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Great Britain, 1939
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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF Great Britain 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF PROTOCOL
Mr. Nordwhod
Mr. hannesman
direc
Rob
PSF Partain
Divisioner
PROTOCOL
be TAN
for
State
Ottawa, Canada.
AT
January 13, 1939.
RCB
Dear Mr. Summerlin:
Shortly after receiving your telephone call this
morning, I got into touch with Dr. Skelton by telephone,
who suggested that I might talk in regard to the
matters you discussed with Mr. Hugh L. Keenleyside of
the Department of External Affairs, who has been placed
in charge of the arrangements for the King's visit to
Canada.
Mr. Keenleyside called at the Legation this after-
noon and I advised him first of your suggestion as to
the advisability of utilizing for the United States the
same train which will bring the Royal party to the
border at Niagara Falls on the afternoon of June 7th.
He thoroughly concurred in this idea. I told him of
the information given to you by Mr. Bannerman, to the
George T. Summerlin, Esquire,
Chief, Division of Protocol,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C. U.S.A.
- 2 -
effect that it was your understanding that some
cars on this train belonged to the Canadian National
Railways, others to the Canadian Pacific Railways,
and that there would probably be two private cars. He
confirmed the fact that there would probably be cars
belonging to both of these two railway systems, and
he estimated the number of private cars as three, or
more likely four, although he said that there was no
decision as yet regarding how many private cars there
would be.
I told Mr. Keenleyside that the United States
Government would pay all necessary expenses which
might be involved in the King's trip, from the moment
the train entered the United States until the time
of the King's departure on his return to Canada.
ÁS to the number of persons who will be in the
party on the train when it enters the United States,
Mr. Keenleyside was unable to give me even an
approximation. I asked him whether he thought that
all those who were making the tour in Canada would
enter the United States, or whether only a small
group of them would do SO. He said that there would
certainly be a number of persons who would not proceed
- 3 -
further than the Canadian border on the downward trip.
He explained in this general connection that no estimates
of the number involved could be attempted at the present
time since (1) they had as yet received no final word
as to the composition of the English party and (2) there
was no final word as to the number of Canadians. He
said that it was quite certain that the Prime Minister
would proceed with the party into the United States, and
that he would do so in his capacity of Secretary of State
for External Affairs rather than as Prime Minister. He
said that the Prime Minister would certainly take with
him a personal staff of about three people. He said that
the protective staff for the King's party would accompany
the King only as far as the border and would be withdrawn
there. He also said that certain other "supernumeraries",
such as the National Defence officer furnished by the
Canadian Government, would be withdrawn. He said that
he himself would doubtless proceed on the trip all through
the United States and that probably Dr. E. W. Coleman,
Under Secretary of State, would also do so. He explained
that, as far as the Canadian trip was concerned, he would
establish a kind of business office on the train for
handling countless routine matters and making various
- 4 -
arrangements for the trip. He said that this office
arrangement on the train would probably be continued
throughout the trip in the United States.
Mr. Keenleyside took the opportunity afforded by
our conversation to ask me to let you know that it
must not be felt that all the Canadians who are going
on the trip through the United States will expect to be
entertained, and he felt that you should know this in
order to be relieved by any feeling of responsibility on
that score.
He said that it would be most useful for the Canadian
Government to know as soon as possible the exact itinerary
in the United States, including the various lines over
which the President will wish to route the party, and
every other detail of the trip which can be made available.
He also said that it would be of great assistance to him
to know the names of the American railway men with whom
the Canadian Government should correspond in relation to
various details of the trip. He indicated that no
definite plans for the trip could be made until the exact
routing and the names of the various lines could be ascer-
tained, since certain railway cars could not be sent over
certain lines and this information would be indispensable
as a basis for making further plans. I believe that a
- 5 -
request for information of this type has already
been made by the Prime Minister direct to the President
in a letter which he recently sent to the President
on these subjects.
In closing, I may add that the Prime Minister, in
talking with me at the State dinner at Government House
on January 11th, indicated that he would be very grate-
ful if any available information might be sent to him
along the lines of the inquiries on this subject con-
tained in his recent personal letter to the President.
Very sincerely yours,
Minimons
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 16, 1939
PR
Mr Summerlin;-
Have noted contents of Mr Simmons confidential
letter to yourself.
It is very important to have the travel routing
definitely determined as soon as possible on account of
the correspondence neccessary to determine whether the
cars to be used by the Royal Party will pass through
certain tunnels and bridges etc.
I understand the Canadian raibway officials
have already decided that a second train to follow or precede
the Royal train will be neccessary in order to accommodate
the various railroad men, protection units, clerical and
press staff traveling with the party.
3063
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF PROTOCOL
Marive Niagans Falls, 4.05pm. June 7.
heave
"
4
9.30 p.m. of "
In the u.s. June 8, 9. 10 & ll.
Arrive Sherbrooke 11am, June 12.
February 4, 1939
PERSONAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE SUMMER WELLES:
I enclose herewith copy of your letter
to the President of February third together with
his memorandum to me, which in self-explanetory.
M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President
RB/mma
Original of Mr. Welles' letter retained.
2/4/39. Memo for Mac: "Tell Summer Welles, in regard to this, to
talk to George Summerlin about it as he knows all about it." F. D. R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 3, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
The British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me this
morning with a message which he had just received from
the private secretary to the King of England.
Mr. Mallet reminded me that in a letter which I had
written to him by your instructions on December 24, I had
told him that you were writing a further letter directly
to the King which would be transmitted through the Amer-
ican Embassy in London in which letter you would make cer-
tain suggestions as to the precise arrangements for the
King's visit. Mr. Mallet said that this letter had not
been received and since the King wanted very much to talk
over with Sir Ronald Lindsay some of the suggestions made -
before the latter leavesLondon on February 11 to return to
Washington - he wondered whether it would not be possible,
if your letter had been delayed and would not reach London
before February 10, for the suggestions contained in your
The President,
The White House.
-2-
letter to be communicated to him by telegram either through
the British Embassy here or through the Ameri can Embassy in
London.
Will you let me know what answer you wish me to make
to the British Chargé d'Affaires.
Believe me
A Faithfully yours,
hull
Published in
Foreign Relations of the U.S.
Vol.III, 1939, the Far East
VOL. PAGES 5
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE:
February 6, 1939
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
The British Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. V. A. L. Mallet;
the Under Secretary.
COPIES TO:
OPO 1-1493
The British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me
this afternoon with a strictly secret message from his
Government. The British Government referred first of
all to an article which had appeared in the NEWS CHRON-
ICLE in London on January 17 and stated that informa-
tion which it had now received showed that that article
was true in part but only in small part.
The British Government had learned on authority
it believed completely authentic that the Japanese
Government was not prepared to accept the new form of
alliance proposed by Germany and Italy; that it was
-2-
formulating counter-proposals and that these counter-
proposals would envisage an alliance directed against the
Soviet. The British Government believed that Japan was
greatly concerned at this moment by reason of the possi-
bility that Great Britain and the United States would
shut her off from raw materials and other supplies needed
in her military campaign and that she was further of the
opinion that if a general war broke out in Europe whether
or not she was a partner in such an alliance as that pro-
posed made no difference since in any event she could lay
her hands upon such possessions of the other powers in the
Far East as she desired.
The British Government went on to say that the German
policy unquestionably was to persuade Japan to enter this
alliance in the new form proposed since, if war broke out,
Germany desired Great Britain's attention to be focused in
the North Sea, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East and
desired for that purpose to utilize both Italy and Japan as
"junior partners". Italy, on the other hand, believed that
the announcement of the alliance would cause Great Britain
and the United States to bring pressure to bear upon France
to grant the concessions sought by Italy in order to avert
war and that the mere announcement of the alliance itself
would have such an effect on public opinion in France as to
break down any existing French determination to resist the
Italian demands.
U:SW: DMK
PSF: St Britai
for file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 7, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
I have received this afternoon from the British
Charge d'Affaires the texts of two messages which he
has received from Lord Halifax "for the personal and
secret information of the President". I am enclosing
herewith copies of these two messages for your informa-
tion.
As was the case with recent messages of the same
character, the texts of these messages have already been
telegraphed to the Department of State by our Embassy
in London, and I understand that copies of these telegrams
have already been sent to you.
Believe me
A Faithfully yours, Alls
Enclosures.
The President,
The White House.
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
have now given further consideration to the question
referred to in Lord Halifax's message contained in the
British Embassy's aide memoire of January 30th and have
reached the following conclusions.
a. His Majesty's Government confirm the view
expressed in paragraph three of the British Embassy's
aide memoire as to the threat that any German attack
on Holland would constitute to the security of the Western
Powers and consider that in the event of a German invasion
of Holland they would be obliged to go to war with Germany.
b. In addition they consider that any attempt by
Germany to dominate Holland by force or threat of force
would also have to be regarded as a menace to the security
of the United Kingdom.
c. A German attack on Switzerland would also be
clear evidence of an attempt by Germany to dominate Europe
by force and from this point of view a German attack on
Holland and an attack on Switzerland are in the same
category. Consequently if the French Government should
enquire whether if Germany invaded Switzerland and France
-2-
thereupon declared war upon Germany we should go to the
assistance of France our answer should be in the affirmative.
2. In view of the general position His Majesty's Govern-
ment have decided to continue staff conversations with the
French Government on broader lines than hitherto and to ex-
tend their scope.
3. His Majesty's Government are further considering
making a public statement about their attitude in regard to
the Netherlands which, without being so specific as to con-
clusions summarized above, would make plain that our interest
in both the Netherlands and Belgium is so vital as to pass
beyond legal obligations and that His Majesty's Government
would therefore be bound to regard as affecting interests
which are vital to the security of the United Kingdom any
attempt to infringe or compromise the full independence and
integrity of the two countries.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
7th February, 1939
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE
FROM LORD HALIFAX
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
have now received the replies of the French and Belgian
Governments and some indication of the views of the
Netherlands Government in regard to the matters referred
to in Lord Halifax's message of January 30th.
The French reply states that their reports although
not confirmed are similar to those received by His Majesty's
Government and afford the same justification for fears of
German aggression towards the West either spontaneously or
in support of Italian claims. The French Government con-
sider that the Western Powers are all equally threatened
whatever the initial direction of a German or Italian at-
tack and that this community of risk should logically en-
tail a real solidarity in face of any unprovoked attack
by Germany or Italy. On this understanding the French
Government agree with His Majesty's Government in consider-
ing the contingency of an invasion of Holland as a casus belli
although they point out that this would not involve any
contractual responsibility on the part of France and that
her joint action with Great Britain would be of a preventive
character. The French Government have also requested an
assurance that His Majesty's Government would regard an
invasion of Switzerland in the same light as an invasion
-2-
of Holland. The French reply finally welcomes His
Majesty's Government's decision to accelerate their
defensive and counter-defensive measures and suggests
that conscription appears essential for effective British
participation in the organisation of common defence on
the Continent. The French Government have also communi-
cated the above views secretly to the Belgian Govern-
ment. The French reply 1s now being considered by His
Majesty's Government.
The Belgian reply expresses gratitude for His
Majesty's Government's message and asks for any similar
information in the future but the only view expressed
is that the Belgian Government resolutely maintain their
policy of independence which they claim to be unanimously
approved in Belgium and to be best suited to the situation
of Belgium and to the interests of Europe. When com-
municating this reply the Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs said that he could not believe Germany contemplated
the seizure of Holland but in any event the Belgian Govern-
ment were convinced that their only chance to maintain
independence and avoid invasion was to have no commitments
at all with any country.
On the receipt of a telegram from the Netherlands
Minister at Washington reporting his conversation with
President Roosevelt on January 26th the Netherlands
Minister for Foreign Affairs asked His Majesty's Minister
-3-
at The Hague whether His Majesty's Government could con-
firm the President's information. His Majesty's Minister
on instructions from His Majesty's Government informed
Dr. Patijn that some of the many reports received by H1s
Majesty's Government suggested that Herr Hitler was con-
sidering an attack on the Western Powers in the near future
and that his plan might involve the occupation of Holland.
Sir Nevile Bland explained that His Majesty's Govern-
ment could not vouch for the reliability of any of these
reports but that in view of their number it would not be
safe to ignore them and that His Majesty's Government were
therefore carefully considering the position. Dr. Patijn
informed Sir Nevile Bland that he was satisfied that there
were no German troop movements against Holland at the moment
but he added that his latest information had not reassured
him. He indicated that if the worst came to the worst the
Dutch would defend their front line defences as long as
possible and then fall back and let in the water. They
were about to spend ten million florins to strengthen the
frontier and he estimated the period of possible resistance
at three to four days. Dr. Patijn is visiting London on
February 14th for the Grotius anniversary celebrations
and I hope to have a conversation with him then.
BRIT ISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
February 7th, 1939
PSF: sr. Britain
JR
GRAY
pain file
London
Dated February 7, 1939
REC'd 12:45 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
RUSH.
176, February 7, 3 p.m.
STRECTER CONFIDE HAL AND PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY
AND UNDERSECRETARY.
My 175, February 7, 2 p.m.
Sir Alexander Cadogan furnished me with a copy of
the following second message sent last night to the
British Charge d'Affaires:
"My immediately preceding telegram.
OnE. The following message should also bE communicated
to the State Department for the personal and secret
information of the President.
Two. His Majesty's Government have now r ECEIVED
the replies of the French and B E lgian Governments and
some indication of the views of the Netherlands Govern-
ment.
Three. The French reply states that their reports,
although confirmed, are similar to those received by
His
-2- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.
His Majesty's Government and afford some justification
for fears of German action towards the west Either
spontaneously or in support of Italian claims. The
French Government consider that the VESTERN Powers
are all Equally threatened whatever the initial direction
of a German or Italian attack and that this community
of risk should logically Entail a real solidarity in
face of any unprovoked attack by Germany or Italy. On
this understanding the French Government would agree with
His Majesty's Government in considering the contingency
of an invasion of Holland C.S. 2 casus bElli, although
they point out that this would not involve any contractual
responsibility on the part of France and that her joint
action with Great Britain would bE of a preventive
character. The French Government have also requested
an assurance that His Majesty's Government would regard
invasion of Switzerland in the same light ?S an invasion
of Holland. The French reply finally welcomes His
Majesty's Government's decision to accelerate their
defensive and counter defensive measures, and suggests
that conscription appears Essential for Effective British
(in?)
participation if the organization of common defense
on the Continent. The French Government have also
communicated
-3- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.
communicated the above views secretly to the Belgian
Government. The French reply is now bEing considered
by His Majesty's Government.
Four. The Belgian reply Expresses gratitude for
His Majesty's Government's message, and asks for any
similar information in future, but the only view Expressed
is that the BElgian Government resolutely maintain their
policy of independence, which they claim to bE unanimously
approved in BElgium, and to bE best suited to the
situation of BElgium and to the interest of Europe.
When communicating this reply, the Belgian Minister for
Foreign Affairs said that hE could not believe that
Germany contemplated the seizure of Holland, but in any
EVENT the BElgian Government were convinced that their
only chance to maintain independence and avoid invasion
was to have no commitments at all with any country.
Five. On receipt of a telegram from the Netherlands
Minister in Washington reporting his conversation with
President Roosevelt on the 26th January, the Netherlands
Minister asked His Majesty's Minister at The Hague whether
His Majesty's Government could confirm the President's
information. His Majesty's Minister, on instructions
from His Majesty's Government, informed Dr. Patijn on
January
-4- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.
January 30 that some of the many reports received by
His Majesty's Government suggested that Herr Hitler was
considering an attack on the WESTERN Powers in the near
future and that his plans might involve the occupation
of Holland. Sir N. Bland Explained that His Majesty's
Government could not vouch for the reliability of any
of these reports, but in view of their number it would
not bE safe to ignore them and His Majesty's Government
were therefore carefully considering the position.
Dr. Patijn informed Sir N. Bland that hE was satisfied
that there were no German troop movements against
Holland at the moment, but hE added that his latest
information had not reassured him. HE indicated that if
the worst came to the worst, the Dutch would defend
their front line defences as long as possible and then
fall back and let in water. They were about to spend
ten million florins to strengthen the frontier and hE
Estimated the period of possible resistance at three to
four days. Doctor Patijn is visiting London on
February 14th for the Grotius anniversary celebrations
and I hope to have a conversation with him then. If
The British Government has not yet replied to the
French communication referred to in numbered paragraph
three. With regard to the French suggestion that the
British
-5- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.
British should introduce conscription, the Under
Secretary said that this suggestion of course was not
a new one but had bEEn broached in French circles
from time to time. HE quite understood their attitude
in view of the probability that if a war did break
out involving both countries, the French would probably
have to suffer, as they did in the last war, appalling
military casualties on land before a British army
would bE ready. On the other hand, as hE has pointed
out to the French Ambassador, the British carry a much
larger complement of men in their navy than the French
do; their air force is now not only larger but better
than the French; and there is no USE in talking in
Great Britain about conscription being introduced
now when there is not yet in Existence sufficient
Equipment to fit out a conscripted army. The Under
SECRETARY indicated that when a formal reply is made
to the French the suggestion in regard to British
conscription will not bE mentioned.
Sir Alexander further said that the French reply
was received before the Prime Minister's important
statement in the House of Commons yesterday (my 173,
February 6, 8 p.m.) and that hE felt that that statement,
which
-6- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.
which hE again characterized as something necessary
and Extremely important, had done real good in France
in allaying apprehensions. HE considers that the
political situation in France under Monsieur Daladier
has greatly improved.
JOHNSON
Privac
February 15, 1939.
Dear Roger:-
Many thanks for your note and that extremely
interesting excerpt from Trevelyan.
who
I wish the British would stop this "We^are
about to die, salute thee" attitude. Lord Lothian
was here the other day, started the conversation by
saying he had completely abandoned his former belief
that Hitler could be dealt with as a semi-reasonable
human being, and went on to say that the British for
a thousand years had been the guardians of Anglo-
Saxon civilization -- that the scepter or the sword
or something like that had dropped from their
palsied fingers -- that the U. S. A. must snatch
it up --- that F. D. R. alone could save the world --
etc,, etc.
I got mad clear through and told him that
just so long as he or Britishers like him took that
attitude of complete despair, the British would not
be worth saving anyway.
What the British need today is a good stiff
grog, inducing not only the desire to save civili-
zation but the continued belief that they can do it.
In such an event they will have a lot more support
from their American cousins -- don't you think so?
As ever yours,
Professor Roger B. Merriman,
Master's Lodgings,
Eliot House,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
MASTER'S LODGINGS
ELIOT HOUSE
CAMBRIDGE. MASS.
February 10, 1939
His Excellency The President of the United States
Executive Mansion
Washington, D.C.
Dear Franklin:
I have been following with interest and, on
the whole, with approval the course of your foreign
policy. The fact that I have had to speak so much on
the Spanish situation has kept me more closely in
touch with current events than I usually am. Arthur
Willert spent twenty-four hours with me here a couple
of weeks ago, and I shall be curious to know how he
will influence your views when he visits you at the
White House.
In the meantime I send you a quotation from
a letter from one of my oldest English friends, George
Macaulay Trevelyan, Regis Professor of History in the
University of Cambridge and author of many books most
of which you have doubtless read. One has to "make
allowances" in considering the verdicts of all Trevel-
yans, but George is saner than most of them, closely
in touch with the people who count in Downing Street,
and not (like your old teacher) a "mere don".
Yours always,
Roger B. Merriman
Excerpt from a letter to Mr. Merriman from Professor George M. Trevelyan,
dated January 28, 1939.
You ask for my 'views' on the world situation. I would not
have bothered you with them otherwise. They are of course very
gloomy.
I think Chamberlain was quite right not to have fought a war
to 'save' Czecho Slovakia in October last, because the war must
have been unsuccessful. Russia is down and out and can be written
off -- she won't or rather can't even save China from Japan. In
the Czech question the Germans had Poland and Hungary on their
side and the Czechs would have been overrun at once by all three.
The only way to 'save' them would have been for France to break
the German lines in the West and with England's help conquer Ger-
many and Italy, aided by the Japanese fleet attacking our trade.
It would in short have been an offensive war on our part strategi-
cally -- to smash through Germany to Czecho Slovakia, and our
military and well informed people all said and say it was hopeless.
The French found that out,- too late as usual. The Czechs were
their 'allies' not ours, and they (and we) ought to have told them
in the spring that we could do nothing for them and they must make
the best terms they could with Germany about their three million
German subjects.
If, as I understand, your fellow citizens think we ought to
have fought this war, I think they misunderstood the possibilities,
as you were to remain neutral yourselves. Munich saved the Czechs
so far as it was possible to save them. But it does not follow
that if (as seems likely soon) Germany and Italy attack France and
England, we shall be conquered in a defensive war. We may or may
not be, but we are preparing to die in the last ditch at worst.
However, we may defend ourselves successfully. In any case noth-
ing will be left of civilization except machinery -- which I don't
care about -- after the war is over, whoever 'wins' it. The only
thing that will stop a war coming pretty soon -- since Hitler and
Mussolini are both 'rabid' men -- would be the United States letting
them know that you will take part if they make aggression. But as
I gather there is little chance of that, I think the prospects are
very black indeed.
In the last war England plus France plus Italy plus Russia plus
Japan plus (half way through) the United States only just beat
Germany and Austria. How do you expect England plus France alone to
"crush the dictators" with Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan against
us? If you don't want Europe and Africa to be prostrate at the feet
of Germany and her allies, with Japan in possession of Asia, you had
better be reconsidering your isolation policy before you are indeed
'isolated'. Naziism, as contagious as Jacobinism of old, has al-
ready landed in South America I understand. But whatever you choose
to do, we will put up a jolly old fight, in which everything I
care for will disappear.
P.S. Remember that Russia, besides being internally rotten and
incompetent for all offensive military purposes, has no longer
got a frontier coterminous with Germany. She cannot attack
Germany across a hostile Poland and Hungary, who do not wish to
be Bolshevized. You must no longer think of the forces in terms
of 1914.
Dearest love to you, your family, and your country.
9-2
PSF. GR Britain
file
MASTER'S LODGINGS
Personal
ELIOT HOUSE
CAMBRIDGE
February 17, 1939
Dear Franklin:
A thousand thanks for your letter.
I shall relay a copy to Trevelyan, but I
shall tell him that it was marked "Private"
so that he will use it with discretion.
I think you are a bit hard on "the
average Britisher". Some of his itinerant
exports over here are intolerable -- I see
shoals of them and know whereof I speak --
but the bulk of the stay-at-homes are of
better quality. The fact is I think that
a lot of those who come over here for the
first time don't quite know how to behave
with us, and hit the wrong note at the out-
set.
I hope you will get a lot of fish.
Yours always,
Roger B. Merriman
His Excellency The President
of the United States
Executive Mansion
Washington, D. C.
PSF Great (2011
1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 4, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
In accordance with the message from you which
Steve Early gave me this morning, I have informed
the British Ambassador that you will receive him at
the White House tomorrow, Sunday, at 2:30 p.m.
I am enclosing herewith a secret memorandum
which the Ambassador left with me when I saw him a
couple of days ago, as well as a memorandum of my
conversation with the Ambassador. I believe you
may wish to read these two papers before you talk
with the Ambassador.
Believe me
Faithfully J yours,
halls
The President,
The White House.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: March 1, 1939
SUBJECT: Visit of King and Queen of England.
PARTICIPANTS: Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador;
the Under Secretary.
COPIES TO:
OFO 1-1493
The British Ambassador called to see me this morn-
ing. The Ambassador asked me to lay the following mat-
ter before the President upon his return. He said that
when the King of England paid official visits to other
countries it had been the invariable practice from time
immemorial for the King to be accompanied by one of the
members of the British Cabinet, normally the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs. He said that Lord Halifax was
personally anxious to take the trip to the United States
to accompany the King, particularly in order to have the
opportunity of talking with the President and the Secre-
tary of State, but that realizing that his visit to the
United States might be misinterpreted by American public
-2-
opinion and might be understood as implying that the
British Government was engaging in some secret negotia-
tions with the United States at the time of the King's
visit, he desired to refrain from the visit if the Presi-
dent believed that it was preferable for him not to come.
I told the Ambassador that I would, of course, be
glad to lay the matter before the President immediately
after his return and that I would advise the Ambassador
in due course of the President's reaction.
The Ambassador asked me how I myself felt about the
matter. I said that of course I could only give him a
personal and snap judgment. I said that while I did not
know Lord Halifax personally I had always understood
that he gave the impression of being a very sincere and
straightforward man and that since I understood the King
would not receive American press correspondents, it would
appear to me that if Lord Halifax were with the party and
could speak directly with the American press correspond-
ents he could make it clear to them that his coming with
the King was merely a matter of custom and that no nego-
tiations of any kind with this Government were being
undertaken. I said that of course I had no 1dea of what
the President's own opinion would be and that the matter
would, of course, have to be determined by him.
My dear Mr. President:
In accordance with the message from you which
Steve Early gave me this morning, I have informed
the British Ambassador that you will receive him at
the White House tomorrow, Sunday, at 9:30 p.m.
I as enclosing herewith a secret memorandum
which the Ambassador left with me when I saw him a
couple of days ago, as well as = memorandum of my
conversation with the Ambassador. I believe you
may wish to read these two papers before you talk
with the Ambassador.
Believe me
Faithfully yours,
The President,
The white House.
MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE
MOST SECRET
Our own reports on the European
situation have not been as pessimistic as those
mentioned to His Majesty's Ambassador by the Under
Secretary of State on February 20th. We now think
that it will be best to communicate in the utmost
confidence the following summary of our information.
2.
While we are not disposed to under-
rate the latent danger in the present international
situation, our latest information inclines us to
think that Herr Hitler has for the time being
abandoned the idea of precipitating an immediate
crisis such as he seemed to be contemplating at the
beginning of the year.
3.
Our information suggests that this
is largely because the German Government has since
January been impressed by the firm attitude of the
French Government towards the Italian claims, by
the progress of British rearmament and by the Prime
Minister's statement of February 6th on Anglo-French
relations and not least by the recent attitude of
the United States Government. It may also be due
in part to temporary deterioration in German railway
system.
4.
According to reliable reports no
preliminary signs of impending mobilisation are
apparent/
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
apparent in Germany and there would not appear
to be any special troop concentrations in Austria.
There has probably been an acceleration of arms
deliveries in Hungary which may have given rise to
stories of assembly of material in the East.
Meanwhile however the German army is working at
high pressure and training of reservists is being
expedited but reports of special military prepara-
tions would seem to be based on the probability
that the German army was warned to be prepared for
all eventualities in the Spring and has been making
the necessary preliminary preparations. While
recent secret information suggests that any plan
for mobilisation in early March may have been post-
poned, reports have recently reached us pointing to
the possibility of a military occupation of Czecho-
Slovakia.
5.
Herr Hitler is clearly preparing for
every possible eventuality. Rumours of one or
other of these plans are continually reaching us
and cannot be lightly discounted. On the other
hand there is no evidence at present that any one
of them has been irrevocably adopted by Herr Hitler
and a date fixed for its being put into force.
6.
Sir Nevile Henderson had conversations
with Herr von Ribbenthrop, Field Marshal Goering
and Baron von Weiszaker on his return to Berlin
last week and gained the impression that Herr
Hitler was at present planning no immediate
adventure. But of course it was not possible for
him/
him to adduce positive facts in support of this.
7.
Against this Herr Hitler's pledge to
Italy in his Reichstag speech of January 30th is
disquieting in view of the present state of Franco-
Italian relations, particularly as Baron von
Weiszaker replied to an inquiry regarding the precise
significance of Herr Hitler's words that any close
analysis was superfluous since it was quite clear
that Germany would support Italy in the event of
war.
8.
As regards Italy we believe the average
peace strength of the Italian army at this time of
year, i.e. before the annual class of recruits
has joined the colours may be a little over two
hundred and fifty thousand rising to as much as
four hundred and fifty thousand when the recruits
have joined. We believe that sixty thousand
reservists of 1901 class have been called to the
colours but that many of them have been found unfit
for service or unable conveniently to leave their
jobs and have therefore been released; their
places have however been taken by other reservists
from later classes particularly that of 1902. We
have heard reports that 1918 class may join the colours
in the immediate future instead of at the beginning
of April which is the usual time. If definite
evidence of this were obtained it might be a pointer,
though the presence of so many untrained recruits in
the army would temporarily decrease its efficiency.
Apart from this a number of individuals of various
classes have been called up but we have no informa-
tion as to the numbers involved nor as to the use
to/
to which they will be put. We have no information
to show that anything like three hundred thousand
men have been called up or that a general or even
partial mobilisation is in progress.
9.
Fact that thirty thousand of the sixty
thousand men referred to above are to be sent to
Libya is at first sight disquieting but it should be
noted that they are rather old for active military
service and have had only very scrappy training
during post-war period. It is of course possible
that despite the definite statements of the Italian
Government younger men will be sent to Libya instead.
10.
It appears to be true that some German
experts have been in Libya but we do not believe
that there can be any German military units there.
11.
Recently there have been some signs of
unusual naval activity in Italy.
12.
Our general impression is that there has
been an abnormal amount of military activity in Italy
of late but that it is at least premature to deduce
that Signor Mussolini has decided to resort to war
in the immediate future. The present activity may
be merely an insurance against unexpected developments
in Spain or a prelude to an attempt to blackmail the
French into meeting Italian demands; but such ex-
planations are of course highly speculative.
Certain Italian officials have recently been asserting
that Signor Mussolini will make war on France if
the position of the Italian colony in Tunis is not
settled to his satisfaction. This may however
merely be part of a campaign to frighten the French
and/
and ourselves into meeting Italy's demands
but the situation certainly needs careful
watching. In this connexion there are
reports from sources that cannot be ignored
that instead of risking a major war by pressing
her demands on France Italy might seek cheap
glory in annexation of Albania.
13.
We still greatly doubt that Japan
has come into line over the anti-Comintern pact.
On the contrary Japan's counter proposals will
only be submitted early next month for considera-
tion by the Germans and Italians. But this will
of course not prevent the three Powers playing
into one another's hands as and when it suits
them to do SO. The Japanese diplomats' meeting
in Paris last month attended by the Ambassadors
from London, Rome, Brussels, by the Minister from
Berne and by the Secretaries only from Berlin and
Paris did not we think make the recommendation
attributed to them by the Under Secretary of State
though quite possibly the Ambassador from Rome in
a minority of one made the recommendation in the
sense suggested.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
February 28th, 1939.
Pst
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 9, 1939
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS LE HAND:
The British Ambassador advises that
in his conversation with the President, yesterday
afternoon, he forgot to say that he hopes the program
of the King and Queen will not be released or any-
thing pertaining to it given out for publication
until there has been an opportunity to submit it
to the King and to obtain his approval.
This for the President's information.
PSF: St. Britain
THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 21, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
In accordance with our telephone con-
versation, I am sending you the confidential
message from Lord Halifax which I have just
received from the British Ambassador.
Believe me
Enclosure:
Faithfully A yours, Halles
From the British
Embassy, March 21,
1939.
The President,
The White House.
ST SECRET
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.
The Rumanian Minister told me on March
17th that he understood that the Rumanian Government
had been asked by the German Government to agree to
give the latter a monopoly of Rumanian exports and
to accept measures of industrial restriction inside
Rumania in German interests. On this basis Germany
would guarantee the Rumanian frontier.
The Rumanian Government, he said, were
disposed to regard this as in the nature of an
ultimatum though I understand that on their refusal
to accept these terms further terms had been suggested.
The Rumanian Minister, emphasising the
extreme urgency, proceeded to ask whether His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom would be able to give
a precise indication of their position in the event of
Rumania becoming the victim of German aggression.
He
enquired whether it would make it easier for His
Majesty's Government to do this if Poland and Rumania
agreed to make the treaty provisions between them
clearly applicable as against German aggression and
if the Balkan Entente proclaimed their joint determina-
tion to guarantee each other's frontier.
I told the Minister that I should report
what he had said urgently to the Prime Minister and
my/
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
my colleagues but that I anticipated that an
essential element in their judgment would be
the knowledge, if it could be supplied, of what
in fact would be the attitude of the Polish,
Turkish, Greek and Yugoslav Governments in the
circumstances foreshadowed.
His Majesty's Representatives in these
four countries were then instructed urgently to sound
the governments to which they are accredited. His
Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow was also instructed
to inform the Soviet Government of the Rumanian
démarche and to enquire whether they could give any
indication that they would, if requested by the
Rumanian Government, actively help the latter to
resist German aggression. His Majesty's Government
also consulted the French Government with a view to
concerting policy.
Subsequent information has cast doubt
on the accuracy of the account given by the Rumanian
Minister of what had passed between the German and
Rumanian Governments. None the less His Majesty's
Government have thought it essential in view of the
situation resulting from the German action in Czecho-
slovakia to pursue their enquiries in the capitals
chiefly concerned. They have therefore instructed
His Majesty's Representatives in Paris, Moscow and
Warsaw in the following terms:-
In spite of doubts as to the accuracy of
reports of a German ultimatum to Rumania, the recent
German/
-3-
German absorption of Czechoslovakia shows clearly
that the German Government are resolved to go
beyond their hitherto avowed aim of the consolida-
tion of the German race. They have now extended
their conquest to another nation and if this should
prove to be part of a definite policy of domination
there is no state in Europe which is not directly
or ultimately threatened.
In the circumstances thus created it
seems to His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom to be desirable to proceed without delay
to the organisation of mutual support on the part
of all those who realise the necessity of protecting
international society from further violation of the
fundamental laws on which it rests.
As a first step, they propose that the
French, Soviet and Polish Governments should join
with His Majesty's Government in signing and pub-
lishing a declaration the terms of which they
suggest should be on the following lines:
"We the undersigned, duly authorised to
"that effect, hereby declare that inasmuch as peace
"and security in Europe are a matter of common
"interest and concern, and since European peace and
"security may be affected by any action which con-
"stitutes a threat to the political independence of
"any European state, our respective Governments
"hereby undertake immediately to consult together
"as to what steps should be taken to offer joint
"resistance to any such action."
It/
-4-
It appears to His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom that publication of such a
declaration would in itself be a valuable con-
tribution to the stability of Europe and we should
propose that publication should be followed by an
examination by the signatories of any specific
situation which requires it with a view to
determining the nature of any action which might
be taken.
