Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
366551920
label
Latin America--Economics (October 1990)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
366551920
contentType
document
title
Latin America--Economics (October 1990)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
91139-011
collections
Brent Scowcroft Papers
Latin America Files
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
366551920
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
53ff68482af29de8
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:
91139
Folder ID Number:
91139-011
Folder Title:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
5
4
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Outline
Re: Meeting with President Patricio Aylwin (3 pp.)
10/1/90
(b)(1)
/
01b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Chilean President
n.d.
(b)(1)
Patricio Aylwin (4 pp.)
01c. Report
Re: Biography (2 pp.)
3/19/90
(b)(1)
S
01d. Scenesetter
Re: President's Meeting with Chilean President Patricio Aylwin
n.d.
(b)(1)
f
Scenesetter (5 pp.)
02a. Letter
President Bush to Secretary General of the Organization of
10/12/90
(b)(1)
American States Joao Clemente Baena Soares (1 pp.)
02b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
10/11/90
(b)(1)
&
Re: Your Reply to a Letter from OAS Secretary General Baena
Soares Proposing an OAS Debt Conversion Fund (2 pp.)
02c. Letter
OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena Soares to President
8/3/90
(b)(1)
Bush (2 pp.)
02d. Note
POTUS to Brent [Scowcroft] (1 pp.)
8/10/90
(b)(1)
02e. Memo
J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft
8/17/90
(b)(1)
Re: Suggested Reply to Letter of OAS Secretary General Baena
Soares Proposing Creation of OAS Debt Conversion Fund (1 pp.)
Page 1 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1164
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
02f. Draft Letter
Re: State Department Suggested Reply to OAS Secretary General
n.d.
(b)(1)
Joao Clemente Baena Soares (1 pp.)
02g. Draft Letter
President Bush to OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena
n.d.
(b)(1)
Soares (1 pp.)
02h. Draft Letter
President Bush to OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena
n.d.
(b)(1)
Soares (1 pp.)
03a. Memo
Donald C. Johnson to Brent Scowcroft
10/12/90
(b)(1)
Re: Enterprise for the Americas Initiative -- Progress and Problem
Areas (4 pp.)
03b. Memo
David A. Pacelli/Meg Lundsager to Brent Scowcroft
9/11/90
(b)(1)
&
Re: Eagleburger Memorandum on Multilateral Assistance to
Central America (2 pp.)
03c. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Possible Telephone Call from Deputy
n.d.
(b)(1)
&
Secretary of State Eagleburger (1 pp.)
03d. Letter
Lawrence S. Eagleburger to John E. Robson (1 pp.)
8/31/90
(b)(1)
03e. Paper
Re: Concept Paper: A Partnership for Democracy and
n.d.
(1)
Development in Central America (2 pp.)
03f. Cable
Re: U.S. - Japan Consultations on Latin America: MOFA
n.d.
(b)(1)
/
Perplexed About U.S. Development Strategy (3 pp.)
Page 2 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1164
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
04a. Letter
President Bush to President Carlos Andres Perez (1 pp.)
10/12/90
(b)(1)
04b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
10/11/90
(b)(1)
Re: Letter to President Perez on Debt (1 pp.)
04c. Memo
Donald C. Johnson to Brent Scowcroft
10/9/90
(b)(1)
&
Re: Reply to President Perez on Debt (1 pp.)
04d. Draft Letter
Re: Department of State Suggested Draft Reply to President
n.d.
(b)(1)
Carlos Andres Perez from President Bush (2 pp.)
04e. Letter
President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush
7/9/90
(b)(1)
[English] (2 pp.)
04f. Letter
President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush
7/9/90
(b)(1)
[Spanish] (1 pp.)
04g. Letter
President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush
7/9/90
(b)(1)
[Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)
04h. Resolution
Re: Resolution I Latin American and Caribbean Proposal for a
6/18-22/90
(b)(1)
Solution to Its External Debt Problem Adopted at the Regional
Cnference on External Debt (17 pp.)
05. Letter
Prime Minister Mulroney to President Bush (1 pp.)
9/21/90
(b)(1)
Page 3 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1164
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
06a. Memo
Donald C. Johnson/Eric D. Melby to Brent Scowcroft
10/29/90
1)
d
Re: Funding for the Partnership for Democracy and
Development (2 pp.)
06b. Cable
Re: The Partnership for Democracy and Develeopment in Central
10/23/90
(b)(1)
America (7 pp.)
06c. Report
Re: The PDD (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(i)
d
06d. Report
Re: The PDD. (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)/1)
07a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
11/5/90
(b)
Re: International Debt: Uruguay and Chile (1 pp.)
07b. Memo
Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft
10/26/90
(b)(1)
Re: International Debt: Uruguay and Chile (1 pp.)
07c. Memo
Nicholas F. Brady to POTUS
10/16/90
(b)(1)
Re; Uruguay and Chile (1 pp.)
Page 4 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1164
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9007748
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 28 SEP 90 12
TO: PRESIDENT
2
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 01 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CHILE
AP
PERSONS: AYLWIN, PATRICIO
SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PRES AYLWIN ON 2 OCT
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 02 OCT 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON
LOGREF: 9007761
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
JOHNSON
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMJT
CLOSED BY: NSLMS
DOC 2 OF 2
CONF IDENTIAL
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
Jhm
LOG # 7748
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
IPRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
paer Ken Hill
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
/
I
KH
A
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
3
8
Brent Scowcroft
4
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
90 SEP 26 P4. 45
16/1 our Agrien
West Wing Desk
Sto
NSC Secretariat
6
N/R
A * Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununa
Other 7 lorgence
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS Original given to John Gardner
by Eper Sec on 10/1
Pres aylwin visit Oct 2, 11:15a.m.
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Epec See Off has diskette
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7748
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 1, 1990
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PATRICIO AYLWIN
DATE: October 2, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office/Cabinet Room
TIME: 11:15 - 11:45 a.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
I. PURPOSE
To get acquainted with President Aylwin, reaffirm our strong
support for democracy in Chile, press for Chilean
legislative action on troublesome issues, and lay the
groundwork for your December visit to Santiago.
II. BACKGROUND
Relations with Chile are traveling through some choppy
waters right now. Ironically, the difficulties are the
result of the return to democracy, which slows down the
process of legislation and requires extensive debate and
consultation. Both countries thought that the return of
democracy would allow them to quickly jettison the baggage
of the past and consolidate our excellent economic
relationship. It hasn't been that simple.
Aside from establishing personal rapport with you in this
first meeting, Aylwin will urge you to address key economic
and legislative issues. We want to show strong support for
Chilean democracy, and demonstrate willingness to solve the
bilateral problems left over from Pinochet's time, without,
of course, giving away the store.
The two most troublesome issues right now involve the
Letelier case, and restoration of GSP benefits to Chile. At
USTR insistence, we are holding GSP "hostage" until the
Chilean Congress passes an effective pharmaceutical patent
protection law. Aylwin is having trouble getting an
acceptable draft through his Congress. Pinochet tried to
ram this legislation through Congress before he left office,
but failed to do it right. The whole package had to start
over.
One important piece of good news that you can give Aylwin is
that USTR has cleared the way for OPIC to resume investment
guarantee programs in Chile. These OPIC programs had been
revoked under Pinochet because of worker rights abuses.
USTR has determined that the situation has been remedied,
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
2
freeing OPIC to resume its programs. We hope this
announcement will give Aylwin leverage to get action from
his Congress on the pharmaceutical law.
On the Letelier case, things are not so upbeat. On June 11,
1990 we signed an agreement under which Chile will provide
ex gratia compensation to the Letelier and Moffitt families.
This agreement requires Chilean congressional approval,
which has not been completed. A separate piece of
legislation transferring jurisdiction over the Letelier
assassination from military to civilian courts is also
moving very slowly through their Congress. As a result, we
have not been able to get beyond Kennedy-Harkin restrictions
against arms sales and other forms of security assistance.
Aylwin may feel compelled to raise the 1989 poisoned grape
incident. The Chilean fruit exporters, who suffered losses
from this incident, are pressing the government to seek
compensation from the U.S., claiming that Food and Drug
Administration bungling caused the fruit embargo. A recent
GAO study indicates that the FDA lab which handled the
grapes was proficient, that the method of analysis as
examined by outside independent scientists was sound, and
that the Administration acted responsibly. Senator Helms,
who requested the GAO study, has not yet released it. If
President Aylwin raises this case, you can express regret
over the losses, but tell Aylwin about the findings of the
GAO report.
Aylwin may also mention to you his concern about the effect
of marketing orders in the new farm bill. In addition to
grapes, the new bill would cover kiwis, nectarines, plums
and possibly apples. The Chileans see the marketing orders
as protectionist. Our trade statistics show that Chile's
grape exports have grown steadily; from 1987 through mid-
1990, their exports grew from 24 to 41 million boxes. We
believe the marketing orders are compatible with GATT
principles and promote market stability and consumer
confidence. If Aylwin raises this, you can offer to look at
ways in which USDA could help Chile meet new inspection and
quality standards.
Chile gave an enthusiastic welcome to your Enterprise for
the Americas initiative, and we will sign a bilateral
framework agreement during the Aylwin visit. In addition to
the framework agreement, Chile has been pressing us for a
commitment to negotiate a free trade agreement.
Agency views on how we should handle this differ widely,
with State eager to move forward and give Aylwin an FTA
commitment, while USTR is strongly opposed, arguing that
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Chile is too small a market. NSC and Treasury favor a
middle course; we would tell Chile that we are willing in
principle to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement, but
that the timing for this will have to be worked out, as we
have a commitment to negotiate first with Mexico. If
raised, you can tell Aylwin that we have a commitment to do
an FTA with Mexico first, but add that you will task your
advisers to work with Chile on how we could make the
transition from the framework agreement to an FTA.
In international affairs, Chile is slowly beginning to take
a more active role. Relations have been re-established with
Moscow, and Chile has joined the Latin American Rio Group.
On Iraq, Chile is in strict compliance with all sanctions,
and has announced a ban on arms sales. You can congratulate
Aylwin on his diplomatic efforts, thank him for support on
Iraq, and urge Chile to take a more active role to protect
international human rights.
III. PARTICIPANTS
A list of participants is at Tab B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
Open photo, writing pool.
V.
SEQUENCE
Photo opportunity in the Oval Office, followed by meeting in
the Cabinet Room.
Attachments
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
List of Participants
Tab C
Biography
CONFIDENTIAL
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs
Charles A. Gillespie, U.S. Ambassador to Chile
William T. Pryce, Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs
Barbara Phillips, Interpreter
CHILE
Patricio Aylwin, President of Chile
Enrique Silva Cimma, Foreign Minister
Patricio Silva, Chilean Ambassador to the United States
Carlos Bascunan, Chief of Staff to President Aylwin
Carlos Portales, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Relations
Estela Lorca, Interpreter
TAB A
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CHILEAN PRESIDENT PATRICIO AYLWIN
--
Congratulations on a successful first six months in office.
You have guided your country carefully and well in its
return to democracy, and you have our respect and
admiration.
-- You are the only Latin American leader that I am meeting
here at the White House in this series of consultations
related to the UNGA. In this small way, we wanted to
demonstrate our full support for Chilean democracy.
--
I am looking forward to my trip to South America in
December. Planning for it is already under way.
-- I am aware that some problems in our bilateral relationship
remain to be worked out. I want to tell you that the U.S.
wants to solve these issues, so we can move on to a new and
broader agenda with a democratic Chile.
GSP and OPIC Benefits
-- I am pleased to tell you that we have cleared the way for
OPIC to resume investment guarantee programs in Chile. The
worker rights question from Pinochet's time has been
resolved, and we look forward to an active OPIC program in
Chile.
-- We are eager to restore GSP benefits. We will be in a
position to do this once the Chilean Congress passes
pharmaceutical patent protection along the lines that you
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
11:00
CONF IDENTIAL
2
originally proposed to your Congress. I hope our OPIC
decision will make it easier to get the pharmaceutical law
passed, so that we can move on GSP.
My strong hope is that the GSP issue will be well behind us
by the time of my visit.
Letelier Case
--
We are still living with the consequences of this terrible
act. We applaud your courage in seeking to have
jurisdiction over this case transferred from the military to
civilian courts.
We were also very pleased with our June 11 agreement to set
up a process to provide ex gratia compensation to the
Letelier and Moffitt families.
You are no doubt aware that our ability to have normal
security assistance relations with Chile depends on
satisfactory progress on this case. Successful legislation,
and the appointment of a special investigator, will make it
possible for us to lift the Kennedy-Harkin sanctions,
something which we would like very much to do.
Poisoned Grapes
We regret that Chilean fruit exporters perceive that their
losses in 1989 were caused unnecessarily by our Food and
Drug Administration.
We are convinced that the FDA acted responsibly and had no
choice but to take the action it did to protect the health
of the American public.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIRE
CUMI IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
3
Our General Accounting Office just completed a study of this
issue. The GAO report finds that the FDA laboratory was
proficient, that the method of analysis as examined by
outside independent scientists was sound, and that the
Administration acted responsibly. This report has not yet
been made public.
--
We want to avoid having this case becoming an irritant in
our bilateral relations.
Marketing Orders
The farm bill now before Congress would add kiwis,
nectarines, plums, and possibly apples to the grapes that
are already covered. We believe that these orders are
compatible with GATT principles, as they help to stabilize
markets and promote consumer confidence.
To mitigate the impact on Chilean fruit exports, the
Administration is exploring the possibility that our
Department of Agriculture help train Chileans in inspection
standards. This would reduce the likelihood of Chilean
fruit being rejected at port of entry.
Framework Agreement, Free Trade Agreement
Congratulations on the signing of our bilateral framework
agreement on trade and investment. This is the third one
since the Enterprise for the Americas initiative was
announced.
--
Chile is seen throughout Latin America an a model of
responsible, creative debt management and sound economic
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONI IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
policies. For this reason, the enthusiastic welcome that
Chile gave to the Enterprise for the Americas was
particularly welcome.
