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Second Debate: Defense Department Issue Papers
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder "Second Debate: Defense Department
Issue Papers" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
sys was 11/24/00
1. cable
amembassy moscow to secstate washde 0118
10/21/76
A
1 page
2. report
Hollingsworth Report OCSA 92-76
5 pages
6/30/76
A
Declassified with portions exempted
3. memo
Sullivan to Secretary of Defense, re: FY 77 budget
10/20/75
A
11 pages
FILE LOCATION
Special Files, Ford-Carter Debate Files
Second Debate--Defense Department Issue Papers (box 2)
plc 3/28/84
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12065 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 1-81)
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH (DRAFT)
(End of Fiscal Year . - 30 June)
FY 52
3,635,912
FY 60
2,476,435
FY 64
2,685,000
FY 68
3,547,902
FY 69
3,460,162
FY 70
3,066,294
FY 71
2,714,727
FY 72
2,323,079
FY 73
2,252,810
FY 74
2,162,005
FY 76
2,081,909
FY 77
2,100,000
TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH (DRAFT)
(As of Dates Given)
31 August 74
2,153,000 (rounded to nearest thousandth)
31 July 76
2,087,000
"
"
"
(Note: This is latest data available)
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
ANNUAL INDUCTIONS
(End of Fiscal Year - 30 June)
FY 75
0
FY 74
0
FY 73
35,700
FY 72
27,100
FY 71
156,200
FY 70
206,800
FY 69
265,300
FY 68
339,600
FY 67
299,200
FY 66
339,700
Brent suggests caution
ON these because they ReQuiRe
some explanation
Washington Roundup
Henry's Slant
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger directed the Central Intelligence Agency to
slant U.S. estimates of the Sovict Tupolev Backfire bomber's range capability,
White House officials are charging. Kissinger ordered that the range estimate be re-
duced to coincide with the present U.S. position in the strategic arms negotiations
now under way behind the scenes by Kissinger, according to a White House staff
member. Other Administration officials corroborate the story. Kissinger already has
conceded to the Soviets that the Backfire will not be considered in the heavy
bomber category in the treaty negotiations and is making sure intelligence estimates
confirm his position, the White House official added.
The way in which the estimate was derived was through intelligence data pro-
vided to McDonnell Douglas. The aerospace firm completed an analysis under con-
tract for the CIA to determine the supersonic Backfire's capability. A 3,500-naut. mi.
range estimate reached by McDonnell Douglas was accurate, the White House offi-
cial said, but the data provided were not all of the information available to U.S. in-
telligence officers. Only those data the CIA wanted to provide the company were
offered to achieve the desired results supporting Kissinger's position, according to
the official.
Different Approach
Similar study is now in progress for the Pentagon by McDonnell Douglas, but it is
based on a different set of data-all the information available to Defense Dept. in-
telligence officials. That study's preliminary results revealed the Backfire's range is
closer to the original U.S. intelligence estimate of 6,000 naut. mi., clearly marking
the aircraft in the heavy bomber category that would be counted in the 2,400 strategic
delivery vehicle limit set in the Ford-Brezhnev Vladivostok agreement. The Ford
Administration is preparing to consummate a treaty based on Vladivostok permit-
ting the Soviets to operate the Backfire as an intermediate-range bomber and
through other concessions limiting U.S. cruise missiles.
Since the McDonnell Douglas/CIA study, the Pentagon has pulled together top-
ranked propulsion and aerodynamic experts from around the nation to examine the
study. They have concluded there is no validity in the estimate of the Backfire's range
being only 3,500 naut. mi. McDonnell Douglas officials declined to talk to AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY about the studies, claiming national security is in-
volved.
Cost Growth
Defense Dept. selected acquisition reports on the costs of 44 major weapon pro-
grams total $175.8 billion, an increase of $4.8 billion over the previous SARs sub-
mitted to Congress on Mar. 31. The latest reports, based on June 30 estimates, re-
flect the addition of a fourth Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and a
major escalation in program estimates for the Air Force/McDonnel Douglas F-15
air-superiority fighter (AW&ST Aug. 2, p. 38). The June estimate for the F-15 acquisi-
tion program totals $12.2 billion, up by $734.7 million from the March report. The
growth includes a $3.8-million cost overrun in prior year funding and a projected
cost growth of $730.9 million from Fiscal 1978 through Fiscal 1980.
Other major cost growths since March include the Navy/Grumman F-14 air-su-
periority fighter, $162.9 million; the Navy/Lockheed S-3A carrier-based ASW pa-
trol aircraft, $111.1 million; the Navy/Lockheed Trident fleet ballistic missile,
$358.6 million, and the USAF/Boeing Minuteman 3 ICBM, $257.6 million, largely
reflecting an add-on buy of 60 missiles in Fiscal 1977.
Noise Compromise
Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller has been asked by President Ford to draft a
compromise proposal on aviation noise policy because of the severe split in posi-
tions between Transportation Secretary William T. Coleman, Jr., on one side, and
James Lynn, director of the Office of Management and Budget, and James Cannon,
director of the Domestic Council, on the other. The President met with Coleman,
Lynn and Cannon early last week but reached no decision on the vital retro-
fit/replacement issue. Presidential indecisiveness forced Coleman to cancel an ap-
pearance before the House Public Works and Transportation aviation subcom-
mittee last weck. Coleman met at least twice last week with the vice president on the
issue, and those Administration officials who would like to see the issue decision de-
layed indefinitely were concerned a decision could be forthcoming from the Presi-
dent in the next few days.
-Washington Staff
Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 13, 1976
13
Editorial
Fumbling the Defense Issue
National defense has surfaced strongly as one of the
This is a genuine and fast-moving trend for which
major issues of the 1976 presidential election cam-
hard evidence can be found across the spectrum from
paign between President Gerald Ford and his chal-
under the sea to outer space. Until Gov. Carter dem-
lenger, Gov. Jimmy Carter. It is encouraging that
onstrates some sign that he has some comprehension
this vital issue of defense has assumed such an im-
of this problem, he will not merit his fellow citizens'
portant role so early in what promises to be a spirited
endorsement of his self-appraised leadership quali-
contest complete with national television debates. It
fications.
is discouraging, however, to see both candidates and
In the case of President Ford, the fumbling of the
their parties fumbling the issue badly and shadow-
defense issue is both inexplicable and tragic. In many
boxing with outdated rhetoric that indicates they
ways, he has tried to take the appropriate action to
have no real conception of the rapidly developing re-
counterbalance the massive Soviet threat externally
alities of the Soviet technological threat.
and to curb the Machiavellian manipulations of
Sen. Walter Mondale, the Democratic vice presi-
Henry Kissinger internally.
dential candidate, leaped into the defense debate
In addition, he has had a chilling demonstration of
recently in San Francisco with a series of cliches that
what an orchestration of the defense issue did for his
reflect faithfully the views of that band of liberal
Republican challenger, who carried him down to the
Democratic senators-Humphrey, Kennedy, Prox-
Kansas City convention eve and narrowly missed up-
mire, Mansfield and McGovern-who regard most
setting the presidential incumbent. Ronald Reagan
defense matters as inherently bad and have an
had very little else in his repertoire besides the de-
apparently unbounded faith in the Soviet Union's
fense issue.
