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{
    "localId": "12005143",
    "label": "Quadrant Conference",
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{
    "id": "12005143",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005143",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Quadrant Conference",
    "description": "This volume on the Quadrant Conference includes the papers and minutes of Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings 106 to 116.  These were held from August 14 to 24, 1943, in Quebec at the Chateau Frontenac.  Also included in the conference were two meetings at the Citadel of Quebec, attended by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on August 19 and 23, 1943.  A wide range of topics were presented including various aspects of the war against Japan and Operation Overlord.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005143",
    "collections": [
        "Records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff",
        "Conference Proceedings"
    ],
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    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005143",
    "naId": 12005143,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1943-08-31",
        "month": 8,
        "year": 1943
    },
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        "logicalDate": "1943-08-01",
        "month": 8,
        "year": 1943
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    "recordType": "description",
    "subtitle": "Papers and Minutes of Meetings",
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/dde-1114/573439/573439_0002_06.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "U. S. SECRET\nBRITISH MOST SECRET\n5. As regards the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and transport\naircraft, increased resources in these would permit of the elaboration of alter-\nnative plans designed to meet more than one set of extraneous conditions,\nwhereas the state of provision herein taken into account dictates the adoption\nof one course only, or none at all. In proportion as additional shipping, landing\ncraft and transport aircraft can be made available, so the chances of success\nin the operation will be increased. It seems feasible to contemplate additions\nas a result either of stepped-up production, of strategical re-allotment or, in\nthe last resort, of postponement of the date of assault.\n6 I have come to the conclusion that, in view of the limitations in resources\nimposed by my directives, we may be assured of a reasonable chance of success\non the 1st May, 1944, only if we concentrate our efforts on an assault across the\nNorman beaches about Bayeux.\n7. As regards circumstances that we can control only indirectly, it is, in\nmy opinion, necessary to stipulate that the state of affairs existing at the time,\nboth on land in France and in the air above it, shall be such as to render the\nassault as little hazardous as may be so far as it is humanly possible to calculate.\nThe essential discrepancy in value between the enemy's troops, highly organ-\nised, armed and battle-trained, who await us in their much vaunted impreg-\nnable defences, and our troops, who must of necessity launch their assault at\nthe end of a cross-Channel voyage with all its attendant risks, must be reduced\nto the narrowest possible margin. Though much can be done to this end by\nthe means available and likely to become available to us in the United Kingdom\nto influence these factors, we are largely dependent upon events that will\ntake place on other war fronts, principally on the Russian front, between now\nand the date of the assault.\n8. I therefore suggest to the Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary, if my plan\nbe approved, to adopt the outlook that Operation \"Overlord\" is even now in\nprogress, and to take all possible steps to see that all agencies that can be\nbrought to bear are, from now on, co-ordinated in their action as herein below\ndescribed, so as to bring about the state of affairs that we would have exist on\nthe chosen day of assault.\n9. Finally, I venture to draw attention to the danger of making direct\ncomparisons between operation \"Husky\" and operation \"Overlord.\" No doubt\nthe experience now being gained in the Mediterranean will prove invaluable\nwhen the detailed planning stage for \"Overlord\" is reached, but viewed as a\nwhole the two operations could hardly be more dissimilar. In \"Husky,\" the\nbases of an extended continental coastline were used for a converging assault\n96"
}