I am aware that Chile has expressed a strong desire to move
forward with a bilateral free trade agreement. You know
that we have a commitment to proceed first with Mexico, so
that we cannot decide the issue now, but I will ask my top
advisers to work with yours to see how we could make the
transition from the framework agreement towards a free trade
agreement. We can discuss this issue further during my
trip in December.
International Issues
We note that Chile has been steadily expanding its
diplomatic activity since the return of democracy. We
welcome this.
--
We very much appreciate Chile's strong public and private
support for the UN resolutions and sanctions against Iraq.
We have to make them work.
--
As you develop you diplomacy, one area that Chile could play
an extremely positive role would be in the protection of
human rights. We urge you to take on this role,
particularly in Latin America.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB B
TAB C
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01c. Report
Re: Biography (2 pp.)
3/19/90
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
TAB I
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
CHILEAN PRESIDENT PATRICIO AYLWIN
SCENESETTER
SIGNIFICANCE OF MEETING
-- You have not yet met Aylwin, but you called him on
December 14, 1989, to congratulate him on winning the
election. The Chileans will view this meeting as an
important sign of U.S. support for Chile's first democratic
government in nearly seventeen years.
DOMESTIC SITUATION
-- Aylwin was inaugurated on March 11, 1990, and will serve a
four-year term. He has proved to be a very effective leader
of a moderate center-left coalition government during his
first six months in office.
Aylwin's conciliatory approach to the military has led to
relatively smooth civil-military relations during the
democratic transition, even though General Pinochet remains
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and has a penchant for
imprudent remarks in public.
-- Aylwin appointed a Commission on Truth and Reconciliation to
investigate the most serious human rights abuse cases and to
recommend appropriate non-monetary compensation to victims
and their families.
-- The present government enjoys broad support at home and
abroad for its decision to continue with the free-trade,
open-market economic model embraced by the previous regime.
ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE
-- Chile, a strong advocate of free-trade principles, was one
of the first countries to respond enthusiastically to the
ideas expressed in your June 27 speech.
-- USTR and the GOC are now negotiating a bilateral framework
agreement covering trade and investment. While the GOC is
eager to move quickly on to a free trade agreement with us,
an Federal Trade Agreement with Mexico has first priority.
DECL:
OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
CONF DENTIAL
-2-
CHILE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
-- After many years of isolation, the GOC is committed to
Chile's reintegration into the international arena. It has
joined the Group of Eight and seeks expanded relations with
the Pacific Basin regional organizations.
-- Chile has reestablished relations with Mexico, Nicaragua,
most of the Eastern European countries, and the Soviet
Union, but not with Cuba due to Cuba's role in Chile during
1970-73 when a Marxist government was in power.
IRAQ
In support of UN Security Council resolutions 661 and 662,
the GOC has announced a ban on arms sales to Iraq and
Kuwait. Chile is in strict compliance with all sanctions.
-- Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Cardoen sold cluster bombs
to Iraq during the Iran war. He still operates a plant in
Iraq that allegedly makes fuses used on bombs and rockets.
The Iraqis will not allow seven Chilean engineers to leave
until the terms of the Cardoen-GOI contract are met.
KENNEDY-HARKIN AMENDMENT SANCTIONS (LETELIER CASE)
-- The amendment imposes an embargo on arms sales and other
security assistance. It requires the GOC to take
"appropriate steps" to bring to justice those responsible
for the 1976 assassination in Washington of former Chilean
official Ambassador Orlando Letelier and American citizen
Ronni Moffitt.
On the criminal side, the USG awaits passage of a bill that
shifts the case from military to civilian courts, followed
by the appointment of a special investigating judge. On the
civil side, it awaits ratification of the June 11, 1990,
bilateral agreement creating an international commission to
determine monetary compensation to the Letelier and Moffitt
families.
CONFIDENTIAL
-3- -
Trade Issues
-- GSP/OPIC BENEFITS: Benefits were suspended in 1987 on
grounds of worker rights abuses. A much improved climate
for workers prevails under the new government. Linking IPR
to this issue, USTR wants pharmaceutical patent protection
legislation passed before restoring benefits.
-- COMPENSATION FOR GRAPE LOSSES: Chilean fruit exporters
sustained losses in 1989 as a result of a temporary FDA
embargo on grape imports when several poisoned grapes were
discovered in a shipment from Chile. At that time several
threats to poison fruit shipments to the U.S. had been
received by the U.S. Embassy in Chile. This has been a very
sore point ever since. They are now talking about seeking
compensation from the USG.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
-4-
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
CHILEAN PRESIDENT PATRICIO AYLWIN
TALKING POINTS
BILATERAL RELATIONS
We applaud Chile's peaceful transition back to its democratic
traditions. I congratulate you on the important role you
have played and will continue to play in the process.
The USG wishes to cooperate with Chile on many fronts. We
seek a resolution to those issues which have caused strains
between our two governments, specifically restoration of GSP
and OPIC benefits and removal of the Kennedy-Harkin sanctions.
GSP and OPIC benefits can be restored once the USG
determination is made that Chile meets the worker rights
requirement under GSP law and the Chilean Congress passes
patent protection legislation.
ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE
We welcome the signing of a bilateral framework agreement on
trade and investment. This will provide a constructive forum
for future discussions.
We are eager to bring the Uruguay Round to a successful
conclusion in December and strongly encourage GOC efforts to
help make that happen.
Chile is seen throughout Latin America as a model of
responsible, creative debt management and sound economic
will assure even more foreign investment in the Chilean
policies. I encourage you to continue those policies as they
economy.
(Only if asked) We appreciate Chile's interest in pursuing a
bilateral FTA with us. However, we are committed to working
out an FTA with Mexico first and expect that process to take
at least a year.
IRAQ
:
It is important for all countries to support the economic
sanctions against Iraq. We are grateful for Chile's support,
knowing that it represents a sacrifice for your country.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
-5-
KENNEDY-HARKIN SANCTIONS (LETELIER CASE)
--
I hope that Chilean Government actions will allow those
responsible for the murder of Letelier and Moffitt to be
brought to justice. That would facilitate the return to full
and normal relations between our two countries.
We look forward to final passage of the legislation that will
transfer the Letelier case from military to civilian courts
and to the appointment of a special investigating judge.
While aware that you face some domestic opposition to ex
gratia monetary compensation to the Letelier and Moffitt
families, we hope that the Chilean Congress will also act
positively in that aspect of the case.
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
--
We urge the Chilean government to become more involved with
international efforts to advance the cause of human rights,
especially in Latin America and in multilateral fora.
COMPENSATION FOR GRAPE LOSSES:
--
We regret that the Chilean fruit exporters perceive that
their financial loss in 1989 was caused by FDA. We are
convinced that FDA acted responsibly and had no choice but to
take the action it did to protect the health of the American
public. Further, FDA laboratories handled the samples
professionally and used sound scientific means to analyze
them.
-- We understand that your government has been under
increasing pressure from the exporters to conduct an
independent investigation. We note that an independent
GAO study is being done in response to a request by the
U.S. Congress.
YOUR TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA
--
I look forward to my trip to Chile in early December which
will allow us to renew our conversation about the many
important issues facing our countries.
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
CHILEAN PRESIDENT PATRICIO AYLWIN
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III
Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
John Sununu, White House Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Assistant Secretary of State Bernard W. Aronson
Assistant Secretary of State J. R. Bolton
NSC Staff
Interpreter (Spanish)
Chile
President Patricio Aylwin
Foreign Minister Enrique Cimma Silva
Permanent Representative Juan Somavia
Ministry of Foreign Relations Director General Carlos Portales
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9006388
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 08 AUG 90 09
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 11 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: OAS
LATIN AMERICA
2
CARIBBEAN
HS
PERSONS: EINAUDI, LUIGI R
SUBJECT: REPLY TO LTR FM OAS SECGEN SOARES RE OAS DEBT CONVERSION FUND
ACTION: SEE 9006338 FOR FINAL ACTION
DUE DATE: 11 AUG 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PRYCE
LOGREF: 9006302 9006304
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSALW
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 6 OF 6
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9006388
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 08 AUG 90 09
TO: BAENA SOARES, JOAO
CHRON FILE
FROM: PRESIDENT
DOC DATE: 12 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: OAS
LATIN AMERICA
CARIBBEAN
HS
PERSONS: EINAUDI, LUIGI R
SUBJECT: RESPONSE FM PRES RE 3 AUG LTR ON OAS FUNDING FOR LATIN AMER &
CARIBBEAN
ACTION: PRES SGD LTR
DUE DATE: 11 AUG 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PRYCE
LOGREF: 9006302 9006304
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
JOHNSON
NSC CHRON
PACELLI
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSALW
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 7 OF 7
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ID 9006388
REFERRAL
DATE: 12 OCT 90
MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: BAENA SOARES, JOAO
SOURCE: PRESIDENT
DATE: 12 OCT 90
SUBJ: RESPONSE FM PRES RE 3 AUG LTR ON OAS FUNDING FOR LATIN AMER &
CARIBBEAN
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH
DUEDATE: 12 OCT 90
COMMENT:
FOR
GEORGE VAN ERON
DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02a. Letter
President Bush to Secretary General of the Organization of
10/12/90
(b)(1)
American States Joao Clemente Baena Soares (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6338
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
WASHINGTON
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
October 11, 1990
90 CCT 11 10: 21
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT R8 for
SUBJECT:
Your Reply to a Letter from OAS Secretary General
Baena Soares Proposing an OAS Debt Conversion Fund
Purpose
To acknowledge the Secretary General's proposal as a creative new
approach to financing the credit needs of the informal sector in
Latin America, but to give a noncommittal response.
Background
OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena Soares wrote you on
August 3, 1990 to propose creation of an OAS debt conversion fund
which would finance the credit needs of the informal sector --
the mostly cash, unregulated, untaxed part of the economy
concentrated among the urban poor (Tab B). He proposes an
authorized investment capital of $500 million. Similar letters
were sent to Chiefs of State of all OAS member countries.
You have correctly noted that we have problems with this idea
(Tab C), especially given our scarcity of resources. The fund
would appear to duplicate some existing micro-enterprise credit
programs of the Inter-American Development Bank and AID, and its
relation to the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is
unclear.
Absolutely no preparatory work was done in the OAS concerning
this proposal, and its drafter appears to have been a Brazilian
former special assistant to Baena. Several OAS missions have
confidentially expressed reservations to us, partly because they,
like us, were not consulted in advance. Your reply at Tab A,
which has been coordinated with the State Department and
Treasury, says that you have asked Ambassador Luigi Einaudi to
keep U.S. agencies informed on OAS discussions of the proposal.
(State asked that we delay our reply so as not to be among the
first to answer.)
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to OAS Secretary General Baena Soares at
Tab A.
CONFIDENTIAL
CC: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
Chief of Staff
CONF
CONFIDENTIAL
Attachments
Tab A
Reply to Secretary General Baena Soares
Tab B
Secretary General Baena Soares' Letter
Tab C
Note to Scowcroft
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02c. Letter
OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena Soares to
8/3/90
(b)(1)
President Bush (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE OAS FUND
I. Introduction
The economic crisis of the 1980s has left strong marks in
Latin America and the Caribbean. The image of a "lost decade" in
terms of economic development, even though a simplification,
aptly summarizes the dismal economic performance of the region
over this period. The dimensions of the crisis become even more
appalling when one compares the economic performance of the
region with that of the United States and Canada. In the case of
the United States, for instance, the 1980s will be remembered as
one of the longest periods of sustained economic growth of the
post-World War II era. In short, from the point of view of the
hemisphere, the last decade has been an experience in economic
asymmetry.
It is interesting to point out that despite these divergent
economic trends, this period was also characterized by the advent
of democratically elected governments throughout the continent.
This development, in which the OAS has been playing a relevant
role, suggests that a process of political convergence in the
hemisphere is under way. The challenge ahead is to create
channels through which this emerging community of democratic
states may pursue economic convergence as well.
The economic recuperation of the countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean is an objective shared by all. An outward-
oriented recovery of the economies of the region would reopen
important markets to international trade. It is important to
recognize that the above mentioned consensus transcends economic
and financial considerations. In a world characterized by growing
interdependence, the impact of other externalities of the ongoing
crisis tends to grow over time. Environmental degradation, drug
trade, and illegal migration are some of the paramount problems
faced by the countries of the hemisphere right now. All of these
problems have been magnified by the economic crisis and eventual
solutions require that Latin American and Caribbean countries be
successful in finding again their path toward sustained economic
growth.
The experience accumulated through the painful adjustment
attempts of the 1980s has served an important purpose,
nonetheless. There is nowadays clear recognition that the path to
recovery requires a more balanced sharing of the adjustment
burden among all parties involved: debtor countries, creditor
countries, multilateral agencies, and commercial banks. The
concept of debt relief -- which was anathema a few years ago --
has become an important element of current efforts to manage the
debt crisis, such as the Brady Plan. An additional step recently
has been taken by President Bush in announcing the U.S.
"Enterprise for the Americas" program, which explicitly expands
the concept to official U.S. loans. This program, with its three
2
pillars (trade, investment, and debt initiatives), opens a new
avenue for cooperation among the nations of the hemisphere.
In spite of these positive developments, a sense of urgency
remains. The globalization of economic activities continues at a
very fast pace, fostered by such technological developments, as
the convergence of computer and telecommunications technologies.
Globalization creates additional incentives for policy
convergence among nations with respect not only to trade (in
goods and services), but also capital flows, technology and
intellectual property regulations. As global networks develop,
the trade-off between the perceived benefits of independent
policy-making and the costs of not being connected into these
networks becomes steeper. For Latin America and the Caribbean,
the capacity to "connect," however, has been significantly
impaired by the deterioration of the region's investment capacity
-- particularly in the case of the public sector. In other words,
unless their rate of investment can be rapidly raised, Latin
American and Caribbean countries will lag behind in sharing the
benefits of the ongoing technological revolution.
Even if one adopts an optimistic view concerning the pace of
economic recovery in the region, there is still cause for
concern. One of the main by-products of the debt crisis has been
the accelerated growth of informal activities in these economies.