Please endeavour immediately to obtain the
views respectively of the French, Soviet and Polish
Governments. His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom would be prepared to sign the
declaration immediately the three other Governments
indicated their readiness to do so.
Instructions in the above sense have been
sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Moscow
and Warsaw. His Majesty's Representatives in
Athens, Bucarest, Angora, Belgrade, Cairo, Lisbon
and Bagdad have also been informed of the position
and told that His Majesty's Government propose that
nothing shall be said to the Governments to which
they are accredited until the French, Soviet and
Polish Governments have agreed with His Majesty's
Government on the declaration. His Majesty's Chargé
d'Affaires in Berlin has also been informed of the
position.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
file
PSF: Gt Britain
3/23/39
SECRET
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.
His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest was
assured on March 20th by King Carol that there had
at no moment been any question of a German ultimatum
although there was much that was unpalatable in
German proposals. King Carol stated that Roumania
would resist German pressure but could not do so
indefinitely without support. King Carol hesitated
however to give His Majesty's Minister detailed
information of the German proposals. Roumanian
General Staff also remained worried at the news of
mobilisation preparations in Germany and troop
movements in Czechoslovakia which they consider
greater than are warranted by recent events. They
are convinced that Hungary would not resist passage
of German troops through that country.
Preliminary replies have now been received
to the enquiries mentioned in paragraph 5 of Lord
Halifax's message of March 21st. The Greek Prime
Minister stated that in the event of aggression
against Roumania, Greece would fulfill her obligations
under the Balkan Pact. As regards the guarantee of
the Roumanian frontier, which went beyond limits of
the Balkan Pact, Greece would examine objectively and
in collaboration with Turkey and Yugoslavia any
Roumanian proposal, while taking deep account of
eventual attitude of Great Britain and France. In
his/
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
his view everything depended on Yugoslavia since
without its support it would be impossible for Greece
and Turkey to guarantee military assistance to
Roumania.
The Prince-Regent of Yugoslavia in his
turn made a similar enquiry regarding the intentions
of His Majesty's Government. He expressed surprise
that the Roumanian Government had not approached him
and subsequently confirmed that no ultimatum had been
presented to the latter.
The Turkish reply also states that no
communication had been received from Roumanian Govern-
ment but that the Turkish Government would study in
a friendly spirit any proposal His Majesty's Government
might wish to make and would carry out theirobligations
under Balkan Entente.
The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs
also doubted whether an ultimatum had been delivered
and stated that if so he would have to go into the
question fully with his own Government and the Roumanian
Government before expressing any view.
The Soviet Government have replied expressing
surprise that the Roumanian Government had not approached
them but proposing a conference of British, Soviet,
French, Polish, Roumanian and Turkish representatives.
The French reply states that their informa-
tion generally agrees with that received by His
Majesty's Government. They were making enquiries of
the Polish, Yugoslav and Soviet Governments whose
replies would have an important bearing but they
considered it to be the last obstacle to the triumph of
German Imperialism and therefore declared themselves
ready/
-3-
ready to assist Roumania if she were the object of
German aggression. The question of assistance was
however dependent on common Franco-British resistance
and the French Government were therefore ready to
collaborate with His Majesty's Government in an
examination of concerted action. His Majesty's
Minister at Paris was assured verbally that France
would go to Roumania's assistance irrespective of
Polish, Yugoslav and Soviet replies.
The above views represent the reactions
to our first enquiries based on the Roumanian
Minister's disquieting information regarding German-
Roumanian economic negotiations as described in the
opening paragraphs of Lord Halifax's message of March
21st. No final replies have yet been received to the
later proposal (summarized in paragraphs 6 to 12 of
Lord Halifax's message of March 21st) which relates
not only to aggression against Roumania but to any
action threatening independence of any European state.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
March 23rd, 1939.
-
PSF:St. Britain
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
March 25, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I enclose herewith a
further message from Lord Hall-
fax received through the British
Ambassador.
C IT
Imate s
Personal and
I
March 25th,
Dear Mr. Secretary.
I enclose herein a further
message for the President from Lord
Halifax regarding the European situation.
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) R.C. Lindsay.
The Honourable
Cordell Hull,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
RCL:FRHM:R:
MOST
SHORT
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.
His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom have now received the final replies of the
French and Soviet Governments to the proposals
summarized in my message of March 21st. They have
also received a preliminary indication of the views
of the Polish Government.
The Soviet reply expresses agreement and
accepts the text of the proposed declaration which
the Soviet Government will sign as soon as France
and Poland have accepted. The Soviet Government are
anxious that not only the Balkan but also the Baltic
and Scandinavian countries should be invited to
adhere after publication.
The French reply expresses entire assent.
In conversation with the Prime Minister and myself
in London the French Minister for Foreign Affairs
has however emphasized the importance of Polish
participation and the difficulty of securing this
in view of Soviet participation.
The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs
informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Varsaw on
March 21st that the proposal demanded very serious
consideration. His chief preoccupation was the
suggested participation of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics in view of which Polish
participation/
regraded iniclassteted
-2-
participation would definitely range Poland in the
Soviet camp against Germany. He has instructed
the Polish Ambassador in London to propose that
His Majesty's Government and the Polish Government
should enter into a secret agreement of consultation
on the lines of the suggested declaration. This
would not however prejudice any official decision
regarding the declaration on which he would communicate
the views of his Government later. Nor would it affect
the position of France as the existing Franco-Polish
treaty already contains a consultative clause. His
Majesty's Ambassador at Warsaw has suggested that
publication with Polish consent might be possible if
Poland were assured that the Western Powers
contemplated effective and immediate steps to resist
German aggression.
The present difficulty is therefore to
reconcile the Polish and the Soviet positions.
Extensive mobilization measures have been
undertaken in Hungary and Roumania and although both
Governments deny any aggressive intentions the
position is dangerous. The Roumanian army now has
approximately 450,000 men under arms. His Majesty's
Government and the French Government are doing their
best to urge moderation and demobilization in Budapest
and Bucharest and the Polish Government appear to be
very active in this direction. The Polish Government
have invited categorical assurances from the
Hungarian Government that they have no bellicose
intentions towards Roumania and the Hungarian military
authorities/
-3-
authorities have categorically stated that no
negotiations are proceeding between Hungary and
the German Government regarding the passage of
German troops through Hungary.
I informed the Turkish Ambassador
generally of our proposals for a joint four-Power
declaration on March 21st. Emphasizing that he was
speaking with full knowledge of the policy of the
Turkish Government, the Turkish Ambassador replied
that they would be prepared to go all lengths with
Great Britain if assured of British support and of
direct British assistance if they were themselves
attacked in the Mediterranean. This attitude was
unconditional regardless of the Polish and Russian
replies. Apart from this Turkey would in all cases
observe all her existing treaty obligations.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
March 25th, 1939.
Original on exphalet E.R Gallery
PSF Gh Britain
1939
They
Personal
Paris, March 23, 197
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to submit herewith to the Chief
of State in accordance with his request made to = at
Warm Springs, Georgia, the recommendations as to the
personal needs of Their Royal Majesties, George :-
and Elizabeth, King and Queen, By the Grace of Go!,
of Great Britain, Ireland and of the British Dominions
Beyond the Seas, King and Queen Defender of the Paith,
Emperor and Empress of India.
I may add that my most onerous diplomatic labor
since reaching Paris has been the extraction of these
recommendations and that I expect you to decorate ne
at once with the Order of the Royal Bathtub.
I ask for this particular decoration because the
President of the French Republic, at vast expense, had
installed in the Palais d'Orsay for the reception of
Their
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
Their Royal Majesties two superb bathrooms containing
mosaic tubs with gold faucets which, during the stay
of Their Royal Majesties, were never once used!
I may add that it has been indicated to me by
the Government of the French Republic that the pre-
ferences of Their Majesties in the way of wines do
not go beyond Veuve Clicquot and Pommery-Greno cham-
pagne of the best years. I have, therefore, prepared
against the arrival of Their Majesties in Washington,
one hundred bottles of Pommery-Greno, 1928, which I
shall be glad to place at your disposal provided the
situation in Europe should seem to indicate that there
ray be some chance of Their Royal Majesties going to
America. My parsimony is motivated by the fact that
the grand smash seems fairly imminent. I prefer,
therefore, to restrain the departure of these bottles
until my next departure for the United States in the
hope that we may drink them together.
With my profound obeisances, I am,
Your humble and obedient servant,
Jilliam
losure
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FURNISHING OF HER MAJMETY'S ROOM.
Large bed
No bolster - two pillows
Bed cushion supplied by Her Majesty's maid
Light, but warm, blankets with a silk cover
No eider down coverlet - a soft silk cover folded in
four on the foot of the bed, with one corner
turned up.
Bedside table with lamp.
Bathroom
A large dressing-table, or a table for the bottles.
Four glasses, one of which is graduated.
Bathrobe type of bath towel.
Quantities of hand towels.
Basket for putting linen after use.
Bath thermometer.
Several spoons, large and small.
Dressing-room or Boudoir
Dressing-table perfectly lighted day and night, with
armchair of corresponding height.
Near the dressing-table a small table with drawers for
hairdressing and toilet articles. This table
should be easily removable.
Very comfortable settee with soft linen blanket.
One or two ash trays and matches for the King. The
does not smoke.
On the desk:
inkstand with blue ink
thin penholder with "J" pen (or similar make) :
medium size
red pencil
blue pencil
ordinary black pencils with very sharp points
ordinary, and typewriter erasers.
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FURNISHING OF HIS MAJES
Large bed "de milieu" (in center of panel) with the :-:1
against the wall. (Never with the side along the n:
No bolster - two pillows.
Special bolster supplied by His Majesty's valet.
Warm, but light, blankets, with a silk cover.
Very soft eider down quilt, which can be accordion-pleated
at the foot of the bed.
On each side of the bed a bedside table with a lamp.
In the bathroom or bedroom (according to possibility and
preferably in a window recess on account of light,
a
dressing table with a triple mirror, high enough to
enable contemplating oneself when standing.
Very comfortable settee.
Ash trays, matches, cigars, and cigarettes for the guests,
His Majesty having his own cigarettes.
Great number of hangers: some of them very wide with the
back slightly curved; others with a double bar for
trousers; no special clip hangers for trousers.
On the desk an inkstand with two inkwells: one full of
blue-black, the other of red ink.
No toweled bathrobe. His Majesty prefers large bath towel
To be ready to supply, if requested, garnet-red and W ite
carnations for boutonnières.
OGÉ
transmission to the President, by the
Forwarded to the secretary for PSF: St. Britain
confidinted
British Embassy
on march 29, 1939.
MOST SECRET
MESSAGE FOR THE PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF
THE PRESIDENT.
The situation as His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom see it is that the absorption
of Czechoslovakia has clearly revealed Germany's
intentions. It marks the first departure from the
Nazi racial theory and there is little reason to
suppose that it is not Germany's intention to extend
over other countries in Europe, notably Rumania and
Poland, a control equivalent to that obtained over
Czechoslovakia.
It is of importance to Germany to avoid a
war on two fronts and her recent behaviour has
stiffened the attitude at any rate of Poland and
created strong apprehension in other countries in
Central and Eastern Europe. It is Germany's purpose
gradually to neutralize these countries, to deprive
them of their power of resistance and to incorporate
them in the German economic system.
When this has been done the way will have
been prepared for an attack on the Western European
Powers.
Germany may seek to achieve her aims
directly by way of military attack, or indirectly by
undermining the independence of other countries by
economic penetration or national disintegration or
threat of force.
His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom/
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
Kingdom have and are still engaged in consultation
with a number of other governments on the present
situation which is one of grave potential menace to
the countries of Western Europe and of the whole
British Commonwealth.
The policy of His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom has been described by the Prime
Minister in his statement in the House of Commons on
March 23rd as follows: "I wish to make it clear
however that there is no desire on the part of His
Majesty's Government to stand in the way of any
reasonable efforts on the part of Germany to expand
her export trade. Nor is this Government anxious to
set up in Europe opposing blocs of countries with
differing ideas about the forms of their internal
administration. We are solely concerned here with
the proposition that we cannot submit to a procedure
under which independent States are subjected to such
pressure under a threat of force as to be obliged to
yield up their independence and we are resolved by
all the means in our power to oppose attempts if
they should be made to put such a procedure into
operation."
The purpose of the consultations upon which
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are
engaged is to fortify by as wide a measure of
international collaboration as may be achieved the
natural resistance which States are bound to offer
to attempts that may be made to constrain them
directly or indirectly to yield up their independence.
At/
-3-
At the recent conversations with the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs in London
general agreement was reached between the French
Government and His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom as to the best course of action to
adopt in view of the reluctance of the Polish
Government to accept the proposed four-Power
declaration.
Instructions have accordingly been
drafted for His Majesty's Ambassador at Warsaw and
His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest prescribing the
lines of an approach they are to make to the Polish
and the Rumanian Governments.
The purport of these instructions is
given in an appendix to the present message. The
intention is that approach to the Polish and Rumanian
Governments should be made in similar terms by the
British and the French representatives at Warsaw and
Bucharest. The terms of these instructions have been
submitted to the French Government for their assent
and if the French Government agree the British and the
French representatives at Warsaw and Bucharest will
be requested to act accordingly.
It has been pointed out to the French
Government that the Soviet Government while not
associated directly with the proposed arrangements
would be kept in touch with developments and invited
to undertake to lend their assistance in certain
circumstances in the most convenient form; and His
Majesty's/
APPENDIX
PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIS MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR AT WARSAW AND HIS MAJESTY'S
MINISTER AT BUCHAREST.
Enquiries in the various capitals
concerned have shown that it will not be
possible to proceed without modification with
the proposed four-Power declaration. While
the French Government have accepted the proposal
and while the Soviet Government have accepted,
subject to acceptance by France and Poland, the
Polish Government are reluctant to associate
themselves with the Soviet Union in a public
declaration of this kind.
It is becoming clear that our
attempt to consolidate the situation will be
frustrated if the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics is openly associated with the
initiation of the scheme. Recent reports from
a number of His Majesty's Missions abroad have
warned us that the inclusion of Russia would not
only jeopardize the success of our constructive
effort but would tend to consolidate the
relations of the parties to the Anti-Comintern
Pact as well as to excite anxiety amongst a
number of friendly governments.
Some alternative method of approach
must therefore be sought. In any scheme the
inclusion/
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
inclusion of Poland is justifiable as one of
the strong Powers bordering on Germany in the
East and the inclusion of Rumania is also of
the first importance since Rumania may be the
state primarily menaced by Germany's plans for
eastern expansion.
His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom have therefore decided to make
an approach to the Polish and Rumanian
Governments in the following sense:-
(a) Germany may either direct attack on
Poland or Rumania or may undermine either
country's independence whether by processes
of economic penetration or national
disintegration as in the case of Czechoslovakia
or by indirect military pressure which in the
case of Rumania might take the form of
Hungarian troop concentrations. Are Poland
and Rumania respectively prepared actively to
resist if their own independence is threatened
in any of these ways?
(b) If so, Great Britain and France
would be prepared to come to the help of the
threatened State. It would be understood
that as a counterpart for an undertaking by
Great Britain and France to support Poland
and Rumania, Poland and Rumania would keep
Great Britain and France fully and promptly
informed of any developments threatening their
independence.
(c)/
(c) The assurance offered in (b) is
dependent upon Poland coming to the help of
Rumania if the latter is the State threatened.
We should wish to know whether Rumania would be
prepared to come to the help of Poland if the
latter were the State threatened.
(d) (Present section (d) of the
communication is to be made to the Polish
Government only since Poland, unlike Rumania,
has a treaty of mutual assistance with France
and is a stronger military power than Rumania).
The undertaking given by Great Britain and
France under (b) would be given as part of a
reciprocal arrangement by which if Great
Britain or France were attacked by Germany or
if they went to war with Germany to resist
German aggression anywhere in Western Europe
or Yugo-Slavia, Poland would come to their help.
If the position of Poland and
Rumania can be consolidated Turkey and Greece
could more easily be rallied to the common
cause and would more likely be able to make an
effective contribution.
It is important that the Polish and
Rumanian Governments should be made aware of
the manner in which we would preserve the
interest of the Soviet Union in this scheme.
The intention would be at some convenient
moment in the discussions to explain to the
Soviet Government that it was proposed in
the first place to proceed with the
Governments of the two countries nearer to
Germany/
Germany and most likely to be affected by a
potentially dangerous situation. In the event
of an attack on Poland or Rumania there would
be good reasons on the merits of the case
for trying to secure some measure of Soviet
participation. We believe that even the
benevolent neutrality of the Soviet would
be to the advantage of these two countries
in case of war and that they might indeed be
grateful in an emergency to have at their
disposal such war material as the Soviet
industry would be in a position to furnish.
We are disposed in the first place to
ascertain the views of the Soviet Government
as to their likely attitude to this market.
It is important not to reinforce their
tendency towards isolation and we propose to
consider in due course how best to retain
their close interest which is after all to
their own general advantage.
It is essential of course that the
present approach to the Polish and Rumanian
Governments should be kept secret as well as
any negotiations that may follow it. Once
however agreement has been secured it would
be necessary for constitutional reasons
that some statement should be made in
Parliament. His Majesty's Government would at
any rate have to state in public the
assurances which they had given to the Polish
and Rumanian Governments. It is possible
that/
that the Polish Government might be reluctant
to agree to make public such counter-assurances
as they would have given us but His Majesty's
Government would certainly be pressed to say
whether any such counter-assurance had been
given and they would very much hope to be in a
position to announce the fact.
