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Digitized from Box 3 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
::
Mr. President, you recently stated that Governor
Carter slandered the good name of the United States
when he said that we have lost respect throughout
the world. However, a recent overseas poll by the
U.S.I.A. now reveals that respect for the United
States among the people of Western Europe has sunk
to its lowest point in 22 years. Don't you owe
Mr.
Mr. Carter an apology?
A:
I did indeed state that Mr. Carter slandered the good
num lost Mrun
name of the United States and I repeat that statement
now.
Let me remind you what Mr. Carter said about
his own country - speaking to all the world by satellite
television: he not only said that we are "not strong
any more", that we are not "respected any more" -
listen to what else he says: he made the grave
charge that we overthrew the elected government in
Chile. He even said this was a "typical example" and
there "may be many others".
He even charged that we "tried to start a new
Viet Nam in Angola", - those were his words.
-2-
A: (cont'd. )
These allegations against his own country are
absolutely false and Mr. Carter knew they were
false when he made them.
Nnen
Tonight he will again be speaking to a world
wide audience and I call upon him now to either
prove those charges or to retract them here on
this podium tonight.
*
*
*
*
(The above might be a good place to end and
let Carter worry about an instant reply. If there
is a follow-up question or if the President would
like to end on a more affirmative note, I suggest
something like the following. )
* * * *
It would be easy for a President to
win Gallup Polls in a foreign country if that's what
he cares about: all he has to do is say yes to every-
thing they ask for.
But the policies of this administration are
determined by the best interests of the United
States, both domestically and as the recognized
leader of the free world. Our policies- our strength
- our morality have maintained peace in a very
-3- -
troubled world and peace will continue to be our
FORD LIBRARY 97VR7
objective regardless of any Gallup Polls in other
countries.
ITEM: It is ironic that Carter made his derogatory
remarks just before the United States made the
first clean sweep in the 75 year history of the
Nobel prizes: Chemistry, Physics, Medicine,
Economics and Literature. I think this tells us
more about the United States' position in the world
than any opinion poll.
FORD & LIBRARY
US PRESTIGE IN EUROPE
ä
Mr. President, what is your reaction to the USIA poll which
it was reported yesterday shows US prestige in Western Europe
at its lowest point in 22 years?
A:
America's greatest international strength lies in our close ties
of friendship and alliance with the nations of Western Europe. In
the Atlantic Community, our solidarity is being more impressively
shown than at any time in the past two decades. Our prestige is
high. Our friendship has never been better.
I am not speaking from the basis of any one poll -- and I would
note, first, my understanding that the evaluation of the poll you
refer to has not even been completed and, second, that it was made
available to the press -- as the reporter acknowledges -- for partisan
political reasons. I could cite a German poll conducted last
Rabia
summer which stated that friendship with the United States was at
the highest in the 18 years that the poll has been taken. So there
are polls and polls.
The simple facts are Western Europe values American
leadership. Western Europe respects America. Over the first
two years of my Presidency, we have clearly demonstrated the
capacity of the West to provide for the common defense and to deal
with common problems, and over the next four years we will build
on this progress. The most significant measure of our relations
is the attitude of the European leaders with whom we must work,
- 2 -
FORD & LIBRARY
and their unanimous public comments as they came here this
year to help us celebrate our Bicentennial testify unmistakably
to the closeness of our relations and the esteem in which the US
is held.
There is trust, there is respect, there is confidence and
there is optimism. This is reflected at all levels of our government-
to-government dealings, and it is reflected in the frienship between
the American and European peoples.
NOTE: Over the two years of your Presidency you have met
with 124 foreign leaders (more than any other President over a
comparable period), including 58 leaders of Western Europe.
FROM USIS, BONN
11630
BRENT
July 9, 1976
FORD
Subject: Wickert Poll on Friendship with U.S.
67 per cent of the West German citizens polled
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during the past two weeks consider friendship between
the FRG and the US as "most important," the Wickert
Public Opinion Institute disclosed July 6.
This marks highest response favoring US in the 18 years
the Institute has been sampling German adult opinion
on the subject.
Runners up:
France
17 per cent
Great Britain
13 per cent
USSR
3 per cent
Monsen:
Interested in micss /not polls.
R558R A4894) 1WYDWYDRYR
POPULARITY
Hylandoth
WASHINGTON, OCT 20, REUTER - AMERICAN "POPULARITY"" AMONG
WESTERN EUROPEANS HAS FALLEN TO ITS LOWEST POINT IN 22 YEARS,
ACCORDING TO POLLS TAKEN FOR THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION
AGENCY, OFFICIAL SOURCES SAID TODAY.
THE POLLS WERE TAKEN LAST SUMMER IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY
AND WEST GERMANY AND WERE THE LATEST IN A SERIES CONDUCTED
ROUGHLY EVERY THREE YEARS.
U.S.I.A. SOURCES SAID DATA WAS STILL BEING ANALYZED AND
THEY COULD NOT RELEASE DETAILS OF THE RAW RESULTS.
BUT THE MAIN TREND, THEY SAID, WAS A SHIFT AMONG
RESPONDENTS AWAY FROM A POSITIVE FEELING ABOUT THE UNITED
STATES AND INTO A FEELING OF ""NO OPINION."
IN THIS SENSE, U.S. '"POPULARITY"' ABROAD DECLINED. BUT THERE
WAS NO COMPARABLE INCREASE IN ""BAD FEELING" ABOUT THE U.S.
THE POLL, EVEN THOUGH THE INFORMATION IS PRELIMINARY, IS
LIKELY TO BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
NOW IN ITS FINAL TWO WEEKS.
DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE JIMMY CARTER HAS CLAIMED THAT AMERICAN
PRESTIGE AROUND THE WORLD WAS AT AN ALL-TIME LOW. PRESIDENT
DRD HAS DENIED THE ASSERTION AND ALLEGED HIS OPPONENT WAS
SLANDERING" THE GOOD NAME OF THE UNITED STATES.
MORE 2341
R559R A8006)LWYDWYDIYC
POPULARITY 2 WASHINGTON
A SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.S.I.A., THE GOVERNMENT"S INFORMATION
ARM ABROAD, DECLINED ANY OFFICIAL COMMENT BEYOND SAYING THAT
THE RESULTS OF SIMILAR POLLS HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN PREVIOUS
YEARS.
BUT U.S.I.A. SOURCES SAID THIS YEAR"S POLL ALSO WOULD BE
PUBLISHED AFTER ANALYSIS IS COMPLETED.
THEY SAID TWO SETS OF ANALYSTS HAD BEEN GIVEN THE RAW DATA
BUT HAD COME TO SOMEWHAT DIFFERING VIEWS AND OFFICIALS WERE NOW
TRYING TO RECONCILE THEM.
THE SOURCES SAID THE POLL WAS TAKEN LAST JULY AND AUGUST
AS ""RIDERS"" TO SURVEYS BEING CONDUCTED BY U.S. POLLING
ORGANIZATIONS ON OTHER TOPICS.
THEY SAID THERE WERE SIX QUESTIONS, SOME RELATING TO
OPINION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES IN GENERAL AND OTHERS TO
INTERNAL EVENTS IN AMERICA.
ALTHOUGH OVERALL FAVORABLE OPINION ABOUT THE UNITED
STATES HAD DECLINED, EUROPEANS WERE GENERALLY AFFIRMATIVE WHEN
ASKED IF THEY THOUGHT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WAS FUNCTIONING
IN THE UNITED STATES AND IF THE COUNTRY COULD SOLVE ITS OWN
PROBLEMS.
REUTER 2344
SOVIET EMIGRATION
TORD
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Q:
Mr. President, you have been accused of defaulting on
important humanitarian issues, including the issue of Soviet
emigration. Governor Carter has been active on this issue
and has told us that only this week, he sent the following
telegram to Vladimer Slepak:
"I have read with great concern about the treatment
that you and some of your colleagues suffered
recently. As you know, I have spoken out on this
matter as Governor and during this campaign and have
referred to your case by name. I want you to know
of my deep personal interest in the treatment that
you and your colleagues receive. Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter"
How do you answer this charge, Mr. President?
A:
I am firmly convinced the best way to deal with this problem
is through quiet efforts rather than a publicity campaign.
Let's look at the record of Jewish emigration from the Soviet
Union. In 1968 the rate was 400 a year. Through sustained
but unpublicized efforts we were able to increase that rate
to 35,000. However, once it became a major public issue and
a subject of legislation linked to trade, emigration fell off
to its current rate of about 12,000 which is still far above
the 1968 level. Our quiet efforts have also been successful
in securing the release of a number of special hardship cases, but
to mention names could jeopardize the chances of any future
efforts. I believe this is the way to deal with this problem.
The kind of telegram you refer to may make good publicity, but
it is not likely to be helpful in solving the problem and
could be quite harmful.
10/17/76
7:00 pm
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
MORALITY AND MORALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
FORD
Americans are today in the throes of the quadrennial
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debate about our past, our present, and the future we hope
to create. In a world where too many are dominated by oppressive
regimes and intolerant ideologies, it is a dramatic demonstration
of the strength of our democracy and the greatness of our nation.
Whatever the outcome, Americans should take pride that we
have once again experienced the reality of a free and democratic
system which gives hope to those countless millions around the
world who yearn for freedom,
It is also, let us be honest, a time of confusion and of
exaggeration. Some tell us we are weak; others tell us we are
strong. Some tell us that our prestige is declining; others assert
-2-
that our global influence for peace and progress has never been
greater. Some tell us we are in retreat around the world;
others tell us we have never been more respected, more
successful abroad than we are today.
As Secretary of State I am, of course, detached
from partisan debate, although I will admit that my sympathies
and in my view; the truth, tend to lie with the "others" rather
than the "some. "
But no matter how strongly Americans may disagree on
specific issues, the history of the post-war period has left
no doubt about the nature of our global responsibility. Without
America's commitment there can be no security. Without our
dedication there can be no progress. Without our strength,
-3-
peoples throughout the world will live in fear. Without our
faith, the world will live without hope.
All of us here are deeply concerned about the survival
and security of Israel. But we also know that the fate of even
our closest friends cannot be assured in a vaccum. Peace,
and
justice, security,/progress will not be securely won for America
or Israel unless they are embedded in a peaceful, just, secure
and progressive international order. The task of building such
an order is the fundamental challenge of our time.
America's unique contribution to
world affairs
has been our conviction that while history is often cruel, fate
can be shaped by human faith and courage. Our optimism has
made us understand better than many more jaded civilizations
-4-
that all great achievements were a dream before they became
a reality and that in this sense all that is creative is ultima tely
a moral affirmation -- the faith that dares in the absence of proof;
the courage to go forward when results are uncertain.
No people has experienced more of man's exaltation
than the Jewish people; few have suffered more from man's
deprevity. The Jewish people know that survival requires
unending struggle. But they know as well that peace, if it is
to be more than a prophet' S dream, must rest on the conscience
of mankind translated into concrete efforts by all peoples and
all nations.
America , because of its own heritage, is perennially
engaged in such a search of its conscience. What is the relationship
between morality and foreign policy? How can America carry
-5-
forward its role as human example and champion of justice?
and
How do we secure our existence/that of our allies and friends
in a world in which power remains a crucial arbiter? How do
we reconcile ends and means, principle and survival?
These questions have been asked throughout
our history and they are being posed again today. But we should
beware of simple answers and easy slogans. There is no doubt that
policy without moral purpose is like a ship without a rudder
drifting aimlessly from crisis to crisis. A policy of pure
calculation will be empty of vision and humanity. It will
lack not only direction, but also roots and heart. This country
has always had a sense of moral mission; Americans have always
held the view that America stood for something above and beyond
its material achievements.
-6-
But we must never forget that policy is the art
of the possible; the science of the relative. We live in a world
of 150 sovereign states, profound ideological differences and
nuclear weapons. Our power is enormous, but it is still
finite. "A wise policy must transcend rhetoric. A truly moral
policy must relate ends to means and commitments to capabilities.
We must keep our eyes on distant horizons; we must also keep
our feet planted firmly in reality. We must learn to distinguish
morality from moralizing. An attempt to impose our values
on all other societies will lead to either a restless interventionism
beyond our resources and what our people will support or to
a withdrawal from the world. We should never forget that the
invocation of abstract principles has in our history led as frequently.
-7-
to abdication as to overextension. Both tendencies would be-
disastrous to all prospects of international order.
Our challenge is to be true to both these impulses
--
to live up to America's usual promise while fulfilling the
still
practical needs of world order. This challenge will/be
with us when the campaign rhetoric ends two short weeks hence;
indeed we will face it for as far ahead as we can see. How
we meet it will determine the peace and progress of America
and of the world.
With your permission, it is this subject that I would
like to discuss today.
American Ideals and American Foreign Policy
Because of our history and geography, foreign policy
has never been central to American life, as it has been for many
-8-
other countries. The history of our foreign policy has been an
experience of learning and of exploring. The tension between
impulse and experience has been a creative force but also an
unresolved dilemma in our perception of foreign policy.
As the United States has grown into the role of
world power, the morality of our actions abroad has been a
recurrent subj ect of the debate -- before World War I, between
the wars, in the 50's and 60's, and again now. The very issues
we hear discussed today -- openness in negotiation, distaste for
armaments and tyrants, fear of involvement, preference for
humanitarian endeavors -- were the focus of equally heated debate
in the 1920's when the affirmation of high moral principle caused
us to opt for isolationism.
-9-
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-
From its beginnings, Americans have always
believed that this country had a moral significance that
transcended its geographic, military or economic power. Unique
among the nations of the world, America was created as a conscious
act by men dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles
they believed to be of universal applicability. Small wonder,
then, that Santayana concluded, "Being an American is, of itself,
almost a moral condition. "
But this idealism has also been in constant tension
with another deep-seated strain in our history and experience.
Since Tocqueville, it has been frequently observed that we are
pragmatic people -- common-sensical, undogmatic, and undoctrinaire --
a nation of practical energy, ingenuity and spirit. We have
-10-
made tolerance and compromise the basis of our domestic
political life. While we have defined our basic principles --
justice, liberty, equality and progress -- in universal terms,
domestically we have sought to enlarge opportunity and freedom
rather than coerce a uniform standar d of conduct.
America has been most effective internationally when
we have combined our idealistic with our pragmatic tradition.
The Founding Fathers were idealists who launched a new experiment
in human liberty. But they were also sophisticated men of the
world; they understood the European balance of power and
manipulated it brilliantly to secure their independence. For
a century thereafter, we devoted our energies to the development of
our continent, content to influence the world b y moral example
FORD
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alone. Shielded by two oceans and the British Navy, and blessed
by a bountiful nature, we tended to believe our special situation
was universally valid, even for nations whose narrower margin
of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited
than our own. We disparaged power even as we grew strong;
we tended to see our successes and the product not of fortunate
circumstance but of virtue and purity of motive.
As our strength grew, we became uncomfortable with
the uses and responsibilities of power and impatient with the
requirements of day-to-day diplomacy. Our rise to the status
of a great power was feared and resisted by many Americans who
foresaw only a process of deepening involvene nt in a morally
questionable world.
- 12 -
In the early decades of this century we sought to
reconcile the tension between ideals and interests by
confining ourselves to humanitarian efforts and resort
to our belief in the preeminence of law. We pioneered
relief programs; we championed free trade and openness
to foreign investment. We attempted to legislate solutions
to international conflicts -- we experimented with
arbitration, conciliation, legal arrangements, neutrality
legislation, collective security systems.
These efforts to banish the reality of power
culminated in our involvement in two world wars.
While we had a clear security interest in a
Europe free from domination by any one power we clothed
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FORD & LIBRARY
it in assertions that we would go to battle for universal
moral objectives --"a war to end all wars" or the
unconditional surrender of the aggressor.
