War, September-December 1941

PSF War Dept. Sept. - Dec, 1941 STE STE he thes the WAR DEPARTMENT fill OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. PSF personal has Folder 2-41 the September 4th, 1941. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: I understand that airplane production for August was 1,854. This is a sharp increase, nearly 400 more than our July production. It is the practice of O.P.M. to publish mon- thly production of planes in the United States. The Nazis have never released their figures, nor have the British. I understand that Churchill thinks we would worry the Nazis more if we kept them in ignorance of our output. I suggest that the figure for August be pub- lished, it being such a good figure, and that thereafter the publication of monthly figures be discontinued. Robert P. Patterson, Acting Secretary of War. rpp:lm PSF has Folder9/5/41 May August Airplanes 1,258 1,854 Machine Guns .30 caliber 1,855 3,598 Machine Guns .50 caliber 2,191 6,835 37 MM Guns 527 827 Height Finders 7 6 Directors 14 2 60 MM Mortars 604 750 81 MM Mortars 181 250 Tanks - light 211 283 Tanks - medium 22 91 Carriers - 1/2 track 92 746 .30 Cal. Rifles - Garand 22,000 31,00 Submachine Guns 20,523 26,900 .45 Cal. Pistols 1,900 3,000 Smokeless Powder 15,700,000 lbs. 28,700,000 lbs. TNT 7,100,000 lbs. 7,000,000 lbs. .30 Cal. Ammunition 108,600,000 rds. 122,000,000 rds. .45 Cal. Ammunition 36,900,000 rds. 35,400,000 rds. .50 Cal. Ammunition 7,500,000 rds. 10,700,000 rds. Machine Tools $65,700,000 $70,000,000 MISS TULLY: Gen. Watson says these are for the President's reading basket. la fill PSF for Folder 2-41 WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON September 6, 1941. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: Subject: Organization of the first Army contingent for Iceland. You may be interested in the following details incident to the removal and replacement of selectees and Reserve officers who were legally debarred from serving in the first contingent being sent to Iceland. For the entire force, eighty-two per cent of the Reserve officers volunteered, while only twenty-two per cent of the selectees did so. The 10th Infantry regiment, less one of its three battal- ions, (93 officers and 2200 men) required the replacement of one- fourth of its officers and over one-third of its enlisted men, this in addition to volunteers obtained from the battalion left behind. The Field Artillery Battalion (30 officers and 520 men) required the replacement of only three of its thirty officers, but the turnover of enlisted men was in the same proportion as in the Infantry. To obtain replacements for those who would not volunteer it was neces- sary to comb another Infantry regiment, the Medical Battalion and remaining Artillery organizations of the Division, and a near-by General Hospital. The specialized Services offered an even more difficult problem. One company of three officers and one hundred and fifty men necessitated transfers from nineteen different organizations. Even key instructors from special schools had to be drafted into the ranks. As the units in the first contingent are in general parts of larger organizations of the 5th Division, the portions of the larger organizations which were left behind were drained of exper- ienced three-year men; also they have had to absorb those men who declined to volunteer. The organization of additional forces of this nature will require the disruption of approximately three regiments for every one sent and, even so, with small probability of securing volunteers of certain specialists essential to forces of this type. I am instructing the Staff to see that a special effort is made be- tween now and next spring to bring units destined for Iceland to full strength with three-year men. The difficulty in this matter is that we are only able to secure a limited number of volunteer enlistments and the high priority for these as well as the desire of the volunteers themselves, is for the Air Corps, and to a lesser extent, the armored force-neither of which are involved in the problem of providing the additional garrison for Iceland. Chief of Staff. - 2 - PSF. WAV DepT. 11Sept '41 The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division (Miles), to the Chief of Staff (Marshall), [Washington,] September 11, 1941. Brigadier General Sherman Miles quotes 8. United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated Sept. 11, 1941 on the subject of political developments in Japan and surgests that Japan may find 8. pesceful way out of the crisis. SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 443-444. (copy of this letter transmitted by the War Department to President Roosevelt) CAREL 2045 DEPARTMENT CONFIDENTIAL PSF IN REPLY REFER TO FILE E = THE PANAMA CANAL = STATE war CANAL ZONE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CABLE ADDRESS: "PANCANAL, PANAMA" Balboa Heights, C. Z., September 18, 1941. The Honorable The Secretary of War Washington, D. C. Mr. Secretary: Herewith is a report showing cash balances available in The Panama Canal appropriations, financial receipts, expenditures, and commissary sales, for the month of July, 1941, as compared with July, 1940, and the monthly average for the fiscal year 1941: July July Monthly Average 1941 1940 Fiscal Year 1941 Appropriation cash balances, end of month: Maintenance and Operation $ 32,491,709.17 32,297,921.40 Sanitation 1,159,262.57 1,039,686.66 Civil Government 1,305,242.24 1,244,746.93 Postal Funds 356,165.10 191,496.08 Repatriation - Aliens 93,865.95 95,468.20 Goethals Memorial 156,508.58 156,508.58 Addn'l Facilities (3rd Locks) 38,219,702.77 15,000,000.00 Trans-Isthmian Highway - 325,000.00 Total 73,788,456.38 50,350,827.85 Pay Rolls: Maintenance and Operation 2,248,086.38 1,797,856.90 1,988,335.80 Sanitation 157,410.52 124,942.04 139,531.21 Civil Government 96,864.30 76,956.36 115,888.81 Postal Service 24,319.30 18,145.24 20,135.89 Addn'l Facilities (3rd Locks) 147,579.03 - 101,658.77 Total 2,674,259.53 2,017,900.54 2,365,550.48 Payments from Appropriations: Paymaster, Isthmus 3,400,151.76 2,070,817.13 2,612,069.44 Disbursing Clerk, Washington, D. C. 2,286,628.68 1,168,510.29 1,771,203.89 Total 5,686,780.44 3,239,327.42 4,383,273.33 Collections: Collector, Isthmus Tolls 1,123,960.62 1,738,055.26 1,515,864.95 Postal Receipts 64,577.13 39,615.00 56,896.28 Taxes, Fees, Fines, etc. 8,726.18 7,680.01 14,237.19 Repayment to Appropriations 1,621,845.25 1,145,356.74 1,259,448.22 Public Works, Panama and Colon - - 7,694.10 Total 2,819,109.18 2,930,707.01 2,854,140.74 Disbursing Clerk, Washington, D. C. 13,225.76 