NSDD 214 United States Response to Gorbachev's January Arms Control Proposals

SYSTEM II UNCLASSIFIED 90138 follow on THE WHITE HOUSE LISSIFIED WASHINGTON February 21, 1985 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 214 U.S. RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S JANUARY ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS On the basis of the tentative decisions taken in NSDD 210, we have now completed an extensive consultation with our Allies. I reviewed the reports of the consultations and the correspondence that I have received from Allied leaders on this same subject. Based on this review, I have reached the conclusion that, with the exception of the guidance on the INF area, the tentative decisions recorded in NSDD 210 should form the basis of the U.S response. With respect to the INF area, the guidance issued in NSDD 210 is superceded. Based upon this last round of consultations, I have decided that in response to the Soviet offer of a near term, zero-zero outcome in Europe, we will offer a proposal that would permit a zero-zero outcome both in Europe and Asia, and globally as well, by the end of 1989 if the Soviet Union will agree. Therefore, the United States proposes the following concrete plan to achieve this aim. By the end of 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union would limit their land-based, LRINF missile deployments in Europe to 140 launchers each, with the Soviet Union making concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia. [The detailed guidance for this portion of the plan, except for the target completion date, is as outlined initially in NSDD 195 and as supplemented by NSDD 206. ] Within the following year, both sides would further reduce the numbers of LRINF missile launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 508. Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons by the end of 1989. Associated with this plan, there would be a parallel series of global LRINF missile warhead ceilings under which the U.S. retains the right to global equality. As Soviet SS-20 launchers are reduced, the launchers and their associated missiles and agreed support equipment would be destroyed. U.S. systems in excess of the launcher limits cited above could be withdrawn to the U.S. unless, or until, they were also in excess of the equal global warhead ceiling associated with the launcher reductions then being implemented, in which case they would be destroyed (while protecting a right to convert Pershing II missiles to Pershing I missiles) Declassifed/Released on 5-17-91 under provisions of E.O. 12356 OARR by S. Tilley, National Security Council