Disillusionment set in as the outcome of both world
wars necessarily fell short of expectations. A tide of
isolationist sentiment rose, accompanied by heightened moral
proclamations coupled with a lowered willingness to undertake
concrete commitments. Many Americans began to
conclude that foreign involvement served no purpose but
to debase the New World into service to the Old. In
both world wars, total victory and an impatience with the
political requirements of peace only enhanced our sense
of moral rectitude. We were poorly prepared for a world of
- 14 -
imperfect security, alliances of convenience, recurrent
crises and the need for political structure to secure
peace in a turbulent world.
We entered the decades after World War II, our
first sustained period of peacetime world leadership, with
a supreme self-assurance fortunately matched by over-
whelming material superiority. And we faced an antagonist
whose political system and actions on the world scene
explicitly threatened, yet again, the very existence of our
most cherished principles.
In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white
divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our
cause. Fortunately, our preponderant power gave us a broad
margin for error. We saw economic problems around
- 15 -
the world -- which we had solved successfully in our own
country -- and sought to overwhelm them with the sheer
weight of resources. We projected our domestic experience
;
overseas and assumed that economic progress automatically
led to political stability. And in the process without making
a conscious decision to do so we set about trying to shape
the world to our design.
The Complexities of the Contemporary World
We no longer live in so simple a world.
We remain the strongest nation and the largest
single influence on international affairs. For thirty years,
our leadership has sustained world peace, progress, and
justice. Our leadership is no less needed today but it
- 16 -
must be redefined to meet changing conditions. Ours
is no longer a world of American nuclear monopoly;
rather it is a world of substantial nuclear equivalence.
Ours is a world of proliferating centers of power and
influence, and at the same time of economic interdependence
and common global challenges.
Today, for the first time in the modern American
experience, we can neither escape from the world nor
dominate it. We can no longer rely exclusively on massive
resources to solve our problems. Today like all other
nations in history we must conduct diplomacy with
subtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination if we are
to preserve and forward our national goals.
- 17 -
We can no longer always impose our own solutions;
yet our action or inaction will influence events , often
decisively. Our leadership remains essential if the
world is to shape cooperative international relationships
that bring mankind peace and progress and human justice.
We cannot banish power from international affairs,
but we can use our own power wisely and firmly to deter
aggression and encourage restraint. We can encourage
the resolution of disputes through negotiation. We can
help construct more equitable relations between developed
and developing nations, and a wider community of interest
among all nations.
These are worthy goals and they are achievable.
- 18 -
But they require a different kind of moral conviction than in
a simpler past. They require the stamina to persevere amid
complexity and endless exertion; the courage to hold fast
to our goals while recognizing that at any one time they
may remain but partially fulfilled.
The complexity of contemporary international
affairs has led some to seek easier answers. We are told
that our foreign policy is excessively concerned with
power politics and too little concerned with human values.
Painfully negotiated gradual steps toward bold objectives
are dismissed as inadequate because partial. The very
processes of diplomacy, necessary to achieve any
national objective, are disparaged as incompatible with
democratic principles.
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It- is time to face the reality of our situation.
It
is well to remember that it was precisely such slogans as
prestige and influence that a decade and a half ago tempted
:
us into adventures that divided our country and undermined
our international position. We should always keep in
mind that it is only in the last few years that we have
finally begun to bring our commitments into line with our
capabilities. We must of course maintain our values and
our principles; but we risk certain disaster unless we
relate them to a concept of the national interest and
international order based not on impulse but on a sense
of purpose that can be maintained by our people with
conviction and steadiness for decades.
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Our choice is not between morality and pragmatism.
We cannot escape either and remain true to our national
character or to the needs of peace and progress. Our
i
cause should be just but it must prosper in a world of
sovereign nations and competing wills. Neither the
rhetoric of moral purity nor an obsession with power
politics will produce the foreign policy worthy of our
challenge -- or even for our survival.
The Morality of Ends
America -- and the community of nations --
today faces inescapable challenges:
-21-
-- We must maintain a secure and just peace;
-- We must create a cooperative and beneficial
international order;
-- We must defend the rights and the dignity of man.
Each of these challenges has both a moral and a practical
dimension. Each involves important ends; but they are sometimes
in conflict. When that is the case we face the real moral
dilemma of foreign policy: the need to choose between valid
ends and of relating ends to means. And we must then be
mature enough to face the fact that when two conflicting objectives
cannot be achieved simultaneously one or the other will suffer at
least temporarily.
In an age when nuclear cataclysm threatens mankind's
very survival, peace is the first and fundamental moral imperative.
-22-
Without it, nothing else we do or seek can ultimately have
meaning. Let there be no mistake about it -- averting the
danger of nuclear war, limiting the growth of destructive
nuclear arsenals is a moral as well as political act.
In the nuclear age, traditional power politics, the
struggle for marginal advantages, the politics of prestige and
unilateral gains must yield to a sense of responsibility
unparalleled in history. Balances based on constant tests of
strength have always in history erupted into war. But in the
nuclear age this is unacceptable. Every President, sooner or
later, will conclude with President Eisenhower that, "There is no
alternative to peace. "
But peace, however crucial, cannot be our only goal. We must
not seek it at any price for that would render us morally
FORD
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defenseless and place the world at the mercy of the most
ruthless. Mankind must do more, as Tacitus said, than
"make a desert and call it peace. "
In the search for peace we are thus continually called
upon to strike balances -- between strength and conciliation;
between partial and total settlements; between the need to defend
our values and our interests and the need to take into account
the views of others. And we must reflect this balance in our
public discourse. Barely four years ago many argued that
conciliation was the only valid route to peace; today policies of
conciliation are frequently denounced as unilateral concessions.
This again is too simple. There will be no stability in a world
whose obsession with peace leads to appeasement; but neither
will there be security in a world which competes only in mock
-24-
tough rhetoric and in the accumulation of arms. Strength
is essential but its nature needs analysis and it should never
be an end in itself. Our policy must be always ready for
conciliation. We must never lose sight of the fact that we owe
our people a satisfactory explanation for their sacrifices and
that we should bequeath to future generations something more
hopeful than a balance of terror.
The second moral imperative is global cooperation.
We now live in a world of more than 150 countries, each
asserting sovereignty and claiming the right to fulfill its national
goals. Clearly no nation can realize all its goals without
impairing the hopes of others. Compromise and shared
endeavors are inescapable. An age of growing interdependence
produces the imperative of world community made all the more
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FORD & LIBRARY
urgent by the danger of polarization.
We live in an age of division, not merely between East
and West but between the advanced industrial nations and the
developing nations. Clearly a world in which a few nations
constitute islands of wealth in a sea of poverty, disease and
despair is morally intolerable and fundamentally insecure. But
equally intolerable are the tactics of confrontation with which
some of the devel oping nations have pursued their goals.
The challenge of world community cannot be met by
obsessive protestations of gui It characteristic of some advanced
nations nor by inadequte sacrifices by the industrial nations nor by the
bloc politics of many of the developing countries. What is required
is a serious dedication to a spirit of cooperation.
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The objectives of the developing nations are clear:
they want economic development, a role in international
decisions that affect them, and an equitable share of
global economic benefits. The goals of the industrial
nations are equally tlear: widening prosperity, an open
world system of trade and investments with expanding
markets for North and South; and reliable and equitable develop-
ment of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw
materials.
- 27 -
The goals of both sides can be achieved only if they
are seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. The
process of building a new era of international economic
relationships will continue through the rest of this century.
It will require compromise and negotiation among diverse
and contending interests. Above all it requires a moral
act: a willingness on the part of the rich to make the
relatively small sacrifices which can contribute to a sense
while there is still time for conciliation and
of community now/before the world is inevitably split into
contending camps; a readiness on the part of the weak and
the poor to recognize the difference between rhetoric
and progress and a willingness to refrain from blackmail
or extortion. Only in this manner can we build
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a stable and creative world which all nations -- new and
old, weak and strong, rich and poor -- have a stake in
preserving because they had a part in building it.
The third moral imperative is the nurturing of
human values. Today the tools of modern technology are
used not onlyfor mankind's betterment, but to intimidate,
terrorize, and control. It is the tragedy of our times
that the very forces of change that have made ours the
most productive century in the history of man have also
served to subject millions the world over to a new dimension
of intimidation and suffering.
Individual freedom of conscience and expression
is the proudest heritage of our civilization. All we do in
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the world. -- in the search for peace, for greater political
i
cooperation, for a fair and flourishing international economy --
must be rooted in fundamental liberties which permit the
fullest expression of mankind's creativity. Technological
progress without justice mocks humanity; national unity
without freedom is the unity of regimentätion; nationalism
without a consciousness of human community -- including
a shared concern for human rights -- can become an instrument
of oppression and a force for evil. The United States,
to be true to its values, has an obligation to stand for
the defense of human rights.
But responsibility compels also a recognition of
our limits. Our alliances and political relationships serve
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regional and world security. If well conceived, they are not
favors to other governments, but reflect a recognition of
mutual and global interests. They should be withdrawn only
:
when these interests change and not, as a general rule, as
a punishment for acts with which we do not agree. In
many countries, like South Korea, whatever the internal
structure, thè populations are unified in seeking our
protection against outside aggression. In many countries,
such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, our foreign policy
relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces
of change. And in many countries it is the process of
American disengagement that has eroded their sense of
security and created the perception that there is a need for
- 31 -
greater internal discipline, while at the same time
diminishing our ability to influence the domestic practices
we criticize.
There are no simple answers to this dilemma.
The painful experience of the last decade should have
taught us that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to
foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in
other societies. Therefore let me restate the principles
that have guided our actions:
--
Human rights are a legitimate international
concern and have been so defined in international
agreementsfor more than a generation.
- 32 -
;
-
The United States will stand up for human
rights in appropriate international forums
and in exchanges with other governments.
--
We will be mindful of the limits of our reach;
we will be conscious of the difference between
public postures that satisfy our self-esteem
and policies that bring positive results.
We thus return to our central problem which
affects each of the moral imperatives of our time -- peace,
global community, and human dignity. In foreign policy, at
any one time, only partial solutions are possible. If
every nation of the world presses for the immediate
implementation of all of its values, hopes and desires, eternal
conflict is inevitable. If we insist that others accept all
- 33 -
our moral preferences are we then ready to use military
force to assist those who do as we demand? And if we
"punish" those who refuse our prescriptions by
withholding support or assistance, what will we do
if. the isolation of this government tempts external pressures.
If we overextend our moral claims and back them up we
will have maneuvered ourselves into the role of the
world's policeman -- a role which the American people
rejected in a decade of turmoil. But if we fail to back up
these claims we will lose relevance and credibility.
We will be conducting a policy of self-gratification without
effectiveness.
Ladies and Gentlemen: it is essential to recognize
- 34 -
inevitable and inescapable tension between our moral
aims -- which of necessity are stated in universal terms --
and the constant necessity for choice that is imposed on the
policymaker by competing goals and finite resources.
The making and implementing of foreign policy is,
like life, a constant effort to strike the right balance
between the best we want and the best we can have -- between
the ends we seek and the means we adopt.
The Morality of Means
The task of statesmen is to find that balance:
to strive with all his heart and mind toward the values
America seeks; even when individual measures must fall short
-35-
of the final goal. The moral aspect of foreign policy thus
involves not only a challenge of ends but of means as well.
Statesmen must understand that there are certain
experiments that cannot be tried -- not because the goals
are undesirable but because the consequences of failure would
be SO severe that not even the most elevated goal can justify
the risk.
The Middle East is a vivid example. No people yearn
for comprehensive peace more than the people of Israel whose
existence has not been recognized by any of its neighbors
throughout its history. There are those who argue that in the
aftermath of the 1973 war the entire complex of Arab-Israeli
issues -- borders, peace obligations, refugees -- should all
have been approached simultaneously at one large scale conference.
But at the time such a cour se would probably have proved
disastrous: the United States had no diplomatic relations with
-36-
several key Arab countries; the Soviet Union was in effect
the lawyer for Arab causes; an oil embargo still prevailed;
and hostility between the Arab states and Israel remained at
the flash point. The chances for success of a comprehensive
approach were slight; the penalties for failure were far-reaching --
a continuation of the oil embargo, a continued freeze in US
relations with the Arab world, corresponding growth of Soviet
influence and the likelihood of a resumption of the Middle East
war in difficult circumstances.
We chose to proceed step-by-step on issues where room
for agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new
relationship in the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity
for exploiting tensions and to build confidence of the parties
-37- -
FORD LIBRARY
directly involved SO that comprehensive solutions would
someday be possible. We approached peace in stages but with
the intention of ultimately merging these steps into an overall
solution.
In the space of eighteen months three agreements were
reached -- two between Egypt and Israel and one between Syria
and Israel. As a result, the possibilities of achieving a compre
hensive peace are greater today than they have ever been before.
Deep suspicions remain but the first important steps have
been taken. The beginnings of mutual trust -- never before in
evidence -- are emerging. Some Arab states are for the first
time openly speaking of peace and ending a generation of conflict.
The nations of the Middle East are now in a position to negotiate
among themselves with confidence that the scope of outside
-38-
pressures has been substantially reduced. The step-by-step
approach ha S thus brought us to a point where comprehensive
approa ches are the logical next step. The decision before
us now is not whether but how the next phase of negotiations
should be launched. And we will engage in it -- together with
our Israeli friends =- with new hope and confidence.
:
Another issue involving means that deserves the
creative attention of the American people is the potential
tension between the democratic process and the process of
diplomacy.
A great deal is being said about openness and secrecy
in the conduct of our foreign affairs. It is an important issue;
it is in fact critical both for the future of our democracy
and our foreign policy. It deserves more careful examination
-39- -
than it has received.
The American people mus t know the direction their foreign,
policy is taking; they must understand their government's
purposes; they must know that its decisions reflect their values.
Our Constitution demands it; our commitment to government of and
by the people compels it. And despite what you may hear in
some quarters, I am deeply committed to an open foreign policy.
I have personally testified formally before Congressional committees
in the past three years more than eighty times; I have met
informa 11y with members of Congress over 100 times; I have given
more than fifty public speeches in thirty cities across the country;
I have held nearly 100 press conferences since coming to office.
Senior State Department officials, since I have been Secretary of
State, have visited more than 30 cities to explain and solicit
-40-
public views about our foreign policy. I am proud of that
record.
But on the other hand, it is important to be clear about
the nature of openness. Modern government is highly complex;
it must deal daily with a wide range of extremely technical
issues. Some of them -- especially these dealing with modern
weaponry -- require long study. To contend that all decisions --
especially when they deal with subjects of great sensitivity -- can
be publicly arrived at is an absurdity. The public can be misled
by a flood of partial or irrelevant information as effectively as by
the withholding of relevant information. Moreover if all ideas, how
ever inadvertantly advanced, became the subjects of public debate,
minute examination by the media; and the object of political attack,
the whole process of decision making will be corrupted and the
-41 -
free exchange of opinion so essential to
effective and
creative Presidential decisions will dry up. Caution and
inflexibility will reign. There will be a dearth of new initiatives
and independent views.
The impact of excessive concern with "secrecy" on the
process of negotiations can be equally pernicious. There is no
question tha t the Congress and the public must be told the aims
of any important negotiation before it is undertaken. The
final results of a negotiation -- the costs involved, including
all the national commitments promised -- must be made known
to the people and submitted to their representatives for approval
or ratification. But selective or partial revelations during the
course of an ongoing diplomatic process will only serve to distort
the over-all picture and thwart progress.
It has often been the case in the history of democracy
-42-
that governments may be more interested in compromise
than their publics. Publicly expressed pressures often represent
special interests, bureaucratic or private. It is difficult
enough for a government to ma ke concessions in the context of
a balanced agreement; it is even harder if concession S are
disclosed before the reciprocal concessions from the other
side are available. In such conditions, leaks of information
are almost always tendentious, and weapons in a bureaucratic
battle. Public disclosure can become a weapon to destroy
negotiating flexibility and undermine the possibilities of
compromise.
