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The original documents are located in Box 3, folder "Second Debate: Suggestions from
White House Staff" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 3 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE PRESIPPOT HAS SEEN
September 30, 1976
TO: Dick Cheney
Bob Teeter
FROM: Doug Bailey
SUBJECT: Foreign & Defense Policy Debate.
The President's major opportunity to win the election is in this
debate. Accordingly, while the "presidential" character of the first
debate should be maintained, it will be important (and appropriate)
for the President to be aggressive from the opening bell.
1.
Basic Strategy. There is peace. And Carter has no
experience. Those two points, repeated over and over,
can generally destroy any Carter argument.
e.g.: "This debate is between a man without two minutes
experience in formulating or executing foreign and
defense policy and the first President since
Eisenhower to be able to say this country is at
peace."
e.g.: "Mr. Carter's call for U. S. troop reductions in
Europe and Korea shows his inexperience. Those
steps must be the result of negotiations with
our allies in which their commitments are sought
to match our troop cutback. Mr. Carter has naively
played all his chips before even getting to the table." If
e.g.:
"I will keep Secretary Kissinger. The people know
my team. Because Mr. Carter has had no experience
at all, I hope he will tell the people in this
debate who his Secretary of State will be, who his
Secretary of Defense will be. The people have the
right to know who will be running the country's
foreign policy."
(This is my nominee for the lead statement, putting
Carter on the defensive from the outset. The
President must be prepared to comment on his choices
if he names them: Brzezinski -- no government
experience; George Ball -- of the Rusk, Bundy,
Rostow group; Henry Jackson -- does he want a
$7 billion defense cut?)
e.g. "Mr. Carter last July proudly said he had never met
an American President. Now he has. But has he
ever met a Secretary of State? Or a Secretary of
Defense? Or, more important, a foreign Secretary
of an ally -- or a head of State, friend or foe?"
- 2 --
e.g.: "Mr. Carter in our first debate said he couldn't
think of anything I've done. Well, quite aside
from 4,000,000 jobs and cutting inflation in half
and restoring trust to the White House, I would
hope Mr. Carter has noticed that this country is
at peace. To suggest that that is not an
accomplishment simply underscores his lack of
experience in this area."
2. Other points to hit hard on.
a.
5-7 billion budget cut. "It's misleading to promise
to re-organize government but not say how. It's
irresponsible to promise to reform taxes but not say
how. But it's truly dangerous for an inexperienced
man to promise to cut $7 billion from the defense
budget but not say how."
b.
B-1 bomber. "Mr. Carter's indecision on the B-1
bomber reflects either his inexperience or evasion
or both. I think it's important for Mr. Carter to
make up his mind and tell the people where he stands.
There's no button in the Oval Office marked 'maybe'."
C.
Radio Free Europe. "Mr. Carter is quite proud of
having written the Democratic Party Platform. Why did
he omit any mention of Radio Free Europe? I assume
it isn't indifference to the people of Eastern Europe?
Or is it lack of experience again?"
d.
Grain Sale Embargo. "The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, which
Mr. Carter supports, would restrict the right of the
American farmer to sell abroad. I oppose any such
restriction. Because I insisted on a U.S./Soviet
agreement I now cannot foresee any circumstance in
which an embargo on trade would be justified."
3.
Some strategy reminders.
a. Avoid the Republican VS. Democrat language. Even the fact
that each of the last 4 wars began under Democartic
Presidents is better said by naming the Presidents
rather than their Party.
b. Avoid citing "Congressional experience." Rather: "It's
been my responsibility for 25 years to know the details
of the nation's defense budget."
C. Henry Kissinger is unpopular only on the far extremes.
And a heavy attack on him can always be thwarted by
asking Carter who he would appoint, given his own
inexperience.
- 3 -
d.
"Open diplomacy" does not have a broad constituency.
"It shows Mr. Carter's naivete and inexperience to
think that national security treaties can be
negotiated publicly.'
e.
Peace is the answer to any criticism. "Mr. Carter's
criticism makes it sound as if this country is at war
rather than at peace. As far as I am concerned, peace
with freedom is the only valid test of a nation's
policy. That's exactly what we have."
f.