good faith and goodwill. These senators, including
His amazing durability in the race for the Republi-
Sen. Mondale, by their votes on key defense issues
can nomination rested primarily on the response of
over the past few years have inflicted more irrepa-
masses of American citizens, who are growing in-
rable damage to the U.S. defense posture than any
creasingly uneasy over these plainly visible trends.
foreign enemy. Their consistent votes to take the
The people of this country are far ahead of their po-
U.S. defense posture even below the already unbal-
litical candidates in recognizing the dangers inherent
anced SALT 1 levels have provided the Soviets with
in the threat, and Reagan's success clearly demon-
an incredible windfall and powerful new leverage for
strated it.
ongoing negotiations. Their vote to demolish unilat-
After narrowly averting defeat for the nomination
erally the sole U.S. anti-ballistic missile operational
over the defense issue on which he could have run
installation and cut ABM advanced research, while
with great strength, President Ford has now appar-
extracting no similar actions from the Soviet, will go
ently quickly forgotten the lesson and is pursuing the
down in history as an act of incredible folly. Sen.
mirage of a SALT 2 agreement containing the worst
Mondale and his cohorts cannot erase their votes on
of the Kissinger concessions. This will make him
that measure and should be held accountable.
guilty of every Reagan campaign charge and cost
Gov. Carter, who makes much of his youthful
him dearly in November votes he had won in Au-
Navy service on the early nuclear submarines, indi-
gust.
cates by his recent speeches that he too has only a
President Ford took decisive action last year to
vague and flimsy grasp of the real defense issues fac-
curtail the unlimited national security powers of
ing this nation with its gravest foreign threat since
Henry Kissinger and restore an element of legitimate
the War of 1812. Although he has some capable de-
debate inside the White House on national security
fense advisers in Paul Nitze and Elino Zumwalt, he
affairs. This prevented Kissinger's first attempt last
apparently has difficulty understanding what they
January at a complete sell-out to the Soviets on the
are trying to tell him. Instead, he seems to be picking
Backfire supersonic bomber, the U.S. cruise missiles
up sheaves of defense position papers prepared by
and nuclear throw weight to achieve a SALT 2 agree-
the armchair academic experts of the Brookings In-
ment. Now, inexplicably, President Ford has become
stitution in Washington-the same people who think
remesmerized by the State Dept. Svengali and is hur-
the B-52 fleet of the Strategic Air Command can fly
rying to complete the same sell-out for a SALT 2
forever.
agreement before the election, with apparently no
There is certainly some merit in the case for some
idea of the quantity of votes it will cost him or of the
of the administrative military reforms echoed by Gov.
potential damage to the future of his country.
Carter and some defense budget savings can be ef-
Meanwhile, the Soviets must be smirking at the
fected by their implementation. But nowhere in his
inability of the American political contenders to per-
extensive discussion of the defense problem is there
ceive either the weight or direction of the massive
any evidence that Gov. Carter understands the ex-
Russian military thrust and their persistence in wal-
tremely grave dangers from the Soviet Union's mas-
lowing blindly along a path that can only lead to fu-
sive quantitative and qualitative arms buildup that is
ture tragedy for the nation they are striving to lead.
growing every hour he orates.
-Robert Hotz
Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 13, 1976
9
INFORMENT OF DEFENSE
NEWS RELEASE
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301
PLEASE NOTE DATE
OX 7-3189 (COPIES)
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
SEPTEMBER 8, 1976
OX 5-0192 (INFO.)
NO. 402-76
-FACT SHEET--
U. S. MILITARY STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
June 30, 1976
Marine
Air
Army
Navy
Corps
Force
Total
Total Outside the United States
237,200
96,800
29,500
100,300
463,800
U.S. Territories and Possession
(including Afloat)
7,400
15,400
1,500
5,800
30,100
Foreign Countries
229,800
81,400
28,000
94,500
433,700
Western Europe and
Related Areas
190,100
39,500
4,600
62,300
296,500
Belgium
1,300
100
*
600
2,000
Germany
182,200
300
100
25,900
208,500
Greece
600
500
*
2,100
3,300
*
Iceland
2,000
100
1,000
3,100
Italy
3,900
3,600
200
3,900
11,600
#
Morocco
700
200
*
900
600
#
*
Netherlands
1,400
2,000
*
300
#
Portugal/Azores
1,000
1,400
#
3,800
200
Spain
5,200
9,200
1,000
#
*
Turkey
3,200
4,400
United Kingdom
100
2,300
300
17,500
20,300
Other
100
100
200
500
900
Afloat
-
25,700
3,300
-
29,000
Southeast Asia
800
-
-
400
1,200
Thailand
800
*
#
400
1,200
Western Pacific
37,800
30,500
22,500
30,500
121,300
Japan (incl. Okinawa)
4,300
7,100
20,500
13,400
45,300
*
Philippines
5,000
900
8,700
14,600
33,000
200
*
South Korea
7,100
40,400
Taiwan
400
400
*
1,300
2,200
-
17,700
1,200
-
Afloat
18,900
(OVER)
2-
Marine
Air
Army
Navy
Corps
Force
Total
Other Areas
8,500
26,700
2,300
7,200
44,600
Australia
*
400
*
300
700
Bermuda
-
1,300
100
-
1,400
Canada
*
500
*
300
800
Cuba
-
2,000
500
#
2,500
Diego Garcia
-
1,100
-
-
1,100
Guam
100
5,300
400
3,800
9,600
Iran
600
100
#
400
1,100
Midway Island
-
800
-
-
800
Panama/Canal Zone
6,800
300
100
1,800
9,100
Puerto Rico
400
3,300
500
100
4,200
Other
500
1,200
700
500
2,900
Afloat
-
10,400
-
-
10,400
Less than 250
Less than 1,000
Bahamas
Greenland
Bahrain
Saudi Arabia
Barbados
Brazil
Ethiopia (includes Eritrea)
Hong Kong
Johnston Island
Leeward Islands
Norway
*Under 100
Totals may not add due to rounding.
END
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: Top-Heavy Military Structure
QUESTION: There are frequent allegations that our present military
structure is top-heavy -- too many generals and admirals, more flag
officers now than at the end of World War II when our force level
was much higher -- more captains on the CNO's staff than serving
on ships, etc. Would you please comment?
ANSWER: Attached are statistics which describe the changes in
military manpower and the senior command/management structure of
the Department of Defense since 1950. Our total military strength
hit 3.6 million in 1952 and again in 1968, two wartime peaks. Some
observations:
The officer strength of the US defense establishment
is, like the total number of people in uniform, at
its lowest point since before the Korean War. The
officer fraction of the total has been remarkably
constant (12-14%) for two decades. The officer-to-
total ratio has leaned out under GRF/DHR.
