NSDD 115 Visit of Prime Minister Shamir

SECRET SECRET SYSTEM II THE WHITE HOUSE 91361 WASHINGTON National Security November 26, 1983 Decision Directive 115 Visit of Prime Minister Shamir The forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Shamir affords us a unique opportunity to make progress on our Middle East agenda and to develop a more mature strategic relationship with the Govern- ment of Israel. In order to put these discussions in a proper strategic context, we need to stress that from the USG perspec- tive, the array of threats to our vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Southwest Asia posed by the Soviet Union, Syria, Libya and the fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran dictate that we enhance and deepen our security coopera- tion with Israel and the moderate Arab states. With this strate- gic purpose in mind, the following should comprise the main themes for our discussions with Israeli leaders. Political-Military Cooperation with Israel. As directed in previous National Security Decision Directives, the US is pre- pared to immediately undertake enhanced and expanded political- military consultations with the GOI. Our objective is to under- take combined military planning to protect common interests and defend shared objectives focusing first on the Soviet-Syrian threats to our interests. Our consultations should work toward the preparation of combined operational plans, access and support for U.S. forces and equipment which could be deployed to Israel and meaningful military exercises which would enhance our read- iness to cooperate in combined military operations. U.S. Security Relations with the Moderate Arab States. Recogniz- ing that there are long-standing Israeli sensitivities regarding U.S. military cooperation with -- and assistance to -- certain Arab states (e.g., Jordan and Saudi Arabia) and a long history of active Israeli opposition to these activities, we will reiterate our determination to pursue these relationships because we deem them critical to the protection of our vital interests. The Israeli leadership must be told of our insistence that while we do not expect open support for these efforts, we cannot accept active Israeli intervention to impede them. Moreover, we need to explain that our relationships with Arab states on the one hand and Israel on the other should envolve in ways that they become mutually reinforcing over time. SECRET DECLASSIFIED IN PART Declassify on OADR NLRR P06-001 #3 BY Cit NARADATE 3/19/08 SECRET COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES