NSDD 206 Instructions for Fourth Round of United States/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Negotiations in Geneva

SYSTEM II 90016 THE WHITE HOUSE UNCEASGIFIED WASHINGTON January 14, 1986 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 206 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FOURTH ROUND OF THE US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA (U) This negotiating round will be unique compared to past rounds in that it follows the summit meeting during which General Secretary Gorbachev and I called for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. (U) The Soviets have not yet provided a formal response to our November 1, 1985, proposals. Since those proposals, in part, reflect elements of Soviet proposals, the U.S. Delegation should emphasize my personal hope that the Soviet Delegation will be prepared to react constructively with an early, positive response to the U.S. proposals tabled at the end of the last round. (U) In seeking to move the negotiations forward, the U.S. delegation should take the position that the Joint Statement of November 21, 1985, reflects the agreement of both sides that the negotiations should give priority to areas of convergence, and that progress in one area should not be held hostage to a resolution of issues in other areas. In this regard, the delegation should take special care to resist Soviet attempts to link progress in the three negotiating groups, in order to permit each group to make progress on its own subject matter as rapidly as possible. In addition, the delegation should also resist any Soviet attempt to erode the separate status and roles of the three negotiating groups, making clear that each group is fully competent both to explore policy issues and to commit governments on subjects within its responsibility. (S) Specifically, the U.S. Delegation should explain, reinforce and elaborate on our November 1 initiatives, seeking to engage the Soviets in a discussion of those proposals with the aim of looking for areas of flexibility on the Soviet side; reducing the barriers to progress on the key issues; and finding additional, or widening existing, areas of potential convergence. (S) Ceclassified/Released on 3/13/96 UNCEASSIRED on: under provisions of n.o. 12938 OABRJ. COPY ICOE 13 COPICE ASSIFIER