Even in the foreign area, it is unwise to claim credit
for the last 8 years -- only the last two. If we
claim credit in one area, we may have to accept blame
in other areas.
4.
A Clincher Point. At any point in the debate, when Mr.
Carter mis-states facts or policy or seems vague, an
effective comment might be: "Mr. Carter may wish to
revise what he just said. I think it's important that
both of us realize that in addition to the 100,000,000
Americans watching tonight, 200,000,000 more people are
watching throughout the world, including many foreign
leaders. I'm sure Mr. Carter would not wish the Kremlin
to think that he is uncertain whether America needs the
B-1 bomber." (Or: "I'm sure Mr. Carter would not wish
our allies to think we would withdraw troops without
discussing the subject with them carefully.")
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 5, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH:
DICK CHENEY
FROM:
JIM CAVANAUGH
SUBJECT:
Memorandum to Commerce Implementing
Certain Procedures Relating to Arab
Boycott of U.S. Firms
Attached is a memorandum for your signature. It has been
reviewed and approved by Ed Schmults, Jim Cannon, Jim Lynn
and Bill Gorog. Bill Hyland has okayed it subject to Brent
Scowcroft's review in San Francisco.
The memorandum has been cleared with Commerce. An
accompanying fact sheet indicating previous actions the
President has taken in the matter has been supplied to
Ron Nessen with the recommendation that it be released
at the time that the President's memorandum is released.
We urge that this be signed and released tonight so that we
can make a midnight deadline in some important papers.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Would you please assure that the Department of Commerce
takes steps to permit the public inspection and copying of
boycott-related reports to be filed in the future with the
Department of Commerce. Only business proprietary
information regarding such things as quantity and type of
goods exported, the release of which could place reporting
firms at a competitive disadvantage, should not be made
available to the public.
During the past year, there has been a growing interest in
and awareness of the impact of the Arab boycott on American
business. Disclosure of boycott-related reports will enable
the American public to assess for itself the nature and impact
of the Arab boycott and to monitor the conduct of American
companies.
I have concluded that this public disclosure will strengthen
existing policy against the Arab boycott of Israel without
jeopardizing our vital interests in the Middle East. The
action I am directing today should serve as a reaffirmation
of our national policy of opposition to boycott actions against
nations friendly to us.
To provide adequate notice to American exporters of this new
policy, these inspection procedures should be placed in effect
for reports filed after December, 1976.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Mr. President:
Attached for your consideration is a
draft concluding statement for the
debate.
B
Brent
WAS
For the past two years I have been charged with responsibility
for the foreign policy and national security of the United States. This
period has marked a major turning point for our country and for the
world. Today, America is strong, secure from threats or attacks.
Today, for the first time since President Eisenhower, a President
running for election can say we are at peace. I consider that my finest
achievement and, as we conclude this debate, I want to leave you with a
clear statement of my goals, and priorities to keep it that way over the
next four years.
First, I will assure that the strength of our Armed Forces
remains unsurpassed. It is the only sure way to preserve peace. It
is the necessary foundation of our diplomacy. No one will respect a
weak America.
Second, I will give the fullest attention to the strength of our alliances.
Our NATO and Asian allies share the total burden of our security, strengthen
our deterrent and reinforce our diplomacy.
Third, I will continue efforts to reduce tension with adversaries.
Always mindful of our deep and abiding differences I believe it is none-
theless essential in the nuclear age to keep differences from erupting
into military confrontation. In this context I will continue our dialogue
with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China, always
dealing from strength and, as a result, always able to insist on terms
which serve U.S. interests.
- 2 -
Fourth, in this spirit I will apply the enormous talent and tech-
nology of America to consolidating peace in such troubled areas as the
Middle East and in Africa. Beyond this, we must eliminate the root
causes of turmoil and conflict around the world: hunger, disease, food
and energy shortages, the environment, and nuclear proliferation. We
can solve these problems.
