Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
16618355
label
Chile, 1942
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
16618355
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Chile, 1942
citationUrl
collections
President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Diplomatic Correspondence
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
16618355
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
423528dc0fe24354
ocrText
PSF
Chile
1942
PSF Chile Folder
figured
Santiago, January 5,1942
Dear Mr President:-
I am inclosing copy of a memorandum of a remarkable
conversation with my covering despatch with comments.
It is now clear it seems that an agreement has been reached between
Rios and the Radicals on one side, and Schnake and the Sociolists on the
other. Both will be candidates. With three in the field no one can get
the absolute majority necessary, and this will throw the election into
Congress where the Leftists have a large majority. The two highest
candidates only go to Congress. Supposing that Ibanez is one of the
two ,the other will be Rios or Schnake and if the former all the
Sociolists in Congress will support him, and should it be Schnake, the
Radicals in Congress will support him.
My impression is that Schnake will be the man to go to Congress ,and
it is certain, I think, if he has any fund at all. A proposition has been
made to Siebert of the Branden Cooper Company A man will ask
to buy 5000 tons of copper at the Chilean price If the sale is made
it will be sold in Argentine to people who are pro-ally, certainly not
to the enemy or to any one on the Black List ,and this will realize
9,000,000 pesos. This would be all that Schnake will need. Siebert
has told this man who approached him that it would be all right with
him but that he would have to be instructed from the home office.You
will know whether it would be wise to have some one say to the
home office that the 5000 ton should be sold. he The Embassy here
has nothing to do with it ,and does not even know about it--if you
know what I mean.
I am informed that Alessandri is thinking of announcing within a few
days. That, if true,and it seems too a bsurd, would, in my opinion,
divide the Rightest minority and defeat Ibanez . It is barely poss-
ible that this is the primary object of Alessandri who is very vain
and jukiand jealous and resents Ibanez picturing himself daily in
full page advertisements as the great past President Alessandri
started out with Ibanez ,and I suspect with the thought that the
latter would abandon the field and turn to him. But it is now quite
clear that Ibanez has no such thought and two weeks ago Alessandri
broke away.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely
Non.Franklin D.Roosevelt
Clauds HBowers
The White House.
PSFICHILE
No.2359
Santiago, January 5, 1942
Subject:
A Pro-Ibanez Interview with Members of the Staff
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum
of a conversation at a luncheon to which Mr. Carlos Griffin,
an extreme Rightist, who represents the New York Times
here none too efficiently, invited Mr. Brooks and Mr. Lyon
of my staff, and at which Señor Jaime Larrain, who is
known as the "royalist of Chile", was present.
I personally have no confidence in Carlos Griffin
politically.
Señor Jaime Larrain was formerly head of the important
Agricultural Society and & bitter enemy of the late President
Aguirre Cerda and all he stood for here. His organization,
the Society, is the most reactionary organization in Chile,
composed of and dominated by the old feudal landowners. I
have attended dinners of this Society for distinguished
visitors
- 2 -
visitors and at the last one Señor Olavarria, former
Minister of the Interior, and responsible for the suppression
of the anti-Nazi films, and looked upon as pro-German if not
pro+Nazi, was given a prolonged ovation that was staged.
I do not believe Larrain's story about Ibanez's relations
with the German Embassy for reasons formerly set forth. That
Larrain is a Spanish Falangist, if not actually pro-Nazi, I am
sure.
The statement that Ibafiez is not being financially backed
by the German Embassy and the Spanish Falangists, composed
of rich Chileans, is contrary to everything I hear from other
quarters.
The assertion that he is being financed by the brother-in-
law of Gustavo Ross, Señor Arturo Lopez Pérez, is probably
true since I have heard this from many quarters.
The assertion that Ibaflez is "absolutely pro-American"
is interesting in view of the fact that for weeks he made
speeches and inserted full page advertisements without once
intimating that he stood for continental solidarity or defense
and certainly not for solidarity with the United States.
This unquestionably hurt his candidacy since Chileans feel
it would not do to elect a President who might be abnoxious
to us under existing economic conditions. Finally, as
reported, he gave an interview to the Chilean correspondent
of the Detroit News saying what the other candidates had
said from the beginning. In view of the attitude of the
Totalitarians toward the truth, this does not greatly impress
me. However, I am sure that should Ibafiez be elected he
would feel it necessary to 80 with us, but I am sure that
anything we asked of him would find its way to the German
Embassy.
Larrain's story that Ibafiez had "fought with Von Marees"
is news in Santiago, especially since it 18 generally under-
stood that Von Marees' young Nazis are working in Ibanez
headquarters. And Von Marees 18 the most pronounced Nazi
and the most bitter enemy of the United States in the country.
We know absolutely that about two weeks ago Ibanez and Von
Marees had a secret conference at a private house.
I cannot believe for & moment that Señor Schnake, whom
I know well and whose views as to Ibañez I have been told
by him, has entered into any such agreement as 1s indicated.
A8 to Larrain himself, 8.8 Minister of Foreign Affairs,
I have never seen or heard anything that would encourage me
to believe that he is a friend of the United States.
You will observe that Ibafiez proposes to scrap the
present Constitution, which is democratic, and to create a
new form of government based on the theories of Hitler,
Mussolinia and Franco.
Larrain's observations on Rossetti do not impress me.
I know where he stands 8.8 to Japan and what he has done in
reference to Japan. I have also informed the Department of
his
- 3 -
his reasons for not declaring war on Japan at this juncture
and that he has no doubt but that While will be at war with
Japan before very long. But he wants the aggressive act
to come from Japan, not Chile.
I note, too, with interest Mr. Larrain's dislike for
Gonzalez Videla and Hector Arancibia Lasso. This is
significant since these two men have gone the fulllimit
as to solidarity with the United States and the latter is
almost extravagant in praise of the United States.
The comment of Carlos Griffin about the Embassy can
only be based on the Embassy 8 silence and the rumors
in the streets, growing out of the generally conceived
popular 1dea of Ibafiez associating with the Naxis and the
Fifth Columnists. I do not think it 1sin the least proper
for me to have a conference withIbaNez or any other candi-
date for the Presidency, since it would be open to misin-
terpretation and would certainly not long be a. secret -
in Chile My conviction 1s that we should not conceal the
fact that we are following the campaignbut that we are
taking no part and saying absolutely nothing.
Respectfully yours,
CLAUDE G. BOWERS
CGB:LRL
MEMORANDUM:
January 2, 1942.
Conversation between
Carlos Griffin, New York Times representative
Jaimo Larrain Garcia Moreno
Clarence Brooks, First Secretary
Cecil Lyon, Second Secretary
Today Carlos Griffin invited Clarence Brooks and myself to lunch
with him and Jaine Larrain García Moreno. All indications were that
the luncheon had been arranged in order that Jaime Larrain could get
his views about the presidential elections over to us. lie is managing
Ibáliez's campaign, and one of the first things he told us was that he
is spending 30,000 posos a day on newspaper and radio propaganda. While
he did not say so directly, he intimated that most of the money was
being supplied by Mr. Arturo LOPEZ Perez, who he said is the richest
man in South America (formerly he owned the Galórie Lafayette, in
Paris, and is said to have gotten most of his fortune, consisting of
1,800,000,000 pesos, out of Europe before the war and has recently
transferred most of it to the United States. He is a brother-in-law
of Gustavo Ross.) Selior Larrain said it was fantastic to think, as he
had hoard, that considerable sums for General Ibáñez's campaign were
being contributed by the German Embassy. Larrain hinself said he had
had a terrific fight with Baron von Schoon at the beginning of the
war, for at that time Larrain was President of the Sociedad Nacional
de Agricultura and very pro-French, as he has always been. In speak-
ing over the radio he referred to the atrocities of the Germans, and
was immediately brought to task by Baron von Schoon in a throatening
letter in which Baron von Schoen intimated that he would bring pressure
on the Chilean Government forces to silence Larrain, thus taking advan-
tage of Larrain's unfavorable position vis-a-vis the present government.
Since then Baron von Schoen has tried to make up, but Larrain will have
nothing to do with him.
Sellor Larrain insists that General Ibáñez is absolutely pro-Ameri-
can, wishes to cooperate with the United States entirely and is all in
favor of Western Hemisphere defense. He says that the story that he
is pro-Axis has beon started by his political enemies. I inquired
as to whether it did not possibly come from Ibáliez's close association
with Jorge González von Mareés. Señor Larrain answered this by saying
that Ibáfioz had fought with González von Maroés and that whether or
not González von Mareés's party was supporting him now was uncertain.
He said, however, that Ibálioz would receive the support of most of the
Conservatives, the Liberals, the Agrarians, and, in the end, the sup-
port of the Socialists, for he and Schnako had entered into an agree-
ment that Schnake would be one of his cabinet ministers. Other of his
cabinet ministors would be: Interior, General Burgoho; Finance, Julio
Bascuñan, with Counselor Arturo López Péroz. Schnake will probably
continue in the Ministry of Fomento; Foreign Affairs, Juine Larrain,
and probably some portfolio would be given to Rossetti, who is also
supporting Ibálioz. (Sellor Larrain said that most of the people in
the Foreign Office at present who had merely come in since the present
government and were not career, would be changed. I recall that the
name of Fernando Orrego WELS montioned as among those to be eliminated.)
lie asked if Carlos Dávila had replied to the tologram sent by Gone-
ral Ibálioz asking him to be Ambassador in Washington. Sehor Larrain
said that he thought he had replied but had requested that his reply
be kept confidential.
Señor Oriffin put a number of questions to Sehor Larrain, and
-2-
-2-
Brooks and I felt as though they were being arranged for our benefit.
Among other things, Señor Larrain said that, were Ibáliez elected, and
he felt that he had a better than good chance to be, he would form a
unicameral system of government, with representatives of agriculture,
industry, bankers, ecclesiastics, educators, etc., which would act as
Congress. This, he admitted, would require a constitutional amendment.
Moreover, Ibáñez would insist upon a strong government and would do
everything possible to help the United States win the war.
We asked Sehor Larrain what he thought would be the results of the
Río Conference (he himself having been President of the Chilean dele-
gation to the Buenos Aires Conference). He said that he thought it
would result in a further solidifying of inter-American cooperation.
He said that, while he respected Rossetti, he did not think he was a
good Foreign Minister, and said that if, for example, Rossetti wanted
to create a more pro-American atmosphere in South America, he could do
so by harping on the Japanese threat, for while Chileans merely laugh
at an Italian threat and are not over-impressed by a German threat,
the Japanese threat is very real to them. They realize that if the
American fleet were defeated Japan would como here and seize the copper
mines. For that reason General Ibálioz and his advisers consider it
supremely important to support the position of the United States. When
I suggested that if the Foreign Minister attempted to over-omphasi ze
the Japanese threat it might result in a policy of hold-off on any
measures against the Japanese, Señor Larrain said that this wouldn't
be the Spanish reaction; "We couldn't conceive of ourselves being domi-
nated by a 'yellow' race, and we would want to fight then before they
attacked us," he exclaimed. Selior Larrain is for all the Americas de-
claring war on Japan immediately, and if he had his may he would ship
all the Japanese in Chile back to Japan immediately.
Sefior Larrain was constantly referring to the danger of Communism
in Chile, and intimated that the Leftists would be forced to select
a candidate who had the support of the Communists. He said that today or
tomorrow, or at least very shortly, the Radicals would be forced to
withdraw their support from Rios, and said that he t hought that the
Communist influence in their party would require then to choose González
Videla or Héctor Arancibia Lasso, or possibly Señor Méndez.
I said to Sehor Larrain that I had heard the Army was not in favor
of General Ibáliez because when he had last been President he had inter-
ested himself too much in their affairs, to which Sehor Larrain replied,
"That's Alessendri's propaganda." He also said that Señor Alessandri
was not supporting Ibánez because he would give hissupport to no one
but Sehor Alessandri.
After Señor Larrain had left, Señor Griffin indicated that he con-
sidered the luncheon had been a good idea "to end the war between the
American Embassy and the Conservative elements in the country." Mr.
Brooks said that he didn't think any war existed, but SeHor Griffin was
of the opinion that at loast there had been some misunderstanding, and
indicated that he thought it would be advantageous if the Ambassador
had an opportunity to talk with Sefior Larrain, or even with General
Ibáñez, at an intimate luncheon such as today. He felt that much good
would come of such a meeting.
CBL:ed
Chile Folder
filgersonal
Valparaiso ,January 16,1942
Dear Mr President:-
After one solid hectic year at my desk I am taking a
much needed vacation while the Foreign Office 18 at Rio. I had written
Welles in detail about Rossetti, his tendencies, his characrer, his weaknesses
and his stoub declarations to me that he would stand with the United
States and Brazil.
The campaign here is interesting and bitter . Heavily financed, Ibanez
2d
threaten to abe a dangerous contender. especially when the Lefts were
quarreling among themselves and not uniting on a si)/ngle candidate. At
length they have awakened to the danger and have united on Rios. This
was made possible by the patriotic sacrifice of Schnak e who withdrww
in the interesta of a united front. He was by long odds our best bet and
this was the strong opinion alsod of the British and Mexican Embassies.
But he is out.
It is difficult to figure how Ibanez can possible be elected. There are
450,000 voters end the chosen man must have a clear majoriry ,or more
than 250,000. The parties are registered and their strength known.
The Left parties are as follows:
Radicals 95,000
Sociolists 2 80,000
Democrats 30,000
Falangists (nothing to do with the Spainsih, 20,000
Agrarians 20,000
Independents 15,000
To this the Lefts add 20,000 Conservative and Liberal members who are
in revolt against their party's nomination of Ibanez.
In addition, the Communists have now decided to support Rio in
preference to One Ibanez, though Rio is not their friend .Theyhave
9
50,000. Where can Ibanez get 251,000 votes. The other night at a
dinner I Cruchaga figured it all out and confessed he could not see
how Ibanez could be elected.
There is a feeling here that Ibanez will not do since Chilpi is
dependent on supplies from the States and that the States does not
trust Ibanez. I have instructed the Embassy staff to say nothing
and mereky report, and I have read to the American business interests
here Hulls telegram to the effext that we frown on Americans mixing
in elections away from home. But Ibanez has been sending people to
the Embassy asking for an pk appointment with me. That is one reason
I am on vacation. Were I to see him it would be known by everyone
i/n Chile and the Ibanez people would cite that meeting by word
of mouth as proof that we are for their candidate. I have instructed
the staff not to mix and not to go to functions for one candidate
or the other. In my absence the wife of the President of the
Conservat ive party who has attacked us in the Senate invited Cecil
Lyon of my staff. to a dinner in honor of Ibanez. It seems that
some one,advised him to go. He had tried to get out of it but
the hostess called him up and insisted. He went. Now he is
stricken because all the papers told of the dinner dn honor of
Ibanez and gave Lyons of the American Embassy as one of the guests.
The purpose was served. I have just sent Lyons a reprimand.
My personal opinion that Ibanez is the candidate of our enemies is
based on these undisputed facts.
(I) He has the active support of every Nazi ijn Chile.
(2) Of every Italian facist in Chile
(3) Ofevery Spanish Falangist in Chile.
who
(4) of the party of von Marees the most fanatic Nazi in Chile be attacks us
regularly in Congress.
(5) Bf The Aleman ,the Nazi organ in Chile.
(6) of the Chilena, an organ financed by the German Embassy.
That is enough for me. A dog is known by the company it keeps.
My impression is that should Ibanez fail of election the cry of "fraud" will
be raised and he will attempt the coup d'etat he has been figuring on all along.
He has madet twoattempts by nazi methods to overthrow the regime of Aguerre
Cerda. If elected of course we could force him to do as we say since Chile
would collapse economivcally without supplies from us. But if the fortunes of
war should at any time turn against us he would go over to theenemy at once.
And in the meanwhile I would feel that any confidential conversations we might
have with him would be passed on to the enemy. At best he would be like the
acting President in Argentine.
He has the support of "the best people", meaning the old feudal land owners and
B ig Business,--as Mussolibi had in Italy, Hitler in Germany and Franco in
Spain. I am afraid that some of our own people would like to help finance him.
Big Business never learns.
I wrote you recently as I did because the British Embassy wanted it and the
Mex ican. Both were willing to do something. That is over now.
Riosi is of the extreme right wing of the Radicals, very reactionary ,but
democratic. He has a good following among business men. No one of them is afraid
of him. The communists will support him under protest because he would
give them their constitutional rights and they think Ibanez would start in
shooting
I shall try to evade an interview with Ibanez. If unable to do 80 I shall
make it as public as possible and shall then have an interview with Rios.
But even so that would be interpreted by the Ibanez people as meaning that
both are satisfactory. I shall not return to Santiago until the 28th and
I hope it will then be too late. My instinct is to refuse to have a
conference or discussion with either candidate on the ground that we have
instructions to stand absolutely aloof from the campaign
Carlos Davila apparently has been bought with the promise of the
is
Ambassadorship in Washington. He has replied to Ibaenz offer with the
stout assurance that Ibanez is all right with us and the Ibanez papers
are saying publicly that this means he has the assurance from the Government
of the United States: I recall that Welles does not have much confidence
in Davilla.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Hon. Franklin D.Roosevelt
claude y Bower
Tge White House.
department OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
The puth his copy ok Folder
January 16, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.
On February 1 there will be elections in Chile to
select the new President to take the place of President
Aguirre Cerda, who died. In the last few days Gen-
eral Carlos Ibañez del Campo has emerged as the leading
candidate. All our reports indicate that Ibañez is sym-
pathetic to the Axis. He is a frequent attendant at the
German Club and moves in Axis circles in Chile.
The opponents of Ibañez, through friends in the
United States, are endeavoring to raise funds in this
country. In view of the possibility that this matter
may be brought to your attention, may I present the fol-
lowing considerations:
(1) This Government signed and the Senate ratified
treaties at the Montevideo and Buenos Aires conferences
by which this country specifically pledged itself not to
intervene in the internal or external affairs, directly
or indirectly, of any American country. The donation of
funds by this Government or by United States citizens
would be a definite violation of these treaty commitments.
(2) The confidence in the United States which the
other
-2-
other American republics now have arises precisely because
the United States has scrupulously refrained from inter-
meddling in the internal concerns of these countries.
This confidence is the most precious asset that the United
States now possesses in the other American republics.
Interference in the internal Chilean political scene might
lose this confidence overnight.
(3) The Chilean political situation is still in
flux. There are two candidates in opposition to Ibañez.
Negotiations are now going on in an endeavor to agree
upon a single opposition candidate. If these negotiations
are successful and a single candidate selected, accept-
able to all groups, the possibility of the election of
Ibañez would appear to be very doubtful. He would have
arrayed against him not only all the democratic forces in
Chile but also a large part of the voting strength of the
two important Chilean parties technically supporting him,
since this part has publicly announced its opposition to
Ibañez's candidacy and its willingness to support any
satisfactory candidate opposed to Ibañez.
C
CH
Chile Folder
department OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
January 19, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.
In further regard to the Chilean situation, the
negotiations for the designation of a single candidate
in opposition to Ibañez have been successful. As a re-
sult all of the principal parties in opposition to Ibañez
are agreed in support of the candidacy of one Antonio Rios
who favors support of the democracies as an external
policy and is sympathetic to moderate reform as an internal
policy.
All signs would point to the strong probability that
Rios will receive a majority of votes in the forthcoming
elections on February 1.
CH
Chile Folder
Satiago January 23,1942
Dear Mr President:-
I have just come from the foreign office and learn that
instructions are being sent by telephone to Rossetti to support the last
Brazilian resolution .I cannot subscribe to the theory that Chile's attitude
denotes the slightest disposition to do anything other than to go with us ,and
its
I know that she has been fearful of a surprise attack on his coast ,25eo miles
long. Since this is a very slender country most of its vital industries, power
plants etc are on the coast, not in the interior ,and she has been ready all
along to go with us with a positive assurance that we will actually provide our
own ships and planes for observation and defence purposes. I know no American
here where we know the facts who thinks this is unreasonable
The election ,judged by statistics of former electionsk, should go by a large
majority to Rios and I think it will but I would not care to make a wager.
Ibanez has a campaign fund without precedent in Chile and it is estimated that
he is spending close to a million pesos a day. Then he has a compact, throughly
organized Nazi organization and a Falangist organization (Francoists) which are
dedicating themselves feverishly to his cause. In addition to all this I have
evidence all around that because of the high cost of living, in contrast to
conditions where he was President but for which he was not responsible, ,and
because of his Nazi-like assurance that he will bring down the cost of living, he
has a remarkably strong support among the lower middle classes regardless of
party. Yesterday at La Union he was given a banquet at the German Club.
The danger, I think, is that should he not be defeated by a most decisive
vote he will attempt for the third time his coup d'etat immediately after the
election. There has been no fear of his attempts along this t line in
governmental circles so long as they were merely a close corporation con-
spiracy among a few army officers and without popular support. But his
candidacy arrays behind and with him thousands who may be lead into a coup
who had no patience with his other attempts. The Army apparently would resist
anything of the sort, but I hear disturbing stories about the Caribaneros who
were organized by him.
By all the rules of logic Rios should be elected ,but the fact remains that
no one can say with any certainty what may happen. This because of the attitude
of the German and Italian and Spanish totalitarians I am shocked by the
almost hysterical support being given him by the Catholic paper, La Illustrada.
It gives almost the whole paper over to Ibanez. Of course such outstanding
Catholic laymen as Cruchaga and Senator Irranr Eranx Errazuriz, both of whom
pretend to like the United States are for Ibanez .One however is honorary
President of the Friends of Germany and the other of Friends of Japan. Both
are said to have resigned since we entered the war but they have spared the
feelings of the Germans and Japs by keeping any mention of it out of the papers.
Of course Ibanez pretends to be our great admirer, and if elected can be
kept in line by threats of ecobnomic reprisals ,but his friends and associates
are entirely among the Nazi and totalitarian groups. It is a pity that Rios
while a reasonably able man and a good looking man is without color or dramatic
appeal.
Warmest regards,
Hon. Franklin D.Roosevelt
Sincerely,
The White House.
Claude yowes
Chile Folder
CH
1-42
KOR
January 24, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
You will recall several recent telegrams from Ambas-
sador Bowers urging that certain military and naval
matériel immediately be made available to Chile in order
to put it in a position to repel the aggression from
Japan it appears so much to fear. The War and Navy
Departments reviewed their supply situation and authorized
me to send a telegram setting forth & list of matériel
which could be made available either immediately or in
the near future. Mr. Bowers has now sent a message in-
dicating his opinion that the list is entirely inadequate
and urging further reconsideration of the situation. It
does not seem to me that Mr. Bowers appreciates the ex-
ceedingly heavy demands which are now being made on our
war production or that the War and Navy Departments, at
your direction, made a real effort to furnish to Chile
whatever they could spare.
There
The President,
The White House.
-2-
There is submitted for your consideration a suggested
telegram to Mr. Bowers. If it meets with your approval I
will see that it is dispatched at once.
There are attached hereto copies of the messages be-
tween Ambassador Bowers and the Department pertinent to
your consideration of this matter.
Faithfully yours,
Cordell Bull
Enclosures:
1. Draft telegram to
Ambassador Bowers.
2. Copies of messages
between Ambassador
Bowers and the Depart-
ment of State.
X
THE WHITE HOUSE
January 24, 1942.
AMEMBASSY,
SANTIAGO (CHILE).
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE AMBASSADOR.
I have given the most careful personal consideration
to the Chilean military and naval situation as described
in your various communications to the Secretary of State.
I fully appreciate the necessity for doing everything
possible to enable Chile to resist attack from any of the
Axis countries. Considerations both of hemisphere defense
and of the importance to our own war effort of Chilean
strategic materials make this obvious.
The materials listed in the telegram transmitted
to you on January 21 by the Department of State were made
available at my orders after consultation with General
Marshall. You appreciate, I am confident, that the de-
mand for war matériel is very great, not only by our own
Army and Navy but by the nations now fighting with us day
and night. Production is increasing rapidly, however,
-2-
and more materials will be forwarded to Chile just as
soon 8.8 they become available.
It would be inexcusable to disregard the possibility
of a Japanese hit-and-run attack on Chile. On the other
hand, it would be equally inexcusable to suppose that any
Japanese plan for such an attack would be in any way
affected by the particular state of Chile's diplomatic
or other relations with Japan at the time. Therefore, I
hope that the "full Chilean cooperation" mentioned in
your telegram 136 will be immediately forthcoming, since
it will be a most valuable contribution to the placing
of both our countries in the best possible position to
meet all eventualities.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
RA:PWB
PA/LD:DMZ
(Repeat to AMDELGAT, RIO DE JANEIRO (BRAZIL)).
fillers
PSF:Chile Folder
Santiago February 2,1942
Dear Mr President:-
Chile has just demonstrated in perfect form that she has a
real democracy, and that the people are essahtially and basimly democratic.
All the Axis Powers, including Spain, exerted themselves to the utmost for
Ibanez the totalitarian candidate who had the most collosal slush fund in
Chilean history. His people paid $7 a vote. Dispite this and the fact that the
democratic coalition did not have enough money to pay transportation costs
in getting their men to the polls from one town where they worked to their voting
town Rios has won by more than 50,000 majority, which is a big majority. The
passionate democratic feeling here is illustrated by the fact that Alessandri,
who hates the groups that won emerged from his retirement to speak to more
than a hundred thousand people in support of Rios in a great oration in which
he said ,what I have written you before, that the issue was clear cut between
democracy and totalitarianism. The issue was clear;the result so devisive that
that there is no danger of an Ibanez coup d'etat. Had the ma jority been slight
that would have been inevitable. As it is Ibanez had issued a statement accepting
the verdict of "the urns".
They have a democracy here;and that brings me to this hope --that we will not be
to to o o impatient with democratic processes. The people here, ardent friends of ours
included, have been afraid to challenge reprisals from the Axis by breaking off
diplomatic relations.So when Rossetti went to Rio it was with instructions from
the Government and from Congress to go along on everything but that . He was
not a free agent. He is not a dictator But I have been positive all along that
that he wishes ardently to stand well with us, and within a day or so after
reaching Rio he sent a telegram to his Government, which was shown me before he
returned, asking fresh instructions to permit him to vote for breaking off
relations. It was a strong telegram. As a result the Government acquiesed but
asked that the agreement be subject to ratification by Congress.
I met Rossetti along with all the American and some European heads of missions
on his arrival at the air port where he got a great ovation. I noticed that
not only the German, Italian and Japanese were conspicuous by their absence ,but
that Luca de la Tena the Spnish Ambassador was not there. Whatever we may think
they all think that Rossetti was with us and against them.