Your French colleague will receive
similar instructions and you should after
consulting him speak to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs in the sense of the present
telegram.
PsF
quit Barlie
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Warm Springs, Ga.,
April 4, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. SUMMERLIN
I have talked with Governor
Lehman, Mayor LaGuardia and Dr.
Butler on the telephone and you
can now go ahead and make arrange-
ments with them.
F.D.R.
memofe Mm I Hand
for Summerlin
thought puhaps
The President Shondd
this called to his
attention bafor ling
for warning
Event.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF PROTOCOL
March 27, 1939.
Memorandum for Colonel Watson:
In drawing up detailed plans in connection with the
visit of the King and Queen of Great Britain, we have come
to the matter of visiting "The Battery" in New York City.
In one of the conferences the President stated that
he would get in touch with Governor Lehman and Mayor LaGuardia
about the kind of ceremony to be held, but last Thursday the
President indicated that he had not yet written to these
officials, and he intimated that he might have them come to
Washington for a short conference in regard to the matter.
Possibly the President might wish to telephone the Governor
and the Mayor.
Also, we know nothing as yet about the ceremony to
take place at Columbia University, in honor of the King and
the Queen, on the afternoon of June 10th.
GSS
George T. Summerlin.
-
PSF:st. Britain
MOST SECRET
MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.
We do not regard Hitler's speech at
Wilhelmshaven as at all reassuring and all our
information goes to show that he is irritated
with us for our efforts to organise a common
resistance against his aggressive policy.
The German press warns us that Germany
intends to take preventive action against the so-
called "encirclement policy" of England. One news-
paper even maintains that our "effort to confine
Germany's living space through alliances with smaller
states is an unprovoked attack by Britain on German
freedom and equality of rights".
Our Embassy at Berlin inform us that the
attitude of the press accurately reflects Hitler's
frame of mind. They add that they learn from a
reliable source that the first sign of German intentions
which will be kept secret until the last moment will be
a lightning attack on the British fleet with the object
of delivering a knock-out blow. There will be neither
an ultimatum nor a declaration of war but Hitler alone
will decide the time for action and will personally
issue the vital order without consulting his military
advisers.
We are arranging to take suitable precautionary
measures.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
GRADED UNCLASSIFIED
April 5th, 1939.
PSF:Gh Britain
London, April 6, 1939
Dear Mr. President,
I am enclosing herewith a most secret
report of British aviation and their estimate
of German aviation. Sir Kingsley Wood, after
talking with the Prime Minister and Lord Hali-
fax, decided to send this on to you for your
own personal information. No one, not even
the members of the Cabinet, has this informa-
tion in detail.
Sir Kingsley Wood wished you to have it
for your own information, so that you would
have a more complete idea of what was going
on here.
I have not given it to anybody in this
office, nor have I shown it to any of the Army
or Navy Officials. No copy is being made and
I am not advising anybody that you have it.
All this is at their request.
Faithfully yours,
Jae
The President,
The White House.
MOST SECRET
Copy No.1.
MEMORANDUM ON THE BRITISH AND GERMAN AIR PROGRAMMES
1.
The German Programme
Details of the German air programme are a well kept
secret. Nevertheless, a wide variety of information is
available to the Air Ministry from which it is possible to form
certain deductions. By a process of checking and cross
checking a reasonably firm estimate an be made of the first
line strength* of the present German Air Force, and a forecast -
necessarily more conjectural - of future intentions.
2.
The Air Ministry believe that the first line strength
of the German Air Force on the 1st April 1939 was approximately
3,750 aircraft. They also believe that, unless there is some
radical change in German plans, the first line strength in
February 1940 will not exceed 4,500 aircraft.
It is believed
to be the German aim to hold 100% of modern reserves behind this
first line. These estimates are believed to be reliable; they
fit in with the available evidence and they have been duly
correlated with figures of present and estimated future German
aircraft production.
3.
The Air Ministry have made a detailed analysis of the
very considerable mass of information available about German
aircraft production. On the basis of the most up-to-date
information in their possession the Air Ministry believe that
the rate of production of all types of aircraft for the German
Air Force (a figure which is generally exaggerated by visitors
to Germany) probably averaged 700 per month during 1938 and that
a monthly average of 900 to 1,000 may be achieved in 1939. As
the output of first line types represents about two-thirds of
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
*
See note at end of Paper.
the total production of all types for the German Air Force the
above output amounts to about 7,500 first line types during the
year. With such an output of first line types it would be
possible to raise the first line strength to the 4,500 mentioned
in paragraph 2, to re-equip 50% of the existing first line and to
raise the reserve to about 100 modern types as well as meeting
normal wastage requirements.
4.
British policy vis-à-vis the German air threat
The policy adopted by the British Government to meet
the situation brought about by the expansion of German and other
air armaments was explained to the House of Commons by the
Secretary of State for Air on 10th November, 1938. The Secret-
ary of State described our objective as an Air Force adequate
for our necessities: our necessities, as previously defined by
the Prime Minister, being the protection of the United Kingdom,
preservation of the trade routes, defence of British territories
overseas, and co-operation in the defence of the territories of
our Allies in case of war. The Secretary of State added that
the policy aimed at producing a sound and balanced force for
war, adequate for our strategic necessities and with the depth
behind it to enable it to sustain its efforts should we be
attacked.
5.
It is clear from this definition that the British
Government do not regard parity of numbers of first line
aircraft as a satisfactory test of what is adequate for a sound
air defence. The test of parity in first line has, in fact, no
strategic basis, a formidable first line, lacking depth, is no
more than a facade which will melt and disappear under conditions
of war wastage*.
Again, the strength of the aircraft
required in the different categories will vary widely from one
war wastage rate of 50% per month can be regarded as normal
country to another. A country dependent upon its trade routes
must provide large numbers of aircraft for trade defence:
another country with large land forces must devote a correspond-
ingly large proportion of its aircraft to Army Co-operation
duties. Even a numerical comparison of bomber forces will be
misleading unless due weight is given to such factors as range
and bomb load. In fact, in comparing bomber forces total
bomb-liftis probably a better yardstick than numerical strength.
These considerations show that the problem of defining what is
necessary for an adequate air defence system is not one to be
resolved by asimple reference to numbers of first line aircraft;
and this fact should be taken into account in connexion with
the outline of the British programme set out below.
6.
The British Programme.
By the spring of 1940 the Metropolitan* Air Force will
have reached a strength of 2,370 first line aircraft. Behind
this first line there will be reserves amounting to nearly 150%,
and all aircraft (including reserves) will be of modern types.
The first line will be organized in 138 squadrons: - 70 bomber
40
squadrons, fighter squadrons, and 28 squadrons of Army Co-
operation and General Reconnaissance aircraft. In addition some
47 Balloon Barrage squadrons will have been created.
By the same date the Royal Air Force abroad will
consist of some 500 first line aircraft stationed at the vital
strategic points on the Empire trade routes. The overseas
squadrons will also be equipped with war reserves.
Mention should also be made of the Fleet Air Arm which
is expected to reach a first line strength of about 500 early
in 1940.
The exact strength will, however, depend on the rate
of commissioning of ships.
i.e. that located in the United Kingdom
7.
Implementing the programme.
(a) Aircraft and Engines.
One of the great difficulties of expansion has been
that the dictator countries were able to plan their programmes
in secret, with the result that, by the time their full
intentions had become apparent, they had received a valuable
start. A vast programme designed to overcome this serious
handicap has been planned and is now making rapid progress.
In 1934, when expansion began, there were 15 aircraft firms
and 4 engine firms producing material for the Air Ministry. In
addition to these firms - and apart from the very large
expansion effected in their own capacity - there are today 13
government factories manufacturing aircraft, engines, airscrews,
carburettors and bombs, while the general basis of production
has been immensely broadened by introducing into the field of
aircraft production such large engineering enterprises as
Vickers-Armstrong, Associated "lectrical Industries, John Brown
and Company, Messrs. Harland and Wolff, Messrs. Denny Bros., and
the English Electric Company. Use is also being made of some
thousands of firms for sub-contracting work for aircraft
production, designed to cover 35% as a minimum, of the total
man-hours involved in construction. An indication of the
extent to which the basis of airframe production has been
expanded, can be obtained from the following figures of
employment:-
Men engaged in the airframe indumstry, including
sub-contracting, on the following dates:-
January 1936
30,000
January 1937
40,000
January 1938
50,000
January 1939
90,000
January 1940
170,000 (estimate)
/(excluding)
(excluding men employed in the production of engines, equipment
and fittings).
To achieve the necessary level of production the number of
types of aircraft in production has been reduced to a minimum
and a new system adopted whereby groups of firms concentrate
on particular types.
(b) Dominion and foreign production
Apart from the above sources of production in the
United Kingdom arrangements have been made to develop production
capacity in Canada, where orders have been placed with the
Canadian Associated Aircraft Ltd. and the Canadian Car & Foundry
Co., and negotiations with a third firm are proceeding. An
Air Ministry Mission is at present visiting Australia and New
Zealand with the purpose of negotiating similar arrangements.
An order has also been placed in the United States of America
with the object of overcoming deficiencies in certain training
and reconnaissance types.
(c) Deliveries and Orders.
The drastic measures taken to increase the basis of
aircraft production referred to earlier in this Note are now
starting to produce their full effect. The rate of production
is at present in the neighbourhood of 700 per month and is
expected to approach 1,000 per month towards the end of the
year.
For some months past actual deliveries have tended to
outstrip production forecasts and estimates of future production
may therefore be regarded as reliable. The total number of
military aircraft of all types on order by the Air Ministry (or
for which orders have been authorised) is in excess of
20,000. Of this number it is anticipated that some 9,000 will
be delivered during the financial year 1939.
(d) War Potential
While the increase in production now being effected
constitute what is virtually an exercise in production on a
war scale, the quantities of airframes, engines and equipment
of all kinds estimated to be required to meet wastage in war
naturally represent an even greater production problem.
Accordingly in the development and creation of productive
capacity for the current programme, close attention has been
given to the war supply problem and allowance made for the
greater demands for war. Plans are being developed not only
for increasing the productive capacity of the professional
industry and its present outside helpers, but also for securing
the assistance of further outside organisations. Perhaps the
most important factor in obtaining an immediate increase in
production on the outbreak of war is the existence of adequate
jigs and tools. To this end, orders have been placed for
additional jigs and tools for the new types coming into
production, thus providing in advance, what, in effect, would be
an essential instrument for additional war potential. Other
steps that have been taken in this direction include the
duplication of existing factories that are located in vulnerable
situations, and the provision of increased capacity for the
production of light metal strip and sheet, which will represent
a 50% increase of the total estimated British output of
aluminium alloys.
(e) Personnel.
One of the most remarkable features of the expansion
has been the response to the recruiting programme. In 1934
the strength of the regular air force was some 30,500, of whom
2,900 were trained pilots and 300 were under training as pilots.
By the Spring of this year the corresponding figures will be
104,000, including 6,800 trained pilots and 1,650 under training
as pilots; and by the Spring of 1940 it is estimated that the
strength will be 130,000, of whom 8,300 will be trained pilots
and 1,650 under training as pilots.
Service flying training
is already being undertaken at over 40 civil and service schools.
Great assistance has been afforded by the Dominions in the
matter of candidates for flying posts in the Royal Air Force.
Substantial progress has also beenmade in the vital matter of
building up an adequate reserve of pilots. The total of
reserve pilots (including pilots under training) has been
raised from 1,400 in April, 1934 to a present level of roughly
5,000, while a strength of 8,300 will be achieved by April,
1940.
In addition some 4,000 pupils are at present undergoing
training in the Civil Air Guard, and the total by April 1940,
should be at least 5,000.
Apart from pilots, all classes of the reserves are
being strengthened and new categories created where necessary.
The total personnel reserves of all classes (including
Auxiliary personnel), which numbered some 10,600 in 1934, will
have been raised to nearly 96,000 by 1940.
(f) The post-1940 programme
Further stages of the programme, in the financial
years 1940 and 1941, although making only a relatively small
change in first line strength will profoundly increase the
war strength of the force. During these two years there will be
a concentration on re-armament with new and more powerful types
of aircraft and the provision of yet greater depth of reserves.
At the end of the period the Metropolitan Air Force will possess
a hitting power and endurance out of all proportion to the
Force which will exist in 1940.
Cost of the Programme.
An index of the magnitude of the effort now being
is afforded by comparison of the level of Air expenditure
successive financial years, as follows: -
Million.
1933 (pre-Expansion)
16-3
1934 (Scheme A)
173
1935 (Scheme c)
27½
1936 (Scheme F)
50
1937
814 *
1938 (Scheme L)
126¹ (estimated)
1939 (Present Scheme)
2081 (estimated)
cluding a proportion from the Defence Loan.
NOTE ON FIRST LINE STRENGTH
As the term "first line strength" is employed in
different senses by different authorities it is necessary to
define the sense in which the phrase is employed in the fore-
going memorandum and elsewhere in Air Ministry announcements.
The aircraft provided for a Royal Air Force squadron
fall into four categories:- (1) the Initial Equipment aircraft,
(2) the Immediate Reserve, (3) the Workshop Reserve, and (4) the
Stored Reserve. Only "Initial Equipment" aircraft are operated,
and the various categories of reserves are maintained to ensure
that the "Initial Equipment" is kept up to establishment in
peace and war. Thus the "Immediate Reserve" represents a
reserve of aircraft kept with a squadron to make good loss by
crashes, etc; the "Workshop Reserve", as the name implies,
that margin of aircraft which experience shows will normally
be under repair at any one time. Finally, the "Stored Reserve"
is the provision made to meet war wastage until such time as
it is covered by war production.
The "Initial Equipment" of a squadron is thus its
"first line"; and all other aircraft which are provided for the
squadron, though identical in type with the initial equipment
aircraft, have no other function than to preserve the first
line intact against wastage. The first line strength of a
squadron is thus the number of initial equipment aircraft it
possesses - a number standardised for each type of squadron.
The first line strength of the whole Air Force is the aggregate
of the initial equipment of all operational squadrons. The first
line strength thus excludes reserves of all categories and
training aircraft of all categories.
1.
PSF
for
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PR
Warm Springs, Ga.,
April 7, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. SUMMERLIN
Will you speak to me
about this?
F. D. R.
PARTMENT OF RECEIVED STATE
ii ??
841.001 GEORGE VI/457
MAY 3 AM
AND RECORDS ACCATIONS
1939
Columbia University
inthe Sity of NewPork
PRESIDENT'S ROOM
April 4, 1939
To The President
White House
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President:
It was most kind of you to take the trouble to
telephone me yesterday evening from Warm Springs to tell
me of the arrangements you are making for the visit of
the King and Queen to New York City and to Columbia Uni-
versity. The arrangements as you have outlined them seem
wholly admirable and we shall do our best to meet your
wishes and expectations. The plan you propose for the
reception at Columbia University is ideal. Granted good
weather, the occasion may well be a memorable one to
record and to remember.
As I said by telephone, it is particularly appro-
priate that Their Majesties should come to Columbia since
this corporation was founded by Royal Charter under date
of October 31, 1754, as King's College in the Province of
New York. Their Majesties may see not only the original
Charter but the iron King's Crown which accompanied it, a
reproduction of which we so often use upon our official
publications and stationery. Everything can readily be
F 841.001 GEORGE VI/457
accomplished in fifteen minutes as you propose and there-
-2-
fore there will be no appreciable delay in Their Majesties'
motor trip from the World's Fair to Hyde Park.
I assume that the Protocol Division of the State
Department will keep me advised if additional information
cartin
reaches them or in case there should be any change whatever
in the arrangement.
It occurs to me to suggest that perhaps it might be
ple asanter for Their Majesties to leave the West Side Parkway
at 72nd Street and then to drive east into Central Park at
the 72nd Street entrance, swinging around southward and then
northward on the east side of the Park, until they should
leave it at 110th Street and Lenox Avenue, at which point
they would swing over toward the East River to take the
Triborough Bridge to the World's Fair. This little detour
would not take more than five to eight minutes but would
show them Central Park in its best early summer guise, and
would bring them near enough to many of the distinguished
high buildings of that portion of the city to give a pretty
vivid impression of them. The drive east through 110th
Street would, I fear, be a rather tiresome alternative as
there would be practically nothing characteristic of the
city for Their Majesties to see.
With warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Sincerely yours,
C
have Parther
June 20, 1939.
My dear Dr. Butler:
Thank you very much for your letter of
June twelfth concerning the visit to Columbia
University of Their Majesties the King and Queen
of Great Britain.
I had heard that all had gone splendidly
concerning their visit there, and am glad to
have this confirmation.
May I take this occasion to express my appre-
ciation of your fine contribution to the success
of the visit.
Very sincerely yours,
Nicholas Murray Butler, Ph.D.,
President, Columbia University,
New York, New York.
June 12, 1939
The President
White House
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President:
You will be glad to know that the visit to
Columbia University on Saturday last of Their Majesties,
the King and Queen of Great Britain, was quite perfect
in every detail. The very admirable and entirely
representative audience assembled in honor of Their
Majesties was deeply moved, and the impression pro-
duced will last through the lifetime of each one of
them.
