc
states, and minority nationalities in the USSR.
A number of things have been accomplished over the past three
years to provide the programs and policies for "competitive
engagement" over the next four years. When they are specifically
related to the four elements of the policy, a clear view of how
to proceed in East-West relations begins to emerge. That follows
for each element.
a. Maintenance of military deterrence through military pre-
eminence.
The doctrinal changes marked by the "strategic" PD-41, 50,
53, 57, 58, and 59 provide the direction our military programs
must take to maintain deterrence in the 1980s. The gap between
our political objectives and our military capabilities must be
reduced. This can be accomplished through simultaneous improvements
in our force posture and meaningful arms control agreements.
- Force Improvements. We must address our military deficiences
in a three-pronged attack which includes:
-- The Budget. Not only must the budget be increased,
but Defense, FEMA, and the DCI must let the strategic
PDs guide their program choices. To date, they have
yielded little to the new doctrine.
-- Organization. All three agencies must be reorganized
to improve "factor productivity," with particular
emphasis on the Pentagon. The President tried to
reorganize DoD once, but the effort failed. He
succeeded with FEMA. He must succeed in the next
term with DoD.
-- Manpower. We must also solve the military manpower
problem. That probably means a return to the military
draft.
The objective of these measures may not be "military superiority"
but it should be "military pre-eminence* for the US and its allies,
in terms of both nuclear and conventional forces.
CONFIDENTIAL
10
CONFIDENTIAL
5
- Arms Control. Arms control, too, plays a part in the
military balance. Arms control, however, is headed for indefinite
dormancy in the 1980s unless it is tied symbiotically to our
defense policy. PD-50 prescribed the process that can achieve
that symbiosis. ACDA, State, and even ISA at Defense have failed
to see this merit in the directive. Yet it is precisely arms
control that is at risk without the PD-50 approach.
SALT I and II were developed to support our assured destruction
defense policy of the 1960s. In the 1970s, that policy became
inadequate. ACDA and State drifted into the position of seeing
arms control as a surrogate for a defense policy. Now we are
hesitantly awakening to the defense policy problem in Europe. We
cannot move with confidence into TNF and SALT III negotiations
because we are in transition with our defense policy. That is not
the only defense policy problem for arms control. ASAT negotiations
move on although we have not the slightest idea of our force goals
for space. No military service has responsibility for them. The
same is true for CTB. We have not developed our defense require-
ments for nuclear weapons development and production of nuclear
materials. Yet we are on a CTB track that enjoys no interagency
consensus.
Two major PD-50 tasks must be launched to extract us from this
disastrous course on which arms control now proceeds toward self-
destruction. First, an across-the-board assessment of all negotia-
tions vis-a-vis one another is essential. Second, a somewhat
more narrow review of the TNF/SALT III sector is needed to clarify
what kind of SALT III can assist our national security in an
unambiguous and objective way. To do that, we must also review the
whole of our strategy and force structure for the defense of Europe.
Both efforts should be complete by next spring. To make these
serious endeavors, the President will have to reconfirm his
commitment to the PD-50 process within the agencies.
b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.
We must devote special attention to the three interrelated
strategic regions of Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.
The Caribbean region is also overdue for our security attention
as is Southeast Asia.
We have major work to accomplish in each area, notwithstanding
much that has already been accomplished. NATO, as mentioned in
connection with PD-50, needs a reassessment of our strategy for
its defense. The Persian Gulf Security Framework effort must be
kept on track, a separate unified command being one of the first
steps next year. For the Caribbean we must begin a similar
security framework effort. In East Asia, the nature of military
ties with China will need further definition.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6
In addition to these regional activities, some key functional
area reviews must be accomplished:
- A successful policy of containment depends on capable
conventional force projection. We have a modest beginning in the
RDF.
- Security Assistance policy needs significant revision,
budgeting, and perhaps changed legislation.
- Our intelligence capabilities in each region must be
improved and expanded with all the speed possible.
- Military training assistance and advisory policy needs
repair.
The most difficult area in the 1980s may prove to be Europe,
West-West relations. Overcoming the lag between our own recovery
from the hopes of the early 1970s and Europe's recovery from its
present illusion of divisible detente, will not occur without
political trauma. How to defend Europe effectively cannot be
dodged as it has been for three decades. And until that is
decided, arms control within that theater will be difficult to
implement in a way that is not politically and militarily injurious
to the West. The LTDP was a modest beginning which must be
turned into a major revolution in the 1980s.
C. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits to the
East.
The Soviet Union and East Europe will continue to look to
the West as a source of reprieve from their economic plight. The
West must exploit that need with offers of economic assistance
based on rigorous and measurable political conditions.
With the new COCOM policies, we have begun to control more
effectively the strategic technology transfers. The next step is
East-West trade coordination. Credits and trade must be coordinated
on an alliance basis. Such a step logically follows from our
COCOM policy. Otherwise, the "alternative supplier" problem will
continue to deny us the political advantages of our greatest edge
over the Soviets -- economic advantage. In the "process know-
how" proposal to COCOM we have already moved slightly toward
trade coordination. That is why Europe resists it. The diplomatic
efforts now in progress to prevent the FRG (Kloeckner) and France
(Creusot-Loire) from taking our ARMCO and ALCOA deals with the
Soviet Union can be the seed from which East-West trade coordination
grows. If the Germans believe that Soviet markets are critical
for their machine exports, then we can retaliate by denying them
our import market. We have strong laws that allow the President
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7
12
to force Europe to choose between the US as a trading partner and
the Soviet Bloc as a market. Once the allies are whipped into
line, we can dictate the political terms of East-West trade.
The Soviets deeply fear a Western united economic front. If
we do not present them with one in the 1980s, the incongruities
between security burdens and economic power in NATO will create a
political backlash in the US which will destroy public support
for US troops in Europe. The Mansfield Amentment was merely a
hint of what can come if the Europeans continue to can get without
paying for because we choose not to tax them.
To move from the rhetorical to the operational, we should use the
post-Afghanistan policy with our allies to lay the basis for East-West
trade coordination at the Economic Summit in Canada next summer. Once
the Soviets see an emerging united economic front, we will have
important opportunities for our economic diplomacy.
d. Reduction of Soviet influence over 1) client states, 2) bloc
states, and 3) national minorities in the USSR.
It is time to reduce the spheres of Soviet influence, and
the opportunities are large. We have the beginnings of a policy
for the three non-Russian areas of Soviet influence.
- Client States. In Southwest Asia, in the Horn of Africa,
in Southern Africa (Angola), in Yemen, in the Caribbean, and in
Southeast Asia we can and should bring some reverses to the
Soviet projection of power. This will involve more vigorous
support for anti-Soviet movements afoot in all areas.
- Bloc States. We already have a policy for East Europe of
encouraging its autonomy vis-a-vis the USSR. We must help Poland
consolidate recent gains.
- Minorities in the USSR. We can do more on the nationality
question within the USSR. The human rights policy is, of course,
already a weapon in our arsenal. In an age of nationalism, there
is nothing permanent about Soviet "internationalism" and Soviet
borders --something we can imply and encourage others to say
explicitly.
A competitive approach to spheres and areas of Soviet influence
will make further Soviet projection of power more difficult. A
passive containment approach will permit Soviet consolidation of
recent gains and new efforts to expand further.
The Soviet Union, however militarily strong it is becoming,
suffers enormous centrifugal political forces. A shock could
bring surprising developments within the USSR, just as we have
CONFIDENTIAL
13
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8
seen occurring in Poland. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire
is not a wholly fanciful prediction for later in this century.
US policy should sight on that strategic goal for the longer run.
When it comes, Era II will be at an end, and we can anticipate
Era III.
To sum up, through a strategy of "competitive engagement"
the President can, I believe, heal some of the fissures in our
foreign policy and media elite opinion on the three key assumptions
for US military, foreign, and economic policy. In a second term
he will be freer to stand above the day-to-day criticisms that
have heretofore made a steady course difficult to follow, particularly
funding programs and pursuing adequate legislation. He also has
the enormous advantage of several inchoate policy developments
(as outlined above) that will allow him, rather than the Soviets
and our allies, to define the nature of Era II in East-West
relations. Basic steps have already been taken in each of the
four elements of "competitive engagement." As policy slogans form
each element, the following are possibilities:
a. Maintenance of military deterrence.
US "military pre-eminence" is the essential basis for deterrence
and security. We shall acquire it and maintain it with our allies.
b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.
"Three interrelated security zones" are the basis for containing
Soviet power projection.
c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits.
"Reciprocally advantageous East-West trade" is our goal, but
trade is not compatible with threats to our security and foreign
policy interests.
d. Reduction of Soviet influence over client states, Bloc states,
and non-Russian minorities in the USSR.
"Resistance to Soviet internationalism" is encouraged wherever
states and nations find it oppressive and unwanted.
CONFIDENTIAL
14
316
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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #4743 0310419
SOVIET
O 310406Z JAN 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
mild
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
SECRET STATE 024743
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/20/01 (VEST, GEORGE)
TAGS: PEPR, PSDC, UR, US
SUBJECT: GROMYKO RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S LETTER
REFS: A. MOSCOW 1088 B. STATE 19053
1. SECRET . ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON JANUARY 29 DELIVERED
TO THE SECRETARY A REPLY FROM GROMYKO TO THE SECRETARY'S
JANUARY 23 LETTER (REF B). THE TEXT FOLLOWS.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. SECRETARY:
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 24
TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND
TAKE NOTE OF THE WISH EXPRESSED THEREIN TO WORK
FOR DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. THIS CORRESPONDS TO
OUR INTENTIONS TOO.
INDEED, THERE EXISTS QUITE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS
IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE ONES
WHICH DESERVE PRIORITY ATTENTION AND ON WHICH IT
WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. IT CAN ONLY
BE REGRETTED THAT SUCH QUESTIONS, JUDGING BY
YOUR LETTER, HAVE NOT YET FALLEN WITHIN THE FIELD
*
*WHSR COMMENT
COLSON VP
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COPY
OF VISION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.
AS TO CERTAIN SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TOUCHED UPON IN
YOUR LETTER I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING.
RIGHT AFTER THE INCIDENT WHEN THE US EMBASSY
PERSONNEL WERE SEIZED IN TEHRAN, THE SOVIET UNION IN
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS CAME OUT AGAINST ACTIONS
OF THAT TYPE, IN FAVOR OF THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF
THE VIENNA CONVENTION PROVISIONS CONCERNING RESPECT
FOR DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND, ACCORDINGLY, IN FAVOR
OF THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES. THIS
WAS ALSO THE POSITION WE ADHERED TO DURING THE
DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION IN THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL AT THE END OF 1979 AS WELL AS IN THE
FOLLOWING PERIOD. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS ALSO FULLY
AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS FROM THESE SAME
POSITIONS THAT WE ADDRESSED OURSELVES DIRECTLY TO
THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP.
THIS, HOWEVER, IS NOW PASSED OVER IN SILENCE.
NEITHER YOUR LETTER NOR THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION CONTAIN A
SINGLE KIND WORD ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET UNION
IN CONNECTION WITH THE POSITION IT ADOPTED. INSTEAD,
CLEARLY TENDENTIOUS ASSESSMENTS ARE BEING GIVEN
TO WHAT WAS REPORTED IN THE SOVIET NEWS MEDIA IN
CONNECTION WITH THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN
DIPLOMATS. MOREOVER, THIS IS BEING DONE IN SUCH A
WAY AS TO ENTIRELY DISTORT IN THE EYES OF
PUBLIC
OPINION THE POSITION HELD BY THE SOVIET STATE ON
THIS MATTER. ONE CANNOT HELP ASKING THE QUESTION
OF WHY ALL THIS IS BEING DONE AND WHETHER ANY
THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN AS TO HOW WE SHOULD REGARD
SUCH DISTORTED INTERPRETATIONS.
NOW ABOUT POLAND. FIRST OF ALL I MUST SAY IN A TOTALLY
DEFINITE WAY THAT THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THIS
SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST STATE CANNOT BE A SUBJECT OF
DISCUSSION BETWEEN THIRD COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BETWEEN
THE USSR AND THE USA. IF ONE IS TO SPEAK, HOWEVER,
OF OUTSIDE ATTEMPTS TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON THE
INTERNAL SITUATION IN POLAND, THEN IT IS NECESSARY
TO STATE THAT SUCH ATTEMPTS DO IN FACT TAKE PLACE
AND THAT THEY ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN PRECISELY ON
THE PART OF THE USA AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS. IN
THIS REGARD IT IS SUFFICIENT TO MENTION AT LEAST
THE PROVOCATIVE AND INSTIGATORY TRANSMISSIONS OF THE
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"VOICE OF AMERICA" AND OTHER US GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED
RADIO STATIONS BROADCASTING TO POLAND. CONSTITUTING
OPEN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND,
THOSE BROADCASTS ARE, IN ADDITION, AIMED AT
AROUSING AMONG THE POLISH POPULATION UNFRIENDLY
SENTIMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION. THERE
ARE ALSO FACTS WHICH INDICATE THAT THE INTERFERENCE
OF WESTERN POWERS IN POLISH AFFAIRS IS NOT LIMITED
TO RADIO BROADCASTS ALONE.
HERE AGAIN A QUESTION ARISES: WHAT PURPOSE THEN
IS BEING SERVED BY THE ATTEMPTS OF THE AMERICAN SIDE
TO INTRODUCE THE "POLISH THEME" INTO THE SOVIET-
AMERICAN DIALOGUE AND TO MAKE AT THE SAME TIME
INAPPROPRIATE WARNINGS ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET
UNION?
AS FAR AS POLAND IS CONCERNED WE, FOR OUR PART, ARE
GUIDED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT STATEMENT--
WHICH, I BELIEVE, YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH--ADOPTED AT
THE BEGINNING OF LAST DECEMBER IN MOSCOW AT THE
MEETING OF THE LEADERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES.
THIS DOCUMENT SPELLS OUT THE COLLECTIVE POSITION
OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE
POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ITSELF, WHOSE LEADERS
PARTICIPATED IN THAT MEETING.
SINCE YOU, MR. SECRETARY, DID NOT BYPASS IN YOUR
LETTER THE AFGHANISTAN ASPECT EITHER, I WOULD LIKE
TO PRESENT BRIEFLY OUR POSITION IN THIS RESPECT.
ITS ESSENCE IS THAT THERE MUST BE A CESSATION OF
THE ARMED INCURSIONS INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND OF ALL OTHER
INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND FIRM
GUARANTEES MUST BE GIVEN THAT THIS WILL NOT BE
RESUMED. DOING so WOULD ALSO ELIMINATE THE REASONS
THAT BROUGHT FORTH THE NECESSITY OF INTRODUCING
INTO AFGHANISTAN A LIMITED CONTINGENT OF SOVIET
TROOPS AT THE REQUEST OF THE DRA GOVERNMENT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.
CONCRETE PATHS LEADING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND
AFGHANISTAN WERE SET FORTH IN THE DRA GOVERNMENT
STATEMENT OF MAY 14, 1980. LATER, ON MORE THAN
ONE OCCASION, INCLUDING QUITE RECENTLY, THE DRA
GOVERNMENT HAS CONFIRMED ITS READINESS TO START
WORKING ON THE APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
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AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AS WELL AS BETWEEN
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN. THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS
PART COULD, NO DOUBT, CONTRIBUTE TO THE CAUSE
OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IF IT WERE TO FACILITATE
THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN
AND PAKISTAN AND DID NOT ATTEMPT, AS IS THE CASE
NOW, TO RAISE OBSTACLES THERETO.