35,936.48 47,391.87 Total 2,832,334.94 2,966,643.49 2,901,532.61 July July Monthly Average 1941 1940 Fiscal Year 1941 U. S. Purchase Requisitions $ 2,339,862.04 2,168,561.05 2,782,349.97 Canal Zone and Miscellaneous Funds: Receipts- Money Orders 1,072,824.02 394,506.78 672,554.78 Interest 3,750.00 3,758.75 6,399.68 Clubhouse Funds 267,975.24 157,286.47 197,217.74 Total 1,344,549.26 555,552.00 876,172.20 Disbursements- Money Orders 749,651.84 364,934.35 497,595.48 Interest 3,433.16 4,963.49 3,315.19 Clubhouse Funds 253,947.83 138,618.35 176,911.84 Total 1,007,032.83 508,516.19 677,822.51 Sale of Commissary Supplies 2,393,209.65 1,476,271.32 1,646,263.21 Respectfully, GLEN E. EDGERTON, Governor. In duplicate Published in 9/22/41 PearlHarbor Hearings PART 15 PAGES 1636- 1639 ROUTING SLIP (RL) TO: GWR 1941 FROM: agn 2 2 DATE: Approval Prepare Report Circulate Necessary sett Action Call Me See Me Signature Comment Suggestions Information Urgent File Noted Hold Prepare Reply Return Dr. Come sags this belongs in the 1941 (Sept) sect 8, PSF. H was in the Masshall George C. (1142) folder. It has been published incidentally in Part Not to be used for remarks that should be made G matter of record. For economy purposes, use both sides. "NA Form 203 (7-48) Hubr mils. Investigation repare 0473: TING SLIP (RL) PSF SECRET war BOX [Seth.22,1941] 22, MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: Subject: Ground Forces. I. Basic Considerations. in National Policy. Defense of Western Hemisphere. Preservation of war effort of Britain, Russia and associated powers. Curb of Japanese aggression. Eventual defeat of Germany. b. Requirements. Germany cannot be defeated by supply of munitions to friendly powers, and air and naval operations alone. Large ground forces will be required. (1) Western Hemisphere Security. Provide minimum garrisons necessary to hold outlying bases in event of sudden collapse of United Kingdom. Prepare task forces for prompt employment against Atlantic islands and Natal region of Brazil. (2) Western Pacific Theater. Rush build-up of air power to Philippines, together with small increases in modern ground army equipment and personnel to restrain Japan from advance into Malaysia or Eastern Siberia. (3) European Theater. Prepare security forces for air and navel bases in the British Isles and Ireland. Prepare task forces to secure, when opportunity offers, additional bases encircling Germany. Britain is reaching limit of usable man power. We must supplement her forces. Prepare framework for forces eventually to defeat Germany. Time is required to organize, train and equip these. -1- SECRET 2. Immediate Requirements. As long as Britain stands and her "leet remains intact. 1500 Total a. ATLANTIC BASES. (1) Greenland. Authorized 2,500; Now there only construc- tion troops and local guards. Base for staging aircraft to Britain and patrol base for North Atlantic. Secure defense of bases and cryolite mines essential. Forces must be dispatched earliest moment. 2000 21500 The The this Total ford fall Tatul (2) Newfoundland. Authorized 5,500; now there 2,500. Naval and air bases for protection of Great Circle Route, and to assist Canadians in defense of Newfoundland. Dispatch of approximately 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these must be equipped and available in United States. (3) Bermuda. Authorized 4,000; now there 800. Air and naval base. Contribute to defense of Atlantic Seaboard. Dispatch of about 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these forces must be available in United States. (4) Jamaica. Authorized 876; now there 14. Essential staging field. Ground forces of 350 men required for protection United 350 Total States installations. Dispatch of remainder can be deferred. The fall (5) Puerto Rico. Authorized and present garrison 21,000. Advanced air and naval base. New naval base under development. Covers approaches to Panama Canal. From military point of view, reduction in garrison by demobilization of Puerto Rican National Guard is feasible. have Demobilization would have adverse political reaction and serious economic repercussions. (6) Trinidad. Authorized 16,000; now there 1,800. Naval anchorage. Major air base for protection Southeast approaches 12,000 to Caribbeen. Jumping off point for prompt movement into South America. Ground forces required for protection and mobile reserve for prompt move- total this foll fall ment. Dispatch of about 4,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but this remainder must be immediately available in United States. (7) British Guiana, St. Lucia, Antigua. Authorized and OK present 350 men each. Essential air and naval bases and staging fields. (8) Panama. Authorized and present 33,000. Ground forces essential to protect locks and utilities, and for ship guards and small reserve for use in South and Central America. Air defense demands OK continuous alert, necessitating forces occupying over 300 scattered posi- tions. Ground forces cannot be safely reduced. b. PACIFIC BASES. (1) Alaska. Authorized 24,000; now there 16,000. Air and naval bases covering Great Circle Route to Far East. Isolated. OK - 2 - SECRET Poor communications. Great distances. Fleet in Pacific reduces threat. Authorized garrison essential to reasonable security. (2) Hawaii. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval installations (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded, requiring additional defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack. Rein- OK: forcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in United States to give Fleet lauva as 15. freedom of action. (3) Philippines. Present garrison or enroute 31,000 (12,000 native troops). Critical situation. Japan wavering. Strong air and naval forces on her flank may deter her or wean her from 12,000 Axis. If Japan moves, forces in position to assist Associated Powers. No reduction possible, on the contrary reinforcements of additional about 12,000 troops, including air complements, in prospect. Philippine Army in process of organization;- 80,000 by January 1, 1942. 