I have just seen Rossetti I saw him Friday evening when with him and Mendez m
alove
the President, I sat at a widow of the Moneda for forty minutes wis watching the
^
assembling for the monster democratic mass meeting when Alessandri made his great
speech They both told me they had no doubt of ratification. This morning
Rossetti told me that he is going to the sea shore until the latter part of the
week for a much needed sleep ,and that he will return and resume his functions on
Friday. He said the President proposes to give Congress a recess for twenty days
since he does not think it wise to throw the ratification question into Congress
when its member have just emerged from a very bitter campaign. He wants the
waters to subside before venturing forth. And Rossetti wants some days for
personally canvassing the members of Congress. He says he had not any d oubt
but that Congress will ratify .I asked him about individual members of the
Opposition--Cruchags mfor one. He says that Crufhaga will vote for ratification.
Colonel Baker has just come in with a telegram from the War Department
about doubling the number of Chilean officers with our army and saying that
until Chile ratifies this cannot be done for Chile. I have told him with all the
emphasis I can command that nothing S hould be done before the vote in Congress
since the doubling for other countries with Chile left out would create bitter
resentments that inevitably might have a very grave effect on the result of that
vote. In other words that nothing be done until after that vote. I am sure you
will agree that I am right .
Wellesd did & magnificent job in Rio. Rossetti is in rhapsodies about him
and vain as a peacock over an authgraphed photograph of Welles who had written
some complimentary lines.
With W warmest regards,
Hon.Franklin D.Roosevelt
Sincerely, claude "Bowers
The White House
Chile Folder
file mal
Santiags Feby 4-1942
bea us President:-
s inclose a copy of
letter to Neels Dear way when
we are about to wake a proposition
a you. D cave a telequaus saying
to chile about sending some ques
with ameear soldies here for
Fre protection of Plo wines and power
to be submitted Though Ple chlean
plants. S get The impression Fer is
ambassador Af done and soon
reacher before cougress after or
the natification of Ple about Res agreement The
20th the Due Thing Feat the opposition
eare use will be sweat away.
Af we intend to do thes. for walle Heavers
sake lets do N before Dls
of natification comes up.
with warmeatreparts
sweerely claude glowes
PSFiChile
Santiago, February 4, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
Rossetti gave a full exposition of the Rio Conference
to the Council of Ministers yesterday and was warmly congratu-
lated by his colleagues and by Mendez, who said that he had
acted precisely in conformity with the instructions of the
Government. I have heard much talk against Rossetti at Rio,
and since it is evident that much of this 18 based on a lack
of understanding both of his position and his power, I want
to go on record on it.
1) Nine tenths of the public men of all parties in Chile
including bitter enemies of Germany and warm friends of the United
States, like Barros Jarpa, were absolutely opposed to break-
ing off diplomatic relations because of their coast line
andwulnerability and their realization that they lacked the
facilities to defend themselves against a surprise attack.
Rossetti was miles ahead of nine-tenths in favor of complete
cooperation with the United States.
2) He went to Rio under iron clad instructions of the
Government and Congress backed by the press without exception.
He could not violate his instructions.
was
3) Two days after the meeting began he/telegraphed
by Pedregal that he was reported weakening on his instructions
and that he should take an advanced stand upon them.
4) He telegraphed the Government asking release from
the instructions, strongly urging that he be instructed
to go along with sentiment in favor of breaking relations,
which was overwhelming in the Conference.
5) As a result of his very strong representations, the
Government then agreed to permit him to vote for breaking
off relations provided it were stipulated that there should
be ratification by Congress. In other words there would
have been no agreement on this phase but for the fight
Rossetti made.
6)
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
-,2 -
6) The ratification's hope is in the fight Rossetti
will undoubtedly make before Congress. Remember that
neither Ortega, Saenz, Mora, Bianchi or Alamas had the
courage or enterprize to get a ratification for the agreements
of Peru, Panama and Habana, and that Rossetti went to Con-
gress, made the fight, spoke and fought for four hours and
got them all ratified. He 1s a powerful man in debate and
very effective and I hope he succeeds in getting the Rio
ratification promptly. He thinks he will. As a result of
Rio sentiment 1s changing here; fears are dissipating be-
cause of the feeling now that we will help protect the Coast;
and there 1s a general conviction that Chile cannot afford
to stand aloof.
Juan Antonio Rios, the new President, attended the
cocktail of the Chile-American Society for the visiting
American journalists. I talked with him briefly. He 18 a
tall, slender, fine looking man with iron grey hair and a
fine eye, looking the President. However, he is not a genius
or brilliant but he had good sound sense and is conservative
in the better sense. He has not been favorable to breaking
relations in the past, but since the Rio Conference he has
taken no real position. Were he to intervene in Congress
he could do much harm but I have a feeling that since action
will be taken before he takes power he will stand aloof.
I hope 80.
Chile certainly has shown any one but an American
"journalist" that she is democratic, following democratic
processes perfectly and in a dignified way in elections;
and civilized, as few South Americannations are, after an
election. Ibanez even called to congratulate Rios. At
the cocktail, Aarrain, who managed Ibanez's campaign, was
present and most cordial to him. Cruz Coke, Senator Maza,
etc., were there and cordial. I have tried to convince
the American journalists here that this is "news". I do
not know with what success.
Someone has just sent me a clipping from the Washington
Star by Allen Haden which shocks me. The purport 18 that
we are more disliked in Chile than in any country in South
America, though Haden knows Argentina. As a matter of fact
we are exceedingly popular with the overwhelming majority of
the Chileans. It is our cars of the Embassy that are often
cheered in the streets. Haden spent muchof his time while
here with Wanmer, of the Coordinator's Office who was recall-
ed on my suggestion because he hated Chile and the Chileans,
made his hate manifest, wanted to blacklist the Catholic
organ, EL DIARIO ILUSTRADO, etc., whichI stopped, and he
was cordially disliked by all Chileans andall American here.
Evidently Haden accepted this man's stuff as gospel. I
had a higher opinion of Haden's profession intelligence.
The
- 3 -
The two were together often and made a trip South together.
Happily Haden's article has not been reproducted here.
It was McClintock of the Coordinator's Office who sized
Warner up and demanded his recall.
The American journalists, making the return visit, have
made a very fine impression here and have been writting
articles for the Chilean papers that are vêry useful. They
have been given & splendid reception.
I have learned now that Cruchaga and Senator Max
Errazuriz retain the honorary presidencies of the "Friends
of Germany" and of the "Friends of Japan". I do not see
how I can invite to dinners at the Embassy the heads of
the organizations. We are at war with the nations of whose
organizations they are official heads. I like Cruchaga very
much and am sorry. I suppose I have had him to dinner
fifteen times. of course I shall treat him with cordiality
as before but I am sure you will agree that he has no place
at an official American dinner so long as he retains his pos
Alessandri and I have become great pals, exchaning
letters and compliments constantly. I admire his great
ability but have been deterred from cultivating him until
recently because of his attitude toward the Government.
This is changed. He rose magnificently above party and
prejudice and his really magnificent speech for Rios in
my opinion swept Santiago into the Rios column when the Rio
people had reconciled themselves to losing the City.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Claude G. Bowers
final
Chile Folder
Santiago, February 20, I942
Dear Mr President:-
I inclose copy of a letter from President-elect
Rios in which you will note that the special precoccupation of his
administration will be collaboration with all the American republics
"and most particularly with the great Democracy of the United States
of America". I am to see him for a long talk next week and shall go
into everything and particularly into the breaking of relations
There is a strange misconception at home regarding Rossetti at
Rio. We must bear in mind that Chile is a democracy ,not a dictator-
ship;that no one man can do as he pleases but must follow democratic
processes; that the mission headed by Rossetti was under absolute
instructions against breaking relations at this juncture;and that
he could not do other than he was instructed. These
instructions
were
in line with general public opinion here. I know, personally know, that
within two days he began hammering the Government with requests for
a change in the instructions to permit him to go along And I am
convinced that the formula reached would have been impossible but for
the fight he was making all the ti me with his Government.
The agreements of Rio will go to Congress probably next week. It is
Rossettis plan first to ask for a vote of approval on his course at
Rio. That will be forthcoming. He will then immediately at the same
meeting ask that all the agreements reached at Rio be ratifiee. He
now has 8 card in his hand he has not had before--he is in position
to inform Congress in secret session of the war material we are
sending for the protection of the coast;since the one strong objec-
tion to breaking relations has been that it would ne unwise to issue
a challenge without having anything with which to protect the coast.
He is clever and powerful in debate and has come through on more than
one occasion because of the fight he has made in Congress in debates
in secret sessions I hope ,can only hope, he will succeed here.
No one opposing breaking relations doubts that this is
inevitable and may come at any moment ,amd most agree that Chile
will be in the war soon. But many take the position that Chiles
friendship and support of the United States should follow the line
our Government did in the V case of England until attacked. These
of course, overlook the fact that Chile has agreed that an attack on
one of the American Republics is an attack on each and all. That I
shall try to impress on Rios. But I have no indications that Rios
is opposing ratification.
We have the opinion of Beunos Aires, through Armour, that the Minister
of Foreign Affairs there had a conversation with Rios on the border.
This when mentioned by the press here was stoutly denied by the
Government which only said however that h it had arrangenho such
meeting ;and it was announced too that Rios would not go to Argentine
soil. That would not have prevented Rios from seeing the Argentine on
Chilean soil. I shall be in better position to guess after I have
had my talk with Rios who has been in the South.
It looks as though the next Minister of Foreign Affairs here will be
either Jorges Matta several times Minister under Alessandri, or Barros
Jarpa. The former is old and 111 and may not accept and I do not know
precisely his attitude. But Barros Jarpa is militantly ,openly,
8 champion of the United States and a close friend of mine. He, too,
was Minister under Alessandri.
I heard Welles recent speech on the radio perfectly. It made a good
impression here and should have a good effect in the ratification
matter.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely, claude y/Dower
Hon.Franklin D.Roosevelt
The White House.
Copy
Excellency:
I have received with particular pleasure your
kind note of the second of this month in which you
congratula e me on my election as President of the
Republic of Chile.
I appreciate in all their value the concepts
to which you refer in the electoral act. My Govern-
ment will have as its special preocoupation collabora-
tion with all the countries of American and more
particularly with the United States of North America.
I assure Your Excellency that during my
Administration the ties of friendship between Chile
and the great Democracy of the North which you 80
worthily represent will be strengthened.
With assures of my highest esteem end considera-
tion,
(signed) JUAN ANTONIO RIOS
Chile folder
Santiago, February 25,1942
Dear Mr President:-
Since writing the letter to Welles,a copy inclosed,I have learned
devinitely that Barros Jarpa is to be the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and will
give his acceptance tonight. He is a militant pro-American and has been for years,
so much so that when a president for the Chile -American Cultural Institute was
selected four years ago he was naturally chosen. He was Minister under Alessandri.
He is a leading lawyer, a very able man ,a lecturer on international law at the
University. Recently he has written articles for the press attacking the Axis and
Japan and in a notable speech at the University he did the same and at the same time
made a spirited defence of our policies. I do not know a single Chilean whom I would
rather trust as far as we are concerned.
But like practically all the leaders of Chile ,like practically all the press, and
most of the people who are pro-American, he does not think Chile should break off
relations until something in the nature of an attack on Chile or an interference with
hefr shipping of war material to the States occurs. He takes the position that the
breaking of relations inevirably would be followed with the sinking or attacks on
ships ,and that so long as Chile can continue sending this material without molesta-
tion the gains is not only Chile's but ours. He thinks that sooner or later and
probably soon the attack will be made and then all public opinion outside Nazi and
Fifth Column circles would back the Government in breaking relations. We may think
otherwise but on my responsibility I state this as a fact-that Chile does not
favor an unprovoked breaking of relations and I mean by that Chileans who are mili-
tantly pro-American.
Because of his attitude on this one thing he is clearly disturbed about accepting
the post offered. I personally think we cannot do as well anywhere else.
If he accepts, Rios, the president-elect, wishes him to go at once before
the inauguration to the States to discuss with the Department every phase of Chilean
relations and since he is a very reasonable, ,able man with a capacity to give and take
I have a feeling that grounds would be laid for the elimination of all misunder-
standings that may exist. It occurs to me that he might be converted to our view on
the breaking of relations.
I am a bit concerned for fear that a delay in breaking relations may lead to press
denunciations of Chile and reprisals which would certainly make us no friends in
Chile and unquestionably would lose us many of our best friends. 1 have cables Welles
this view and the hope that we will exercise patience for the moment at least.
The Chileans are a peculiar people and a very proud people and they are
very much against yielding to pressure from the outside .They showed that when
Franco broke relations and gave out an insulting statement. To my amzement every
paper, including the most rabid anti-Government papers, went aggressively to the
support of the Government .I am hoping theerefore that there will be no precipitate
reprisals and that Barros Jarpa can be convinced in Washington.
I dislike to bother you but this impresses me as so important that it is my duty
to get this exposition of the situation to Washington.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Hon ,Branklin D.Roosevelt
clauds ABowers
The White House.
PSFichile Chile
Santiago, February 26, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
During the last two days I have had long conversations
with the President-elect, Rios, with Acting President Mendez
and with Rossetti. I cabled the substance of my conversation
with Rossetti (My telegram No. 323 February 25, 08 am). I got
the distinct impression, taking into consideration the charac-
ter of Rossetti, that he actually believes that Congress will
ratify the agreements of Rio and that the actual breaking of
relations thus made possible without any further reference to
Congress will be left to the new Administration. In this con-
nection he said that while he had personally not discussed the
matter with Rios, three others had told him that from their
conversations with Rios they were convinced that Rios is ready
to break.
There is no longer any thoughtin Rossetti's mind of
remaining on as Minister, and I am persuaded that he had
fixed his hope on the ambassadorship in Rio which he will
scarcely get unless he acts decisively and courageously on
the breaking of relations.
My conversation with Mendez was very cordial. He is in
no sense a great men but by no means the utterly colorless and
characterless figure he was pictured in some of the wise-crack-
ing American journals. He 1s a fine physician, a real humani-
tarian, kindly, honest, very moderate, and the fact that he
does have character is manifest in the fact that he has main-
tained order and tranquility under difficult conditions during
a critical period. He said that his Government's feeling
toward the United States is one of complete coordination and
cooperation, of a realization that his 1s best for the Chilean
people, and that we can count on ChileIs help in every way in
connection with the war. That he hates the Ax1s and its
allies is very clear. He said something rather indefinite
to the effect that Chile has some problems peculiar to itself
which makes it wise to move with some caution and deliberation
but he clearly wished to make it clear that this should not be
interpreted as being under the pressure of the Axis. He
clearly feels that sooner or later Chile will be attacked.
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
Rossetti said very emphatically that any one who thinks
that by refusing to break relations with the Axis powers Chile
can escape attack is stupid; that from the view point of
realism it is inevitable that the Axis and Japan will sink or
attack Chilean ships and industries to prevent the sending to
the States of cur war needs; that for the momen Japan probably
feels that nothing can be gained by an attack but that this
merely means that she is not ready. Thus he answers very real-
istically and wisely the arguments against breaking relations.
He 1s a queer combination. I ampersuaded that his bad impression
in R1o was due to his vanity. He should have been very frank
about the obstacles and difficulties he faced because of his
lack of power beyond his instructions. But to have admitted
that he is not a powerful figure dictating the policies of
Chile would have hurt his vanity. Thus he posed evidently as
a man having the power and authority to do what he pleased.
My conversation of an hour with JuanAntonio Rios was most
pleasant. He began in a very complimentary strain of personal
compliments apropos of my work here, and went on to say that
he wishes to go along with the United States in complete coopera-
tion. He said his personal and professional relations with
American business here had given him a better understanding
of the psychology of North Americans than most Chileans had.
He said that he hadreceived many clippings from the North
American press on his election which he deeply appreciated.
He then made it clear that he will change the Minister
of Foreign Affairs and that the new man will be a sincere
I friend said that of the while United I St no anit known dail Amprisan.
ciated if he were in position to inform me for Washington the
name of the man he has in mind. I told him laughingly that at
Viña the other day I had seen Barros Jarpa and had begun my
conversation with him by asking him when he was going to take
office; that he began talking of something else and that I
had repeated the question as impudently as I could, and that he
had passed it off with a joke. Rios asked me when I had seen
Barros Jarpa. I told him last Friday. He laughed and said
that I was "warm". I told him I had heard three men mentioned
as possibilities, Barros Jarpa, Jorge Matte and Benjamin Clave.
He seemed surprised when I mentioned Claro and I have since
heard that Ben is to be Minister of Education or is to succeed
to the well-paid job now held by Rios. He then said that there
is no objection to telling me confidentiall who is to be his
Foreign Minister but that he cannot doday since the man he has
in mind 1s to give him his answer at eight o'clock tonight.
The moment the thing 1s settled he will give me the information
in confidence for transmission to Washington.
I got the impression that it is to be Barros Jappa. This
gentleman side+stepped at Viña in my conversation with him and
- 3 -
implied that his practice is such that he could not afford
it but I suspect that since he had not been made a definite
offer he protected himself by side-stepping the question.
He certainly is an outstanding and most able opponent of the
Ax1s Powers and in a speech at the University of Chile he made
a powerful speech against them.N 1s also very partial to the
United States, militantly so, and for three years has been
the President of the Chile-American Cultural Institute. He
was twice Minister of Foreign Affairs under Alessandri, of
whom he is a close personal friend. He meets our desires on
everything but one, - he does not think it wise to break dip-
lomatic relations without a specific offense aimed at Chile.
This is not due to any friendly feeling for Germany, Italy or
Japan, all of whose policies and purposes he has attacked for-
mally in public. But there it 1s. He is moderate, reasonable,
most friendly and partial to us, and on the whole he would be
a good selection from our point of view. I doubt if it would
be possible to get anyone else so acceptable. His relations
with the whole American business colony are close and intimate.
He is & great admirer of Roosevelt, Hull and yourself.
Since writing the above Barros Jarpa sent for a member
of my staff with a message to me to the effect that he is the
man who is to give his answer by eight o'clock tonight. He
apparently was worried because while actually militantly pro-
American on everything in general he, like most of the other
Chileans, thinks it would be unwise to break off relations until
& specific reason is furnished. He says that Rios wishes him
to go immediately to the United States for the purpose of a
general survey conversation with the Department covering the
whole field. At nine o'clock he informed us that he had
accepted.
Whatever may happen or not happen during the next month,
before the new administration comes in, I think it would be
unwise to indulge in any reprisals against Chile and especially
before Barros Jarpa has an opportunity to reach Washington,
since it seems possible to me that he may be won over from this
one point and on every other point of our policies I think he
is completely with us.
Congress is to be called for next Monday and Rossetti
thinks the discussion may drag along for ten days or so, but
he acts as though he has counted noses and knows that ratifica-
tion will follow with & large majority in the Chamber and a
small majority in the Senate, where the old reactionary hold-
overs have a third of the votes. There is little we can do
about it beyond working on Rossetti to make a fight. I talked
very bluntly and strongly to him, along the line of your sug-
gention but his only reaction was that I need "not worry", that
the agreement would be ratified, and that within a short time
diplomatic relations will be broken. It would be & great
blunder, considering Chilean character, to attempt to work on
- 4 -
members of the Deputies or Senate, since anything in the way
of outside pressure would be resented and do more harm than good.
I have just heard that before the Rio Conference the Em-
basey in Buenos Aires had the exact formula we favored regard-
ing the breaking of relations. I assume from this that some
clerk in the Department by oversight failed to send that
formula to us. It would have been very helpful to have had it
since it would have permitted & lot of spade work. We were
taken by surprise in the Embassy here when it developed at
Rio that tthe breaking of relations was considered by us the
crux of the whole conference. I had sent you my conversation
with Rossetti in which he made clear the reluctance of the
Government here to break relations at this time and this may
have persuaded the Department that nothing could be accomplished
at thie end.
I have just had some side lights on Rossetti at Rio
which throws an entirely different light upon his conduct
there. I understand that he tried to do a lot of heavy bar-
gaining amounting almost to an attempt at blackmailing
Brazil and the United States. I know that is the opinion
of Barros Jarpa. All I had heard before was in connection
with his failure to get authority to go along with the plan
for breaking relations. He certainly was not wholly
responsible for that as he had his instructions and there
was no possible way for him to evade his instructions.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Chile Folder
friend
Santiago, March 2, 1942
Dear Mr President:-
Barros Jarpa, the forthooming Minister of
Foreign Affairs just left my house after an hour conversation
As I wrote you it would be impossible to find any one in public
life in Chile so notoriously, sincerely and militantly pro-Ameri-
cultural
sustitute
can He was I and still is, President of the Chile-American ^ Seciety
appointed by us five years ago The British Ambassador called
me yesterday to say we must be pleased at his appointment.
He told us a few days ago that President-elect Rios had told
him he wished him to go st once to Washington for frank and
broad discussions with you, Hull and Welles about Chilean collo-
boration Today he tells me that Rios has changed him mind about
c
the time and now thinks it best for him to go immedaitely or very
soon after taking office. His reason is that should he go now
he is afraid of resentment on the part of Rossetti, and possibly
the present Government, and that the former might, in resentment,
take some step that would greatly embarass his Administration.
Barros Jarpa said he thought he would suggest to Rios that Ben
Cohen, whom you probably know and who certainly is well known to
Welles ,and who is now Ambassador to Bolivia, be sent now ,under
the pretext of business or pleasure, to make a preliminary survey
of the whole scene with our Government .This, he thinks might
simplify his own work when he goes.
Barros Jarpa is a very able man, an erudite international
lawyer, a former Foreign Minister, & leader of the
Bar, dignified, high-minfed honest, frank nand
personally charming. He has been one of my best friends
ever since I came. We all at the Embassy are pleased with his
appointment dispite his feeling that the time is not ripe for
breaking relations. Unfortunately this view is shared here by
all Chileans including the most ardent of our friends. They all
admit that Chile will be attacked and will instantly not only
bbeak relations but probably declare war .They cite our attitude
toward England during the first two years and insist theirs is
precisely the same toward us and that they will act as we did
when the condition which confronted us in Decemvber arises.
We all combat this as much as possible but with the sentiment so
unanimous, or almost so, it is very difficult to make progress.
Last night Miles Sherover was at the house. He is
very eager to join in the war work regardless of pay. I know
our people at the Department do not care for him much but since
he speaks Russian, knows Russian psychology, and knows Mussian
leaders since floating the Russian bonds, he might be used to
advantage in some connection in the embassy at Moscow.
The press here carries a story from Madrid of a govern-
ment function there in honor of the thirty aviators in the
Spanish army who are leaving to fight with Hitler against the
Russians.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely
Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
clauds "Bower
filend.
Chile Folder
Santiago March 16,1942
Dear Mr President:-
The inclosed copy of a letter
to Welles may throw some light on the present
Chileen outlook.
With warmest regardsm,
claus Hower
Hon.Franklin D.Roosevelt
The White House.
Santiago, March 16, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
I am rather concerned over two things, - one, recent com-
plications which are clearly creating irritation both in Wash-
ington and Santiago, and second the evident misconception in
theUnited States of the attiude of Chile on the war. It is
possible that & review of the situation as seen here at the
present time and an analysis of the figures in the forthcoming
Government with whom we shall have to deal may be of some service.
The overwhelming mass of the Chilean people are wholly with
the United Nations and against the Axis. The decisive victory of
Rios over Ibanez who frankly stood for the Totalitarian point
of view does not measure the extent of this partiality for the
United States. Many thousand of partisans, eager to get rid of
the Popular Front, but in no sense Totalitarians or pro-Nazi,
voted for Ibañez. These men were shortsighted, small-bore poli-
ticians and partisans who did not realize that they were playing
into the hands of Hitler.
In our various negotiations with the Chileans we have
encountered in some quarters a bargaining spirit indicative less
of a desire to stand with us because of the principle involved
than of getting all possible out of us in the way of credits,
etc. You found that Rossetti in Rio was such a bargainer, but
I am afraid we most not single him out for condemnation. It is
the Chilean spirit. Pedregal is infinitely worse I think. He
was once overheard saying at a dinner: "I will stay with the
Yankees as long as the money holds out" But thisrepresents the
viewpoint of the business men and the politicians and not of
the major part of the people. Unfortunately the press reflects
the views of the politicians and business element, not of the
major part of the people.
It is difficult to find many public men who frankly are
sympathetic toward the Axis. Some who I am sure are sympathetic
will stoutly maintain that they are not. The two outstanding
friends of the Axis who puzzle me not a little are Cruchaga
and
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
and Senator Max Errazuriz The first of whom holds on to the
honorary presidency of the German organization, and entirely
Nazi organization and the second maintains his position as the
head of the Japanese organization. Cruchaga I have tried to
excuse but when he presided over a farewell dinner given by
Friends of Germany to Leisewitz, and at his age toured the country
with Ibañez, I abandoned the effort. Politically, however,
Gruchaga is passé. His association with the Friends of Germany
is unfortunate however because of his past prestige, and his
intimate identification with the Church. He makes a fine banner.
While his age and his not unnatural indisposition to break
old social ties at his time of life offers something in extenua-
tion, I find absclutely nothing in the case of Errazuriz. He has
no close social friends among the Japanese of whom there are
few in Chile. When old friends of his have expressed their
astonishment that he does not resign he asks "Why should I ? It
would only irritate them?" He too is an outstanding layman of
the Church. I cannot accept as a friend of the United States
at this time anyone who heads a Japanese organization.
These two, Cruchaga and Errazuriz, are principal owne rs
of the Carrera Radio, and so anxious have I been to bring them
into the fold that when Jim Farley's Coca Cola people gave a
very large advertising contract to radios and did not include
the Carrera, I wrote Farley explaining the situation and asking
him to remember it in the future. These men tell us that they
refused an enormous contract from the Axis and hoped to make
up the loss by support of American and British business men and
I have asked our people to remember them. This, however, was
before Japan launched her attack on us. By all the rules a
radio station owned by the head of a Nazi organization and by
the head of a Japanese organization would be put on the black
list. But 80 long as it does not spread Axis propagandal
would be opposed to this because of its relation to the Church
through the ownership of two outdtanding laymen.
These two men are members of the Senate where they have
influence, especially with the opposition, and they may be
put down as opposed to breaking relations.
(2) ACTIVITIES OF ALLIED MISSIONS.
Our cause is handicapped here by the intense activity of
the Axis Powers, including Spain, through their embassies and
legation. Having no trade matters to look after all four
concentrate on propaganda. Very few of the Allied missions do
more than mark time.
The British Embassy 1s an exception of course and is doing
a
issn
ronor birs
- 3 -
a great deal in the way of propaganda. Its propaganda section
is especially worthy of commendation. Sir Charles Orde, the
Ambassador is not well, and his methods lack the brute force
of the Axis diplomats.
The Yugoslav Minister, Dr. Kolombatovic, 1s intensely and
effectively active. After the Germans, the Yugoslavs have the
largest and most prosperous colony here. They are ardently
devoted to their country and are intensively organized. They
follow Kolombatovic blindly, contributing money whenever asked.
They have the brute force that matches that of the Germans
and the Germans cannot pound the table any lounder than
Kolombatovic. He is an educated man, speaking English, French
Spanish, Yugoslav, Russian and German and he saw service in
the Army and understands espionage. He talks bluntly to
the Foreign Office.
The Dutch Minister, or Chargé, von Oven, is an ardent
patriot but wholly ineffective. His wife is more aggressive.
There is a fair sized Dutch colony that could be used to
greater advantage.
The Polish Minister, Mazurkiewicz, does little beyond
giving masses for the Polish martyrs, etc.
The Danish Minister, stationed at Buenos Aires, impresses
me greatly, but he is seldom here, and Theodor Wessel, the Chargé,
is a pleasant man, married to an American woman, but he seldom
visits the Foreign Office and does nothing that I can discover.
The Chinese Minister 1s active but young and inexperienced and
of course has no colony to back him, none worth while. He
does go to the Foreign Office however and he wants to act
closely in conjunction with us.
The Belgian Minister, Gerard, seemed for a time completely
crushed by the fate of his country, but he has recovered and
is more active, though he seldom goes to the Foreign Office.
Whenever anything comes up of any importance, the German,
Italian, Spanish Ambassadors and the Japanese Minister move
in quick succession to the Foreign Office, but only the
British, Yugoslav and ourselves among the Allies combat their
efforts.
(3) THE SOUTH AMERICANS.
Gracie, the Brazilian Ambassador, has become very active
and forceful in dealing with the Foreign Office. He was 80
indifferent at first that I had no confidence in his position
but since Aranhas visit here ha has changed and is now the
most energetic and effective diplomat in furthering our aims.
Elegf
BI
$
- 3 -
Señor Nieto Caballero, the Columbian Ambassador, and
Garcia Salazar, the Peruvian, are certainly with us but they
seem to hold back - are not very forceful. Of course, Nieto
has but recently arrived.
Guiraldes, the Argentine, is as active against our cause
as the German, Italian or SpanishAmbassadors, with whom he
mostly associates. Ostria Gutierrez, the Bolivian, 1s a
strong, forceful man and gives us excellent support.
Spindola, the Mexican, since the change in Administration
in Mexico, has been very active and forceful in dealing with
the Foreign Office.
The Ministers of Panamá and Venezuela are withus but
not very effective or active.
(4) JUAN ANDNIO RIOS
Juan Antonio Rios is a handome man who "looks like a
President" and is friendly to the United States. He 1s not
a great man and he has neither the humanitarian traits not
the idealism of Aguirre Cerda, nor the brilliance and color
of Alexxandri. He is a lawyer whose practice has largely been
in the corporation field and he has been connected profession-
ally with the American businesses here and for a time was on
the board of the Telephone Company. I am sure we shall have
nothing to fear from him in the matter of protecting American
interests here. The danger is that he will think this all
we should ask hin in the way of pro-Americanism. He is apt
to confuse Big Business with the United States and I suspect
that he 1s certain that "Dollar Diplomacy" and not the "Good
Neighbor Policy" reflects the United States. He wants
American money invested in Chile but on a fifty-fifty basis.
In the campaign he took & square position for democracy and
against totalitarianism indirectly but he refrained from any
comments that totalitarians would resent. Reared in the
South among the Germans, with whom his political career began,
he got 8. surpFisingly large vote in the German centers of
Valdivia and worno, but this was probably personal. His
wife 1s a German and I hear that she is very pro-German and
that there have been family quarrels on the war. it is said
a divorce was pending, because of a mistress, whenhe was
nominated for President, then his wife concluded she could
tolerate the mistress for residence in the Moneda.
He has said that Congress will not pass on the Rio
agreements until after his inauguration, and he certainly
has never indicated any disposition to break diplomatic
relations. I am informed by Barros Jarpa, who 18 to be his
Foreign Minister, that in his inaugural address he will skirt
- 5 -
around the Rio agreements and merely say that if the breaking
of relations becomes necessary he will consultCongress. In
brief, I think we can count wholly on his economic collabora-
tion but at this time I am not so sure of his political
collaboration to the extent desired by us. He is very cagey
about that.
I do not gather from anything I have heard that he is
more than superficially interested in a program of social
amerioration but that his attitude toward labor 1s very much
that of our own Chamber of Commerce. He is a bitter enemy
of the communists and Barros Jarpa tells me that he will stand
no nonsense from them. He will try to curtail their activities.
I am a bit afraid he may go so far as to precipitate social
disorders since he will be very apt to interpret any demand
of labor on wages or working conditions as "communistic".
I am giving you the dark side, hoping that I may be wrong.
Barros Jarpa is certainly sincerely pro-American. He
bases his opposition to breaking diplomatic relations on the
belief that it would be but an idle gesture calculated to
invite attack when Chile is not prepared for the defense of
its coast. He finds Chile's position in its relation to the
United States precisely that of our position in relation to
England during the first two years of the war. He said to
me that Pan-Americanism does not contemplate the determination
of the foreign policy of any one nation by a majority vote of
the whole. This interested me, since I have heard from Aguirre
Cerda, Foreign Ministers and other public men bitter resent-
ment of the action of some nations in South America in publicly
proposing and publicly urging the adoption of some action
on all American nations without previous diplomatic consultations.
But not withstanding all this, he insists that Chile will
go along with the United States in the war.
This may furnish the Department with some background
material and be helpful.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
file
Chile Folder
Santiago,April 2,1942
Dear Mr President:-
I inclose herewith a copy of a letter to Mr
Welles which may contain information you would like to have.
I am firmly of the opinion that if the Government here,
shy of anything that may annoy the Axis ,continues to hold
back from the public the various contributions we are making
to the economic life and national defence of Chile, this in-
formation should be given to the United and Associated Press in
Washington and sent here for the local press. We have popular
sentiment with us, but with the Axis propoganda lying about us and
with Government here withholding from the public ,as it so often
has done, our contributions, I feel we must give our friends the
leading paper
facts. I took up with El Mecurio the failure of the press to
give us credit for the coast defence material and the owner
followed with a strong fine editorial
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Hon. Franklin D.Roosevelt
The White House.
clauds allowers
Santiago, April 2, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
The clear intent of Ruiz Guiñazú's visit was to exert
pressure on Chile to go along with Argentina on her war
policy, and all the Axis missions here, including, of course,
the Spanish, also part of the Axis, prepared to make a Roman
holiday. The Government here was embarrassed as I wrote you
or rather wired you. That Rossetti was in earnest about it I
learned later in a strange way from Barros Jarpa who told me
that Rossetti showed him a telegram to Michels instructing
him to inform our Government in the sense of his talk with me.
I was a bit surprised to hear Barros Jarpa say that he had dis-
approved. Rossetti gave a luncheon for Ginazú but invited no
diplomats, just the members of the Guinazú mission and members
of the Foreign Office staff. Members of my staff who have seen
him in the street report that no one was paying any attention
to him. My daughter happened to pass the Moneda when he made
his much advertised appearance there to call on the Acting
President and was amazed to find not more than a dozen people
standing about, though on such occasions usually there is &
large crowd.
The climax came when Guiñazú delivered his address at the
University of Chile to which the entire Diplomatic Corps was
invited. Not oone solitary member of the diplomatic missions
of South and Central America attended. I did not. None of
the European Allies attended except the poor Pole, who is a nice
well meaning fellow but a bit dull and who was frightened to
note the absence of all diplomate except those of the Axis -
the German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese, wll with all their
military members in uniform. This has been the topic of much
conversation in the Corps.
The next morning the superb article of the U. P. to the
effect that we are not furnishing war material to Argentina
now because of her failure to cooperate on a policy of conti-
nental defense appeared, conspicuously displayed, in all the
leading
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
leading papers and created something of a sensation. It
helped to increase the governmental timidity here regarding
Guiflazü. That night Guinazü spoke by invitation before the
House of Deputies. It was a bromidic speech but he managed
to get something about the desire of Argentina and Chile to
remain neutral in the war. On the whole the Guinazú visit
has been a dismal flop.
Yesterday in response to the expression of a desire of
Gonzalez Videla to meet me, I invited him with & senatorial
friend of his and four others to a quiet luncheon at my house.
He stayed until four o'clock, from one, and talked very
freely. He is & handsome man and really brilliant and alto-
gether charming. He was enthusiastic about the U. P. story
of that morning. He thought that we are not using enough of
that sledge hammer kind of propaganda. The Axis is using
the most unscrupulous methods, lying, etc., and taking ad-
vantage of the traditional feeling in Chile in favor of neu-
trality in ordinary wars to get in their work against breaking
relations. He actually did not know about the coast defense
material we have already set up here. He thought that few
do know. As you know I told Rossetti he could give out the
story of the arrival of the guns, in accordance with instructions,
but some days went by before anything was said in the press and
then it came in the form of & brief statement from the Minister
of Defense which was not what it should have been. I did not
feel at liberty without instructions from Washington to give
it out from the Embassy. You may recall that I suggested that
it be given out in Washington to the U. P. with the request
that it be given a full play here.
Gonzalez commented on the fact that our A. P. and U. P.
do not appear to be doing any pro-American war work on their
own and he said that the French agency, the German agency,
the Italian agency, the Spanish agency, all are engaged in
constantly propaganda mostly predicated on lies, while our
agencies can in such stories as appeared yesterday serve our
cause enormously by printing the truth. He said that the
United States has a very great popular following in Chile but
that we must give them something totalk about.
Cecil Lyon thought that Gonzalez was implying that he would
be glad to look after Chilean propaganda for us, but the idea
did not occur to me, nor to others present, thought it may be
true. My impression that he is slated for a diplomatic post
blinded me at least to such an impression. Whether we could
make use of Gonzalez, if such was in his mind, depends in my
opinion entirely on his relations to Rios. As far as I know
they are good. Because of Gonzalez' fight with Marcial Mora
for refusing to extend the day for the primary three days to
give Gonzalez a chance to get to the people, an attempt was
made to expell Gonzalez from the Radical party. It resulted
- 3 -
in failure and Morahas resigned the Presidency of the Party.
Just have your letter of the 26th. It is queer that
even after the date of your letter Barros Jarpa spoke to
me about Arturo Alessandri being offered the post if feelers
indicate 8. willingness. However, as I informed you, he
said at the same time that if Alessandri will not take it
no change would probably be made. I wonder if Rios is
acting on such things without keeping Barros Jarpa informed.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely, Claum abower
Chile Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Claude:
April 28, 1942
I have received your letter of April 16, 1942
with which you enclosed B. copy of your letter of
April 15, addressed to Sumner Welles.
There has, to my knowledge, been no intimation
by any responsible officer of the Government of the
United States that this Government is contemplating any
deliberately unfavorable action against any friendly
country such 2.5 Chile which has not 8.8 yet seen fit to
take drastic action against our enemies to. the extent
at least of breaking relations. From a purely realistic
point of view, there would seem to be nothing to gain
from such action on our part. As I believe Summer Welles
has mentioned to you, however, there will naturally
be some matters with respect to which the nations who
have broken relations with the Axis will inevitably
receive treatment different from the treatment received
by those countries which continue to maintain a semblance
of neutrality. But this difference will be due to the
necessity for giving preferential assistance to those
countries which are cooperating most closely with us.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Franklin D. Rosevelt
The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago, Chile.
Signed original of the letter send s Hon Summer
Willes 4/24/42 hm
ESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
April 27. 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I have received your memorandum of April 23,
1942 enclosing a. letter of April 16, 1942 which you
have received from Ambassador Bowers at Santiago.
There is enclosed for your consideration a draft
of a reply to Ambassador Bowers.
Sincerely yours, Kills
Enclosure:
Draft of reply.
The President,
The White House.
Chile Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 23, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. SUMNER WELLES
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.
F.D.R.
Letter from Claude Bowers, April 16,
Santiago, Chile to the Pres.
filler
Chile Folder
Santiago, May 14, 1942
Dear Mr. President:
I am rather sorry that we have decided against the
acceptance of an invitation to Wallace or Welles to be
the guest of the Chilean Nation since it had seemed to
me that if offered the opportunity which means so much
in a soundly democratic country like this to reach and
marshall public opinion which determines governmental
action in accordance with the principles of democracy.
It is true that Chile has moved slowly and has not broken
relations yet but it is moving slowly in the right direc-
tion and the foreign policy here is in the hands of a
Minister who is ardently and sincerely our friend, a real
champion of democracy and well known as an uncompromising
enemy of Totalitarianism or dictatorships. A dictator can
fix a policy today which may be all we ask for, and if the
fortunes of war sway against us tomorrow and the prospects
of our enemies brighten, he can change the policy over
night; but the real democratic convictions of the Chilean
people would make that change here impossible.
Yesterday at a banquet given at the Air Field in honor
of the American aviators who brought the fifteen planes I
made a speech presenting the American flag sent by you and
General Marshall. In the speech I got in the fact that we
have thus served Chile at a sacrifice; and General Castro
in his reply said Chile would hever forget the sacrifice
we had made. I sat beside Barros Jarpa and had a long talk
with him on Chilean policy. He is clearly unhappy over the
situation.
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
situation. He said that his hesitancy about going to Wash-
ington 1s due to the fact that until Chile breaks relations
his position there among a people highly worked up naturally
on the war would be difficult in that until relations are
broken he could not say to interviewers the things he would
like to say and that we would have him say; that this would
make Chile's position with the American public more unfor-
tunate than now. He then said that there are certain things
he wants to do and thinks he can do speedily. He wants to
remove the pro-Nazi Ambassador in Argentina and send Luis
Subercaseaux; he wants to suppress the Nazi paper here,
the ALEMAN; and hw wants to go after all the pro-Axis
activities here, the agents, spies, propagandists, and all
organizations enemies of the United States and wipe them out.
He made this astonish statement: "The only possible justifi-
cation for our present policy of legal neutrality would be
to proceed drastically against all these enemies of the
United States."
I told him I thought it is a great mistake to postpone
indefinitely his trip to Washington, that the misunder-
standings could be wiped out in intimate conferences, that
postwar matters would be considered and that I am afraid
that if Chile holds off from such a conference while other
nations are holding them Chile may find in the end that she
has missed the bost. I shall continue to press him on this.
I confess that I cannot understand clearly the psychology
here about the breaking of relations. Barros Jarpa said
something vaguely which suggested to me the possibility
that there are party considerations involved which do not
meet with his approval.
Our situation is much better I think than ever before.
Gracie, the Brazilian Ambassador, agrees with this. The
press is very friendly. My relations with the leaders here
both of the Government and the Opposition are most cordial,
on terms of personal friendship. With patience I feel we shall
get in the end all we want. Today I am having an intimate
luncheon at the house with Arturo Alessandri, the former
President, Senator Alessandri, his son, Barros Jarpa and wife,
Cruchaga, Marcial Mora, the Radical, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Finance, and the Agustín Edwards.
With both Barros Jarpa and President Rios worried,
with the desire of both of them to have close relations
withus, with public opinion and the press becoming more
and more on our side, I am persuaded that with patience
we shall get what we want.
I am writing similarly to Welles.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
claude Bower
Chile Folder
1-42
Dear Claude:
I hope that the vigorous campaign which you
are initiating, according to your letter of April 29,
1942, will bear fruit in a changed Chilean attitude,
and I understand from Mr. Welles that the measures
you have suggested to his are undergoing study.
Sincerely yours,
The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 18. 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I have received your memorandum of May 11, 1942
enclosing for preparation of reply a letter dated
April 29, 1942 from Ambassador Bowers. There is
enclosed a suggested reply for your consideration,
and signature if you approve.
Faithfully A yours,
Enclosures:
1. Letter from Ambassador Bowers,
dated April 29, 1942.
2. Suggested reply to
Ambassador Bowers.
The President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
RA
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
5/14/42
ADDRESSED TO
The President,
The White House.
e. . SAVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1-1033
april
S antiago, 29,1942
Dear Mr President:-
I inclose a copy of a letter to Welles that may
interest you. It gives some indication of the conditions with which we
have to deal here. I am firmly convinced that the time has come to talk
rather bluntly to our friends. Our great trouble is that our real friends
are apparently afraid to stand up for us publicly while the Axis crowd
hammers away at us. I am now arranging with a number of Chileans who will
sign letters to the papers answering the attacks --letters I shall write
or inspire. They are easily and effectively answered. I sometimes think
that the trouble here as in some parts of our own country is that the
cheaperpoliticians are afraid of the "German vote". Day before yesterday
the Illustrado, organ of the Church had a two and a half column review of
a book on the Rio Conference which would have the Pan-American Union
mean merely a union of the South American states and which creates the
impression that we are not real friends of these States .The author had
the audacity to attack insultingly the I8 nations that have gone with us
by breaking relations. I arranged with a Chilean to write an answer of
equal length which was quite as downright and this appeared today in
the Illustrado Strange thing about this paper. I am convinced that at
heart it is totalitarian and it certainly is reactionary but it publishes
everything we ask and publishes more in our favor than any other paper
here.
We are all deeply interested in what really is happening in
Italy. of cpurse she is practically out of the war and is as much a
conquored country as Belgium.Possibly she wants peace But peace with
Mussolini would be absurd. A peace with him in power at the conclusion
would scarcely be a victory for democracy. I feel the same way about
Franco and Suner. Here the Italians are under cover, ashamed in public,
inactive or at least so ineffective that they may be ignored. The Japs
are the most insolent
The Francoist the most sneaking and in propoganda
in certain quarters the most valuable to Hitler.
I have hopes that under Morales, the new Prime Minister, something will
actually be done to wipe out the Axis agents and Fifth Column conspirators
He talked very frankly to me ,initiating the conversation along this line,
and the next day he sent the new head of the bureau of investigations,
Colonel Frias to see me
I was much impressed by him, and plans were made
for close colloboration
We shall soon see what we shall see.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
claude
The White House.
Santiago, April 30, 1942
My dear Mr. Welles:
0
Late in the day I last write you, I saw Barros Jarpa
and had a rather straight and downright conversation with
him, taking advantage of my personal relations with him
before he entered the Ministry. I began by observing lightly
that the Brazilian Ambassador had protested against the
insult to his country by the Nazi propaganda sheet called
EL ALEMAN. He said he had. I then said that, of course, I
felt 100 per cent sympathy with the Brazilian. But, I added,
"the United States and President Roosevelt have been atro-
ciously lied about and outrageously attacked for many months
in both this paper and EL CHILENO". I said that I have
sympathy with the laws guaranteeing the liberty of the press,
but that he, Barros Jarpa, knew perfectly well that these
two papers, financed, subsidized by the Axis, are not legi-
timate newspapers but mere propaganda sheets, concentrating
on attacks on the United States. I then said in substance:
"The fact is that I have been greatly embarrassed by
the tone and color of the press. For example: For many months
the Chilean Government begged me to impress on Washington
the vital need of batteries for coast defense, for planes,
etc., and, agreeing with that need, I made many personal ap-
peals not only to Mr. Welles but even to the President. I
actually fought Chile's battle on that issue. You, know,
of course, it was a bad time to get arms from us. Our own
Army was insisting that we could use everything we could
produce. Our Allies, fighting with us, Britain, Chine,
and Russia were in dire need of these guns and planes. But
in the end we made the sacrifice for Chile, and the batteries
arrived. They arrived withmen sent to give the necessary
instructions to the Chilean Army on the use of the guns.
Now, you know, I have been utterly amazed by the fact
that I have yet to hear one word of appreciation".
"Do you mean from the Government?", asked the Minister.
"Well, yes. The fact 1s that I have not had one word
of
The Honorable
Supner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
of appreciation from the Government, outside personal
words from the Army and Navy, but I was not thinking 80
much of that. I was thinking of the press. (Lying a bit)
I said that I had been instructed to send to Washington
the reactions of the press."
"And", I went on, "we searched the Santiago papers
microscopically and I was unable to find one single
syllable of appreciation. On the contrary" -- and here I
took up several copies of ALEMAN and EL CHILENO having
each double page, sensationally headlined attacks on us
for sending this material -- "on the contrary I found
these. Here, time and again, in these Axis propaganda
sheets, we are accused of having actually bullied a relutant
and embarrassed Chile into taking these guns against her
wishes. We are accused with having actually sent "an army
of occupation". The Chileans were invited to hang their
heads in shame as long 88 'the foot of the invader is on
Chilean soil'. The public was told, falsely, that the
Americans went 8.8 a great courtesy to instruct the Chilean
Army in the use of these gunds, were insutling to Chilean
officers.
"Now you can understand my embarrassment. I had urged
that this material so earnestly and persistently asked to be
sent and I had to send to Washington -- all there was to send -
nothing but these foul attacks on use for having dared send it.
"This attitude of the press concerns me greatly because
human nature is human nature everywhere, and Chile needs
other things that we can furnish only at a sacrifice, and
when I urge the sending of these I am afraid that our
experience in the case of what we have sent will not be a
strong inducement."
Here Barros Jarpa told me that the press had said
nothing about the arrival of the batteries on instructions
of the Government then in power.
"But", I said, "after the Axis subsidized propaganda
sheets had flooded the streets with the story of their arrival
along with denunciations of us for forcing them on Chile, it
was no longer a secret. A statement of the facts would then
have seemed to be in order - but not a word".
He then said that a meeting of certain Ministers had
been called by Morales, Minister of the Interior, to consider
what can be done about these papers. I said I hoped some-
thing could be done to protect the friends of Chile from
insults.
II
= - 3 -
II
There is one way to reach these Axis propaganda sheets.
They could not publish without paper. They get this paper
from a paper manufacturing company here which furnishes all
the Santiago press, and this company could not make the paper
without wood pup from Canada and possibly, I do not know,
from the United States. The British here, acting through
Arthur Pack, Commercial Attaché, in charge of the Black List
and by odds the best man in the Embassy, tells me that he
1e going to recommend that no more wood pulp be sent this
manufacturer if he is to continue to furnish the finished
product to the two papers. He says he has talked with the
manufacturer who is quite ready to refuse them paper but he
says there 1s a Government commission which orders the dis-
tribution of the paper to the press, and these two papers
are included. In other words the Chilean Government orders
this manufacturer to furnish these Axis sheets paper.
If the Allied nations furnishing the wood pulp informs
the Government that all wood pulp from them will be cut
off unless these papers are cut out, it will find itself
in the position of either cutting them off or saying, in
effect, that better it is that no paper be published at all
in Santiago if these two Axis organs, subsidized by the
German Embassy we are sure, are refused paper. The effect
on EL MERCURIO, and ell the other papers would then be
magical. The Government would not dare sacrifice them for
the two Nazi sheets.
This 18 something you may care to think over.
III
The Radical Party is again on the war path against its
own Government. At E. meeting of the Radical Junta, one
Mario Bunster Carmona, a rich playboy, not in Congress,
but a member of the Junta, actually brought up a resolution
attacking Morales for having appointed Colonel Frias head
of the Bureau of Investigations. I strongly suspect the reason.
I believe, thus far, that Morales is in earnest about
cooperating with us in the matter of running down the Axis
agents, etc., and Colonel Frias, who came to me from Morales,
impressed me as a strong and sincere man who may mean
business. In other words, he will not be a tool of the
Axis in the Investigations. We know that throughout the
war Nazi tools have been members of the Investigations;
that damning evidence has beenpigeonholed; that when raids
have been made the Nazis have been tipped off in advance.
It
sse
- 4 -
It looks very much as though the pro-Axis element,
including the cheaper of the politicians interested in
the "German vote", is concerned lest something actually
be done. I do not think Morales will pay any attention
and I cannot believe that President Rios will not sustain
him. But here we have an issue and on the solution we may
reach intelligent conclusions.
IV
On the anniversary of the birth of the Japanese Emperor
some of the papers carried full page articles in glorification.
EL MERCURIO did. of course the Japanese paid for it but
EL MEROURIO failed to note publicly that it was an advertise-
ment. However, EL MERCURIO in the same issue carried a
hot editorial the very reverse of complimentary to the
Jagnese. The Japs are very cooky here. They have almost
taken possession of the Chilean Golf Club. Last Sunday
some Americans told me that about fourteen were there.
Also, of course, the Germans, Italians and Spaniards.
I enclose an interesting report prepared by Garrison
on the Havastele Agency.
With warmest personal regards, I Am
Sincerely yours,
18 1949
My dear Mr. President:
I have received your memorandum of May 11, 1942
enclosing for preparation of reply a letter dated
April 29, 1942 from Ambessador Bowers. There is
enclosed a suggested reply for your consideration,
and signature if you approve.
Faithfully yours,
Summer Welles
Enclosures:
1. Letter from Ambassador Bowers,
dated April 29, 1942.
2. Suggested reply to
Ambassador Bowers.
The President,
The White House.
file Pers Chile Folder
Santiago May 23,1942
Dear Mr President:-
The other day I arranged a secret meeting with Pres-
ident Rios and Barros Jarpa at the formers private residence at Io P.M.
to talk off the record and very frankly of the various things which
I am afraid are creating serious misunderstandings among the men in the
street in the United States and Chile. I send a full report of the hour
and a half conversation to Welles and suggested to him that you might
care to see it. The atmosphere was most cordial One thing came out
which throws a new and I think true light on the fact that the agreements
of Rio have not been ratified by Congress. I was told frankly that the
President himself had prevented the submission of the agreements to
Congress when Rossetti was trying to submit them He said that under
Chilean tradition and the Chilean Constitution the management of
foreign affairs is the exclusive prerogative of the President . He
submits only treaties for ratification. To have submitted the agreements
of Rio would have compromised his presidential rights and have raised a
question as to his power. He says that the agreements are in operation;
that he has recognized them in sending Chilean representatives to two
conferences called by the Rio conference .He says that if and when / he
decides to break diplomatic relations with the Axis he will not ask
Congress anything about it since he has the power to do so on his own.
My plain talk about N azi activities here being unmolested
"
thus converting, as I toldt them, Chile into a Nazi base for operations
"
against the United States and the Canal had, I think, an immediate effect.
is
Thirty six hours later came the President opening address to Congress.
He reached a paragraph which I am sure was added as a result of my
conversation. When he reached it, he paused, looked over the Congress
deliberately, and then read very slowly and with marked emphasis the
declaration that Chile will not tolerate any activities aimed against
The Ferruan autossador secide we
any of the American republics. almost jumped our of Go chair.
The day before I think I got another result of the conversation. I had
told the President and Minister that speeches were made in Congress and
articles had appeared in the press ,honestly made and written I thought
probable, and because of misinformation.W had been charged with dis-
criminating against the Chileans when ,I said, "the Chilean Government
knows this is not true and yet no representayive of the Government has
"
made the correction. Within twenty four hours
Barros Jarpa addressed
Congress on foreign policy and said with great emphasis that these
stories are without foundation and that there has been no discrimination
against Chile and that whatever embarassments may come here as a result
of rationing have come to all the American countries and most of all to
the United States.