The number of flag/general officers has steadily
decreased since the 1968 Vietnam War peak. The
ratio of flag/general officers-to-total-military
is being leaned out under GRF/DHR, from 5.8 to 5.5
per 10,000 total.
Civilian supergrade (GS-16 and above) numbers have
been reduced steadily since 1969, in parallel with
senior military grades. The ratio of flag/general
officers-to-supergrade civilians has remained
constant at 0.92.
The relevance of the various ratios in the attached table is
subject to question. There is every reason to expect officer-to-
enlisted ratios to increase, for example, due to changes in the com-
plexity of modern warfare -- more two-pilot aircraft, smaller more
numerous tactical units, new strategic nuclear missile system requirements
-- since WW II.
- 2 -
SPECIFIC: The fact is that there are significantly fewer generals
and admirals today than there were at the end of WW II. In 1945,
we had 2,068 general and flag officers compared to 1,184 today. At
the peak of the Vietnam War there were 1352. (We project a reduction
to 1,170 at the end of FY 1977, further reducing to 1,157 by end-FY
1978.)
General/Flag Officers
Actual (End Fiscal Year)
Planned
1945
1955
1965
1970
1975
Today
1977
1978
2068
1239
1287
1339
1199
1184
1170
1157
Although the number of general/flag officers has been almost
halved, there are more compared to the total military population today
than was the case in WW II. The point is that the number of senior
military officers should not be expected to change in direct proportion
to the overall size of the Armed Forces, but depends more on basic
organization and functional needs.
The significant organizational changes since WW II include:
establishment of a separate Air Force, establishment of Unified Com-
mands and International Headquarters, and strengthening the Office of
the SecDef and OJCS. Significant changes in functional requirements
derive from the facts that procurement and distribution of material
and equipment are more technically demanding and require a much higher
degree of economic control than was the case 30 years ago; further-
more, command and control systems are more elaborate.
- 3 -
SPECIFIC: Using the Navy as an example, the fact is that there are
more captains (0-6) at sea than on CNO's staff. Sea billets for
captains include commanding officers of ships, squadrons, and air
groups as well as afloat staffs.
262 0-6's on CNO staff; 369 0-6's on sea duty; 310
0-6's in ships and squadrons; plus 59 on sea duty
in maritime aircraft squadrons and staffs.
It is not unreasonable to find this number of the Navy's most experienced
and capable officers assisting the CNO in fulfilling his statutory
responsibilities to the Secretary of the Navy.
15 September 1976
SELECTED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRENGTHS
Strengths
Ratios
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Off
Gen/Flag
Gen/Flag
Gen/Flag
End
Mil
Enl
Off
Gen/
Civ
to
per 1,000
per 1,000
to
a/
FY
(000)
(000)
(000)
Flag
Supergrades
Tot Mil
Tot Mil
Tot Enl
Supergrades
1950
1,460
1,279
181
881
122b/
.12
.60
.69
7.22
1951
3,249
2,926
323
1,047
.10
.32
.36
1952
3,636
3,260
376
1,142
236b/
.10
.31
.35
4.84
1953
3,555
3,178
377
1,197
.11
.34
.38
1954
3,302
2,948
354
1,205
.11
.36
.41
1955
2,935
2,583
352
1,239
.12
.42
.48
1956
2,806
2,456
350
1,279
.12
.46
.52
1957
2,796
2,453
343
1,276
.12
.46
.52
1958
2,601
2,275
326
1,282
.13
.49
.56
1959
2,504
2,185
319
1,268
.13
.51
.58
1960
2,476
2,160
317
1,260
726b/
.13
.51
.58
1.74
1961
2,484
2,169
315
1,254
.13
.50
.58
1962
2,808
2,465
343
1,303
.12
.46
.53
1963
2,700
2,365
334
1,292
.12
.48
.55
1964
2,687
2,350
337
1,294
1,323
.13
.48
.55
.98
1965
2,655
2,317
339
1,287
.13
.48
.56
1966
3,094
2,745
349
1,320
.11
.43
.48
1967
3,377
2,993
384
1,334
.11
.40
.45
1968
3,546
3,132
416
1,352
1,490
.12
.38
.43
.91
1969
3,460
3,041
419
1,336
1,556
.12
.39
.44
.86
Complete data on civilian supergrades (GS-16,17,18) not readily available for some years before 1968.
b/
Authorizations.
Strengths
Ratios
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Off
Gen/Flag
Gen/Flag
Gen/Flag
End
Mil
Enl
Off
Gen/
Civ
to
per 1,000
per 1,000
to
FY
(000)
(000)
(000)
Flag
Supergrades
Tot Mil
Tot Mil
Tot Enl
Supergrades
1970
3,066
2,664
402
1,339
1,545
.13
.44
.50
.87
1971
2,715
2,343
371
1,330
1,503
.14
.49
.57
.88
1972
2,323
1,987
336
1,324
1,460
.14
.57
.67
.91
1973
2,253
1,932
321
1,291
1,415
.14
.57
.67
.91
1974
2,162
1,860
302
1,249
1,363
.14
.58
.67
.92
1975
2,128
1,836
292
1,199
1,303
.14
.56
.65
.92
1976
2,082
1,801
281
1,184
1,287
.13
.57
.66
.92
1977
2,102
1,824
278
1,164
1,267
.13
.55
.64
.92
COMMENTS
1. The officer strength of the US defense establishment is, like the total number of people in uniform,
at its lowest point since before the Korean War. The officer fraction of the total has been remarkably
constant (12-14%) for two decades. The officer-to-total ratio has leaned out under GRF/DHR.
2. The number of flag/general officers has steadily decreased since the 1968 Vietnam War peak. The ratio
of flag/general officers-to-total-military is being leaned out under GRF/DHR, from 5.8 to 5.5 per 10,000
total.
3. Civilian supergrade (GS-16 and above) numbers have been reduced steadily since 1969, in parallel
with senior military grades. The ratio of flag/general officers-to-supergrade civilians has remained
constant at 0.92.
September 16, 1976
SUBJECT: Combat/Support Ratio
QUESTION: It has been alleged that the military has too many support
troops per combat troop and that millions of dollars could be saved
if this ratio were reduced. Would you please comment?
ANSWER: The balance between combat troops and support troops has
fluctuated over time, as the complexity of ground warfare has changed
and the emphasis has shifted between sustained combat and initial,
forward defense. The following table summarizes, in consistent terms,
the distribution of Army manpower since 1945:
Approximate Distribution of Army Manpower
HST
Ihe
LBJ
Korea
RN
6
RF
WW II
SE Asia
1945
1950
1952
1955
1965
1968
1970
1975
Present
Combat
42%
38%
38%
28%
47%
35%
50%
50%
53%
Support
50%
62%
62%
72%
53%
65%
50%
50%
47%
As you can see, the ratio of combat troops to support troops has
varied widely, tending to lean out in wartime as additional troops
begin to use the sustaining base maintained during time of peace.