01 TASK FORCES. (1) Organized forces for overseas expeditions. Two forces especially trained for landing attacks. Complete equip- ment and ammunition reserves necessary. (a) East Coast Task Force with amphibious training. air. One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. Possible use; Azores, Cape Verdes, Martinique. (b) West Coast Task Force with amphibious training. One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. For use in Pacific or west on coast South or Central America. Available for use in Atlantic. (c) Relief Forces. For Azores, Cape Verdes, 110 one division (reinforced) 27,000 men. After taking Azores, Cape Task Verdes, specially trained amphibious task force should be relieved smerging and quickly reconstituted for additional operations. frie (d) Expeditionary Force. Reinforced Corps (3 divisions foot; two divisions armored; reinforcing units) - 154,000. For use as required; Brazil, Africa, Philippines, England, Middle East. Essential to security Western Hemisphere, for exploiting OK. success of task forces and for carrying out commitments of ABC-1. (e) Iceland Force. One division (reinforced) 28,000 men. 5,000 now in Iceland. Remainder to relieve Marines and OK British in spring of 1942. d. REMAINDER OF ARMY. (1) Ground Forces. (a) GHQ Reserve (4 armored, 2 cavalry divisions, antiaircraft 115,000 (b) Two field armies (20 infantry divisions) 465,000 -3- SECRET (2) Air Forces. (a) Combat 60,000 (b) Maintenance 40,000 (c) Schools 150,000 (3) Additional personnel. (a) Harbor Defenses 45,000 (b) Administrative overhead 125,000 (c) Trainees not assigned to units and instructors 150,000 Total 1,150,000 (4) The Ground and Air Combat Forces are essen- tial: (a) For reinforcement of expeditionary forces -- always unpredictable and to meet the unexpected. (b) To permit rapid expansion. (c) For training of new units and reserves. (5) Armored Forces included are difficult to train. Approximately 9 months required. Large number of specialists. Cannot be readily created by conversion of other forces. Any op- erations against Axis will require high percentage of armored forces. First two armored divisions about 90% equipped, with 95% proposed by April 1, 1942. Second two divisions recently organized, about 45% equipped. Equipment for third two divisions 20% or less. By spring of 1942, four armored divisions vál 11 be 85% or better equipped and trained. The remaining two cannot be ready for opera- tions before the late summer of 1942. No reduction in armored units should be made. 3. Effect on Defense Aid of reducing Ground Forces. a. Policy of Defense Aid should be based on: (1) Task forces equipped 100%. (2) Overseas forces equipped 100%. (3) Remaining Army Forces equipped 50%. b. Task forces require 100% equipment for combat. Any reduction in strength will reduce Tasks which can be undertaken. C. A reduction of 25% in the personnel of overseas de- partments would have no effect on antiaircraft materiel and combat vehicles and only minor effect on infantry and artillery materiel. Similar reduction in strength of Base Forces would not materially increase the amounts of Defense Aid releases. Excluding the Philippines, the saving in shipping would amount to some 32,000 tons annually. d. Reduction of equipment of Remaining Army Forces below 50% is impossible without seriously lowering morale and retarding development of new units. Additional Defense Aid materiel from this source can be obtained only by reduction in number of units. SECRET e. Summarizing, no appreciable increase in Defense Aid items desired by the British can be realized except by eliminating units of Remainder of Army. 4. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. By 1943, Nazis may dominate Europe from Urals to Iberian Peninsula and from Scandinavia to North Africa. Germany's war machine may comprise 400 divisions. Collapse of Russia, England, offensive tactics by Japan and belligerent attitude in Latin America are possibilities. We must prepare to meet these eventualities, Our broad concept of encircling Germany and closing in on her step by step is the only practical way of wearing down her war potential by military and economic pressure. In the final decisive phase we must come to grips with and anihilate the German military machine. Forces deemed necessary at this time to accom plish role of ground units in supreme effort to defeat Germany comprise five field armies of about 215 divisions (infantry foot, armored, motorized, airborne, mountain and cavalry). If the United States remains committed to the policy of defeating Germany, making an all-out effort mandatory, then we must build toward these forces as rapidly as possible. To seize and hold the initiative we must have forces available for employment at the time and place of our own choosing, not Hitler's. Any reduction of our present forces may result in fatal delay. Time is required for the training of forces in the technique of modern war. We are already late. We must not abandon present gains and we should push on with unremitting effort. Furthermore, sudden basic changes of policy are seldom justified in prolonged efforts, and are devastating to organized effort. The "long view" is essential to our interests. In other words, to shift our national objectives by the reduction of our army at the present time, might well be disastrous. Certainly the momentary encouragement it would give the Russian and British governments, would be far outweighed by the positive indications it would give to the German government, that they need not fear an eventual onslaught of ground forces. 5. Conclusions. No appreciable increase in items of equipment especially needed by the British (AA guns, armored vehicles and ships) will result from any reduction of Army ground forces, which can be justified by the present international situation, Chief of Staff. - 5 - CONF 105171 PROPOSED UNITED STATES DELIVERIES OF LIGHT TANKS, M3 OCTOBER 1, 1941 TO COMPLETION OF CONTRACTS NOTE: No English Contracts Scheduled MONTHS TOTAL ALLOCATIONS TO PRODUCTIONS Other Nations United States (1) (2) (3) (4) October 290 183 107 November 300 180 120 December 310 180 130 January 330 100 230 February 360 110 250 March 400 300 100 April 400 300 100 May 400 300 100 June 400 300 100 Sub total 3190 1953 1237 July 400 300 100 August 400 300 100 September 400 300 100 October 130 98 32 TOTALS 4520 2951 1569 COMP TDENTIAL Published in PearlHarbor Hearings PART 20 PAGES 4430-4435 SF-War PSF WAR DEPARTMENT was SECRE WASHINGTON September 22, 1941 The President, The White House. Dear Mr. President: of In accordance with your letter of September 18 an estimate has been made to indicate the total number of American built air- craft produced between October 1, 1941 and July 1, 1942 which, in my opinion, could be given up for export to other nations without too dangerously reducing the defensive strength of our vital outposts and task forces. That estimate is presented in the form of a table, and is attached as Tab A. It is based upon minimum allocations to the Army and Navy to fulfill their most urgent needs. It will be seen from this table that the exports granted in each class except that