IN CONCLUSION I WOULD LIKE ONCE MORE TO CONFIRM
OUR READINESS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON A WIDE
RANGE OF ISSUES. I HOPE THAT SUBSEQUENTLY IN OUR
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS A PROPER PLACE WILL BE ACCORDED
TO THE QUESTIONS ON THE RESOLUTION OF WHICH DEPEND,
IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE PROSPECTS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT BOTH OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE.
SINCERELY, A. GROMYKO.
MOSCOW, JANUARY 28, 1981.
END TEXT. HAIG
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UNCLASSIFIED
ISSR
18
USSR CHRONOLOGY
January 1-31, 1981
January
2
Nadezhda Mandel'shtam buried in Kuntsevo Cemetery.
8
Felix Serebrov arrested (last free member of
Helsinki Group's Psychiatric Commission).
12
Lev Kopelev and Raisa Orlova deprived of Soviet citizen-
ship while visiting in FRG.
15
Arstanbek Duysheyev (age 49) transferred from chair-
manship of Presidium, Kirgiz Supreme Soviet, to
premiership, replacing the assassinated Sultan Ibraimov.
16
Lithuanian Party Secretary R. B. Songayla named premier,
replacing I. Manyushis, who retired.
16-17
22nd Turkmen Party Congress.
18
Sel'skaya Zhizn' published party and government decree
permitting private plot owners to raise livestock on
contract for sale to government procurement agencies.
20-22
17th Kirgiz Party Congress.
22-24
15th Moldavian Party Congress.
27th Armenian Party Congress.
26th Georgian Party Congress.
23
Central Statistical Administration reported 1980 grain
harvest of 189.2 million metric tons.
Prosecutor General Roman Rudenko died at age 74.
23-25
19th Tadzhik Party Congress.
27-29
29th Belorussian Party Congress.
28-30
30th Azerbaydzhan Party Congress.
18th Estonian Party Congress.
29-30
23rd Latvian Party Congress.
18th Lithuanian Party Congress.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
- 5 -
As the Soviets See Themselves
1.60pm
- Ты чувствуешь, KaK подрос наш мальчик?
Рисунок Γ. ИОРША
"You can feel how our boy has grown!"
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Zo
- I -
USSR CHRONOLOGY
February 1-28, 1981
February
3-5
20th Uzbek Party Congress.
4-6
15th Kazakh Party Congress.
7
Leningrad air crash killed Pacific Fleet Commander
E. N. Spiridonov; fifty persons in all died, in-
cluding a dozen flag officers.
10
Pravda reported that posthumous honors for Kosygin
include the naming of streets in Moscow and Lenin-
grad, a Moscow textile plant, and a ship and the
placing of an apartment house plaque.
Pravda announced the promotion of A. M. Rekunkov from
first deputy to Prosecutor General USSR, replacing
the late R. A. Rudenko.
10-12
26th Ukrainian Party Congress.
11
Foreign Ministry summoned Washington Post reporter
Kevin Klose for oral reprimand for "slanderous
assertions about Soviet life."
Literaturnaya Gazeta correspondent Vladimir Simonov
concluded a three-part series charging diplomats
with smuggling ikons from USSR.
14
Pravda criticized USICA and CIA employees for briefing
American newsmen at a Kennan Institute seminar.
15
Ivan Serbin, head of Defense Industry Department of
CPSU Central Committee, died at age 71.
17
V. A. Kazakov, Minister of Civil Aviation USSR, died
at age 65.
Iosif Mendelevich released from confinement pre-term
and deported to Israel; only two Russian participants
in the 1970 skyjacking case now remain in confinement.
19
Vasily Baratz, a member of the Committee for the
Right to Emigrate, arrested.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
21
- II -
20
One-day session of CPSU Central Committee heard
Brezhnev and Tikhonov give previews of their
reports for the 26th Party Congress.
TASS published its version of January 15 incident
in a Rovno hotel involving Major R. Holbrook and
Lt. Col. Spencer of USDAO.
Ivan Stepanovich Silayev was named Minister of
Civil Aviation USSR.
Boris Vladimirovich Bal'mont was named Minister of
Machine Building and Instrument Making USSR, replacing
the transferred I. S. Silayev.
22
Pravda announced publication of a new CPSU Central
Committee journal, Kadry sel'skogo khozyaystva
(Agricultural Cadres), dedicated to personnel policy
in the unified agro-industrial complex.
23
26th CPSU Congress opened; Brezhnev delivered 3-hour
and 40-minute accountability report; G. F. Sizov
gave report of Central Auditing Commission.
27
Premier Tikhonov gave report on economic guidelines
for the 1981-85 period and for the period up to
1990.
UNCLASSIFIED
22
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FILE UNDER
00326
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SOVIET UNION
Pipes
*
*
UNITED STATES OF
THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH:
ITS POLICIES, POLITICS, AND ACTIVISTS
Summary
BUREAU OF
Western observers and Soviet Orthodox Church
INTELLIGENCE
activists have long portrayed the Russian Orthodox
Church as a captive of the regime: dominated by
AND RESEARCH
central and local organs of the party and state,
infiltrated by informers, hemmed in by restrictive
legislation, paralyzed by inertia, and no longer
capable of fulfilling its responsibilities or
defending its interests. When Orthodox activists
ASSESSMENTS
began to threaten established church-state rela-
tions, as well as the discipline and outward author-
ity of the church, both church and state acted to
AND
silence them. This paper examines the nuances and
tensions of the relationship the church has with
RESEARCH
its activists and the Soviet regime, using the
judgments of an unusually candid confidential report
of the Soviet Government agency in charge of reli-
gious affairs as a point of departure.
******
Coopling Organized Religion
The close control Soviet authorities exercise
over policies and activities of registered (i.e.,
legal) religious denominations, at both the central
and local levels, has been extensively documented
by unofficial Soviet sources and Western observers
as well as by available official internal documents
of party and government organizations, including
those of the State Council for Religious Affairs
(the agency directly responsible for the supervi-
sion of church-state relations in the USSR).
Publication in the West1/ of a confidential
document of the Council for Religious Affairs
1/ Vestnik russkogo Khristianskogo dvizheniya, Nos. 130 and
131, Paris, 1979-80.
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CAS 7/17/02
Decontrol on 8/5/81
Report 64-AR
February 5, 1981
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23
recently provided an unusually graphic glimpse of the actual
relationship between church and state in the USSR, considerably
at variance with the idealized version purveyed by Soviet
officials and media for external consumption. The council's
lengthy report to the CPSU Central Committee, prepared in 1975
and signed by its deputy director V. Furov, discussed the hier-
archy of the Russian Orthodox Church and its activities. The
language of the report left no room for doubt as to the complete
subservience of the church hierarchy to the council, which was
shown as determining church policies and supervising the actions
of the Episcopate in minute detail. It was also evident from
the report that the council measured its own performance by the
success it achieved in neutralizing the role of the church domes-
tically, while using it as an instrument for propaganda abroad.
The report divides the entire Orthodox hierarchy (i.e., the
Patriarch, metropolitans, archbishops, and bishops) into three
categories, in some instances characterizing individual perform-
ances:
--those who wholeheartedly supported the regime and its
policies, including policies with respect to religion
(this category included Patriarch Pimen) ;
--those who were loyal to the regime but who nevertheless
sought to further the interests of the church, although
without violating the laws on religion; and, finally,
--those who were religious activists, with a record of
attempts to evade or violate the law in order to
strengthen the church, spread the faith, and oppose
regime policies toward religion.
Although the report contains many previously unknown details,
its chief value lies in the fact that an official document pre-
pared for internal use by a responsible Soviet official portrays
church-state relations in a way that is fully congruent with
reports from unofficial Soviet sources and with the views of
Western specialists regarding the status of the church in the
USSR. It also leaves the reader with three principal impressions,
although these were implied rather than stated in the report:
The regime--committed to the implementation of atheism--has
achieved near-total control over the Russian Orthodox Church
and its hierarchy. The regime has maneuvered the church
hierarchy into the position of participating in the imple-
mentation of policies aimed at the eventual destruction of
the church and the gradual creation of an atheist society.
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24
- 3 -
-Soviet interests are, however, for the time being, served
by maintaining the outward integrity of the church and the
authority of its hierarchy, so as to prevent the development
of dissension or open protest within the hierarchy or among
Orthodox believers. The authorities need church leaders to
be sufficiently strong to keep their people in line and
within the letter of Soviet law, because excessive enforce-
ment of the law on religion by the authorities would gener-
ate charges that the regime was persecuting citizens for
their religious beliefs.
--Despite the regime's attainment of "near-total" control
over the church, there remains a substantial number of
individuals among the clergy, including members of the
hierarchy, who chafe under the Draconian restrictions
imposed on the church by the authorities and who find the
dilemma of being forced to act against their conscience
and clerical responsibility to be an agonizing one. The
council's report is shot through with a sense of distrust
toward the clergy and exhortations for eternal vigilance
by state and party organs.
Church and State in Russia
When Soviet authorities stepped up their repression of orga-
nized dissent in 1979-80, their targets included all four major
categories of nonconformism: political, nationalist, cultural,
and religious. The campaign against religious activism was in
many respects an outgrowth of traditional Soviet attitudes and
policies toward religion, but it was directed not so much against
religion per se as against certain of its manifestations:
religious activity serving as a vehicle for nationalist
aspirations (as among Lithuanian Catholics);
unregistered religious denominations; and
unofficial activist groups within registered denominations.
The common denominator in all three instances was that
religious activities were taking place outside the framework of
established church-state relations and outside the bounds of
permissible religious activity as defined by Soviet legislation
and policy. In short, they were activities uncontrolled by the
authorities.
The Historical Tradition. Church-state relations in the
USSR have developed in a complex pattern reflecting the constant
interaction between a Soviet regime unremittingly hostile toward
, IMITED OFFICIAL USE
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- 4 -
religion and the national cultures and religions of the multi-
national Soviet state. In this mosaic, the Russian Orthodox
Church, as the church of the country's dominant culture and
nationality, occupies a central and leading role. It remains,
in a sense, the establishment church, and its historical experi-
ence still imparts a special character to its dealings with
Soviet authorities.
As part of its legacy from Byzantium, the Russian Church
received a tradition of regarding the Tsar's authority as a
manifestation of God's will. To be sure, the royalty of
Western Europe also ruled "by the grace of God," but in the
East, the Patriarchate never institutionalized, as did the
Papacy, its spiritual authority over the monarch, even though
the Patriarch on occasion wielded great power if he happened to
be a strong personality. This tradition was reenforced in
Russia when Peter the Great abolished the Patriarchate and
deprived the church of an independent institutional voice. For
a period of 200 years, the church functioned virtually as an
arm of the state and in turn taught obedience to the Tsar's
authority as an obligation of Orthodox Christians.
Thus, when the activist priest Father Dimitriy Dudko was
persuaded to make a public confession in June 1980, some six
months after his arrest, the explanation he gave for repudiating
his career as an outspoken defender of the rights of believers
was firmly grounded in Orthodox tradition, even though it
sounded incongruous in its application to the Soviet regime.
Dudko explained that he finally realized that his activities
were in fact political (and anti-Soviet) rather than religious
when he remembered what he had earlier forgotten--that "every
[secular] authority comes from God." And if the statement
Dudko read over Soviet television was not his own but the product
of KGB drafting, then the readiness of Soviet authorities to
invoke tradition in discrediting religious activists and in
reenforcing the legitimacy and authority of the Soviet state
becomes all the more striking.
The Tradition Lost, Restored, and Betrayed. The appearance
of Russian Orthodox activists in the 1960s paralleled the appear-
ance of independent thought and action in other areas of Soviet
life. But while the expansion of intellectual freedom--and,
ultimately, overt dissent--developed in the wake of de-Staliniza-
tion under Khrushchev, the Orthodox Church experienced a different
sequence of repression and liberalization. Following the initial
brutal post-revolutionary phase of persecution, the church as an
institution barely survived into the 1930s.
World War II provided a temporary remission from anti-religious
pressures. The role of the church in rallying popular support for
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26
- 5 -
the Soviet regime at this critical period earned Stalin's recog-
nition and served as the basis for a concordat restoring the
Patriarchate and placing church-state relations on a stable basis.
Thus, the institutional church achieved a measure of security and
succeeded in reopening churches, monasteries, and seminaries by
a policy of supporting and serving the regime, rather than by
opposing it in a struggle for "religious freedom."
The liberalization of the intellectual climate under
Khrushchev did not, however, bring similar benefits to religious
believers. Quite to the contrary, Khrushchev set in motion a
sweeping anti-religious campaign during the latter period of his
rule (1959-64) that resulted in the wholesale closing of churches,
a reduction in the number of priests from 20,000 to 7,000, and the
loss of many of the gains the Orthodox Church had achieved under
Stalin. The Patriarchate itself survived the onslaught but at
the price of maintaining silence as churches were being closed
or destroyed. Indeed, high-ranking Orthodox clerics continued
to describe the status of the church in rosy colors at inter-
national religious conferences, citing as proof the guarantees of
religious freedom found in the Soviet Constitution.
In general, official attitudes toward religion under
Brezhnev have been more nuanced and differentiated than under
Khrushchev. Pressures against religion have continued unabated
but have been applied selectively and skillfully and carried out
under the cover of legality. Some denominations have fared better
than others because of local circumstances (i.e., the Armenian
and Georgian churches) or international considerations (the
Muslims). Relentless harassment of the unregistered evangelical
sects--such as the Pentecostals and the Seventh Day Adventists--
has been balanced by relatively generous treatment of the official
(i.e., registered) segment of the Baptist Church, evidently in
order to persuade the independent groups of the wisdom of reg-
istering and cooperating with the regime.
The Russian Orthodox Church, under Brezhnev, has continued
to view its traditional policy of silence in the face of hostile
pressure as the key to survival, but the wisdom of this policy
has become increasingly questionable. The disadvantages now
heavily outweigh the advantages, and the price the church has
paid in the loss of its integrity is a heavy one. Subservience
to the regime now provides not security and stability but, rather,
a participatory role in helping the Council for Religious Affairs
implement its salami tactics of gradually but steadily slicing
away the substance of the moral, material, intellectual, and
organizational resources of the church.
The Orthodox hierarchy continually has been placed in the
position of failing to defend the interests of the church and the
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- 6 -
faithful; of turning a deaf ear to pleas for help from individuals
and congregations; of acquiescing to manifest violations of
Soviet law on religion by the authorities; of obediently executing
all official instructions, including the disciplining of activist
laypersons and priests; and of performing foreign assignments for
the government whenever called upon to do so. Indeed, the regime
has channeled the Patriarchate's activities primarily into the
area of foreign contacts and, by numerous accounts, has closely
controlled its Office for External Relations with KGB personnel.
Since the 1950s, the Patriarchate has all but ceased to
perform its primary responsibility of administering the affairs
of the church as the organizing and unifying center of religious
life. Individual dioceses have found themselves in effect cast
adrift and without support in coping with local problems, including
the central one of dealing with the authorities. The Patriarch
no longer visits individual dioceses and rarely issues orders or
receives visitors, including ruling archbishops. His only direct
link with believers has been reduced to appearances at religious
services in several Moscow churches. His isolation is not self-
imposed but forced upon him by official policy; in effect, his
activities are limited to those suggested by advisers from the
Council for Religious Affairs. Even his personal chauffeur is
reportedly a KGB retired major. In private conversations, the
Patriarch refers to himself as living in a "golden cage."