This is not a call for secrecy, it is a call for
responsibility. Unwarrented secrecy is intolerable; mechanical
doctrinaire openness is self-defeating and stultifying. The
-43-
American people and their government must find this
balance together with mutual confidence and a consciousness
that we are engaged in a common enterprise some of whose
aspects require the same degree of confidentiality extended
to any lawyer or doctor on the performance of his trust --
the ability to achieve an agreed end by the most appropriate
proper means.
Finally there is our commitment to human freedom.
There is perhaps no more difficult, no more painful
issue about means than this.
- 44 -
We have a moral as well as a practical obligation
to vindicate our values and combat injustice. Those who
speak out for freedom and expose the transgressions of
repressive regimes do so in the best American tradition.
They can have -- and on occasion have had -- a dramatic
and heartening impact. But there can also be times when
rhetoric becomes a substitute for action, or tragically
drives those it seeks to influence into even greater acts
of repression.
This Administration has believed that quiet
diplomacy is generally the best way to further the cause of
human rights. Our objective has been results, not publicity.
We were concerned that when such sensitive issues are
FORD
LIBRARY
- 45 -
turned into tests of strength between governments the
concern for national prestige can defeat the most worthy
goals. And we have generally opposed attempts to deal
with sensitive human rights issues through legislation --
not because of the moral view expressed, which we
share, but because it usually lacks the flexibility necessary
to accomplish what it seeks, and because it is almost always
too challenging to the government whose actions it
seeks to change.
By using the tactics of quiet diplomacy this Admin-
istration has brought about the release or parole of hundreds
of prisoners throughout the world, and mitigated
repressive conditions in numerous countries. We have
- 46 -
not often, in keeping with our insistence on quiet diplomacy,
publicized these successes.
The most striking example of the two contrasting
approaches to the issues of human rights is the case of
Jewis emigration from the Soviet Inion. The number of
emigrant Soviet Jews who were permitted to emigrate in
1968 was 400;- in 1973 that number had risen to 35,000.
The reason for this quantum leap lies in our persistent but
private approaches to the Soviet Government and the
parallel overall improvement in U.S. -Soviet relations.
Hundreds of hardship cases were dealt with in quiet personal
discussions by the President or his senior officials. No
- 47 -
public announcement or confrontation ever took place. But
when results were sought by confrontation and legislation --
progress was reversed. Today Jewish emigration from the
Soviet Union has dropped to some 10,000 a year. I
stress this not to score debating points against men whose
dedication to Jewish emigration is unquestioned. Rather
it is to stress that moral ends require the selection
of appropriate means and that this cannot always be
deduced from public declarations.
Conclusion
I have discussed the dilemmas of moral choice
not to counsel resignation but as a message of hope.
Fond as we are of self-flagellation especially in years
divisible by four, Americans can take pride in the moral
- 48 -
achievements of their foreign policy in recent years:
--
We have ended the war we found and
preserved the peace;
--
We have restructured and strengthened
our partnerships with the industrial
democracies and our sister republics in
this hemisphere;
--
We have opened new relationships with
adversaries;
--
We have begun to curb the race in
nuclear arms;
--
We have helped to SOW the seeds of peace
in the Middle East and begun the process of
conciliation in Africa;
- 49 -
--
We have put forth a comprehensive agenda
for cooperation between the industrial and
developing worlds;
We have worked with others on new global
challenges that transcend boundaries and
ideologies;
We have defended our values and interests
around the globe while preserving the peace
But our agenda will inevitably remain unfinished.
Great opportunities lie before us:
--
We have an early opportunity to place a
ceiling on strategic nuclear arsenals and
move on from there to reduce them.
- 50 ..
We have the possibility of major progress
towards peace in the Middle East.
--
We can help the peoples of Africa
reach for conciliation, human justice, and
development rather than violence and hatred.
We can build on the promising foundations
of the new relationship with the People's
Republic of China.
--
We can see to it that the atom is used for
mankind's benefit not its destruction.
--
The industrial democracies can usher in a
new and dynamic period of creativity based
on equality and mutual respect.
voro
- 51 -
LIGRARY
The developing countries can become true
partners in the international community.
--
All countries can work together to fashion
a global community both on land and
in the vast domains of the oceans.
In pursuing these goals, the question is not
whether our values should affect our foreign policy, but how.
We must have the courage to face complexity and the inner
conviction to deal with ambiguity; we must be prepared to look
behind easy slogans and recognize that great goals can only
be reached by patience, and often only in gradual stages.
A world of turmoil and danger cries out for
structure and leadership. The opportunities that we
- 52 -
face as a. nation to help shape a more just international
order depend more than ever on a steady, resolute, and
self-assured America. This requires confidence -- the
leaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence
in its government, and the nation's collective confidence in
the war th of its objectives. It is time to remind ourselves
that while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all
have the same ultimate objective -- peace, prosperity, and
justice in our country and in the world.
We remain the only force capable of protecting
and furthering the process of liberating the human
race from the tyranny it has all too often imposed upon itself.
For the weak such responsibility would be a burden beyond
- 53 -
bearing. But America is a nation born in idealism, reared in
the knowledge that a frontier was something to be
challenged and crossed, and matured in the knowledge that
the ideals that had so set us apart from others implied an
obligation that we made untiring efforts to implement them.
Many years ago Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that
no nation could long endure "half slave and half free,
and touched the conscience of a nation. Today people
the world over cry out for liberty, and look with hope
and longing to America, for we have touched the conscience of
all mankind. If we hold to our ideals, if we persevere in
the day-to-day task of building a better world, there will
come a time when the generations that come after us will be
able to say that no man is a slave and no man a master.
SALT
FORD LIBRARY & 078230
Q:
Last winter (January, February) SALT seemed to be moving
ahead at the time of Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow.
And then, suddenly, you abolished the word "detente, " and
SALT became stalled. Wasn't this simply a political decision
of your during the campaign against Reagan?
A:
I think it is important first that we put this whole thing
into perspective and understand the nature of the problem.
The first and overwhelming factor is that the United States
and the Soviet Union each have the capability of destroying the
world. This is the first time in human history that such a
situation has existed and it not only makes US-Soviet relations
unique but places an awesome responsibility on them.
It is also important to understand that while we have a
vital interest in the reduction of tensions and improvement
of relations with the Soviet Union, we are not prepared to
follow a "peace at any price" philosophy. In the end, a more
stable, more peaceful world can result only from US strength
and certain knowledge on the part of the Soviet Union that we
will respond if challenged. It is true that something happened
to US-Soviet relations early this year. What happened was
that the Soviet Union intervened massively with military
equipment and Cuban troops in Angola. I warned them publicly
and clso sent Secretary Kissinger to Moscow in January in part
- 2 -
to convey directly and in private the depth of our concerns.
The cooling of US-Soviet relations was directly related to
their intervention in Angola. They cannot be allowed to get
the impression that adventures of this sort are without cost.
On SALT itself, Mr. Carter says we have made no progress.
That simply is another demonstration that he does not know what
he is talking about. We made a fundamental breakthrough at
Vladivostok -- achieving an agreement on equality in numbers,
at a level which required Soviet reduction. Since then we have
continued our work and we are about 90 percent of the way to the
achievement of a new SALT agreement. This is not the place
to get into the incredibly complex details of such an agreement
but there are basically only two issues left -- backfire bomber
and cruise missiles. They are difficult issues in that they
are both weapon systems that do not fall neatly into any
particular category. But we have made progress on them.
FORD
ARAB BOYCOTT
LIBRARY
Q:
Mr. President, Governor Carter has said that if he is
elected he will put an end to Arab boycott practices. Would
you comment.
A:
The basic problem here is the bitter antagonism between
the Arab countries and Israel. Unless we attack that problem
and try to solve it, it is misleading to the Ame rican people to
think that the boycott will simply be ended because we say it
should be. The answer to the problem of the Arab boycott is
to get a lasting peace in the Middle East. That is the objective
we have pursued over the last two years and we now may have
favorable prospects in the period ahead.