You and the country as a whole are to be
congratulated upon the significance of this royal
visit. It goes far beneath the surface of things.
It indicates that deep down in the heart and life
of the American people there is profound respect
and affection for the great political traditions
of the English-speaking peoples, which are in all
essentials our own.
With renewed congratulations and every good
wish, I am
Faithfully yours,
C
Nichales hundredler
PSF: St. Britain
Handes Mr Mmoh 3
Hnga Millar 4-8-39
Delivered to Secretary Hull
CONF IDENTIAL
for forwarding to the President at
1.
As a result of conversations held in
London on April 4th to April 6th, 1939 between
the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the
one side and the Prime Minister and the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs on the other the
Polish Government and His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom record the following
conclusions:
I.
2.
The Polish Government and His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom have decided to
place their collaboration on a permanent basis by
the exchange of reciprocal assurances of assistance.
They are accordingly prepared to enter into a formal
agreement on the following basis:
a. If Germany attacks Poland His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom will at once come
to the help of Poland;
b. If Germany attempts to undermine the
independence of Poland by processes of economic
penetration or in any other way His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom will support Poland
in resistance to such attempts. If Germany then
attacks Poland the provisions of paragraph (a)
above will apply. In the event of other action by
Germany which clearly threatened Polish independence
and was of such a nature that the Polish Government
considered it vital to resist it with their national
forces His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom/
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
Kingdom would at once come to the help of Poland;
C. Poland reciprocally gives corresponding
assurances to the United Kingdom;
d. It is understood that the Polish Government
and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
will keep each other fully and promptly informed
of any developments threatening the independence
of either country.
3.
As an earnest of their intention to enter
into a formal agreement to render assistance to
Poland in the circumstances contemplated above
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
have informed the Polish Government and have stated
publicly that during the period required for the
conclusion of the formal agreement outlined in
paragraph 2 above in the event of any action which
clearly threatened Polish independence and which the
Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to
resist with their national forces, His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom would feel
themselves bound at once to lend the Polish
Government all support in their power.
4.
The Polish Government for their part give
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a
reciprocal undertaking to the same effect which is,
in the same way as the undertaking given by His
Majesty's Government, already in force and will
remain in force during the period required for the
conclusion of the formal agreement outlined in
paragraph 2 above.
II./
-3-
II.
5.
The following points remain to be settled
before the formal agreement can be concluded:
a. His Majesty's Government desire that the
formal agreement should provide that if the United
Kingdom and France went to war with Germany to
resist German aggression in Western Europe (the
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark) Poland
would come to their help. (M. Beck appreciated the
vital importance of this question for the United
Kingdom and undertook that the Polish Government
would take it into serious consideration.)
b. The obligations which His Majesty's
Government have accepted towards Poland during the
the
period necessary for the conclusion of A formal agreement
have also been accepted by France. It is understood
that the obligations to be accepted by His Majesty's
Government in the formal agreement itself should
also be accepted by France; the method of arranging
for this would be a matter for discussion with the
French Government.
III.
6.
His Majesty's Government wished it to be
part of the formal agreement that Poland should come
to the help of Rumania if the latter were the State
threatened. The Polish Government, while respecting
to the full the obligations of mutual assistance
which exist between Poland and Rumania, thought it
premature to express a definite opinion as to the
desirability of including the case of Rumania in the
formal agreement. They consider that they should
treat/
-4-
treat the matter in the first instance directly
with the Rumanian Government and the Hungarian
Government. They will in the meantime immediately
consult His Majesty's Government should developments
in relation to Rumania or Hungary render this
desirable.
IV.
7.
It is understood between the Polish
Government and His Majesty's Government that the
conclusions recorded above do not preclude either
Government from making further agreements with other
countries for the purpose of safeguarding their own
independence or that of other States.
8.
It is the intention of His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom for their part:
a. to continue the exchange of views which
they have already initiated with the Rumanian
Government with the object of developing collaboration
between the United Kingdom and Rumania and other
powers for the purposes set forth above;
b. to initiate exchanges of views for a similar
purpose with the Governments of other members of
the Balkan Entente.
9.
His Majesty's Government while realizing
the difficulties standing in the way of associating
the Soviet Government with action such as is
contemplated above are further persuaded of the
importance of maintaining the best possible relations
with the Soviet Government whose position in this
matter could not be disregarded.
10.
The Polish Government for their part
declare/
-5-
declare that should His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom assume further obligations in Eastern
Europe these obligations would in no way extend the
obligations undertaken by Poland.
11.
The Polish Government emphasize the
importance, in the consideration of any attempt to
develop collaboration, of taking into account the
position of the Eastern Baltic States.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
April 8th, 1939.
PSF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 10, 1939.
ASK UNDERSECRETARY WELLES AND MR. SUMMERLIN
The President would like to order
five sets of his books in sheets, have
them specially bound in full morocco
with the seal of the country or the
royal family and the Presidential seal
both on the front cover. He would
like to give them to the two Crown
Princes, the President of Nicaragua,
President de Valera and the King.
What do you think of the idea, the
State Department to pay for them.
Also Mrs. Roosevelt to have one of
her books specially bound for the
Crown Princesses, Madame Samoza,
Mrs. de Valera (?) and the Queen.
PSF are
EX
Barta
file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 16, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PUBLIC PRINTER
The enclosed is what we are
going to use on the books for the
King and Queen. For the set of the
President's books you will use the
Crown with G. R. I. underneath it
and for the Queen's book - THIS
IS MY STORY - you will use the
Crown with E. R. underneath it.
You will note how they arrange the
initials.
I hope this is clear.
Many thanks,
fee
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Briter
DIVISION OF PROTOCOL
MEMORANDUM
June 3, 1939
Miss Tully,
The White House.
In answer to your request for our suggestions
concerning inscriptions to be used on the book the
President is to present to King George VI, and on
the book Mrs. Roosevelt is to present to Queen
Elizabeth, I would suggest that for the King's book
the President use either "To George VI from his Good
Friend," or "To my Good Friend George VI with my warm
and sincere greetings."
For the Queen's book, I would suggest that Mrs.
Roosevelt use "To Queen Elizabeth from Eleanor Roosevelt,"
or "To Queen Elizabeth with sincere greetings from
Eleanor Roosevelt."
GHI
George T. Summerlin
Sw
PR: WOODWARD MEM
[4-20-39
PSFiDreat Britain
LONDON. - PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN ANNOUNCED IN COMMONS BRITAIN'S
LATEST IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS WAR PREPARATION--CREATION OF A MINISTRY OF
SUPPLY.
THE MINISTRY WOULD TAKE OVER WAR STORES AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR PURCHASE AND MAINTENANCE OF RESERVES OF ESSENTIAL METALS AND
OTHER RAW MATERIALS FOR DEFENSE.
THE NEW MINISTER WILL BE LESLIE BURGIN, LIBERAL NATIONAL, WHO WILL
HAVE FULL CABINET RANK. HE WAS FORMERLY PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE
BOARD OF TRADE AND NOW IS MINISTER OF TRANSPORT WITHIN THE CABINET.
THE MINISTRY OF SUPPLY, CHAMBERLAIN SAID, WILL DEAL WITH PROBLEMS
OF SUPPLYING THE ARMY, WHICH HAVE BECOME MORE PRESSING BY THE RECENT
DECISION TO INCREASE THE ARMY'S STRENGTH, NOTABLY AN INCREASE OF THE
TERRITORIAL ARMY (HOME GUARD) TO 340,000 MEN.
HE ADDED THAT THE MINISTRY WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN
WAR STORES WHICH THE WAR OFFICE NOW SUPPLIES TO THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE
AS WELL AS THE ARMY.
CHAMBERLAIN INDICATED THAT THE MINISTRY IN TIME OF EMERGENCY WOULD
BE TRANSFORMED INTO A MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS, HAVING THE POWER TO
ENFORCE PRIORITY FOR GOVERNMENT ARMS ORDERS.
THE NEW MINISTRY WILL TAKE OVER FROM THE WAR OFFICE THE BRANCHES
RESPONSIBLE FOR RESEARCH IN DESIGNING EXPERIMENT, PRODUCTION,
INSPECTION AND ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES,
CHAMBERLAIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS EVIDENCE THAT A BIRTHDAY MESSAGE
OF CONGRATULATION WHICH KING GEORGE SENT TODAY TO ADOLF HITLER WAS NOT
AN INDICATION OF A WEAKENING OF BRITAIN'S EFFORTS FOR AN ANTI-AGG-
RESSION FRONT OR ITS URGENT RE-ARMAMENT.
CHAMBERLAIN DISCLOSED THAT A NEW MINISTER OF TRANSPORT WILL BE
APPOINTED WHEN HE TOLD A QUESTIONER IN COMMONS; "OBVIOUSLY THE MINISTER
OF SUPPLY COULD NOT ALSO CARRY ON THE DUTIES OF MINISTER OF TRANSPORT.
4/20--R1228P
1
[1939]
Memo to the President
From Cordell Hull
May 16, 1939
Attaches two statements of the British
on the Jewish-Palestine situation
accompanied by an analysis of their
proposals. Pres. reply to Hull of May 17, 1939
See Palestine folder-Foreign file-Drawer 1-1939
25 F great Britain
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1939.
MEMO. FOR MISS. TULLY.
REMINDER TO CALL COL. HALSEY.
TEL. & TEL.
MC*
MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT
I spoke with Colonel Halsey this
morning and told him that you and
Mrs. Roosevelt had suggested asking
the wives. He said the space would
not permit asking many more people
and that they thought only of asking
Mrs. Garner and Mrs. Bankhead. They
have it under consideration but are
much afraid they will run into all
kinds of difficulties unless they are
able to ask all of the wives.
This letter declared
by the Presedent for
General Watson's signature
May 24, 1939.
My dear Bishop Manning:-
The President asks me to
thank you for your letter of May twenty-
third. The program of the King and Queen
for Saturday, June tenth, was under dis-
cussion for several months and the problem
presented was that of outting down the
many appealing visits which many of us
wanted our guests to make in the City of
New York.
The time was limited
by the earliest hour they could leave the
World's Fair and the latest hour they
could arrive at the President's house at
Hyde Park in time for dinner. This has
meant that there will be time only to
stop for about ten minutes at Columbia
University where the King and Queen will
view the original Charter of King's
College, the predecessor of Columbia.
I understand, however,
that the route to be taken will pass the
Cathedral. I regret that it is impossible
to make any change at this time.
Very sincerely yours,
Secretary to the President
The Right Reverend William T. Manning,
Bishop of New York,
1021 Amsterdam Avenue,
New York, N. Y.
Diorese of New York
THE BISHOP'S OFFICE
THE SYNOD HOUSE
1021 AMSTERDAM AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY
May 23rd, 1939
The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States.
My dear Mr. President:
At a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the
Cathedral of St. John the Divine held to-day, May 23rd, a
resolution was adopted requesting me to write and ask you
if it can be arranged for Their Majesties, the King and
Queen of Great Britain to stop for a few minutes at the
Cathedral when they are here in New York.
As a Trustee of the Cathedral you will I am sure
feel as fully as we do the appropriateness of this,
especially in view of the close relations between the
Episcopal Church and the Church of England.
On their way to Columbia University the King and
Queen will pass right by the doors of the Cathedral and a
brief stop could therefore be arranged without any dis-
turbance of the program and with practically no delay.
The Trustees will very greatly appreciate it if
you can arrange this for us and a letter which I have re-
ceived from the Archbishop of Canterbury gives me every
reason to believe that such an arrangement will be quite
acceptable to the King and Queen.
Faithfully yours,
William J. Manning
Bishop of New York.
PSF great
Britaci
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 3, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM
The pionic list at Hyde
Park is O.K. emcept for the
one change I have indicated --
The Secretary of the Treasury
and Mrs. Morgenthau come before
Bishop Tucker.
F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 3, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM
THE POTOMAC LIST IS O.K.
F.D.R.
file llwen
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 3, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM
Why 1s Lady Nunburnholme
left off the list for the Tea
on Friday afternoon, June ninth?
She is staying in the house.
F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 3, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM
Admiral Byrd does not occupy
any official position, as he is on
the Retired list and not an employee
of the Government. I have numbered
the others the way they should rank.
you R si 7
/
#
/ / HOMEL /
24
HO
Line
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 3, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM
Will you put General and Mrs.
Watson right after Secretary and
Mrs. Early, and put Captain Callaghan
right after Dr. McIntire?
F. D. R.
/ /
/
// / THE / MOUNT
&
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 3, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM
How about Franklin, Jr.
for one of the dinners at Hyde
Park?
F. D. R.
PSF quat
Britain
LE CONVOI ROYAL
[6-11-39]
CANADA
Dran Mr President.
Gesterday I found
a most delightful present,
When lgot back to the train.
I could not have used
anything which could hase
given her here pleasure
Ishale value it all hey
life as a websents of a bey
honderful Event an hold
history!
Further than that
190 away with a Sicture
of a huly Corable family
radiating such a Lappy
joyful atmosphere = an
atmosphere which hurst
blen all (tore who are
priviliged to Enter in
as one of those prinleys
ones - it will always zelues
the as a treasured back
ground to a honderful four
days visit
I hut, M: President,
that [on hill torgin this
frank hat very Sincere
and Lumble tribute from
one the has gained a freat
deal of happy hope to the
future from this visit
with deepect respect
L
1.
to you, Mr. President.
law.
Gr. huts.
Autie
UNITED STATES
POSTAGE
3. NTS
ROYAL TRAIN JUNE 11 R.P.O.
RAILWA
MAIL
1939
U.S.A.
SERVICE
The
NEW WORLDS YORK FAIR 1939
President
of the United States
of america
The white Hour
quis
Washing ton
D.C.
PSF great
Britais
-
fill
and
The Canada Royal Train
June 124/39
Dear her Pressurity
will you
please accept my most
Sincere thanks for your
f hospitality during our historic
Visit to your country σ for
the portrait of Jourself & is
Charming inscreption which
for were so good as 15
Send me.
we all have Grought away
with us the most pleaswable memores of our
visit 19 + my family will always treasure
the portrait as a lasting Thefor souvenies
of our stay in your hospitable land
Belive The Junes very survey
Geo.
To Prodent Roosevert
Personal
CANADA
POLITY JUN
IIII
43
3
To The Presedent CANADA of the limited
States of america
White House
Washington
W.S.A.
PSF PS F
Great Brilain
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1939
MEI ORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:
Attached are copies of letters to
and from Mr. Bernheim which have to do
with the silver frames for the President's
photographs for the Pres. of Nicaragua and
the King of England.
R.F. Bruns
April 19, 1939
My dear Mr. Bernheim:
I am sending on this copy of the
President's seal which is to be placed on the
silver frame for the President's picture, just
as the Roosevelt crest goes on the frame for
Mrs. Roosevelt's picture.
A photograph of the President goes
to you under separate cover today. This is
being sent so that you may have the proper
measurements. The President has asked that
the picture be framed close, leaving suffi-
cient room at the bottom for his signature.
Will you please return both photo-
graphs as soon as you have taken the measure-
ments, as they will have to be autographed
before they are framed. Will you also return
this cut of the President's seal.
This order is for one frame for the
President's picture and one frame for Mrs.
Roosevelt's picture, in case I have not made
it clear. Of course these C ests go at the
top of the frames, in the center. Needless
to say, we need these frames as soon as possible.
Sincerely yours,
Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt
Mr. M. Bernheim
347 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.
Enclosure
COPY
April 20, 1939
Dear Mr. Bernheim:
I have just consulted with Miss Tully, the President's
Secretary, who tells me that the President wishes that his
photograph be framed in fairly close, leaving enough white on
either side proportionately and at the top to make it attractive.
There should be enough white left at the bottom to enable him to
inscribe a long name and his signature.
You are to make one frame to fit the President's picture
and one frame to fit Mrs. Roosevelt's picture. The frame for the
President's picture is to have his seal, a likeness of which was
sent you yesterday, engraved in the center of the frame at the top.
Can this seal be reduced sufficiently to bring in the details and
not make too wide a frame?
Mrs. Roosevelt's picture is to be framed the same as the
President's, with white on either side, at the top and sufficient
at the bottom to allow for a name and signature. The frame for
her picture is to have the Roosevelt crest, which you have already,
engraved in the center of the frame at the top.
The photograph of the President that you now have is the
one he wished to be used as a sample. However, to avoid any possible
error, I am sending you the actual photograph which he will autograph
later and which will be framed in the frame you are making.
As soon as you have finished with both photographs of the
President and the one of Mrs. Roosevelt, will you return them to me, as
these are the only photographs that I have and it is imperative that
nothing befall them. The frames are to be sent to me at the White
House as soon as they are ready. The bill for the frames is to be
sent to the State Department in Washington, attention of Hon. George
T. Summerlin. If this is not perfectly clear, would you mind tele-
phoning me.
Sincerely yours,
Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt
Mr. M. Bernheim
347 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.
COPY
WOODSIDE STERLING CO.
347 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.
April 22, 1939
Mrs. J. M. Helm
White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mrs. Helm:
I have both your letters of the 20th and 21st before me, and am
very sure that we understand you perfectly. The two frames have
been put in work and the photographs themselves will be returned
to you by insured mail on Monday. How, in regard to a few tech-
nical details.