Today we have the same number of combat divisions as before the SE Asia
conflict, but much less support manpower. That does not mean necessarily
/ In computing the distribution, divisions, separate combat brigades,
armored cavalry regiments, nondivisional field and air defense
artillery, combat engineer, assault and attack helicopter, special
forces units and separate maneuver battalions have been considered
in the combat tabulation. Nondivisional units -- such as communication,
maintenance, medical, support aviation, transportation, ordnance,
military police, and finance -- that supply and service combat
forces are considered as support.
- 2 -
that there is less need for support troops: it means that we have
consciously structured our active force to include as much readily
deployable combat power as possible, while recognizing that we
would have to rely more heavily than ever before on the Reserve
Components to provide the necessary support forces. We can't push
that too far, but I believe that we have been moving in the direction
of the economies referred to in the question.
Of course, our objective is a defense posture sufficient to
maintain -- in conjunction with our Allies -- the desired military
balance. To the extent that active forces assume a greater part of
the combat posture, and Reserve Components provide the requisite
base of support, there are not necessarily large reductions in the
resources required. Dollars saved in the active force posture
must be reapplied to Reserve support base readiness and war reserve
materials.
FORD LIBRARY is 023410
COMBAT TO SUPPORT RATIOS
US ACTIVE ARMY
WORLD WAR II
KOREAN CONFLICT
100
80
60
PERCENT
SUPPORT
40
20
50
46
43
42
30
COMBAT
38
41
38
26
28
28
28
45
0
0
YEARS
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
$ 3'
RA
COMBAT TO SUPPORT RATIOS
US ACTIVE ARMY
100
80
PERCENT
60
SUPPORT
40
35
33
32
37
15
50
53
54
COMBAT
20
0
YEAR
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
September 16, 1976
SUBJECT: Implications of a $5-$7 Billion Cut in Defense
QUESTION: The Democratic Party platform calls for reducing present
Defense spending by $5-$7 billion. Could that be done by cutting
fat and running the Department more efficiently, or would the impact
be more severe?
ANSWER: Let's begin by looking at some facts. Presidents from both
parties have, over the past decade, proposed budgets they believed to
be adequate to meet the requirements of the nation's defense. Congresses
have -- almost ritually -- cut those defense requests each year by $3B to
$8B. The result has been a series of budgets which, although they ap-
peared to grow from $72B in 1967 to $106B in 1976, represented a steady
decrease in spending on national defense.
In real terms -- that is, in dollars applied to baseline capabilities,
corrected to cancel the effects of inflation -- the resources devoted to
Defense decreased steadily by about 2% a year between 1967 and 1976. The
budget for 1976 was the first which did not involve a reduction in more than
a decade; the budget just approved for 1977 has established an upward trend.
Chart I (attached) depicts this upturning in constant FY 77 (not inflated)
dollars.
The point is that a trend of decreasing US defense budgets, arrested
only this year, coincident with an upward trend (3%-4% annual growth) in
spending on military programs on the part of the Soviet Union over the
past decade, has been unmistakably adverse to US national security.
The question of how a $5 to $7 billion cut in the Defense budget
would affect us must be answered in that context.
FORD
- 2 -
Such a cut would put the U.S. once again on a downward
path, aggravating already adverse trends.
A cut of that magnitude could be accomplished, of course,
merely by transfering budget authority for some functions
now covered in the DOD budget to another appropriation.
Done any other way, the impact would be severe. There
is simply not that kind of flexibility in the Defense
budget.
Chart 2 illustrates the implications of such a cut. The
DOD budget is displayed in terms of major function
R&D, procurement, readiness, and manpower. The consequences
of applying the cut in toto to any one of those categories
are described, even though the more likely approach in
Congress would bea chipping away at all four categories
CHART I
THE CHANGING TREND
1 FY77 BUDGET $ $ - -
200
0
0
150
ANNUAL
O
PRESIDENT'S REQUEST
DOD
BUDGETS
0
(TOA $B)
APPROPRIATIONS
a
#####
The E. > 100
50
1967
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
1977
FISCAL YEARS
CHART 2
IMPLICATIONS OF A $5-7 BILLION DEFENSE CUT
A $5-7 Billion Cut in any
% of DOD Budget
of the Accounts Would:
100%
Research & Development
Our Investment
Result in Loss of U.S.
10%
in the Future
Technological Leadership
Procurement
Modernization to
Reduce Army, Navy, and
25%
Keep Pace with the
Air Force Equipment
Military Challenge
Modernization
Ensure that our
Readiness
Reduce Ship Overhauls,
15%
Equipment is
Spare Parts, Equipment,
Combat Ready
and Base Maintenance
Manpower
Related
Man our Equipment
Reduce 400-560,000
and Forces
50%
Personnel
AND,
IF TAKEN
ACROSS
DOD
0%
Put us on the same course of reduced DOD
expenditures we have followed for the past
several years prior to FY 76.
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: U.S. Forces Overseas
QUESTION: It has been alleged that the U.S. has too many troops and
bases overseas and that millions of dollars could be saved if the
overseas troops and bases were reduced. Would you please comment on
the advantages and disadvantages of having the troops and bases in
foreign lands?
ANSWER: Such allegations have been a recurrent theme in U.S. political
campaigns for several years. There is a certain superficial appeal
to such calls to "bring the boys home" and "save the taxpayers'
money." These notions don't look so good when one begins to assess
the cost in terms of our national security interests and foreign
policy objectives what we would lose by seriously reducing current
forward deployments and overseas basing facilities.
Our overseas deployments are concentrated in two areas, both of
which are of central importance to US national security objectives:
NATO Europe and Northeast Asia. In Western Europe, deployed U.S.
troops constitute about one-tenth of the ground forces of the NATO Alliance,
the treaty which has been the centerpiece of US foreign policy since
World War II. These forces -- both on land in the Central Region
and seaborne in the Mediterranean -- contribute vitally to the
Alliance's warfighting capability; moreover, they are regarded by
our Allies as politically significant symbols of continuing U.S.
commitment to mutual security. In the past two years, we have
streamlined and modernized our forces in Europe, first, by converting
some 20,000 billets from support to combat functions and, in addition,
- 2 -
by various redeployments designed to improve NATO warfighting capa-
bilities.
Significant reductions in the level of U.S. deployments would,
thus, reduce total NATO military capabilities in Central Europe
and the Mediterranean. It would also affect our political relationships,
since the Allies would inevitably interpret any such action on our
part as a clear signal that our interest in Western Europe's security
and our commitment to their support had been downgraded. It could
also give rise to a serious miscalculation on the part of the Soviets,
were they to conclude the same thing and seize the opportunity to
exert pressure, either political or military, upon the NATO Allies
to make them more pliant towards Soviet objectives in Europe. The
United States has too many vital interests at stake in Western Europe ---
deep political and cultural ties, large investments, major national
security interests -- to invite Soviet adventurism there.