Some analysts even suggest that the resourcefulness of the urban
poor in securing alternative income from the informal sector has
played a major role in explaining the relatively low level of
political unrest in the region in spite of all the economic
hardship experienced. The growing importance of this economic
"dualism" (formal versus informal sector), however, creates
additional challenges for efficient policy-making in these
economies. It is not clear that economic recovery per se will
generate the conditions for "formalizing" these informal
activities. Actually, there is a growing realization that if
economic reform does not come together with institutional reform
-- geared to simplify the tangles of regulations and to
strengthen legal institutions --, this dualism is bound to
continue.
To the extent that the informal sector will continue to be a
major source of income for a significant portion of the labor-
force in Latin America and the Caribbean in years to come, it is
fundamental to address its needs. Failure to do so can not only
introduce a socially skewed bias in the pattern of adjustment,
but also, over the long run, endanger the very process of
democratic political convergence mentioned above. It is against
this backdrop that the OAS, in keeping with its objectives of
promoting peace and security in the hemisphere, intends to
establish the OAS Fund.
3
The OAS Fund would provide an additional instrument for debt
relief, increasing the menu of options for debt management. In
addition to that the resources of the fund will explicitly target
clientele whose needs have not been properly addressed in
conventional economic programs: individuals in the informal
sector of economies in Latin America and the Caribbean.
II. A Development Crisis
The Causes of the Debt Crisis:
Most analysts tend to explain the economic crisis
experienced by Latin America and the Caribbean as the result of a
combination of external shocks (oil price increases, the
deterioration of terms of trade, slow growth in the
industrialized world in the early 1980s, the rise of
international real interest rates) and domestic errors (public
sector mismanagement, overborrowing, policy-induced capital
flight, inward-oriented trade regimes). The weights assigned to
external shocks and domestic errors in accounting for the crisis
provide the main point of contention in the literature.
Those countries that made better use of borrowed resources
and/or had more efficient fiscal policies and/or more outward-
oriented development strategies fared better than others in the
region. All of them, however, experienced a significant slowdown
in the process of economic development, a result which suggests
the major role played by the international macroeconomic
environment in this crisis. The slowdown of the economies of
member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the parallel deterioration in the terms of
trade of the region, for instance, had a major negative impact on
the current account of Latin American and Caribbean countries.
It is also recognized that negative real interest rates in
the 1970s -- a strong inducement to overborrowing by less
developed countries (LDCs) -- and their dramatic upswing in the
early 1980s were major influences in shaping the foreign debt
problem. The change from an inflationary environment to
disinflation at the world level and, particularly, the unorthodox
combination of a tight monetary policy coupled with fiscal
expansion in the United States played an important role in
explaining the abnormal behavior of real interest rates. Latin
American and Caribbean countries had to begin their adjustment by
the second semester of 1982, when private banks --in response to
the Mexican debt servicing "moratorium" announced in August 1982
-- cut the flow of voluntary lending to the region.
The Four Phases of Debt Management:
At the outset of the debt crisis, the prevailing wisdom was
that LDCs were confronting a liquidity crisis -- i.e., a short-
4
run cash-flow problem. One of the major concerns at that moment
was the possibility of an international financial crisis sparked
by the over-exposure of major commercial banks to Third World
debt. Accordingly, debt management -- as understood by
multilateral financial institutions and major industrial country
governments -- should focus on the design of rescue packages.
These packages, negotiated on a case-by-case basis, would
address the liquidity problem of LDCs and at the same time,
create the incentives for the introduction of domestic austerity
measures. Commercial debt was rescheduled and new money was
offered with conditionality (requirements concerning the
implementation of stabilization programs by highly-indebted
countries -- HICs). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) played
a leading role in this phase of the crisis.
Orthodox stabilization programs, centered on demand
management (tight monetary policies and fiscal austerity) and
real devaluation of the exchange rate, were applied all over
Latin America and the Caribbean. Many countries also adopted
debt-led commercial policies: export incentives coupled with
import restrictions. The results were mixed.
On the external front, the countries of the region began to
experience significant balance-of-trade surpluses as of 1983 --
averaging US$27,209 millions over 1983-88. Despite this dramatic
transference of real resources to the rest of the world, the
region continued to endure deficits in its current account,
reflecting its heavy servicing commitments. Accordingly, its
external debt continued to increase.
On the domestic front, recession did not bring inflation
under control. In many countries of the region, generalized
(formal or informal) indexation practices -- the result of a
long-run coexistence with high inflation rates -- tended to
subvert the usual path of stabilization. Real wage decline
required acceleration of inflation. Therefore, several countries
experienced the unfortunate mix of recession and inflation
acceleration.
In spite of these adjustment efforts, the access to external
savings did not improve. All "new money" offered by the private
banks to the countries of the region -- most of it in the context
of nonvoluntary negotiating packages -- was required to finance
their interest bills. During the 1983-85 period, for instance,
Latin American and Caribbean countries experienced an accumulated
negative net transfer (disbursements of external loans minus
interest and amortization payments on foreign debt) of
approximately US$21.846 billion in favor of creditor countries.
As the region entered its third year of adjustment under
conditionality, debt-fatigue had already become a familiar
5
expression. It was also clear by then that the debt crisis was
more than a liquidity crisis. In September 1985, a new debt
initiative was announced by then U.S. Treasury Secretary James A.
Baker. The Baker Plan opened up a new phase in the history of the
debt crisis.
Though the emphasis was still on the need for policy reform
in debtor countries, the Baker initiative recognized that the
foreign debt problem had evolved into a development crisis.
Countries were expected to grow out of the crisis via structural
adjustment programs designed to promote trade and investment
liberalization, privatization, and public sector reform.
Multilateral institutions -- particularly the IMF and the World
Bank -- would provide not only technical guidance for these
reforms, but also would increase their role in financing the
HICs. Commercial banks, in turn, were expected to extend new
lending of about US$20 billion over the 1986-88 period. It is
worth mentioning that eleven of the seventeen countries
identified as HICs belong to Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Baker Plan fell short of its target of reestablishing
significant voluntary capital flows to HICs. New-money packages
negotiated over 1986-88 by commercial banks amounted to no more
than 64 % of the expected US$20 billion and were heavily
concentrated in only three countries (Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico). Multilateral institutions also failed to accomplish
their lending targets, particularly because of a large decrease
in IMF net lending over this period. And the economic performance
of the region continued to be sluggish, with its GDP growth rate
averaging only 1.7 % per year.
Against this background, it is no surprise that the number
of countries in the region falling behind in their debt payments
continued to increase steadily: 7 in 1986, 11 in 1987, and 13 in
1988. The Brazilian partial moratorium announced in February 1987
added a new dimension to the crisis. In response to this
development, U.S. commercial banks -- the largest private
creditor group -- significantly increased their developing-
country loan-loss reserves. The perceived erosion in the
commitment of borrowers to austerity programs and the implicit
recognition by commercial banks that part of developing-country
debt eventually would have to be written-down sent secondary
market prices of developing countries loans into a sharp decline.
Accordingly, the volume of operations in the secondary market
increased significantly from 1987 on.
Growing activity in the secondary debt market paved the way
for the third phase in the history of debt crisis management.
Building upon the Baker initiative, negotiations evolved in the
direction of the so-called market-based "menu" approach.
Financial packages involving debt-relief instruments (e.g., debt-
equity conversions, buybacks, and exit bonds) began to be
6
negotiated. Voluntary bank participation was expected to replace
the "concerted approach" based on nonvoluntary loans which had
prevailed until then. Banks were offered a menu of options
designed to match different interests in the banking community,
while attending the financial needs of developing countries on a
case-by-case basis. Banks willing to exit from new-money packages
were offered this option in exchange for a certain degree of
debt-relief.
The implementation of the menu approach, however, proved to
be more difficult than expected. Only large debtors -- like
Brazil and Argentina -- had the bargaining power to negotiate
new-money packages under the aegis of the menu approach. And even
in these cases, the agreements collapsed later on. The
recognition of the limitations of voluntary debt relief, without
direct involvement of creditor countries' governments and
multilateral institutions, naturally led to proposals in favor of
an expansion of the concept. Officially supported debt-relief
proposals were presented by Japan's former finance minister,
Kiichi Miyazawa, and France's President François Mitterrand
during 1988. The proposal presented by U.S. Treasury Secretary
Nicholas Brady in March 1989 served to reinforce this trend and
its ongoing implementation marks the fourth phase of the debt
crisis.
The Brady initiative maintains the case-by-case approach of
the Baker plan as well as the emphasis on policy reform in the
HICs. Debt relief is finally accepted as a necessary ingredient
for a successful debt management strategy and multilateral
institutions are expected to provide funding for debt and debt-
service reduction. The amount of official support for debt relief
over three years is estimated to reach approximately US$30
billion: US$24 billion would come from the IMF and the World
Bank, while the Japanese Government would contribute US$6
billion. Creditor governments also are expected to review their
tax, accounting, and regulatory provisions in order to eliminate
eventual obstacles to the implementation of debt relief.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico and Costa Rica
have already developed negotiations according to the Brady plan
guidelines. It is still too early to evaluate how effective it
has been in attenuating the debt crisis. There is no doubt,
however, that the framework provided by the Brady initiative is a
step in the right direction. The recently announced "Enterprise
for the Americas" expands on this concept not only by supporting
an active role for the Inter-American Development Bank in debt-
relief programs, but also by opening up the possibility of debt
reduction on existing U.S. concessional loans to Latin American
and Caribbean countries.
Debt relief coupled with structural adjustment programs
provide the best strategy for overcoming the debt crisis. Yet, it
7
is important to recognize that the path to the recovery of Latin
American and Caribbean economies will not be an easy one. In most
of these countries, the public sector is under heavy financial
stress. Domestic stabilization typically will require further
steps toward fiscal austerity. It is fundamental to provide
mechanisms to ease the burden of this adjustment process upon the
low-income population of the region, even more so because the
capacity of governments to efficiently assist the poor amid
stabilization efforts is an open question.
The OAS Fund is designed as an additional instrument to
promote debt relief for Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Of course, given its dimensions (see below), the fund will at
best provide a marginal contribution to the ongoing process of
debt crisis management. Its impact, however, can be quite
significant both in economic and social terms to the extent that
it is intended to address one of the most basic needs of the
poor: access to credit.
III. The Importance of Microcredit Programs
for the Informal Sector
The informal sector has been attracting a lot of attention
lately. Once portrayed in a very negative light, as the realm of
"marginals" who lacked the education and the skills to
effectively participate in the modernization process experienced
by developing economies, it has now achieved a much more positive
(and sometimes idealized) image as the refuge of energetic
entrepreneurs harassed by the tangles of government regulation.
The relevant fact, however, is that the informal sector is
responsible for a growing proportion of income and employment in
developing economies. In Latin American and Caribbean countries,
for instance, 20 to 50 % of all urban employment is related to
informal sector activities.
There is no doubt that the economic crisis of the 1980s, by
curtailing the expansion of job opportunities in the formal
sector, has contributed to the significant expansion of informal
sector activities observed in the region over the last decade.
What is not clear is to what extent a process of economic
recovery per se would be sufficient to reverse this situation in
the short run. To the extent that these activities are important
suppliers of goods and services to the poor, it seems that only a
significant improvement in the income-distribution profile of
Latin American and Caribbean countries would reverse the trend
mentioned above. In short, the informal sector will continue to
be the main source of income for a significant proportion of the
poor in Latin America and the Caribbean in the years ahead.
Support for informal sector activities can be rationalized
in different ways. Equity considerations and the fact that they
provide channels for entrepreneurial training -- particularly for
8
women and the poor -- are often mentioned. It is enough, however,
to remember that if these activities cannot sustain minimum
income levels, a significant proportion of the population in the
hemisphere will be condemned to live in extreme poverty.
One of the main obstacles to the expansion of informal
sector activities, and as a consequence of a more effective
participation of the poor in economic growth, is the lack of
access to institutional credit. Over the last few decades, a
series of original credit programs targeted to the poor have been
developed by governments and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the Badan Kredit
Kecamatan (BKK) in Indonesia, Accion International and its
affiliated programs throughout Latin America and the Caribbean
provide some of the best examples in this context.
The most successful among these programs are precisely those
that have been able to minimize transaction costs and that do not
offer subsidized loans. The lessons from these programs are
clear: first, informal sector businesses can be a good credit
risk due to their potential profitability; second, it is
fundamental to minimize transaction and access costs in order to
effectively attend the needs of these entrepreneurs.
The OAS intends to build upon these experiences to provide a
new source of microcredit for those who work in the informal
sector in Latin America and the Caribbean. The OAS Fund will open
up the possibility of utilizing the leverage of the international
financial market, via debt-conversion operations, to finance the
needs of the poor in the hemisphere.
IV. The OAS Fund: A Proposal
The OAS Fund (the "Fund") would be organized as a
specialized equity fund in the United States of America. The
precise definition of its legal structure will be decided later.
Commercial banks, financial institutions, foundations and other
investors would be its subscribers. Limited partnership in the
Fund would be acquired with titles of foreign debt of OAS Member
Countries or with cash to be used in the acquisition of debt
titles via the secondary market for foreign debt.
The Fund authorized investment capital could be defined as
the equivalent to US$500 million. In order to raise this capital
the Fund would offer up to one thousand Units, each one with a
face value of US$500,00 Investors could use titles of foreign
debt of member countries to buy these Units, with the secondary
market price of the debt providing guidance for the terms of
exchange. The Fund would have an expected operational life of 20
years.
9
The Fund would organize affiliates in the member countries
represented in its portfolio to act as its intermediaries. The
Fund would redeem the acquired external debt obligations in local
currency, according to conversion rules negotiated with the
member country. A small part of these resources would be used to
finance the supervision of the Fund's affiliates. The rest would
be transferred to the affiliates which would use the resources to
make loans at market rates to micro-entrepreneurs in the informal
sector. The results obtained by these affiliates would be
re-invested in new operations until the Fund's liquidation.
At the Fund's liquidation, the resources invested via the
affiliates as well as related profits would be converted into
U.S. dollars via the Central Bank of participant countries. These
proceeds would be employed to repurchase the Units from the
subscribers. The repurchase procedure could be designed to take
into account the performance of the affiliates capitalized with
debt titles of the limited partner.