Our agent here is now satisfied of complete cooperation of the Government
in the uncovering of Nazi activities. The new Chief came to see me at
once on taking office. The President said the other night he had coke on
his instructions He made a fine impression on me and better still on
our agent with whom plans are being worked out. I have a feeling that
something worth while will come of this, that action will be taken that
will create an impossible situation for the Axis and lead to the
breaking of relations under circumstances that will not appear to have
anything to do with pressure from us.
At the opening of Congress as the diplomats were leaving ,getting in
their cars in front of the Capitol ,where a great crowd was gathered,
the Japanese were roundly hissed. I left before the Germans. But when
my car --I had three of our naval and military men in plenty of gold
braid with me--statted there was vigorous cheering for a full block
We are all agreed that the situation is much better.
At the same time I have information which bears out my impressions of
Rossetti and his attitude. As I have insisted all along Rossetti went to
Rio intensely eager to please us;as I have reported two days after the
conference at Rio convened I saw a telegram from Rossetti asking the
Government to alter his instructions so he could go along I00 per cent
with us;and the other night Bill Arnold, head of the Tel.and Tel. here
was with Ruis, the Sub-Minister who was at Rio as a delegate and who has
who
always impressed me as pro-Nazi ,talked freely while in an inebriated
state and said that he had had a "hell of a time with Rossetti at Rio"
because dispite his instructions he was wanting all the time to disregard
his
instructions and go in for breaking relations;and that ,Ruis, business
had been to watch him and see that this was not done. I have always
felt that we got the wrong xint slant on him at Rio. Unhappily Ruis is
Minister without portfolio, Secretary General of the President, and
1 have no doubt his influenceixx is thrown against us. But 1 do not think
him a strong character.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
clauds is
Hon.Franklin D.Roosevelt
The White House.
fullowed
Chile Folder
Santiago, May 27,1942
Dear Mr President:-
The decisive action of Congress in voting an investi-
gation of Nazi activities would have been impossible four months ago. I
think there is no doubt that we are making big progress toward the
realization of our ends. The personnel of the Committee is anti-Nazi
--that is the big majority are pronouncedly anti-Nazi.
to Hilles
I have explained the statement issued by the Foreign Minister with the
1
approval of the Peruvian, Bolivian Ambassadors and myself. The Nazis
through their numerous paid agents who carry on the whispering campaign
against us were circulating the fantastic story that we were arming
Peru and Bolivian and encouraging them to attack Chile to recover the
lost provinces Fantastic as it seems, it was causing great uneasiness
even among our friends. I think the correction necessary'
Today I gave a luncheon for Bishop of Walsh of Maryland and a New
York priest with him en route to Bolivia on some church mission, , and had
all the hierarchy from the Archbishop down ,two prominent Church laymen
Senator Cruze 7 Coke and Senator Horatia Walker, two members of the
Deputies belonging to the Falangist party here who are militant against
facism and the nazis and friends of ours, the Bolivian Ambassador, and
"
Dawson of the City National who was one of the founders of The Commonweal,
Twenty in all and all Cathomics. It created a very fine impression. We
are closer to the Church as an Embassy I think than any other Embassy
here, including the Spanish.
I am to see Barros Jarpa in half an hour. Luis Subbercassuax told me
at luncheon that Barros Jarpa is going to the States by H June 15th.
I shall find out if this is true.
We all feel that Chile is moving rather rapidly toward a change in
policy. The President's wife is arriving in Los Agedes on June 4th to
put her boy in an American S chool. I have suggested to Welles that
while she is going incog I think we should byall means have a representa-
tive of the Government meet her on landing and offer any service.
This action of the President is gall and worm wood to the Germans.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Hon.Frankoin D.Roosevelt
Claude ynower
The White House.
fiel
Chile Folder
Santiago, June 2, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
You may be interested in some observations on a
very noticeable change in sentiment here toward the
breaking of relations during the last two weeks. The
cordial reception of Prado of Peru has contributed some
to the feeling that Chile is not in a comfortable position;
and Mexico's declaration of war has had a powerful effect.
The mass of the people here are not enamored of Vargas' 1deas
of government; they are of Mexico's and this means a stronger
sentiment among the masses for the breaking of relations.
Barros Jarpa is singing another tune, and instead of
saying that of course Chile will not break relations unless
directly attacked is now speaking of when Chile breaks
relations. I think that my straight off-the-record warn-
ing addressed to the President and him at the night meet-
ing at the President's house has had some effect. He
now assures me he 18 going to Washington.
Then, too, he has been talking very aggressively to
Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador. The other day
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington.
he told him that any one found engaged in activities
against another American nation will be jailed or expelled;
and this week he told him that any attack on Chilean
mines or on the Panama Canal will mean a declaration of war.
More noticeable still, is the radical change in the
tone of the press. It, aside from the Axis sheets, has been
fair, but much too neutral for my system. Now allthe
legitimate papers are changing. EL IMPARCIAL, the most
reactionary paper, which has been pro-Axis at heart and
in tone within reasonable bounds, is now printing our propa-
ganda. It is owned by two brothers. Recently one, not
connected with the management, wrote an article against
the Rio Conference. A Spanish refugee, former editor of
EL LIBERAL in Madrid, wrote a beautiful and brilliant reply,
very courteous and almost courtly in tone, which EL IMPARCIAL
published. Infuriated by the effectiveness of the reply,
the brother wrote a bitter article against us and our cause
which his brother point-blank refused to publish, saying
he would not publish anything against the United States.
The paper was dependent on German advertising and now that
we have guaranteed 15,000 pesos worth of American advertising
a month it promises to come over entirely. You can imagine
the effect here.
In Valparaiso, La UNION, conservative paper, has from
time to time been scarcely friendly, and recently it used
some Transocean matter. We challenged its action and
the editor, a Conse rvative member of the Deputies, came
here to see me and gave a satisfactory explanation and
a pledge not to repeat. We have straightened him out
with the American advertisers and hehas put me on his
free list for his daily paper.
I am sending Welles today a proposition sent me by
four Ministers which he may repeat to you. The majority
of the Government today is for breaking relations. I have
a feeling that we may get results within a few weeks.
I have heard an explanation of the failure to recall
the Ambassador from Buenos Aires immediately after his
action in the May Day demonstration. He has a group of
friends among the Radicals in Congress and the President
does not want to affront them while his emergency legisla-
tion is pending. Then, again, he is notoriously a crack
shot with the pistol and prone to challenge critics. But
I think his days are numbered. Armour writes me that he
1s much subdued.
I wish you could have seen the ceremony at Chile's
West Point on the occasion of the presentation of the
American flag sent by you and General Marshall. It was
an impressive ceremony. I spoke, General Escudero spoke,
and then the color bearers, three men, were ordered forward,
the flag placed in their possession, and the band struck
up, and these men with the American flag flying gaily
passed down the line of the cadets -- doing the goose step.
No use to quarrel with the goose step here. In the salon
where cocktails were served afterwards I noticed portraits
of a number of the former Directors with mustaches twirled
up cockily at the end, a la Wilhelm. I thought it significant
of a certain period here and on the way back mentioned it to
Colonel Johnson and Major Kane. "Have you ever seen the pic-
tures of the mess hall at West Point?", they asked in a chorus.
I confessed ignorance. "Well you ought to see how many of
them wear the Prussian mustache", they said.
But I started out merely to say that I feel more
encouraged over the outlook here than ever before. I am
sure we are following the right course here, considering
Chilean psychology, in appearing more hurt than angry at
Chile's tardiness.
With warmest regards,
Faithfully and sincerely yours,
Claude yBower
Chile Folder
Santiago, June 18, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing a copy of a pastoral instruction sent
out by Archbishop Caro, head of the Church in Chile, citing
instructions from the present Pope while Papal Secretary
of State, instructing Catholics not to align themselves
with any one political party, thus making it a Church party.
It has been sent the Department, but you may be interested.
Had the Hierarchy taken this stand in Spain instead of
ordering Catholics, as Cardinal Gama did, to vote against
the Republican parties in the election of March 1936 on pain
of hell fire and damnation otherwise there would have been
no incident S involving the Church there.
I would particularly call your attention to the signi-
ficance of this letter. The Conservative Party here, the
Tory party, representing the old feudalistic element poses
as the "Church party", and is against breaking relations
and I think is Totalitarian in spirit. It has been using
its pretence as a Church party to line up Catholics against
breaking relations and liberalism in general, and the old
Archbishop, a lovely old man, is a liberal and was made the
head of the Church because of his work among the poor. This
letter is a notice to Catholics that they are under no
compulsion to follow the policies of the Conservative Party
and is therefore a lusty blow in our behalf.
I incorporate as part of this letter the following
from a letter I have written Mr. Welles today:
More and more the matter of breaking relations with
the Axis revolves around the inexplicable position of Barros
Jarpa. We know positively that he personally is exerting
himself
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
himself in every way to stem the rising tide in favor of
a break. I know that he is inspiring, indeed almost ordering,
and in at least one instance has written editorial articles
in favor of his present policy. He dictates to LA NACION
and EL MERCURIO. The first directly; the second through
a subordinate in the Foreign Office who writes on foreign
affairs for it.
Garrison has this morning brought me an amazing story.
EL IMPARCIAL, as you know, is probably the most reactionary
of the Rightist papers, and until recently pro-totalitarian,
but we have an understanding with the publisher who is
pledged to publish nothing against us and who is taking and
publishing matter in our favor and in favor of breaking
relations. The former editor of EL LIBERAL, Madrid, a refugee
here now, a friend of the publisher of EL IMPARCIAL, and a
man of great cleverness with his pen, has been writing subtle
but powerful articles for EL IMPARCIAL signed "Ghost of the
acific". These have evidently been getting under the skin
of Barros Jarpa. Yesterday the publisher of ELIMPARCIAL told
Garrison that Barros Jarpa had asked who wrote these articles.
The publisher says he refused to tell. He says Barros Jarpa
said that if the growing division among the Rightists on
breaking relations continues he may have to resign.
That to me means two things: First, that unless some-
thing outrageous is done by the Axis Barros Jarpa will con-
tinue to oppose breaking relations. Second, that I am right
in my suspicion that domestic politics, involving a plan to
convert the Government into a Rightist Government through
some understanding with the Conservatives and Liberals, who,
as parties, are opposed to breaking relations, is at the botton
of the whole thing. And yet the other night Barros Jarpa
talked seriously to me about recognizing Russia as proof
that Chile is with the democracies. Another of those contra-
dictory things about the Minister.
The publisher of EL IMPARCIAL told Garrison he understood
that President Rios 18 wavering, which I think true. That
probably is making Barros Jarpa uneasy.
I am invited to lunch at Barros Jarpa's tomorrow and his
wife told my wife's secretary that it is not "official" and
what
- 3 -
the guests are to be my "friends". It has possibilities
and I may hear something there.
The most shocking thing I have heard, and this
comes second hand but reliably I think from Matte,
Minister of Finance, favoring the break in relations,
18 that Barros Jarpa in giving the President a summary
of our telegram which in substance I read to the President
and which Barros Jarpa translated in my presence, and
properly, to him, he said that we had taken a position
against "bargaining" but - and this is the point - that
we had said we would continue to give assistance to Chile
despite her present policy. This, if true, is downright
dishonesty and trickery. There is a fight within the
Government now on breaking and Barros Jarpa might be
capable of such sculduddery and again Matte may have
been misinformed by the President. Barros Jarpa has
told several people that the majority of the Ministers
are in favor of breaking relations.
Mr. Hull told the press conference that Barros
Jarpa was expected to visit us and this was printed
in the papers here. I cannot understand why Barros
Jarpa should have thought it necessary to tell the
local press that the story that he had been "invited"
to the United States is "inexact". A formal invitation
has not been sent but your own letter and the fact
that I have personally told Barros Jarpa that you and
the President both have written me that they are looking
forward to his visit makes this denial seem far-fetched.
It is the kind of petty quibbling that annoys me most
in the Minister. And makes his position inexplicable.
Gustavo Ross is back. Luis Subercaseaux, a Con-
servative aristocrat wholly with us, has seen me twice
since the return and both times has asked me eagerly
if I had seen Ross. Both times he told me Ross is
ardently pro-Ally. Yesterday it was whispered around
that Ross with President Rios had conferred with me at
my house. Formerly, according to the gossip, I was
having secret conferences with Contreras Labarca, the
Communist leader. I am reliably informed that at a
dinner at the home of a pro-Nazi ex-Deputy, Ross
calmly summed up the situation pro and con and ended
by showing that the advantages were on the side of
complete cooperation with us. From another source
I am informed that t Ross told the President, "You
have two problems: one social; the other international;
you think you have an economic problem but that is not
true". Figure that out yourself.
With warmest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Claud 4Bows
PSF:Chile
TRANSLATION
KL IMPARCIAL - June 11, 1942.
THE CHURCH AND PARTISAN POLITICS
Declaration of the Archbishop of Santiago
"On various occasions we have fulfilled the duty of in-
sisting on the observance of the norms announced by the Holy
Apostolic See, regarding the attitude which priests, members
of the Social Action and the faithful in general should as-
sume in regard to partisan politics.
"We are pleased to observe that, in general, those in-
structions have been complied with, and thus to verify that,
thanks to God, there reigns in our nation an atmosphere of
respect for the Church, its ministers and for the faithful
in general, the good results of which for the Church and the
Nation it is impossible to deny.
"We deem it convenient, nevertheless, to recall once
more the pontifical norms referred to, with the desire that
they may be observed fully and perfectly.
"In the letter of the then Examo. Cardinal Pacelli and now
happily reigning Pope S. S. Pio XII, addressed especially to
the Chilean Episcopate, under date of June 1st, 1934, very
wise instructions were given, some of which we wish to quote:
"Without doubt the Church cannot be without interest in
the true 'great politics,' which looks toward the general wel-
fare and forms part of General Ethics; that is, which promotes
and defends the sanctity of the family and of education, the
rights of God and of consciences. The Church must see to it
that its sons are at the same time the best citizens and that
they cooperate to the public welfare, both in the administra-
tion and in the Government of the State. In this sense par-
ticipation in politics is a duty of justice and of Christian
charity.
"'It is another thing if it is a question of 'partisan
politics," that is, of the activity of groups of citizens
who desire to solve economic, political end social problems
in accordance with their own schools and ideologies, which,
although they may not be contrary to Catholic doctrine, may
arrive at different conclusions.
"In other words, a political party, although it may de-
sire to take its inspiration from the doctrine of the Church
and defend its rights, cannot arrogate to itself the repre-
sentation of all the faithful, since its concrete program
cannot have an absolute value for everybody, and its practical
actions are subject to error.
"It is evident that the Church could not link itself to
the activity of a political perty without compromising its
supernatural character and the universality of its mission.'
"To these inspired words the Exemo. Cardinal believed it
useful to add the norms given by the Plenary Council of Latin
America, in every respect in agreement with his, as dictated by
the same spirit:
-2-
"Lot the clergy refrain prudently from questions which
refer to purely political or civil things, and with regard
to which, within the limits of the Christian law and doctrine,
there can be different opinions, and let than not involve
themselves in political factions, to the end that the Holy
Religion, which should be above all human things and unite
the spirits of all citizens with the cord of mutual charity
and benevolence, may not appear to fail in its office and
that its salutary ministry may not make itself suspect.
"May these words be received by all with the respect
and adherence they deserve; rather than human words, they are
the voice of Our Lord God, who speaks through the intermediary
of the successors of the Apostles, whom the Holy Spirit on-
lightens. They are supernatural words which seek solely the
welfare of the Church and of souls.
"May they have the power to raise our thoughts above
human passions, which divide men for temporal and fleeting
motives, and prevent them from contemplating the truth;
may they bring them, on the contrary, that lofty serenity, in
which reigns the peace which unites hearts with the cords of
charity and illumines minds with the splendors of the insut-
able truth and of God."
JOSE MARIA CARO R., Archbishop of Santiago
Chile Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 23, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.
F. D. R.
Letter to the Pres. from Claude Bowers
from Chile June 13th re situation in
Santiago.
Chili Folder
Scand
1-42
COPY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Claude:
In reply to your letter of June 13, I wish
to state most emphatically that Senor Carlos
Dávila has not received from any authorized per-
son in the Government of the United States any
indication of the policy of the United States
toward Chile. Specifically, he has not seen me
on this or any other matter and he has seen
neither the Secretary of State nor Mr. Welles
for many months past. You are, of course, fully
familiar with the details of his interview with
Henry Wallace.
It 1s most important that you lose no oppor-
tunity to express to President Ríos my view that
the maintenance of diplomatic and other relations
between Chile and the Axis powers represents a
grave danger to Chile and to the cause of the
Americas.
Very sincerely yours,
The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
соь
PSFiChile
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 27. 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I have received your memorandum of June 23, 1942
enclosing a letter of June 13 you have received from
Ambassador Bowers in Santiago, Chile.
In response to your request, I am enclosing a draft
of a suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers for your consi-
deration and signature if you approve.
A Faithfully yours, Hills
Enclosures:
1. Draft.
2. Letter returned.
The President,
The White House.
PSF: Chile
Santiago, June 13, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
You will recall that just before the inauguration
of President Rios I wrote you the suggestion that you
write him a letter of congratulation and in it make it
clear enough that you hope he will break relations with
the Axis. That suggestion was made by me because two
men close to the President had reported to me that he had
said that should you make the request he would conform.
Since then there is no doubt in my mind that Rios
has been given very wrong impressions as to our feeling
regarding Chilean policy and the breaking of relations.
He has said to several people, and I think in all
sincerity, that the United States is entirely satisfied
with Chile's policy and is entirely indifferent as to
the breaking of relations. I have been informed that
Carlos Davila recently wrote him personally that he
should not permit himself to be "stampeded by pressure
from the Embassy" here since he had it directly from
Welles or you - I have heard it both ways - that every-
thing is satisfactory as it is.
Yesterday without being forced to be assertive I
had the opportunity to make it absolutely clear to him
that we have no other thought than that he should break
relations in conformity with the continental solidarity
agreed upon. This was at a meeting arranged by him, and
Barros Jarpa was present. It also gave, an opportunity
to say to Barros Jarpa in the President's presence what
I have often said to the Minister himself that it seems
very necessary to me that the Minister should go to Wash-
ington as soon as possible.
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington.
My purpose in writing now 1s this: night before last
at a dinner at the Gritish Embassy the Ambassador gave me a
memorandum to the effect that Senator Anselmo Hevia and a group
of Senators are working for the breaking of relations, and
through a friend of the Senator's, who is a close friend of the
President, Osvaldo Hiriart. The latter was won over and saw
President Rios. He then reported that President Rios was
firmly convinced that "the United States was quite happy with
the way in which Chile was behaving" since she was getting
Chilean supplies without danger and that there were no
internal disturbances making for sabotage. He said, or is so
reported, by his friend, to the Senator that if the United
States wants Chile to break relations it was desirable that
some action be taken by an important American statesman to
dissolve the aforementioned impression of our satisfaction;
that if you or Mr. Welles "could state openly and publicly
that the United States wishes Chile to break off relations
with the Axis", which he said could be done without an ap-
pearance of pressure - the argument most effective with public
opinion favoring the present policy would fall to the ground.
This is in keeping with my suggestion referred to in the
first paragraph. This could be arranged at a press conference
of yours or Welles, but with the situation as gratifying and
promising as it is just now, I doubt the wisdom or necessity
at this juncture.
The situation here is clearing remarkably recently and
President Rios in the presence of Barros Jarpa told me
yesterday that the present policies of his Government leads
logically and inevitably to a breaking of relations.
With warmest regards,
Faithfully and sincerely yours,
claude "Bowes
free
PSF.chile
Santiago, July 14, I942
Dear Mr President:-
On the receipt of your undated letter asking me
to avail myself of the first opportunity to tell President Rios that
in your opinion Chile's action in maintaining diplomatic and other
relations with the Axis is dangerous not only to Chile but to all the
American Republics, I made an appointment and saw him t yesterday
afternoon. I found him extremely cordial and in good spirits .In
some preliminary conversation before I reached your message Chile's
policy in the war came up ,and largely on the Presidents initiative.
He talked with emphasis and seeming sincerety. He said that he is
absolutely with the Allies and "particularly with the United States".
That is proposes that Chile shall go along with us in every way and
to cooperate in any way we suggest "for the winning of the war, the
defence of the United States ,and of the Americas". That he has
instructed Michels on his return to Washington to say as much to you.
That he is sending Barros Jarpa to Washington under instructions to
comply with any request we may make in respect to the war
On reading your message he said:"I am glad I said what I did before
reading this because I hope it shows that these are my own views".
He then said, apropos of breaking relations, that there may be
some little trouble, and he wants just enough time to strengthen his
position. :le appears to fear that the Nazis might preciptitate
troubles in the mines of the North and he then said that he hoped
in such contingency that he could count on the support of the United
States
He then said that he had heard that Carlos Davila had not seen you or
the State Department in months. This he undoubtedly heard from Michels
who came here with blood in his eye
I
verified
what
he
had
heard.
Whether this information disturbed him as to Barros Jarpa I do not
know. It should. There is no doubt in my mind that Barros Jarpa is
tricky, given to brazen misrepresentations and suppressions ,and is
dishonest. This is shocking to me and the American colony has been
shocked by his attitude in view of his reputation for years as a
strong pro-American. I suspect that he is trying to make his policy
conform to the selfish interests of the Chilean shipping company and
other Chileans who are now making money hand over fist. Very confiden-
tially I am told by the Electric Company that after he became
Minister he was offered a retainer of 30,000 pesos with no thought
of his accepting and that he took it without a blink. I have thought
that a reversal of his policy on orders of Rios would precipitate his
resignation but I am now convinced that he will hold on and I am
afraid try to defeat Rios purpose by trickery. However if he goes to
Washington as he must now plain talk may get results and if not from
/
him , from Rios.
Warmest regards,
Sincerely
Franklin D.Roosevelt
The White House.
Clauds HBower
Chile Folder
filsonal
Santiago, July 23,1942
Dear Mr President:-
When Michels reaches Washington he will ask to be
received by you since he is under instructions, according to his word
to me, and according to President Rios statement to me, to say to
you that Chile is ready to do whatever you think necessary to the
winning of the far, to the defence of the United States and of the
Continent. This is what Rios said to me as I reported before. Just
before leaving Michels had a final talk with Rios and he told me
afterwards that the President had reiterated what he had said to him
and to me.
Under these circumstances I think you should be very firm on what
we think necessary so Michels can so report to Rios.
I have written Welles in the same vein.
Lund, the Danish Minister ,on his arrival here came to consult me
regarding his audience with Barros Jarpa. I told him I had the
positive pledge of Barros Jarpa and of Rossetti before him ,that
no Quisling designation would be considered? Today Lund reported
back to me on his talks with the President and the Minister and he
said that both conversations were most satisfactory For this both
Lund and Wessell here say they are indebted to my intercession.
Unahppily our British friends here did nothing.
Senator Cruz Coke ,the most popular man in the Conservative party
has just resigned the Vice Presidency of the party on the ground
that he cannot accept responsibility in the party's present opposi-
tion to tge breaking of relations He had told me that he would
make his reasons public but nothing has yet appeared. It may follow.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
claude Howels
The White House
\
file
Chile Folder
1-42
Santage July 31-1942
Dear we President:
you way be interested
in gust Two sections of eater
to Welles.
with warmant
me and swearely
clauds y/Bowes
HOU nauble ne Roosever
The white House
Santiago, August 1, 1942.
Dear Mr. Welles:
Your memorandum on your conversation with Michels
will probably arrive later today but your telegram
assures me that the Ambassador did say to you what
Ríos told me he would be instructed to say. There is
a noticeable weakening in Conservative and Liberal
circles on the breaking of relations. When I read the
press report of Ríos visit to Valparaiso and his speech
I thought instantly of what he had said about "a little time
to strengthen his position", and since he lost Valparaiso
in the elections it flashed on me that this tour was part
of the process. Itresembled the visit of a candidate in
the heat of a presidential campaign for he did not miss
á spot in the town. The speech emphasized two points -
his determination to act alone on foreign policy and his
declaration that he will not permit Chile to be separated
from the sister republics on the issue of democracy.
This struck me as a cautious and gradual approach to
something definite. On going to the office I found I
alone had the impression that some step forward had been
taken. But the next day I was convinced that my interpre-
tation had been correct when Horsey of the United Press
told me Ríos had called him that morning and asked what
the reaction to his speech had been in the States. Horsey
was compelled to tell him there had beennone and to suggest
that perhaps it was because there was nothing new in the
speech. This clearly disappointed Rios who said: "Your
report should have interpreted the speech". It looks
favorable at last. But from Barros Jarpa not a word.
II.
Lund the Danish Minister has finally come and gone.
I alone have fought his battle here against the Quisling
designation, as reported to the Department at various
times. When Lund arrived he called on me before seeing
the President and Minister to get my suggestions as to
his line with them. I told him I had positive assurances
and that he should, in my opinion, say absolutely nothing
that would indicate the slightest doubt as to Chile's
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
-
2
-
attitude. He saw the two officials and reported to
me afterwards that he had followed this course, that
he had been most cordially received, that there was
nothing in anything they said or in their action to
indicate that he was in the slightest danger. And since
then the Diplomatic List has been printed by the Govern-
ment and Lund is down as the Danish Minister. He came
to thank me before leaving and he said he had notified
the Danish Minister in Washington that we had been res-
ponsible for saving him from an embarrassing situation
here.
III
I have received nothing in reply to my two telegrams
regarding LA CRITICA, the Socialist organ here. Unless
we are able, indirectly, to help there, it seems certain
the paper will pass out, and since it is one of the two
only papers here that has been demanding the breaking
of relations, and since it has gone beyond all others in
defense of our position, and since the Socialist party is
the one pro-American party, as a party, it seemed to me
that we cannot possibly stand by and let this happen at
this time. I understand that $50,000,000 was made avail-
able to the Coordination Committee to meet war needs and
emergencies and this impresses me as an emergency. And we
have been appealed to.
I certainly realize the delicacy of such proceedings.
LA CRITICA is a party paper. If we are known to help it,
it can be interpreted as an interference in internal
politics, though of course we are thinking of the paper as
a supporter of our policy only. For that reason we have
discussed the matter with Dawson of the Bank and the proposal
made to the Department is the only one he could figure out.
If we cannot do this, it is unfortunate, since the
German Embassy would give this paper or any other $25,000,
greatly more than we are considering, for its support in the
twinkling of an eye. Of course LA CRITICA could not be
bought by the German Embassy for $100,000 - which is all
the more reason why we cannot be indifferent to its passing.