It is important to understand that any discrimination by
American trading firms on the basis of race, religion, or national
origin has been totally and completely ended by my actions last
November. The boycott itself was established by the Arab
governments; only they can end it. What the U.S. Government
can do is to take action to deal with its effects. The actions we
have taken, including my recent decision to make public reports
of boycott activity, will go a long way toward inhibiting partici-
pati on and reducing its effect, so the answer must be sought in
a comprehensive peace settlement. I am sure Governor Carter
knows this and any other approach is simply another impossible
promise.
FORD
GRAIN DEAL WITH ISRAEL
ä
Mr. President, did the State Department inform Israel
that it would not be possible to sign a long-term grain
agreement with them? If so, why?
A:
There have been ongoing discussions with the Israeli
Government on US supply of agricultural commodities to
that country. With respect to the agreement you refer to,
any problems are purely technical. The issue is not
whether or not we will provide sufficient grain and other
agricultural commodities to Israel. Of course the United
States will provide Israel all the grain Israel requires to
meet her needs.
We anticipate shipments to Israel of approximately
2 million metric tons of grain products in 1977.
1977 (thousands of metric tons)
Wheat
450-500
Sorghum
700
Corn
300
Soybean
400
Soybean Oil
Up to 10
1,900,000
FORD
COMPUTER SALE TO THE PRC
Q:
According to Aviation Week Magazine, Control Data Corporation
is negotiating the sale of highly advanced computers to the PRC.
This sale is reported to be favored by the State Department but
opposed by DOD and ERDA. Can you confirm that report?
A:
A number of American companies have been discussing the
sale of oil exploration equipment, including computers for the
processing of seismic data, with the PRC. It would be
inappropriate to comment on the details of any specific license
application. Businesses provide such information to the
government in confidence. Any export license application will
be handled in accordance with the provisions of the Export
Administration regulations, as continued in force by Executive
Order. Under these laws and regulations, such proposed exports
are subject to extensive inter-agency review designed to assure
that no exports occur which would be detrimental to the national
security of the US. The views of all the agencies affected,
including the Department of Defense, ERDA as well as State
are reflected in this review.
NAMIBIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL
Q:
Why did the U.S. veto the resolution on Namibia in the UN Security
Council on October 19?
A:
As Governor Scranton said in his explanation of the
American vote, the U.S. concern with the Namibia problem has
been demonstrated dramatically by our continuing efforts to assist
the parties involved in finding a peaceful solution. Negotiations are
currently actively under way. While the sensitive process of
consultation is going on I did not believe it would serve a useful
purpose for the Security Council to take new initiatives on the
Namibian question. After many years of frustration in trying to
bring about independence for Namibia, the prospect for results
exists now for the first time. The proposed resolution risked
upsetting the progress already made.
It is important to note however that the U.S. has continued
to enforce its own arms embargo towards South Africa since 1962,
a year before the UN Security Council called for a voluntary embargo.
[The Security Council vote was 10 in favor; 3 opposed (U.S.,
U.K. and France) and 2 abstentions (Italy and Japan). The three
opposing votes are all vetos since they were all by permanent
members of the UN Security Council. ]
October 20, 1976
Strategic Stockpile Policy
Q:
Senator Proxmire has accused the administration of wasting the
taxpayers' money on a new strategic stockpile policy. What is the
basis for our new policy, and have we consulted with the Congress in
making these changes?
A:
Our strategic materials stockpile provides an important source of
critical materials needed in the production of military equipment and
other key items in a wartime economy. Because of U.S. dependence upon
overseas suppliers for many new materials, wartime availability can be
curtailed or cut off completely. Even though foreign suppliers may be
friendly nations, it may be impossible to move materials to the U.S.
during actual hostilities.
strongly supported by other other Congressmen on cognizant committees,
The President's revised stockpile policy has included a
comprehensive review of the basic materials needed in the construction
of today's complex military weaponry and those materials needed to
insure the continued health of the civilian economy during wartime. Our
new stockpile goals are based upon a complex analysis of industry
requirements, processing plant capabilities, reliability of foreign
supply, and degree of substitutability by other materials. Because these
many variables can change, the President has directed that stockpile
purchases and sales be reviewed annually, and that a comprehensive
policy review be conducted every four years. In conducting this past
year's interagency stockpile study, the administration has consulted
closely with the appropriate Congressional committees (including
Senator Proxmire's).
[FYI: General Leslie Bray, Federal Preparedness Agency Director, will
testify before Proxmire next month on the stockpile. This session has
been planned for some time. ]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 19, 1976
Mr. President:
Attached is the transcript you
requested of the press conference
Henry gave in Boston on Friday,
October 15.
Bo
Brent Scowcroft
PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
OCTOBER 15, 1976
NO. 518
PC 116
PRESS CONFERENCE
BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
FORD LIBRARY &
OCTOBER 15, 1976
For further information contact:
518/116
FORD LIBRARY & SERVIC
PROF. FAIRBANK: Ladies and gentlemen, I am
John Fairbank, representing Harvard University.
Harvard has called this press conference and
is extremely glad that Secretary Kissinger is able to
come here today, because we have an interest in East
Asia that we think is absolutely essential to develop in the
public interest. The Secretary is helping us in this way
at our request. We appreciate it very much. I hope each of you
will identify your paper as you ask questions.
Q
Mr. Secretary, what is this Administration
doing at this moment to secure a final accounting of
American servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and
also a comment from you on the cooperation of the present
government in Viet-Nam on this matter?
A
(Secretary Kissinger) We have made it clear to
the Government of Viet-Nam that progress towards normalization
and progress towards better relations with the United
States absolutely depends on an accounting for the missing
in action. We are prepared to discuss this with the
Vietnamese. We've had diplomatic exchanges in Paris,
518/116
2
and we expect to start some discussions with them in
the near future on that subject.
Now, so far, the Vietnamese Government has not
been particularly cooperative. They have been feeding
out just a few names to influence particular decisions, but we
think that as a question of principle we cannot let the
Vietnamese Government blackmail American families with an
anguish that has been going on for years, in order to
do something that they should have done under the Armistice
Agreement to begin with.
So we hope that in the future that we will get
a complete accounting for the Missing in Action and that
will then permit progress towards normalization.
I
Just a follow up on that: Is this
Administration prepared to veto the entrance of the Government
of Viet Nam into the United Nations until this matter
is resolved?
A
Well, we have vetoed it before. We have
made it clear that we would veto it before, and the President
has stated that this is a precondition.
Q
Mr. Secretary, how is the State Department
responding to Fidel Castro's
518/116
3
statement that his country is cancelling the 1973 Sky-
jacking Agreement with the United States?
A
First, in my speech to the United Nations
I condemned terrorism as an instrument of national policy
pursued by any nation, for whatever cause. The United States
is not engaged in any activity of this kind, and the charge
by Fidel Castro that the United States or its government, or
any agency of the government had anything to do with the
explosion of that airliner is totally false.
Secondly, we think that it is an act of complete
irresponsibility to encourage hijacking at this moment
at a time when the -- when one of the biggest of human
problems is the taking of hostages that cannot possibly
influence political decisions or foreign policy decisions.
And we have stated today, and I repeat
again, that we will hold the Cuban Government accountable
for any actions that result from their decision.
I
Mr. Kissinger,
The Democratic Presidential nominee, Jimmy Carter, says
that when it comes to foreign policy that you, in fact, are
the President of the United States; in that particular
area that you really have the responsibility that President
Ford apparently has very little input in foreign policy
518/116
4
FORD
matters. Could you respond to that?
LIBRARY
A
I will respond to that question.
But could I ask you to
-- in your other
questions to leave them out of the partisan areas. You
can mention criticisms and ask me to comment on criticisms
but don't get me into specific references to personalities.
In this particular case I think I would have to
say that this shows that Mr. Carter has more experience as
a Governor than at the Federal level.
There is no such thing -- Dean Acheson used to say
that there can be a strong President and a strong Secretary
of State as long as the Secretary of State knows who is
President.