of four-engine bombers, as well as in the total of all classes, far exceeds the rule of thumb of 50 percent mentioned in your letter. After most careful considera- tion, I have concluded that I can not approve of the application of that rule to the four-engine bomber class on which we have already taken such heavy deferments. The following table shows these deferments, including the further contributions which we feel we can make now. To go further would, in my opinion, impose a risk upon the defense of our vital outposts which would be excessive. Normal Re- Reduced Allotment Status After Exports quirements Agreed to 9/10/41 Now Contemplated Disposition 4 2 2 Philippine Islands 3 2 2 Hawaii 2 1 1 Panama 1 1 1 Newfoundland 2 1 1 Alaska 2 1 1 Iceland-Greenland 1 0 0 Puerto Rico 5 1 1 U. S. 6 2 1 South America 1 0 0 Mexico 3 0 o ABC-1 (England) 30 Groups 11 Groups 10 Groups SECRET SECRET No airplanes are available for training of four-engine pilots, for reserve, for ABC-1, or for Puerto Rico, under the proposed Army allotment. I invite your particular attention to Tab B and Tab C which indicate, respectively, the basis for the Army's require- ments and the comparison of production with requirements. The majority of all bombers, heavy and medium, avail- able for export, cannot be equipped with Sperry bomb sights or automatic flight control equipment. There are on order, for the Army, less than one hundred and fifty sets of this equipment. Bombardment airplanes in addition to this number must be delivered without bomb sights and automatic flight equipment unless the Norden equipment, which is standard on our planes, is released for export. Respectfully yours, Newry h Stenson Secretary of War SECRET 2 SECRET ESTIMATED TOTAL AIRPLANE PRODUCTION, ARMY AND NAVY ALLOCATIONS, AND AIRPLANES FOR EXPORT (October, 1941 through June, 1942) 1941 1942 ARNT AND OCT NOT = 24M ru as APR EAT JUNE TOTAL TAVI TIPES NATIONAL AND AND NATIONAL ANY AND WITNET NATIONAL ANT - NATIONAL AUT AID BATT NATIONAL ANY AED NATIONAL ANT AND BATT MARY NATIONAL KNIT AND MONTHLY NATIONAL AND AND MONTILS taxt PRO- MONTHST MONTHLY NONTHLE WITHER BATT MATIONAL ARMIT AND SANT NATIONAL AND AND EXPORT MONTHLY LOITILY comer MONTIST somet SAFT MONTHLY MONTHEY MONTHLY use PSD- no- A works MOTHER RAVE MONTHLY PM= EXPORT are LIMIT no- EXPORT no- MONTHLE MONTHLY SAVE MONTHLY WRTTILT SAVI MONTHLY DOCTION alloca- ALADCA- EXPORT allock- PAC- EXPORT DICTION DUCTION é NONTHLY EXPORT DUCTION - octan max- FRO- WORTHLY THIS ALLOCA- assocs- EXPORT THE DICTION KLLOCA- TIME TIME Time Time AUTOM RELOCA- 13000 ALLOCA- IDING TIDE STATT NAME ARKT Inglee as 3 25 E 12 32 où 33 36 207 TO 37 100 15 15 118 100 as 126 107 2 117 3 18 an 52 19 R10 su 219 MIT - Patril 4 Inglaw 1 1 - a a - 3 , - 6. . . TOTAL as 3 25 44 12 32 $ 33 36 207 a " 111 # 15 DE 100 if 126 107 19 139 301 18 104 as 19 au - as ANT Ingine 66 15 11 53 a a #5 30 11 144 0 101 230 11 159 326 114 a 7% 189 105 311 162 149 305 179 126 1814 my 139 RAVI Patril a Englam & # 20 27 4 2) 71 e If 34 a 12 36 a 11 a 28 - SI 26 * € R 40 R R a LOT 202 205 TOTAL $ 15 e 80 36 E 156 E a 178 15 a) 2M # 1% 3% 162 232 348 225 131 371 1/2 199 ym 209 146 2212 1977 1144 warr AND SIVE AND 439 11 225 290 1 269 311 2 309 3% , 315 295 22 21) 313 41 272 308 75 233 352 108 au 30 126 237 2765 2M DIT MYT X 19 19 50 & 31 ET = e 135 20 x 124 a 9. 139 49 - 150 N. # 166 # 90 212 114 " 2067 - 9 - - Turgedo 1 1 - 3 3 - 7 , - a # - 27 17 . 2 a - x a - 30 x - 118 ne - TOTAL 266 33 235 332 31 300 401 30 376 E a 405 as - 353 at in 362 475 149 5. E as 134 195 E 325 3950 936 3014. ATD FIGITED AINT 4% 149 347 734 209 529 835 356 an # 305 45 E yy 491 1027 3/4, MJ as 305 sas 771 336 435 full LM 411 7277 e 4373 SANT # 59 37 8 40 20 75 40 35 es 40 N a e 20 a 4 20 % of R en o 20 73 53 20 3 cas 217 TOTAL 592 208 386 249 549 900 3% 146 MA 345 520 I 393 (1) 1000 405 $ 153 369 543 IM 303 455 ¿ and 431 TELE NM LINO TOTAL CONDIT TERM 254 1300 or III UM 5 3 1499 531 HI 17% 429 1245 1114 676 EN 1551 E ALA 1600 824 17,566 - THE ARMIT 829 221 GOM 1105 851 SAVE 154 = 76 148 74 74 236 115 121 216 c 177 at 110 us 245 135 us 306 164 142 325 179 150 yrs 230 sur $229 1170 1009 NO 1020 10% - 996 1987 1048 set 14,805 ser met TOTAL Did E 5 1453 328 925 1536 536 1002 1991 526 1075 1090 ELL 2049 2029 7% un 1800 ORDERVATION ANT 39 5 - 14. % 145 8 a 130 30 = E 43 105 et 43 22 45 43 , 44 34 10 721 394. 317 M . - - SAFE 60 2 4. F 65 & 73 67 6 95 10 . 130 130 - 155 155 - 148 165 . 150 150 - 132 133 . 3831 1013 18 105 230 208 22 198 199 5 176 156 10 1762 un 323 TOTAL 95 = & 111 105 4. 127 121 4. 240 161 al 252 166 % 303 - and 11 11 - of 54 . . . - TA. 74 - ARMI 20 = 20 - If 20 4 11 , 4. 4 - 4 177 151 : BUTT 5 IT - 29 19 . 20 18 : " 20 4. 24 4 27 5 - 29 29 . 20 18 2 is 20 4 a 10 4 if 20 4. 35 N 4. 48 a 4. 13 1 4 254 225 # TOTAL TAB B BASIS FOR THE ARMY'S ALLOCATION FOR HEAVY BOMBERS Requirements in Heavy bombers are most critical, An immedi- ate minimum requirement of 11 groups (748 airplanes) exists. After de- ducting 15% of Army Production, the heavy bombers allotted to the Army between October 1941, and July 1941 will only provide 597 airplanes. These, together with 100 on hand October 1st will make possible activa- tion of the following units: 136 (2 Groups) for the Philippine Islands 68 (1 Group) Newfoundlend 68 (1 Group) Iceland or Greenland 68 (1 Group) Panama 136 (2 Groups) Hawaii 68 (1 Group) Alaska 68 (1 Group) United States 68 (1 Group) British Guiana and Brazil 680 (10 Croups) with 3 small reserve of 17 airplanes to provide for normal attrition. The need for long range land based bombers in the critical North Atlantic theater is imperative due to the fact that water based patrol planes may not be able to operate in that area in the winter. The two groups in the Philippines is the smallest force that can have any real influence in that theatre. A larger force is needed if Japanese aggression in the Far Fast is to be retarded. Attention is invited to the fact that, in the above allotment, no heavy bombers have been provided for ABC 1 although in the Joint Staff Conversations it was specifically agreed to have available three full groups with reserves (255 airplanes) for employment in England. The other requirements have been reduced to a single group at such vital points as Panama, Alaska, and the South American Theater. This allotment does not meet the minimum requirements of the Army. TAB C COMPARISON OF PRODUCTION, EXPORT, REQUIREMENTS OF COMBAT TYPE AIRCRAFT October 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942 Types :Total :Recom- :Balance ::Army & :Defi- :Army & :Deficiencies :Produc- :mended :Retained::Navy