We have spent many thousands of the Coordination
Committee funds for things that do not remotely approach
the importance of this. I am giving you this, not as a
new appeal, but as an explanation of the position of this
Embassy, and I shall not press the matter more. But unless
something is done speedily it will be too late.
I
- 3 -
I know our policy of standing entirely aloof from
interferences of other countries internal affairs and
wholly agree in normal times. Even now it is "magnificent",
but "it is not war", - not this war -b I am afraid we cannot
fight in a bar room with drawing room manners, or meet the
Nazis with meat cleavers with ping pong mallets.
With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely yours,
Chile Folder
1-42
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 3, 1942
atfidential
My dear Mr. President:
In accordance with our telephone conversation
of yesterday, I am sending you herewith a copy of a
letter dated August 1 which I have received from the
Acting Secretary of War and which has to do with the
policy of our Government towards Chile.
The War Department was advised of the policy
which we intended to pursue towards the other American
Republics, as approved by you, prior to the Rio de
Janeiro Conference of January 15 last. I have, there-
fore, received this letter with very great surprise.
In any event there appear to be expressed therein
a considerable number of misapprehensions and an equal
number of incorrect statements.
No suggestions have ever been made by this Gov-
ernment that we should take any action "which can be
made to appear as a bribe of munitions of war offered
to Chile for breaking with the Axis Powers", as
The President,
The White House.
-2-
expressed in the War Department's letter. Immediately
after Pearl Harbor the Chilean Government expressed
its desire to negotiate a Lend-Lease Agreement with
us, but we have replied that we would not be in a
position to conclude such an agreement until and unless
Chile indicated her intention of actively participating
in measures for the defense of the Hemisphere. (This,
of course, is exactly the same position which we have
taken with regard to Argentina, except that in the
case of Chile we sent the Chilean Government last
winter four batteries and a few airplanes so that
Chile could defend her strategic ports in the event
of a surprise attack by the Japanese.)
The President of Chile has now sent you word that
Chile will break relations with the Axis Powers if
this Government believes it necessary, but has at the
same time urged that when this step is taken Chile be
permitted to obtain from this country munitions of war
and armament which we can spare, and which will put
Chile in a better position to resist attack, should
attack occur. I have informed the Chilean Government
that we will consequently be willing to reach an agree-
ment with Chile as to the nature of a Lend-Lease Agree-
ment so that such an agreement can be signed when and
-3-
if Chile takes the action which she has said she will
take.
The most astonishing feature in this letter,
however, is the two paragraphs which read:
"Granted that such action would stop
undesirable trade with Japan and eliminate
Axis influence in Chile, and granted that
such action would have a good effect on
Latin America as a whole, it must also be
borne in mind that Chilean shipping, now
immune from Axis attack, would be subject
to hostile submarine action.
"The main concern of the War Depart-
ment with respect to Chile from a military
point of view is the supply of copper. How-
ever, it is believed that under present con-
ditions, Chile will continue to export this
metal to the United States, as her failure
to do so would result in an economic crisis.
In the case of a rupture between Chile and
the Axis Powers, this supply might well be
jeopardized."
As you know, there has been no trade between Japan
and Chile since Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, only a very
small percentage of strategic materials, such as copper,
exported from Chile to the United States is carried in
Chilean flag ships. The great bulk of these materials
is carried in United Nations flag ships. Under present
conditions, therefore, if Japan were able to do so, she
would be sinking these United Nations flag ships on
their way between Chile and the United States, but the
truth of the matter is, of course, that if Japan were
-4-
in a position to prevent Chile from sending us stra-
tegic materials even in Chilean flag ships, she would
undoubtedly do so were she in a position to take effec-
tive action in that regard, whether Chile broke diplo-
matic relations or not.
It seems to me of vital importance that Chile break
relations with the Axis Powers as promptly as possible.
A break in relations is of the highest degree of impor-
tance in our national defense interests because of the
fact that the Axis embassies and consulates in Chile are
not only today directing subversive activities in the
other American Republics which have broken with the Axis
but, as you know, these missions are likewise sending a
flood of intelligence to the Axis Governments, reporting
on conditions in the United States, and what is probably
more dangerous, reporting not only on the movements of
our ships touching Chilean ports, but also on the move-
ments of United Nations ships throughout South America.
Finally, if Chile breaks relations, I am fairly confi-
dent that Argentina could not then stand out for long
as the one country in the New World which had not broken
with the Axis Powers.
I have been concerned for some months past with
repeated reports which have come to me that the Chilean
and Argentine military and naval officers in Washington
-5-
have been reporting to their respective governments
that officers of this Government are telling them that
we do not in reality wish those two countries to break
with the Axis Powers. Similar reports have reached
me that the British military and naval officers in
Washington and in the capitals of the two countries
in question have been telling high officials of the
Army and Navy of Argentina and Chile exactly the same
thing. This confusion as to policy has not unnaturally
created very considerable doubt on the part of the
Chilean Government, particularly on the part of the
Chilean President, as to what our real desires might be.
As you remember, the Chilean Ambassador is calling
to see you this coming Wednesday morning, August 5.
He will immediately report to his President the state-
ments you will make to him. I believe that 1f he under-
stands clearly that you hope that the Government of Chile
will break relations with the Axis Powers because of the
great assistance which that will render in the defense
of the Western Hemisphere, favorable action will be
taken in the not too distant future.
Believe me
Enc.
D Faithfully yours,
Hills
Franklin D. Hoosevelt Library
DECL
DOB
(9/27/58)
COPY
Data 2-11-70
WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington
Stignature- 80ml
August 1, 1942
SECRET
The Honorable,
The Secretary of State.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I am informed that the Government of Chile, through
its Ambassador in Washington, has informed our Govern-
ment that it will, if we should consider it desirable,
break relations with the Axis Powers, but that it could
not maintain itself in power after such action unless
the United States could transfer to Chile sufficient
munitions of war for the defense of Chile.
I also understand that you desire an estimate from
the War Department as to the minimum amount of munitions
which it would be necessary to transfer to Chile to
insure her defense under the present circumstances,
and in addition, a statement of what munitions the War
Department could recommend for transfer to Chile in
order that she might break with the Axis Powers as
above indicated.
I think it proper to point out that, from the point
of view of the War Department, the advantages to be de-
rived by the United States from the breaking off of
relations between Chile and the Axis Powers are question-
able.
Granted that such action would stop undesirable
trade with Japan and eliminate Axis influence in Chile,
and granted that such action would have a good effect
on Latin America as a whole, it must also be borne in
mind that Chilean shipping, now immune from Axis attack,
would be subject to hostile submarine action.
The main concern of the War Department with respect
to Chile from a military point of view is the supply of
copper. However, it is believed that under present
conditions, Chile will continue to export this metal
to the United States, as her failure to do 80 would
-2-
result in an economic crisis. In the case of a rupture
between Chile and the Axis Powers, this supply might
well be jeopardized.
Moreover, should we take action which can be made
to appear as a bribe of munitions of war offered to
Chile for breaking with the Axis Powers, this action
will become known to the other Latin American nations
and cannot fail to cause resentment among those who
have already declared war, or who are at present afford-
ing us material assistance in the use of their territory,
and for whom we have been able to do very little in the
way of Lend-Lease aid.
Returning to the immediate sub ject of transferring
munitions to Chile, I understand that you feel that it
is not advisable at this time to obtain from the Chilean
Government an estimate of what they consider necessary
for their national defense.
In consequence, I have listed in Annex "A" of this
letter, the more important items for which the Chilean
Government has to date made official requests. Practi-
cally every item listed is critical.
Lacking time to make a complete study of the
defense needs of Chile, it is still possible to analyze
some of the main considerations.
It seems logical to assume that the most probable
hostile action would be the shelling, by submarine, of
the more important Chilean ports or the installations
located near them. These ports are Tocopilla, Antofa-
gasta, Barquitos, San Antonio and Valparaiso. The
best defense against such action is the fire of properly
placed light and medium artillery, of which the Chilean
Army now has an adequate supply. In this connection it
may be noted that the War Department has already supplied
Chile with the materiel of four (4) batteries of 155mm
guns expressly for the purpose of defending all of the
above-mentioned ports, except Valparaiso, to safeguard
the copper supply.
Less likely, but still possible, is a hostile air-
craft carrier raid directed at one of the above-mentioned
objectives.
-3-
Effective defense against such a threat would
necessitate combined air and ground forces, including
especially anti-aircraft artillery.
As will be noted from Annex "B" of this letter,
the Chilean Army is reasonably well equipped to supply
the necessary ground forces except in the matter of
tanks and anti-aircraft artillery, and consequently
their request for field artillery and like items can-
not seriously be considered.
The Chilean Army is deficient in combat aircraft,
anti-aircraft artillery and tanks, and 8. request for
these items is logical, and the amounts requested are
not excessive for the defense of the five localities
listed above.
Unfortunately these items are highly critical.
It is unthinkable to take such equipment from the
hands of our troops, and in consequence, it could only
come from future production. The allocation of means
from future production is a function of the Munitions
Assignments Board and the War Department could not,
in the present circumstances or the foreseeable future,
recommend the transfer of such equipment to Chile, in
the amounts requested. Combat aircraft is at present
out of the question.
However, appreciating the urgency of this situa-
tion and despite the critical nature of the items in-
volved, the War Department will recommend transfer of
the following:
a. 20 - 37mm antiaircraft guns with 1500 rounds
of ammunition per gun to be available
by September 1, 1942.
b. 30 - Mormon-Harrington light tanks to be
available by August 10, 1942. This
type of tank is operated by three (3)
men, armed with one (1) 37mm gun and
three (3) caliber .30 machine guns.
It is possible that at a later date, thirty (30)
of a slightly different type Mormon-Harrington tank
may become available. This latter type employs a crew
of four (4) men and is armed with two (2) 37mm guns
-4-
and six (6) caliber .30 machine guns. Production
difficulties with respect to engines make it imprac-
ticable to set a delivery date for this type at present.
In addition, I attach an Annex "C" of this letter
certain other smaller items of equipment which could
be recommended for transfer in moderate amounts.
Sincerely yours,
ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Acting Secretary of War
3 Incls.
Annex "A"
Annex "B"
Annex "C"
file THE WHITE HOUSE
Chile Folder
WASHINGTON
August 5, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Sumner Welles wanted the following
message given to the President before he
sees the Chilean Ambassador today:
"I have just received a personal
message from the Foreign Minister
of Brazil, which tells me that the
President of Chile yesterday told
the Brazilian Government that the
Chilean Government is only awaiting
the result of the President's inter-
view today with the Chilean Ambassador,
in making its decision to break diplo-
matic relations with the Axis. 1:
MHM
filenal
Chile Folder
Santiago ,August 8,1942
Dear Mr President:-
Because of rapidly developing changes here
the copy of the letter to Welles,enclosed,may interest you. It
is now realized ,as a result of your "firm stand" with Michels
on the breaking of relations with the Axis ,and since this is the
one thing that Rios has been saying he was waiting for,and since
he has said repeatedly that he would break in the event you said
so,I cannot be assume that he is going to break. And Barros Jarpas
right-about-face is significant of the attitude of Rios. Nothing
could be more significant than Barros Jarps insistence that my
friend Cruze Coke shall go along with the President to Washington
since he is a reader in the demand for the the break. And he
is the most popular man in the Conservative party,which,as a
party, has been opposed. His personal popularity, extending beyond
party lines, is such that the party did not dare accept his
resignation as Vice President, based on his inability to subscribe
to its policy ,and he was given absolute freedom to fight for
the break.
With warmest regards,
Hon.Franklin D.Roosevelt
Sincerely,
The White House.
clauds yours
PSF:Chile
Santiago, August 8, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
As I telegraphed, Cruz Coke came to me directly from his
hour's conference with Barros Jarpa and I have sent you the
substance of the conversation. The Senator evidently was very
vehement for at one juncture he tells me the Minister smilingly
touched him on the knee with the admonition "not so loud". He
told the Minister that but for his long personal friendship
with him he would attack him personally because his policy of
"equivocal". It appears that Barros Jarpa was most conciliatory
and that he gave unmistakable indications of a radical shift
on his part. When the Senator told him it was "outrageous"
and "almost treason" to have given permission to the author
of the book on the Rio Conference to speak to the War College
and subtly to attempt to incite to rebellion by the Army if
diplomatic relations with the Axis were broken, and demanded
the right to reply before the same body, Barros Jarpa said:
"You are absolutely right and you shall have permission".
The Minister told him of the Michels conversation with
Roosevelt and said that our President was veryfirm on the
necessity of breaking relations, and the Minister did not seem
to resent this but to be reconciled to it.
More significant, in my opinion, is the fact that he said
also President Roosevelt 18 prepared to invite Rios to Wash-
ington if assured of his acceptance and that he, the Minister,
is going to urge the President to accept. He said "it is most
important". And in the event of his going he said he thought
he should be accompanied by about two parliamentarians and that
Cruz Coke should be one of them. In view of the Senator's
position this certainly is significant. The Senator told him
that he would not go unless assured that his own views were
accepted and would be acted upon. I told the Senator I
thought it well for him to go; that in view of what Rios
positively knows about our position it would be incredible for
him to go without the intention of breaking.
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
.2M
- 2 -
2851
fuont
This morning the new Consul to Los Angeles, Señor
Cardenas Muñoz, came in to say good-bye. He 1s intensely
pro-American and has a son at Yale. He said he had just come
from President Rios who seemed much pleased because, as he
told him, he had been or would be invited to Washington. The
Consul has the impression that the break 1s inevitable.
With warmest personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
custs
file friend
Chile Faller
Santiags august 12th2
seeas un President:-
Neees sent we
memovadone ou weat cave wishel
sent sand him ou the enclosed comments.
a has return and &
cen wather he mentioned
all ally Cas been
but withel information is
apropos commented ou by we before
much strouger Narineal repards
sweety clauds grower
Hou Wankles al. Roosever
The white House
Santiago, August 11, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
The memorandum of the conversation of Michels with
you and the Ambassador's observations call for some com-
ments from this end. I am impressed especially with the
Ambassador's discovery that the President "was greatly
misinformed, not only in regard to public opinion and the
views of the Government of the United States, etc." This
would seem to be a most serious reflection upon me, whose
business it is to properly inform this Government along
that line. This I have done time and time again, without
number, in discussions with the Foreign Minister, but as
you have seen, when reports continued to reach me that the
President here had said he was reliably informed that we
were entirely satisfied and that he had a misconception
of the feeling in the United States, I asked permission to
talk frankly, and off the record, and did talk with him
at his house with the Foreign Minister present, for almost
two hours. You yourself can Judge from the long report I
sent you on that conversation whether there could have been
any possible justification for the implication that I had
not given him the real information.
Let me add here since the Chilean Ambassador in Wash-
ington presumably was reporting to his Government, it seems
all the more remarkable that the President should have been
misinformed.
Apparently the misinformation reached the President
from Barros Jarpa; and the misinformation reached him from
Carlos Dávila who it seemd did send information opposed
to that I had given and presumably to what Michels had sent.
Nor can there be any possible excuse for any misunder-
standing with the members of the Cabinet. I personally
have talked often with the leading members of the Ministry
who not only did understand the situation but have been
insisting on the breaking of relations.
I agree with Michel's explanation of Barros Jarpa's
attitude in part. As I have made clear to you, I have
thought
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
thought that having taken such a pronounced stand immediately
after taking office, his personal pride had become involved,
making it difficult for him to shift without some specific
reason. But I do not ascribe his former stubborness to that
as the primary reason. I cam convinced that he has been
thinking of the selfish interest of a little group of Chilean
money makers who have been making money hand over fist under
existing conditions, notably the shipping company, and who
want no disturbance of the status quo. That 1s also the view
of Cruz Coke.
II
We now come to the Ambassador's statement that the
policy of the British Embassy and the British colony 1s
diametrically opposed to our policy; that the commercial
interests of the British here are insisting day by day that
Chile should not break relations; and that the reason for the
attitude of Embassy and Colony is that they believe the com-
merical preponderance in Chile of the British will be best
served if relations are not broken.
I have not heard from any of our people of members of
the British Colony engaging in that open propaganda. I
shall take pains to investigate discreetly. But it seems to
me not improbable. When the Willingdon Commission was here
I was much impressed by the fact that --
(1) The members of this Commission in their speeches,
and talks among people generally, had little to 8 ay about
the war and that they seemed entirely concerned with post-
war trade with Chile after the war.
(2) That the Commission was composed almost exclusively
of bankers and industrialists, of the Tory element that
was with Chamberlain and his policies, and that all with
whom I talked very noticeably moderated their praise of
Churchill. At heart this group seemed to me to be of the
old appeaser element and not friendly to Churchhill.
Later when Lord Davidson was here I talked alone with
him for more than an hour and I was a bit shocked to notice
in him the same trend of thought.
But that which has disturbed me most has been the fact
that the Embassy here has given very scant support to us at
the Foreign Office. Orde, the Ambassador, in several cases
has said that he had not put in a lick in that quarter
because he "had no instructions from London". He talks to
me personally as though he would like to see relations
with the Axis broke, but he appears a bit academic about
it, and he talks to me like an outsider spectator observing
a fight that interests him mostly as a spectator. He
certainly
- 3 -
certainly has made no effort to help at the Foreign Office
in this regard. His position seems to be that since the
breaking of relations with the Axis concerns only the
American nations that formulated the agreements of Rio, it
would do harm to us and our fight for a European Power to
intervene. I get the distinct impression that he tries to
convey the idea to me that the British Embassy 18 playing
our game by staying out.
III
I know of no earthly reason why "The Socialist and
Radicals do not feel that they have any real contact with
the American Embassy". I have had repeated and close con-
tacts regularly with Schnake, the real leader of the
Socialists, and with Marmaduke Grove the head of the party.
I have had Schnake at the house at lunch with two or three
men alone several times. Grove seems me often. Among the
Radical leaders I have close contact with Marcial Mora, for-
mer Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Finance and head of
the Party; with Sáenz, former Foreigm Minister andthe first
man to be elected by the Popular Front, and with Labarca,
former Minister of the Interior several times and an out-
standing leader of the party, and with numerous others.
The only criticism of myself I have heard, before this, has
been that I did not cultivate the Rights . which is also
untrue.
I suspect that the Ambassador gets his information
from some members of his party with whom we do not have
intimate contacts. We cannot attempt to have such relations
with 11 the members of the Party. it would be bad policy.
There is a great deal of jealousy in the Radical party.
So much 80 that it has been in the habit of throwing out
the President of the Party at intervals of two or three
months ever since I came to Chile. However, if he will
indicate specific persons we should cultivate we shall be
glad to do 80.
But the Ambasador's statement that members of my staff
maintain social contact "solely with elements of the Right"
18 distinctly not true, and absolutely false. Heath
has Rightists at his house but he does have Socialists and
Radicals; Lyon has invaluable contacts with the Rights, but
he has at his house many leaders of the Left and goes to
their parties, and, as officer in charge of cultural
relations, his intimate contacts with the intellectuals
brings him into close touch with Leftists almost entirely.
Brooks social contacts are almost entirely with the parties
of the Left because they are in power. Faust, who reported
politics, had scarcely any contacts with the Rights and
almost too intimate contacts with the Left including the
Communists.
- 4 -
This, I think, covers the ground as far as any disagree-
ment as to facts are concerned. There is no possible reason
why any Secretary need be sent here that the Leftists can see
frequently; since they can see the people now hear frequently
if they wish; since members of the staff do see them frequently;
and since it is notorious here that I am always glad to see
any man in public life on a human basis and without regard to
protocol, a matter often commented on by the press here ina
complimentary way. There 1s no need for sending anothe
Secretary here for that purpose.
Michels acted precisely as he should while here, but it
is well to bear in mind that he is a very active politician,
with his own group of friends in his Party whom he wishes to
see predominant in the Party and he probably wishes to see
them on intimate terms with the Embassy since instead of
being detrimental to a politician now days it is very
advantageous.
IV
Cruz Coke 1s to make a speech on international affairs
in the Senate today, according to the press. He hadtold me
of his intention. Whether this is good or bad at this
juncture is conjectural. It would seem to me to have been
better if he had made the speech outside the Senate, since
in the Senate his speech may give an opportunity for our
enemies to speak also, and I doubt if Rios is anxious to
have a furious fight on as he approaches action on the
breaking of relations.
Returning to the Michels report about the British opposi-
tion to the breaking of relations: Senator Horacio Walker,
very pro-English, of English extraction, certainly pro-
democratic, and hostile to the Axis openly, is nevertheless
opposed to the breaking of relations. He has closecontacts
with the British Embassy. That may be significant.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely yours,
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
fele personal
Chile Folder
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 22. 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I have received your memorandum of August 12,
1942 transmitting a letter of August 4, 1942 from
Ambassador Bowers at Santiago, Chile.
A draft of a suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers
is enclosed for your signature if you approve.
A Faithfully yours, pubs
Enclosures:
1. From Ambassador
Bowers, August 4, 1942.
2. Reply to Ambassador
Bowers.
FORDEFENSE
The President,
The White House.
BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND STAMPS
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
RA
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
8/18/42
ADDRESSED TO
The President,
The White House.
. . - HOTEL -
1-100
PSF: chile
Santiago,August 4,1942
Dear Mr President:-
From several reliable quarters I have it that
President Rios has said precisely what he said to me,--that is,that
if we say that the breaking of relations with the Axis is helpful
or necessary in the winning of the war he will break ;but that he
is a bit concerned lest there be some trouble and he told me,as
he apparently has said to others, that in that event he would like
to feel that he could count on the support of the United States.
As I wrote before,after having said this once,he followed
me to the door to reiterate it. And because of that I have suggested
that it would be helpful if I were authorized to say to him that
in the event of trouble from the Nazis he nout could count on
us
our support. I have had be reply to that suggestion.
Rios seems primarily concerned lest this trouble take the
form of strikes in the nitrate and copper fields,and he has
specifically mentioned the communists in those fields . This seems
stupid to me,but it conforms with his character, since he is a
Rightest at heart ,and unfriendly to the communists whose 80,000
votes elected him. It seems incredible to me that at this juncture
the communists would be interested in stopping the accumulation of
war material to be used against Hitler. I suspect there may be
some Nazi agents in these fields posing as communists ;and there
no doubt are Nazie ,Facists and Spanish analgists in these mines
,unknown to the managers. Contreras Labarca ,communist leader here,
has been told indirectly from us that in the event of any change
he must see to it that his people go right and he has given the
assurance.
I understand that Michels will tomorrow give you a personal letter
from Rios and assume that your reply will come in the packs pouch to
me for personal delivery to the President. I have not yet heard
what Michels reported to Hull and Welles ,and I cannot well act
with intelligence here unless I am kept completely informed of
the proceedings there. I assume the report is on its way by courtier
But in view of the fact that I think Rios ready to break and
Barros Jarpa is not ,it is most important that I have reasons for
seeing Rios without interference from Barros Jarpa .Your letter
in reply to Rios will give me the reason.
The situation is delicate since I must continue to deal with Barros
Jarpa and pretend to believe in his sincerety ,and without an
excuse I cannot well ask to see the President without arousing his
suspicions and incurring his displeasure
With warmest regards,
Hon.Franklin D.Roosevelt
Sincerely, Claude flower
The White House.
& laws no doubt there is a good
explaciation but you should know teat
among the masses here our freuds
and not communist F6 failure
of Butaus and tho u.s.to assent Russes
is creating uneson suspress and a very bad
COPY
PSF: Chile
Embassy of the
United States of America
Santiago, August 4, 1942
Acknowledged
Dear Mr. President:-
8/18/42
From several reliable quarters I have it that
President Rios has said precisely what he said to me,--that
is, that if we say that the breaking of relations with the
Axis is helpful or necessary in the winning of the war he
will break; but that he is a bit concerned lest there be
some trouble and he told me, as he apparently has said to
others, that in that event he would like to feel that he
could count on the support of the United States.
As I wrote before, after having said this once, he
followed me to the door to reiterate it. And because of that
I have suggested that it would be helpful if I were authorized
to say to him that in the event of trouble from the Nazis
he could count on our support. I have had no reply to that
suggestion.
Rios seems primarily concerned lest this trouble take
the form of strikes in the nitrate and copper fields, and
he has specifically mentioned the communists in those
fields. This seems stupid to me, but it conforms with
his character, since he is a Rightest at heart, and
unfriendly to the communists whose 80,000 votes elected
him. It seems incredible to me that at this juncture the
communists would be interested in stopping the accumula-
tion of war material to be used against Hitler. I suspect
there may be some Nazi agents in these fields posing as
communists; and there no doubt are Nazis, Fascists and
Spanish Falangists in these mines unknown to the managers.
Contreras Labarca, communist leader here, has been told
indirectly from us that in the event of any change he
must see to it that his people go right and he has given
the assurance.
I understand that Michels will tomorrow give you a
personal letter from Rios and assume that your reply will
come in the pouch to me for personal delivery to the
President. I have not yet heard what Michels reported to
Hull and Welles, and I cannot well act with intelligence
here unless I am kept completely informed of the pro-
ceedings there. I assume the report is on its way by
courier.
But in view of the fact that I think Rios ready to
break and Barros Jarpa is not, it is most important that
I have
-2-
I have reasons for seeing Rios without interference from
Barros Jarpa. Your letter in reply to Rios will give me
the reason.
The situation is delicate since I must continue to
deal with Barros Jarpa and pretend to believe in his
sincerity, and without an excuse I cannot well ask to see
the President without arousing his supicions and incurring
his displeasure.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
CLAUDE G. BOWERS
Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
(Written in Pen) - I have no doubt there is a good
explanation but you should know
that among the masses here, our friends and not
communists the failure of Britain and the U.S. to
assist Russia is creating suspicions and a very bad
impression.
PSFichile
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Claude:
Your letter of August 4, was of particular in-
terest. It confirms my impression that developments
in Chile are proceeding along the right lines. I
have discussed with Sumner Welles the points raised
by President Rios and I understand that he has already
informed you of our point of view.
I am confident that the position we have taken
will be completely satisfactory to our Chilean friends.
With best wishes,
Very sincerely yours,
The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
full
Chile Folder
Santiago, August 25, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I enclose herewith a copy of a letter to Welles
which I think contains important suggestions. You will
note that I was not mistaken in my original estimate
of Alessandri when he was in Washington. I am convinced
that he dictates the policy of Barros Jarpa. But that
the latter needs no prodding from him. The Foreign
Minister's cousin, a complete Nazi tool, 1s Chilean
Ambassador in Berlin and is reporting, even by telephone
to Barros Jarpa all the propaganda handed him by Goebbels;
and this is hurried to Rios. The attitude of the Foreign
Minister is utterly inexplicable. The Chinese Minister,
a very able, plain-speaking gentleman, talked with him
for an hour and then reported to me. He found Barros
Jarpa holding strange views. His talk certainly indicated
a feeling that Germany will win - for he no doubt has
frequent assurances of this sort from the Nazi Ambassador.