The final decisions are always made by the
President.
I see the President three or four times a
week. I am on the telephone with him constantly.
There is no major decision that is taken which is not
made by the President.
In the day to day conduct of foreign policy
every President has to delegate certain tactical decisions
to somebody -- to his Security Advisor, to his Secretary
of State -- and that, too, has happened with every
518/116
5
President in the post-war period.
President Ford
and I have had a very close working relationship and it
is in the nature of such a relationship that the points
of view of the two partners merge.
But it is always clear who is the senior partner
and who is the junior partner.
I
Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that in a
sense when President Ford admittedly made a blunder
during the second debate with Jimmy Carter on the Eastern
European situation, that that indicated that he was not
on top of the situation -- that he wasn't aware fully
of certain foreign policy issues?
A
No. That indicated that under the pressure
of a debate he did not make a point as felicitously as he
might have made it -- as he has since admitted.
Nobody who knows his record could believe
that on this particular issue he did not know exactly what
the facts were. He had one thing in mind and he
expressed it in a manner that created the wrong impression
and he has stated that publicly and has clarified it.
But there was no misapprehension in his mind
as to the presence of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe
A 6
And we have been negotiating for years to reduce
the number of those divisions; and he has personally
visited three East European countries.
I
Mr. President,
A
I appreciate the promotion but -- [Laughter. ]
there's a constitutional provision against it --
I
Mr. Secretary, what was your reaction to
Carter's remarks on the Panama Canal, and has that
affected the negotiations in any way?
A
Could you leave names out of these questions?
[Laughter. ]
It has not affected the negotiations which
are just on the verge of resuming.
We have stated repeatedly that with respect to
the Panama Canal it is not an issue between the United
States and Panama. It is an issue of the United States
position with respect to the Western Hemisphere and
ultimately with respect to all of the new nations in
the world.
If there is a consensus in the Western Hemisphere
on any point, it is that the existing arrangements in
Panama are to be changed. And if the United States
518/116
7
relies simply on the physical assertion of its power --
which we have, and of course we are stronger than Panama --
then we are going to mortgage the possibilities of a
more creative relationship in the Western Hemisphere.
So therefore, the problem is whether we can
assure access through the Canal -- free and unimpeded
access through the Canal -- by arrangements different from
those that now exist.
This is the essence of the negotiation and
I do not think it helps to make extreme statements in
this regard.
Any agreement that we make -- first of all, there's
no doubt -- not one line of an agreement exists at this
moment. Once a concept of an agreement is agreed
to, it will be discussed with the Congress.
Once the Treaty exists, it will have to be approved by
two thirds of the Senate.
So there is plenty of opportunity for a full
debate and it will take an overwhelming majority to pass
it. And we believe that the negotiations are in the
518/116
8
national interest and I believe that any President
will come to the same conclusion that every President has
come to since 1964, namely that these negotiations should
be continued and that all possibilities should be
explored.
Q
Mr. Secretary, could you tell us a little
bit about the Southeast Asia Conference and why it is
important for you to be meeting with businessmen?
Will you give us a little bit of your concept of the role of
multinationals in East Asia?
A
Well, first of all, I am meeting with this
Conference primarily because my friend John Fairbank has
asked me to meet with it. And I did not call the
Conference nor did I have anything to do with the
membership of the Conference.
As I understood it, Harvard is calling a conference
of Americans with interests in Asia and attempts to bring
that group together with faculty members that have been
studying the problems of Asia.
Now I believe that this is an excellent idea.
I think that Americans who are active in Asia ought
to understand the cultural, political and economic
conditions of the area. And I believe that professors
518/116
9
who are studying the area can benefit from some of the
practical experiences which some of these corporations
and others who are interested in the area have. I
have always believed that one of the problems in our
society is to bring together those who have an
opportunity to reflect about the problems with those
who have to be active in the area.
So I have welcomed this opportunity and, as
you know, I am speaking OFF THE RECORD. I am not using
it to make any public pronouncement. I am doing it to
help my former colleagues at Harvard and my old
institution to engage in a worthwhile program.
I Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us
if you or President Ford have plans for visiting the
new Chinese leader at any time in the near future?
And could you also give us your assessment of the kind of
relations we are likely to have with the new government?
A There are no plans now for either President
Ford or myself to visit China, because while we have
no doubt about the election, there is a certain decorum
about making plans -- (Laughter) until the results are
clear.
518/116
10
FORD
It has been more or less an annual event that
LIBRARY
the Secretary of State would visit China at some point
during the year -- and that could happen, although no
plans exist now.
There are no plans whatever for the President
to visit China. And there is something to be said
for perhaps having a return visit at some point, or to
meet at some other place.
But this, I think, has to be decided after the
election.
As for the impact of changes in leadership on
policy, the long term policy of any country, and
especially of a country that moves with the care and
thoughtfulness of the Peoples Republic of China
doesn't depend so much on personalities as on a
perception of their interests and of their values.
I think that the basic factors that brought
the United States and China into contact with each other
are still operating and are likely to continue.
Of course personalities affect the style
of diplomacy and may affect how certain things are carried out,
518/116
11
but I do not expect a fundamental change in the
relationship and it is too early for us to
tell what differences of style might emerge.
Q: Mr. Secretary, in reference to South Africa,
why do you refuse SO far to meet with key African
liberation organizations, particularly the African
National Congress and the Pan African Congress? And why
do you schedule meetings excluding these
legitimate organizations, spokespersors for the
African people in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and
South Africa?
A
Let's separate the liberation movements
in Rhodesia - Zimbabwe -- from those in Namibia, for a
moment.
When I visited Africa in April, I met with the
Presidents of the so-called "front line states". They
all felt at the time that the experience of Angola should
not be repeated. Thatis to say, they did not want any of the
outside powers to back one particular liberation movement and
thereby get a fight started among the liberation movements.
I then agreed with President Nyerere and President
Kaunda and President Khama that the United States would
not get in touch directly with the liberation movements
518/116
12
in order to permit the African problems to be dealt
with by Africans.
And we agreed to deal with these liberation
movements through the front line Presidents,
provided that all other countries did the same.
They have seen to it that these liberation move-
ments would not become the plaything of great power
rivalry and it is not failure to recognize these
movements -- it is, rather, our attempt to insulate the
problem from superpower rivalry.
Now that they are going to Geneva, we will
of course deal with them and our whole policy has been
to put these liberation movements into a position where they
could negotiate directly for the future of their own
country.
With respect to the liberation movement in
Namibia, which is to say SWAPO. I have met with Nujomo
and my representatives have met with Nujomo.
In that case, we do not have the special conditions of
many movements, since as one movement he deals also with
Communist countries. And we deal with him and we have
recognized him as an important factor -- as a key
518/116
13
factor in the Begotiations.
In fact we are
just now waiting for him to come back to New York from
Africa, before I have another meeting with him.
With respect to -- again to the Rhodesian movements--
I want to repeat, we recognize them. We
accept them. We do not want to choose among them.
That is to say, we want the African presidents and the
leaders, themselves, to determine their own relationships
but we will recognize them and we support them.
I
Well is it not a fact that the
State Department has had a preference for Joshua Nkomo
in Zimbabwe?
A
That is not a fact.
I
That is not a fact.
A
No. Nkomo was recognized by all of
the movements as the chief negotiator at the last
negotiation, in February, which broke down.
At this moment, we are meticulously staying away
from indicating any preference; and when Mr.
Schaufele visted Salisbury he was in touch with Muzorewa
as well as with Nkomo, as well as with representatives of
Mugabe.
518/116
14
Q
Mr. Kissinger, on the
hijacking question do you feel at this
point that these incidents of skyjacking will increase?
And also what can the United States do about it
now that Castro has cancelled the arrangement?
A
I don't want to speculate what exactly
Castro intends to do with this arrangement, and what
it means with respect to his actual performance.
Theoretically he could carry out the same
obligations, which is to say to return the
skyjackers without having the formal obligation to do SO.