Re-:ciencies:Navy Im-:in Army & Navy :tion :for Ex-:by Army ::quire- :in Army : Mediate : Immediate Re- :Schedule:port & Navy :ments & Navy : Minimum : quirements :9/1/41 to: : :: :Require-:Require-: :7/1/42 : : :: : ments : ments : : : : :: : : : : : : :: : : : (A) Heavy Bomber : 810 : 219 : 591 :: 2550 (2) 2160 : 748 (3) 358 (N) Patrol Bomber : 6 : 0 : 6 :: 6 : 0 : 6 : 0 : : : :: : : : (A) Medium Bomber : 1814 : 939 : 875 :: 85 (2) 0 : 1360 (3) 485 (N) Patrol Bomber 2 Eng. : 407 : 205 : 202 :: 202 : 0 : 202 : 0 : : : :: : : : (A) Light & Dive Bomber : 2765 : 2367 : 398 :: 837 : 439 : 770 (3) 372 (N) Torpedo Bomber : 118 : 0 : 118 :: 118 : o : 118 : 0 (N) Dive Bomber : 1067 : 647 : 420 :: 420 : 0 : 420 : 0 : : : :: : : : (A) Pursuit : 7177 : 4373 : 2804 :: 6662 (2) 3858 : 3510 (3) 706 (N) Fighter : 641 : 217 : 424 :: 424 : 0 : 424 : 0 : : : :: : : : TAb (A) Observation : 711 : 317 : 394 :: 2043 : 1649 : 1635 (3) 1241 (N) Scout "C" : 1031 : 18 : 1013 :: 1013 : 0 : 1013 : 0 Totals : 16547 : 9302 : 7245 ::14360 : 8106 :10206 : 3162 : : 56.3% : 43.7% :: : : : Army Requirements : - : - : - ::12177 : 8106 : 8023 : 3162 Army on hand 10/1/41 : - : - : - :: : 2220 : : 2220 TAb Not Army Deficiency : : : :: : 5886 : : 942 Notes (1) No allowances have been made for attrition. (2) Includes ABC 1 commitments of: 3 Heavy Bomb Groups 1 Medium Bomb Group plus 1 Squadron 3 Pursuit Groups plus 1 Squadron (3) Do not include ABC 1 commitments or Depot Reserve (A) Army (N) Navy TAB D BASIS OF COMPUTATION OF ARMY AND NAVY REQUIREMENTS Strategic Defense in Asia Hemisphere Defense Provision of Initial Units for ABC 1 Column A ARMY - REQUIREMENTS Heavy Bombers Groups Airplanes with reserves Hemisphere Defense 23 1955 U.S. Possessions in Asia 4 340 ABC 1 (England) 3 255 30 2550 Medium Bombers ABC 1 1 + 1 squadron 85 Pursuit Hemisphere Defense 36 5850 Strategic Defense in Asia 2 325 ABC 1 3 + 1 squadron 487 41 + 1 squadron 6662 NAVY Same as shown in Tab A Column B ARMY IMMEDIATE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TA Heavy Bombers Groups Airplanes Hemisphere Defense 9 612 U.S. Possessions in Asia 2 136 ABC 1 (England) 0 748 Medium Bombers Hemisphere Defense 20 1360 Pursuit Hemisphere Defense 27 3510 U.S. Possessions in Asia 4 424 3934 This immediate minimum requirement does not provide for our commitments under ABC 1, nor does it provide for any reserves. Frankling. Reprevelt Library FSF Home Dept packer 8-41 DECLASSIFIED ARV Dia. 5200.9 (9/27/58WAR DEPARTMENT SECRET Date- 7-30-70 WASHINGTON PSF Signature- ND September 23, 1941 The President The White House Dear Mr. President: There is presented herewith The Anglo-American Consolidated Statement--a balance sheet showing stocks of major items of war material as of June 30, 1941, and expected quarterly production to the end of 1942 for the United States, the United Kingdom, end Canada. As our interests are so linked with those of England, the necessity for some overall statement of combined British and American production seemed to me to be essential if we were to plan intelligently our production and our strategy. Accordingly I arranged to obtain from the British authorities a statement of their production figures for their war effort and to combine them with our own. The work has been conducted in the War Department by a group hended by Mr. Stacy May who has been lent to us by the Office of Production Management for this purpose. Mr. May has recently returned from London where he was given every consideration and assistance by the British authorities. SECRET -2- SECRET Plans have been perfected to give these figures continuing value through periodic revision, so that they may serve as reference points for the development of joint plans. There will be a monthly exchange of actual production achievement for the several cate- gories of materiel covered by the report, and a quarterly revision of advance production estimates and inventory data. There will likewise be a continuing effort to improve our knowledge of Axis production through the joint efforts of our Intelligence Services. This statement will, no doubt, be useful in many ways, and the uses to which it may best be put are now being studied. In the meantime, however, certain conclusions can be readily drawn from the facts set forth in the report. The statement affords a ready means of comparison between the production planned over the next eighteen months by the United States, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and Canada on the other, first in absolute terms and second in terms of the proportion of total resources that each is proposing to marshal for armament production. SECRET 3. SECRET- I. Comparison of U.S. and U.K.-Canadian Production Schedules in Absolute Terms. The overall comparisons have been effected by assigning approximate dollar valuations to the several procurement items in the balance sheet, thus reducing all of the listed schedules to 8. common denominator. For the eighteen month period covered in this report, from July 1, 1941, through December 31, 1942, the production of airplanes, ordnance items and navel and merchant vessels scheduled for production by the United Kingdom and Canada will exceed that presently scheduled by the United States by approximately four per cent. For the current quarter, which ends September 30,1941, U.S. production will be less than two-thirds that of the British-Canadian. By the second quarter of 1942, the production of the United States will be about level with that of the U.K.-Canadian total, and in the last quarter of 1942 it will have forged ahead by approxi- mately thirty per cent. The adventage of the U.S. in the final quarter is exaggerated somewhat by the fact that British production of naval vessels in that period is scheduled to taper off sharply from previously achieved SECRET SECRET levels. If the last quarter comparison is limited to planes and ordnance items, the advantage of the United States is reduced to twenty per cent. For ordnance items alone, which account for almost one-half of the total value of the listed items, the United States production for the six quarters is about one-eighth lower than the U.K.-Canadian aggregate. In the current quarter, the United States total is less than sixty per cent of that of the United Kingdom and Canada. The second half of 1942 shows the two schedules approximately equal. In aircraft, United States output is less than three- fourths of the British-Canadian total in the current quarter, but moves ahead in the final three-months of 1942. In the last quarter of 1942 it is fifty per cent above the U.K.