In Northeast Asia, the stakes are similarly high. Stability on
the Korean peninsula is vital to the security of Japan, our major
ally in Asia. Deployed US forces are a necessary addition to South
Korean military forces, ensuring that, in the event of attack, the
South Korean's will have the ground strength and air support they
themselves currently lack. The outbreak of renewed hostilities in
Korea would be likely to force the Chinese and the Soviets, out of
political rivalry and mutual mistrust, to vie in backing the North
Koreans. This would tend, in turn, to bring the United States into
a face-to-face confrontation with one or both of these two powers.
- 3 -
As in NATO Europe, therefore, the presence of US troops in South Korea
serves a dual purpose: military and political. Reduction of US
deployed strength would suggest to allies and possible adversaries alike
that the US regards stability in Northeast Asia as less essential to
our own national security and foreign policy objectives than before.
It is also worth noting that the total number of our troops over-
seas is currently at a 20-year low. Attached is a table that shows
assigned US troop strength overseas from 1955 to 1976. The present
number is half what it was in 1955, and approximately a third of what
it was at the peak of the Vietnam War in 1967. Interestingly enough,
total overseas deployed strength steadily decreased during the Eisenhower
Administration, increased markedly during the Kennedy-Johnson period,
and has steadily decreased since 1968.
Finally, there is considerable question as to how much money
the US would save by significant reductions to overseas deployment
levels. Assuming that the forces withdrawn were kept in the force
structure -- a necessity given the military balance in the world --
extensive expansion of CONUS basing facilities would be needed to
accommodate the returning forces. This would occasion a considerable
one-time expense which would require some years to amortize. Further-
more, to maintain the capability to return rapidly and reinforce Central
Europe or Northeast Asia in the event of hostilities, we would need
to expand our existing airlift and sealift capability considerably -
another expensive endeavor. On the other hand, if we chose to redefine
- 4 -
our overseas interests in terms much narrower than hitherto since
World War II, we might choose to demobilize the homecoming forces
and remove them from the force structure entirely. This would
severely reduce our conventional capabilities, almost certainly
raising, rather than lowering, the nuclear threshold. We would then
very possibly find it necessary to invest more money in expanding and
improving our strategic forces to make up for the conventional capa-
bility, forward deployed, we had sacrificed.
GERALD FORDS
U.S. Troop Strength - World-Wide and Overseas
(Ashore and Afloat)
(in thousands)
As of June
Overseas
World-Wide
1950
3252
1,460
HST
1951
NA
3,249
1952
1,180
3,636
1953
1,217.
3,555
1954
1,031
3,302
1955
867
2,935
IKE
1956
813
2,806
1957
799
2,796
1958
734
2,601
1959
699
2,504
1960
698
2,476
1961
703
2,484
JFK
1962
770
2,808
1963
762
2,698
1964
755
2,685
LBJ
1965
778
2,653
1966
1,013
3,092
1967
1,247
3,377
1968
1,241
3,547
1969
1,195
3,459
1970
1,071
3,066
RN
1971
842
2,714
1972
628
2,322
1973
585
2,252
1974
519
2,162
1975
517
2,128
GRF
1976
464
2,082
1/ Includes U.S. Territories and Possessions
2/ Afloat excluded (not available)
14 Sep 76
I.
TROOP WITHDRAWALS
Trop Withdrawn UP 200, fall Down- are 1434,000. Pens. RM
A. General Withdrawals
CARTER. Carter always mentions troop withdrawals in the context
of cutting the defense budget. He said, for example, "we have
a bloated bureaucracy in the Pentagon, too many troops overseas,
too many military bases overseas " (11/23/75), and "we' re wasting
enormous quantities of money. We've got too many military bases
overseas. (3/21/76).
Response. Generally you should try to emphasize the fact that
Carter statements have been fuzzy, at times concradictory, and
invariably wrong when citing particular facts and figures. This
should be done in the context that he is ill-informed on defense
matters (because of lack of experience on national problems) and
badly served by all too sloppy staff work.
When asked about troop withdrawals, you should ask if Carter
means: (a) cutting the total number of U.S. troops by bringing
home and deactiviting some; or b) maintaining the overall number
of troops yet deploying less overseas and more in the U.S.
If Carter means (a) or reducing the overall number of troops, a
response is that we are at the lowest level since before the
Korean War, going from a peak of 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.1 million
today. We just cannot afford to go any lower and maintain the
overall military balance (the Soviet Union has 4.4 million under
arms).
If Carter means (b) or merely bringing home troops, a response is
that such a move would lower capabilities and deterrence without
lowering costs in the near future. Troops stationed in the U.S.
just do not have the deterrent effect of those stationed on the
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
NATO or Korean borders. Should deterrence fail, such troops at
home do not have the capability for defense that those in place,
with equipment and facilities on hand, have. In terms of cost,
the savings of redeploying troops in the U.S. would be, at best,
minimal. To bring home one-fourth or 50,000 of our ground forces
assigned to NATO would cost an additional $700 in the first year,
with some type of capability in Europe maintained for such forces.
No savings at all would accrue for 15 years, at the least.
Deferel no for lunch
2
B. Withdrawals from Asia
CARTER. "I think that to reduce our land forces in South
Korea gradually over a period of years would be an appropriate
action to take," (5/10/76): Carter would try to reassure Japan
by "ccnsultation" that this withdrawal from Korea had no impact on
our commitment to Japan (6/23/76). According to a Carter policy
statement in early 1976, he would advocate a gradual U.S. troop
withdrawal from Japan as well.
RESPONSE. Events last month showed that the threat from North
Korea is still a serious one. Our troops serve there, as they
have successfully for 25 years, for deterrence. Redeployment to
the U.S. would initially cost money and would save nothing for a
number of years. Japan is concerned about our commitment to
Korea, and we are concerned about our commitment to Japan, our
second largest trading partner (after Canada), a good friend,
democratic government, and an ally. All of Asia, indeed the
world, would be concerned about Japanese rearmament. As a nation,
we have guaranteed Japan's security since World War II in part to
discourage such rearmament; lessening that commitment would surely
well:
encourage more militaristic forces in Japan to rearm. If not
rearming in such a situation, Japan could go neutral (like India?)
which would also be a serious move for us as a Nation and for the
overall balance in the world.
II.
ECONOMY MOVES
074839 FORD
A. General Measures
CARTER. Most of his remarks on defense focus on economy measures --
to trim down the huge bureaucracy and flabby, "frilled" military
establishment. The Democratic Platform sets the tone:
"
with
the proper management, with the proper kind of investment of
defense dollars, and with the proper choice of military programs,
we believe we can reduce present defense spending by about $5
billion to $7 billion.' Carter has come down to this figure from
$12-15 billion March, 1975; and $7 to $8 billion in January, 1976.