Finally, and most important, peace will be empty if we cannot
make progress in the defense of our principles. I will insure that the
American ideals of freedom for all peoples and races, the dignity and
security of every man and woman, and the sanctity of law, are reflected
in our international as well as our national policies. In the United Nations
and in other forums we will speak out for the principle of fairness that is
the heritage of America. This nation cannot be pressured or blackmailed.
My message to the world is that there is much to be accomplished with us
through cooperation; nothing through coercion. We face a compelling
mandate from mankind. Let's get on with it.
MIKE DUVAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
FYI
WASHINGTON
go
October 3, 1976
10/3/76
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DAVE GERGEN
FROM:
AGNES WALDRON
SUBJECT:
Max Frankel and Henry Trewitt
I talked to Bob McCloskey about both of these men. He said
Max Frankel is first rate, one of the finest persons he has
ever worked with. He is a superb analyst and is held in
high regard by Secretaries Rusk, Rogers and Kissinger.
Frankel was born in Germany in 1930. His parents were
refugees from Nazi Germany and came to the U.S. in 1940.
Frankel became a naturalized citizen in 1948. He received
an A.B. in Political Science from Columbia University in
1952. In 1953 he received an M.A. from the same University,
also in Political Science.
Frankel has been a member of the staff of the New York Times
since 1952. He has covered the White House and the State
Department. In 1968, he became chief of the Washington bureau
and later was promoted to associate editor where he has
responsibility for the Sunday edition.
I am unable to find much biographical information on Henry Trewitt.
He is from Tennessee and worked on a Tennessee newspaper. He joined
the Baltimore Sun and for a long time was their correspondent
in Bonn. Later he left the Sun for Newsweek but he returned to the
Sun. Ambassador McCloskey said Trewitt does not waste his time
worrying about marginal stuff, he is a serious journalist and
not a "personality." Trewitt is particularly interested in
Western Europe, NATO and Strategic Arms and is most knowledgeable
about all of these subjects.
Frankel is especially knowledgeable about the above subjects
and because of his background is concerned about Israel and
attendent Middle Eastern problems.
Attached is an article by Trewitt, appraising HAK. It is a
balanced appraisal of HAK's African effort.
Attachment
The Rhodesia deal was more than luck
Baltimore Sun 10-3-76
By HENRY L TREWHITT
be real. But if it does hold, Rhodesia
Kissinger himself says cheerfully that
control 16 million blacks, is at different
will make a peaceful transition to black
his "personal charm" tipped the bal-
matter. Even most blacks concede the
majority government. The lessons there
ance. He meant the remark lightly, one
vested interests of the whites there.
will be applied to Namibia-or South-
assumes, but neither is a frivolous
though not their assumed right to die-
West Africa-where South Africa rules
point. Being in the right place at the
tate:
Washington.
in defiance of world opinion. Eventual-
right time is a critical judgment of di-
From time to time, black Africa has
If it is Henry A. Kissinger's final
ly, they inevitably will be applied
plomacy. Personal charm, translated
become a public playground for the
grand pirouette on the global stage, no
against the white government in South
into persuasiveness and cold-eyed ex-
perpowers, as in the Congo in the mid-
one can complain about the last act. It
Africa itself. And the Russians will
ploitation of interests, is one of its tools.
1960's. More often, their competition
still is a bit early to bring down the cur-
have been maneuvered into impotence
For what is happening in Southern
for influence has been quieter The So-
tain. There may be time for another
in a strategic area.
Africa now is more than anything else a
viet Union by no means has fared badly.
arms control treaty with the Russians,
In human terms, the blood already
calculated, in some cases agonized,
despite its diplomatic ham-handedness.
even if the voters expel Mr. Ford. But
running will stop. Given the vast pre-
reappraisal of interests. The motives of
Its position in the horn of the Northeast
for high drama, with thousands of lives
ponderance of blacks over whites, and
some leaders are clear, of others ob-'
is strong. It has established influence in
and superpower strategy at stake, few
thus certainty of the eventual outcome,
scure. The drama has few elements of
some of the states now arrayed against
performances can equal that of the Sec-
only racists of both sides could wish
romance. It is a tale of survival and
Rhodesia.
retary of State in Southern Africa.
otherwise. Yet, Rhodesia, where 270,-
power.