The Church in Disarray
One effect of the steady reduction in the number of churches,
especially in rural areas, has been to deprive large numbers of
believers of access to a working church or the services of a
priest. As a result, the church experienced an appreciable loss
of believers to other religious groups, particularly to the
Baptists. Evangelical Protestant denominations proved far more
resilient and better adapted to survival under conditions of
oppression because they did not require priests for the perform-
ance of religious services and other essential functions or a
hierarchy for maintaining an institutional church organization.
Instead, they relied on the initiative of individual believers
in maintaining small working congregations united by loose,
informal ties geared to cooperation and mutual assistance.
Paradoxically, the decline of institutional Orthodoxy also
created possibilities for its revival and renewal, in encouraging
the appearance of unofficial study groups and religious seminars.
Organized by activists, they functioned entirely outside the
formal church structure, or--less frequently--gathered around
courageous priests at the parish level. This spontaneous trend
was able to absorb and gain strength from a modest revival of
interest in religion among those Soviet citizens--especially the
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28
- 7 -
youth--who were repelled by the spiritual vacuum of the official
culture.
The formal church could not take advantage of this interest
because the controls and policies imposed by the Council for
Religious Affairs prevented it from engaging in proselytizing
activities or showing any evidence of growth. Quite the contrary,
the council expected the church to demonstrate the validity of
the regime's ideological assumptions by showing, in its steady
decline, the gradual loss of interest in religion in the USSR.
There is evidence that some members of the hierarchy welcomed
the appearance of unofficial activists because the activists
brought new blood, intellectual vigor, and--above all--integrity
to the church. They were able to express openly what the church
had to conceal, and they revived public discussion of issues
vital to the continued survival of the church. There is little
doubt that some members of the hierarchy provided activists with
discreet support and encouragement, surreptitiously circulated
samizdat literature (as well as Russian-language religious
literature published abroad), and preferred not to discipline
activists unless prodded by higher authority.
At the same time, relations between religious activists and
the Patriarchate steadily deteriorated, partly because the
Patriarchate came under increasing pressure from the Council for
Religious Affairs to crack down on dissent within the church but
also because the Patriarchate itself became the target of
dissident criticism. The activists could hardly criticize the
policies of the Soviet regime toward religion without at the same
time reproaching the Patriarchate for inaction in failing to
defend the interests of the church.
Published literature contains extensive documentation of how
religious activists of various denominations--including the
largely Orthodox Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers'
Rights, the Lithuanian Catholic Committee for the Defense of
Believers' Rights, and similar groups established by the Pentecostals,
Seventh Day Adventists, and the unofficial (i.e., unregistered)
Baptists--have publicized and documented all aspects of official
anti-religious policy, including repressive actions directed
against the religious activists themselves. Much less attention
has been focused on the Christian Committee's sweeping indictment
of the Patriarchate and its policies and the possible consequences
of these attacks on the Orthodox Church and its official status
vis-a-vis the Soviet state.
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Criticism of the Patriarchate by the Activists
Dereliction of Duty and Heresy. Documents of the Christian
Committee contain frequent criticism of the internal and external
policies of the Patriarchate, but perhaps the most cogent critique
of its internal policy was contained in the letter the committee
sent to Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch Demetrius of Constantinople
in April 1978.2 The committee praised Demetrius for proclaiming
1977 as a year of religious freedom and then explained why no
support or sympathy from the Moscow Patriarchate could be expected.
According to the committee, unremitting hostile pressure had
forced the Patriarchate to deviate from its pastoral duties and
responsibilities:
"The episcopate's rejection of the charisma of
confession led to a situation where the duty
of a church leader to intercede for the people
was forgotten
In a state dominated by an
ideology hostile to Christianity, the struggle
to preserve outward well-being has so trans-
formed the minds of Church leaders that they
are beginning to do what is completely unaccept-
able
to merge Christianity with the ideology
of the adversaries of Christ."
This dereliction, in their view, led the Patriarchate into
taking positions involving doctrinal error and, ultimately, heresy.
The letter spelled out these errors in precise theological formu-
lations.
Citing a statement by Patriarch Pimen that Orthodox believers
are guided in their liturgical life by the canons of Orthodoxy,
but in their working and public lives they live by the principles
of the October Revolution, the letter noted: "This statement
by the head of the Orthodox Church is tantamount to ecclesiological
Nestorianism ... an official admission that under Soviet condi-
tions, a Christian must be ambivalent and lead a double life
"
For the clergy it meant that they were required to observe
church canons in performing religious rites, but outside the
church, "they must be guided by these canons only insofar as
they do not contradict the general policy of destroying religion
"
As a result, "Anyone who carries out missionary work not only
risks being persecuted by state organs but also risks receiving
canonical prohibitions from his superior in the Church."
The letter termed the argument of church leaders--i.e., that
the condition of servitude of the church to the state was illusory,
2/ Arkhiv Samizdata, Munich, document No. 3249.
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that in a spiritual sense the church remained completely free--
"an example of ecclesiological monophysitism in its extreme
Docetic form." That doctrine reflects extreme distrust of all
human activity and creativity and a denial that God can act in
history through the human will. The church's position of
nonresistance to evil translated in practice into a flight from
reality and a rejection of any form of activism. In short, it
was a religious attitude located at the opposite pole from the
notion that God helps those who help themselves.
The two deviations from accepted Orthodox thought, the
letter concluded, led "the episcopate and a significant portion
of the clergy" to display "hostility, suspicion, or indifferent
aloofness to human rights activity, to campaigns for the opening
of churches and the registration of new parishes. It is not
rare for the bishops to use their authority against such under-
takings
Finally, the letter charged that by submitting to state
supervision and control, the Russian Orthodox Church had
violated the ordnances of the 1918 All-Russian Church Council
that restored the Patriarchate and declared the church to be
fully self-governing and independent of the state.
The activists' charges evidently stung the church suffi-
ciently to elicit an unusual and defensive-sounding rebuttal
in Patriarch Pimen's Christmas message of 1980 (i.e., on
January 7, 1981, according to the Gregorian calendar). It
stated that the Orthodox Church "performs its mission within
contemporary society existing in the Soviet state, as before,
in strict compliance with the teaching of Christ and his
Apostles, the Holy Book, and the traditions of the Church."
Canonization of Martyred Clergy. In May 1975, three
Orthodox activists--Father Gleb Yakunin, Viktor Kapitanchuk,
and Lev Regelson (two of whom were to become founding members
of the Christian Committee) -called upon the Orthodox Church
to honor in its prayers those who were martyred for their faith
by the communists during the Civil War and in the subsequent
period of religious persecution. Moreover, in letters3
addressed to the Patriarch and the Russian Orthodox Churches
abroad, they proposed the need for preparatory work leading
3/ Documents of the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights,
Vol noye Slovo, No. 28, Posev Publishers, Frankfurt, 1977.
4/ Russian Orthodox Churches outside the USSR include the following major groups:
the Orthodox Church in America, the Russian Orthodox Synodal Church Abroad,
the Russian Orthodox Diocese in Paris (under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical
Patriarch of Constantinople), and the Russian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow
Patriarchate).
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31
to the canonization of celebrated martyrs of that period. "The
Moscow Patriarchate, they pointed out, " has for all prac-
tical purposes disowned its martyrs and consigned them to
oblivion." They also expressed regret that the Patriarchate
had missed a favorable opportunity to seek official rehabilita-
tion for at least some of the martyred Orthodox churchmen
during the "personality cult" revelations when many victims
of the terror were rehabilitated.
In 1979, the Christian Committee welcomed the resolution
adopted the year before by the Russian Orthodox Synodal Church
Abroad to initiate the canonization of martyred clerics, recom-
mending only that this action should be taken, if possible, by
all Russian Orthodox Churches jointly. Regarding the Synodal
Church's second resolution-- to consider canonization of the last
Tsar, Nicholas II, as well the committee reacted cautiously but
on the whole favorably, although it noted the controversial
nature of this proposal.
A Threat To Split the Church. The ultimate weapon available
to the Christian Committee and other Orthodox activists in goading
the institutional church into action was to threaten a church
split. In a letter of August 1978 to the Patriarch, the committee
reproached him for his alleged complicity with the authorities
in opposing the creation of new parishes. It warned that such
policies raised the possibility that a bishop, unable to respond
to pleas by the faithful in his diocese, might allow the creation
of a parish recognizing the jurisdiction of another autocephalous
orthodox church.
Left unsaid but implied was the possibility that a bishop
might shift allegiance to another orthodox church--perhaps that
of the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Russian Synodal Orthodox Church
Abroad, or the Orthodox Church in America. The committee pointed
out the "possibility under canon law" for Orthodox parishes in
the USSR to come under the jurisdiction of a non-Soviet orthodox
church, given the precedent established in the US where some
parishes of the Patriarchal Church had shifted to the Orthodox
Church in America in accordance with their parishioners' wishes--
and with the acquiescence of the Patriarchal Church.
In his last report to the Christian Committee, shortly before
his arrest in November 1979, Yakunin argued that one of the basic
principles of canon law, requiring that Orthodox Churches be organ-
ized on a territorial-geographic basis and precluding the operation
5/ Vol'noye Slovo, No. 35-36, 1979.
6/ Russkaya Mysl', Paris, November 30, 1978.
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of one church on the territory of another, had been irretrievably
breached by historical events. Nor could canonical rules foresee
"that a local Church would appear that refuses to care for its
spiritual children and refuses to spread the Gospel in places
where an atheistic state does not permit it. These circumstances,
in his view, justified "exceptions corresponding to the reality
of our time," including an action by the Orthodox Church in
America (or some other Orthodox Church) "to take under its juris-
diction the suffering Orthodox flock in the USSR.
The same idea was explored by Father Dimitriy Dudko in a
1978 letter to Metropolitan Filaret of the Orthodox Church in
America. Dudko complained about the shortage of clergy and lack
of "independent" bishops and wondered whether there was any
feasible way of introducing additional priests and bishops into
the USSR, either officially or unofficially.
Repression and Collusion
The independent and insubordinate posture of the Orthodox
activists presented a threat to the existing structure of church-
state relations in the USSR. The Patriarchate faced the possi-
bility, if dissent were to spread, of increased disarray within
the church and a challenge to its authority. The authorities,
for their part, understood that the Patriarchate and its hierarchy--
the regime's principal instruments of control over the church--
needed the outward image of their authority to be enhanced (if
not their actual powers). Both Patriarchate and authorities
perceived a need for silencing the religious activists. Evidence
of their collusion to that end remains for the most part frag-
mentary and circumstantial, but it is suggestive.
The Arrests. During the general repression of organized
dissent that began in 1978, Soviet authorities arrested and
brought to trial most of the prominent Orthodox activists:
--Aleksandr Ogorodnikov: member of the Christian Seminar,
arrested in November 1978; sentenced in January 1979 to
one year of labor camp for parasitism.
-Vladimir Poresh: member of the Orthodox Seminar, arrested
in August 1979; sentenced in April 1980 to five years in
labor camp plus three years of internal exile on charges
of anti-Soviet activity (Art. 70, RSFSR Criminal Code).
71 Orthodox Monitor, Washington, No. 7-8, 1980, p. 101.
8/ Vol'noye Slovo, No. 33, 1978, p. 18.
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33
-Tatyana Shchipkova: member of the Christian Seminar,
arrested in September 1979; sentenced in January 1980 to
three years in labor camp on charges of hooliganism.
Gleb Yakunin: Orthodox priest, founder and intellectual
force of the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers'
Rights, arrested in November 1979; sentenced in August 1980
to five years in labor camp plus five years of internal
exile on charges of anti-Soviet activity (Art. 70, RSFSR
Criminal Code).
Lev Regelson: member of the Christian Seminar, arrested
in December 1979; sentenced in September 1980 to five-year
suspended sentence on charges of anti-Soviet activity
(Art. 70, RSFSR Criminal Code) after pleading guilty and
confessing.
Vladimir Burtsev: founder of the Christian Seminar, arrested
in January 1980; sentenced in April 1980 to 18 months
in camp on a charge of "forging documents."
Dimitriy Dudko: Orthodox activist priest known for his
outspoken sermons, arrested in January 1980; confessed
over Soviet television on June 20, 1980, to engaging in
anti-Soviet activities; now assigned to suburban parish
outside Moscow.
-Viktor Kapitanchuk: member of the Christian Committee,
arrested in August 1980; sentenced in October 1980 to
five-year suspended sentence after pleading guilty to
charges of anti-Soviet activity (Art. 70, RSFSR Criminal
Code).
Signs of Favor. In May 1978, celebration by the
Patriarchate of the 60th anniversary of its restoration received
extensive coverage in the Soviet media, including the three-hour
speech the Patriarch delivered at a reception in Moscow's Hotel
Sovetskaya. Thereafter, especially in 1980, the Patriarchate
began to receive unusual marks of official favor and media
attention:
The number of seminarians enrolled in Soviet Orthodox
seminaries reportedly increased.
--In March 1980, TASS circulated a lengthy report on a
synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and on the activities
of the church in promoting world peace.
--In an authoritative article published in Kommunist (No. 5,
1980), Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs
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Kuroyedov criticized various religious denominations in
the USSR for violating Soviet laws on religion but did not
mention the Orthodox Church or its activists in this con-
text. Instead, Kuroyedov approvingly cited the "peace-
loving" initiatives of the Patriarchate in supporting
Soviet foreign policy objectives.
--On June 22, Izvestiya reported the award of the Order
of the People's Friendship to Patriarch Pimen on his 70th
birthday by an order dated June 20 (i.e., the day Father
Dudko confessed over Soviet television).
--Although in September 1980 the church did not participate
in the official celebration of the 600th anniversary of
the Kulikovo Battle (when defeat of a Tatar army paved the
way for the establishment of an independent Muscovite
state), its role in the rebirth of Russian nationalism was
reflected in Soviet media, especially by Russian neo-
nationalists within the Soviet establishment.
In early October 1980, the Patriarch formally opened a
large workshop for the manufacture and restoration of
religious objects and supplies. Although built and
financed by the church, it could not, of course, have
reached even the planning stage without prior approval
of the authorities.
--A Soviet film on the Russian Orthodox Church, produced by
the Moscow Central Documentary Film Studio and shown as
part of a Novosti Press Agency's public lecture on October 31,
portrayed the church without anti-religious overtones as a
vital component of modern Soviet life; it included shots of
church services, worshippers, and seminarians with a back-
ground soundtrack of Orthodox choral music.
--On November 18, in a ceremony in the Kremlin publicized by
TASS, First Deputy Chairman Kuznetsov of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet presented the Order of the People's Friend-
ship (awarded June 20) to Patriarch Pimen. The latter, in
expressing thanks, declared that "We, the believers of the
Soviet Union, highly appreciate the care shown by the leaders
of our state for prosperity of the people, their devotion
to the ideas of durable and fair peace, and wholeheartedly
wish full success in their noble activities."
In return, the church continued to represent the regime
abroad in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives, including
attendance at the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid, where
Archbishop Nikodim spoke at a press conference on behalf of
the Soviet position.
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35
Aloofness and Noninvolvement
Outwardly, the church maintained a posture of aloofness and
noninvolvement during the arrests and trials of its activists.
All of the cases involved criminal charges against individual
believers and did not implicate the church in any way. The failure
of the Patriarchate to speak out in their defense may not have
reflected credit on the church, but it did not, of itself,
constitute evidence of collusion with the authorities.
The cases of the three activists who admitted their guilt
did, however, raise questions about the methods used to obtain
confessions and the motives of the defendants. Available
evidence about two who chose to plead guilty--Regelson and
Kapitanchuk--does not provide any clear answers. From what is
known so far, they behaved with dignity during their trials,
avoided compromising others by their testimony, and emerged with
minimum damage to their integrity. Both admitted that their
actions and writings had damaged Soviet interests and violated
Soviet law.