The Foreign Minister said the world 1s changing to a new
order and Chile must have men in Tokyo and Berlin so she
can watch the development; which certainly sounds as
though he is convinced that the Axis will determine the
new order.
Three cheers for your statement about the trying and
execution of the gangsters and assassins among German com-
manders responsible for the mass assassinations in the
conquered countries. I had said many times that since this
is a gangster war, in which all the laws of war and humanity
are scrapped, the gangsters after the victory cannot be
treated as honorable defeated soldiers and must be dealt
with as sommon assassins. Of course, that dates back with
me for six years.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely yours,
Uaude known
The Honorable
Franklin Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Santiago, August 25, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
If you are interested, I have sent a despatch on Waldo
Frank's visit. He placed himself absolutely under my
guidance and did not move & finger without consultation.
I have been disappointed by the editorial tone of
most of the press on the Brazilian situation. All the papers
express a complete solidarity with Brazil and disgust over
the action of Germany and Italy. But I have no doubt the
press, aside from the Communist and Socialist papers, took
their cue from the Foreign Office. It seemed significant
to me that President Rios' paper, LA HORA, refrained from
comment for fortyeight hours.
I find little to enthuse me in the reply of Barros Jarpa
to Aranha and but little in the President's telegram to Vargas.
Gracie, the Brazilian Ambassador, with whom I am in very close
contact, seemed fairly satisfied. But when I called his at-
tention to the fact that the reference to Brazil's change in
policy being justified by new concrete facts, may be inter-
preted as meaning that Chile will act likewise when she
has "new concrete facts" - that 1s an attack on Chile or her
ships - he thought there might be something to it, and was
less satisfied.
As a matter of fact the President could have promptly
broken relations on the Brazilian attack and I am told he
would have had general support. I think he has missed a boat.
That which alarms me is this: Rios 18 not a strong man.
He has no imagination. No flare. No initiative. Little
moral courage. And he is easily swayed.
Our situation is this: Barros Jarpa, who 18 resorting
to everything in an effort to prevent the breaking of rela-
tions is in position to see Rios daily and tell him whatever
he wishes in secret. No one else has that privilege. That
puts us at a disadvantage. In a few days I shall see him
under the pretext of putting myself at his disposal regarding
any phase of his visit to the States and he may give me an
opening
The Honorable
Sumner Welles
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
opening to say that since he has said he 1s prepared to
break relations I think it best for him to act before going,
since in that event he would gat a popular ovation. His
pride is conspicuous, or rather his vanity, and that may
have effect.
But this seems worth considering: Would it be possible
for you in talks with Michels to comment on the fact that
Barros Jarpa 18 at the President's elbow, probably not in-
capable of misrepresenting things, and that it would be well
for Michels to write frequently directly to Rios and not
depend on his despatches to Barros Jarpa reaching him.
Michels is in position to make it clear to him that -
1) We understand that he has said without quali-
fication that he will do whatever Roosevelt thinks
necessary or helpful in the winning of the war, in
the defense of the United States and the American
nations. That he has instructed Michels to say as much
to President Roosevelt and the Department.
2) That President Roosevelt has replied that
he thinks the breaking of relations absolutely necessary.
3) And that we naturally assume that he will
break relations before leaving for the States.
He can say that to Rios where I cannot, without appearing
to bring "pressure".
In this connection here 18 something that bears out my
often repeated statement that Arturo Alessandri is running
Barros Jarpa and is primarily responsible for the latter's
position. Sorriano, former Spanish Republican Ambassador,
a very clever man, came to me the other day to report on a
remarkable conversation with Arturo Alessandri whom he knows
very well. He found Alessandri in a very excited state,
holding forth with great bitterness against the United States
8.6 a powerful country trying to impose its will on little
Chile. He attacked us all along the line and became so
excited that Soriano asked him, "why are you 80 excited".
This can be interpreted as a good omen. if Barros Jarpa
has told him that a brekk seems scheduled it would account
for his excitement and fury. There is no doubt that Barros
Jarpa is working very intimately with Alessandri. In my
personal contacts with Alessandri he is most cordial and even
flattering, but I have not seen him recently. I can see now
why Barros Jarpa was so anxious to send him to Washington.
The primary purpose of this letter 18 to make the
suggestion about Michels maintaining direct and intimate
contact with President Rios.
Despite
- 3 -
Despite all this, the general feeling is that Chile
is about to break. Gonzalez Videla, Chilean Ambassador
to Brazil, who barely missed the Presidency and whom I
reported as clearly our man in the Presidential primary,
told my daughter in Rio that Chile will break by the last
of October. But he is a militant democrat andhas been
with us from the beginning.
"ith warmest personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
claude upowns
/
file
Chile Folder
sautings aug 30-42
read, un Presider:-
Thes avalyte
of Flo personal of
President Rioo party
may possibly be of
interest to you
warmed repards
sweety
clauds 4 Bower
Hou Thankler ne. Roosever
The mate House
Santiago, August 31, 1942.
The Honorable
Summer Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Welles:
You may be interested in an analysis of the personnel that is to accom-
pany President Rios to Washington, sent by cable August 28th.
Alvarez, Minister of Commerce, is one of the members of the Ministry
that has stood out frankly as favoring a breaking of relations with the Axis.
He is an engineer, a Radical, and having had two years training in a lead
mine in Missouri he speaks English like a native, and is an easy man to get
along with at all times. It is fortunate that he is to go.
Ben Cohen, Ambassador in Bolivia, you know. You know his relationships
in America and he always poses with me as a great friend of ours. I think
he is. His great ambition has been to be Ambassador at Washington, but he
has been a bit tricky and shifty in politics and he has no chance. He ought
to be with us on the main issue and probably is, but he is a worse bargainer
than Rossetti, I am afraid. You know his type. Barros Jarpa says he is
going because of his familiarity with the American scene.
Ben Claro is the son of a man who had many American connections and who
represented American corporations as a lawyer. When his father died in New
York we sent Ben in our bomber to meet the ship. Ben is very bright, but
with that brightness which likes to display itself in disputation. He was
in Washington about two years ago and I think he saw you. He saw President
Roosevelt and came back very much set up about it. But at my house as my
guest at cocktails and dinners he has been overheard in conversations criti-
cizing us because of our big investments here. I have heard that he is against
breaking relations, but to me he goes no further than to say that while
relations must be broken sooner or later no pressure must be brought. He
speaks English like a native. He is well placed in the Radical party and
was secretary of Ríos's campaign committee. I think he was bitterly dis-
appointed when offered no place in the Ministry, and I suspect this desig-
nation is meant as soothing syrup. But if treated with great consideration
I have no doubt he would favor our policy completely.
Castelblance, President of the House of Deputies, former president of
the Radical party, is thoroughly democratic and a very decent man generally.
I am told that he would be more aggressively for breaking relations but for
the fact that there are many Germans among his constituents. He is a
friend, however, of González Videla, Ambassador now in Río, and most
militantly our friend, and I net him last at a small dinner given by
González when here. I would put him down as with us.
Barrenechea, Socialist, is described to ne by Barros Jarpa as "a
Socialist but very decent," which is praise indeed. of course he is mili-
tantly for breaking relations. Though I have never heard him, he is said
to be a fine speaker.
Senator Hernán Videla, who has been added since Berros Jarpa gave me
the list, is a Radical, a man of great ability, and essentially friendly
to us and our cause. He knows the United States and speaks English per-
fectly. He is an expert on minerals and I suspect he is added with the view
to a bit of bargaining on the price of minerals.
In addition there are others with no political significance, such as
Valenzuela, of the Protocol office, a military aide, a private secretary.
It is not definitely determined that Marcelo Ruiz, former Sub-Minister
of Foreign Affairs whom you met at Rio, and now Secretary General of the
President, will go. Barros Jarpa says he may go, since the President
feels he "must have a confidential adviser on the delegation." This is
rather disconcerting. I have known Ruiz for three years and am convinced
that he is altogether wrong on the war, that his sympathies are wrong.
When Rossetti was Minister he was our friend here, just as Ruíz was against
us under cover. I hope he is left at home. You may have formed a differ-
ent opinion at Río but all my instincts, which are generally reliable,
warn me that he is not our friend. However, he is not a strong man and he
will fall in with whatever Ríos wants. Even so you will observe that the
delegation is overwhelmingly with us.
I think this Embassy should be promptly furnished with the program
which Barros Jarpa tells me has been made out for Rios's visit.
When Rockefeller comos I an arranging a dinner to which all who ac-
company Rios and Barros Jarpa will be invited, along with others like
Cruz Coke who are with us, and Cruchaga, who I am sure is most friendly
to us.
II.
I em curious about your conversation with Michels about Cruchaga
and Max Errázuriz. Did Michels try to defend the latter? Iws delighted
with your reply. Max is our open enemy, and since he is a miserly sort
of person I suspect that he is profiting financially by his devotion to
the Pagan enemy, though his stock in trade is that he is a most pious
Catholic, a professional.
III.
Real Catholics here are more and more coming over. AS in Spain, our
-3-
enemies among them are of the old feudalistic aristocracy who use reli-
gion as a cloak for their selfish political ends. On my visit to Con-
cepción I called on the Archbishop, who seemed most appreciative, and to
my amazement he and the Bishop appeared at the station to see ne off in
a rain storm.
On visiting the 350 year old church of San Francisco here I found
that because of a tax on the cloisters which the church cannot stand it
was thought necessary to tear down part of the building and sell the
ground. It seemed such vandalism to me that I asked the priest for the
data and told him I would see if, as an individual, I could do anything
about it. I saw Barros Jarpa, told him it was none of my business, that
I was speaking to him as an individual, with a historian's reverence for
historic things and as a lover of Santiago, and asked if a way could not
be found to prevent this destruction. He was avowedly amazed and equally
pleased, and he said he would see what could be done. The problem has
been solved. San Francisco has been saved. And Barros Jarpa has given
the fact, together with the correspondence, to the press.
Saturday the corner stone of a new building of the Catholic Univer-
sity, to replace one burned, was laid. I was invited. We had made a
good contribution. The Catholic Ambassadors of Perú and Bolivia were
present and the Catholic Minister of Poland. To my surprise I was put
between the Nuncio and the Archbishop, and when the parchment scroll was
signed, first by the Nuncio, then the Archbishop, I was again surprised
when Ims asked to sign on the first line with them.
I think we have completely wiped out the old notion that we are a
pagan and an anti-Catholic nation.
Warmest regards,
Sincerely,
fund
Chile Folder
Santiago,September 10,1942
Dear Mr President:-
I am writing Welles about some important developments
but assume he will convey the information to you if he thinks it necessary
are advisable. This is a personal letter. Some time ago I visited the
colonial church of San Francisco, church and monastery, built 350 years ago
and one of the most precious possession of Santiago. The priest told me
that while the buildings were exempt from taxation there was a tax of
2000 pesos a month on the cloisters which are the most charming . It
would be necessary he said, sadly, to tear down part of the church and
monastery and sell the cloisters. I told him I would see if anything could
be done . I went to Barros Jarpa as an individual, not as an Ambassador,
as a historian W ith a reverence for historic things, and told him I
thought it would be a tragedy. He was amazed but manifestly pleased and
he said he wouldi interest himself. As a result the tax has been reduced
to 400 pesos a month and the ancient church is saved. Barros Jarpa then
gave the press my letter to him and his reply ,and the press has been
filled with fulsome praise of me. Today I received from the Father of
the Franciscans the following:
"The Father of thr Providencial P of the Franciscans greets you
attentively and thanks you in the name of the Franciscam monks for the
enormous favor which you have done them in using your good offices before
the Chilean Government so that the internal taxes on the real estate of
our Monastery of San Francoso is lowered and the church and monastery
saved from destruction. God bless the Ambassador".
I did this because I actually was intensely interested but it has
created something of a sensation among the Catholics who deluge me with
letters I am giving Luca de la Tena the Spanish Ambassador sent here to
mobilize the Catholics against us a run for his money and am doing more
for the Catholics and getting more credit from them than he.
I also intervened ,as you may know, to prevent Chile from deposing Lund
,the Danish Minister from his post to make way for a Quisling appointee,
as was done in Argentine. I was successful through several devices and
it may interest you to know that Lund knows 1 did it and has just written
me as follows:
"I want to thank you again most sincerely for your brilliant guidance and
help in the matter which we may call my continued recognition in Chile .It
was a beautiful piece of diplomatic skill".
I understand that Lund has so informed the Danish Minister in Washington
and the Government in London.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely
Hon.Franklin D.Roosevelt
The White House.
Cland yBowers
Santingo - u.s. - chilean relations
PSF
Chile
LSH
Santiago
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
Dated September 11, 1942
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 1:12 a.m. 14th
Secretary of State,
Washington,
1467, September 11, 5 p.m.
FOR SECRETARY AND UNDER secretary
Had two hour talk with Schnake who resigns
from Ministry to concentrate on seeking better coopera-
tion of parties with the approval of Rios.
His relations with President close. He thinks it
stupid not to break before going to Washington. Says
Rios had thought attitude toward break did not
include Roosevelt but his letter to me, which I
showed Rios, altored his opinion and now convinced
break must come. His idea is to talk over things
in Washington and then agree. I spoke of personal
and political advantages in break preceding visit and
Schnake agreed. He ascribes Barros Jarpas attitude
to pride of opinion aggravated by criticism of fellow
ministers. He doubts, however, if he is entirely frank
with President. I urged immediate break, but suggested
that if it is postponed until after visit government
might softon disappointment of American public if
DECLASSIFIED
it prepared
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB
4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
-2- #1467 September 11, 5 p.m. from Santiago
it prepared the way by (one) cutting telecommunications
with Axis countries, (two) by arresting and deporting
leading Nazis and other agents, (three) and by immediately
expelling the former German Consul (#) General in
New York, and (four) by declaring Lippe persona
non grata. He agreed this should be done.
His impression is that the visit will mean a break
and complete cooperation; that the three days in
Washington will not permit complete plans; that
then someone, and he made it clear it would probably
be himself, will be sent to help work out the
lines of effective cooperation.
He said that in all the countries Rios visits
efforts should be made, as I have suggested proviously
to have each country speak plainly to Rios on the
necessity of a break and complete cooperation. This
he said would make it possible for Rios to S tross the
fact that "pressure" had como from all the American
nations and not just the United States. He also said
he is convinced that Gustavo Rios is favoring a break
and that he has said that "Chile is a fool for not
going in completely with the United States. a
BOWERS
NPL
Delay on above message caused by 124 group omission
in original text.
PSF: PSF:Chile
mal
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
September 14, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
With reference to the attached
letter from Ambassador Bowers I do not
believe that anything more can be done
at the present time. Mr. Welles had
two rather extensive conversations
with the Chilean Ambassador at the
beginning of September, when he ex-
pressed his serious concern at the
reports being received from Chile and
stressing the desirability of a break
in relations prior to Rios' visit to
the United States. The Ambassador
agreed and at the second of the two
interviews showed Mr. Welles a very
emphatic letter which he proposed to
send Rios.
On September tenth I had an
extensive conversation with the
Chilean Ambassador and this morning
I again saw the Ambassador. Copies
of my memoranda of these conversations
are attached.
P.S.
CH
I call your special attention to tele-
gram No. 1467 from Santiago which has
just been received.
COPY:S:ARK
Chile Folder
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
DATE: September 10, 1942
SUBJECT: BREAKING OF RELATIONS WITH AXIS
PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE CHILEAN
AMBASSADOR, SENOR DON RODOLFO MICHELS
The Ambassador of Chile called at his request.
He said he came first to pay his respects and
secondly to explain why the President of Chile planned
to stop in certain other countries en route to the
United States. He said that President Rios would be
obliged to stop one day in Lima, one day in Quito and
one day in Bogota. He added that the President had
recently accepted an urgent invitation to stop in
Mexico, and from there would come to the United States
direct, returning by way of Caracas and Rio de Janeiro.
I promptly replied that no explanation was necessary,
but that I appreciated the courtesy and consideration
implied.
I inquired of the Ambassador how the situation in
Chile looked from his personal viewpoint. He promptly
replied that he still believed that President Rios had
no other intention than to carry out his proposal, re-
cently made to and accepted by this Government, that
Chile dissolve diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.
He added that he had heard nothing to the contrary since
he returned from Chile. He then proceeded, however, to
argue on his own initiative in favor of the possible
course of the President of Chile in not taking this ac-
tion on the part of his Government until his return to
Santiago following his visit to the United States. He
discussed for some minutes the wisdom of this course so
far as the President might be concerned. He concluded
by saying that the President himself would have to
decide on the timing of the announcement dissolving dip-
lomatic relations.
I
-2-
I then said that, of course, I was aware of the
Ambassador's personal views as expressed to the Under
Secretary a short time ago and also conveyed in his
letter to the President of Chile according to his
statement to Mr. Welles. I added that I was pleased
and not at all surprised at the Ambassador's personal
views with respect to this matter, and that the Under
Secretary and I have been in complete accord with this
view from the time it was first discussed between the
Ambassador and Mr. Welles. I proceeded to say that
our two countries are in the same situation; that we
are going up or down together depending on the outcome
of the present war with the Axis powers, and that what
1s to the best interests of Chile in this matter should
be to the best interests of the cause as a whole. I
continued by saying that I was for the moment speaking
personally to the Ambassador in an effort to work out
as accurately as possible what should be the official
views of our respective Governments.
I then inquired of him whether, in the event the
President should withhold an announcement of the action
of his Government on this matter until his return, the
enemy propaganda and malcontents in Chile might not
with effectiveness charge that the President of Chile
had been subjected to pressure by the United States,
and even Mexico. The Ambassador answered that he did
not think SO. I remarked that in the light of my fifty
years of experience in dealing with public psychology,
I could not help but take the opposite view. The Am-
bassador finally said that he had written to President
Rios some ten days ago in an endeavor to keep the mat-
ter alive and that he expected shortly to have the
President's further word on this subject.
I thanked him and again indicated the interest of
this Government.
C.H.
S:CH:MA
PSF: Chile
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: SEPTEMBER 14, 1942
SUBJECT:
BREAKING OF RELATIONS WITH AXIS
PARTICIPANTS:
SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE AMBASSADOR OF CHILE,
SENOR DON RODOLFO MICHELS.
COPIES TO:
are 1-1493
The Ambassador of Chile called at his request.
He referred to the fact that he had conferred with
Mr. Bonsal on Saturday and had given him more or less
the contents of a telegram just received from his Govern-
ment. He proceeded to repeat some portions of the tele-
gram, which he had before him in Spanish. Having read
the complete translation over the week-end, as given to
me by Mr. Bonsal, I made clear to him that Mr. Bonsal
had acquainted me fully with their conversation on
Saturday. The Ambassador made an earnest plea in support
of the idea that President Rios should not break diplo-
matic relations with the Axis powers until after his visit
to this and other countries in October, adding that it was
his own personal view that the domestic political situa-
tion in Chile warranted the advisability of this course.
The Ambassador said that this was definitely the view of
his Government, and that, in addition, President Rios had
requested him to say that he preferred that this question
should not be further discussed. He said that this was
all in a friendly spirit and based on the assumption that
such discussion would tend to stir up controversial ele-
ments in Chile, and thus complicate the whole situation.
I
I thanked the Ambassador for coming in and speaking
with me as he did, and then proceeded to state that, of
course, everything we say on this or any other subject
relating to the war in connection with the matter of
Chile's severing diplomatic relations with the Axis gov-
ernments would be said in the warmest spirit of friend-
ship and thoroughly amicable relations, Just as members
of a family discuss questions among themselves. I said
that, of course, the Ambassador and President Rios have
the most perfect right to express their views fully and
freely about all phases of this question of breaking dip
lomatic relations, and whatever those views are, I and
other officials of this Government will not take umbrage
since this 1s the only spirit in which matters between
our two Governments can be suitably considered and dis-
posed of. I then said that as this matter developed,
it was my understanding that President Rios, speaking
through the Ambassador himself on his recent return from
Chile, said that he was willing to do anything considered
necessary for the defense of the hemisphere, and that
President Roosevelt then informed Ambassador Michels
that the maintenance of diplomatic relations between
Chile and the Axis powers was a serious threat to the
security of the continent. Thereafter, the invitation
was extended to President Rios. The Ambassador agreed
that the invitation was thus extended after the commit-
ment had been made by the President of Chile without
reference to the question of his visit to this country.
I then added with some emphasis that since the President
and the Ambassador have the right freely to offer any
comment in their minds at this time with respect to this
matter, I and my Government feel equally free to offer
our comment, which is to adhere to the original views
expressed by President Roosevelt, Mr. Welles and myself
to the effect that it would be more advisable for a break
in relations to take place before the President's visit
to this and other countries in October. The Ambassador
bowed and seemed to acquiesce in the unqualified adherend
of the President and others of us to our original views
but proceeded again to rehearse some of his personal
ideas in support of the opposite view. We separated with
the matter remaining in this way.
It was manifest that the Ambassador and President
Rios plan to adhere to their position that the President
of Chile would not break off relations until his return
to Chile, despite the adherence of this Government to
the opposite view.
C.H.
S:CH:MA:ARK
PSF:Chile
Santiago,September 4,1942
Dear Mr President:-
I understand from reports that Michels said to you what
President Rios told me he would instruct him to say ,that anything you
think ne cessary or useful in the winning of the war, for the defence of the
United States ,or of the American continent, Chile would do. Unhappily
Barros Jarpa who resorts to all manner of misrepresentations and suppress-
ions to prevent a break in relations ,which you told Michels you thought
necessary and useful, is still Minister of Foreign Affairs and constantly at
the elhow of the President. Yesterday I had an hour with Rios on the
cutting off of telicommunications with the Axis counties and 1 was shocked
to find that the proof submitted to his Minister that the Axisymissions
are constantly and intensively reporting the movements of American ships
and engaging in activities not only dangerous to us but to Chile, had not
been called to his attention as his Minister had promised. I was even more
shocked to find that he actually seemed to think that the decree issued
recently forbade the use of code to the Axis missions in communicating with
their Governments.
It is now very plain to me that Rios has no thought of breaking relations
before going to Washington ,though something may be done to force it.
Five leading Senators, representing all the parties, are going to submit at
a secret session of the Senate next Wednesday when international affairs
are to be discussed ,a resolution, signed by them all, demanding the
breaking of relations but whether this passes is problematical, since
Barros Jarpa will probably have some excuse or other and hand it down as
coming from the President.
The Peruvian Ambassador at last has talked with Barros Jarpa about breaking
and he found ,as we all do,that he is absolutely against it,and he gives
as one of the reasons that the world order is changing and that it is
important that Chile should have representation in Berlin and Tokio to
keep informed;the implication being that Germany will dictate the new
order. His cousin,a Nazi ,is Ambassador in Berlin and no doubt sends him
whatever Goebbels gives out,and also "very confidential information" about
the state of the war ,indicating that the Axis is about to win.
At last we are getting a little cooperation from the British
Embassy which does absolutely nothing without specific instructions from
London.
I have suggested to Welles the wisdom of a very frank talk with Michels
who conveyed the pledge of Rios. It can be safely said that our information
is that there is no serious thought of breaking relations before he goes to
Washington and that we hear from many sources that he gives the impressiom
to some who see him that he has no really serious thought of breaking at
all unless Chile is directly attacked. Having said that ,we can properly
ask Michels for his interpretation of the pledge he was instructed to
convey.
There is a powerful and numerous pro-Nazi group here ,posing as friends of
ours who can see no advantage to us in breaking relations and these are
acquaintances of the President who go in relays to him with their story.
These are backed up by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Under these circumstances I think it of the utmost importance that
Michels communicate directly to the President just how we feel in Washington
Most of these people here are afraid of the United States ,of the economic
damage we can do Chile if forced to it, but as the Peruvian Ambassador says
they feel they are on velvet now and that if they can get away with it it is
all to the good. For that reason I think plain speaking in Washington to
Michels is most important.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Hon. Franklin D.Roosevelt
claud Bower
The White House.
Chile Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
September 11, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
Should we do something about
this?
F.D.R.
Letter from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, Embassy of the
U.S.A., Santiago, Chile, 9/4/42, to the President.
Mr. Bowers refers to Barros Jarpa, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile, who is absolutely against
breaking relations with the Axis. Mr. Michels,
who conveyed to the President the message from
President Rios, that anything the President of the
United States thought necessary or useful in the
winning of the war, for the defense of the U.S. or
of the American continent, Chile would do. Mr.
Bowers feels that some plain speaking in Washington
to Michels is most important. He feels sure there
is no serious thought of breaking relations before
President Rios goes to Washington.
PSF Chile Folder
Santiago, Chile, September 21, 1942.
filer
Dear Mr. President:
Rockefeller has come and gone and has acted in conformity
with my suggestions. I gave him leave to reply frankly to all
questions as to how we feel at home about Chile's policy, and
since those who talked with him and cultivated him were the
business crowd and politicians interested primarily in that
crowd, and these are for not breaking relations, what he said
I think was effective. They have the notion--the name explains--
that he is the man who decides what they can get here in the
way of money and material. They thought he would speak their
language. Instead he spoke a very robust American language.
However, I have reported all this in detail to the Department.
It occurs to me that it might be helpful for you to have
a rather intimate portrait of President Ríos before you talk
with him. He is a man of fair education but very provincial.
He is a lawyer of fair ability and has represented corpora-
tions mostly. Among our business men here he was represented
to me in the days of Aguirre Cerda as a "strong man". I have
found him incredibly weak, not remotely comparable with Aguirre
Cerda. He is reactionary as to domestic politics, and his
reputation for "strength" comes from his attitude toward labor
and strikers. He believes in he club for them.
He is a man without an ideology, without ideals, without
strong convictions or principles. He is a second rate politi-
cian, an opportunist. Elected by the Leftest parties, his
supreme ambition is to make such terms with the Rightest
parties as to make it possible for him to rid himself of any
dependence on the parties that elected him. One of the mis-
sions of Barros Jarpa, a Rightest, in the Ministry, is to help
The Honorable
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
FEB
By J. Scheuble Date
4
1972
Washington, D.C.
bring this about. Unhappily the Rightests here, as in Spain
and everywhere, are not really against dictatorships. They,
here, as parties are not supporters of our policy. And since
Ríos thinks in terms of local politics entirely, he is loth
to adopt a policy that might interfere with his plans for a
Centre or better still a Rightest regime.
When I say he is weak I do not mean that he lacks physical
courage. He has very little moral courage, I am afraid. I des-
cribed him to Rockefeller as "the Warren G. Harding of Chilean
politics". After some talks with him, Rockefeller thought I
had"hit him off uncannily".