His fragile deal between Rhodesia's
000 whites dictate to 6 million blacks,
The historical setting is important.
Late last year and early this year
white minority government and its
had held out through a generation of
In the generation since World War II
Angola became the greatest Soviet tro-
black neighbors may not hold. By its
change in most of Africa. Why did
the white colonial powers yielded grad-
phy in Africa. Russian money and guns,
very nature, there will be moments of
Prime Minister Ian D. Smith yield now,
ually to black rule. For most of that
and the proxy fighting of Cuban troops,
apparent collapse, and one of them may
and why through Mr. Kissinger? Some
generation, white Rhodesia survived as
installed the Socialist government of
critics argue that the secretary this
an anomaly, having declared its inde-
Agostinho Neto after Portugal aban-
Heary L. Trewhitt reports on diplomat-
doned the last important colonial
time merely happened to be in the right
pendence of Great Britain 11 years ago,
te affairs for The Sun.
place in the right circumstances. Mr.
South Africa, where 4 million whites
See RHODESIA, K2, CoL1
shaky but viable accord
RHODESIA, from KI
more nationalist than ideologue, willing
guarantee some of the things Mr. Smith
to take help from anyone as long as no
specified. Nor could Mr. Kissinger
strongholds The United
rattached
States due Kissinger's
guarantee absolutelyten end to United
all wanted Rhodesist
Nations sanctions especially If the
belated support for Mr. Neto's rivals
white government to yield quickly and
Russians object-of congressional ap-
collapsed against congressional opposi-
bloodlessly. R was by no means certain,
proval of several handred million dol-
tion and Communist power.
it
however, that they could agree among
lars in United States aid and indemnity
But Angola, to understate it, held
themselves on Rhodesia's future or on
funds for Rhodesia. All are elements of
Mr. Kissinger's attention on Africa.
the allotment of power among Rhode-
the complex settlement package.
Above all else, lie takes the long view,
sia's fragmented revolutionary move-
backward and forward. He could envi-
Actually, U Sofficials said, they had
ments.
received general approval of the ap-
sion Southerm:Africa, with its wast re-
In that light, the threatened blood-
proach from the black leaders, not de-
sources, falling totally under Soviet in-
bath in Rhodesia also contained risks
tailed acceptance, as Mr. Smith seemed
fluence as.it made . bloody transition
for other leaders, white and black,
to believe. Taken all together, the evi-
to black government.
throughout the area. Confusion and divi-
dence suggested that Mr. Kissinger al-
Mc
Those resources are important in a
sion n black Africa. Chaos in South AP
lowed some impressions to develop un-
world cingishortages South Africa al-
rica, as militant white volunteers
warranted momentum, to put It charit-
so overlooks crowded sea-lanes, histori-
surged across the border to help their
ably. In turn, the white Rhodesians and
cally a prime element in strategic posi-
neighbors. Increasing manipulation by
their black neighbors put their own in-
tion. Administration planners could
the great powers, with the danger of
terpretation, each according to his po-
sense domestic Implications in the de-
confrontation.
litical needs, on each element of the
veloping conflict as well. American
Enter Mr. Kissinger, talking of a
package.
blacks would sympathize with Southern
peaceful solution. For once he was on
Africa's blacks, creating turmoil at
Those who advocate higher morality
the side of the angels at home and he
home-especially if the United States
and less secrecy in foreign affairs may
was prepared to exploit all of the
wound up in the familiar position of
not approve. But it is not an unfamiliar
changes in the area. The domestic judg-
seeming to support elite capitalism
pattern in negotiations. The end result
ment of his effort still is by no means fl-
over the masses. American interests
often, as in this case, is that the negotia-
nal. But be went with the blessing of
were obvious, if how to serve them was
tors find themselves further down a
white liberals and most American
not.
long road than they might otherwise.
blacks. Even conservative criticism has
Mr. Kissinger's reaction was histor-
been muted. Apparently, he persuaded
For the Russians, the'development is
ic. He moved to pre-empt the Soviet
many conservatives that support for
a severe political embarrassment.
role, approaching Africans under the
Africa's whites was politically impossi-
Their assault on Mr. Kissinoer's diplo-
maxim: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em.
ble, and that orderly transition in fact
macy has been unusually strident. For
As it turned out, the response was hap-
was the only way to protect American
one thing, they see it as an effort to
pier than he might have expected. The
interest.
preserve American interests and the se-
reason, apparently. was that reassess-
What followedwas, in most respects,
curity of white Africans, which it is.
ments were under way in other capitals
vintage Kissinger. First be appealed to
For another, they have labeled it as a
at the same time.