The trial of one who did not confess--Father Gleb Yakunin--
featured testimony for the prosecution by witnesses who held
positions within the Patriarchate, raising the possibility of
church involvement in his case:
--A. I. Osipov, a professor at the Moscow Theological Academy,
and Igumen (Father-Superior) Iosif Pustoutov--both reportedly
members of the Patriarchate's Office for External Relations--
testified that Yakunin's writings had greatly impeded the
work of the church abroad. In particular, they described a
letter Yakunin sent in 1975 to the Conference of the World
Council of Churches in Nairobi as having caused "irreparable
harm." They also accused Yakunin of inciting Christians
against the Soviet regime. After the trial, Pustoutov
declared in a TASS interview that he had testified as a
private person and not as a representative of the Patriarchate.
--Another witness against Yakunin was Aleksandr Shushpanov, a
known KGB informant within the church, a former interpreter
in the Patriarchate's External Affairs Office, and currently
a parish official in Moscow. Although Yakunin and Kapitanchuk
had exposed Shushpanov as a provocateur two years earlier,
the Patriarchate has taken no action against him and has
allowed him to continue holding responsible positions within
the church.
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The Case of Father Dudko
The Patriarchate was not able to maintain its posture of
noninvolvement in the case of Father Dimitriy Dudko even though
it attempted to do so.2/ The very circumstances of Dudko's
confession, as arranged and highlighted by the authorities,
pointedly carried a message for perceptive believers and indi-
cated the active role of the Patriarchate. The confession Dudko
read over Soviet television on June 20, as published in Izvestiya
the following day, was dated June 5. The reason for the author-
ities' choice of June 20 as the date for putting Dudko on
national television became apparent when Izvestiya announced
on June 22 the award of the Order of the People's Friendship to
Patriarch Pimen on his 70th birthday--June 20. Later, TASS
reported Dudko's letter to the Patriarch asking Pimen to forgive
his activities--but without indicating that the letter preceded,
rather than followed, Dudko's television confession.
A. Levitin-Krasnov, an eminent Orthodox theologian, church
historian, and friend of Dudko who emigrated from the USSR several
years ago and is respected for his detailed, first-hand knowledge
of Orthodox affairs and personalities, has now provided a more
complete account of what actually happened. According to
Levitin-Krasnov, Dudko wrote to the Patriarch during a period of
depression while under arrest and in expectation of trial. Dudko
knew Pimen well; Pimen, while still Archbishop of Dmitrovsk, had
personally helped Dudko to become a priest (no simple matter,
because Dudko had just been released from labor camp) and even
ordained him personally. The letter provided the KGB the oppor-
tunity to exploit Dudko's personal relationship with Pimen.
In Levitin-Krasnov's account, soon after Dudko wrote to the
Patriarch,
"
he was visited in the KGB building by
Metropolitan Yuvenaliy
who began to
urge him, in the name of the Patriarch, to
sign [the confession]. I even know the
exact language he used: 'Father Dimitriy,
the Host awaits its consecration by you
your flock yearns for you. The Holy
Patriarch himself asks this.' Later, they
[the KGB] arranged an audience with the
Patriarch and took him to Chistyy pereulok,
the Patriarch's residence. And here he
decided to capitulate. The Patriarchate's
role in his capitulation was indicated even
9/ The Orthodox Monitor, January-June 1980, pp. 26-27.
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37
a month earlier, when Metropolitan Yuvenaliy
stated during a visit to Belgium: 'I think
that everything will be all right with
Father Dudko.
Following his release, Dudko celebrated liturgy for the first
time in Moscow's Novodevichiy Monastery jointly with Metropolitan
Yuvenaliy. Dudko stood at Yuvenaliy's side when he delivered the
sermon. Later, Dudko received a parish in the Moscow suburbs,
where he currently lives in seclusion.
The possibility, advanced by some admirers of Dudko, that
his confession was induced by drugs and severe interrogations
cannot be excluded, but this hypothesis remains unconfirmed.
(There do not seem to be any documented cases of dissidents
having been programmed by psychiatric methods to behave against
their convictions. Soviet authorities employ psychiatry for
political purposes primarily as a punitive measure. Activists
who have been released from psychiatric detention usually return
promptly to their former activities without any alteration of
their convictions, although they often suffer physical after-
effects and may require medical care.)
Future Prospects
Recent events have tended to tarnish the integrity of the
Russian Orthodox Church, but despite some signs of disarray,
there is no indication of change in its policy of survival
through nonresistance to repression. The church has, however,
failed to issue any formal condemnation of individual activism
within its ranks, and the rment associated with the activists
continues to exist in spite of the recent arrests. The
activists' considerable body of polemical, historical, and
theological works circulates surreptitiously among clergy of
all ranks, as well as among lay believers. Like all Soviet
citizens, the Orthodox hierarchy and its clergy are afflicted
by the schizophrenia and hypocrisies of Soviet life and must
live with their own particular burden of conscience. They also
see the example set by the evangelical sects, which survive
despite severe repression, and by the tightly knit and well-
organized Lithuanian Catholics, whose recent achievements have
included a petition bearing the signatures of over 143,000
believers asking Brezhnev for the return of a Catholic Church
in the town of Klaipeda.
10, / A. Levitin-Krasnov. "O tekh kogo nedavno sudili," Posev, Frankfurt,
No. 11, November 1980.
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38
- 17 -
Any future move by the authorities against vital Orthodox
interests is bound to increase the already considerable pres-
sures within the church, raising the possibility at some point
of open protest by a member of the hierarchy. The authorities,
for their part, base their strategy on avoiding confrontation
by maintaining tight control over the hierarchy and by enforcing
continuous incremental cuts in the structure of the church, none
of which, taken individually, is of sufficient magnitude to
serve as an issue for arousing major protest.
Nor have the arrests of Orthodox activists resolved their
conflict with the Patriarchate. The Christian Committee survives,
its ranks filled out by new members. Its operations, like those
of other dissident groups, have taken on a semi-clandestine
character under the current conditions of continuous repression.
In March 1980, the Christian Committee issued a statement
announcing that it had accepted 10 new members, "taking into
account its increased workload in the human rights field," but
that it would not reveal their names. Subsequently, the
committee decided to identify publicly only two members at all
times in order to protect the rest and insure continuity of
work. The well-publicized but not fully explained confessions
by two of its members also impelled the two currently identified
members--Father Fonchenkov and Vadim Shcheglov--to issue state-
ments disavowing any confession they might make in the event of
arrest.
Prepared by I. Belousovitch
x29204
Approved by M. Mauntner
x29536
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CONFIDENTIAL
South QUTGOING
Department of State
39
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
STATE 032554
3976
ORIGIN EUR-12
INFO
OCT-00
ADS-00
INR-10
SS-15
CIAE-00
ICA-11
DODE-00
H-02
NSC-05
NSAE-00
SY-05
L-03
CSCE-04
TRSE-00
PM-07
PA-01
DCT-02
ACDA-12
SYE-00
SP-02
SPRS-02
/093 R
DRAFTED BY EUR/SOV: RECOMBS, JR. LR
APPROVED BY EUR: GSVEST
EUR/SOV: RKGERMAN
EUR/CE: TMTNILES
007531 071505Z /41
R 070817Z FEB 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
ONF
I DENTIAL STATE 032554
E.O. 12065:
RDS-1 2/6/11 (VEST, GEORGE S.)
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, GW
SUBJECT: FALIN COMMENTS TO FRG AMBASSADOR
LIN COMMENTS TO FRG AMBASSADOR
REF: USNATO 628
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. FRG EMBOFF CALLED ON EUR/SOV DEPUTY DIRECTOR
FEBRUARY 5 TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE
JANUARY 30 CONVERSATION IN MOSCOW BETWEEN FRG AMBASSADOR
AND SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICIALS ZAMYATIN AND FALIN
(REFTEL). FRG EMBOFF ASKED THAT HIS INFORMATION BE
CLOSELY HELD.
3. FRG EMBOFF SAID THAT FALIN HAD VOLUNTEERED THE
FOLLOWING POINTS REGARDING CURRENT U.S. POLICY:
--SECRETARY HAIG'S COMMENTS ON SOVIET SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM SEEM TO have BEEN PREMEDITATED AND PART OF
A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE USSR. THE U.S. PROBABLY WILL
HENCEFORTH BLAME THE SOVIET UNION FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM
AROUND THE WORLD.
--THE USSR WILL RESPOND TO ALL SUCH CHARGES.
--THE SOVIET UNION NONETHELESS IS PREPARED TO
COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES, AFTER THE "BAD"
CARTER YEARS, PARTICULARY ON ARMS CONTROL. COOPERATION
IN THIS FIELD IS URGENT because OF THE INEVITABLE
MOMENTUM IN ARMS TECHNOLOGY.
-CONTINUATION OF THE U.S. HARD LINE REGARDING
THE USSR WILL GRIND DOWN DETENTE AND WILL "PULL
THE SMALLER COUNTRIES BACK INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE
CAMPS.
--AMERICA'S EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD TELL WASHINGTON TO
THINK FIRST BEFORE COMPLICAT-NG U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS,
AND THE "SMALLER AND MEDIUM COUNTRIES" SHOULD DO
SOMETHING TO BRING THE U.S. TO COOPERATE WITH THE
USSR ON SUCH VITAL ISSUES AS ARMS CONTROL.
HAIG
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06 714/7 #9844
BY CN NARADATE 7/7/08
CONF IDENTIAL
*
CONF IDENTIAL
40
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OTTCZYUW RUDKRBA0982 0400830
IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY
O P 090812Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9349
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 138
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 396
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 214
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 185
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 201
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 631
Sec 1-2 oF 2
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2124
BT
C
0
N
F
I
E
N
SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 0982
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/6/91 COUNLOP, T.P.H.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG, YO
SUBJ: YUGOSLAV PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEW DELHI NAM MINISTERIAL
REF: (A) BELGRADE 948 (NOTAL) (B) BELGRADE 882 (NOTAL)
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
63
ACTION
(U,6,7,8)
INFO CJCS: (*) CJCS (3) DJS(*) J3(5) NIDS(*)
SAGA (1) J3:NMCC (*) J5(2) IADB(1) USRMCLO(1)
RDJTF8L0(1) NSC(5) SECDEF: (*) SECDEF (7) USDP(15)
USDRE (3) ASD:PA(1) ASD:PA&E (1) NMIC(#) SWS(1) AT(2)
DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1) DB=1G(1) DB-2C(1) DB-3C(3)
DB=3D(3) DB-4A (1) DB-5(1) DIA FILE (1) ARMY (*)
NAVY (*) AIR FORCE (*)
*CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
*CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+ANMCC
*CIA WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED
63
MCN=81040/03413 TOR=81040/0912Z TAD=81040/1047Z CDSN=MAY580
DECLASSIFIED
PAGE 01
*
CONF IDENTIAL
*
090812Z FEB 81
NLRR F06-114/7 #9845
SECT 01 OF 02
BY RW NARA DATE 11/24/09
CONF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
2. SUMMARY: YUGOSLAVS HAVE BEEN DIPLOMATICALLY ACTIVE
IN PREPARATION FOR NEW DELHI. GOY HAS CIRCULATED A
WORKING PAPER ON PEACEFUL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT) THINKS
EGYPTIAN MEMBERSHIP WILL NOT BE RESOLVED IN NEW DELHI;
HAS TOLD INDIANS IT PREFERS THAT HENG SAMRIN AMBASSADOR
NOT BE PRESENT FOR OPENING CEREMONIES; AND EXPECTS
INFORMAL IRAN=IRAQ GOOD OFFICES" COMMITTEE MEETING.
YUGOSLAV NAM EXPERT TELLS US OF OPEN CUBAN SUGGESTIONS
THAT 1982 NAM SUMMIT BE DELAYED OR REMOVED FROM
BAGHDAD THIS GOY OFFICIAL ALSO CLAIMS THAT CUBANS
ARE SPREADING RUMORS THAT YUGOSLAVIA IS ANGLING TO
HOST THE SEVENTH SUMMIT. THESE "FALRE" RUMORS ARE
INTENDED TO ESTRANGE YUGOSLAVIA AND IRAQ. GOY
OPPOSES VENUE CHANGE OR POSTPONEMENT BUT BELIEVES
IRAQIS TO BE WORRIED ABOUT THIS CUBAN "CAMPAIGN.
THE YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL INDICATED THAT SPECULATIONS
ABOUT THE 1982 SUMMIT ARE WIDESPREAD. END SUMMARY.
3. COMMENT: WE HAVE HAD INDICATIONS FROM SEVERAL
SOURCES LATELY THAT IRAQ AND CUBA ARE HAVING
DIFFICULTIES. ONE LOCAL ARAB DIPLOMAT INDICATED
TO us THAT IRAQ MAY BELIEVE THE CUBANS TO BE
TAKING PRO-IRANIAN ACTIONS AS MOSCOW'S STALKING
HORSE IN A LONG-RANGE SOVIET PLAN TO GAIN INFLUENCE
IN IRAN (REF B). WHATEVER THE ACCURACY OF THIS
VIEW, IT IS CERTAIN THAT THERE IS AT LEAST SOME
NAM SPECULATION, LED BY CUBA, ABOUT MOVING THE
SEVENTH SUMMIT. GREATLY INCREASED NAM SUPPORT FOR
THIS EFFORT, THE GULF WARDS DRAGGING ON INTO 1982
OR A MAJOR IRAQI SETBACK AND LOSS OF PRESTIGE
WOULD PRESENT THE GOY WITH SOME PRATICULARLY PAINFUL
IDEOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY
REGARDING THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ.
IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO LEARN HOW THE YUGOSLAVS
APPROACH THIS PROBLEM IN NEW DELHI. END COMMENT.
4. AS USUAL, THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN THE
RUN-UP TO THE NEW DELHI MINISTERIAL, THE FIRST MAJOR NAM
GATHERING TO BE HELD WITHOUT PRESIDENT TITO. IN
RECENT WEEKS, THEY HAVE SENT EMISSARIES TO A NUMBER
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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OF KEY NAM STATES INCLUDING CUBA, SINGAPORE, AND
PAKISTAN. VISITING BELGRADE HAVE BEEN THE IRAQI,
CUBAN AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTERS AND SENIOR
INDIAN AND INDONESIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS.
THE YUGOSLAV FEDERAL ASSEMBLY, SERBIAN PRESIDENCY,
FEDERAL SOCIAL COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND OTHER IMPORTANT BODIES HAVE MET TO DISCUSS THE
UPCOMING MINISTERIAL AND TO GIVE SUGGESTIONS TO
THE STATE PRESIDENCY WHICH ON FEB. 4 ADOPTED THE
OFFICIAL YUGOSLAV "PLATFORM" FOR NEW DELHI. THE
PLATFORM, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS, IS A RATHER
BLAND STATEMENT OF CONCERN OVER THE WORSENING
WORLD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION.
5. DELEGATION: THE GOY WILL HAVE A STRONG
REPRESENTATION IN NEW DELHI LED BY FOREIGN SECRETARY
JOSIP VRHOVEC. IN A FEB. 5 TELEVISION STATEMENT
PRIOR To HIS DEPARTURE, VRHOVEC CALLED INTRA-NAM
DISPUTES A "SAD FACT" BUT SAID THE
MINISTERIAL MUST NONETHELESS ADDRESS THE CONTROVERSIAL PROBLEMS
CONFRONTING THE MOVEMENT. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
YUGOSLAV DELEGATION INCLUDE UN PERM REP MILJAN
KOMATINAS ASSISTANT FON SEC KAZIMIR VIDAS (MULTILATERAL
ECONOMIC); NAM OFFICE DIRECTOR DJEVAT MUJEZINOVIC;
UN DEPUTY PERM REP DARKO SILOVIC, AND UN ECONOMIC
COUNSELOR ZORAN LAZAREVIC. THERE WILL ALSO BE A
LARGE CONTINGENT OF YUGOSLAV PRINT AND ELECTRONIC
JOURNALISTS.