He is not a Nazi. He realizes Chile's economic dependence
on us. He wants to be considered our firm friend. He was
pleased as Punch with his invitation to visit us and is greatly
worried lest we get the impression he is not friendly. Like
Barros Jarpa he is partial to American investments down here and
thinks that we as a nation judge other nations by their attitude
toward American business interests. Lacking ideals or an ideology,
he finds it difficult to believe that we put the preservation of
democratic institutions immeasureably above our moneyed interests.
But he is awakening slowly. He would have awakened earlier
but for his Foreign Minister who is not entirely frank with him.
I am persuaded that he is also a bit afraid. I am sure he
fears that an attempt may be made by the Nazis here to make
trouble if he breaks relations. He dreads it.
His personal popularity does not approach that of Aguirre
Cerda. His character explains that in part. He has lived apart
from his wife for eight or nine years. There was a momentary re-
conciliation for the purposes of the campaign and they lived to-
gether a little over a month after he entered office. Then she
packed up and went to California. The reason heard here is that
he resumed his relations with his mistress, a big blond Nazi
German woman, and his wife is said to have tossed some article
at him--playfully I hope--and left the house. The other story
is that his wife bought all the clothes in town and he rebelled
against the bill. These are the tales of the gossips. I do
know that he and his friends do not want his wife invited East
when he is there, the reason given being that she "might create
a scandal". When she left for the States, I inquired as to the
propriety of going to the plane to see her off and Barros Jarpa
advised
advised against it. So that is that. He is very much of a
ladies' man and we know some of his lady playmates. He is a
rather impressive looking man, tall and with et fine head and
good features, but you will see at a glance that he is a weak
one.
I have a feeling that when you come into contact with him,
he will shrivel and agree to almost anything you ask. Morales,
his Minister of Interior, says that he will tell you the exact
date when he will break with the Axis.
While I am seeing him this week again to press for an im-
mediate cutting off of telicommunications and an immediate break,
I have no confidence in my success.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Claude ynown
Non. Summer Welles you 10/13/421 deliving Bowers.
Signed original of their letter acturned 8 mr. to
hm
chile fredu 1-42
THE WHITE HOUSE
October 13, 1942
WASHINGTON
My dear Claude:
I wish to acknowledge your letter of September 24,
1942, outlining the effect that may be anticipated as a
result of a reduction of Chile's fuel supply to forty
percent of the last year's consumption figure. I under-
stand that the Department of State recently sent you a
telegram explaining the necessity for this reduction,
which, in the case of Chile, did not become effective
until October 1 of this year.
The increased demand for oil tankers to be used in
war operations is primarily responsible for the fuel
shortage in the Western Hemisphere. Many countries
have already taken steps to meet the existing shortage
and I am sure you appreciate that there has been no
discrimination against Chile in so far as fuel allot-
ments are concerned.
Our first consideration, naturally, is to use our
existing transportation facilities to supply fuel to
the actual theaters of war, and civilian needs in all
countries must be considered secondary. Whenever the
special circumstances make it possible, additional
allotments of fuel will be made to enable reserve
inventories to be built up in the various countries
of the Western Hemisphere.
With cordial regards, I am
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt
The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago, Chile.
Santiago, September 24, 1942.
Dear Mr. President:
This morning I was asked by President Ríos to advise
you that if we persist in the announced reduction in gasoline
to 40 per cent of last year the effect, economically, will
be disastrous, resulting in the closing down of factories
and shops and the unemployment of men. He tells me that pri-
vate cars will be refused gasoline beginning October 1st,
but, with this gain, the 40 per cent reduction would be,
economically, very serious and even grave. He is afraid,
and I have no doubt he is right, that this sort of upheaval
economically will be used against his regime and his plan
for breaking relations, by the Nazi element.
Some time ago Phillip Clover, Special Assistant to
handle the gasoline rationing in Chile, was here and made
& very thorough investigation, and he reported that to re-
duce Chile lower than 60 per cent compared with last year
would be disastrous economically. Our own people in the
Embassy, who are experts on the subject and on the ground,
agree with Clover. Apparently the gasoline people in
Washington, with this recommendation and advice before them,
decided to reduce, not to 60, or even 50, but to 40 per cent.
On the advice of those in the Embassy in charge, I tele-
graphed all this to the Department long ago, urging some-
thing more compatible with the positive economic needs,
but no reply has been received. I sent a follow-up telegram
asking for a reply some time ago, and no answer.
The President,
The White House.
-2-
Just now we are primarily interested in the breaking
of relations; and in this respect we have made great pro-
gress in the last month. Politically, we all feel that it
would be a great setback, resulting in bitter resentment,
if factories must close, farms go uncultivated, essential
transportation fail, and men be thrown out of jobs upon
the streets. Clover put the figure at 60 per cent. Some
of my people feel the Chileans might get along barely with
a 50 per cent reduction; everyone agrees that 40 per cent
is disastrous. If someone has some purpose in all this it
would be highly advantageous were we to be informed. We will
be blamed by many because private cars are taken from the
street, but with that I am not concerned; it is a different
matter when factories are closed, unemployment is forced,
and absolutely essential transportation facilities are
denied. I hope that something can be done about it.
With warmest regards, I am
Faithfully yours,
Chande yBowns
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 12. 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to refer to your memorandum of
October 2 requesting that a reply be prepared to &
letter dated September 24 from Ambassador Bowers at
Santiago.
There is enclosed for your signature, if you
approve, & draft of a reply to Ambassador Bowers'
letter.
A yours, Niths
Enclosures:
1. Letter from
Ambassador Bowers,
September 24, 1942.
2. Draft of reply to
Ambassador Bowers.
The President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
RA
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
10/7/42
ADDRESSED TO
The President,
The White House.
- A. GOVERNMENT PAINTIRE OFFICE
1-1033
gream
Chile Folder Chile Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
October 2, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.
F. D.R.
Letter to the Pres. from Claude Bowers
Chile, Sept. 24th.
chile folder 1-42
friend
Santiago, October 19, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing copy of a letter to Welles that
has some amusing features. Rios is now awake to the
situation in which Barros Jarpa has placed him and the
country and has apparently turned upon him. If drastic
action against the spy ring 1s taken, as promised for
this week, something will have been done to create a
better atmosphere for the visit; and if Rios completely
shuts off all telecommunications with the Ax1s that should
help. I personally feel Rios should first break and then
go, fixing a date for the visit far enough in advance;
but he seems rather strongly convinced that it is of the
utmost advantage for him to be able to say to the congress-
ional leaders and others that on his trip he found all
the South and Central American nations agreed that Chile
should break and that he cannot, and will not, have Chile
isolated. It is possible of course that if drastic action
is taken against the spies, and telecommunication is com-
pletely shut off, a controversy with the Axis missions may
result which will force a speedy break. It is 80 advan-
tageous to the Axis, however, to have a free hand here that
I doubt if the Axis countries will take the initiative in
breaking.
The case of Barros Jarpa is tragic. He has been a
great friend of ours for years and all the American colony
were devoted to him, and most of his clients were the Ameri-
can corporations, and he finds himself anathema with his
old friends, and about to be repudiated by the President.
I am told that he is terribly depressed. His attitude 1s
utterly inexplicable to me on any ground other than one so
infamous that I would rather not mention it.
With warmest personal regards, I am
Most sincerely yours,
claude yBowes
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Santiago, October 19, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
The Nazi honeymoon resulting from the postponement
is now over and Chileans whose brains would not rattle
in a mustard seed are now most contrite and humble.
General Escudero and high functionaries of the Army are
depressed and told Colonel Johnson that they felt they
had "lost a friend". President Rios 1s depressed and I
hear from several quarters that he is through with Barros
Jarpa. The best proof of his loss of confidence in his
Minister 18 his action in consulting with the Sub-Minister
instead, and in rejecting Barros Jarpa's idea that Rios
should not go to the States now. He now seems in a mood
to cut off telecommunications with the Ax1s completely.
This week will tell whether Morales means business about
the espionage ring. He has promised the arrests of the
eighteen leaders whose names, with proof, were furnished
the Foreign ffice three months ago. I am told from seem-
ingly dependable quarters that there will be a reorganization
of the Government with Barros Jarpa out this week. The
latter 18 much depressed and humble and apparently would
give much to be able to retrace his steps. He has been
seeking some way out without any ostensible back-down
on his part, and, as you know, has expressed the hope that
Brazil will smooth things over. Gracie tells me that
Aranha is now willing to act on the assumption that there
18 nothing to mediate. EL MERCURIO will henceforth work
for a rupture in relations, according to Agustin Edwards.
Emilio Edwards Bello came to thank me for the infor-
mation I sent him from you, and he tells me he did go to
Alessandri to inform him that he had his story all wrong.
He found Alessandri in bed sick, and the old man at first
flamed and tried to tell his visitor just what his visitor
had actually done in Habana, but the visitor stood stoutly
by his guns, told him you are a friend of Chile and of all
the Americas, and finally the old man subsided and agreed.
Alessandri
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
Alessandri insisted that he is a friend of ours which I
gravely question. and pointed to a copy of "Jefferson and
Hamitlon" on his bed which I had inscribed to him, and
said he hoped we are still friends.
The truthis that domestic politics and personal political
ambitions have played a major part in the confusion here.
Rossetti is demanding that the Rio agreements be lived
up to. Barros Jarpa told Gracie that the agreements may
be submitted to Congress for ratification and Rios had said
as much to the Sub-Minister, notwithstanding the fact that,
at the instance of Barros Jarpa, the President had prevented
the ratification when Rossetti was pressing for it just
before he went out, on the ground that all this was the
prerogative of the President and that this could not be
compromised by a submission. Gracie told Barros Jarpa
that of course the submission would be a great triumph for
one man who would make the most of it "Who", asked Barros
Jarpa. "Rossetti", said Gracie. "Well, let him", said B.J.
I have stood aside, said nothing, seen no one, and
after the cancellation of my dinner I cancelled a fair at
the Embassy to raise money for the war workers here. and had
the things donated for raffle returned, and the ticket
money as well. This has worried them quite a lot and the
merchants were very nervous, evidently fearing that they
had incurred our displeasure and might find themselves on
the Black List. They were reassured and told that if the
fair is held later they will have another opportunity to
contribute. The Chileans are now going out of their way
to appear cordial.
The atmosphere here is better for us as a result of
the upheaval. The Axis people now seem certain the rupture
will come. The ACCION SHILENA, whose editor is in Jail
because of its infamous attack on Roosevelt, came out this
week with an article which implies that a rupture is coming
and attacking me as "shameless and cynical" and engineering
a rupture with "friendly nations". I am ignoring this last
issue.
That which saves the situation more than anything else
is the Chileans fine sense of humor. They are laughing at
Barros Jarpa, laughing at the sending of the spies to Zapallar,
saying that they are going to turn Nazi spies to get a summer
at Zapallar at Government expense. The aristocracy with
villas there are protesting indignantly about making &
spy nest of the place and the spies are now removed from
there. TOPAZE, the best paper of humor in South America,
always
- 3 -,
always strongly with us, is full of amusing sketches.
You figure in one. Roosevelt standing on the steps of the
White House smiling and with a chin that almost drags the
ground is saiting for Rios who is approaching up the walk
when you, from behind a tree with a sling knock off Rios'
plug hat. This alone might be misinterpreted, but taken
with all the rest of the issue it is not misinterpreted
here. Another sketch is based on the practice here of the
ladies putting their hair in curl papers before a party.
All the members of Ries party for the trip are shown with
their hair in ourl papers and an expression of utter con-
fusion on their faces.
With warmest personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
PSF:Chile
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 19, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
TO AMBASSADOR BOWERS IF YOU DEEM
ONE NECESSARY.
F. D. R.
Letter to the President
from Ambassador Bowers, dated
October 10, 1942, re President's
rios' visit to the U. S. and
Under Secretary of Welles' speech
in Boston.
chile folder
1-42
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Santiago, October 10, 1942
My dear Mr. Early:
I wish you would have the enclosed letter
to the President delivered at once sinceit is of
vital and pressing importance.
Sincerely yours,
claude effower
The Honorable
Stephen Farly,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
fill al
chile folder
1-42
October 22, 1942.
Dear Claude:-
Thank you much for yours of the
fifteenth. We are keeping discreetly quiet.
I hope you liked my cordial reply to Rios.
I really meant it when I talked about sitting
around a table peacefully and talking things
over.
I do hope and believe things will
work out all right.
My best wishes to you,
Always sincerely,
Honorable Claude G. Bowers,
American Embassy,
Santiago,
Chile.
PSF:Chile
Santiago, October 15,1942
Dear Mr. President:
In case it may interest you I am enclosing a copy of
my letter to Welles. With a secret enemy like Barros Jarpa,
posing ostentatiously as a cordial friend, it was inevitable
that Welles' statement of the bald facts would be seized upon
to prevent the Rios visit. I have felt all along that Barros
Jarpa would do anything within his power to prevent Rios
from meeting you. He has eeized upon the Boston speech to
misrepresent what was said; has bullied the press here, with
the exception of the Socialist, and the Communist organs
into playing his game, and for the moment made himself into
a national hero. Not however with the intelligent and the
masses who have been with us all the time.
It has since occurred to me that possibly Welles' speech
was intended to postpone the visit of Rios until he breaks
relations. If 80 it was a heroic method and I am hopeful
it will be successful. It has been enormously helpful because -
I have poured in on Barros Jarpa positive proof of the
operations of the Nazi espionage ring here and he has kept
everything from the press, not to mention the Senate, and
as I found five weeks ago not even to President Rios. The
Welles speech brings this out dramatically. The people
themselves know now what we think.
Too much importance must not be attached to the seeming
general jubilation over Barros Jarpa "defending the national
honor". There is a very large and influential element here,
financially and socially important, which is secretly if
not openly pro-Nazi, anti-democratic and anti-American. All
these have rushed into print and shouted.
Then, with the exception of the Socialist and Communist
organs which are making a fight on Barros Jarpa, all the
other papers here, easily intimidated, were called in and
given orders by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make
the most of the incident. EL MERCURIO, the highest grade
paper
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington.
- 2 -
paper here, really a distinguished paper, resented the
dictation I am sure and when Arturo Alessandri issued
his distinctly pro-Nazi lying letter, EL MERCURIO called
up the Foreign Office and protested against its publication.
It was told to print it. This paper goes on the theory that
regardless of who is in power, the press should support the
Government, but in the present instance it 1s fed up.
Day before yesterday the Agricultural Society gave its
big dinner and this was made the occasion for a big ovation
for Barros Jarpa. But it is well to remember that this
Society is composed of the old feudalistic landowning
aristocracy which 18 bitterly anti-democratic, always pro-
totalitarian, and now pro-Nazi and pro-Argentine and anti-
United States. It is hated by the mass of the people.
The people now are beginning to awaken to a realization
of the fact that neither the sovereignty nor dignity of Chile
was insulted by the Boston speech, and that they have been
lead by Barros Jarpa into an attitude offensive to the one
nation on which the economic life of Chile now depends. Some
bitterness is developing in consequence against him. Last
night Marcial Mora, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and
of Finance, and former President of the Bank of Chile, came
to me to express his disgust. He came out militantly for
breaking relations some time ago. He was frankly alarmed over
the possible effect on Chile. Senator Cruz Coke came to the
house last night seething with indignation. Senator Maza,
head of the Liberal Party, very conservative, and until recently
against breaking relations, but for some time now in favor of
it, has resigned the Presidency of the Party and the directors
of the Party with him.
At this moment I feel -
That you having sent a cordial letter to Rios, our
position now should be one of silence while these people sweat
and come to a realization that Chile must break relations and
act drastically against Nazi and Axis espionage. I do not
think we should make a single move. It is clearly up to
Rios now. The less we say the more nervous these people will
become. I am saying absolutely nothing and have issued orders
to the heads of all sections in the Embassy to instruct all
under them that they are to say absolutely nothing if ap-
proached beyond "it 1s too bad".
Many decisive things may happen here before this
reaches you, - the resignation of the Government and a
reorganization, with Barros Jarpa out, seems possible before
Sunday.
- 3 -
Sunday.
I am informed that Rios has in mind making
Ben Claro Foreign Minister and while he is a bright
young man, I could name a score of others better qualified
and for us more dependable.
With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely yours,
craum
Santiago, October 15, 1942
Dear Mr. Welles:
You may find it convenient to have a review of the
incidents here relating to the Boston speech. There cer-
tainly was not one word in the speech that does not conform
to the precise facts. The reaction here 18 of two sorts.
In the case of Barros Jarpa and his pro-Nazi Fifth Column
allies it was one of pretended outrage because of a simulated
"insult" to the dignity of Chile. This 18 pure Nazi propa-
ganda. In the case of PresidentRios it was a little different.
I have no doubt that the reaction of our press on the speech
did create an unhappy atmosphere for his trip. I have many
reasons for believingthat it was with the greatest reluctance
that he postponed it.
The subtle misrepresentations of Barros Jarpa of the
speech, conveying the impression, popularly held in consequence,
that you had said that Chile is stabbing her American neighbors
in the back, instead of that the Nazi espionage rings here
are stabbing them in the back; and the fact that the Govern-
ment here, which in this instance means Barros Jarpa, has
failed to give out the statement made to Michels by President
Roosevelt in your presence, have had a bad effect on public
opinion.
Having built up a case by misrepresentations and suppres-
sion, Barros Jarpa and the Nazi element have been making
the most of it. The fact 1s that Just before this Barros Jarpa
was very much on the defensive and there was a general feel-
ing that he could not last long. New he has set to work to
convert himself into a national hero, Horatio at the bridge,
valiantly defending the sovereignty and dignity of his country,
against the Colossus of the North. This has been done largely
through the press. Before giving out his statement which
contained lies, he summoned all the papers to his office and
gave instructions as to what he wanted said and what he wanted
unsaid. This has had no effect on LA CRITICA, the Socialist
organ
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
organ, or EL SIGLO, the Communist, but all the others, with
the exception of EL MERCURIO which has been reasonable
throughout, have fallen in line with zest. The result has
has been that the press for some days has been filled with
glorifications of Barros Jarpa, some in editorials, some
in special articles and letters, some in telegrams sent to
the Minister, and - this seems serious to me - some in edi-
torials of commendation from Brazilian papers.
There 18 no doubt in my mind, as I had reported, that
Barros Jarpa was much chagrined over Rios' prospective visit
and that he was most eager to find a pretence to sabotage
the trip. In this sense the speech played into his hands.
But, on the other hand, the suppressions by Barros Jarpa
of essential facts pertaining to Ax1s espionage had utterly
confused the public as to the realities, and the speech
has shocked them into a realization that something must be
wrong. At first blush I think they Jumped to the conclusion
that you merely intended to insult them; but they are now
beginning to suspect that you would never have made such a
statement without ample justification. And the fact that
President Roosevelt has sustained your position convinces
them all the more. The original thought of our enemies was
to differentiate between you and President Roosevelt, and
to create the impression that the latter would not approve.
No one longer entertains that fantastic idea.
The speech and the reaction have also served a good
purpose in that it has brought various men out in their
true colors. I fancy the Department no longer thinks , if
it ever thought, that my impressions of Arturo Alessandri
were dictated by prejudice. But in an article of glorifi-
cation of Barros Jarpa's attitude, I find the names sub-
scribed of Juvenal Hernandez, Rector of the University,
whom I have always thought pro-German and anti-American;
Jorge Matte, who would have been Foreign Minister if Barros
Jarpa had not been and who is absolutely against offending
the Axis; Carlos Vial, President of the Compañia Sud-americana
de Vapores, and of course our old Nazi friend del Pedregal
of the Fomento Corporation.
Our supporters have been momentarily silenced and over-
whelmed because of the merry pro-Barros Jarpa crusade of
the press; they have been afraid to say much lest what
they say be put down to hostility to President Rios; but
their opinion as to breaking relations has not altered in
the least and their opposition to Barros Jarpa has intensified.
EL SIGLO
- 3 -
EL SIGLO and LA CRITICA have ferociously attacked
Barros Jarba, demanding his resignation, and the Socialist
Party has formally demanded the immediate breaking of
relations and the removal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
As the conservative elementinterested selfishly in the
economic well-being of the country begin to reflect on the
wisdom of attacking or opposing the one nation on which
Chile is economically dependent, I have no doubt that there
will be a change in them and that they will reach the con-
clusion that Barros Jarpa has rendered a great disservice
to the nation.
II
The arrest of the three Nazi spies, including the
President of the German Bank as the leader, and of the
former Consul General in New York dwindles in importance
in view of the fact that they are not to be expelled, on
the pretext that Argentina will not permit them to enter
that country even to get a boat for Spain. They are not
imprisoned. Barros Jarpa had told me that if they could
not find a way out they would be confined to some obscure
out-of-the way little town under police supervision. It
now develops that they are sentenced to a summer at
Zapallar, the Newport of Chile, the choicest summer spot
in the country, within easy reach of Valparaiso, and
thick with Axis sympathizers, and they will in no sense
be confined but will be free to come and go about at will
and only be compelled to report once a week to the police
in Zapallar. The German Ambassador, and Leisewitz of the
German Embassy to my personal knowledge are in and out of
Zapallar constantly. I have not the slightest doubt but
that they are being sent to Zapallar to please, if not on
the request of, the German Ambassador. I should think it
well worth while if some American humorist would write a
funny story on the mockery of the thing and have the A.P.
and U.P. send it to Chile.
III
Rooseveltis reply in a friendly way to Rios' telegram
1s entirely satisfactory but nothing more should be done
now but the Chileans should be permitted to sweat in our
silence. I have instructed all the people at the Embassy
that they are to refuse to discuss the controversy. I find
that our silence makes them sweat and worry more than
anything else.
IV
As you know Barros Jarpa has been gunning for Michels
ever since he went in. Because Michels in an interview
after leaving President Roosevelt expressed himself as
- 4 -
satisfied and said the incident seemed closed, the Minister
and his cohorts are trying to work up a sentiment against
him, with the hope of having him removed. EL IMPARCIAL
last night had a cartoon with Michels up in the air looking
dazed and saying, as he said on leaving the White House
that "he could see the rainbow", while a noble citizen
looking up from the ground remarks that he seems "up in the
moon". Of course I do not think Rios would dare remove him
and I am sure he has no thought of doing SO.
With warmest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Chile folder 1-42
11
they and
Santiago, October 24, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
Nothing but some great blunder can prevent the hoped
for rupture with the Ax1s now, and I hear from various sources
that it may come within a few days. Duhalde, the Minister of
Defense, and the strongest man in the Government, told a
friend of mine that "It is a matter of hours". Nothing can
be expected until Fernandez the new Minister of Foreign Affairs
arrives on Sunday. We have reached the point where further
attacks during the next week or ten days on Chile's failure
to act would be harmful.
I find among even those most strongly withus a feeling
that the dignity of Chile has been offended rather seriously
because as far as the public knows we have not taken the
trouble to reply to Chile's protest. Of course you made the
reply in person to Michels and Chile was authorized to give
it out. For manifest reasons, of course, Barros Jarpa sup-
pressed it and people generally have the impression we have
treated an official statement of Chile's with the contempt
of silence. I have telegraphed my opinion that our reply
as submitted to me should be given the U.P. and A.P.
Rios is as eager to go to Washington as can be and is
determined to go and his cordiality to me in public yesterday
at the review in the O'Higgins ceremony was rather unusual.
I am becoming rather uneasy over the disposition of our
Ambassador's in other South American countries to give out
interviews against Chile, since I can assure you your Ambassa-
doe in Chile is infinitely better qualified to know what
should and should not be said to fit in with the situation of
the moment. I understood that these over-eager colleagues
were given the facts as background to feed the press quietly
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
and not to issue official statements. I have an unpleasant
recollection of the timewhen your Ambassador in Spain
was reporting the exact truth when American Ambassadors
here, there, and everywhere were reporting on Spain in
contradiction to my reports, getting it all "out of the horse's
mouth" - mostly Fifth Columnists. The record is most
eloquent now as to who was right and knew what he was about.
With highest personal regards, I am
Most sincerely yours
Claude yBowers
chile folder
fillows.
1-42
Santiago,October 29,1942
Dear Mr President:-
As 1 telegraphed the Department at the time, your
teølegraphic reply to Rios was magnificent and took the wind out of
the sails of our enemies. I took the liberty in a personal note to
Rios to quote from your letter about the sincerety of your statement
about sitting down like brothers ,and this morning Fernandez, the new
Foreign Minister, told me Rios is delighted and is writing me.
At his frtst diplomatic reception this morning only the Germans,
Italians and Japanese were absent ,these being received later. Fernan-
dez was most ostentatious in his attentions to me.After passing all
along the line he immediately hurried back to me and talked a long
while ,and 1 noticed the tip off from a functionary of the Ministry to
the photographer who caught us in conversation. I have the feeling
that Fernandez is a pure opportunist and that his policy will be
dictated by Rios absolutely. ne seems more hearty and cordial since
his conferences with Rios than when I first saw him before he had
these conferences. He told me this morning that Rios has given orders
to proceed drastically and intensively against the espionage ring.
The press at home may have had something about the
college student "demonstrations" and may have exaggerated. The fact
my house
is one evening about 25 students appeared in front, sang the national
antem, h and then left a letter to me. was at the office, not home, .The
letter was most respectful, complimentary to the United States and to
me ,and declared the students in complete sympathy with the Allies and
thoroughly democratic, but that they were hurt because Chile's protest
had been ignored. 1 told the servants that if they appeared again to
invite them in and summon me;but the next days a gang of young nazis
hitched on / and the officers at the gate refused them entrance. 1 then
sent a note to the young men who had come first and told them 1 would
be glad to receive a committee of fifteen. They appeared the next day
and 1 found them spåèndid young fellows, really on our side, really
hurt because they thought the protest had been treated with contemptu+
ous silence. I had three members of the staff there so there could be
no misrepresentation of what was said and I heard their spokesman
and discussed matters with them for almost two hours. We then posed
in a group for a picture.
By inviting them in and treating them as I did it smashed the plan
of the Nazis ,and the leading magazine here gives the front page cover
to the protograph with the comment that nothing could better illustrate
the spirity of democracy and particularly of the democracy of the
American nations. I assured these boys that you personally had replied
on October IOth ,and 1 told them at length about the espionage
activities here.
There is no doubt that Rios is most eager to make the journey .Now
that arrests are being made of the nazi and Axis spies on a large
scale, I have suggested here that it would be well were the Government
to give the A.P. and U.P. full stories on these arrests for the papers
of the United States --useful in creating a better atmosphere for the
visit.
Am disgusted with Wilkies playing of Jim Watson politics after he
had had the doors thrown u open to him through your letters. John Lamb
,of Indiana, the wisest politician I ever knoew ,often said to me that
"if you b go to bed with your enemies you get lice". I was favorably
impressed with Wilkies conduct until after and during his last trip
when
and he began to play the demagogue with an international situation.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
clauds "Bower
on.Franklin D.Roosevelt
The White House.
