NSDD 199 Review by President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) of Implications of Yurchenko Defection and Related Espionage Cases

NSC/ICS-401321 91159 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/LIMITED-BISTRIBUTION- November 12, 1985 National Security Decision Directive Number 199 REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD OF IMPLICATIONS OF THE YURCHENKO DEFECTION AND RELATED ESPIONAGE CASES (TS) The activities of Soviet and Soviet Bloc intelligence services remain a serious and continuing threat to US national security interests at home and abroad. A key national security goal of this Administration has been. to improve our government-wide capabilities to detect, analyze, counter and protect our vital secrets and values from the hostile intelligence threat. We have made progress in this area, but the recent uncovering of a nümber of serious espionage cases and other activities of the Soviet intelligence services suggest that further improvement and attention are necessary. In response, we have initiated a number of actions to limit and control the hostile intelligence presence within this country and to improve our security and countermeasures capabilities. (U) The recent events surrounding the apparent defection of KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko and the revelation of espionage by former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard have raised a number of questions about the adequacy of our efforts to meet the challenges posed by the hostile intelligence threat. Because the hostile intelligence threat is so serious and .because of the gravity and sensitivity of the issues involved, it is necessary that these matters be reviewed in a systematic way by an outside body. I, therefore, am directing that, consistent with the provisions of Executive Order 12537, my Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board undertake a review of the performance of the intelligence community in the Yurchenko and Howard cases and report the Board's findings and recommendations to me. In addition to a review of the adequacy of US counterintelligence capabilities in these cases and the implication of these cases for improving US capabilities to counter the hostile intelligence threat, the Board should: COPY FOR SECRET/SENSITIVETLIMITED. DI ISTRIBUTION Declassify on: OADI EYES ONLY