6. GOY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PAPER: AS NOTED IN
REF A, PRINCIPAL YUGOSLAV CONCERN REMAINS TENDENCY
BY MANY STATES -- ESPECIALLY THE USSR -- TO RESORT
TO FORCE. THE GOY WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT RECENT
UNGA WAS UNABLE TO ADOPT DECLARATION ON PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. WE SUSPECT THAT THE
YUGOSLAVS ALSO BELIEVED THE INDIAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
TOO TEPID ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PARTICULARLY
AMONG NAM STATES. WE HAVE OBTAINED A COPY OF THE
YUGOSLAV "WORKING PAPER ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES" WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS BEING CIRCULATED
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
IN NEW DELHI. THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT REITERATES THAT
ALL STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE "WITHOUT
INTERFERENCE" THEIR OWN SOCIAL SYSTEM. "ANY ATTEMPT
BT
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OTTCZYUW RUDKRBA0982 0400835
IMMEDIATEVPRIORITY
0 P 090812Z FEB 81
Genny The
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9350
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 139
RUEHEGVAMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 397
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 215
RUSBQDVAMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 186
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 202
RUSBAEVAMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 532
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2125
BT
CONFIDENT I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 0982
FROM OUTSIDE TO IMPOSE UPON THE PEOPLES A SOCIAL OR
POLITICAL ORDER DIRECTLY THREATENS WORLD PEACE."
THE PAPER WOULD OBLIGATE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO
"REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE DIRECTED
AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE OF ANY OTHER STATE." IT CALLS ON THE
MOVEMENT TO FORM "GOOD OFFICES" GROUPS TO ASSIST IN
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT.
ACTION
(I,M)
INFO CUCS: (*) CJCS(3) DJS(*) J3(5) NIDS(*)
SAGA (1) J31NMCC(*) J5(2) IADB(1) USRMCLO(1)
RDJTF#L0(1) NSC(5) SECDEF#(*) SECDEF(7) USDPI(15)
USDRE(3) ASD:PA(1) ASD:PA&E(1) NMIC(*) SWS(1) AT(2)
DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1) DB-1G(1) DB=2C(1) DB-3C(3)
DB-3D(3) DB=4A(1) DB-5(1) DIA FILE(1) ARMY(+)
NAVY(*) AIR FORCEI(*)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+ANMCC
+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
MCN=81040/03715 TOR=81040/0943Z TAD=81040/1047Z CDSN=MLT736
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
7: SPECIFIC NEW DELHI ISSUES: ON FEBRUARY 4,
POLCOUNS MET WITH STANKO NICK, ONE OF GOY'S
PRINCIPAL NAM EXPERTS, TO ASCERTAIN YUGOSAV VIEWS
ON SOME OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS WHICH
WILLI ARISE IN NEW DELHI:
DO: EGYPTIAN MEMBERSHIP: THE MINISTERIAL WILL
PASS THIS "HOT POTATO" TO THE 1982 SUMMIT.
-- KAMPUCHEA8 THE HENG SAMRIN AMBASSADOR HAS
ARRIVED IN NEW DELHI AND WILLI PRESENT CREDENTIALS BEFORE THE
MINISTERIAL OPENING. THE GOY HAS TOLD THE INDIANS
THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO HAVE HIM PRESENT AT
THE OPENING CEREMONIES. EVEN IF HE IS, HOWEVER,
IT WILLI NOT BE TOO SERIOUS A PROBLEM SINCE MANY
OF THEI ENVOYS ATTENDING, "INCLUDING THE AMERICAN
AMBASSADORY WILL NOT BE REPRESENTING NAM MEMBERS,
(NOTE: BELGRADE MEDIA CARRY REPORT FEB. 6 THAT
HENG SAMRIN REPRESENTATION WILLI BE PRESENT
ONE SUCH NEWS ITEM IS HEADED "THROUGH THE NAM'S
BACK DOOR. ")
-- IRAN/IRAQ: THE GOY EXPECTS IRAN TO SEND A
STRONG DELEGATION TO NEW DELHI. NICK RATIONALIZED
THAT THE WAR IS NOT REALLY SUCH A "BAD PROBLEM" FOR
THE NAM BECAUSE ALMOST NO ONE SUPPORTS IT. HE DID
NOT KNOW ON FEBRUARY 4 WHETHER THE NAM "GOOD OFFICES"
COMMITTEE WILLI CONVENE FORMALLY BEFORE THE
MINISTERIAL. THEI INDIANS ARE NOT KEEN ON THE IDEA,
AND THE CUBANS OPPOSE IT. NICK ALLEGED THAT
CUBA DOES NOT WANT THE
"GOOD OFFICES" MEDIATION EFFORT TO SUCCEED. NICK
BELIEVES THAT THERE VERY LIKELY WILL BE SOME KIND
OF INFORMAL: MEETING OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE "GOOD
OFFICES" MINISTERS.
8. 1982: SUMMIT: POLCOUNS ASKED WHETHER IRAN WOULD
TRY TO CONVINCE OTHERS IN NEW DELHI THAT 1982:
SUMMIT SHOULD BEI MOVED FROM BAGHDAD. NICK EXPLAINED
THAT THE MINISTERIAL COULD NOT CHANGE A DECISION
TAKEN AT THE LAST SUMMIT. THIS WOULD TAKE AN
EXTRAORDINARY NAM GATHERING OF DELEGATES
ARMED WITH SPECIAL POWERS FROM THEIR HEADS OF STATE.
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
IRAN, HE CONTINUED, HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY "QUIET"
ON THIS ISSUE "SO FAR".
9. CUBAN INTRIGUES: WHAT IS GREATLY UPSETTING THE
YUGOSLAVS ARE PERCEIVED CUBAN INTRIGUES OVER THE
SEVENTHI SUMMIT. ACCORDING TO NICK, THE CUBANS HAVE
BEEN "QUIET OPENLY" SUGGESTING A NEW VENUE FOR THE
1982 SUMMIT. WHILE HAVANA HAS "NOT EXACTLY"
PROPOSED ITSELF, NICK HAS THE FEELING THAT CASTRO
MAY BE ANGLING FOR ANOTHER TERM AS COORDINATOR OR
AT THE LEAST FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAGHDAD
SUMMIT so THAT THE CUBAN COORDINATOR ROLE CAN BE
EXTENDED. ACCORDING TO NICK, THE CUBANS HAVE EVEN
PUT OUT RUMORS THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WANT THE 1982
SUMMIT MOVED TO BELGRADE. HE DENIED THAT ABSOLUTELY
AND SAID THAT THE CUBANS ARE ONLY ATTEMPTING TO
"ESTRANGE" THE YUGOSLAVS AND IRAGIS. NICK STATED
FLATLY THAT THE GOY IS AGAINST MOVING OR POSTPONING
THE SEVENTHI SUMMIT AND BELIEVES THIS TO BE THE
MAJORITY OPINION.
10. IRAQI WORRIES: ACCORDING TO NICK, BAGHDAD HAS
TAKEN THE "UNUSUAL" STEP OF SETTING THE SEVENTH
SUMMIT DATES (SEPT. 5-10) FAR IN ADVANCE. TO NICK
CAND TO US) THIS INDICATES THAT THE IRAQIS ARE "NOT
so SURE OF THEMSELVES. INDEED, IRAQI CONCERN MAY
BE JUSTIFIED NICK INDIRIECTLY INDICATED THAT THERE
HAS BEEN IN FACT RATHER WIDESPREAD CONSIDERATION
SURROUNDING THE SUMMIT TIMING AND VENUE. EVEN IF IT
WERE "PROPER" TO SHIFT THE 1982 SUMMIT FROM BAGHDAD,
WHICH THE GOY DOES NOT BELIEVE SHOULD BE DONE, THERE AREI
MANY OBSTACLES TO FINDING ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION.
FOR EXAMPLE, ACCORDING TO NICK, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE
TO RESCHEDULE THE SUMMIT IN A CITY WHICH HAS HOSTED A NAM
SUMMIT BEFORE, THIS ELIMINATES ALGIERS, COLOMBO, HAVANA,
BELGRADE. ETC., NEW DELHI, WHICH IS HOSTING THE MIN-
ISTERIAL. WOULD ON THE SAME GROUNDS NOT BE APPROPRIATE.
AMONGH THOSE CITIES WHICH NICK INDICATED HAD BEEN
MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT IS TRIPOLI; HE SAID FLATLY
THE GOY "WOULD NOT LIKE" TO SEE THE 1982 SUMMIT IN
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
TRIPOLI. PERHAPS SOME AFRICAN CITY WOULD BEI THE MOST
APPROPRIATE NICK OBSERVED, BUT NONE HAVE VOLUNTEERED.
(NOTE: AN ASIAN DIPLOMAT HERE CLAIMS TO HAVE HEARD FROM
ANOTHER GOY OFFICIAL IN JANUARY THAT IN FACT YUGOSLAVIA
ACTIVELY SUPPORTS LAGOS AS THE 1982 SUMMIT VENUE. NICK
COULD HAVE BEEN LYING TO US OF COURSE, BUT GIVEN THE
VIRTUAL CERTAINTY THAT A FIRM YUGOSLAV POSITION ON THIS
MATTER WOULD BECOME KNOWN EVENTUALLY, PROBABLY SOONER
RATHER THAN LATER, AND GIVEN YUGOSLAVIA'S ACUTE BILATERAL
INTEREST IN MAINTAINING ITS SPECIAL IRAQI CONNECTION,
WE DOUBT IT. POSSIBLY ANOTHER CUBAN DISINFORMATION EFFORT?)
11. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BENSON
BT
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Pipes,
448
MEMORANDUM
48
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
February 12, 1981
DECLASSIFIED
ACTION
NLRR F06-114/7 # 9842
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RICHARD V. ALLEN
NP
BY CCI NARADATE 6/25/09
FROM:
RICHARD PIPES
SUBJECT:
Anniversary of Soviet Invasion of Georgia
(ii)
February 16 will mark the 60th anniversary of the Red Army's
invasion of the Republic of Georgia. It is an event of great
historical importance. The previous year (1920), the Soviet
Union had recognized by formal treaty the sovereignty of the
Georgian Republic. The subsequent invasion and incorporation
of Georgia into the USSR marks one of the earliest instances
of Communist imperialism, the beginning of the process of
expansion by military conquest now continued in Afghanistan.
(S)
A brief statement by the President to the Georgian people on
this anniversary would:
1.
Send a powerful signal to all the national minorities
of the Soviet Union, especially those living in the Middle
Eastern region, that we have not forgotten them; and
2.
double-edged sword. (S)
Put Moscow on notice that "national liberalization" O is a
Would you like me to draft such a statement for submission to
the President?
Let's discuss I'd like to eu
Yes
No
VOA, RFE/RL put out
a for of shuff,
Nodney
Rather than have
P
Delims
make statement, why not
have a Reorgia group fend
something 6 him - and
Juhaps buen could be a
SECRET
Review February 12, 2001
Extended by RVAllen
WH. responde
Reason: NSC 1.13 (f)
2/16/81
49
VOL. 6, No. 2
FEBRUARY 15, 1981
Highlights
SOVIET
Soviet
Moscow SIDESTEPS REAGAN CHARACTERIZATION OF SOVIET INTEN-
TIONS: Soviet commentaries relied on a mix of scorn and hurt in efforts to refute
President Reagan's statement on January 29 about Soviet aims to establish communism
worldwide and to subordinate all morality to the communist cause. Pravda and Radio
World
Moscow called Reagan's statements "unworthy." Izvestiia saw a revival of the cold war.
Nevertheless, Gromyko, writing in Kommunist, looked to the landmark role of the
upcoming Soviet Party Congress in "our world's social renewal" and gave a revolution-
ary slant to concepts of proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence, the two
Outlook
"fundamental principles" in Soviet foreign policy. Past Brezhnev statements, recently
published anew by Moscow, emphasize Moscow's 'internationalist duty" to support
the "world revolutionary process" and cite the higher moral force of communist obliga-
tions. Countless other Soviet spokesmen make the same points.
CAMPAIGN HERALDED AGAINST EUROMISSILES: Soviet media are
intensifying efforts to induce West European governments to renege on NATO's De-
cember 1979 decision on deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe.
Encouraged by growing opposition on the part of Social Democrats especially in West
A monthly report on the
Germany, Moscow is focusing (contrary to the facts) on the argument that the NATO
decision was part of a deal requiring U.S. ratification of SALT II which the U.S. has
view from the Kremlin
allegedly violated. Moscow, notably in an article by Foreign Minister Gromyko, is
demanding that the U.S. ratify SALT II as is. U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger's
on issues critical to U.S.
February 3 remarks on the neutron bomb have brought a renewed Soviet campaign on
interests
that issue.
No
LETUP IN ALARMS ABOUT POLAND: The Soviet media continue to portray the
situation in Poland as touch-and-go between a beleaguered leadership and the all but
Edited by:
subversive Solidarity trade union organization. The bulk of recent Soviet coverage has
Mose L. Harvey
sought to discredit or weaken Solidarity. Soviet commentaries profess continued con-
Foy D. Kohler
fidence in the Polish leadership and especially the Polish army, but the outcome of the
Polish crisis is portrayed as still highly uncertain.
Morris Rothenberg
Two TONGUES ON RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES: Evidently stung by U.S. pro-
tests, Moscow officially denied that the Soviet media sought to complicate matters during
final U.S. negotiations on the release of the hostages in Iran. However, Moscow never
AISI
used the terms of indignation on the U.S. problem such as it used when Tehran dem-
onstrators entered the Soviet Embassy in December 1980. Moreover, throughout Janu-
ary, Soviet commentaries and broadcasts to Iran took positions clearly aimed at hardened
Iranian opposition to a deal. And after the hostage release, a Soviet-based broadcast
praised the "occupation of the U.S. spy den" as a 'patriotic act" which merited "deep
appreciation and gratitude."
INVESTMENT PROBLEMS SPELLED OUT: A candid article in Kommunist on Soviet
investment problems emphasized the impact of excessive investments on a tighter man-
Advanced
power situation, problems in attracting workers because of consumer goods shortages,
cost overruns in unfinished projects, investment imbalances and inefficiencies especially
International
in agriculture.
Studies
Institute
IN BRIEF: A new decree announced on January 18 called for a variety of measures to
encourage expanded agricultural production on individual private plots
The Soviet
media are strongly attacking U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government against the guerrillas
in association with the
whose struggle is being called the apex of the revolutionary movement in Latin Amer-
University of
ica.
Miami
SOVIET WORLD OUTLOOK, © 1981, Advanced International Studies Institute, Inc., in association with the University of Miami.