Although no assurance can be ex ante provided with respect
to the long-term appreciation of the Fund's portfolio, the
experience of organizations such as Accion International and the
Badan Kredit Kecamatan underscore the financial feasibility of
providing credit to the poor.
6388
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DATE:
8-10-90
FROM THE PRESIDENT
To:
Brent
I assume we will have problems
with OAS Fund?
Right
Wrong
my
Do meno
to pres.
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
6388
August 17, 1990
9017494
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Suggested Reply to Letter of OAS Secretary General
Baena Soares Proposing Creation of OAS Debt Conversion
Fund
OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena Soares has
requested the support of President Bush for a proposal to
create a $500 million OAS Debt Conversion Fund aimed at
addressing the credit needs of informal sector
micro-entrepreneurs throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
He sent the same request to the Chiefs of State of all OAS
member countries.
The OAS Fund proposal may be a creative new approach, but
there are fundamental questions. How the OAS Fund would fit
into the Enterprise for the Americas initiative is unclear.
The Fund would appear to duplicate some existing
micro-enterprise credit programs of the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Agency for International Development.
In addition, several Latin American and Caribbean permanent
missions to the OAS have confidentially expressed reservations
to us, partly because they, like us, were not consulted in
advance.
We consider it premature for the President to address
Baena's proposal substantively. We recommend a non-committal
interim response.
R.A.LAMANTISte
Fox
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Suggested reply
2. Incoming correspondence
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02f. Draft Letter
Re: State Department Suggested Reply to OAS Secretary
n.d.
(b)(1)
General Joao Clemente Baena Soares (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
9017494
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
August 7, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House
SUBJECT:
Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence
Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush
from OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena Soares
which is transmitted for your information.
This correspondence was received in the Information Resources
Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on August 7, 1990
A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.
,Nith
for
Director, S/S-IRM
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02g. Draft Letter
President Bush to OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente
n.d.
(b)(1)
Baena Soares (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
United States Department of State
United States Permanent Mission to the
Organization of American States
FAX: 647-0911
Washington, D. C. 20520
DATE 10/2
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET
TRANSMITTED TO:
DAVID PACELLI
NSC
(ORGANIZATION)
(9)395-6926
(FAX NUMBER)
395-3860
(TELEPHONE NUMBER)
TRANSMITTED FROM:
JIM REILLY
(ORGANIZATION/NAME)
647-9482
(TELEPHONE NUMBER)
PAGES BEING SENT:
/
(DO NOT COUNT THIS COVER SHEET AS A PAGE)
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02h. Draft Letter
President Bush to OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente
n.d.
(b)(1)
Baena Soares (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 6338
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG Ef. A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
9
Review
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
90 OCT12 A8. 55
10
D
NSC Secretariat
11
DAD 10/12 D
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS Date
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
P Reply to OAS Section - 000 Debt Cano Proposal
National Security Council
FELC FE te
The White House
PROOFED BY:
His
LOG #
633c
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
ema Ken Hill
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
55
A
Bill Sittmann
6
Bob Gates
7
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
8
24.1011 P
NSC Secretariat
e 7 : 12
A = Action
= Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
U
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Dater Time)
COMMENTS
V
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
mail out via State Dept courier.
Exec Secs OK has diskette
P Reply to ORS Soares re Debt
National Security Council conversion
The White House
PROOFED BY: MEN
LOG # 6388
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG OHD A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Taker Ken Hill
\
KH A
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
90 AUC 22 P4. 17 P4.17
Returntariat
Situation Room
West
Desk
I
8/29k
D
NSC Secretariat Wing 4
FF A
Re-do DAP 10/5/90
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Exce See office has diskette
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9008135
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 12 OCT 90 10
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
2
FROM: JOHNSON
DOC DATE: 12 OCT 90
PRYCE
SOURCE REF:
DEAL
KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA
ECONOMICS
INTL TRADE
PERSONS: ROCKEFELLER, DAVID
SUBJECT: ENTERPRISE FOR AMERICAS INITIATIVE - PROGRESS & PROBLEM AREAS
ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
DUE DATE: 16 OCT 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
GANTT
JOHNSON
NSC CHRON
PRYCE
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSLMS
CLOSED BY: NSMEM
DOC 1 OF 1
CONF IDENTIAL
Enterprise for Americas
Initiative - Progress (
National Security Council
The White House
Problems
PROOFED BY:
LMS
LOG #
8135
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
with Ken Hill
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
W
A
Bill Sittmann
I
300
W,
A
to
Bob Gates
8
7
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
APNSA Has Seen
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat
R
90 00112 P5. 25
4 Aln118 R
5
N
RE
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
COLIE St
[_____]
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
clea
CONFIDENTIAL
ONFIDENTIAL
8135
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
October 12, 1990
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
ACTION
messo
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
WILLIAM PRYCE/TIM DEAL
FROM:
DONALD C. JOHNSON
Is
SUBJECT:
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative -- Progress
and Problem Areas
The Good News
The Enterprise for the Americas initiative was prompted by our
desire and commitment to have a coherent, long-range, and well
balanced political and economic policy toward Latin America.
With Central America no longer dominating our attention to the
region or poisoning domestic debate, and in recognition of the
changes in the strategic relationship with the Soviets, we sought
to craft a post-Cold War policy for our relations with this
hemisphere.
The President's proposal came at a moment when the Latin American
and Caribbean leaders were eager to be reassured of the
President's commitment to long-term engagement with the region,
and evoked both relief and excitement. It came at a moment when
the larger countries were in transition to more dynamic
leadership (Collor in Brazil, Aylwin in Chile, Gaviria in
Colombia) which has been willing to jettison old economic dogma.
The first months of the President's initiative have been an
outstanding success. For the first time in years, we now have a
coherent political and economic policy for Latin America and the
Caribbean that is welcomed by the region. We have (a) set in
motion the negotiations for a free trade agreement with Mexico,
while at the same time making a commitment not to saw off the
rest of the continent at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; (b)
translated our free trade commitment into action, with bilateral
framework agreements completed with Colombia, Ecuador and Chile;
(c) drafted and introduced in Congress implementing legislation
for the Enterprise for the Americas, and working hard for passage
this session, if possible; (d) drafted and introduced in Congress
implementing legislation for a special trade preference for the
Andean nations, to follow up on the Cartagena Summit commitment;
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CUNI IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
and (e) served notice on our Houston Summit partners that we will
be looking to them for resources to help this hemisphere
consolidate the gains of democracy.
This policy has credibility in Latin America and the Caribbean.
It has revitalized and refreshed our dialogue. Hemispheric
leaders acknowledge that we are addressing issues other than
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and drugs. They are genuinely looking
forward to the President's trips in November/December. Among
Latin American and Caribbean leaders, President Bush is the most
popular U.S. President in recent memory.
Problem Areas
However, because the Enterprise initiative has been so well
received, we are unusually sensitive to problems that might
undermine it. At the one hundred day mark, we see three actual
or potential trouble areas: (a) lack of publicity at home, (b)
the lack of a quarterback for the whole operation, and (c) a
competing State Department initiative.
On the issue of publicity at home, David Rockefeller's recent
letter (Tab C) hits the nail on the head. We are in the ironic
position of having Latin Americans know more about the
President's initiative than most Americans do. People on our
southern border may be aware of the FTA proposal for Mexico, but
most have no idea that the FTA fits into a larger strategy of
engagement with this hemisphere. Domestically, our Hispanic
audience is not being made aware of the President's activism with
Latin America.
Showled
Publicity should be the problem area easiest to fix. The
President's trips to Mexico and South America offer excellent
opportunities to do so, and we need State and Treasury to begin
Exp
working together to develop and implement a public relations
strategy for the Enterprise and the trips. Op-ed pieces,
white
of
backgrounders with U.S. and Latin American press, TV analysis
programs, and seminars on EAI can and should be prepared.
This leads into the second problem area, and that is the lack of
a quarterback coordinating the entire policy. State, which is
weak on the economic side, played a peripheral role in the
development of the Enterprise for the Americas (admittedly
because of Treasury's reluctance to involve State in the debt and
environment aspects) as well as the Andean initiatives.
Treasury, which developed the debt/environment portions of EAI,
has been eager to promote this aspect of the initiative, and has
taken the ball and run with it on the Hill. USTR, meanwhile, has
been working hard on the bilateral framework agreements, but
resisting mightily any efforts to open discussion on FTA's after
Mexico (e.g., with respect to Chile).
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Partly because there is no quarterback, and partly because it
sees Treasury running such a large chunk of the EAI program,
State has been pushing a special G-24 mechanism for Central
America. The genesis of the G-24 idea was apparently an informal
discussion between Secretary Baker and the President (without any
staff work that we are aware of), during which the President made
a favorable response. State has interpreted this conversation as
full backing for the proposal, and continues to talk it up in
discussions with our allies.
As the cable from Tokyo (at Tab B) indicates, this has caused
some confusion. The Japanese have come to the conclusion that
G-24 is essentially a competing policy proposal, and they are
telling us that they will sit on the sidelines on both EAI and
G-24 until they get a clearer idea of where each proposal fits.
The fundamental problem with the G-24 idea, as we see it, is that
it suggests that we will seek European/Japanese financial
contributions to a fund in addition to what we are already
seeking for the EAI Investment Fund. Having only recently gone
through their pockets for money for the Gulf peace-keeping
effort, and with our own foreign policy budget for Central
America almost certainly going to drop, yet another effort to
extract resources from our allies has very limited prospects for
success. Furthermore, if we push it too hard, we may end up
missing the chance to get the investment support funds we are
seeking under EAI. There are also unresolved problems of how the
G-24 idea fit in with existing World Bank consultative
mechanisms, which concerns Treasury. As we informed you
previously (Tab A), State has refused to hold an inter-agency
meeting to work out conceptual problems.
Possible Actions
We believe the bureaucratic jockeying over the G-24 idea needs to
be put under control fairly quickly. Given the resource-poor
environment in which we are operating, it seems to us that G-24
can only prosper if it is blended in with EAI. The Central
Americans have indicated that they are interested in G-24 only if
it produces more resources for them. We do not want to hold out
false hopes for additional resources if these resources will not
be forthcoming.
The G-24 proposal could yield positive results if we structure it
as an effort to maintain the flow of development money to Central
America, and seek to maximize the impact of the money that does
go there. Furthermore, we can use G-24 as a vehicle to steer
investment money to the area and to promote EAI debt reduction
and environmental protection. As a separate, competing
initiative, however, it will detract from the President's EAI.
CONF
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
We are fully aware of the bureaucratic competition that makes
rational decision-making models difficult to implement. In the
case of EAI, we risk disappointing ourselves and the rest of the
hemisphere if we cannot follow through. To improve coordination,
we have considered the possibility of the President naming a
special high-level person to work on this for a year or two to
make certain that EAI achieves its full potential. At the very
least, however, we need a periodic injection of high-level
attention, to keep the EAI on track.
RECOMMENDATIONS
That you draw on this memo to brief the President at an
appropriate opportunity.
That you raise these issues directly with Secretary Baker and
Secretary Brady (we can provide talking points for this).
Approve B
Disapprove
"Into the jaws of death rode
the six hundred"
Attachments
Tab A
G-24 Package
Tab B
Cable from Tokyo on G-24
Tab C
Letter from David Rockefeller to the President
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB A
CONFIDENTIAL
LUNI
6956
Re-Do
COPY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C 20506
September 11, 1990
Nati Sec Advisor
has seen
ACTION
DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
THROUGH:
WILLIAM T. PRYCE/TIM DEAL
M2for
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/21
DAP
FROM:
DAVID A. PACELLI/MEG LUNDSAGER
mL
SUBJECT:
Eagleburger Memorandum on Multilateral Assistance
to Central America
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to you from Deputy Secretary of
State Lawrence Eagleburger which provides a copy of a concept
paper outlining plans for a G-24 mechanism for Central America
and a copy of a memo which he sent to Treasury Deputy Secretary
John Robson on the initiative. He says that he hopes that the
memo and his call to Robson will be enough to enlist Treasury's
support for the plan, but he may have to ask you to step in to
push the matter forward. (We have learned that he had not called
Robson as of September 10.)
As you may recall, this G-24 idea for Central America has had a
troubled history. Secretary Baker apparently floated the idea by
the President sometime in May and gained his approval. State
then informed the agencies (and us) of this at a very difficult
NSC/PCC meeting, and was quite put off when it met with
resistance, particularly from Treasury. Nevertheless, Secretary
Baker surfaced the idea at the Central American summit which he
attended in Guatemala in June, saying we would work out the
details later. State representatives also discussed it at the
Rome donors conference for Nicaragua later that month. The
Central Americans have emphasized that they would view the idea
positively only if it means that they will receive additional
resources.
After this initial flurry of activity, nothing further has been
done to shape either a USG consensus on the proposal or to gain
international support. State showed no interest in a follow-up
PCC meeting, preferring to deal with this at a higher level.
Eagleburger's memo to Robson therefore comes out of the blue, and
it is so sketchy that it is unlikely to resolve any of Treasury's
doubts.
We believe that the proposal should be fleshed out in an
interagency meeting at the working level. (We have so informed
State, but it has made no commitment.) Note, for example, that
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
2
CONFIDENTIAL
the concept paper makes no mention of how this fits in with the
President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative or its
relationship to the regional strategy on Central America which
Secretary Baker recently sent to the President. It tacks on a
whole new section on working with the Europeans to strengthen
democratic institutions, without giving any specifics on how this
would work. Finally, it does not even refer to the multilateral
fund idea which is only casually mentioned in the regional
strategy.
If Secretary Eagleburger approaches you with a complaint about
Treasury's intransigence, we recommend that you coax him to have
this idea fully worked out using normal interagency procedures.
RECOMMENDATION
That you use the Points to be Made at Tab I if Secretary
Eagleburger calls you to enlist your support for the initiative.