-Canadian output. In all classes of planes except heavy bombers, American production moves ahead of the British level by the middle of 1942. British production of heavy bombers has been increased apparently at the expense of medium bomber production. The following figures indicate the relative levels of production: SEPRET OLORLI -5- SECRET- RATIO OF VALUE OF U. S. PRODUCTION TO U.K.-CANADIAN PRODUCTION* Ordnance Aircraft Vessels Total July-Sept 1941 58 72 58 61 Oct.-Dec. 1941 72 101 60 75 Jan.-Mar. 1942 83 120 72 89 Apr.-June 1942 91 130 77 97 July-Sept 1942 97 139 106 113 Oct.-Dec. 1942 103 149 181 131 July 1941-Dec.1942 88 122 86 96 *Includes all major items of armament and ammunition, military aircraft, naval vessels and merchant vessels. Excluded are some signal equipment, all quartermaster items, military construction, and industrial equipment and facilities. It is of interest to compare the items in which one group or the other holds the relative advantage. The output of the United States will be greater than the U.K.-Canadian output in medium and light bombers, merchant ships, light tanks, army artillery, 20mm. guns, rifles and small arms ammunition. The two pro- ductions will be approximately equal for fighter aircraft, machine guns, and anti-aircraft gun ammunition. U.K.- Canadian production will exceed for heavy bombers, SECRET -6- SECRET heavy and medium tanks, tank and anti-tank guns, anti- aircraft guns, and army artillery ammunition. The production of merchant ships in the United States, a vitally important factor in any victory program, is planned on an impressive scale exceeding joint British and Canadian output by more than 100 per cent. On the other hand, the British output of several of the most difficult and essential war materiel items is greater than ours. For example, the British output of heavy bombers over the eighteen months period exceeds ours by 75 per cent. United States heavy bomber production as planned is well behind the British planned production even in the last quarter of 1942. Similarly, the British are to produce over 2,000 heavy tanks by the end of 1942 whereas we have as yet no production scheduled, and the British-Canadian pro- duction schedule for medium tanks over the eighteen months period exceeds ours by more than ten per cent. The British advantage in anti-tank guns is over fifty per cent and in anti-aircraft guns about one-third. The record for the sixth quarter shows that, upon the basis of present schedules, not only shall we still be behind British production in most of these items, but in several of them we shall not be appreciably accelerating production SECRET -7- SECRET at the end of the period. II. U. S. vs. U.K.-Canadian Production Relative to Comparative Resources. Considering the head start which the British have had over us, and considering the all-out character of their effort due to the realities of actual warfare, the fact that this country is planning to produce only slightly less of the major items of war equipment than will be produced by the United Kingdom and Canada through the year 1942 is a most substantial achievement. On the other hand, our resources are much greater than those of the British, both our population and national income is approximately two and a half times that of the United Kingdom and Canada combined, and even when allowance is made for our very substantial exports to the United Kingdom and Canada, our supply of vital raw materials such as steel, copper, zinc, tin and rubber, is from two to six times that available to the British. Moreover, although the stimulus of actual warfare is great, the extent to which England has been bombed from the air and has suffered losses in materiel necessarily has had a deterrent effect on her production. Interruptions and delays and inefficiencies have resulted from outright an SECRET -8- SECRET destruction, from improvised and hasty planning and the inability to concentrate her manufacturing processes. Whether our effort has been commendable or not, the fact remains that the extent of our production roughly only approximates that of the United Kingdom and Canada. The British production is not alone great enough to supply its own forces. Large deficits will exist in this respect even if the new Lend-Lease appropriations are passed. On top of this the War Department is re- ceiving constant demands to supply the Russians, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Latin Americans, and there is constantly before us the necessity of equipping our own armed forces to meet situations which can develop with great rapidity. Furthermore, the requirements necessary to the achievement of victory are far larger than those needed merely to avert defeat. The War Department, as you know, is conducting studies to determine the over-all necessities in order to accomplish a victory over the Axis powers;and not only am I engaged in discussions on this subject at the present time, but the Mission sent recently to England has been instructed to obtain from the British and Russian governments their estimates of their requirements for this purpose. It is SECRET -9- SECRET inevitable that the conclusions which will result from these studies and discussions as well as from our present commitments must lead to the necessity for increased production in this country of war equipment. How much this production will have to be increased remains to be decided, but the enclosed Statement of the British and American Production should prove most useful in arriving at our decisions. yours Henry h Stunson Secretary of War Franklin D. Roosevelt Library DECLASSIFIED DOU D.M. 5200.9 (9/27/58) Date- 7-30-70 Signature- we SECRET NOTE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSOLIDATED SECRET STATEMENT OF THE POSITION AT 30TH JUNE, 1941. The Anglo-American Consolidated Statement which accompanies this report shows the present stock and expected output of war equipment quarter by quarter to the end of 1942 for U.SA., United Kingdom and Canada. The summary attached hereto compares present stocks of major items or groups of items with output for the first and last quarter of the survey, and with the total that will be produced between now and the end of 1942. British and American Supplies Present Stock 1. Briefly the total output in eighteen months in the and future three countries together, if the estimates in the statement output. are realised, will compare with present stocks as follows:- Stocks at Production in 30th June 18 months. 