Address subscriptions to Director of Publications, AISI, Suite 1122, 4330 East-West Highway, Washington, D.C. 20014. Telephone
301-951-0818. Subscription price: $48.00 per year for corporations and government: $18.00 per year for academic institutions and
individuals. Recipients may quote or reproduce contents without further permission. ISSN 0162-2404
Moscow Sidesteps Reagan
Current Gromyko Testimony
50
As circumstances would have it, almost coincidentally
Characterizations of Soviet
with President Reagan's remarks was the circulation of
Intentions
the January 1981 issue of Kommunist that included an
article by Soviet Politburo member and Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko which spoke frankly of the issues raised
R
ATHER THAN outright denials, Soviet commentaries
by the U.S. President. The forthcoming 26th Soviet Party
have relied on a mix of scorn and hurt in efforts to
Congress, wrote Gromyko, would not only be of domestic
refute President Reagan's statements about the Soviet
importance but a landmark "in the entire process of our
Union at his press conference on January 29.
world's social renewal," current Soviet jargon for the
worldwide triumph of communism. Further, Gromyko
Pravda on February 1 claimed "indignation in many
emphasized that the fundamental principles of Soviet for-
public circles" over "a number of unworthy utterances
about the aims and character of Soviet policy," and cited
eign policy are "proletarian internationalism and
critical comments of NBC news commentator John Chan-
'peaceful co-existence" to both of which he gave a de-
cellor, NBC correspondent Bernard Kalb, the Washington
cidedly revolutionary slant:
Post, and the New York Times in support of its contention.
"Proletarian internationalism as the fundamental principle
And to this list, Pravda on February 2 added the Associ-
of Soviet foreign policy means that this policy consistently
ated Press and columnists James Reston and Joseph
upholds the fundamental interests of world socialism and of
Kraft.
the forces of the international communist and workers move-
ment. As for peaceful coexistence, it represents a specific
A radio Moscow review of January 30 assumed a lofty
form of class struggle-peaceful competition, ruling out the
pose:
use of military force, between the two opposite socioeconomic
"In an unworthy manner Reagan went on to talk about
systems-socialism and capitalism."
some sort of insidiousness in the Soviet Union's policy which
allegedly aims to establish a worldwide socialist or communist
state. Such words can only show that Washington evidently
cannot understand the meaning of the changes taking place
Brezhnev Testimony
in the world. These changes stem from the peoples' striving
for national liberation, independence and economic and so-
Further, of course, the Soviet Government has been
cial progress. These processes are not dependent on either
busy in recent times publishing anew Brezhnev state-
the United States or the Soviet Union."
ments which are replete with emphasis on the Soviet role
in the revolutionary struggle to transform the world, as
Izvestiia asked on February 1 what sort of "new begin-
for example:
ning" was indicated by Reagan's remarks. This question
was said to be "troubling many observers" who see "at
Speech to the Komsomol Central Committee, October 15,
least a new outbreak of the 'cold war' and, more likely,
1968:
a deliberate strategy of returning to that inauspicious
"We have never divorced our tasks and affairs from the
phase in international relations which lasted many years."
common cause of liberating the working people of all
countries, from the cause of socialism and world peace. It
"President Reagan gave examples of this at his 29 January
may be said that internationalism is in the blood of all of us.
press conference. He claimed that the Soviet Union has re-
It has been nurtured by several generations of Soviet people
peatedly and firmly made statements to the effect that its goal
and each epoch has subjected it to a new test and set it new
must be the promotion of world revolution and the creation
tasks."
of a world socialist or communist state, call it what you will.
Article in the World Marxist Review, August 1969:
"His very words. Call it what you will, but it would be
impossible to invent a claim which would so ostentatiously
"Throughout its history the CPSU has founded its policy
challenge the generally known facts as that cited above.
on the Leninist concept of proletarian internationalism. We
Do people need reminding that at the dawn of Soviet
have always been guided by the well-known Leninist definition
power Lenin himself advanced the principle of peaceful
that to be an internationalist is to do 'the utmost possible in
coexistence as the fundamental principle of Soviet foreign
one country for the development, support and awakening of
policy, or that this principle has been repeatedly and
the revolution in all countries.' The CPSU has always striven
firmly reaffirmed since then at CPSU congresses, which
to make full use of all inner potentialities to strengthen and
have called for detente and, in particular, for the im-
promote socialism and communism to the utmost in the Soviet
provement of Soviet-U.S. relations, which are so impor-
Union and, at the same time, to support and develop the
tant for a normal international situation as a whole?
revolutionary struggle throughout the world. Such is our idea
of internationalist duty to the world communist and working-
"There is no point in explaining what is self-explanatory.
class movement."
Neither is there any point in denying once again what life
Speech on the Lenin Centenary, April 21, 1970:
long ago completely refuted as the most absurd of anti-
Soviet old wives' tales."
"The World revolutionary process is developing inexorably.
The stronger and more influential the Marxist-Leninist Parties
Similar hurt puzzlement was professed by Pravda on
become, the greater will be the achievements of this process.
February 6: With reference to the Soviet Union's 'inten-
The deeper the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism sink into the
tion' to establish world supremacy through world rule by
minds of the masses, the sooner will the revolution achieve
communist states, it remains a mystery on what stand R.
new victories. Under the banner of Leninism we shall secure
Reagan read or computed such an intention."
the complete triumph of our just cause."
2
51
Report to the 24th Party Congress, March 30, 1971:
just and unjust peaces which will continue as long as
"In recognition of its international duty, the CPSU will
capitalism exists. "Lasting peace" can only come with
continue to pursue a line in international affairs toward pro-
the world triumph of communism. In the words of the
moting the further activation of the world anti-imperialist
article:
struggle and the strengthening of the combat unity of all its
"100-percent durability of peace stems from the elimination
participants. The total triumph of socialism the world over is
of the source of war as a result of the transition from capi-
inevitable, and for this triumph, for the happiness of the
talism to socialism. Peace between socialist countries is the
working people, we will fight, unsparing of our strength."
highest type of present-day peace. It is the existing model for
Speech on the 60th Anniversary of the October Revolution,
the world peace of the first phase of the communist society.
November 2, 1977:
Socialism and peace are so inseparable that the concept
"We are advancing towards the epoch when socialism, in
'peace' becomes redundant and is scarcely used in relations
some specific, historically determined form or other, will be
between socialists countries. It is replaced by the concepts of
the prevailing social system on earth, bringing with it peace,
proletarian internationalism, friendship and cooperation,
freedom, equality and well-being to the whole of working
which reflect an especially durable peace. Unlike imperialism,
mankind. This is no Utopia, no beautiful dream. This is a real
which develops the foundations of war, socialism forms the
prospect. It is daily brought nearer by our work and struggles,
foundations of peace."
comrades. It is brought nearer by the work and struggle of
millions of our contemporaries. This work is the continuation
The Soviet Morality Issue
of the cause begun by the October Revolution."
Regarding President Reagan's charge that the "only
morality they [the Soviet leaders] recognize is what will
Other Representative Statements
further their cause," the only notable Soviet response so
far has been by Pravda on February 5. Pravda asserted
Echoing Brezhnev are countless statements by numer-
that "we will not argue with the U.S. President" and that
ous other authoritative Soviet spokesmen. Three of recent
"our views on morality do not coincide." It then went on
vintage are particularly revealing:
to claim the highest motivation for Soviet policies and the
The first is contained in a book published in 1977 by
lowest for the U.S. However, neither Pravda nor other of
Karen N. Brutents, Deputy Chief of the International
the Soviet media made reference to the most authoritative
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist
pronouncement on the matter currently extant, that
Party of the Soviet Union entitled, "National Liberation
voiced by Brezhnev at the most recent Soviet Party Con-
Revolutions Today":
gress, the 25th which met in 1976:
"In accordance with the whole course of the world revo-
"Let us recall Lenin's idea that everything is moral in our
lutionary process, the question of alliance with the national
society that serves the interests of communist construction.
liberation movement and the orientation of development of
Similarly, we can say that for us the democratic is that which
the once subjugated countries has now acquired both objec-
serves the people's interests, the interests of communist con-
tively and subjectively-in the light of the struggle between
struction. We reject everything that runs counter to these
the two social systems-a largely different meaning that it
interests, and no one can persuade us that this is the wrong
had, say, in the early period of the Soviet state. At that time,
approach. We know exactly where we are going as we im-
it was largely a matter of defense of the first socialist revo-
prove our political system. We are fully convinced that the
lution against imperialism, whereas today it is a question of
course we have chosen is the right one."
carrying on the offensive against imperialism and world cap-
italism as a whole in order to do away with them."
The second appeared in New Times, a Soviet foreign affairs
journal aimed primarily at audiences abroad, November
1980:
Massive Campaign Heralded
"Revolutions cannot be made to order. But, likewise, rev-
Against Euromissiles
olutions cannot be forbidden by order. The old world should
reckon with the desire of the people to choose their own
S
OVIET MEDIA indicate Moscow's intention to intensify
destiny. And the socialist world and the working-class move-
efforts to induce the governments of Western Europe
ment have the right and even the duty to help establish the
to renege on the NATO decision of December 1979 to
new world.
modernize the alliance's long-range theater nuclear forces
"The CPSU has never concealed its interest in the balance
through deployment of 108 U.S. Pershing II medium range
of world forces changing in favour of socialism, the working-
missiles and 464 ground-based cruise missles. Pravda on
class and national liberation movements, and the peace-lov-
January 12 foresaw the possibility of a 'mass movement"
ing forces, that is, to the detriment of imperialism, to the
unfolding in Belgium and the Netherlands; New Times No.
detriment of the handfuls representing the dominant class in
4 (January 23) noted the existence of mass campaigns in
the capitalist countries which stake on war and suppression
the UK and Italy; and New Times No. 5 (January 30)
of democratic movements the world over for the sake of their
carried an article on rising protests in Germany.
self-seeking class exploitative interests."
N. Portugalov, a prominent Soviet commentator on
The third appeared in the Soviet journal Problems of
European affairs indicated rising Soviet confidence that
Philosophy in October 1980. The article argues that there
the campaign against the missiles will be successful. Writ-
are different kinds of peace as there are different kinds of
ing in Socialist Industry on January 29, Portugalov as-
war, and that as there are just and unjust wars, there are
serted:
3
52
"The United States and leading organs of the North At-
"For its part the Soviet Union has frequently stated that it
lantic Alliance can now see a real threat to the implementation
is prepared to ratify the SALT II treaty and observe all its
of the well-known resolution adopted at the NATO session of
provisions. We treat with due respect the results of the hard
December 1979 in the growing active opposition of the public
7 years of labor which resulted in the emergence of this treaty
and political and even some military circles in the European
which on the basis of a balance of the interests of the USSR
NATO countries to the plans for Europe's 'nuclear upgrad-
and the United States-a verified balance open to mathe-
ing.' They can in no way pass off the storm of protest against
matical analysis-sets forth clearly the two sides' commit-
the missiles now arising in West Europe as an 'act of Mos-
ments. The Soviet Union cannot and will not take part in talks
cow.' So, in Belgium and the Netherlands the governments
aimed at canceling the SALT II treaty and breaking the
and majority parties are not dropping their reservations to
fundamental principles on which this treaty was concluded
'the nuclear upgrading' plan and in the FRG, the Social
and on which the SALT I accords are based and operate."
Democrats are beginning to protest against them with in-
creasing resoluteness."
Neutron Bomb Again
U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger's remark on Feb-
Linkage to SALT II Ratification Stressed
ruary 3 that the U.S. would reconsider deployment of
neutron bombs in Europe is not surprisingly being woven
The focal point of immediate Soviet efforts is the con-
into the Soviet campaign against NATO modernization.
tention that the Europeans had agreed to the NATO de-
TASS on February 4 carried a dispatch entitled "Neutron
cision on the condition that the U.S. would ratify SALT
Threat Over Europe Again" which recalled previous So-
II and that the U.S. was now violating its end of this
viet arguments against the weapon and warned "adoption
bargain on SALT. Thus New Times No. 4 wrote:
by the West European countries of the American demands
"The whole Atlantic nuclear construction, carefully raised
would adversely affect their relations with the socialist
on two props-rearmament plus negotiations on the basis of
countries."
ratification of the SALT II treaty-has begun to loosen. The
Another TASS dispatch on the same day recalled that
refusal of the White House to ratify SALT II, the American
"rejection of the neutron bomb by the former administra-
doctrine of limited war for Europe has created a new situa-
tion was forced upon it, that it happened as a result of the
tion. If the NATO leaders as before rely on rearmament,
powerful protest by the peoples of the West European
then broad popular opposition is focusing upon reconsid-
countries and the reluctance of the governments of certain
eration of the disputed question, on the revision of the
member states of NATO to support the American plans."
decision, one of two components of which, if it has not
Radio Moscow on February 6 reported that "once again
been finally dropped, has in any case become highly prob-
a wave of protest like the one three years ago has begun
lematical."
in Western Europe as elsewhere over the neutron threat."
Pravda on January 24 cited with approval a statement by
TASS on February 7 reported FRG "depression and per-
William Borm of the West German Free Democratic Party
plexity" over Weinberger's statement and argued that the
that because of U.S. failure to ratify SALT II, "the basis
"potential for conflicts is accumulating betwen Bonn and
agreed on by the Western alliance for NATO's decision
Washington, particularly in the sphere of East-West re-
to upgrade its armament has to a large extent been vio-
lations, potential that might turn out to be even more
lated." Several Soviet commentaries cited a demand by
explosive than in Carter's time."
150 West German Social Democrats that the government
admit the NATO decision was a mistake and its imple-
mentation would raise "mortal danger" for the FRG.
No Let Up in
Contrary to such allegations, Western leaders were
careful not to link SALT ratification with the Pershing
Alarms About Poland
question. The NATO Communique of December 12, 1979
merely welcomed the contribution the SALT II treaty
T
HE SOVIET MEDIA continued to portray the situation in
would make toward stabilizing the strategic situation and
Poland as touch-and-go between a beleaguered Polish
supported U.S. efforts to negotiate with the USSR on
leadership and an all but subversive Solidarity Trade
medium range nuclear missiles. After issuance of the com-
Union organization. Moscow still suggested that it is con-
munique, Secretary of State Vance emphasized that the
fident of Polish ability to control matters. But Soviet rhet-
NATO members had rejected the idea of a freeze on
oric about anti-socialist forces in Poland and the design of
deployment pending negotiations.
outside forces-NATO and West German
In focusing on the alleged link between NATO modern-
"revanchists"-grew shriller as the strikes continued in
ization and SALT II ratification, Moscow evidently antic-
Poland. Thus, although avoiding any direct threats, Mos-
ipates a prolonged impasse on ratification which it intends
cow kept open its option to intervene.
to take advantage of to generate European pressures
The Soviet reply to a reported warning against inter-
against the NATO decision. To intensify these pressures,
vention by Secretary of State Haig, made public by Mos-
Moscow is demanding that the U.S. ratify SALT II as is
cow on February 11, consisted of a charge that it was the
and is emphasizing that the USSR will not agree to any
United States which was intervening by making the sub-
changes.
ject a Soviet-American issue as well as through radio
In the initial 1981 issue of the authoritative journal Kom-
broadcasts and other unspecified actions. As has generally
munist, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko deplored U.S.
been the case in Soviet treatment of Poland, the Gromyko
"indefinite postponement" of SALT II ratification and
letter did not specify the nature of Haig's warning, but
declared:
only described it as "inappropriate."