RESPONSE. Generally five points should be made. (1) The way
Carter is coming down on his defense cuts, pretty soon e'll
be supporting the President's budget. We are quite pleased with
his statements which -- though contradictory -- are showing an
increasing awareness of the threats to freedom, adverse trends,
etc. (2) Any government agency, indeed any business, can get
greater efficiency. The call for better management of the defense
establishment has been made since DoD began, and will be made as
long as it exists. It is a constant need deserving constant
attention. In this post-Vietnam era, we are constantly making
adjustments and modernizing. (3) Most if not all the specific
proposals made by Carter have already been done, or at least are
being done. It is easy to promise things already accomplished or
underway. Furthermore, the figures he gives as savings are consist-
tently wrong. He is ill-informed and, as a result, is misleading
3
the American public, not only on the general point that huge
sums can be saved through better management, but also that
savings of specified amounts will accrue from his recommended
actions. (4) The President has taken many more actions to
improve efficiency than ever mentioned by Carter. Under his
own authority, the President has taken efficiency measures
which save $2.2 billion in FY 1977 and will save $50
billion in the next 15 years. Other actions require legis-
lation. Unfortunately, the Democratic Congress has yet to
act on the whole package sent up last January which would save
some $800 million in FY 1977, and more than $70 billion over a
fifteen year period (FY 1977-91). Rather than clamor for actions
already underway in DoD, he should push his party leaders in
Congress to take new actions. (5) Although necessary, we feel
that there are more important national security issues facing
America than these management concerns. The real issue of
national security in 1976 is: How can we keep the peace in
the decades ahead while preserving our principles, maintaining
our vital interests abroad, assuring our allies, etc? This
involves a careful consideration of the threats to freedom
which do exist in the world, the increasing power and
appetite of the Soviet Union, the adverse trends, etc.
B. Transfers of Personnel
CARTER. "We must recognize that our military personnel are
transferred too much. At any given moment, about one out of
seven of those personnel is in the process of moving
This year,
$2.5 billion will go simply to move service personnel, their
families
Such frequent moves not only eat up money, they undermine
morale. If we extend the average tour of duty by just two months,
we could save $400 million per year" (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).
Response. (1) We are working on this problem with our PCS/
Turbulence reduction efforts and have been working on it
since I took office ten months ago -- long before Mr. Carter
addressed the issue. (2) His figures are inaccurate. He is
ill-informed by sloppy staff work and consequently misleading
the American people. The $2.5 billion figure includes some
civilian personnel as well as "service personnel. " Most
important, a two-month extension of service would save less
than half the amount he presents ($186 million, not $400
million as he states).
C. Training Ratios
CARTER. "We need to reexamine our military training programs
We now have an average of one and a half military students for
each instructor. By moving to a ratio of only three students
to each instructor, we could save an estimated $1 billion per
year. " (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).
RESPONSE. (1) We have already taken action in this area as
well --- reducing training staff by 14% (or 31, 600) while in-
creasing the number of students trained 2% between FY 1975 and
4
1977. Flight training has been reduced by 44% and graduate
education by 36% between FY 1973 and 1977. (2) Again,
Carter's figures are wrong; again the result of sloppy staff
work. At present there are five students per instructor, not
1.5 as he states. Moving to three per student, as Carter
advocates, would only cost money, not save it. Does he wish
to increase the number of instructors per students?
D. Cost Overruns
CARTER. "Cost overruns have become chronic. The Pentagon itself
estimates that the total current cost of overruns on the 45 weapons
systems now in the process of development in the three services
-- exclusive of inflation -- is $10.7 billion. Over the next
five years that would approximate the cost of the proposed B-1
bomber program over the same period." (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).
RESPONSE. (1) Cost overruns are serious, but they are a problem
of society in general -- both business and government -- rather
than one confined to the military. In fact, a recent GAO Report
states that the Pentagon is better in this regard than other
government agencies. Whereas military programs grew by 33%, non-
military acquisition programs in the government grew over 100%
from base estimates. The Federal Highway Administration and
Appalachian Regional Commission both grew by 100% and Department
of Transportation by 50%. In private business, the Bay Area
Rapid Transit grew by 73%, the Washington Metro by 86% (and is
still growing), the John Hancock Building in Boston by 100%.
(2) Carter's figures are actually low; the correct amount is
$13.4 billion for 44 weapons systems.
E. Officer to Non-Officer Ratio
CARTER. "What we have now are. too many major military officers
and generals" (8/23/75). "Waste and inefficiency are both costly
to taxpayers and a danger to our own national existence. Strict
management and budgetary control over the Pentagon should reduce
the ratio of officers to men
"
(8/12/74).
"We'
ve
got
too
top-
heavy a layer of personnel assignments. We've got more admirals
and generals than we had at the end of the Second World War."
(3/21/76)
RESPONSE. (1) Again, his facts are wrong, again because of sloppy
staff work. We do not now have more generals and admirals than
at the end of WW II. In fact, today we have about half the
number (1138 today VS. 2068 in 1945). (2) Efforts to reduce the
officer to non-officer ratio have been underway for some time.
Between FY 1973 and 1977, the reduction in senior officer personnel
has been nearly twice that of military personnel overall (13% vs
7%). These cuts include an 8% reduction in admirals and generals,
and a 12% reduction in colonels and lieutenant colonels. (3)
While we are making progress, the amount of savings possible by
reducing the number of officers is minimal. To fire all generals
5
and admirals outright would save DoD only $60 million
per year. To replace them with colonel-level officers
in the same positions would save only $10 million per
year. (4) The officer to non-officer ratio must remain
higher in peacetime than during war -- such as World War
II -- in order to allow for rapid mobilization, should the
need arise.
F. Tooth-to-Tail Ratio
CARTER. "We've got too many support troops per combat troop"
(3/21/76)
"What we have are
too many support troops per
combat troop " (11/23/75).
RESPONSE. (1) We have taken action in this area, beginning
four years ago. From FY 1973-76, we reduced support forces
by 244,000 while increasing combat strength by 29,000. (2)
We are now streamlining the entire military establishment,
in part by eliminating or proposing for elimination 15
command headquarters and 25,600 headquarters positions since
FY 1974.
G. Transferring Programs From DoD
CARTER. "The Defense Department now overlaps the functions of
civilian agencies, with a great waste of money" (5/2/76). He
advocated transferring programs "like education, training, housing,
social programs, and transportation" from DoD to civilian agencies.
RESPONSE. It is misleading the American people to state that
such transfers could save substantial sums of money if the functions
of the various programs were maintained. This resembles Carter's
widely-heralded streamlining of the Georgia government by reducing
the overall number of agencies, etc. What he neglects to mention,
however, is that while he was governor, state spending increased
58% and the number of state employees increased 24%.
III. OTHER POINTS
A. Eliminating Nuclear Weapons
CARTER. "The biggest waste and danger of all is the unnecessary
proliferation of atomic weapons throughout the world. Our ultimate
goal should be the elimination of nuclear weapon capability among
all nations" (12/12/75). "I think this nation ought to have
as its ultimate goal zero nuclear weapons for any nations in the
world" (12/15/74). "
we (must) demonstrate meaningful progress
toward the goal of control and then reduction and ultimately
elimination of nuclear arsenals" (5/14/76).