1941 Heavy Bombers 270 5,500 Medium Bombers 2,930 8,350 Fighters 8,850 27,900 Heavy & Medium Tanks 2,290 24,800 Merchant Ships (000 gross tons) 25,000 7,140 Army Artillery (field, medium and heavy) 7,880 15,100 A.A. guns (excluding 20 m.m.) 19,170 34,200 Tank & Anti-Tank Gune 5,750 67,600 Rifles 5,100,000 1,988,000 Machine Guns 384,000 875,000 Amminition:- Field and Anti-tank Guns (000 rounds) 16,160 123,000 A.A. (000 rounds) 24,000 103,000 S.A.A. (millions) 2,460 15,000 No attempt has been made to calculate stocks at the end of the period. To do so would require a forecast of the rate of sinkings, operational loss or other wastage during the eighteen months. This has not yet been made. -1- SECRET Rate of Growth 2. The figures in the second column will be attained by the following estimated increases in the rate of output in the three countries taken together during the eighteen months covered by the consolidated statement:- Heavy Bombers 7 times Medium Bombers 2 times Fighters 30 por cent Heavy and Madium Tanks 3t times Merchant Ships 3 times A.A. Guns 3t times Tank and Anti-Tank Guns at times Rifles 4 times Machine Guns 2 times Ammunition:- Field and A.T. Guns 4 times A.A. 2) times S.A.A. 3 times The production of Aray Artillery (Heavy, Medium and Field) is expected to show a slight decline, while light bomber aircraft will only rise by some 20 per cent. As the United States is at an earlier stage of production than Britain and Canada, the American rate of growth will in most cases be considerably greater than that of Britain and Canada. Comparative 3. The outputs of the U.S.A. and of Britain and Output Canada respectively during the whole period compare as follows:- (a) Output of the U.S.A. will exceed that of Britain and Canada int- Medium and light Bombers Merchant ships Light tanks Army Artillery (Light, medium and heavy) 20 m. guns Rifles S.A.A. (b) The outputs will be approximately equal ini- Fighter Aircraft A.A. Own ammunition Machine guns (e) British and Canadian output will exceed that of U.S.A. int- Heavy Bombers Heavy and medium tanks Tank and anti-tank guns A.A. guns Army artillery ammunition. -2- diverse seas To compare the general armament effort of the three countries would require a common neasure between tanks, aircraft and ships. Figures are not available of either man hours or money cost in & form that can be applied to the consolidated statement. But a rough estimate of unit prices has been applied to the items of Army equipment listed in the appended summary. The calculation shows that estimates of production of Army equipment by Britain and Canada during the eighteen months will exceed that of the UnitedStates by about 15 per cent - the index figures being U.S.A. 100, U.K. plus Canada 115 (1.e. U.K. 95 and Canada 20). In the current quarter, Britain and Canada will be producing approximately twice as much Army equipment as the United States; the margin progressively narrows, and in the last quarter of 1942 the U.S. output in total will be roughly equal to that of Britain and Canada. All the above comparisons are, however, subject to the important qualification that American planning is not yet complete. Further, in comparing industrial efforts, it should be added that current British consumption of steel is being provided to the extent of 15 to 20 per cent from U.S.A. Similarly, explosive for the British filling programme is being provided from U.S.A. to the extent of 25 to 30 per cent. British and 4. On the estimates before us, however, the combined American British and Canadian production for the current quarter Supplies. will be substantially larger than that of the United States for some two-thirds of the items listed on the appended summary sheet. In the sixth quarter expanding American production will have reversed the comparative production achievements. Upon the schedules presented, American production in the sixth quarter will surpase British-Canadian in about two-thirds of the listed items. But, since British-Canadian stocks as of June 30th, 1941, were larger than those of the United States, and in most cases very substantially larger, the United Kingdom and Canada would still lead in total quantities of material made available by the end of 1943 (stocks as of June 30th, 1941) plus production for the next six quarters) for most of the listed items even though no further transfers from American production were made. Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that British- Canadian production alone will not be sufficiently large to meet British minimum requirements for aggressive varfare. Still less will it be sufficient to allow Great Britain to nake substantial contributions in military equipment to other actual and potential combatants against the Axis powers - Russia, China, the Dutch East Indies and such uprisings as might occur upon the European continent. American production mjst be relied upon to supplement, in important neasure, Britain's armanent programme, and in addition to provide the implements needed to nake the efforts of other anti- Aris forces effective. Furthermore, this must be accomplished while the United States is attempting to bring its own forces to a vartime footing with the least possible delay. -3- Already the requisitions filed by Great Britain and other powers seeking Lease-Lend aid amount to something between one third and one half of the entire armament programme that has been planned in the United States. It seezs obvious that, if its dual task is to be performed in an effective fashion, the United States must marshal for armament production an amount of its production resources proportionate to that which is devoted to this purpose in Great Britain and Canada. German Y. British and American Supplies. 5. The proposal to prepare and Anglo-American statement of armament resources included the further suggestion that these resources should be compared with those of the enemy. It has not been possible to carry the German estimating as far as the statement of our own resources; but information from the American and British Intelligence Departments has been laid on the table. The statements are appreximations only and in the graphs which follow we have not thought it vise at this stage to chart any German figures on the ground that they are of quite a different order of accuracy to our own and for a number of reasons are not comparable with them. In some respects the foreign estimates differ in coverage from the figures in the Consolidated Statement. There is considerable doubt whether the American and British estimates include production and stocks of the same groups of Nasi allies and satellites. The stocks on the Anglo-American statement are gross stocks; the German estimates are built up from known establishments and identified units. To reach a figure comparable with our own, it would be necessary to assume that the number of veapons based on establishments should be raised by some allowance comparable to our own for veapons in reserve, in transit or in store. Similarly, ve could only estimate Germany's supplies during the next year and a half from statements of current output by assuming that German output is at & peak and will remain at its present level. Finally, comparative military strength is not to be judged by a single category-by-category matching of war materiel, but W a balancing of the strategic weight of one type of equipment against another to which it my be directly opposed with due regard for the terrain and conditions under which it will operate. 