The silver on the frame for the President's picture will be one
inch wide, which is not too wide for a frame of this size, and at
the same time will allow for engraving EN the President's shield
in all its detail. The silver on the frame for Mrs. Roosevelt's
photograph will be 7/8 of an inch wide. You were quite right in
assuming that we have a copy of the Roosevelt Crest.
In regard to the backs on the frames, unless it does not meet with
your approval, these will be made of bakalite. This is superior
to velvet, inasmuch as the frame can be cleaned without soiling
the back, and there is no chance of its becoming loose or warped
as is often the case where there is a velvet back.
We expect to make shipment of both of these frames by the latter
part of next week, which we hope will be in ample time for your needs.
Sincerely,
M. Bernheim
COPY
April 24, 1939
My dear Mr. Bernheim:
Thank you very much for your letter
in regard to the frames. I have passed on this
letter to Miss Tully, who will show it to the
President. It will be perfectly all right to
make the backs of the frames of bakelite.
*******
Sincerely yours,
Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt
COPY
WOODSIDE STERLING CO.
347 5th Ave.
April 29, 1939
Mrs. J. M. Helm
The White House
Dear Mrs. Helm:
As is not unusual in special order work, we were somewhat delayed
in making these two special frames, but the result has proved
very satisfactory. They are both finished and now comes the
question of engraving. In one of your letters, you asked that
we be sure that they get all the detail of the President's shield.
In going over the matter with the engraver, who by the way makes
a specialty of this sort of work, he tells us that while all the
detail can be put in by engraving it flat, the effect will be
more or less lost. On the other hand, the background is cut away,
giving the shield a raised effect, thus making the detail come
out strongly and clearly. Now as to the cost. The flat engraving
will cost approximately $15.00 while the style suggested by the
engraver will cost about $22.00. Inasmuch as this will be held
up until we hear from you, would you let us have an answer quickly.
We have told our engraver to hold himself in readiness for this
job, and he will stop any work he may have on hand. So you see,
it will only be a short time before we make shipment after hearing
from you.
Sincerely,
May 6, 1939
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:
We will need another frame for the
President's picture for the King.
Is it all right to order it now?
MRS. HELM
N.B. Miss Tully said "Yes" and it was ordered
as per letter of May 6th.
May 6, 1939
Dear Mr. Bernheim:
******
There will be two more frames to be made ⑉ one
for the President's photograph just as you made this past
one, and one for Mrs. Roosevelt's picture which I will
have to have made just the right size to fit the frame.
Will you please let me know exactly the dimensions it
should be.
-*******
Sincerely yours,
Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt
WOODSIDE STERLING CO.
347 Fifth Avenue
May 8, 1939
Mrs. J. M. Helm
The White House
Dear Mrs. Helm:
It was very nice of you to let us know that the frames proved
satisfactory. It is just too bad there was all the misunder-
standing.
We have put the two frames that you ordered in work, and would
appreciate so much your letting us know just when you wish same
delivered. In regard to the President's seal, we still have
the original here and would like to keep it until the second
frame is finished so that we may check all the detail. However
we have a copy of it and if you want yours back, we will gladly
send it.
******
Sincerely yours,
M. Bernheim
May 9, 1939
My dear Mr. Bernheim:
Certainly, keep the President's seal until
the second frame is finished in order to check all
the details.
*****
I am sending on today by insured mail the
President's photograph for the large frame that you
are making. I think it will be easier for you to put
this in the frame and return it framed for the Presi-
dent's autograph.
I have asked Harris & Ewing to send you Mrs.
Roosevelt's photograph as soon as it is finished, for
you to frame and return to me for her autograph. Will
you please deliver these as soon as they are finished.
Sincerely yours,
Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt
RSF great
Britan.
THE ROYAL CANADA TRAIN June 14.1939.
Dear Mr President,
I am so my song
that oning to the rush at the
last moment I had to get
into the hain without saving
foodbye to you. - In thanking
you for the quat Kindness and
hospitality which you extanded
me, may I also add that
it the memory the oceasion
will Eur mmain with me.
I am apaid that I
did not have the opportunity
of Ca anking you for the
my Kind sift of your
blutopaph which I shall
licasure as a heppy
Soursnir if a must delight
ful and unique visit.
Believe me
m dear MY President
Junes sincerely
Peris Lagh.
Personal
THE
CANADA
RU
1939
J
ass
CE
CA
The Prident
POSTES
CENT POSTAGE
1
2
CENTS
United Statis A America
the White House
washington
D.S.
PSF quat Britain
THE ROYAL TRAIN
CANADA
Juneisth 1939.
Dear Mr President
I should like
once again to thank
you very much for your
kindness to me, for
your gift of asiqued
photo graph of yourself.
This I shall always
value sheep bq me in
hours. memory of some happy
Believe me, Mr President,
Your Kapecifully
H.E.Y. Y. White
Penoval
CANADA
ROA RO TAL JUN TR 15 AIN Z
6 PM TRANNING
yes
CANADA
3
3
Me President of the United Stales
of america
The White House
Washington
DC.
U.S.A.
T
June 15, 1939.
Dear Bill:-
I am especially glad that Eugene Ware's
poetry has been put together in a book -- and
thankful to you for sending it to me. I have
known some of the verses -- and it has seemed to
me that in some ways "Ironquill" has much of
the combined philosophy of two other friends of
mine -- William Allen White and will Rogers.
It is worth preserving and fostering it.
I wish you could have met the young
couple from England. They had a real under-
standing not only of foreign affairs but also
of social problems. I think they enjoyed the
rather successful mixture of adequate formality,
plus informal family life, which we managed to
work out for them during those four days.
As ever yours,
William Allen White, Esq.,
The Emporia Gasette,
Emporia,
Kansas.
THE EMPORIA GAZETTE
June 8, 1939
Dear Miss LeHand:
I am sending the president a book
that 1 think he will enjoy. It is not a
serious book. It is a book of verse, gay,
humorous. beautiful and It sometimes is written satirical by an an ar and man, a
grand old man who died a quarter of a cen-
tury ago. Enclosed I am sending a letter
to go with the book and I am doing so be-
cause at one time or another the President
has suggested this way as a sure way to
get to him.
to A White Respectfully yours
THE EMPORIA GAZETTE
Britain
W.A. WHITE, EDITOR AND OWNER
K. W. DAVIDSON. BUSINESS MANAGER
EMPORIA, KANSAS
June 8, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
What you need just now is a little poetry. You are
going too hard and too seriously. So I am sending you a book
of verse written by a Kansan, Eugene F. Ware, former Commissioner
of Pensions under Theodore Roosevelt. T. R. greatly admired
Eugene Ware and used to quote these verses on many occasions in
private conversation.
Putnam's are bringing out a new edition and I have
written a little introduction for this new edition. I have
marked in the Table of Contents some of the verses that I think
you might read happily. They are gay, satirical, sometimes a
bit tragic but always most humorous and frequently full of the
robust humor that men had in the seventies, eighties, nineties,
of the old century. It was not Elizabethian but it had the
same gusto.
Before closing will you permit one who differed with
you about the court plan and who bats his eyes and swallows and
gasps a bit as our debts mount to say that I think you did one
swell job entertaining the King and Queen from England. No
other President in my memory, excepting Theodore Roosevelt ond
possibly Benjamin Harrison, could have given such social
distinction as you gave to the occasion of this week. I'll bet
you sent George VI home wondering what George III was thinking
about to overlook this American bet. With warm personal regards,
I am
President Franklin D. Roosevelt
White House, Washington, D. C.
Always WAWhite most cordially yours,
WAW/AS
file
R.M.S. Empress of Baitan
at Sea:
PS F, Bilani
Halifasc N.S. to
Sr.Johns, Newtaundland.
16th th June, 1939.
Dear m ! President,
Conditions in the tram and
the somembat full programme
of the last few days in Canadar
have priched me hom writing
a letter to which I gni areat
importance
It is very difficult for me
to commy the quat pleasure 2
felt on receiving from you your
photograph. I shall always
value it, not only as a rememberance
of having the honour of meeting
you Sir, but also as a mements
of the historic visit of Then
majostics to your very great country.
It mill bring to my mind the
picture of H Potomac folying
the Presidential and Rmal Standards
at the Same time; sunch a sight
of the atmost significance in their
times. and not H least to
help me to recollect they de Park
and a family who made me
Leel immediately "at 'home in a strange
country and in enicumstances
which H. world generally would
not Himh such a conditions easiy
achenid.
Ido thank 20 McProsident. for
His photograph and for m star in
H. United states of America from th
botton of my hant.
Yours sincerely
h.th
NEWFOUNDLAND
NEWFOUNDLAND
PLYMOUTH
JNE
STACE 3
POSTAGE
POSTAGE
POSTAGE
PO
OT
DEVUN.
A.
910)
THREE CENTS
36
2 TWO CENTS
2
S
The President of the
United states of America,
The White House,
U.S.A.
Washmigton,
D.C.
June 22, 1939.
Dear Mrs. Helm:-
I know how happy you must be
to be back in Grayville after the hectic
weeks which ended the so-called social season.
I want to tell you that I fully realize what
difficult days they were for you and that I
appreciate and am grateful for the fine work
which you and the Social Bureau did.
I do hope you will have a
grand Summer.
My very best wishes to you,
Always sincerely,
Mrs. James M. Helm,
Grayville,
Illinois.
June 22, 1939.
Dear Gus:-
I want to send you this personal note
to tell you what an excellent job I think you
did on the books and frames for the Royal
visitors. They were perfect in every detail
and we were all much pleased with them. Many
thanks to you and your Staff for such efficient
service.
My best wishes to you,
Very sincerely yours,
Hon. Augustus E. Giegengack,
The Public Printer,
Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C.
June 22, 1939.
Dear Jo:-
I know how much you helped to make
the books and frames for the Royal visitors
a real success, and I am very grateful to
you for your fine cooperation and assistance.
My best wishes to you and I hope
to see you one of these days.
Very sincerely yours,
Miss Jo Coffin,
Assistant to The Public Printer,
Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C.
June 24, 1939
Memo for Gen. Watson
From Summer Welles
Attaches conf despatches from Amb Biddle marked
for the President
No. 1069, dated June 1, 1939 concerning the pos-
sible reopening of negotiations affecting Danzig
and the Corridor;
No. 1072, dated June 3, 1939 reporting the sub-
stance of a conversation with the Polish Ambassa-
dor to Great Britain on Anglo-German differences:
No 1074, dated June 3, 1939 concerning status of
Polish attempts to obtain British financial
assistance.
No. 1075, dated June 3, 1939 concerning reaction
in official Polish circles to Molotov's address
of May 31, 1939.
See Poland folder-Foreign File--Drawer 1--1939
PF :
Great Bitals
OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA
Oltawa, July 3, 1939.
Dear me. President,
The privilege of being
introduced to Wws. Roosevelt and yourself,
suring to visit of the King and even
to the United States, will be kept doubly
fresh in the memories of those of US to
whom you 10 graciously presented photographs
of yourself with to characteristically
jenesous unscription
I think that a express the
fuling Common to all who WHI present
in washington and at styde Park in
recalling that livily sense of great and
jood events which charges the while
atmosphere and made such a lasting
impression spow JS all
As one of the two Reanadian members
of tis Majesty's suite, the first one b
Coulse being my Trime Minister I should
like to express my Jup gratitude to you,
sid, for your personal Kindness and
hospitality and even more for your
great service to the Cause of friend liness
letween the two inlat nations with which
we are most closely associated.
I an sil,
with great respect and Kind wishes,
yours truly
A) Heeney
The 1
- s The
Was
&
Personal
July 6, 1939.
Dear Jimmy:-
I well remember that when you went to
the Coronation I asked you to suggest to the King
that if he went to Canada he should come to visit
us in Washington; that you spoke to him about it
and that he said he would be delighted to.
It is just as well that this be put
on paper for future generations, though I see no
particular reason for making any announcement
about it'now.
Thereafter I was more or less in touch
with Mackensie King, and last Summer when I dedicated
the International Bridge at the Thousand Islands
he told me that the King and Queen would in all
probability visit Canada in 1939. Thereupon I
started a personal correspondence with the King
himself -- and the rest is now history.
It was grand to see you the other day.
As ever yours,
Honorable James W. Gerard,
40 Wall Street,
New York City,
New York.
My dear Franklin:
You may remember that when I went
over to represent you at the Coronation you gave
me one job, namely, to ask the acceptance by the
King of your invitation to visit you in the
United States.
I talked to the King directly and
he accepted your invitation and I so informed you.
Of course, I have never publicly quoted
anything about this but talking to Sir Richard Tute,
formerly Chief Justice of the Bahamas, yesterday
he told me that he thought it would be a good thing
if you announced this because as he said many people
believed that the visit at this time was something
arranged recently for purely political purposes.
I have no opinion myself one way or
the other but am inclined to agree with Brad Sit Richard.
Yours very Jane sincerely,
Jan
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Memo for Watson
From Sumner Welles
July 11, 1939
Attaches conf despatch No 1082-June 7, 1939
from Amb. Biddle for the President
Subject-discussion which took place between
Biddle and the newly appointed Russian Amb.,
Sharonov and his observations of the Soviet
mbassador in Warsaw on current Anglo-Soviet
discussions.
See Poland folder-Foreign File --Drawer 1--1939
PSF: st. Britain
PRIME
MINISTER
?
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.
25th August, 1939.
my draw the President,
The Secretary of State for Air informs me that the
United States Navy Department have developed a new type
of automatic air bombsight known as the Norden bombsight,
and I understand that this sight (together perhaps with a
similar development of the United States Army Air Corps)
is the most efficient instrument of its kind in existence.
We are therefore most anxious to obtain details of the
sight and have inquired urgently through our Air Attache
in Washington whether they can be given to us. For
reasons which I can readily imagine the Air Authorities
of the United States have not felt able to accede to our
request.
In normal times I should not make a direct approach
to you in such a matter, but in the present grave
situation I venture to ask you whether you could help us
to obtain the information we desire. I make this urgent
personal request to you because Great Britain today faces
the possibility of entering on a tremendous struggle,
confronted
PRIME
2
10, Downing Street,
Thiteball.
confronted as she is with a challenge to her fundamental
values and ideals. Moreover, I believe they are values
which our two countries share in common, and I am
convinced that if there is a certainty, it is that our
two countries will never go to war with one another.
Should the war which threatens break out, my
advisers tell me that we would obtain a greater
immediate increase in our effective power if we had the
Norden bombsight at our disposal than by any other means
we can foresee. Air power is, of course, a relatively
new weapon which is so far untried on a large scale;
there is the danger of unrestricted air attack which we
for our part would never initiate. I am however most
anxious to do all in my power to lessen the practical
difficulties which may arise in operations even against
legitimate military targets, and I feel that in air
bombardment accuracy and humanity really go together.
For this reason again I am certain that you would
render the greatest service if you could enable us to
make use of the magnificent apparatus which your
Services
Services have developed.
I need hardly say how grateful I shall be if
you can see your way to help us.
Yours sincerely
. Chamburlain
The President of the
United States of America.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 28, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
I am sending to you herewith a per-
sonal letter addressed to you by the
British Prime Minister of which I spoke
to you on the telephone.
Believe me
Faithfully yours, Rells
The President,
The White House.
August 31, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
I have dictated & suggested reply for
you to send Mr.Chamberlain in accordance
with your suggestions as communicated to me
by Captain Callahan. I think that your
reply to Mr. Chamberlain might best be sent
through Lord Lothian.
Believe me
Faithfully yours,
Summer Welles
Enclosure.
The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have been very glad indeed to receive
your letter of August 25 and to hear from you
directly with regard to the question set forth
so clearly and so movingly therein.
The initial survey which I have had made
of the situation and which I have myself studied
very carefully leads me to the conclusion that
under the existing legislation of this Government
the request you make could not be granted unless
the sight desired by the British Government were
made available to all other governments at the
same time it was made available to Great Britain.
This clearly would not be in the interest of the
United States, nor for that matter, I believe
you will agree, in the interest of Great Britain.
I am sending you this preliminary reply to
your letter because of my knowledge that you
desire some indication from me in response to
your request at the earliest moment. I may
assure you, however, that I shall give continued
consideration to the request you have made and
to the possibility of acceding to it either under
present conditions or under such new conditions
as may arise, and that I shall write you again
upon this subject as soon as a final decision
can be reached.
Believe me
Yours very sincerely,
The Right Honorable
Neville Chamberlain,
P.C., F.R.S., M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Received from the
British Embarry at 8:25 p.m.
aug. 28.
got
COPY
PS.BUTAM
Telegram of August 28th
[1939]
Following 1s substance of His Majesty's Government's
reply to Herr Hitler's communication of August 25th.
1. His Majesty's Government reciprocate Chancellor's
desire for Anglo-German understanding.
2. Chancellor's message dealt with two groups of
questions.
(1) Matters in dispute between Germany and
Poland.
(2) Ultimate relations between Germany and
Great Britain.
3. His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss
questions raised by Chancellor 1f German-Polish differences
are peacefully composed.
4. His Majesty's Government agree that German-Polish
settlement is first essential but everything turns on nature
of settlement and method by which it 1s to be reached.
Chancellor says nothing on these points and an understanding
on both is essential to further progress.