Approve
AD
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Points to be Made
Tab II
Eagleburger Memorandum to Scowcroft
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6956
Redo
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR POSSIBLE TELEPHONE CALL FROM
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER
--
The Partnership for Democracy and Development in Central
America idea has potential. I agree that we need to get the
Europeans and Japan involved in encouraging economic reform,
strengthening democratic institutions, and looking for ways
to channel additional resources.
--
Nevertheless, it seems to me that the best way to resolve
any differences that Treasury has is to first tackle it in a
PCC meeting or a meeting at the DAS level.
--
I know that State has put some energy into this idea, but
your people really haven't made much of an effort to develop
an interagency consensus, and that is where the problem
lies. My staff tells me that the idea has been virtually
unheard of since the meetings on it in June.
--
Moreover, it seems to me that the concept paper needs to be
fleshed out with details on just how we think this plan will
work.
--
I don't think this would take much time, but it will make
for a better product.
Having done that, I don't think there will be a need to
speak to John Robson. But I would be happy to discuss this
idea with you and John later if the differences can't be
resolved.
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC/S PROFILE
SUBJECT:
90 11
TO: SCOWCROFT
& Ental
FROM: PACELLI
COPY
America
DOC DATE: 11 SEP 90
LUNDSAGER
SOURCE REF:
PRYCE
KEYWORDS: CENTRAL AMERICA
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
PERSONS: ROBSON, J
SUBJECT: EAGLEBURGER MEMO ON MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMER
ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
DUE DATE: 05 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
LUNDSAGER
NSC CHRON
PACELLI
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSGAD
CLOSED BY: NSGLM
DOC 3 OF 3
CONFIDENTIAL
6100
9019245
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 31, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Multilateral Assistance to Central America
Attached is a letter from me to John Robson on the new
multilateral assistance effort for Central America that you and
I have talked about previously. I am hoping that this letter
and a subsequent telephone call to John will be sufficient in
getting Treasury on board for this initiative. However, if
that does not work, I may have to ask you to step in to push
the matter forward, as we will need to launch this initiative
in early September.
ith
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Attachment:
As stated.
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 31, 1990
Dear John:
Enclosed is a copy of a Concept Paper for a "Partnership
for Democracy and Development in Central America", or PDD. As
you may recall, the idea grew out of the April 23 meeting
between Secretary Baker and EC President Jacques Delors.
Following discussions with President Bush, the Secretary
presented the concept to the six Central American Presidents in
June and to the G-24 ministerial in July. The idea received
positive responses, and we are ready to move forward with it as
soon as possible.
The Concept Paper is designed to serve as a skeletal
framework for a multilateral partnership which would bring
together the industrialized countries of Europe, Japan, and the
Americas in support of the countries participating in the
Central American peace process. It would build on and enhance
the existing consultative group mechanisms of the international
financial institutions.
I would appreciate your looking over this paper. I will
call you in the near future to discuss it further and would
welcome your comments. We certainly intend to work closely
with you in this effort and look forward to having Treasury's
support.
Lavrence Jarry Eagleburger
Sincerely
Enclosure:
Concept Paper
The Honorable
John E. Robson,
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.
CONCEPT PAPER
A PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA
In fulfillment of the promise of the Esquipulas Accords,
all the countries of Central America have established
democratic governments and are moving toward market-oriented
economies. As agreed at their June summit in Antigua,
Guatemala, the leaders of Central America firmly support the
goals of democracy, development, and demilitarization.
The convergence of political and economic goals provides
the basis for a partnership in support of Central America's
commitment to strengthening democratic institutions and market
based economic policies. The Partnership for Democracy and
Development (PDD) would bring together the industrialized
countries of Europe, Japan, and the Americas in support of the
development of those countries participating in the Central
American peace process -- Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. This effort might later
extend to include Belize.
The countries participating in the Partnership would meet
together to review and encourage the major economic reform
process underway in all the countries of Central America and to
coordinate efforts to assist the region economically and
commercially. Partnership efforts to sustain and broaden
support for the region would be undertaken in close
coordination with the World Bank/Inter-American Development
Bank consultative groups. The Partnership would review needs
assessments, help monitor regional projects, and consider
economic and financial issues raised by the consultative groups.
At the Antigua Summit, the Central American Presidents
identified the path to growth and development as increased
trade and investment and strengthening outward-looking regional
integration. The Partnership would provide a forum for
participating countries to discuss and coordinate regional
economic and trade policies, regional integration efforts, and
investment policies and opportunities.
The Partnership would work to assist Central Americans to
meet commitments, made in the Esquipulas Process, to strengthen
democratic institutions, promote and protect human rights, and
encourage national reconciliation. The PDD could establish a
working group to coordinate efforts in support of democratic
political development. Participating countries would
coordinate and increase their support to democratic
institutions and procedures, including free and fair elections,
free speech and free press, respect for human rights, the
administration of justice, and the rule of law.
- 2 -
As recognized in the Antigua Declaration, Central America
has paid a high price for conflict, political violence, and
arms buildups. The Esquipulas Process set forth principles for
peace based on democracy and national reconciliation. The
Central American Presidents stated in the Antigua declaration
their willingness to redirect resources away from war and
toward economic and social development. The Partnership would
explore opportunities for assistance programs to Central
America in support of increased civilian control over military
and police institutions, and the reincorporation into civilian
life of those leaving the military forces.
The Partnership would convene periodic meetings at the
senior experts level with representatives from Central America,
all interested industrialized countries of Europe, Japan, and
the Americas (including Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, as
participants in the San Jose Accords). These meetings would be
the primary forum for work and decision making within the
Partnership. It is also anticipated that there could be an
annual ministerial-level meeting. The United States is
prepared to provide the logistical support to coordinate the
PDD's work, particularly for the initial meetings. The
Partnership could also draw on technical and administrative
support from the international financial institutions.
Meetings could be hosted by regional and non-regional countries.
The agenda for an initial meeting of senior experts could
include discussion of the objectives of the Partnership,
consideration of creating a clearinghouse for information on
assistance programs and activities in support of democracy and
development, and consideration of organizing working groups on
a limited number of issues.
TAB B
<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL <OSRI> RUEHKO<DTG> 0908;
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7979
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: U.S. JAPAN CONSULTATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA:
MOFA PERPLEXED ABOUT U.S. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
<TEXT>
€ O N F IDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 18394
TREASURY FOR OASIA D. TEMPLEMAN
USDOC FOR 4410/ITA/IEP/EAP/OJ
ALSO FOR USAID
STATE PLEASE PASS ALL LATIN POSTS
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, JA, XM
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN CONSULTATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA:
MOFA PERPLEXED ABOUT U.S. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
REF: A) STATE 326344; B) STATE 326345; C) STATE 329659
1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ALTHOUGH MOFA OFFICIALS LAUD THE SEPTEMBER 17
U.S.-JAPAN CONSULTATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA, THEY HAVE
CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FOR
THE REGION. MOFA OFFICIALS VIEW THE G-24-TYPE PROCESS
FOR CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE
AMERICAS INITIATIVE AS DRIVEN BY COMPETING U.S.
BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS AND AS NOT NECESSARILY
COMPATIBLE. THEY REQUEST MORE CONCRETE INFORMATION ON
THE PROGRAMS, AND ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE. END
SS By
SUMMARY.
BROAD AGREEMENT ON PRIORITIES
PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
3. MOFA FIRST LATIN AMERICA DIVISION DEPUTY DIRECTOR
ISOBE, WHOSE OFFICE COORDINATED MOFA'S PARTICIPATION
NARA, Date
DECLASSIFIED
IN THE U.S.-JAPAN CONSULTATIONS, PRAISED THE SEPTEMBER
7 MEETINGS AND SAID HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE "MORE
FREQUENT." WHILE ISOBE SAID THAT "NO NEW ELEMENTS"
EMERGED IN THE TALKS, HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT
U.S. AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES ON LATIN
Z
3/1/24
AMERICA HAD APPEARED TO BE ALMOST UNIFORM.
4. SUBSEQUENTLY, SECOND LATIN AMERICA DIVISION DEPUTY
DIRECTOR FUKUSHIMA TOLD POLOFF THAT THE MEETINGS WERE
"SUCCESSFUL" BECAUSE THEY INVOLVED "FRANK EXCHANGES."
IT ALSO HELPED THAT BOTH SIDES "AGREED ON VIRTUALLY
EVERYTHING," FUKUSHIMA SAID. POLOFF SAID U.S.
PARTICIPANTS CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT JAPAN
WOULD FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON COSTA RICA, CHILE,
NICARAGUA AND PERU (REF B), AND ASKED FOR FUKUSHIMA'S
COMMENTS. FUKUSHIMA SAID THAT THE FOCUS IS ACTUALLY
BROADER. HE CONFIDED THAT, DURING PREPARATORY MOFA
MEETINGS FOR THE CONSULTATIONS, SEKI TOLD HIS STAFF
THAT JAPAN WOULD FOCUS ON FIVE COUNTRIES THAT WERE
MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ECONOMICALLY -- MEXICO,
BOLIVIA, CHILE, COSTA RICA AND COLOMBIA -- AND FOUR
THAT WERE IMPORTANT POLITICALLY -- NICARAGUA, PANAMA,
PERU AND BRAZIL.
MOFA WANTS DETAILS ON G-24 VERSUS EAI
5. ISOBE SAID MOFA IS "STILL UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND"
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE G-24-TYPE PROCESS FOR
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS
INITIATIVE (EAI). ISOBE SAID MOFA WENT INTO THE TALKS
DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT -- G-24
BY STATE AND EAI BY TREASURY. HE ADDED THAT MOFA
PARTICIPANTS ASSUMED THESE WOULD BE MERGED INTO A
COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE, AND THAT THIS WOULD BE CLEARED
UP DURING THE CONSULTATIONS. THEREFORE, MOFA
PARTICIPANTS WERE "SURPRISED" WHEN A/S ARONSON,
RESPONDING TO AN INQUIRY FROM SEKI, SAID THAT THESE
TWO PROGRAMS WOULD BE KEPT DISTINCT.
5. AS BACKGROUND, ISOBE SAID THAT IT BECAME
"DIFFICULT" FOR MOFA TO GET CLEAR, COMPREHENSIVE
INFORMATION ON U.S. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY TOWARD LATIN
AMERICA FOLLOWING THE JULY SUMMIT. THIS STEMMED FROM
THE SUMMIT AGREEMENT THAT THE G-7 "DEPUTIES" WOULD
FOLLOW-UP ON THE EAI, WHICH IN EFFECT ESTABLISHED A
FINANCE MINISTRYTREASURY DEPARTMENT CHANNEL WHICH
C ONF I DENTIA SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 18394
TREASURY FOR OASIA D. TEMPLEMAN
USDOC FOR 4410/ITA/IEP/EAP/OJ
ALSO FOR USAID
STATE PLEASE PASS ALL LATIN POSTS
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, JA, XM
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN CONSULTATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA:
BYPASSED MOFA (AND, IMPLICITLY, STATE). THEREFORE,
"WE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO," ISOBE SAID. DURING AN
AUGUST MOFA PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THE BILATERAL
CONSULTATIONS, MOFA'S ECONOMIC COOPERATION BUREAU
ASKED WHETHER G-24 OR EAI WAS "MORE IMPORTANT" TO THE
U.S. AND SHOULD THEREFORE DEMAND GOJ ATTENTION. THE
LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU RESPONDED THAT, SINCE THIS WAS
UNCLEAR, BOTH MUST BE PURSUED. THE ECONOMIC
COOPERATION BUREAU SAID THIS WAS "NOT ACCEPTABLE,
ACCORDING TO ISOBE, AND DEMANDED THAT THIS POINT BE
CLARIFIED DURING THE CONSULTATIONS.
6. ISOBE SAID THAT IF BOTH INITIATIVES ARE TO BE
PURSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY, MOFA WOULD APPRECIATE "MUCH
MORE CONCRETE INFORMATION" ON THE EXACT MECHANISMS,
THEIR RELATIONSHIP, AND HOW BEST TO PROCEED.
EMPHASIZING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, ISOBE
SAID HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD NOT EXCLUDE A UNIFIED
APPROACH BECAUSE THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE
LATIN AMERICA BUREAU TO GENERATE POSITIVE BUREAUCRATIC
MOMENTUM WITHIN MOFA AND WITH MOF.
7. FUKUSHIMA TOLD POLOFF THAT THE G-24 CONCEPT "SEEMED
TO DISAPPEAR" AFTER THE HOUSTON SUMMIT. ALSO,
CONSIDERING EUROPEAN HESITATION, IT WAS "NOT CLEAR"
THAT G-24 WOULD "SURVIVE" INDEPENDENTLY, FUKUSHIMA
SAID. HE NOTED THAT JAPAN "RESPONDED VERY POSITIVELY"
TO THE G-24 PROPOSAL WHEN IT WAS PROMULGATED IN
APRIL. NOW, HE SAID, HALF A YEAR HAS PASSED SINCE
JAPAN COMMENTED ON THE PROPOSAL, AND THERE HAS BEEN
"NO RESPONSE" FROM THE U.S. "WE WANTED AN OVERALL
SCHEME" TO INCREASE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO LATIN
AMERICA, FUKUSHIMA SAID, SINCE THIS WOULD MAKE IT
"EASIER TO COOPERATE." DURING THE CONSULTATIONS, A/S
ARONSON TOLD SEKI THAT THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO
PURSUE G-24 PARALLEL TO EAI, FUKUSHIMA SAID. HOWEVER,
SEKI CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT A/S ARONSON
HAD RESPONDED "VAGUELY" ON THE DETAILS OF HOW G-24
WOULD BE PURSUED. FUKUSHIMA TOLD POLOFF THAT,
FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIONS, LATIN AMERICA DEPUTY
DIRECTOR GENERAL TANAKA AND FIRST LATIN AMERICA
DIVISION DIRECTOR KOJIMA IN PARTICULAR EXPRESSED
"SURPRISE" BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT G-24 AND EAI WOULD
SURELY BE COMBINED.
SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN AT THE
CONSULTATIONS THAT THE G-24-TYPE MECHANISM FOR CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE
WILL NOT BE MERGED INTO A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM. THE
GOJ HAS GIVEN STRONG INDICATIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO
PROVIDE INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA IN A
MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK, BUT IS NOW AT SOMEWHAT OF A
LOSS ON HOW TO PROCEED AND SEEMS TO BE SETTLING INTO A
"WAIT AND SEE" MODE. PROVIDING MOFA WITH A DETAILED
EXPLANATION OF U.S. CONCEPTS FOR BOTH PROGRAMS, ON HOW
THEY ARE INTERRELATED, AND ON A STRATEGY FOR
IMPLEMENTING THEM WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD BRINGING
THE GOJ INTO A MORE ACTIVE POSTURE.
ARMACOST
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 8394<STOR> 901009043515 MSG000276755715
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 8394<STOR> 901009043547 MSG000276755747
<TOR>901009044708
) PAB
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
10/4/90
TO:
EDE HOLIDAY
FROM: JAMES W. CICCONI
Assistant to the President and
Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Please prepare a response for
the President's signature.
CC: NSC
:
U
7970
AMERICAS
SOCIETY.
NC
680 2ARK AVENUE NEWYORK1021 212 249 8950
CA. DIROCKEFELLER
October 1, 1990
Dear Mr. President:
As you know better than anyone, the recent meetings of
the General Assembly of the United Nations have brought a great
many Heads of State to New York. I am happy to say that the
Americas Society has been able to take advantage of this fact by
entertaining at lunches and dinners eight of the leading Latin
American Presidents including Presidents Collor, Gaviria and
Salinas, who, in my judgment, are three outstanding leaders of
the Hemisphere. The functions we gave provided them with oppor-
tunities to meet with opinion leaders from the private sector at
public events coupled with smaller private meetings with senior
businessmen doing business in their respective countries.
I am taking the liberty of writing you at this time
because I thought you would be interested and encouraged to hear
that the reaction of the Latin American leaders we have talked
with has been uniformly enthusiastic with respect to your
"Enterprise for the Americas" initiative. They agree with you
that the time is propitious to emphasize investment and trade
and that the private sector will need to play a major role even
though there are important ways in which Government can stimulate
and encourage these private activities. American businessmen
with existing interests in Latin American share the enthusiasm of
their Latin American counterparts. Many, including myself, are
also convinced that the debt for nature proposal embedded in your
initiative could be very important in encouraging more aggressive
programs to protect the environment in Latin America.
My one concern is that, unlike in Latin America, the
initiative has thus far received very little public recognition
in this country. Organizations like the Americas Society and
the Council of the Americas are fully on board and hopefully
are being helpful in selling it both here and in Latin America.
But, with developments in the Soviet Union and Central Europe,
2.
not to mention the Gulf, it would appear that even within the
Administration there are relatively few people who are actively
promoting the initiative. This is a pity since your leadership
and the message you are conveying to the newly-elected leaders
of Latin America are widely and enthusiastically recognized.
Indeed, I have heard it said by many that no President of the
United States in recent decades has enjoyed the popularity you
have or has been perceived to have your personal interest and
concern for the affairs of this Hemisphere.
We in the Americas Society are keeping in close touch with
Nick Brady and David Mulford in the Treasury, with Bob Mosbacher
in Commerce and with Roger Porter and Steve Farrar in the White
House. Please be sure that we believe in what you are doing and
would like to help in other ways if you see the opportunity.
Please let us know.
Sincerely,
Dair
David Rockefeller
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9007970
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 05 OCT 90 20
TO: PRESIDENT
FROM: ROCKEFELLER, DAVID
DOC DATE: 01 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
MP
WH REFERRAL
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM AMER SOCIETY RE ENTERPRISE FOR AMER INTITIATIVE
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 09 OCT 90
STATUS: S
STAFF OFFICER: LUNDSAGER
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
LUNDSAGER
PRYCE
JOHNSON
PACELLI
UHL
10
9 Bell excellent This chance to an all 100 10 us the the
to them
Congress ort Snterprise to pregisistion If
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY:
DOC 1 OF 1
UNCLASSIFIED
UNRUN TILE
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9007258
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 13 SEP 90 09
TO: PRESIDENT
FROM: PEREZ, CARLOS A
DOC DATE: 12 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: VENEZUELA
HS
2
LATIN AMERICA
ECONOMICS
CARIBBEAN
PERSONS: PEREZ, CARLOS A
SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES PEREZ OF VENEZUELA RE LATIN AMER & CARIBBEAN
PROPOSAL FOR SOLUTION TO FORN DEBT PROBLEM
ACTION: PRES SGD LTR
DUE DATE: 12 OCT 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
JOHNSON
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
UTA
DATE 10/12
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY: NSWEA
DOC 6 OF 6
CONFIDENTIAL
-
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 7258
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG 24. A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
/
Review
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
90 OCT 12 A 8 : 55 A8:55
2
X
NSC Secretariat
3
WA10/12 D
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS Date 07/12/1990
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Rout ine Dispatch per Johnson
pe 10/12
mysy
reing
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
415
LOG #
7258
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS.
NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG M A/O
enu Ken Hill
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
1
A
Bill Sittmann
I
W
Bob Gates
3
8
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat
PEC
90 SOOCING P7 12 P7:12
4
24.19,1
DN
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc.
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Exec Secs ofc has diskette- -
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04a. Letter
President Bush to President Carlos Andres Perez (1 pp.)
10/12/90
(b)(1)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7258
DECLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
WASHINGTON
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
90 OCT 11 AM 20
October 11, 1990
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT Rsfrr
SUBJECT:
Letter to President Perez on Debt
Purpose
To reply to Venezuelan President Perez' letter to you of July 9
enclosing a report on debt.
Background
President Perez sent you a letter dated July 9 (but received by
State in early September) forwarding the report of a June 18-22
conference on external debt, held under the auspices of the Latin
American Economic System (SELA in Spanish). The report focuses
on the need to reduce debt, without linking debt reduction to
economic reform. It is an example of "old thinking" in Latin
America.
Although CAP was undoubtedly one of the sponsors of the
conference, his letter to you transmitting the report was couched
in very neutral terms. As far as we are aware, he has not
referred to the work of the Conference in any other communication
to you or with our Embassy.
The draft reply at Tab A, which has been cleared by State and
Treasury, acknowledges CAP's letter, but very politely lays down
some markers about the importance of market-oriented economic
reforms and indirectly reminds CAP of our assistance in helping
Venezuela reach a Brady Plan agreement with its commercial bank
creditors. It is a nice way of telling CAP that we do not accept
the premises of the report, and that we remain committed to our
own very effective debt policy.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to President Perez at Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A
Letter to President Perez
Tab B
Letter from President Perez Attaching SELA Report
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7258
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 9, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
WILLIAM T. PRYCE
WTO
FROM:
DONALD C. JOHNSON
SUBJECT:
Reply to President Perez on Debt
From June 18 to 22, the Latin American Economic System (SELA in
Spanish) held a conference in Caracas on external debt problems.
The conference produced a document which is full of Third World
rhetoric. President Perez sent the President a copy of the
document under cover of a July 9 letter which was not received by
State until early September.
State and Treasury believe CAP's letter deserves a response which
politely lays down markers rejecting the prescriptions advanced
in the SELA report. The draft letter at Tab A is based on a
State Department draft which was cleared by Treasury.
Concurrence by: Tim Deal.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Letter to President Perez of Venezuela
Tab B
President Perez' Letter of July 9
Tab II
State Incoming
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on:
OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
9019747
7258
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
September 28, 1990
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Reply to the President of Venezuela on Debt Reduction
Attached please find a draft reply from the President to a
letter from Carlos Andrez Perez, President of Venezuela. The
Perez letter transmitted a statement on debt reduction from the
Regional Conference on Foreign Debt, hosted by the Government
of Venezuela in Caracas June 18-22, 1990.
J. Stapleton Roy
For
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1 - Draft Letter
2 - Letter from President Perez
0
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04d. Draft Letter
Re: Department of State Suggested Draft Reply to President
n.d.
(b)(1)
Carlos Andres Perez from President Bush (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04e. Letter
President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush
7/9/90
(b)(1)
[English] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
7258
S/S 9019747
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
September 12, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House
SUBJECT:
Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence
Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush
from Venezualan President Carlos Andres Perez
which is transmitted for your information.
This correspondence was received in the Information Resources
Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on September 12, 1990
A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.
Director, S/S-IRM
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991
7258
EMBAJADA DE VENEZUELA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
N 955/Dli
THE EMBASSY CF VENEZUELA
presents its compliments tc the Department of State and has
the henor to transmit hereto attached a letter addressed by
H.F. Carlos Andrés Pérez to H.E. George Bush, President of
the United States of America, forwarding the results of the
Regional Conference on Foreign Debt, which took place in
Caracas from the 18th to the 22ⁿᵈ of June 1990 within
the framework of The Latin American Economic System. The
Conference entrusted the Government of Venezuela, as host
country of the Conference, to present the "Latin American
and Caribbean proposal for a solution to its External Debt
Problem", to the Heads of State or Government of the Group
of 7.
THE EMBASSY OF VENEZUELA
avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the
Department of State the assurances of its highest
consideration
CE
EMBAJADA EN LOS REPUBLICA ESTADOS DOS MEDICAL DE AMCR En
UN
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04f. Letter
President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush
7/9/90
(b)(1)
[Spanish] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04g. Letter
President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush
7/9/90
(b)(1)
[Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04h. Resolution
Re: Resolution I Latin American and Caribbean Proposal for
6/18-22/90
(b)(1)
a Solution to Its External Debt Problem Adopted at the
Regional Cnference on External Debt (17 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Latin American Files
Subseries:
Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Latin America - Economics (October 1990)
Date Closed:
5/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91139-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9007591
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 24 SEP 90 16
TO: SITTMANN
374 CHHON
FROM: ROY, J
DOC DATE: 15 OCT 90
SOURCE REF: 9020780
2.
KEYWORDS: CANADA
HS
FTA
MEXICO
INTL TRADE
PERSONS: MULRONEY, BRIAN
SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MULRONEY RE PARTICIPATION IN NORTH AMER FTA
ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE
DUE DATE: 27 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE
LOGREF: 9007259 9007552
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BASORA
MELBY
NSC CHRON
PRYCE
RICE
SALVETTI, L
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 2 OF 2
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
7591
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
S/S 9020780
Date October 15, 1990
FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House
REFERENCE:
To: The President
From: Brian Mulroney
Date: September 21, 1990
Subject: Letter to President from Prime Minister Mulroney
Regarding Participation in the North American FTA.
WH Referral Dated: 9007591
NSCS ID# (if any): September 24, 1990
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
ACTION TAKEN:
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
X We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other (see remarks).
REMARKS:
No response is necessary, because the issue was discussed by the
President in phone conversations with PM Mulroney and handled by
other senior officials.
for Director Smlis
Secretariat Staff
UNCLASSIFIED
Stalf 7591
CANAÇA
PRES NOTED SUMMARY
PRIME MINISTER PREMIER MINISTRE
September 21, Laco.
Dear George,
I am writing to express the interest of the
Government of Canada in participating in negotiations
with the United States and Mexico on a North American
free trade agreement which would benefit all three
countries. I would ask that this proposal be taken
into account in your domestic procedures.
I am confident that an examination over the
coming months of the objectives each country would wish
to pursue in such negotiations would demonstrate that a
mutually advantageous agreement can be concluded.
I look forward to joining you and
President Salinas in this common endeavour.
Yours sincerely,
Suain
The President of the United States
of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9007591
DISTRIBUTION RECORD
DATE 21 SEP 90
SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MULRONEY RE PARTICIPATION IN NORTH AMER FTA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
9/24/90 2251
COPY: Refall 1
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/15/09
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT. ROOM 379 OEOB
$
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9007591
DISTRIBUTION RECORD
DATE 21 SEP 90
SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MULRONEY RE PARTICIPATION IN NORTH AMER FTA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
9/24/90 2314 S. 38en
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/15/09
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT. ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ID 9007591
REFERRAL
DATE: 24 SEP 90
MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J
STATE SECRETARIAT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: PRESIDENT
9020780
SOURCE: MULRONEY, BRIAN
YU SEP-24 11:16 PM
DATE: 21 SEP 90
SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PM MULRONEY RE PARTICIPATION IN NORTH AMER FTA
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY
DUEDATE: 27 SEP 90
COMMENT:
Walth E.Airs
FOR
GEORGE VAN ERON
DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject:
Proposed Response by the President to a letter
received from Prime Minister Mulroney
Attached please find a draft statement for the President's
use in answering Prime Minister Mulroney's letter of September
21, 1990.
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Draft Response.
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9008583
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED CHRONTILE
TO: SCOWCROFT
FROM: JOHNSON
DOC DATE: 29 OCT 90
MELBY
SOURCE REF:
PRYCE
2
KEYWORDS: DEMOCRACY PROGRAM
LATIN AMERICA
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
INTL TRADE
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCARCY & DEVELOPMENT
ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
DUE DATE: 01 NOV 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
JOHNSON
MELBY
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSGLM
CLOSED BY: NSAMM
DOC 1 OF 1
CONF IDENTIAL
FundingPartnership for Democracy
National Security Council
The White House
WEA
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 8583
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG LMS A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPQSITION
A Ken Hill
1
A
Bill Sittmann
2
copy
copy
Bob Gates
YAPNSA 3 Has Seen
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
0.00 29 0.00 29 P7 41 P7.41
5
Lms 16/30
N
NSC Secretariat
6
N/R
REC
A * Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
to
te/Time)
COMMENT
NSC Bill for
9-10-29/90
DISPATCH
CONI IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
8583
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
CHRON
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
October 29, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
WTOn
THROUGH:
WILLIAM TY PRYCE/TIMOTHY DEAL
FROM:
DONALD C. JOHNSON/ERIC, As MELBY
SUBJECT:
Funding for the Partnership for Democracy and
Development
Before the President announced his Enterprise for the Americas
initiative (EAI), Secretary Baker got the President's approval
for a G-24 mechanism for Central America. Ever since, Treasury
and State have been trying to work out the relationship between
the two. Larry Eagleburger has spent a good deal of time with
John Robson on this. He signaled you sometime back that he might
look for your help.