RESPONSE. This is a noble goal, one possible if the world were
a Garden of Eden with an absence of threat to freedom. However,
as a serious proposal in the real world, it shows a lack of rigorous
6
analysis and consideration of the repercussions. Since World War
II, the U.S. has been able to deter aggression and maintain the
overall military balance because of our nuclear weaponry, particularly
our superiority in the number of nuclear warheads. Were we and
the Soviet Union to simply eliminate nuclear weapons in the near
future, we would have to increase our conventional strength sub-
stantially, perhaps doubling or tripling our forces, with all
that implies in terms of doubling or tripling the budget, reinstatement
of the draft, etc., in order to meet the superior Soviet conventional
forces. Alternatives to this vast increase of our conventional
forces would be unthinkable: retreat to a form of isolationism or
accommodation to the Soviet view of the world.
B. Euro-Communism
CARTER. "I believe that we should support strongly the democratic
forces in Italy, but still we should not close the doors to
Communist leaders in Italy for friendship with us. I just hate to
build a wall around Italy in advance, should the Communists be
successful" (5/10/76).
RESPONSE. Leaders in America just should not give the wrong
signals about the acceptability of a government with Communist
leaders in NATO. Such signals are easily picked up and used
for legitimization, as was done by Italian Communist leader
Berlinguer who (according to UPI dispatch, 6/16/76) said in
a nationally televised broadcast from Rome:
"
others,
including
Presidential hopefuls from the Democratic Party, have said
that although they don't like the idea of our participation in
a government, this should be viewed with relative tranquility."
The Communist newspaper, L'Unita, earlier praised Carter for
saying that the U.S. should not rule out cooperation in advance
if the Communists entered a coalition government, according
to the same dispatch.
C. Other Points Mentioned by Carter
FMS. "Can we be both the world's leading champion of peace and
the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war? If I Lecome
President, I will work with our allies and also seek to work
with the Soviets to increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce
the commerce in weapons of war" (7/18/76) " we (must) put a
stop to the dubious practice of arms giveaway programs for
potential adversaries" (8/24/76).
RESERVES.
"
I have been concerned that our reserve forces, both
the regular reserve and the National Guard, do not play a strong
enough role in our military preparedness. We need to shift toward
a highly trained, combat-worthy reserve, well-equipped and closely
coordinated with regular forces --- always capable of playing a
crucial role in the nation's defense" (8/24/76).
7
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR. "Our Defense Secretary and Secretary of State
have talked about limited war. My belief is that if we ever start
a limited atomic war that it would very quickly escalate into an
all-out war
I
think we ought to be prepared to recognize
that
once a nuclear war starts
a very good likelihood is that it
would be an all-out nuclear war" (7/7/76).
B-1 BOMBER. "We don't need the B-1 bomber" (2/9/75). "I believe
we should cancel the B-1 bomber. It's toò expensive and its an.
unnecessary new system" (12/2/75). After a visit to SAC Headquarters
in Omaha, Carter stated he-would continue research and development:
on the plane because "it might be after I become President I would
change my mind" (5/10/76). The Democratic Platform states, "Exotic
weapons which serve no real function do not contribute to the defense
of this country. The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed
system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers'
dollars."
DTR 210954Z Oct 76
FM
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC 0118
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 16556 (or 0)
SUBJECT:
COMMERCIAL CABLE REGARDING VLADIMIR SLEPAK
1. EMBASSY OCTOBER 21 RECEIVED COMMERCIAL CABLE FROM
ATLANTA, GEORGIA WITH FOLLOWING TEXT:
QUOTE: PLEASE DELIVER THIS CABLE ON BEHALF OF
GOVERNOR CARTER TO VLADIMIR SLEPAK AND ACKNOWLEDGE
DELIVERY:
I HAVE READ WITH GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE TREATMENT
THAT YOU AND SOME OF YOUR COLLEAGUES SUFFERED
RECENTLY. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE SPOKEN OUT ON THIS
MATTER AS GOVERNOR AND DURING THIS CAMPAIGN AND HAVE
REFERRED TO YOUR CASE BY NAME. I WANT YOU TO KNOW
OF MY DEEP PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE TREATMENT THAT
YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES RECEIVE. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER.
END QUOTE.
2. GIVEN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY OF OUR DETERMINING AUTHENTICITY
Now
OF MESSAGE, WE WILL DEFER TAKING ANY ACTION PENDING CONFIRMA
FROM DEPARTMENT AND GUIDANCE. WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH SLEPAK
AND COULD DELIVER. PLEASE ADVISE.
MATLOCK
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
By
TOP SECRET
REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN
WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT
WITH FERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE,
OR HIGHER AUTHORITY
Don
AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE
CONVENTIONAL WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY
AND POTENTIAL
OF THE
US ARMY IN CENTRAL EUROPE
BY
LTG JAMES F. HOLLINGSWORTH
FORD
LIBRARY
VOLUME I - BASIC REPORT
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)
30 JUN 1976
MR 94-162, #3 OSD Hr. 11/5/96 5/23/97 Army
By KBH NARA, Date 10/16/97
Classified bv LTG James F. Hollingsworth
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OCSA No.
92-76
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
1.
(TS) PROLOGUE: The defense of NATO is second only to the defense of
the United States as our national security objective. Over the last two
and one half decades, our force structure and planning for the defense of
Central Europe evolved and now, in conjunction with our NATO allies, we
must stand ready to defend in Central Europe against the threat posed by the
USSR/Warsaw Pact. Advancements in military technology, weaponry and mana-
gerial improvements have been incorporated into our structure and plans
over the years while political and economic constraints within NATO, and
major qualitative and quantitative Warsaw Pact improvements, have compli-
cated the task of defense.
With the advent of nuclear parity between the U.S. and the USSR, the
need for a capable, viable conventional force in Central Europe has become
paramount. This U.S./Allied force must serve as a real deterrent, and
must be capable of defeating a Warsaw Pact attack. As an alliance we should
be capable, with total mobilization, of fighting conventionally for as long
as the Warsaw Pact can sustain conventional combat. Our emphasis, however,
must be placed on developing NATO's ability to win a quick, decisive, con-
ventional victory against a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact with no more
than 48 hours of warning. The forces and firepower in being in Central
Europe, plus their immediate reinforcements must have that capability.
With it, NATO will be an effective deterrent; without that capability, we
invite disaster.
It is equally clear that the US Army must examine requirements for the
defense of Central Europe that go beyond the boundaries of V and VII US
Corps. U.S. leadership and initiatives in this area must be encouraged
and supported by the Department of Defense and the Congress.
The key is to have a credible conventional deterrent on the ground
in Europe backed up by the ability to reinforce in hours and days, not
weeks and months. This force must be capable of providing massive fire-
power--tactical air force and artillery--so that we expend the cheap part
of our society--materiel--against the cheap part of communism--people.
This is what it's all about, and what this assessment will examine.