4
53
Attacks on Solidarity
Situation Still on Razor's Edge
The bulk of Soviet coverage in the past month has
Direct Soviet commentaries and the quotations selected
focused on a multifaceted attack on the Solidarity Trade
from Polish leadership statements portrayed the outcome
Union organization. The most ominous charges against
of the Polish crisis as still highly uncertain. Soviet cov-
the organization concern its ties with three Polish dissi-
erage increasingly included terms such as "anarchy" and
dents-Moczulski, Kuron and Michnik. Literary Gazette
"serious" to describe the situation. TASS on February 4
on January 21, for example, accused the three of "sedi-
noted that Polish party leader Kania had spoken of "in-
tion" and said they "make no secret of their hopes of
stances of dual power" and "the dangers of counterrev-
undermining socialism in Poland and of tearing the coun-
olution," concepts sure to trigger Soviet alarm about the
try away from the Warsaw Pact." Singling out Moczulski
direction of events. Izvestiia on February 1 suggested that
in particular for favoring a "sovereign Poland free from
the situation was at a razor's edge:
Soviet domination," Literary Gazette said that "only a
"The present situation, which has increased in complexity,
person without the elementary sense of responsibility for
is increasingly clearly drawing a dividing line. On one side
the life of his cocitizens and the fate of his homeland can
there are those who really cherish working people's interests,
set some Poles at loggerheads with others by calling for
are really worried about the destiny of Poland and the Polish
the destruction of the socialist system." Kuron was be-
people and really see their country's future as lying on the
rated for aspiring to have Solidarity "replace the existing
road of socialism, and on the other side are those who are
state power in Poland," a charge which was echoed in the
increasingly clearly revealing their anti-socialist face by using
number. of other Soviet commentaries.
demagoguery and exacerbating the difficulties."
Izvestiia on February 4 charged that "the leadership of
For the time being, however, Soviet commentaries still
the Solidarity Trade Union is urged [by Western radios]
stressed expectations that the Polish leadership will be
to engage in 'political activity' by opposing the organs of
able to control the situation. Red Star on January 28 de-
power and by not submitting to them. Special emphasis
scribed the opponents of socialism as "numerically weak
is laid on undermining the PZPR's [Communist Party's]
but vociferous" and said the PZPR was taking the "nec-
leading role." Interestingly, however, the Soviet media
essary measures" against NATO subversive efforts.
have not attacked Lech Walesa or other Solidarity leaders
TASS on January 30 reported a Polish Government state-
by name.
ment of intent to ensure "order and discipline."
The Soviet media sought to suggest that the Polish army
In efforts to discredit and weaken Solidarity, Moscow
is particularly concerned about what is going on. The
has resorted to a variety of other gambits. One is to sug-
Polish army newspaper was frequently cited with respect
gest that the leadership of the organization is split. Radio
to the dangers facing Poland and to the good relations
Moscow on January 15 referred to an "extremist wing"
between the Soviet and Polish armed forces. One Soviet
which was seeking to pressure Polish authorities, while
correspondent, writing in a Czech paper on January 14,
TASS on January 24 blamed continuing strikes in Poland
reported that the Polish Army is prepared at any moment
on a "right, anti-socialist wing." Radio Moscow on Jan-
to protect the socialist system."
uary 29, however, suggested that Solidarity as a whole
was "veering to the right."
A number of Soviet commentaries sought to convey an
impression that significant numbers of Polish workers op-
Two Tongues on
posed Solidarity. Radio Moscow on January 12 and
Pravda on January 19 claimed that a majority of Polish
Release of U.S. Hostages
workers had gone to work on the preceding Saturday
despite Solidarity's appeals for them not to do so. Trud on
January 14 and February 3, Pravda on January 21 and
E
VIDENTLY stung by U.S. charges, Moscow has offi-
cially denied that the Soviet media sought to compli-
February 6 reported interviews with Polish workers who
cate matters during U.S. negotiations for the final release
were allegedly disturbed by Solidarity's actions and their
of the hostages in Iran. In his February 11 letter to Sec-
impact on the Polish economy.
retary of State Haig, Foreign Minister Gromyko recalled
that the USSR "in clear and unambiguous terms came out
As echoed in Gromyko's letter to Haig, Soviet propa-
against type of actions in favor of the strict observance of
ganda maintained a steady barrage of charges about ne-
the Vienna convention provisions concerning respect for
farious Western activities in Poland. The Soviet army
diplomatic immunity and accordingly in favor of an im-
newspaper Red Star on January 28 said that NATO was
mediate release of the detainees." Gromyko recalled a
backing anti-socialist elements in Poland and "striving to
Soviet vote to that effect in the UN Security Council and
set People's Poland against its socialist allies." Izvestiia
claimed "that it was from these same positions that we
on February 4 accused Western radio stations of dissem-
addressed ourselves directly to the Iranian leadership."
inating information "selected in such a way as to provoke
an even greater complication and destabilization of the
While true as far as it went, Gromyko's disclaimer failed
situation in Poland." Izvestiia contended that "the coor-
to address itself to the other aspects of the Soviet position
dination of actions between certain Western circles and
which generated the U.S. protests.
the anti-socialist elements in Poland is becoming increas-
Thus Soviet remarks on international law and the Vi-
ingly brazen in character." Izvestiia and a rising number
enna convention were minimal statements. At no time did
of other articles claimed that West German "revanchists"
any Soviet spokesman or commentator use such language
were meddling in Poland.
on the Iranian seizure of the U.S. Embassy and U.S.
5
54
personnel as was used by the Soviet Foreign Ministry
the American Navy from the Persian Gulf area back to the
when the shoe was on the other foot, that is when it
U.S. shores." Accordingly, it concluded:
protested against demonstrators who had entered the So-
"The thought prompts itself that the campaign around the
viet Embassy in Tehran on December 27, 1980. In a first
question of the former American hostages, the campaign
note of protest on December 28, Moscow charged that
hostile to the Soviet Union, is being kindled in the United
"a large group of raging elements armed with clubs, stones
States exactly in a bid to cover up plans of consolidation of
and knives broke into its [Soviet] territory. The life of
the American military presence in the above-mentioned area
members of staff of the Soviet Embassy was threatened,
as a means of gross pressure upon the countries of that
the state flag of the USSR insulted and serious damage
region."
was caused to the building of the embassy." A second
note of January 12, 1981 said this was "a violation of both
Finally, in contrast to its denials when addressing the
the norms in relations between states which have been
U.S., the Soviet-based National Voice of Iran took a much
sanctified by age-old practice and sealed in international
different line in a January 22 broadcast to Iran. According
conventions, and elementary notions of decency charac-
to this broadcast:
teristic of civilized countries." The note criticized the
"The compromising liberals, who desire the return of U.S.
Iranian government for not having condemned the "com-
imperialism to Iran, strove immensely during these 14 months
mitted crimes" and said it "virtually took the pogrom-
to portray the patriotic act of the Muslim student followers of
makers under their protection." The note also said the
the imam's policy as an act contrary to the interests of the
USSR "will have to protect the legitimate rights and in-
Iranian revolution
The occupation of the U.S. spy den
terests of the Soviet state and its citizens if the Iranian
proved the impotence and helplessness of a powerful country
Government does not wish or finds itself unable to per-
such as the United States in the face of the invincible deter-
form its duty regarding the ensurance of the safety of
mination of a united and risen nation.
In response to the
Soviet institutions and their personnel in Iran." Also, it
liberals and certain agents such as Ghotbzadeh, from the very
stated that the Soviet Government expected "complete
beginning the struggling and liberated Iranian nation ap-
compensation" for the damage done to USSR property in
praised the act by the Muslim student followers of the imam's
Iran.
policy as a patriotic act, and has expressed its deep appre-
Soviet propaganda both before and after the release of
ciation and gratitude to those brave and pure sons of the
U.S. hostages confirmed U.S. charges that the USSR was
Iranian nation."
taking positions which could only harden Iranian oppo-
sition to any deal with the U.S. The Soviet media almost
every day during January reported U.S. hostility toward
Iran. A Radio Moscow broadcast to Iran on January 6
Investment Problems
said the U.S. was using the hostages as a means of "ter-
rorizing your country." Another broadcast on January 13
told Iranians that the U.S. was trying "to coerce Iran into
Spelled Out
waiving its demands." Another one on January 17 said
the U.S. was preparing "military aggression" in order to
A
CANDID article by V. Kirichenko, director of the
free the hostages.
USSR State Planning Commission Scientific Re-
search Institute for Economic Sciences, in the authorita-
Pravda on January 8 carried a series of items under the
tive journal Kommunist (no. 18, 1980) spelled out in some
rubric "Anti-Iranian Campaign." A Pravda commentary
detail the problems being encountered by Soviet planners
on January 17 charged that there had been many oppor-
in maintaining the USSR's economic growth. According
tunities to negotiate the release of the hostages but
to Kirichenko:
"Washington, however, did not use them, preferring to
"A concrete analysis of the last five-year plan and previous
brandish arms." The U.S., Pravda continued, "did not
five-year plans shows that there exists in the USSR's national
stop its dishonorable game around the hostages" and
economy a significant tension-in a number of cases, increas-
"under the cover of negotiations on that problem, the
ing tension-in the coordination of available resources with
Pentagon is preparing a new 'intimidating' operation
requirements. This is manifested in the shortage of manpower
against Iran."
(particularly skilled), the lack of correspondence between the
Despite U.S. protests, the basic Soviet line remained
construction work front and the volume of capital investment
unchanged after the release of the hostages. Pravda on
allocated, the shortage of certain types of raw material, con-
January 22 declared:
struction materials and fuel, the lack of correspondence be-
tween the level of development of production and that of such
"The fact is, as the development of events showed, the
elements of the infrastructure as railroad transport and
hostage problem could have been settled long ago by peaceful
the system for storing material valuables, the lack of
means through diplomatic channels after satisfying the Ira-
alignment between export potential and existing demand
nian people's legitimate demands. Even the local press and
for imports of resources and the outstripping increase in
many politicians were forced to admit that the White House
the population's financial income in relation to the in-
was the true author of the hostage drama."
crease in goods and paid services."
While expressing "satisfaction" with the release of the
hostages, a Soviet statement handed to the U.S. Chargé
in Moscow on January 19, reaffirmed the Soviet charge of
Manpower Shortages
U.S. misuse of the hostage question. Rejecting U.S. pro-
Kirichenko asserted that investment policy was even
tests regarding Soviet coverage, the statement asked why,
more responsible than demographic trends for Soviet
then, had the U.S. not announced its "intention to bring
manpower problems. The latter is a problem for the fu-
6
55
ture, whereas "marked manifestations of manpower
Cost Overruns
shortages began to occur as long ago as the first half of
Kirichenko noted that an effort had been made in the
the seventies
when the demographic situation was
entirely favorable." Accordingly, he concludes:
five-year plan just completed to solve the cost overruns
problem by a "sharp deceleration in production invest-
"The real reason for the increased complexity of the tasks
ment growth rates" but that this expedient and timely
involved in providing the national economy with manpower
economic maneuver "was not carried out consistently
resources lies in the fact that recruitment of the able-bodied
enough."
population into social production had already reached a high
What happened, he said, was an expansion across the
level (more than 90 percent) as a result of which additional
board on unfinished projects and sharp increases in the
manpower sources
were sharply reduced."
costs of new and unfinished projects, increases which
At the same time, there were continued demands for
Soviet planners did not take into account. In this connec-
manpower as a result of accelerated investments which
tion, he writes, "the total estimated cost of projects under
could not be met. Kirichenko cites a study by his orga-
construction at the same time (the construction front) was
nization showing that "in 1971-75 in industry alone more
80-100 percent above the normative." On this point he
than 2 million new jobs were created for which the man-
concludes:
power was not fully provided; add to this in excess of one
"The fragmentation of capital investments over an exces-
million in 1976-1978." Even more startling was Kiri-
sively broad front of construction and the frequently unjusti-
chenko's revelation that "this excessive commissioning
fied raising of the estimated cost of projects under construc-
of fixed capital (in terms of availability of manpower of
tion as against cost reckoned when forming national eco-
quality for its utilization)
accounted for approxi-
nomic plans thus act as what are in our view the main eco-
mately one-fourth of total capital introduced."
nomic reasons for disruptions of the balance of capital
Existent manpower shortages have generated practices
investment plans."
exacerbating the problem. Thus, "new enterprises, es-
pecially in the machine-building sector, have to be staffed
with skilled workers brought in from areas with large
Investment Inefficiencies in Agriculture
manpower shortages. To hedge against manpower raids,
Kirichenko called special attention to the lack of coor-
executives seek to hoard employees. According to Kiri-
dination in agricultural investments. For one thing, he
chenko, "the tendency to maintain excess personnel has
noted, "investments in the economic assimilation of re-
intensified."
claimed land has fallen significantly behind the actual
To meet this situation, Kirichenko proposes that job
reclamation process." For another, he emphasizes that,
placement functions be taken out of the hands of Soviet
between 1966-1978, 54 billion rubles were earmarked for
executives and lodged with governmental agencies, a pro-
the construction and equipment of livestock premises but
"the real increase in the number of animals was only 46,
posal certain to meet with considerable resistance.
Kirichenko's proposal states:
36 and 20 percent of the number of places available" for
cattle, hogs and sheep respectively. As a result 'there are
"Considering that in the economically most developed re-
frequent cases where livestock raising complexes and
gions of the country the release and redistribution of workers
large livestock units are not filled and where good build-
between sectors, enterprises and organizations will be the
ings are written off prematurely and the buildings of ex-
main source of supplying them with cadres, it is necessary to
isting units are used for the wrong purposes.' Kirichenko
improve this entire practice substantially. It is expedient to
notes that establishment of a better balance between an-
transfer all job placement functions to local organs and ab-
imals and buildings would free resources for such impor-
solve enterprise and organization leaders of this duty."
tant purposes as "increasing fodder production or capac-
ities for storing agricultural produce."
In Brief
Weakened Incentives
Kirichenko emphasizes that efforts by Soviet enter-
Private Plots Encouraged. The Soviet agricultural news-
prises to keep or attract skilled labor by economic incen-
paper Selskaia Zhizn on January 18 published the summary
tives are increasingly running afoul of consumer goods
of a party-government decree "on extra measures to in-
shortages. In this connection he notes that savings bank
crease production of agricultural products on citizen's
deposits "a certain proportion" of which he said "are the
personal plots." Of particular importance, the decree per-
result of unsatisfied demand" had increased by 13.8 billion
mits individuals or families who sign agreements with the
rubles a year in the 1976-80 period, whereas in the pre-
collectives to "exceed the accepted norms for keeping
vious decade they had increased by an average of 7.2
livestock as the personal property of the family of a kolk-
billion rubles. As a consequence, Kirichenko writes:
hoz member, workers, employees or other citizens." Pre-
"Obstacles to normal spending of the money income the
viously, that is according to Soviet regulations since 1935,
individual citizens have been allowed one cow, one or two
population receives for labor in social production and from
social consumption funds reduce the effectiveness of material
calves, one or two sows, from three to ten sheep.
incentive measures, weaken labor incentives and thus impede
The decree calls for a variety of incentives for Soviet
the growth of social production and the raising of its effi-
collective and state farms to help individuals cultivate and
ciency."
increase production on their private plots. These farms
7
are to get credits so that they pay individuals quickly for
along the Salvadoran border by Guatemala and Honduras. 56
their output of meat, vegetables, and fruit. They are en-
Of major import, an editorial in the Soviet foreign policy
joined to make available fodder, grazing land and tools for
magazine New Times of January 30 suggested that the U.S.
individual cultivation. It is stipulated that purchases from
is laying down the gauntlet to world leftist forces in aiding
the private holdings can then be counted in the fulfillment
the Salvadoran government in its flight against the Marxist
of their obligations to the state.
led guerrillas. According to New Times:
The promulgation of the decree reflects the difficulties
"The Salvadorans in the situation being created have
to which Soviet agriculture is currently subject. Accord-
moved forward to the vanguard of the anti-imperialist move-
ing to 1980 plan fulfillment figures published in Pravda on
ment in Latin America. To the degree that their struggle will
January 24, agricultural output was 97 percent that of
be successful, in no small measure will depend the further
1979, itself a poor year. Although the grain harvest rose
development of this movement in the 80s."
from 179 to 189 million tons, this was considerably below
the target set. The lower value of agricultural output was
On one side of the struggle, New Times listed the U.S.
evidently accounted for by the dramatic shortfall in potato
and "local reaction," on the other, the guerrillas and "all
production from 91 million tons in 1979 to 66.9 million in
true champions of human rights." The editorial recalled
1980. Vegetable production also fell from 27.2 million tons
a statement by the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with
in 1979 to 25.9 in 1980. Meat production fell from 15.5
Asian and African Countries issued on January 17 which
million tons in 1979 to 15.1 in 1980, milk from 93.3 to 90.7
had pledged Soviet support for the Salvadoran struggle.
million tons. However, sugar beet production rose from
In this connection, New Times cited the overthrow of the
76.2 million tons to 79.6; eggs from 65.6 to 67.7 million
Somoza regime in Nicaragua as an illustration of the fruit-
units.
ful results which "the movement of international solidar-
ity with fighting Latin American peoples has more than
The current importance of private plot production was
once brought."
emphasized in an interview in Sovietskaia Rossiia by the
Russian Republic Minister of Agriculture L. Y. Floren-
Despite this call for international solidarity with El Sal-
tiev. "Suffice it to say," he noted, "that the personal
vador, the Soviet media denied U.S. charges reported in
plots of our republics' rural population produce more than
the Washington Post, that Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet
one-fourth of the total quantity of meat, milk, and eggs.