5. His Majesty's Government intend to honour their
obligations to Poland and would not for any advantage to
Great Britain acquiesce in a settlement jeopardising Polish
independence. His Majesty's Government consider that German-
Polish differences could find reasonable solution on lines
of sefeguarding Poland's essential interests. But it must
be understood in advance that any settlement would be
guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would
be prepared to participate in such guarantee. His Majesty's
Government
Government think that the next step should be direct
German-Polish discussions on foregoing basis. His
Majesty's Government have made representations to Polish
Government that they should express willingness to enter
into discussions on this basis and hope that German Govern-
ment will do the same.
6. His Majesty's Government agree that:
(1) Principal danger in German-Polish situation
is reports of treatment of minorities. Present
state of tension, frontier incidents and in-
flammatory propagenda are a danger to peace.
These with incidents should be suppressed in
order to give time without provocation on either
side for examination of possibilities of a settle-
ment. His Majesty's Government are confident
that both the Polish and German Governments are
alive to these considerations.
7. Because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous
concerning their obligations to Poland this does not mean
that they are not anxious to use their influence to assist
the achievement of a solution commending itself both to
Germany and to Poland.
8. Such a settlement is essential not only for its
own sake but in view of wider considerations. The advantage
of a peaceful settlement over the resort to force is obvious.
The results of a decision to use force have been made clear.
9. If a settlement were reached the possibility of
practical measures to effect transition from preparations
for
-3-
for war to normal activities of peaceful trade. (some
words omitted). Reference in Chancellor's message to
limitation of armaments is noted.
10/ Failure to secure a just settlement of German-
Polish differences would ruin hopes of an Anglo-German
understanding and might lead to war with untold suffering
and loss to many countries.
efreat Bitain ,
Copy of Memorandum for the President
From Gen Watson
August 30, 1939
"
The British Embassy phoned that they find they only
have the substance of Hitler's reply to the English,
and not the full text. Lord Lothian gave the
President the impression that perhaps the Embassy
had the full text, which is erroneous."
See: Watson folder-Drawer 2-1939
August 31st 1939.
Dear Mr. Secretary,
I enclose herein the text of a
message for the German Chancellor which was
sent on the afternoon of August 30th to
His Majesty's Ambassador 1n Berlin with
instructions that he should not deliver it
pending a further communication from London.
I also enclose the text of a
telegram sent at the same time to His
Majesty's Ambassador 10 Warsaw. He too
was informed that no action should be
taken on this telegram pending further
instructions.
Believe me,
dear Mr. Secretary,
Yours very sincerely,
onourable
ordell Hull,
(SGD) LOTHIAN.
Secretary of State of the
United States,
Washington, D.C.
MESSAGE TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR
1. His Majesty's Government appreciate the
friendly references in certain sentences of reply of
German Government to latter's desire for an Anglo-
German understanding and to their statement of the
influence which this consideration has exercised
upon their policy.
2. His Majesty's Government repeat that they
reciprocate the German Government's desire for
improved relations, but it will be recognised that
they could not sacrifice the interests of friends in
order to obtain that improvement. They fully under-
stand that the German Government cannot sacrifice
Germany's vital interests, but the Polish Government
are in the same position, and His Majesty's Government
believe that the vital interests of the two countries
are not incompatible.
3. His Majesty's Government note that the
German Government accept the British proposal and are
prepared to enter into direct discussions with the
Polish Government.
4. His Majesty's Government understand that
the German Government accept in principle the condition
that any settlement should be made subject to an inter-
national guarantee. The question of who shall
participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed
further, and His Majesty's Government hope that to
avoid loss of time the German Government will take
immediate steps to obtain the assent of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics whose participation in the
guarantee/
guarantee His Majesty's Government have always
assumed.
5. His Majesty's Government also note that
the German Government accept the position of the
British Government as to the Polish Government's
vital interests and independence.
6. His Majesty's Government must make express
reservation in regard to the statement of particular
demands put forward by the German Government in an
earlier passage in their reply. They understand
that the German Government are drawing up proposals
for a solution. No doubt the latter's proposals will
be fully examined during the discussions. It can then
be determined how far they are compatible with the
essential conditions which His Majesty's Government
have stated and which the German Government express
their willingness to accept.
7. His Majesty's Government are at once
informing the Polish Government of the German Govern-
ment's reply. The method of contact and the arrange-
ments for the discussions must obviously be agreed
with all urgency between the German Government and the
Polish Government. But in His Majesty's Government's
view it would be impracticable to establish contact
so early as to-day.
8. His Majesty's Government fully recognise
the need for speed in the initiation of the discussions
and they share the apprehensions of the Chancellor
arising from the proximity of two mobilised armies
standing face to face. They would accordingly most
strongly/
-3-
strongly urge that both parties should undertake
that during the negotiations no aggressive military
movements will take place. His Majesty's Government
feel confident that they could obtain such an under-
taking from the Polish Government if the German
Government would give similar assurances.
9. Further His Majesty's Government would
suggest that a temporary modus vivendi might be
arranged for Danzig which might prevent the occurrence
of incidents tending to render German-Polish relations
more difficult.
TELEGRAM TO HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR IN WARSAW
1. My telegram to Berlin gives the text of the
reply of His Majesty's Government to the German
communication which has been repeated to you.
2. Please communicate it to M. Beck. In doing
so you should point out that whilst the first part of
the German Government's reply consists of an indefensible
and misleading presentation of the German case, the
really important part of the reply consists in Germany's
acceptance of proposal for direct discussion of
suggestion of proposed international guarantee, and
Germany's assertion that she intends to respect Poland's
vital interests.
3. It is perhaps unnecessary to take exception
at this stage to much that finds place in the German
reply, of which His Majesty's Government would be as
critical as they have no doubt would be the Polish
Government, but His Majesty's Government have made an
express reservation in regard to the statement of
particular demands put forward in the German note.
Point that seemed to call for immediate comment was the
German demand that a Polish representative should
present himself at Berlin to-day. M. Beck will see
the line which we have taken on this and the further
reference we have made to the point in our reply to
the German Government's latest communication. The
German Government are now drawing up proposals for a
solution and it will be in the light of these and of
other developments that the decision as to future
procedure including the place and conditions of discussion
will/
will have to be taken.
4. M. Beck will see from the reply of His Majesty's
Government that the proposal has been made for a military
standstill during the discussions to which His Majesty's
Government earnestly hope that the Polish Government will
have no objection.
5. His Majesty's Government will be glad to have
the views of the Polish Government urgently. In view of
the fact that the Polish Government have authorised His
Majesty's Government to say that they are prepared to enter
into direct discussions with the German Government, His
Majesty's Government hope that provided the method and
general arrangements for the discussions can be satisfactorily
agreed to, the Polish Government will be prepared to do so
without delay. We regard it as most important from the
point of view of the internal situation in Germany and of
world opinion that so long as the German Government profess
themselves ready to negotiate no opportunity should be
given to them for placing the blame for a conflict on
Poland.
6. You should of course emphasise that His
Majesty's Government have made it quite clear to Herr
Hitler that they are sincerely determined to implement
their obligations without reserve. on this point there
is no misunderstanding in Berlin. The position of the
Polish Government is very different from that which hey
occupied last March since it is now supported both by
direct British guarantee and promise of British participation
in the guarantee of any settlement reached on the bases
indicated and the conversations would be carried on
against/
against this background.
7. Another consideration present in our
minds 1s that reliable information from Berlin gives
us reason to suppose that German territorial demands
do not represent Herr Hitler's last word. on the
other hand a blank refusal to negotiate is likely to
increase the German forces working for war and will
enable Herr Hitler to place the onus of breakdown
on Poland.
Birtish refly to Presidents massage-
(Dicated over telephone 5 Bated Entony wale
to Stite left- Formal note entrodying Dani & GAT &
Please deliver to the President the following message
in the name of His Majesty's Government:
"His Majesty's Government welcome the weighty and
moving appeal of the President of the United States
against the bombardment from the air of civilian popula-
tions or of unfortified cities. Deeply impressed by the
humanitarian considerations to which the President's
message refers, It was already the settled policy of
His Majesty's Government should they become involved in
hostilities to refrain from such action and to confine
bombardment to strictly military objectives upon the
understanding that those same rules will be scrupulously
observed by all X their opponents. They had already
concerted in detail with certain other governments the
rules that in such an event they would impose upon them-
selves and make publicly known."
COPY
BRITISH EMBASSY,
Washington, D.C.
September 1st 1939.
CONFIDENTIAL
My dear Mr. Secretary,
Yesterday I gave Mr. Sumner Welles a copy of a
telegram addressed to the Foreign Office by His Majesty's
Ambassador in Warsaw reporting M. Beck's reactions on
being shown a copy of His Majesty's Government's latest
communication to Herr Hitler, a copy of which I sent to
you in my letter of August 31st.
I have now been instructed to send you the enclosed
summaries of four further telegrams:
(A) A telegram dated August 31st from His
Majesty's Ambassador in Warsaw, reporting
a conversation with M. Beck when the latter
communicated the Polish Government's reply
to our representations.
(B) A further telegram from His Majesty's
Ambassador in Warsaw dated August 31st,
giving the text of this Polish reply.
(c) A telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador in
Berlin sent on August 31st.
(D) Text of telegram sent to His Majesty's
Ambassador in Warsaw on August 31st.
I have been particularly asked to emphasise the con-
fidential nature of the two telegrams from Warsaw.
Believe me,
My dear Mr. Secretary,
Yours very sincerely,
LOTHIAN
The Honourable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
Summary of telegram of August 31st
from His Majesty's Ambassador
in Warsaw
M. Beck has just handed me written Polish reply
to my representations of last night. Translation 1s
given in my following telegram. M. Beck particularly
asked that it should be treated as highly confidential.
2. I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs what action
he proposed taking to establish contact with German
Government. He replied that he would now instruct
Polish Minister in Berlin to see either Minister for
Foreign Affairs or State Secretary, in order to say
that Poland had accepted the British proposals set
forth in your telegrams. I urged him to do this at
once.
3. I then asked what line M. Lipsky would take if
Herr von Ribbentrop, or whoever else he saw, handed
him German proposal. M. Beck said the Ambassador would
not be authorised to accept such a document since in
the light of previous experience it might be accompanied
by some sort of ultimatum. He felt it was essential
that contact should be made first of all and that then
details should be discussed as to where, with whom, and
on what basis negotiations should be begun.
4. He pointed out that the situation in Danzig was
becoming extremely serious. Polish officials were being
arrested, railway traffic was held up, and he felt it
essential that immediate measures be taken to set up a
modus vivendi in order to allow the release of the arrested
persons
persons and the resumption of railway traffic. He
suggested that M. Burckhardt might effect this.
5.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed that
no other serious incidents had taken place but added
that he feared that in connexion with any negotiations
he would have to appeal to the intervention of His
Majesty's Government.
6. M. Beck added that if invited to go to Berlin
he would of course decline as he had no intention
of being treated like President Hacha.
Summary of telegram of August 31st
from His Majesty's Ambassador
at Warsaw.
Following is the text of the Polish reply dated
August 31st, 1939.
1. Unconditional confirmation of their already
expressed willingness for a direct exchange of views
with the German Government naturally on the basis
suggested by the British Government.
2. The Polish Government are also prepared
on a reciprocal basis to give a formal guarantee that
if negotiations are held, Polish troops will not
violate the German frontier provided that a corres-
ponding guarantee is furnished regarding the non-
violation of the Polish frontier by German troops.
3. In the present circumstances it is essential
that a simple provisional modus vivendi be set up in
Danzig.
4. As regards the suggestions communicated to
the Polish Government, a request has already been made
to the British Ambassador for an explanation of what
the British Government understood by international
guarantees in regard to the relations between Poland
and Germany. In the absence of an answer to this
fundamental question, the Polish Government feel
obligated entirely to reserve their attitude towards
the matter until they have received fuller explanations.
5. The Polish Government trusts that if conver-
sations with Germany are initiated, they may continue
to enjoy the good offices of His Majesty's Government.
Telegram to His Majesty's
Ambassador in Berlin,
of August 31st.
Please inform the German Government that His
Majesty's Government understand that the Polish Govern-
ment are arranging to establish contact with them
through M. Lipski in Berlin. Please enquire whether
in view of the serious situation in Danzig they agree
to the necessity for setting up an immediate provisional
modus vivendi. We have already made this suggestion to
the German Government in paragraph 9 of our recent com-
munication. Would they agree that M. Burckhardt might
be employed in this connexion if it were possible to
secure his services.
Summary of telegram of August 31st
to His Majesty's Ambassador
at Warsaw.
1. His Majesty's Government are gratified to
learn that the Polish Ambassador in Berlin has been
instructed to get into contact with the German Govern-
ment.
2. His Majesty's Government fully agree as to
the need for discussing detailed arrangements regarding
the negotiations and as to the undesirability of M.
Beck's visiting Berlin.
3. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government
do not understand why the Polish Government should find
it difficult to authorise M. Lipski to accept document
from the Germans and they sincerely trust that they
may feel able to amend their instructions in this matter.
No ultimatum was mentioned in the report on the German
proposals furnished to His Majesty's Government and the
suggestion that the demand that Polish representative
should be in Berlin by August 30th was equivalent to an
ultimatum was definitely repudiated by German Foreign
Minister in talking with Sir Nevile Henderson. If the
document were to contain an ultimatum, Poland would
naturally refuse to discuss it until ultimatum was with-
drawn. On the other hand, for them to refuse to re-
ceive the proposal would arouse grave misunderstanding
by outside opinion.
4. It would seem M. Lipski could surely be
instructed to receive and forward the document and
say (a) if it contained anything like the expected
ultimatum
-2-
ultimatum the Polish Government would certainly be
unable to discuss on such a basis, and (b) that in
any case in the Polish view matters such as the venue
of the negotiations, the basis on which they should
be held and the individuals who should take part in
them should be discussed between the two governments.
5. If negotiations are begun, His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom will at all times be
glad if desired to lend any assistance they can to
achieve a just settlement.
6. As regards an international guarantee, this
matter will no doubt have to be discussed at length.
What His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
had in mind was a guarantee of the full and proper
observance of any settlement reached.
7. Regarding Danzig, His Majesty's Government
entirely share M. Beck's views as to the importance
of establishing some modus vivendi. They have already
made a suggestion to this effect to the German Govern-
ment and will do so again. If the Germans agree, they
will approach M. Burckhardt.
Please speak to the Polish Foreign Minister
immediately in the above sense.
COPY
fillsnal
PSF:
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
September 1st, 1939.
My dear Mr. Secretary,
I have received instructions to inform you
that the following communication is being made to
the German Government by His Majesty's Ambassador in
conjunction with his French colleague this evening.
"On the instructions of His Majesty's
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I
have the honour to make the following communication.
Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a
proclamation to the German Army which indicated clearly
that he was about to attack Poland. Information which
has reached His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German
troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks
upon Polish towns are proceeding. In these circumstances
it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and
France that by their action the German Government have
created conditions viz. an aggressive act of force
against Poland threatening the independence of Poland
which call for the implementation by the Governments of
the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to
Poland to come to her assistance. I am accordingly to
inform Your Excellency that unless the German Government
are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory
assurances that the German Government has suspended all
aggressive action against Poland and are prepared
promptly
The Honourable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
-2-
promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will
without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland".
Sir Neville Henderson has been instructed to ask
for an immediate reply and to report the result of his
interview, when he will be sent further instructions.
He has been told that in reply to any question he may
explain that the communication is in the nature of a
warning and is not to be considered as an ultimatum.
Believe me, My dear Mr. Secretary,
Yours very sincerely,
LOTHIAN
PSF:
BRITISH embassy,
WASHINGTON D.C.
September 3rd, 1930.
No.369.
sir,
I have the honour under instructions
from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the
following declaration has been made on behalf of
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
and the French Covernment:-
#
The Governments of the United
"Kingdom and France solemnly and publicly
"affirm their intention should a war be
"forced upon them to conduct hostilities
"with a firm desire to spare the civilian
"population and to preserve in every way
"possible those monuments of human achieve-
"ment which are treasured in all civilized
"countries. In this spirit they have
"welcomed with deep satisfaction President
"Roosevelt's appeal on the subject of
"bombing from the air. Fully sympathising
"with the humanitarian sentiments by
"which that appeal was inspired they have
"replied to it in similar terms. They had
"indeed some time ago sent explicit
"instructions to the commanders of their
"armed forces prohibiting the bombardment
"whether from the air, or the sea, or by
"artillery/
The Honourable
Cordel 2 Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
&
"artillery on land of any except strictly
"military objectives in the nerrowest sense
"of the word. Bombardment by artillery on
"land will exclude objectives which have no
"strictly defined military importance; in
"particular large urban areas situated
"outside the battle sone. They will further-
"more make every effort to avoid the
"destruction of localities or buildings
"which are of value to civilisation. As
"regards the use of neval forces, including
"submarines, the two governments will bide
"strictly by the rules laid down in the
"submarine protocol of 1936 which have been
"secepted by nearly all civilized nations.
"Further they will only employ their aircraft
"against merchant shipping at sea in conformity
"with the recognised rules applicable to the
"exercise of maritime belligerent rights by
"warships. Finally, the two allied governments
"reaffirm their intention to abide by the
"terms of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 pro-
"hibiting the use in war of asphyziating or
"poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological
"methode of warfare.