2.
(8) PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to assess the threat
and the war fighting capabilities and potential of US Army units in
Central Europe to defend, in conjunction with NATO allies, against the
Warsaw Pact, and to make recommendations based on that assessment.
3.
(5)
SCOPE: This report focuses on the strategy, operational plans,
tactics, structure, doctrine and .S./Allied cooperation and interoper-
ability necessary to defeat a conventional Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack in
Central Europe.
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4. (8) BACKGROUND: The Chief of Staff of the Army directed that an
assessment be made of the war fighting capabilities of US Army units in
Central Europe. A study team was formed on 28 March 1976 and collected
information in Europe from 30 March 1976 to 22 June 1976.
5. (8) METHODOLOGY: A four-man study team visited every major US Army
and NATO headquarters in Central Europe. Over a three month period, each
US Army corps, division and separate brigade or regiment was seen. Dis-
cussions with senior officials and soldiers at each level occurred and
data were collected in a variety of areas. Additionally, NATO commands,
to include SHAPE, AFCENT, NORTHAG, CENTAG, 2d ATAF and 4th ATAF, were
visited, as, well as each allied corps headquarters in AFCENT (except
the Netherlands Corps). Headquarters, USEUCOM and USAFE, to include 17th
Tactical Air Force, were visited as were USNAVEUR and the American
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). As a result of
these extensive visits during a concentrated period of time, and with
full examination of the facts and figures collected, a clear perception
of the current capability and needed improvements was developed. This
report is not based on detailed analytical study but rather on an overall
perception of the status of the situation in Europe. Some follow-on
computer assisted analytical work by appropriate headquarters will be
necessary to refine some of the recommendations contained in this report.
This should be done on an expedited basis.
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SECTION VII
ASSESSMENT
1.
(8) GENERAL: As outlined in the introduction to this report, the
purpose of this study effort has been to "conduct an assessment of the
war fighting capabilities and potential of the US Army units in Central
Europe
To accomplish this, it has been necessary to look not
only at the US Army's posture in Europe, but, perhaps more importantly,
how it fits into the Central Region battle--based on an on-the-ground
appreciation of the terrain, the threat, the capabilities of our allies,
and strategy. No assessment of the US Army's capabilities and potential
can be addressed in isolation. The following comments assess the US
Army in Europe in the context of a NATO war. This assessment is based on
the threat which clearly indicates the Warsaw Pact capability of conducting
a surprise attack with no more than 48 hours warning. Obviously, an asses-
ment based on a different scenario (e.g., 23/30) would result in different
conclusions.
2. (5) WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY: In terms of soldier and junior leader
potential, the war fighting capability of the US Army in Europe is excel-
lent. In terms of quality of equipment and general availability and
readiness of equipment on hand, it is excellent. However, in view of the
threat described in Section II of this report, the ability of US Army Europe,
as an organizational entity, to project its full potential in the defense of
Central Europe is severely constrained by:
- Inadequate appreciation (at the policy making level) of the Warsaw
Pact's capability to launch a surprise attack.
- Resultant force structure and strategic planning predicated on
an unrealistic warning time--23/30.
3. (IS) STRATEGY: The current "flexible response" strategy that balances
direct defense,
for the
defense of NATO is valid. There is, however, a need to emphasize and
increase the credibility of the first phase of that strategy. The direct
conventional defense capability for Central Europe is not credible today.
It is based on "in-place" forces which are inadequate in terms of fire-
power and location to stop a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact, and
strategic reinforcements which would require weeks and months to reinforce
rather than hours and days.
The US strategic planning guidance for the direct conventional defense
of NATO does not take into account the NATO agreed assessment that the
Warsaw Pact is capable of attacking the Central Region with up to 54
divisions with no more than 48 hours warning. Forces and supplies are
positioned in Europe without recognition that the most likely main
avenue of a Warsaw Pact attack would be in the north German plain. As
a result, our force structure, plans, and concepts for the conduct of
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the defense against a surprise attack are inadequate.
4.
(S) ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL PLANS: With our current
force structuring and strategic planning dependent on adequate warning,
any assessment of organization for combat and operational planning must
reflect these major deficiencies:
- Malpositioning of forces in Cetral Europe ready to respond to the
major threat.
- Acceptance of a "transition to war" concept rather than an immediate
readiness for war.
- Inadequate in-place, hardened, and ready command, control and com-
munications capabilities.
- Failure to properly emphasize the every day operational capability
of NATO headquarters/staffs.
- Inadequate fire support.
- Tactical concepts and operational plans based on trading space for time.
- Shortages in POMCUS and its malpositioning.
5.
(S) RATIONALIZATION: With a requirement for
readiness on the part
of USAREUR to be ready to fight, rationalization becomes a strategic,
economic, and tactical necessity. We must take bold steps in this area.
National goals must be subordinated to the common NATO goal. The force
Standa.edu
to defend Central Europe should have common doctrine, tactics and equip-
ment. This is not the case now, and as a result millions of dollars are
wasted annually by redundancy and duplication of effort in equipment
development. NATO is doing a great deal to overcome the complex problem of
rationalization, but until solutions are developed, NATO's full potential
as a fighting force will not be realized.
6. (IS) SUMMARY:
This is not
primarily the fault of USAREUR, but essentially a function of the scenario
within which it has been told to live and plan, and the evolution of
events which have stationed our forces where they are today in Europe. It is
time to meet the problem head on and develop a conventional defense strategy
and position our forces to meet the real capability of the Warsaw Pact. The
tactical and strategic nuclear capability within NATO will continue to be a
significant deterrent and must be maintained while a credible conventional
deterrent is developed.
TOB
to SEGRET
VII-2
9/13/76
CARTER ON SCHLESINGER
TAB
Q.
Should a President tolerate Cabinet members who dissent
from Administration policy as heavily as Jame S R. Schlesinger
did as Secretary of Defense?
A
I believe I could pr event that disharmony occurring by being
more heavily involved in the evolution of basic commitments. I
always managed the affairs of Georgia on long-range goals and
I can't imagine a basic strategic difference developing between
myself and one of my Cabinet members if the understanding were
that we worked toward the long-range goals. There might be
some differences on tactics. But I think I could tolerate the
degress of independence shown by James Schlesinger.
*
*
*
Q.
Of the recent Secretaries of Defense, is there one that you
have found you admire the most as a model for the job --
Schlesinger, Melvin Laird, Clark Clifford or Robert McNamara?
A.
Well, I'm a little reluctant to choose one because of the impled
criticism of the others. I think they all brought beneficial
characteristics to the job -- McNamara was coldly analytical,
and I think operated under very difficult circumstances in Vietnam.
-2-
Laird was much better able to work harmoniously with the
Congress. I think Schlesinger was a brilliant strategists
who was very independent, who thought he didn't have quite
close enough relationships with the President and the Secretary
of State to avoid public disharmonies, but I think a very competent,
brilliant man. I wouldn't want to say who was my favorite.
(National Journal 7/17/76)
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