Mr. Vorster's need for time. Mr. Vors-
disguised campaign to preserve white
For South Africa, the message of An-
ter, in turn, threatened to shut off vital
rule, which it is not.
gola-- reflected in the rioting of
economic channels to Rhodesia. Left
South Africa's own blacks-foretold the
The whole delicate structure could
with nowhere to turn, Mr. Smith made
future: White rule had been left naked
break down at any time on any of sever-
the critical decision he had avoided be-
by Portugal's departure. Prime Minis-
al issues. No doubt, there will be crises
fore-to begin concrete steps toward
ter John Vorster did not have the ulti-
in negotiations, including interruptions.
majority rule.
mate answers for his own racial transi-
But the dynamics of change are now
The tactical details available so far
tion. But one thing he needed was time.
running, as Mr. Kissinger recognized,
suggest Mr. Kissinger took many short
Orderly transition in Rhodesia might
ready for further exploitation. In that
cuts, not a rarity in diplomacy. Mr.
buy time for South Africa. As principal
regard, he has achieved a breakthrough.
Smith for example, said in his address
supplier and supporter for Rhodesia,
He was, indeed, in the right place at the
of capitulation that Mr. Kissinger had
South Africa in effect could decide Rho-
right time. But it is more complicated
promised an end to economic sanctions
than that.
desia's future if not its own.
and terrorism with the first steps to
In the so-called frontline black
ward transition. He set out the black-
states-Zambia, Tansents, Mozam-
white division of power in detail.
blgue, Botswans and
"Who? Us?" the black leaders an
weire certain of their goals, cheestain of
swered in effect. They wanted negotia
execution and consequences. In outlook,
tions, but without preconditions Some-
they range from the militance of Mr.
how the principals appeared to be sad
Neto and Mozambique's Samora
died with promises they were not aware
Machel to the moderation of Zambia's
they had made.
Kenneth Kaunda. Tanzania's exquisite-
by intellectual Julius Nyerere exempli-
As a practical matter, the black
fies the Socialist third world leader,
leaders of government were unable to
A shaky but viable accord
RHODESIA, from KI
more nationalist than ideologue, willing
guarantee some of the things Mr. Smith
to take help from anyone as long as no
specified. Nor could Mr. Kissinger
stronghold on the continent. The United
strings are attached.
guarantee absolutely an end to United
States was humiliated. Mr. Kissinger's
Obviously all wanted Rhodesia's
Nations sanctions-especially if the
belated support for Mr. Neto's rivals
white government to yield quickly and
Russians object-or congressional ap-
collapsed against congressional opposi-
bloodlessly. It was by no means certain,
proval of several hundred million dol-
tion and Communist power.
however, that they could agree among
lars in United States aid and indemnity
But Angola, to understate it, held
themselves on Rhodesia's future or on
funds for Rhodesia. All are elements of
Mr. Kissinger's attention on Africa.
the allotment of power among Rhode-
the complex settlement package.
Above all else, he takes the long view,
sia's fragmented revolutionary move-
backward and forward. He could envi-
Actually, U.S. officials said, they had
ments.
sion Southern Africa, with its vast re-
received general approval of the ap-
In that light, the threatened blood-
proach from the black leaders, not de-
sources, falling totally under Soviet in-
bath in Rhodesia also contained risks
fluence as it made a bloody transition
tailed acceptance, as Mr. Smith seemed
for other leaders, white and black,
to black government.