The crosshatch cable at Tab A, which was coordinated by State and
Treasury after arduous negotiations, would establish a
Partnership for Democracy and Development (PDD) in Central
America. State has been pressing us hard for rapid clearance,
arguing that they want to invite countries to a Washington
conference in mid-November to discuss this.
Aside from asking for a USTR clearance, which we are doing, two
issues merit your attention. First, the question of funding.
We believe OMB should clear on this cable, in view of the
possible financial implications, and the Economic Directorate has
given OMB a copy of the crosshatch and the State-Treasury
Memorandum on how the PDD would work. Assistant Secretary
Aronson and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger's office have told us
that no new money is expected to be requested from Congress for
the PDD. Under those circumstances, OMB should not have a
problem with the cable. They will have to be consulted in the
future if there is a move to enlarge the funding base of the EAI,
a possibility mentioned in the State/Treasury agreement. Second,
the priority of the President's initiative. We think it should
be clear at the outset that funding for the President's EAI is
our most important objective. This is not merely an academic
issue: we have already requested European/Japanese financial
assistance for Eastern Europe, the Persian Gulf, and EAI. Some
of our partners have asked us how EAI and PDD fit together,
wondering if they are going to be asked to contribute twice (we
think they are and have no problem with this). We want to
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
UNIT IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
2
have our partners contribute generously to aiding Central
America, but we believe they should be made aware that EAI is our
top Latin American priority, and that we want to fund EAI first.
We plan to propose language (clearly marked in the crosshatch)
which would make the USG position clear. We believe State and
Larry Eagleburger will object strenuously, preferring a fuzzier
formulation, and we would like to know your thoughts on the
matter before proposing the language. Treasury has cleared on
the crosshatch, but is not particularly enthusiastic about it.
RECOMMENDATION
That you review the attached crosshatch cable and our suggested
additions, and authorize us to clear the cable with the proposed
change.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A
Crosshatch cable with proposed language
Tab B
State-Treasury Memorandum on PDD
che
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
A
WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
B
12 : 36
S/S #
057990
UNCLASSIFIED
MESSAGE NO.
CLASSIFICATION
No. Pages 8
WRPEARSON
S/S
75302
7224
FROM:
(Officer name)
(Office symbol)
(Extension)
(Room number)
cable to GUATEMALA--THE PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA
TO: (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
Extension
Room No.
NSCS
WILLIAM SITTMANN
456-6534
WHSITRM
KENNETH HILL
456-6534
WHSITRM
NSCS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
456-6534
WHSITRM
NSCS
PACELLI
PRYCE
DEAR /MELBY
FOR:
CLEARANCE
XX
INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
REMARKS:
Clear 10/29
S/S Officer:
WRPEARSON BP gam
CROSSHATCH
RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S S.
ORIGINAL
UNCLASSIFIED
ARA/CEN:C S COCKBURN: CSC
10/23/90 X7-0087
ARA/FO:B ARONSON
ARA/FO:J SULLIVAN, EB:E MCALLISTER, AID/LAC:J MICHEL, D:K JUSTER,
C:M FOULON, P:C BLAKEMAN, EB/IFD:S GIBSON, EAP/J:J HIGHLAND,
EUR/RPE:A CARY, ARA/ECP:J HARRINGTON, TREASURY:J FALL,
NSC:
7 E:X WILKINSON C:RZOELLICK
IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA, MANAGUA IMMEDIATE, PANAMA IMMEDIATE,
SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE, SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE +
PRIORITY BELIZE, BOGOTA PRIORITY, CARACAS PRIORITY, MEXICO PRIORITY,
ALOEC
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
E.O. 12356: N/A
BA
TAGS: ECIN, EAID, PREL, XK, JA
CSC
JS
SUBJECT: THE PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN
EM
CENTRAL AMERICA
JM
KJ
MF
CB
SG
JH
AC
JH
JF
XW
RZ
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2
1. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTED: AS ADDRESSEE POSTS ARE
AWARE, CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION AND ATTENTION HAVE BEEN
GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING A MULTILATERAL PARTNERSHIP
CONSISTING OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES,
INDUSTRIALIZED AND INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES OF EUROPE,
JAPAN, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS THE LATIN
AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE SAN JOSE ACCORDS. THIS NEW
PARTNERSHIP, TERMED THE PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT, OR PDD, {ASOCIACION PARA LA DEMOCRACIA Y EL
DESARROLLO EN CENTROAMERICA}, IS INTENDED TO BUILD ON THE
PROGRESS MADE AT THE ANTIGUA, GUATEMALA SUMMIT AND TO
EVOLVE INTO A PRODUCTIVE, RESULT-ORIENTED PARTNERSHIP OF
ALL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, REGIONAL AND NON-REGIONAL.
THE PDD WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS,
PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ENCOURAGE REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND DISARMAMENT. THE COORDINATED EFFORTS OF
THE PARTNERSHIP TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
IN CENTRAL AMERICA WILL SERVE AS A COMPLEMENT TO THE
ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE {EAI} IN ITS
ENDEAVOR TO SUPPORT INCREASED TRADE, INVESTMENT AND
GROWTH. U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE
PARTNERSHIP, PARTICULARLY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PDD
AND EAI, HAS BEEN COORDINATED BY STATE, TREASURY AND AID.
INSERT ON FUNDING
2. AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME, BUT NOT LATER THAN
OCTOBER 30, AMBASSADORS/CHARGES IN ACTION ADDRESSEE POSTS
ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE TEXT OF THE PDD PAPER {TEXT
IN PARA 3} TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL
AND SEEK/REPORT ANY INITIAL COMMENTS. PLEASE SLUG REPLIES
FOR ATTENTION OF ARA/CEN, ARA/ECP, AID/LAC/CEN, AND D FOR
JUSTER. IN MAKING THE PRESENTATION, YOU MAY ALSO DRAW ON
THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 4, WHICH ALSO SHOULD BE
PROVIDED TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE PLAN TO
CONSULT FURTHER WITH OECD COUNTRIES, VENEZUELA, MEXICO AND
COLOMBIA. WE ANTICIPATE A PRELIMINARY PDD SENIOR
OFFICIALS' MEETING AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL IN
WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 19-20. AMBASSADOR/CHARGE SHOULD
ENCOURAGE HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATION AT THIS INITIAL
MEETING. SEPTEL WILL FOLLOW FOR INFO ADDRESSEES WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A SIMILAR DEMARCHE. END SUMMARY AND
ACTION REQUESTED
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PAPER FOR "A PARTNERSHIP
FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA."
BEGIN TEXT:
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
3
PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
IN CENTRAL AMERICA
{ASOCIACION PARA LA DEMOCRACIA Y EL DESARROLLO
EN CENTROAMERICA}
IN FULFILLMENT OF THE PROMISE OF THE ESQUIPULAS ACCORDS,
ALL THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AMERICA HAVE NOW ESTABLISHED
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS AND ARE MOVING TOWARD MARKET-ORIENTED
ECONOMIES. AS AGREED AT THEIR JUNE SUMMIT IN ANTIGUA,
GUATEMALA, THE LEADERS OF CENTRAL AMERICA FIRMLY SUPPORT THE
GOALS OF DEMOCRACY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND REGIONAL
DISARMAMENT.
CENTRAL AMERICA'S SUCCESS IN ADVANCING THESE AIMS WILL
DEPEND ON STRONG SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE
UNITED STATES HAS LAUNCHED THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS
INITIATIVE {EAI} IN AN EFFORT TO BOLSTER THE DEMOCRATIC AND
MARKET-ORIENTED TRANSITION THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT WOULD BE
VERY USEFUL FOR THERE TO BE A COMPANION MULTILATERAL
PARTNERSHIP TO PROVIDE FOCUSED SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THIS PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY
AND DEVELOPMENT {PDD} WOULD PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE COUNTRIES
PARTICIPATING IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS -- COSTA
RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, AND PANAMA.
IT MIGHT LATER BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE BELIZE. THE UNITED
STATES VIEWS THE PDD AS A COMPLEMENTARY PROGRAM TO THE EAI, AND
BOTH AS MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA-
THE PARTNERSHIP WOULD BRING TOGETHER THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
COUNTRIES, THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, JAPAN,
CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND
COLOMBIA {AS PARTICIPANTS IN THE SAN JOSE ACCORDS} TO REVIEW
AND ENCOURAGE THE REGIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
THE PARTNERSHIP WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS, PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ENCOURAGE
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DISARMAMENT. THE OBJECTIVE
WOULD BE FOR PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES TO FIND WAYS TO SUPPORT
THE STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIC TRENDS AND REGIONAL STABILITY,
AND TO REVIEW POSSIBLE MEANS TO INCREASE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES. THE COORDINATED EFFORTS OF THE
PARTNERSHIP WOULD SEEK TO MOBILIZE INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES AND
ACTIVITIES IN PROMOTING REGIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT.
INSERT PARA
UNCLASSIFIED
ON FUNDING
UNCLASSIFIED
4
THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE WILL PROVIDE
CRITICAL SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS BY THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES
TO IMPROVE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT. IT IS THE CENTERPIECE FOR
U.S. -LATIN AMERICAN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND
REFORM. IT ALSO RESPONDS TO THE NEEDS IDENTIFIED AT THE
ANTIGUA, GUATEMALA SUMMIT OF CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS FOR
ADDITIONAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND REGIONAL
INTEGRATION.
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR STAND TO
BENEFIT FROM THIS INITIATIVE.
-- THE REDUCTION OF OFFICIAL BILATERAL DEBT OWED THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT WILL PRODUCE GREAT BENEFITS FOR THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN COUNTRIES.
-- A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND ESTABLISHED IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK WILL CONCENTRATE A SIZEABLE
PORTION OF ITS RESOURCES AND HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON
CENTRAL AMERICAN NATIONS IN NEED OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND
OTHER SUPPORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS TO REFORM INVESTMENT REGIMES,
PRIVATIZE GOVERNMENT-OWNED INDUSTRIES, AND ATTRACT CAPITAL.
-- THE CENTRAL AMERICAN NATIONS ALSO HAVE A VEHICLE UNDER THE
EAI FOR SUPPORTING TRADE AND INVESTMENT REFORMS, DEVELOPING
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT, AND WORKING
TOWARD AN EVENTUAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.
THESE MEASURES AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EAI WILL BUTTRESS
THE EFFORTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW THROUGH
ON THEIR COMMITMENTS TO MARKET-BASED ECONOMIC POLICIES AND WILL
HELP THEM ACHIEVE A NUMBER OF OBJECTIVES THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY, INCLUDING STRONGER ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
IMPROVED STANDARDS OF LIVING FOR THEIR PEOPLE.
THE PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT WOULD FOCUS
ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR INCREASED TRADE ACCESS OF CENTRAL
AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO MARKETS IN PDD MEMBER COUNTRIES. THE
PARTNERSHIP WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR PARTICIPATING
COUNTRIES TO DISCUSS REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES AND INTEGRATION
EFFORTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK/WORLD BANK CONSULTATIVE GROUPS.
UNCLASSIFIED
ED
5
ED BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IS ALSO AN
COMPONENT AND COMPLEMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND
ATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
RM STABILITY AND GROWTH. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN
MUST BE WELL-COORDINATED TO SUPPORT EFFECTIVELY
VELOPMENT NEEDS IN THE REGION. WITH THIS IN MIND,
RSHIP COULD CONSIDER A CATALYST ROLE FOR THE
ICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK TO ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION
IALIZED NATION ASSISTANCE. THIS COULD BE DONE
E CREATION OF A NEW CONSULTATIVE GROUP FOR CENTRAL
N CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE WORLD BANK, OR THROUGH
ANISMS.
RTNERSHIP WOULD CONVENE PERIODIC MEETINGS AT THE
ERTS LEVEL WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM CENTRAL AMERICA,
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, JAPAN, CANADA,
I
STATES, AND MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA {AS
rs IN THE SAN JOSE ACCORDS}. THESE MEETINGS WOULD
DRA FOR ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES AND SHARING
N ON PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY
PMENT. IT IS ALSO ANTICIPATED THAT THERE WOULD BE A
S
-LEVEL MEETING TO FORMULATE SPECIFIC, COORDINATED,
_Y JOINT, PROGRAMS, SUCH AS REGIONAL DISARMAMENT
TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT. THE
U.S WORK WOULD BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH FUND
ERATIONS TO AVOID PLACING COMPETING DEMANDS ON
PARTICIPANTS.
D
; POINTS:
RY BAKER DISCUSSED THE GENERAL IDEA FOR THIS
WITH YOU AT ANTIGUA, GUATEMALA IN JUNE AND HAS HAD
DISCUSSIONS WITH INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AT THE
S
ERIAL IN JULY. THE IDEA WAS WELCOMED, AND
COMMENT WAS HIGHLY FAVORABLE.
ND
TO PRESENT YOU TODAY A COPY OF A PAPER WHICH
IR THINKING ON A MULTILATERAL MECHANISM TO SUPPORT
TION AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND ITS
RY RELATIONSHIP TO THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS
T
{EAI}.
E
CALLING THE MECHANISM A PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY
MENT {PDD} IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND INTEND FOR IT TO
E PROGRESS MADE AT THE ANTIGUA, GUATEMALA SUMMIT AND
NTO A PRODUCTIVE, RESULT-ORIENTED PARTNERSHIP.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
7
0
THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO HOST AN INITIAL PDD
MEETING AND TO PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THE PARTNERSHIP
COULD ALSO DRAW ON TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FROM
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS
COULD BE HOSTED BY REGIONAL AND NON-REGIONAL COUNTRIES.
O WE PROPOSE A SENIOR EXPERTS MEETING IN WASHINGTON NOVEMBER
19-20 TO ENABLE US TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL.