Union are involved in the Salvadoran struggle. About
These plots account for more than 32 percent of potato
Soviet involvement, Izvestiia on January 20 inquired:
procurements, 17 percent of fruits and berries, and ap-
"What has the Soviet Union to do with it? The Washington
proximately 6 percent of vegetables, the bulk of which are
Post reasons according to the old pattern: if a revolution
the most valuable vegetables-onions and garlic."
takes place somewhere, that means the Soviet Union is
to blame." On February 3, Radio Moscow denounced
Soviet handling of the new decree and treatment of
the "far-fetched accusations against Nicaragua and
certain of its specific elements suggest considerable ideo-
Cuba" as an attempt to rally the rest of Latin America
logical trepidation over this approach to improving Soviet
around U.S. policy. Nevertheless, Moscow's Radio
agricultural output. Unlike the usual procedure in case of
Peace and Progess on January 28 quoted a Salvadoran
important directives, the decree was not published in
revolutionary to the effect that if the U.S. invaded El
Pravda or Izvestiia. The final sentence of the summary
Salvador:
carried in Selskaia Zhizn stated that "it is important to
create everywhere a social climate in which kolkhoz mem-
"El Salvador, as well as the rest of the Central American
bers, workers, employees and other citizens feel that they
peoples, undoubtedly will react and the conflict could become
are doing useful, state work by raising livestock and poul-
more than a Central American issue, because the Cuban
try on their personal plots and by engaging in truck gar-
Government could intervene in the defense of the legitimate
dening and fruit farming." By implication, such a "social
rights of our people, and I mean they will intervene with arms
climate" does not now exist. In the words of the summary,
in hand and aid our country in a conflict which could become
"party, soviet and economic organs in a number of ob-
an international issue."
lasts, krais, and republics underestimate the role of per-
Meanwhile, since the advent of the Reagan administra-
sonal plots in supplementing food resources."
tion the Soviet media have toned down their claims of
guerrilla successes. Izvestiia on January 15 had written
El Salvador Pictured as Apex of Revolutionary Struggle in
that the junta was "on the verge of collapse," and Red
Latin America. Soviet media have paid almost daily atten-
Star on January 18 that the guerrillas had the "strategic
tion to the insurgency in El Salvador, with principal focus
initiative." Except for a Radio Moscow reference on Jan-
on denunciation of the decision of both outgoing and in-
uary 25 to "important victories," Soviet broadcasts and
coming U.S. administrations to give military aid to the
dispatches currently appear to avoid any characterization
Salvadoran junta and on alleged U.S.-induced moves
of the guerrilla operations.
ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES INSTITUTE
Non-Profit Org.
Suite 1122
U.S. Postage
4330 East-West Highway
PAID
Washington, D.C. 20014
Washington, D.C.
Permit No. 418
NSC/S PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8100500
57
RECEIVED 17 FEB 81 13
TO
PRES
FROM ALLEN
DOCDATE 17 FEB 81
SOVIET WRILENT
KEYWORDS: USSR
SALT
SUBJECT: TASS SEES US LINKAGE POLICY AS CONFRONTATION
ACTION: FOR INFORMATION
DUE:
STATUS C FILES WH C
FOR ACTION
FOR COMMENT
FOR INFO
PRES
PIPES
SCHWEITZER
ODOM
LORD
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG 8100467
NSCIFID
(C/C)
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
58
MEMORANDUM
0500
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 17, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
RICHARD ALLEN Dear
SUBJECT:
TASS Sees U.S. "Linkage" Policy as "Confrontation"
The following is the text of an article which appeared in yester-
day's TASS international service under the title, "Policy of Linkage
in a Policy of Confrontation."
Begin text
The new American administration declares that the SALT II treaty
agreed upon and signed by the leaders of the USSR and the United
States in June 1979 in Vienna is unacceptable and that it does
not intend to present it to Congress for ratification. Washington
is thus demonstrating again the inconstancy, inconsistency and
unpredictability of its foreign policy, and also its unreliability
as a partner, not only in talks with the Soviet Union but also
with regard to the West European countries.
In effect, the United States swindled them by promising to ratify
SALT II in the event of an agreement by its NATO partners to deploy
American medium-range missiles on their territories.
In order somehow to justify the violation of its obligations and
promises, and also to lessen the worldwide wave of indignation
at this decision, the Reagan administration declares that it is
ready to hold talks on strategic arms limitation, but with the
indispensable condition of "linkage" with other problems and events
of international life, of correlation with the "behavior of the
Soviet Union in the international arena."
Why do the new authorities in Washington reject SALT II, and do
they intend at all to undertake serious efforts to limit the arms
race? In the SALT II treaty, on which the two countries worked
for 7 years, the principle of parity and identical security is
set out. In signing the treaty, the Soviet Union and the United
States took as their point of departure the fact that there exists
approximate parity of military might between East and West, and
they stipulated measures so that this balance would be maintained.
59
-2-
But, to all appearances, this is not to the liking of the new
U.S. administration which openly proclaims a course of attaining
military superiority over the Soviet Union. The SALT II treaty
is an obstacle on this path; it hinders the efforts of the NATO
countries to alter the world's strategic balance in favor of the
bloc.
Washington's thesis that further talks with the USSR on strategic
arms limitation must be conducted in "linkage" with other questions
which have no relation to this problem should be considered in
precisely this context. In essence, it is an attempt to lead
the talks into a blind alley since the meshing of all problems
into one will allow none of them to be solved. Such an approach
would only create the appearance of talks, and would deliberately
doom them to failure.
Washington's course of confrontation, the desire to use the "power
factor," that is, an attempt to dictate its own conditions to
the Soviet Union, to make "demands" on it, are concealed behind
the proposal concerning talks with "linkage."
However, the White House is deeply mistaken if it thinks that
it is possible to talk with the Soviet Union in such manner.
The only reliable path along which relations between the USSR
and the United States can develop is by observance of the principle
of equality and equal security and rejection of "power factors"
in politics. The Soviet Union is ready to do business with the
United States only as an equal, if the American side also shows
readiness for this."
End text
soucet General
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INFO
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R 181535Z FEB 81
OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED ON BREZHNEV'S BEHALF. MATLOCK
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION USNATO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USICA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 02383
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PINT, UR
SUBJECT: STALIN'S "CULT OF PERSONALITY" IGNORED
ON EVE OF XXVI PARTY CONGRESS
1. SUMMARY. WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS
HAS NOT YET OBSERVED THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE XX PARTY CONGRESS WHICH EXPOSED STALIN'S "CULT
OF PERSONALTY." IT MAY BE THAT THIS ANNIVERSARY, WHICH
WAS DULY NOTED FIVE YEARS AGO, HAS so FAR BEEN PASSED OVER
IN SILENCE BECAUSE OF THE CULT NOW BEING MADE OF
BREZHNEV AS WELL AS HIS REGIME'S OVERALL RELUCTANCE
TO GIVE ANY NEW LIFE TO THE "STALIN QUESTION." END
SUMMARY.
2. THE SOVIET PRESS, AND IN PAATICULAR "RAVDA, TOOK
NO NOTICE ON FEBRUARY 14 OF THE 25TH XX PARTY CONGRESS.
THIS TREATMENT CONTRASTS WITH PRAVDA'S HANDLING 00 THE
ISSUE FIVE YEARS AGO. AT THAT TIME THE PARTY PAPER
REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE CONGRESS IN ITS LEAD EDITORIAL
"THE CONSISTENT LENINIST COURSE," NOTING THAT "IT
DIRECTED PRINCIPLED CRITICISM AGAINST MANIFESTATIONS
OF THE CULT OF PERSONALITY AND VIOLATIONS STEMMING FROM
THE CULT OF NOOMS OF PARTY LIFE, PRINCIPLES OF PARTY
LEADERSHIP, AND REVOLUTIONARY LEGALITT." CRITICISM
OF SUCH "SINS," MOREOVER, APPEARED IN THE REVIEW
ARTICLES ON THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF STALIN'S BIRTH
(DECEMBER 21, 1979).
3. WE SUSPECT THE FAILURE TO NOTE THE ANNIVERSARY
REFLECTS BOTH THE REGIME'S DESIRE TO IGNORE THE
"STALIN ISSUE" AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND THE LEADERSHIP'S
EMBARASSMENT AT MENTIONING THE PERSONALITY CULT AT THE
SAME TIME AS IT LAUDS BREZHNEV. THERE IS NO REAL
COMPARISON, OF COURSE, BETWEEN THE BREZHNEV CULT AND
THE ALMOST BYZANTINE DEVOTION ACCORDED STALIN. BUT
THE BREZHNEV CULT HAS BOOMED IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS
WITH NUMEROUS AWARDS AND PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF TRIBUTE
TO HIS LEADERSHIP. SUCH PRAISE IS PARTICULARLY
EVIDENT AS THE XXVI CONGRESS DRAWS NEAR. THE LEADERSHIP
CAS 7/17/02
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 02384
MILITARY ADDRESSEES FOR POLAD
MADRID ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12065: GDS 2/18/87 (MATLOCK, JACK F. JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PARM, PEPR, SOPN, SALT, UR
SUBJECT: (U) PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
ON THE EVE OF THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS
REF: MOSCOW 837
1. (C) SUMMARY: IN A FRONPAGE EDITORIAL, PRAVDA
REAFFIRMS SOVIET READINESS FOR "NORMALIZATION AND
IMPROVEMENT" IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ON THE BASIS
OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. ON SALT, THE EDITORIAL
REPEATS THE LINE TAKEN BY GROMYKO IN HIS KOMMUNIST
ARTICLE THAT THE USSR WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIA-
TIONS AIMED AT DESTROYING THE FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF
WHSR COMMENT
POS NOTE
EOB: SEA, EA, PRC, EURE, EURW, EEUR, WEUR, DEPOL
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THE SALT II TREATY, AND IMPLIES THAT MOSCOW WILL
CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE TERMS OF THE 1972 SALT I
INTERIM AGREEMENT. APPEARING LESS THAN A WEEK BEFORE
THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS, THE EDITORIAL PRESAGES
A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PEACE PROGRAM" ADOPTED AT
THE XXIV CONGRESS IN 1971, WITH NO NEW FOREIGN
POLICY DEPARTURES LIKELY. END SUMMARY.
2. (ii) FEBRUARY 18 PRAVDA FEATURES AN UNSIGNED
FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL WHICH PROVIDES A PREVIEW OF THE
MAIN LINES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY LIKELY TO BE
ENUNCIATED AT THE XXVI CPSU CONGRESS BEGINNING
FEBRUARY 23. RECALLING THE PEACE PROGRAM" ADOPTED
AT THE XXIV CONGRESS IN 1971 AND REAFFIRMED AT THE
XXV CONGRESS IN 1976, THE EDITORIAL REPEATS THE
STANDARD LIST OF PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE THE USSR
IN WORLD AFFAIRS: THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN ORDER TO
PROVIDE "FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNISM; COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL, BUT A READINESS TO PURSUE
PARTIAL MEASURES LEADING TO THAT GOAL; THE LENINIST
PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" AS THE BASIS FOR
RELATIONS WITH NON-SOCIALIST STATES, AND DETENTE
AS THE MOST IMPORTANT MEANS FOR REALIZING THOSE
PRINCIPLES. THE EDITORIAL SINGLES OUT SOVIET-INDIAN
RELATIONS AS THE BEST EXAMPLE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE USSR AND COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERING SOCIAL SYSTEMS.
3. (C) ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE EDITORIAL
CONSPICUOUSLYIGNORESTHE RECENT PUBLIC EXCHANGES
OF POLEMICS, AND STATES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS
1
READY FOR NORMALIZATION, FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS
WITH THE USA FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH
COUNTRIES, IN THE INTERESTS OF OVERALL PEACE. THE
ONLY HOPEFUL PATH TO THIS IS THE OBSERVANCE OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. IN A
POSSIBLE REPLY TO HARD-LINERS WITHIN THE CPSU WHO
ARE CRITICAL OF SEEKING IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE
U.S., THE EDITORIAL GOES ON TO STATE: "THE PEACE-
LOVING DISPOSITION (MIROLYUBIYE) OF OUR COUNTRY
IS NOT A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. OUR STRENGTHS AND
POSSIBILITIES ARE GREAT...THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES
WILL ALWAYS KNOW HOW TO STAND UP FOR THEMSELVES,
TO GIVE A REBUFF TO ANY MILITARIST INTRIGUES.
4. (C) ON SALT, THE EDITORIAL TAKES A LINE SIMILAR
TO THAT OF FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN THE CPSU
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THEORETICAL JOURNAL KOMMUNIST LAST MONTH (REFTEL):
THE AMERICAN SIDE, "REFERRING TO A NEED TO 'IMPROVE'
THE DOCUMENT FOR THE USA, IS SAID TO BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR "SABOTAGING" THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SALT II;
WHILE NOT EXPLICITLY RULING OUT THE RENEGOTIATION
OF SALT II, THE EDITORIAL QUOTES THE GROMYKO ARTICLE
VERBATIM THAT "THE USSR CANNOT AND WILL NOT
PARTICIPATE IN TALKS HAVING THE PURPOSE OF RENDERING
NULL AND VOID THE SALT II TREATY, OF DESTROYING
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THAT TREATY WAS
BT
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6 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 02384
MILITARY ADDRESSEES FOR POLAD
CONCLUDED, AND ON WHICH THE SALT I AGREEMENTS ARE
BASED AND ARE FUNCTIONING." (COMMENT: THE REFERENCE
TO THE "FUNCTIONING" OF THE SALT I AGREEMENTS IN
BOTH INSTANCES MAY BE MEANT TO IMPLY THAT THE USSR
WILL CONTINUE TO OBSCERVE THE TERMS OF THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT, AS AGREED AT THE TIME OF ITS EXPIRATION
IN 1977, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS MADE NO COMMITMENT TO
ABIDE BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNRATIFIED SALT II
TREATY. END COMMENT.)
5. (U) THE EDITORIAL ALSO REPEATS SOVIET COMMITMENT
TO THE TALKS ON EUROPEAN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, TO
THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO THE CONFERENCE ON
MILITARTY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE PROPOSED
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