Chile folder
Santiago, November 7, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
The situation as to Chile now is this:
First there is no longer any doubt of her determination
to break relations with the Axis and to proceed energetically
against Axis espionage.
Second, President Rios 18 eager to make his trip and
wants the atmosphere prepared in the United States so he
can have the kind of reception a Chilean President must have.
Third, immediately on his return he proposes to break
relations, basing his action on the ground that not "pressure
from the United States" but the common desire of all the
American countries he had visited makes it imperative and
desirable.
When I saw Rios last Tuesday he talked along this line
and thought it would be most helpful if some one high in
authority in Washington said something in commendation of
the present activities of the Government against Axis espionage
and expressed confidence in Rios' intentions to cooperate
fully. I telegraphed Washington proposing the plan which
was adopted of having a correspondent at a press conference
ask either you or Hull for comment. The effect here has been
splendid. President Rios, Fernandez, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Ruiz Solar, Secretary-General of the Presi-
dent, Morales, the Minister of the Interior, have expressed
their gratitude warmly to me and the diplomats of our
American allies are delighted.
I think that unless conditions here force a rupture
before we must reconcile ourselves to having Chile act now
and persistently against German espionage and let her have
her way about breaking on Rios' return. I find that
practically
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
practically all my American colleagues think it best in the long
run that way. They fear that an immediate break would be ascribed
to "pressure" or "dictation" from us, and they feel that Rios'
idea of returning with the announcement that in all American
nations but one, he found the feeling that Chile should break
and for the sake of solidarity he was breaking, would be less
difficult for Rios and divert attacks from us.
That Rios is eager to go I know. Intimate official asso-
ciates of the President tell me that he cannot go until after
the visit of the President of Ecuador but that he plans to go
immediately thereafter, and Ben Cohen, Ambassador in Bolivia,
who was summoned here to accompany Rios a month ago, tells me
he is remaining here since it would not be worthwhile for him
to return to La Paz and then come back in three weeks.
The press is now making an open campaign for rupture on
the request of Rios and the Foreign Minister. The other night
60,000 people of all parties, all but the Conservatives, staged
a demonstration without precednet in favor of rupture and for
two hours Rios, Morales and Fernandez reviewed the parade from
the balcony of the Moneda.
They saw banners with your pictures, Churchills and other
United Nation leaders including Stalin's and heard shouts for
you. Churchill and victory. It was orderly and it has made
a deep impression.
We must be very careful now to do nothing, and say nothing,
that would change the current which now is strong and growing
stronger every hour.
The election seems to me a great victory for your Adminis-
tration. In an off year, with you necessarily silent, with
taxes burdensome, with the isolationist element resentful,
and with our Party in power for ten years, it is marvelous
that we emerge in control of every branch of the national govern-
ment. The gubernatorial result in New York does not amaze me.
Somehow, Bennett, who probably 1s an able and good man, has
never thrilled me, and he lacks the color and the dramatic
appeal that his democratic predecessors have had. His
election rather smears Wilkies chances. The Lord's will be done!
With warmest regards,
Sincerely yours,
claude ybour
Chile folder
1-42
Santiago, November 10, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
Yesterday I had an hour with President Rios, apropos
our landing in North Africa. I was impressed with his
earnestness and sincerity. He greeted me effusively on
entering the room, with warmest congratulations on our
landing and on your speech to the French people, and his
expression, usually reticent and shy, bore out the sincerity
of his words. He said that because of Chile's love for
France our action will have a splendid effect here; and
because South Americans are largely Latin it will have a
fine effect over the continent.
I then told him our
attitude toward Italy and our action in declaring Italians
in the States not alien enemies and he said this too would
be effective.
He told me that he asked all the papers here to begin
a campaign for rupture and that within a few days "even the
ILUSTRADO" will be supporting his policy in this sense.
With a laugh he added "I even have the pledge of Arturo
Alessandri that he will keep silent henceforth". He then
said that the trouble with Arturo is his apparent inability
to understand that in a grave international situation local
politics should stay out.
He also said, apropos of the recent action of the
Supreme Court in holding the German banker spy that he
had asked the Court to take such action if possible as a
matter of high public policy. Laughingly he then added
that when the German Ambassador saw him in the interest of
this banker spy he had told the Ambassador that this is a
democracy with three independent branches of government,
but that the Court was composed of able men who would handle
the banker's case according to law.
I am
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
I am sending a confidential report of the Minister
of the Interior to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which
the latter sent to my house last night, to the Department
today in despatch No. 4904. This report is an honest
statement of facts, as I know from my own knowledge and
after conferring with our Intelligence Officer, Wall.
If you are interested in this phase you will find an
explanation of the delay in taking action against the
Ax1s espionage and something on the difficulties here due
to lack of adequate funds. I have submitted a suggestion
apropos of that.
With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely yours,
Claude HRowers
Suice writing This, The
Zorenge uninster eas year seed
we a copy of Reoo telequau
to you. This to excellent
and the Perminan
who has rest east we there
He same
PSF File Chile
Santiago,November 16,1942
Dear Mr President:-
I am inclosing two telegrams sent by me yesterday
(Sunday) and today which I consider of such importance at this juncture
that I feel you should see them and consider them, and 1 am afraid that
in the crush of work Mr Welles may overlook calling them to your
attention. There is no doubt that Chile has definitively determined to
break with the Axis ,and the Presidents statement to me that he had
called in the papers and askedcthem to begin the campaign for rupture
has been since borne out by their action. When he told me that the
Ilustrada, extremely Right, and the organ of the Church had promised him t
to support him if he ruptures 1 was more than skeptical. This morning
proofo of his sincerety again in the editorial in that paper.
We have had so many reasons for resenting Chile's lack
of action that I am afraid some of our people have become prejudiced
and are prone to be indifferent to Chile's present advances under
enormously changed conditions. Nothing could be worse here. I have
no doubt that at this juncture we must give the President here every
sympathetic consideration and such assistance as we can in making his
right about face easier ,more dignified and graceful.
For the first time during the last month I have been able to
talk with the utmost frankness in an atmosphere of unweserve ,and
confidentially ,and we are going places. Your telegram to Rios in
reply to Rios startlingly cordial and sympathetic cable to you on
North Africa, has pleased the President enormously ,delighted the
Foreign Minister and given great satisfaction to the Chilean people.
That is the tone we must assume and the line we must follow. The
rupture seems positively assured ,and 1 do not think we should quibble
over the method or means Rios may think best. For the first time
Government here has talked confidentially to me on Chile's relations
with Argentine, revealing what 1 had long thought.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Hon.Franklin D.Roosevelt
clauds y Bowes
The White House.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dupt. Letter, 1-11-72
AIR MAIL
J.
Date
FEB
4 1972
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Telegram of November 15, 2 pm, 1983
FOR SECRETARY UNDERSECRETARY & DUGGAN
Referring to your telegram of November 14, 2 pm, #1371
1) This morning Fernandez telephoned asking if I would receive
him at 12:30 today. He came to inform me that yesterday instru-
tions had been sent to the Chilean legation in Vicy to retire
them to Madrid and remain there pending clarification of the
situation since with the Germans in absolute control in France
there is no point in having a legation there; and also to the
end that Chile may be in better position to follow us on what-
ever steps may be taken as to possible recognition of another
Government. He told me the French Minister has informed him
he had received not one word from his Government in eight days
and 1s very much distressed as to his situation.
2) He also came to express profound appreciation for the
"very moving character" of Roosevelt's telegram to Ros.
3) I then told him I had transmitted the request brought me
by Cohen and explained failure to incorporate sentence asked.
4) I then told him President Roosevelt's schedule which makes
impossible Rios' visit before January 5th and he appeared to
understand, but half in earnest suggested it might be possible
to arrange exchange of dates with Cuban President. He said he
thought Rios should go as soon as possible.
5) When he said he and Rios felt it best to break relations
immediately on return instead of before going, I told him I
have no instructions, no authorization but asked if he would
like for me to give him my own feeling personally. He said he
would. I then set forth the reasons why a break before would
be advantageous, covering the line in your telegram. He thanked
me for speaking frankly and said he would speak frankly in
return. This brought out a plan of Government here not hitherto
known. I give you a rough but absolutely accurate quotation:
"We are a neighbor of Argentina, our territory touching,
with always a possibility of some territorial or other complica-
tion and for that reason alone we wish to be fair with Argentina.
Rios' plan is this: he makes the trip and his last stop 1s
in Buenos Aires. There he will say to Cestillo that Chile has
determined absolutely on an immediate rupture with the Axis, and
since Chile does not wish to leave Argentina out on a limb or
isolated, he will urge that Argentina join and break simultaneously.
He will make it clear that Chile will break at once even if
Argentina will not, but that he wished to spare Argentina the
embarrassment of being left alone." Fennandez said there is a
very strong feeling for rupture among Argentinians and that
there 18 a good prospect that when Rios makes his immediate
intentions known and invites Argentina to join, she may do BO.
If she does not, it will not deter Chile at all.
Here is something you may want to consider. It 18 the first
clear exposition of Chile's attitude toward Argentina I have heard.
I told him frankly that our friends had been worried because
Rios' last visit would be to Buenos Aires and that the Argentines
might persuade him not to break. He said that this was quite
true at one time but no longer.
He said he would give Rios my views and he hoped I would
Its submit emious this very confidential plan of Rios to Washington for
consideration as a practical way of bringing not
2,
M ЯӀА
- 2 - (1983)
AIR MAIL
only Chile but Argentina into the orbit. But he reiterated
that having given Argentina her chance, Chile will act
regardless of Argentina's reaction. I am sure he talked with
complete frankness.
6) El Mercurio today editorially mentions rupture.
The editorial written by Foreign Office official.
Please call the President's attention to this telegram.
Repeated to Buenos Aires.
Bowers
STRICTLY CONFIDENT
AIR MAIL
Copy of Telegram No. 1987 of November 16, 3 pm
FOR THE SECRETARY UNDERSECRETARY AND DUGGAN
Referring to my telegram No. 1983 of November 15, 2 pm
Now that even the DIARIO ILUSTRADO has come out editorially
with pledge to support Rios in whatever policy he may adopt, I
think it very necessary that Washington consider the rapidly
changing prospects here. It must be kept in mind in whatever
1s done or said that there is no doubt that the determination
has been reached by the President and his Government to break
with the Axis; that Government is acting positively to prepare
the way for the break soon; that the action of ILUSTRADO this
morning bears out Rios' statement to me reported at the time
that he has the pledge of this paper to support him in the event
of a break; that Morales Saturday made a speech given to the
press which leaves no doubt of Government's position in which
he said, apropos of the action being taken against Ax1s espionage,
that he 18 acting on the President's instructions to act ener-
getically against all agencies operating against the democracies.
While we ant and shall do what we can to break the
break before Rios' visit, we should give due consideration
to Fernandez' explanation of the plan 8.8 it relates to Argentina
and bear in mind that there is a special Argentine-Chilean
problem involving the relations of the two nations.
We have the assurance from every governmental quarter up
to the President that the break will come immediately on
Rios return; and the fact that the President feels that the
visit should be at an early date indicates the feeling that
the break must come as soon as possible.
Now that the press campaign is launched to prepare the
ground for the break I am afraid that it 1s unfortunate to
have this continued for as much 8.8 two months since it will
lose its punch in that time, and I suspect this may be in the
mind of Rios.
Our resentments of Chile's attitude in the past have been
richly earned, but now that the dirft in our direction is
pronounced, and pledges are made, I feel that an attitude of
indifference now would be very bad and that it should now
be our policy to do what we can to smooth the way for the
Government there to act through such confidential cooperation
as we can give.
If President Roosevelt could possibly spare three days
for Rios immediately after the Cuban leaves it would greatly
hasten the rupture; and if the visit made before the rupture
Coordination Committee and propaganda agencies in States
could prepare a good atmosphere by having press assume that
this is the preliminary to the break.
We shall do what we can within the proprieties to convince
the Government that rupture should come before the visit.
However for the first time, we have reached a very friendly
cooperative confidential state of negotiations, and the
purpose of this telegram is to urge that Washington take
cognizance of this changed situation and be as helpful as
1é reasonable and proper in making it 8.8 easy as possible
for Government to right about face with some semblance of
dignity.
DECLASSIFIED
BOWERS
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
Chile folder
1-42
Santiago, November 23,1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am much gratified by the report in the press here
that you have intervened to prevent the assassination -
for that is what it would amount to - of Largo Cabellero,
Quiroga, and Giron, arrested by the Germans in France and
sent to Franco. I note that special emphasis 1s laid on
Largo Cabellero which is all right. But since Largo
Cabellero is a Socialist and it appears from the press that
my old friends Fernando de los Rios and Del Vayo have inter-
ceded with you, it occurs to me that they may not have said
enough about Quiroga and Giron who are of the party of Azaña,
mere republicans and outstanding democrats. Girons arrest
is outrageous since he was not a politician, merely a
strong republican and an idealist, a physician of standing,
who was made Prime Minister to succeed Quiroga when the
latter at the very beginning of the war was displaced. He
was a personal friend and appointment of Azaña.
Quiroga is a man of ability, an ardent democrat and
republican, and he was very close to Azana. He was Prime
Minister when the war began. Because he was Prime Minister
when Calvo Sotella, the head of the Axis crowd in Spain,
was assassinated by three officers of the Assault Guards,
it was charged, as part of the Nazi conspiracy, that he had
arranged the assassination, and because of this he is in
danger. Of course he had no more to do with arranging an
assassination thanAzana. Calvo Sotello, who was killed
none to soon in the interest of the Republic, was killed
because Just before, three days I think before, an officer
of the Assault Guards was assassinated by the Fascists and
the Assault Guards took matters into their own hands without
consulting the Government at all.
I am gratified by your intercession because military
reasons have necessitated the giving out of statements by
us implying perfect confidence in Franco, and this has caused
a painful impression among all the friends of Spanish
democracy
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
democracy who do not see the military angle.
Apropos of Ranco's and Jordana's Meutrality", I
might suggest that perhaps, since the proof of the pudding
is the eating" that perhaps Jordana might instruct his
Missions here and throughout South America that neutrality
does not mean an intensification of their cooperation
with the Axis in the nastiest kind of propaganda against
us; and that it is difficult to associate "neutrality"
with the presence of Spanish troops with the Germans
operating against Russia, our Ally.
Incidentally, Jordana, whom I know, was the man
who entered into the agreement with Mussolini in 1926
to turn the Balearic Islands over to the use of Italy
as a base in the case Italy should be involved in a war.
He was a Fascist then as he is a Fascist now. One can be
a monarchist, as in Italy, and still stand for a
Fascist regime, as in Italy.
I am merely giving you this as background.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely yours,
clauds spowces
And
Chile folder
Santiago, December 7, 1942.
Dear Mr. President:
Since Morales, Minister of the Interior, and Oscar Schnake
arrive in Washington Wednesday or Thursday on a confidential
mission from Ríos to you, it may be of assistance for you to have
my analysis of these men and of their mission before you see them.
Primarily both have been militantly anti-Nazi and both lead and
persisted in the fight for a rupture with the Axis. Both are
pro-American and pro-Roosevelt, particularly Schnake. The latter,
whom you know, is in my opinion by odds the nearest to a statesman
of vision and judgment of any man in public life here, but I under-
stand you have a high regard for him. Morales is young, a bit
exalted, impulsive, very ambitious, but inexperienced; and his
judgment of men and things is very often not sound. He appears to
have the impression that Nelson Rockefeller is the dictator of our
foreign policy, etc.
I talked with Morales before he left but found him rather too
cagey on his mission to suit me and I had an hour's confidential
talk with Schnake at my house Saturday. There appears to be no
doubt that the purpose of the mission is to say to you that Chile
is going to break with the Axis very soon; to give you Ríos's idea
of what may be needed in the way of cooperation as defence against
possible attacks or sabotage. Schnake said that he is not impressed
by economic needs, but that certain material for defence does seem
reasonable to him. I told him that when Chile breaks it is my
impression that she may get some defence material, but expressed
doubt about getting anything until Chile's position is entirely
clarified. I suggested that you be told first that Chile will
break on a specified day, that this be made a secret, official
governmental declaration. I told him that with this determined
absolutely, I felt sure there would be a disposition to talk over
with Morales and Schnake the defence necessities sympathetically.
The President,
The White House.
-2-
I intended to say to Schnake that I thought it a grave mistake
not to inform Michels of the visit, but before I got to it Schnake
anticipated me by saying that he is distressed over that phase and
thinks it a grave mistake. I suggested that since Michels has been
for rupture and stands well with Washington, this concealment of the
intended visit from him would be open to misinterpretation. He saw
that at once, had seen it before. He said he would see the Foreign
Minister that day and tell him what he thought, and that unless the
Foreign Office informs Michels, he said, "I personally shall inform
him." I think that this concealment from Michels merely reflects
local political maneuvering, and I am convinced that Morales wants
to be Ambassador in Washington.
As you have possibly observed, if you read the telegrams to the
Department I sent you, I feel very strongly that the situation here
now is such that we must change our attitude from one of justified
resentment over past policies to one of sympathetic cooperation with
Ríos. I base this on the common understanding in all circles here
that rupture is coming very speedily. There are reasons.
First: Ríos three weeks ago called in the publishers of all the
papers, told them he is preparing to break and asked them to launch
a campaign for rupture. If he does not intend to break this would be
incredibly stupid.
Second: The papers are acting in accordance with the request,
and EL MERCURIO, the NEW YORK TIMES of Chile, very conservative, is
strong in its editorial declarations that Chile must break.
Third: The Foreign Minister in a powerful exposition of foreign
policy before the Senate told it bluntly that Chile must break and
very soon, and will.
Under these circumstances I feel strongly that it would be a
grave mistake to permit resentment of past policy to lead us into an
attitude of indifference, and that on the contrary we should now con-
centrate on doing whatever is possible to make it easier for Ríos.
We understand here that if Chile breaks the Argentine Government
will stand pat against rupture; that she is encouraged in this atti-
tude by the British; and in line with this is the fact that the Brit-
ish here, including the Embassy, have stood aside and given us no help
whatever in the matter of rupture. In addition we find that the Brit-
ish colony is making the most of our alleged alliance with Darlan,
the French Fascist, and expressing its sympathy effusively with the
Free French, who will have no truck with the Darlans and Pétains, and
criticising us to them. These are things to be kept under cover, of
course, and not given to the public, but I think it necessary for you
to have the facts.
-3-
I was talking this morning with the Brazilian Ambassador,
who thinks that when Chile breaks, if Argentina does not, we
must get rough with her, and he expressed surprise over the
six millions furnished Franco Spain for the purchase of goods
from the Argentine.
I cannot be expected to share in anyone's enthusiasm over
good General Franco in view of the vicious cooperation the Span-
ish Embassy here is constantly giving the Axis through propa-
ganda of the most unscrupulous sort. I note one new result
in an intercepted letter from a Falangist here to one in the
Canal Zone:
"The North American politics is in its worst period of
presumption and imperialism. The American Ambassador
Bowers is & declared Communist, who aided the Spanish
Republic, and he now lunches daily with Contreras Labarca."
Labarca is the Communist leader whom I saw once at a public
gathering.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely, claude ynower
un dear Early
- Hope Phes reaches
The Presedent prompter
suice n relates to The
prospective call upon
Rive by morales and
schuefe who reach
Washington Wednesday
or Thursday.
sincerely
claude yBowes
P5F: chile
December 18, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing herewith the letter addressed
to you by the President of Chile which was brought
to Washington by the Chilean Minister of the Interior,
Señor Morales, whom you received yesterday. I am
also enclosing a translation thereof.
In the event that you wish Señor Morales to take
back to Chile when he leaves next week a reply to this
letter, I am enclosing a suggested reply. If this
draft meets with your approval, please sign it and
send it back to me and I will hand it personally to
Señor Morales before he leaves Washington.
Believe me
Faithfully yours,
SUMNER WELLES
Enclosure:
Letter from President
of Chile.
Suggested reply.
The President,
The White House
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Stephen Early, Esquire,
Executive Office,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
URGENT
(373)
Signed original of this letter scals
Chile folder
1.42
Hon. Summer hm Welles, 12/23/42
December 23, 1942
sty dear Mr. President:
It was a pleasure to receive Your Excellency's letter
of December 2 from the hands of your Minister, Señor Raúl
Morales.
It has been all the more gratifying to ne to talk
with Señor Morales since I have learned from you of your
personal friendship for him and the unlimited confidence
with which you honor him.
I share with you a firm belief in the value of discus-
sions of this nature between representatives of peoples
who share a great tradition of friendship, and, at the
present critical hour in the world's history, face together
with the other free peoples of the world the imperative
necessity for common sacrifices and cooperative effort if
they are to preserve their right to forge their own des-
tinies as independent, sovereign nations.
It is my confident hope that the conversations which
I and other officials of my Government have enjoyed with
His Excellency
Juan Antonio Rios Morales,
President of the Republic of Chile,
Santiago.
-2-
Señor Morales have brought very close the day when the
community of American Republics, of which the United States
is proud to be a member, may count upon the fullest support
and practical collaboration of your great country in the
vitally important task of insuring our common survival.
I an glad to have this opportunity of expressing to
you, as I did to Señor Morales, my hope that when the dif-
ficulties of the immediate future in Chile are passed, you
may feel that circumstances are such that you may come to
the United States in pursuance of the invitation which I
had the pleasure of extending to you last August.
Please accept the assurances of my highest esteem
and my best wishes for your personal well-being.
Believe ne
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
His Excellency
Juan Antonio Ríos Morales,
President of Chile,
Santiago.
THE WHITE HOUSE
DE
CAR
NOO DEPARLICA
.
CHILE
Exemo Señor
FRANKLIN D. RCOSEVELT
Presidente de los Estados Unidos
de Norte América.
WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT DE PUBLIC
PRE
CHILE
Santiago, Diciembre 2 de 1942.-
Exemo.Señor
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidente de los Estados Unidos
de Norte América
WASHINGTON.
GRANDE Y BUEN AMIGO:
Circunstancias que son conocidas de Vues-
tra Excelencia y que nadie lamenta más que yó, me han impedido
hasta ahora corresponder a la gentil invitación de Vuestra Ex-
celencia e ir a Washington para tratar personalmente y en un
ambiente de sinceridad y confianza las cuestiones que intere-
san vitalmente a nuestros dos paises y a la América, para lle-
var al Gobierno de Vuestra Excelencia y a su gran pueblo el
testimonio de la sincera amistad y del propósito de france co-
laboración que animan a Chile en estos momentos decisivos para
los destinos de América y del mundo.
No deseando postergar por mas tiempo la
expresión de esos anhelos, he pedido a mi Primer Ministro, Señor
Raúl Morales, para que como Enviado especial y personal mío se
dirija a Washington y lleve a Vuestra Excelencia y a su ilus-
trado Gobierno el pensamiento exacto y los verdaderos sentimien-
tos que animan e informan la acción del Presidente de Chile.
La amistad personal e ilimitada confianza
que dispenso al Señor Raúl Morales, la posición que oeupa en mi
DE
GREAT REPUBLI PUBL 20153 BD
CHILE
Gobierno y las dotes de talento que lo distinguen, me dán la
seguridad que habrá de encontrar favorable acogida en Vuestra
Excelencia y que sabrá interpretar fielmente los propósitos
que me animan de hacer cada día mas estrechas las muy cordiales
relaciones que felizmente unen 8. nuestros dos pueblos.
Ruego a Vuestra Excelencia quiera aceptar
las seguridades de mi particular aprecio y los votos que for-
mulo por su ventura personal y el éxito de su Gobierno.
Flushrise
PSF:Chile
[TRANSLATION]
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
CHILE
Santiago, December 2, 1942.
His Excellency
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United
States of America,
Washington.
GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND:
Circumstances which are known to Your Excellency
and which no one regrets more than I have prevented me
hitherto from responding to Your Excellency's kind
invitation to go to Washington to discuss personally
and in an atmosphere of sincerity and confidence the
questions which vitally concern our two countries and
America, and to take to Your Excellency's Gov ernment
and your great people the assurances of the sincere
friendship and the purpose of frank collaboration which
animate Chile in these moments decisive for the destinies
of America and of the world.
Not desiring to postpone longer the expression of
these desires, I have asked my First Minister, Mr. Raúl
Morales, to go to Washington as my special and personal
envoy
- 2 -
envoy and take to Your Excellency and your enlightened
Government the exact thought and the true sentiments
which inspire and shape the action of the President of
Chile.
The personal friendship and unlimited confidence
which I have for Mr. Raúl Morales, the position which
he occupies in my Government and the talented gifts
which distinguish him afford me the assurance that he
will meet with a favorable reception from Your Excellency
and that he will be able faithfully to interpret the
purposes which move me daily to draw closer the very
cordial relations which happily unite our two peoples.
I beg Your Excellency to be good enough to accept
the assurances of my particular esteem and my good
wishes for your personal happiness and the success of
your Government.
(S) J. Ant. Ríos
TR:FGH:JMC
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
THE PRESIDENT
" PRINTING enner -
1-1633
RJ
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
Return she
WASHINGTON
December 18, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing herewith the letter addressed
to you by the President of Chile which was brought
to Washington by the Chilean Minister of the Interior,
Señor Morales, whom you received yesterday. I am
also enclosing a translation thereof.
In the event that you wish Señor Morales to take
back to Chile when he leaves next week a reply to this
letter, I am enclosing a suggested reply. If this
draft meets with your approval, please sign it and
send it back to me and I will hand it personally to
Señor Morales before he leaves Washington.
Believe me
A yours,
Enclosure:
Kalls
Letter from President
of Chile.
Suggested reply.
The President,
The White House
PSF:Chile
CROSS-
REFERENCE
(Name, number, or
subject under
which this form
is filed)
DATE
tax
April 7, 1942
TO
Claude G. Bowers
IDENTIFI-
FROM
CATION
Franklin D. Roosevelt
OF
RECORD
BRIEF
Reply to Bowers letter of March 28
SUMMARY
OF
CONTENTS
FILED
(Name, number, or subject
O.F. 429
under which the document
itself is filed)
Optional Form 21
Feb. 1962
GSA Circular 259
CROSS-REFERENCE
CROSS-
PSF: Chile
REFERENCE
(Name, number, or
subject under
which this form
is filed)
DATE
April 16, 1942
TO
Franklin D. Roosevelt
IDENTIFI-
FROM
CATION
Claude G. Bowers
OF
RECORD
BRIEF
SUMMARY
Chilean relations with Japan
OF
CONTENTS
FILED
(Name, number, or subject
O.F. 429
under which the document
itself is filed)
Optional Form 21
Feb. 1962
GSA Circular 259
CROSS-REFERENCE