to believe. Taken all together, the evi-
throughout the area. Confusion and divi-
dence suggested that Mr. Kissinger al-
Those resources are important in a
sion in black Africa. Chaos in South Af-
lowed some impressions to develop un-
world facing shortages. South Africa al-
rica, as militant white volunteers
warranted momentum, to put it charit-
so overlooks crowded sea-lanes, histori-
surged across the border to help their
ably. In turn, the white Rhodesians and
cally a prime element in strategic posi-
neighbors. Increasing manipulation by
their black neighbors put their own in-
tion. Administration planners could
the great powers, with the danger of
terpretation, each according to his po-
sense domestic implications in the de-
confrontation.
litical needs, on each element of the
veloping conflict as well. American
Enter Mr. Kissinger, talking of a
package.
blacks would sympathize with Southern
peaceful solution. For once he was on
Africa's blacks, creating turmoil at
Those who advocate higher morality
the side of the angèls at home and he
home-especially if the United States
and less secrecy in foreign affairs may
was prepared to exploit all of the
wound up in the familiar position of
not approve. But it is not an unfamiliar
changes in the area. The domestic judg-
seeming to support elite capitalism
pattern in negotiations. The end result
ment of his effort still is by no means fi-
over the masses. American interests
often, as in this case, is that the negotia-
nal. But he went with the blessing of
were obvious, if how to serve them was
tors find themselves further down a
white liberals and most American
not.
long road than they might otherwise.
blacks. Even conservative criticism has
Mr. Kissinger's reaction was histor-
been muted. Apparently, he persuaded
For the Russians, the development is
ic. He moved to pre-empt the Soviet
many conservatives that support for
a severe political embarrassment.
role, approaching Africans under the
Africa's whites was politically impossi-
Their assault on Mr. Kissinoer's diplo-
maxim: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em.
ble, and that orderly transition in fact
macy has been unusually strident. For
As it turned out, the response was hap-
was the only way to protect American
one thing, they see it as an effort to
pier than he might have expected. The
interest.
preserve American interests and the se-
reason, apparently, was that reassess-
What followedwas, in most respects,
curity of white Africans, which it is.
ments were under way in other capitals
vintage Kissinger. First, he appealed to
For another, they have labeled it as a
at the same time.
Mr. Vorster's need for time. Mr. Vors-
disguised campaign to preserve white
For South Africa, the message of An-
ter, in turn, threatened to shut off vital
rule, which it is not.
gola-now reflected in the rioting of
economic channels to Rhodesia. Left
South Africa's own blacks-foretold the
The whole delicate structure could
with nowhere to turn, Mr. Smith made
future. White rule had been left naked
break down at any time on any of sever-
the critical decision he had avoided be-
by Portugal's departure. Prime Minis-
al issues. No doubt, there will be crises
fore-to begin concrete steps toward
ter John Vorster did not have the ulti-
in negotiations, including interruptions.
majority rule.
mate answers for his own racial transi-
But the dynamics of change are now
The tactical details available so far
tion. But one thing he needed was time.
running, as Mr. Kissinger recognized,
suggest Mr. Kissinger took many short
Orderly transition in Rhodesia might
ready for further exploitation. In that
cuts, not a rarity in diplomacy. Mr.
buy time for South Africa. As principal
regard, he has achieved a breakthrough.
Smith for example, said in his address
supplier and supporter for Rhodesia,
He was, indeed, in the right place at the
of capitulation that Mr. Kissinger had
South Africa in effect could decide Rho-
right time. But it is more complicated
promised an end to economic sanctions
desia's future if not its own.
than that.
and terrorism with the first steps to-
In the so-called frontline black
ward transition. He set out the black-
states-Zambia, Tanzania, Mozam-
white division of power in detail.
bique, Botswana and Angola-leaders
"Who? Us?" the black leaders an.
were certain of their goals. uncertain of
swered in effect. They wanted negotia-
execution and consequences. In outlook,
tions, but without preconditions. Some-
they range from the militance of Mr.
how the principals appeared to be sad-
Neto and Mozambique's Samora
died with promises they were not aware
Machel to the moderation of Zambia's
they had made.
Kenneth Kaunda. Tanzania's exquisite-
by intellectual Julius Nyerere exempli-
As a practical matter, the black
fies the Socialist third world leader.
leaders of government were unable to