THE AGENDA FOR THIS MEETING COULD INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE,
DISCUSSION OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTNERSHIP, CONSIDERATION
OF CREATING A CLEARINGHOUSE FOR INFORMATION ON ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSIDERATION OF ORGANIZING ONE OR TWO WORKING
GROUPS ON SELECTED ISSUES. THIS MEETING COULD ENABLE US TO
DISCUSS AND REACH AGREEMENT ON THE PDD PROPOSAL FOR
PRESENTATION TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AT THE SUMMIT
IN DECEMBER.
0
WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEND A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 19-20. ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ARONSON AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WILL PARTICIPATE IN
THE INITIAL MEETING. YOUR GOVERNMENT'S SENIOR REPRESENTATION
AT THIS MEETING WOULD GREATLY HELP TO ADVANCE THE PROPOSED
MULTILATERAL APPROACH.
0
WE WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS INITIATIVE.
YY
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
8
TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE Y
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
The PDD program does not involve new levels of U.S. assistance
beyond existing economic development programs (bilateral and
multilateral), and the assistance which may become available
through the debt-reduction and investment portions of EAI.
As the President noted in his June 27 speech on EAI, we will
seek Japanese and European contributions to the investment
portion of the EAI initiative. We will seek contributions of
$100 million per year for 5 years from Europe, and an equivalent
amount from Japan. We will of course give priority to funding
of the EAI by both the USG and other sources. However,
we also contemplate seeking additional flows of assistance to
Central America from Europe and Japan. Once the US meets EAI
funding targets, the U.S. will seek to provide additional funds
for PDD.
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/1/24
The PDD program does not involve new levels of U.S. assistance
beyond existing economic development programs (bilateral and
multilateral), and the assistance which may become available
through the debt-reduction and investment portions of EAI.
As the President noted in his June 27 speech on EAI, we will
seek Japanese and European contributions to the investment
portion of the EAI initiative. We will seek contributions of
$100 million per year for 5 years from Europe, and an equivalent
amount from Japan. We will of course give priority to funding
of the EAI by both the USG and other sources. However,
we also contemplate seeking additional flows of assistance to
Central America from Europe and Japan. Once the US meets EAI
funding targets, the U.S. will seek to provide additional funds
for RDD.
a
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C 20220
October 24, 1990
"90 OCT 24 P6:54
Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger
Deputy Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
Dear Larry:
Enclosed is a paper that reflects the
discussions at our meeting last Thursday and
our further refinements of the fundraising
options.
We will be happy to visit with you and
your people about this initiative if you
wish.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
John John E. Robson
Enclosure
cc:
Secretary Brady
David Mulford
Charles Dallara
CONCEPT PAPER
Support for Political and Economic Reform in Central America
Recent political and economic changes in Central America hold great hope for the
process of strengthening democracy, supporting regional disarmament, and facilitating
economic growth. Although all the countries of Central America have established
democratic governments and appear to be embracing more market-oriented economies,
democratic institutions in the region continue to be quite fragile while economic prospects
remain tenuous.
The seven countries of Central America urgently need strategic political support and
reinforcement, together with broadened support for regional development, investment and
trade reform, and market-based economic policies. We must be prepared to catalyze such
support through a multi-faceted effort. To do so will require close cooperation among the
Department of State, the Department of Treasury, and AID with a view to providing a
foundation from which to build and encourage multilateral support for the region.
The following provides the substantive and presentational context for dealing with
efforts to meet the needs of Central America through the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative (EAI) and the Partnership for Democracy and Development (PDD). Efforts to
advance the PDD would be presented in the broader context of ongoing implementation of
the EAI.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
President Bush announced in June the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI).
This Presidential Initiative is an effort to support democratic and market-oriented transitions
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It is designed to accomplish this task through
the promotion of increased trade, investment, growth and development throughout the
hemisphere -- as well as closer ties between the United States and its neighbors. It is the
centerpiece for U.S.-Latin American efforts to promote economic growth and directly
support democracy through increased economic opportunity.
The countries of Central America, in particular, stand to benefit from the measures
proposed under the EAI to increase investment and reduce official bilateral debt burdens.
The reduction of official bilateral debt owed the United States government will
produce greater benefits for Central American countries which owe a substantial
portion of their external debt to official creditors, particularly the United States.
The nations of Central America nations have nearly 40% of their external debt in the
form of obligations to bilateral official creditors. The Central American nations as
a group (excluding Nicaragua) owe 51% of this debt to the United States.
2
The Central American nations also have a vehicle under the EAI for mobilizing
support for trade and investment reforms, discussing these issues with the United
States, developing framework agreements on trade and investment, and concluding
an eventual free trade agreement between Central America and the United States.
Under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, a multilateral investment fund was
to be established in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). As originally
conceived, this fund would have concentrated a sizeable portion of its resources on
smaller countries where it would have had a measurable impact, such as Central
American nations in need of technical assistance and other support for their efforts
to attract capital.
These measures and other elements of the EAI will buttress the efforts of Central
American countries to follow through on their commitments to market-based economic
policies and will help them to achieve a number of objectives that are important to
strengthening democracy, including stronger economic growth and improved standards of
living for their people.
Partnership for Democracy and Development in Central America
We believe it would be very useful to provide a complementary and supportive
framework, multilateral in orientation, to accompany the EAI but targeted exclusively on
Central America. This effort would seek to mobilize international resources and activities
to complement those of the United States in promoting regional democratization and
development. This companion effort would require close cooperation among the
Department of State, the Department of Treasury, and AID.
The vehicle for the companion effort would be a multilateral Partnership for
Democracy and Development in Central America (PDD) to provide support for
democratization and development in the countries participating in the Central American
peace process Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
It might later be extended to include Belize. The Partnership, through its multilateral
orientation, could supplement and reinforce the fund-raising efforts for the EAI and thereby
strengthen the EAI in Central America. The Partnership could also focus attention on the
need for increased trade access of Central American countries to markets in PDD member
countries.
The Partnership would bring together the industrialized countries of Europe, Japan,
with the United States and selected other large democracies in the Western Hemisphere.
These nations would join together to review and encourage the regional democratization and
development process already underway in Central American countries. It would help
Central Americans to strengthen democratic institutions, promote and protect human rights,
and encourage regional development and disarmament. The objective would be for
participating countries to find ways to strengthen democratic trends and regional stability,
and to review possible means to increase their support for democratic institutions and
procedures -- including free and fair elections, free speech and free press, respect for human
rights, the administration of justice, and the rule of law.
3
Central America has paid a high price for conflict, political violence, and arms
buildups. The Partnership would explore opportunities for assistance to Central America
in support of increased civilian control over military institutions, an increased sensitivity to
human rights among both military and police, and the successful assimilation into civilian
society for those leaving the military forces.
At the Antigua, Guatemala summit, the Central American Presidents also identified
the path to growth and development as increased trade and investment and outward looking
regional integration. The Partnership would encourage member countries to support the
EAI in order to achieve these objectives and to open their markets to Central American
countries, thus enhancing the orientation toward outward looking regional integration. In
addition, the Partnership would provide a forum for participating countries to discuss and
focus attention on regional economic policies and integration efforts, in cooperation with
World Bank/Inter-American Development Bank consultative groups.
The Partnership would convene periodic meetings at the senior experts level with
representatives from Central America, interested industrialized countries of Europe, Japan
and the Americas (including Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia as participants in the San
Jose Accords). These meetings would serve as fora for establishing objectives and sharing
information on programs and activities in support of democracy and development. It is also
anticipated that there would be a ministerial-level meeting to formulate specific,
coordinated, and possibly joint programs, such as regional disarmament activities, to
strengthen regional democratization and development. The Partnership's work would be
closely coordinated with other fund raising operations to avoid placing competing demands
on potential donors. Issues relating to US policy positions within the World Bank IDB and
the IMF would continue to be handled in the traditional manner.
Mobilizing Financial Support for Central America
The original $500 million contribution by the United States for the multilateral
investment fund and the $1.5 billion total for the fund as formulated in the President's
announcement and in the legislation transmitted to Congress would remain unchanged.
To reduce potential confusion over multiple U.S. fund-raising efforts on behalf of
Central America (in support of the PDD) and on behalf of Latin America and the
Caribbean (for the EAI), we may wish to consider several options for structuring fund-
raising efforts and administering financial support. One such option would be to rely on the
traditional consultative group type of mechanism. Other approaches would be to enlarge
the funding base and broaden the scope of the $1.5 billion multilateral investment fund
envisioned by the EAI. This could be done by creating two separate but complementary
funds or by structuring a single, dual-purpose fund with separate windows to more directly
target the distinct needs addressed by the PDD and EAI.
4
A Consultative Group Approach
Successful economic development is an important component of and complement to
the peace process and is an essential element in longer-term stability and growth.
The Inter-American Development Bank could serve as a focal point for helping advance
development through enhanced bilateral development assistance. Specifically, the IDB
could assist in better coordination of industrialized nation support for ongoing development
needs through the creation of a new Consultative Group for Central America to be led by
the IDB in close cooperation with the World Bank. Such a process would build on
traditional means for coordinating development assistance. The U.S. government role in this
process would be managed through the traditional channels used for U.S. relations with the
multilateral development banks.
It should be noted that the IDB's coordination role with respect to the Consultative
Group would be separate and distinct from its role in managing its own investment sector
lending program and any multilateral fund for investment. The Consultative Group effort
would, however, closely complement other efforts.
A Dual Fund Approach
Consideration could be given to restructuring the multilateral investment fund
envisioned by the EAI into two separate and distinct funds. The first would be the
Enterprise Fund for Investment in the IDB as originally called for in the EAI with a funding
target of $1.5 billion. A second, separate fund would be created for the PDD, to be known
as the PDD Fund for Democracy and Development in Central America. This fund would
operate under a separate multilateral mandate for the benefit of Central America.
The Enterprise Fund for Investment would correspond to the original multilateral
investment fund that was to be developed in the IDB in response to the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative. In the EAI, up to $1.5 billion was to be mobilized over a five-year
period to provide support for investment policy reforms and privatization throughout the
hemisphere. These funds will support investment reforms and will provide support for
privatization programs. They will also be used to cover technical assistance in support of
privatization and worker training, education, and social dislocation expenditures for workers
displaced through the privatization process. The Enterprise Fund for Investment will be
funded through contributions from the United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada.
The Fund for Democracy and Development in Central America would provide and/or
coordinate assistance targeted specifically and exclusively for Central America to help
strengthen democratization and development in those seven countries. Funds available
under this facility would be used as grants to ease direct dislocation costs of demobilizing
military and paramilitary forces in Central America, to foster development of micro-
businesses through establishment of revolving capital funds, to support democratization
through education and support of electoral and judicial reform, and to provide other, similar
support for democratization and development. Some funding for this fund might be
obtained from Latin American countries with strong political interests in the Central
American region.
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9008262
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 90 10
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
2
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 05 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: INTL FINANCE
URUGUAY
CHILE
VENEZUELA
CM
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: INTL DEBT / URUGUAY & CHILE
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 20 OCT 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DEAL
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
NSC CHRON
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMEN
CLOSED BY: NSGLM
DOC 3 OF 3
UNCLASSIFIED
Internatic Debt
National Security Council
The White House
chice
PROOFED BY: MEN
LOG # 8262
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG SYSTEM SA PRS A/O NSC
INT
WED fir
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
I
Kg
A
Bill Sittmann
N
Bob Gates
3
8
Brent Scowcroft
Y
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
90 OCT OCT26 P 3 13
waas seu
Natl Sec Advisor
West Wing Desk
5
LNS LNS''S "IS
A
NSC Secretariat
6
ILM 11/7
Z
A A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS Nsc/S
Pres N old
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 6, 1990
MR. PRESIDENT:
Apologies for the time this took
to reach you. I have spoken
with NSC to ensure that, in the
future, letters from Cabinet
members get more speedy treatment.
This should have reached you the
day it was sent.
gim
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8262
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
90 NOV -5 PM 8: 18
November 5, 1990
INFORMATION
CO
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
B
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
11'
SUBJECT:
International Debt: Uruguay and Chile
Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to you from Secretary Brady,
reporting that both Uruguay and Chile have reached agreement in
principle with commercial creditors for either restructuring or
rescheduling outstanding commercial debt.
Secretary Brady had originally suggested a congratulatory
telephone call to Uruguayan President Lacalle. Treasury, State
and NSC now agree that a cabled message from you, when the deal
is finally concluded, would fill the bill.
Attachment
Tab A
Memo from Brady
CC: The Vice President
Chief of Staff
8262
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 26, 1990
ACTION
OTED
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL
&
SUBJECT:
International Debt: Uruguay and Chile
Secretary Brady has sent the President a short memorandum (Tab A)
reporting on debt negotiations between commercial banks and the
Uruguayan and Chilean governments. Brady suggested a possible
Presidential call to Uruguayan President Lacalle to congratulate
him on reaching agreement in principle with the commercial banks
on a debt restructuring package. In accordance with your
guidance to Bill Pryce, we plan to send a telegraphic message
once the deal is concluded.
The memorandum at Tab I transmits Brady's paper, noting plans for
a telegraphic message once the deal is concluded.
Concurrence by: Don Johnson
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to the President
Tab A
Memo from Brady
OF
DEPARTMENT
THE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
#8262
WASHINGTON
THE
October 16, 1990
1789
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
NICHOLAS F. BRADY 27s
SUBJECT:
URUGUAY AND CHILE
Uruguay reached agreement in principle with commercial bank creditors last Friday.
The deal will restructure all of Uruguay's commercial bank debt, provide significant debt
reduction and provide new money on terms very similar to those in the Venezuela deal.
This is a major step forward for Uruguay and represents another success for the debt
strategy. Although Uruguay is a small country, it will be a major beneficiary of that
strategy.
You may wish to telephone congratulations to President Lacalle. He worked hard to
move Uruguay forward and personally met with banks in New York to help the deal
along. He has also lobbied on the Hill for your Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. I
know he would welcome a call.
Chile also recently reached agreement with its creditor banks on a deal that will
reschedule that country's bank debt and return Chile to voluntary market-based lending
from commercial banks. When this deal is completed, Chile will become the first Latin
country to "graduate" from the ranks of troubled debtors.
These developments in Uruguay and Chile underscore the continued progress in getting
Latin America's economic and financial house in order.