#
An enquiry will be addressed to the
"German Government as to whether they are
"prepared to give an assurance to the same
"effect.
"It/
BRITISH embassy,
WASHINGTON D.C.
No.369.
September 3rd, 1939.
sir,
I have the honour under instructions
from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the
following declaration has been made on behalf of
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
and the French Government:-
#
The Governments of the United
"Kingdom and France solemnly and publicly
"affirm their intention should a war be
"forced upon them to conduct hostilities
"with n firm desire to spare the civilian
"population and to preserve in every way
"possible those monuments of human achieve-
"ment which are treasured in all civilised
"countries. In this spirit they have
"welcomed with deep satisfaction President
"Poosevelt's appeal on the subject of
"bombing from the air. Fully sympathising
"with the humanitarian sentiments by
"which that appeal was inspired they have
"replied to it in similar terms. They had
"indeed some time ago sent explicit
"instructions to the commanders of their
"armed forces prohibiting the bombardment
"whether from the air, or the sea, or by
"artillery/
The Honourable
Cordel 2 Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
-3-
#
It will of course be understood
"that in the event of the enemy not observing
"any of the restrictions which the Govern-
"ments of the United Kingdom and France
"have thus imposed on the operations of
"their armed forces these governments reserve
"the right to take all such sction as they
"may consider appropriate".
I have the honour to be,
with the highest consideration,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,
THAIN
September 11, 1939.
My dear Mr. Chamberlain:-
I need not tell you that you
have been much in my thoughts during these
difficult days and further that I hope you
will at all times feel free to write me
personally and outside of diplomatic pro-
cedure about any problems as they arise.
I hope and believe that we
shall repeal the embargo within the next
month and this is definitely a part of the
Administration policy.
with my sincere regards,
Faithfully yours,
The Right Honorable
Neville Chamberlain, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London,
England.
-
Copy :FDRL:11-30-55:cdm
PSF:
Great kritain
DOCUMENTS ON
9-20-38
BRITISH
9-21-38
FOREIGN POLICY
9-23-38
1919-1939
Edited by
E.L. WOODWARD, M.A., F.B.A.
and
ROHAN BUTLER, M.A.
Assisted by
ANNE ORDE, M.A.
Third Series
Volume VII
1939
LONDON
Her Majesty's Stationery Office
1954
Copy :FDRL :11-30-55
627
(v)
Sir R. Lindsay (Washington) to Viscount Halifax
(Received September 20, 10.40 a.m.)
No. 349 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]
Washington, September 20, 1938, 2.30 a.m.
1. The President telephoned to me himself this afternoon to call on
him at the White House in the evening, and I had a long conversation.
He emphasized the necessity of absolute secrecy. Nobody must know I had
seen him and he himself would tell nobody of the interview. I gathered
not even the State Department.
2. He said the Anglo-French note to Czechoslovak Government" 1 was the
most terrible remorseless sacrifice that had even been demanded of a
State. It would provoke a highly unfavourable reaction in America. He
himself was not disposed to blame the French or British Governments whose
difficulties he completely understood. He spoke in a most friendly and
appreciative manner of the Prime Minister's policy and efforts for peace.
If the policy now embarked on proved successful he would be the first to
cheer. He would like to do or say S omething to help it but was at a loss
to know what. He had no illusions as to the effect in Europe of his pre-
vious public statements. Today he would not dare to express approval of
the recommendations put to the Czecholoslovak Government. He would be
afraid to express disapproval of German aggression lest it might encourage
Czechoslovakia to vain resistance. He thus felt unable to do anything and
thought at his press conference tomorrow (he has postponed the last two)
he would confine himself to refusing to make any comment at all.
3. As to the immediate future the first possible case he would deal
with was that Czechoslovak Government should acquiesce, but that he re-
garded as virtually impossible. They would fight and his general staff
told him they would be overrun in three weeks. Hungary and Poland would
join in the pillage. And even if Czechoslovakia did acquiesce in the de-
mands made, would Germany rest there? Had Herr Hitler given any pledges
to the Prime Minister as to the future? He was sure that other demands
would follow elsewhere: Denmark, the Corridor or most likely of all a
dangerous and forcible economic or physical penetration through Roumania.
4. The second case that he examined was that the present policy fail-
ing the Western Powers would find themselves at war with Germany and prob-
ably Italy sooner or later, but as he thought sooner. In this case, in
his opinion, even if Great Britain and France and Russia were fighting
loyally together they would be beaten if they tried to wage war on classi-
cal lines of attack. They would suffer terrific casualities and would
never get through.
5. He therefore came to the third case. This is the very secret
part of his communication and it must not be known to anyone that he has
even breathed a suggestion. If it transpired he would almost be impeached
and the suggestion would be hopelessly prejudiced.
1 See Volume II of this Series, No. 937.
628
6. Assuming present expedients would only delay crisis for a short
time if at all, Western Powers might choose to call a world conference
for the purpose of reorganizing all unsatisfactory frontiers on rational
lines. They should invite active heads of States to attend including Herr
Hitler. He himself would be willing to go to it but not if it was held
in Europe. That he would never do. But he would go half way and attend
a conference in the Azores or some other Atlantic island. This part of
his idea viz. the calling of a conference was not strongly emphasised.
7. But assuming Western Powers would find themselves forced to war he
believed that they should carry it on purely by blockade and in a defen-
sive manner. He had spoken about this to Lord Runciman when he visited
him at the White House. The Powers should close their own frontiers to
Germany, stand on an armed defensive and call on all other States adjoin-
ing Germany to adopt the same line of non-intercourse. The blockade line
should be drawn down the middle of the North Sea through the Channel to
Gibralter and the Mediterranean should be closed at the Suez Canal.
Should any of the adjoining Powers refuse to join in this policy of non-
intercourse it should be informed that its supplies from overseas would
be rationed. He believed that they would indeed protest against this,
but that they would acquiesce fairly easily, and would make the ration-
ing system work as it did in the last war. (In passing it is possible
that this is what was in the President's mind when he talked about 'quar-
antine' in his Chicago speech.)
8. To my suggestion that this was reminiscent of sanctions he said that
any suggestion of sanctions must be most carefully avoided. Blockade must
be based on loftiest humanitarian grounds and on the desire to wage hos-
tilities with minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and
property, and yet to bring enemy to his knees. In this connection he men-
tioned bombing from the air. He said only defence to this was to retali-
ate in the same way; but bombing from the air was not the method which
caused really great losses of life.
9. This method of conducting war by blockade would in his opinion meet
with approval of the United States if its humanitarian purpose were
strongly emphasised. Though he himself could not possibly take any initi-
ative in the matter he pointed out that it is entirely within the consti-
tutional prerogative of a President on his own authority, to declare that
a blockade was of an effective character. He could thus help blockading
Powers and would be willing to do so, in the absence of unfavourable cir-
cumstances. Under the Neutrality Act he was empowered to forbid United
States vessels to enter a danger zone except at their own risk.
10. On this we came to some discussion of the Neutrality Act, and in
reply to my questions he was very hesitant indeed as to the possibility
of the United States Government turning a blind eye to any evasion of
prohibition of exports of arms and ammunition in our favour. But he in-
sisted that we should be free to export parts of munitions to Canada to
be set up there. But he urged with some emphasis that if possible West-
ern Powers should turn this difficulty by not declaring war on Germany
629
at all. Let them call it defensive measures or anything plausible but
avoid actual declaration of war. He had already been able to give him-
self wide latitude in the interpretation of the Neutrality Law in the
Far East and in Ethiopia and if the law was not changed he would be dis-
posed to do 80 again. He even indicated that even if Germany declared war
on us and we refrained from doing sp he might yet be able to find that we
were not at war, and that the prohibition of export of arms need not be
applied to us.
11. Present German aggression would awaken similar tendencies elsewhere
perhaps not in Italy though she would have to be watched, but very likely
from Japan. He was convinced that the Japanese Government was bound by
a secret treaty to come to German support in case of war. It was quite
possible that they would extend their operations to Canton or even seize
Indo-China or Hongkong. In reply to my enquiry he said that seizure of
Hongkong would make a very profound impression on the United States but
he was very hesitant indeed as to whether they would do anything about it.
He finally said it would take some time before they would do anything.
12. Several times in the conversation he showed himself quite alive to
the possibility that somehow or other in indefinable circumstances the
United States might again find themselves involved in an European war.
In that case he regarded it as almost inconceivable that it would be possi-
ble for him to S end any American troops across the Atlantic even if his
prestige were as high as it had been just after the 1936 elections. But
it was just possible that if Germany were able to invade Great Britain
with a considerable force, such a wave of emotion might arise, that an
American army might be sent overseas.
13. Much of what the President said as reported above was elicited by
my questions. His tone throughout was marked by utmost friendliness. I
do not think he expects any particular answer.
(vi)
Sir R. Lindsay (Washington) to Viscount Halifax
(Received September 22, 1.20 a.m.)
No. 351 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]
Washington, September 21, 1938, 4.29 p.m.
1
My telegram No. 349.
It is unlikely that I shall be able to see President again in the near
1 Document (v) in this Appendix.
future but I think it would be useful if you would send me a friendly
expression of appreciation of his message which I could convey to him
through his Private Secretary. I should be grateful for instructions.
(vii)
Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington)
No. 640 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]
Foreign Office, September 23, 1938, 4.20 p.m.
Your telegram No. 351.¹
You may certainly convey to President my great appreciation of his hav-
ing taken you so far into his confidence, and my assurance that I will
observe complete secrecy in the matter.
At the present moment it is extremely difficult to forecast events. We
have gone as far as we can in an effort to remove what might be consider-
ed a German grievance. If our effort fails, there will no longer be any
doubt as to Herr Hitler's real intentions.
Should His Majesty's Government be drawn into any conflict, their major
role would probably be enforcement of blockade, as President foresees.
But situation is very obscure: position of Italy in event of conflict
may yet be doubtful: a neutral Italy might be more valuable to Germany,
as an avenue of supply, than an Italy as an ally in arms. Blockade of
Germany would be rendered to a great degree ineffective unless Italy were
also blockaded or rationed, but even the latter would probably turn the
scale and bring Italy into action against France. It might be necessary
to choose between a neutral Italy with an ineffective blockade and a
hostile Italy with an effective blockade.
It is of great encouragement to know that the President has been giving
thought to these questions and I am most grateful to him for his confi-
dence. We are doing our best to keep United States Ambassador fully in-
formed.
1 Document (vi) in this Appendix.
PSF
Tile
Sr. Baitam 1939
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
3
October 25, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TO READ AND RETURN
F. D. R.
Interesting -
+ U
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 25, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TO READ AND RETURN
F. D. R.
Note from Ambassador Kennedy
transmitting reply from Neville
Chamberlain to the President's
letter of September 11th, 1939.
PSF igant Britan
London, October 6, 1939.
Dear Mr. President:
I enclose a letter addressed to you by
the Prime Minister which was handed to me yester-
day.
Yours sincerely,
Enclosure: as stated.
The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON.
PRIME
10, Downing Street,
Whiteball.
4th October, 1939.
my dear In Roosenle
Your letter of the 11th of last month
has just reached me and I am very grateful to
you for your sympathetic and encouraging words.
These are indeed difficult days and there
are many more before us, but I retain full
confidence that we shall come out successfully
in the end.
My own belief is that we shall win, not
by a complete and spectacular military victory,
which is unlikely under modern conditions, but
by convincing the Germans that they cannot win.
Once they have arrived at that conclusion, I do
not believe they can stand our relentless
pressure, for they have not started this war with
the enthusiasm or the confidence of 1914.
I
PRIME
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.
I believe they are already half way to this
conviction and I cannot doubt that the attitude of
the United States of America, due to your personal
efforts, has had a notable influence in this
direction. If the embargo is repealed this month,
I am convinced that the effect on German morale
will be devastating.
I hope so much that one day I may have the
great pleasure of meeting you personally and
discussing with you the happy results of the
actions of our two countries in this testing
time for democracy.
with kind legands
Eruss sincerely
Geville Chamberhin
The President of the
United States of America.
PSF
PRIME
Britain
10, Downing Street,
biteball.
PRIVATE & PERSONAL.
8th November, 1939.
My dran In Rooselt
In your letter of the 11th September you
invited me to write to you personally whenever there
were any problems on which I wished to consult you.
You may be sure that I shall do so.
At the moment,
I have no question to raise with you, but I cannot
forbear from sending you a private line of thanks
and congratulation on the great development of the
last week-end.
The repeal of the arms embargo, which has been
so anxiously awaited in this country, is not only an
assurance that we and our French Allies may draw on
the great reservoir of American resources; it is
also a profound moral encouragement to us in the
struggle upon which we are engaged.
As I said in
my letter of the 4th October, I am convinced that
it will have a devastating effect on German morale;
it
PRIME
EXPIRATE
10, Downing Street,
Witeball.
it will also, I am confident, have a great
influence on world opinion.
We here have
derived all the greater satisfaction from it
because we realise to what an extent we owe it
to your personal efforts and goodwill.
May I send you my sincere thanks, not
only for the measure itself, but for your great
sympathy to which it is so largely due?
with Kind upand
Ema incents
Ksmila Chambulain
The President of the
United States of America.
gp
Private Personal.
The President of the
United States of America,
The White House,
Washington,
U.S.A.
December 8, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPT. CALLAGHAN
Attaches two letters containing information which may
prove to be of interest to the President. One letter is from
Allan Kirk-London and the other from Hayne Ellis-Naval Operating Base-
Norfolk, Va.
See: Capt Callaghan memo of Dec 8, 1939-Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939
December 8, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN
Attaches tabulation of British naval losses to Nov. 29, 1939.
See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939
December 11, 1939.
Memorandum for the President from Capt. Callaghan
Attaches sheets containing compilations in tabular
form of the graphic data presented in the attached books of
graphs from Ambassador Kennedy.
Re-Merchant Marine Losses
BRITISH--ALLIED--NEUTRAL
These are compiled from official British Graphs
and prepared by the ONI
See:Joe Kennedy folder-Drawer 1-1939
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary
of State, London, December 25, 1939
"Personal for the President from Naval Person [Chuchill]
=
[Concerning British naval action off the River Plate]
Publihsed in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939,
Vol. V, The American Republics, pages 121-122.
PINK 15,16,17
U.S.S. HOUSTON
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM MR EARLY, SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRESIDENT
0020 FROM HULL THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM
ENGLAND GAVE ME THIS MORNING THE TEXT OF A PERSONAL AND SECRET
MESSAGE SENT TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
AND RECEIVED BY TELEGRAM TODAY. AFTER REFERRING TO PREVIOUS
MEMORANDA SENT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
THE MESSAGE STATES THAT THE BRITESH GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE
FRENCH GOVERNMENT AS REGARDS SWITZERLAND THAT IF GERMANY INVADED
SWITZERLAND AND FRANCE THEREUPON DECLARED WAR UPON GERMANY THE
UNITED KINGDOM WOULD GO TO THE ASSISTANCE OF FRANCE IN THE SAME
WAY THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPORT GREAT
BRITAIN IF GERMANY INVADED HOLLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN THEREUPON
DECLARED WAR ON GERMANY. THE REMAINDER OF THE MESSAGE READS TEXT
UALLY AS FOLLOWS QUOTE IN REPLY TO THE FRENCH ARGUMENTS REGARDING
ANGLO-FRENCH SOLIDARITY IN FACE OF AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY GERMANY
OR ITALY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM STATED
THAT JOINT ACTION BY GERMANY AND ITALY AGAINST THE TWO WESTERN
GREAT POWERS OR AGAINST ANY one OF THEM WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO BE
RESISTED IN COMMON BE THE TWO POWERS WITH THE WHOLE OF THEIR
RESOURCES; INDEED THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD ASSUMED TOWARDS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. HOUSTON
FROM MR EARLY, SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRESIDENT
BY TREATY ALREADY COVER THE CASE OF AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK DELIVERED
UPON FRANCE BY GERMANY WHETHER ACTING ALONE OR IN SUPPORT OF ITALY.
WHILE IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON FRANCE BY
ITALY ALONE FRANCE MIGHT FEEL THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY IN HER IN-
TERESTS THAT GREAT BRITAIN SHOULD INTERVENE IF THE EFFECT OF SUCH
INTERNENTION WERE TO BRING GERMANY INTO WHAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE A
LOCALIZED CONFLICT, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
WERE FULLY CONSCIOUS THAT THE RISKS TO WHICH THE TWO POWERS WERE
SEVERALLY EXPOSED COULD NOT BE DISASSOCIATED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
WOULD HAVE NOTED THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS ON FEBRUARY SIXTH.IT WAS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION
THAT HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD PROPOSED
TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THE EXTENSION OF STAFF CONVERSATIONS AS
INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH TWO OF LORD HALIFAX'S SHORT MESSAGE OF
FEBRUARY SEVENTH
THE TERMS OF THIS REPLY TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ARE BEING
COMMUNICATED TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR SECRET INFORM-
ATION END QUOTE 2320
ADM. REAR ADM. MIL. NAVAL ADM. FLAG COPIES TO
PRESIDENT LEAHY MeINTIRE AIDE AIDE AIDE OFFICE