6. Such considerations need far more exhaustive study than ve have been able to give them and some of them are outside of our competence. We suggest that the Intelligence Staffs of the two countries should attempt to reach an agreed estimation of the enemy's resources, not because it will afford an exact neasure of requirements, but in order to give & sanse of scale to the figures in the present statement. Comments on the Programmes. Programs 7. The Consolidated Statement reveals significant Contrasts differences between the programmes of the United States and the United Kingdom, of which the following are examples:- (a) Que Ammunition The American programme will in general produce a much lower ration per gun than the British and Canadian for artillery veapons. On the other hand, the American programme provides anti-aircraft ammunition on a much more liberal scale than the British and Canadian. (b) Small Area Ammuntion. The American programme is such larger than the British and Canadian. (a) Bombers Over 75 per cent of the heavy and medium bombers produced in the last quarter of 1942 in Britain and Canada will be heavy bombers. In the United States the proportion will be only about 35 per cent. The United States light bomber production estimate is about three times as big as the United Kingdom programme. (d) Bombs. the bomb programmes have not yet been finally settled. The production expected from U.K. under the revised demand of the R.A.F. is included in the Consolidated Statement. But this will leave & deficit which the U.S.A. is being asked to supply. The United States figures show the American programme prior to the receipt of this request. It shows a such larger proportion of small bombs than the British programse. The United States have, so far, no incondiary bomb programme, but one is expected shortly. (e) Arsoured Fighting Vehicles. The United States is expected to produce large quantities of light tanks throughout 1942. No light tanks are to be produced in the United Kingdom after the end of 1941. The United States are, however, ceasing their production of scout care whereas the British programme of Armoured Fighting Vehicles includes a large quantity of armoured care not matched at present by a precise American equivalent. + SAX Materials. 8. Comparable figures have been compiled for certain raw materials. The figures show that the production of aluminium is increasing in a such slower proportion than the anticipated increase in the output of aircraft. The question of the supplies which the United States of America and the United Kingdom together may be expecting to receive from Canada needs further study. The sufficiency of supplies of magnesium will depend upon the sise of the United States incendiary bomb programme, but even if the large planned increase in output comes through up to time, the danger signals are up. British 9. The output of British countries Bast of Sues is not Countries included in these figures. A table attached to the East of Bues. Anglo-American Consolidated Statement shows the output during the whole period from these countries of stores which they are producing entirely or partly for the United Kingdom. In general, the contribution of these countries adds less than 10 per cent to the supplies of these stores available to the United Kingdom. In rifles, mortars, field guns, S.A.A., carriers and armoured cars, howefer, their contribution is appreciably greater than 10 per cent. 3rd September, 1941. -6- you OUTPUT AND STOCKS OF WAR EQUIPMENT. United States. United Kingdon and Canada. Stocks. Output. Dth June 1941 1st Quarter 6th Quarter Total July-Sept. Oct.-Dec. in 18 1941. 1943. months. AIRCRAFT. TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT (incl.Flying Boats). U.S.A. 4,250 2,750 6,720 31,760 United Kingdom & Canada. 14,780 4,020 4,330 25,140 HEAVY BOMBERS U.S.A. 120 55 770 1,990 United Kingdom & Canada. 160 200 1,020 3,490 MEDIUM BOMBERS U.S.A. 610 200 1,410 4,670 United Kingdom & Canada 2,320 720 330 3,680 LIGHT BOMBERS U.S.A. 1,800 980 1,530 9,840 United Kingdom & Canada 4,430 755 545 3,460 FIGHTERS U.S.A. 1,365 1,390 2,700 14,110 United Kingdom & Canada 7,480 2,300 2,260 13,800 MERCHANT SHIPPING (incl. Tankers.) (Th.Gross Tons) U.S.A. 6,840 230 1,210 4,840 United Kingdom & Canada. 18,160* 320 440 2,300 . British Register and Allied and Neutral on time charter to United Kingdom. -1- Stocks Output 30th June 1941 1st Quarter 6th Quarter. Total July-Sept. Oct.-Dec. 18 months. 1941 1942. TANKS. HEAVY & MEDIUM TANKS. U.S.A. 80 450 3,000 10,790 United Kingdom & Canada. 2,210 1,250 3,030 14,040 LIGHT TANKS U.S.A. 350 910 1,035 6,250 United Kingdom & Canada. 1,360 40 Nil 55 ARTILLERY. FIELD, MEDIUM & HEAVY GUNS. U.S.A. 2,260 1,170 1,520 8,740 United Kingdom & Canada. 5,620 1,410 790 6,380 TANK AND ANTI-TANK U.S.A. 1,650 2,990 5,870 31,065 United Kingdom & Canada. 4,100 2,470 8,700 36,550 A.A.LAND AND NAVAL (ex.Cerlikons) U.S.A. 4,600 675 3,960 14,740 United Kingdom & Canada 14,570 1,785 4,170 19,480 OUN AMMUNTION. (Thousands of rounds) ARMY ARTILLERY (including tank & anti-tank) U.S.A. 6,130 630 9,460 37,410 United Kingdom & Canada 10,030 6,380 18,425 85,580 A.A.LAND & NAVAL (over 20 m). U.S.A. 5,200 2,910 11,570 50,830 United Kingdom & 18,850 6,210 9,660 Canada 51,900 + Stocks. Output. 30th June 1941. 1st Quarter 6th Quarter Total July-Sept. Oct.-Dee. 18 months 1941. 1942. 20 an GUNS (Aircraft Cannon & Oerlikon) U.S.A. 8 510 20,400 67,570 United Kingdom & Canada 5,195 3,080 7,070 34,160 SMALL ARMS. MACHINE GUNS, ARMY AND AIRCRAFT. U.S.A. 54,720 39,020 90,860 428,480 United Kingdom & Canada 329,650 50,930 90,930 446,530 RIFLES (Thousands) U.S.A. 1,930 106 236 1,194 United Kingdom & Canada 3,170 11 223 794 SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION (Ball A.P. and Tracer) (million rounds) U.S.A. 690 670 2,480 9,310 United Kingdom & Canada 1,770 510 1,230 5,420 ----- -3-