If he, however, deliberately encourages skyjackings
to Cuba, it would be an act of extraordinary irresponsi-
bility, because I think whatever the disputes between countries
may be, no country should use the suffering of innocent
people who, I repeat, have absolutelv no
possibility of affecting events for the sort of rivalrv
that now exists.
518/116
15
I
What can the United States do about that?
A
Well, I said we will hold them accountable.
What we will do we will have to study.
I
Dr. Kissinger, because you are returning to
help Harvard for the East Asian Conference, would you
give any thought to returning to Harvard in any capacity
after you leave office?
A
Well, this won't be a problem before 1981, SO
we will have many opportunities to discuss this. (Laughter.)
I Dr. Kissinger, last night the President said
that Jimmy Carter had slandered the name of the United
States when he criticized American foreign policy under your-
self in the Ford Administration. How far can a Democratic
candidate go in his criticism before the President
has to go run and hide behind the American flag to defend
against it.
A
Well, I consider the office of the
Secretary of State essentially a non-partisan office;
and I think the candidates have to determine for
themselves how far they should go and what they can say.
Q Mr. Secretary, in your answers you gave before
about staying on until 1981 --
A That was a joke. (Laughter.) That was to
518/116
FORD LIBRARY
16
demoralize my staff.
Q Does that mean you are prepared to stay with
President Ford if he is re-elected?
A No. I've said repeatedly that eight years is a
long time -- especially eight years as turbulent as these have
been -- that I did not want to state before the election was over
what I would do before the President has talked to me,
but that on the whole I thought that eight years is a long
time. So I have not made my final decision. I want to wait
until the President has talked to me.
I Mr. Kissinger, aren't you in fact saying you'd
prefer to leave, although you will serve at his request if he's
re-elected?
A I haven't really stated what I will do
because I want to look at it under the conditions that
then exist, and I owe the President
the opportunity to discuss it with me.
Q Is there any other job you prefer to take?
A No.
Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you:
Is it true that -- is it possible that recent arms sales by the
United States to Israel were motivated by political
considerations before the election?
518/116
17
A Well, I think the President has answered
this yesterday. These items have been before the
Administration for several months. They come up for
an almost monthly review. And the President decided to
act because he thought, as he pointed out yesterday, that
it was in the best interests of the United States.
Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up on
Mr. Krimer's question of before, since you said your answer
to that was a joke. Taking for granted that you
will at some point leave the State Department, would
you at that point consider returning to Harvard? And,
if so, have you at any time discussed that possibility
with any member of the Harvard administration?
A I haven't discussed it with any member
of the Harvard administration, and I have really not
given any systematic thought to what I'm going to do when
I leave this position. I have taken the view that after
I've announced my resignation, or after the voters announce
my resignation for me (laughter), I can then make the
decision on what I might want to do. But I think it's
inappropriate for somebody in my office to discuss his
future with anybody until he's resigned.
518/116
18
I
Mr. Kissinger, I understand the United
States is investigating the cause of the crash of the
Cuban plane off Barbados.
A
Yes.
2
Can you tell me who is doing the investigating,
what the investigation has learned so far?
A
To the best of my information, we have
asked the CIA to check into it. I don't know whether
the FBI is. making a formal investigation of it. We have
offered the governments concerned any assistance that
they might request since it did not occur on American
soil.
But I can state categorically that no official
of the United States Government -- nobody paid by the
American Government, nobody in contact with the
American Government -- has had anything to do with this
crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this
totally reprehensible.
I
Mr. Secretary, speaking of the CIA, the CIA
has been accused by some Southeast Asia observers of
more or less manipulating the recent military takeover
in Thailand. Now, have the United States interests gone
so far as to try to emulate the type of military dictatorship
FORD & LIBRARY
518/116
19
that was set up in Chile? Are we talking about that
topic?
A
"Emulate," you mean? We have had absolutely
nothing to do with the upheaval in Thailand, and therefore
there's no point comparing it with Chile. We had
absolutely nothing to do with it. We didn't know about
it beforehand.
2
Is Chile still an issue?
A
That depends with whom.
2
With the United States, with the recent
car blow-up in Washington, D. C.?
A
Well, we of course totally condemn the
murder of former Ambassador Letelier, whom I knew
personally and respected, even when we had our differences.
We have seen no evidence yet as to who was behind this
assassination. But whoever was behind it, it is an
absolutely outrageous act.
We also had nothing to do -- as the Church
Committee said -- with the overthrow of the Chilean
Government. We had nothing to do with the military
junta that overthrew it.
2
Despite some of the evidence to the
518/116
20
contrary?
A
The Church Committee made clear that
we had nothing to do with the military junta. What
we were attempting to do was to strengthen the
democratic parties, who in turn had nothing to do with the
overthrow, for the 1976 election. That was a different matter.
0
Can we say without a doubt that the United
States had nothing to do with the recent bombing in
Washington, D. C.?
A
You mean of Letelier?
0
Exactly.
A
Absolutely.
I
Thank you.
Q
You mentioned earlier that you're going
to consider your fate following the election, and perhaps that
fate might be decided by the voters. How much of an impact
do you, yourself, feel your performance during the last
eight years will have on this election?
A
Well, foreign policy is inevitably an
issue in any election, and that's inevitable. These have
been eight turbulent years. I believe that they were the
period in which we had to make the change from a belief
518/116
21
in American omnipotence, in which we could overwhelm
every problem with our power, to a period in which we
have to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have
had to conduct it throughout history -- with a
consciousness of a national purpose, a choice of means --
where we have had to establish new relationships with
old allies open new relationships with old adversaries,
liquidate vestiges of a war which we found, and deal
simultaneously with a revolution that is represented
by these new nations.
I don't want to judge myself how effectively
all of this has been done, and I don't frankly believe
that candidates are in the best position to judge that
either -- although, obviously, they must make their
cases.
We will leave to history what the ultimate
assessment is. But without doubt, an eight-year record in
foreign policy will be subject to discussion.
I
Will you be an asset to Gerald Ford
on Election Day or a liability?
A
I don't go into the public opinion or
polling business, and I can't judge it. My obligation
is, under the direction of the President, to conduct foreign
FORD
518/116
LIBRARY
22
policy and to advise the President as to what I believe
to be in the best interests of the United States and
world peace.
Now, I understand that most polls show that I
have an adequate public support, but this is not the ultimate
test of a Secretary of State.
I
Secretary Kissinger, do you think that
at some point the United States should or might sell
arms to China -- provide any kind of defense
equipment to China?
A
We have never had any request
for the sale of arms to China. We have never had any
discussions with China about the sale of arms. We believe
that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
China is very important to the world equilibrium, and
we would consider it a grave matter if this were threatened
by an outside power. But we have never had any defense
discussions with China. I don't foresee any, but
I do have to state our general view that it would not be
taken lightly if there were a massive assault on China.
I
Is it correct, as former Secretary
Schlesinger has said, that the State Department withheld
invitations for him to visit China?
518/116
23
A
I don't believe that Secretary Schlesinger
said this, and the only formal invitation to
Secretary Schlesinger that was issued happened to coincide
with his departure from the Government so that the
problem of withholding it did not arise.
I
He said that two invitations were extended
previously.
A
Well, with respect to the first -- I don't
think he said it. I think a member of his
party must have misunderstood; there was no formal
invitation the year before.
Q
Mr. Secretary, if this' does turn out to
be your last year in office, could you look back and think
about what might be the major disappointment and major accom-
plishment during your period as Secretary of State?
A
You know, when you are in this sort of a
position, you perform almost like an athlete, in the
sense of reacting to the series of situations that develop
very rapidly. I would think that I would be much more re--
flective about it after I'm out of office than while
I'm in office. I would think that the major accomplishment
would be the attempt to shift American foreign policy
from a perception that we could do everything simultaneously
518/116
24
to an attempt to relate our commitments to our means
and our purposes and to our possibilities.
This involved recasting our relationships
with allies, developing new relationships with adversaries,
and beginning new approaches to the new countries.
The disappointment has been that in the period
after 1973, the Executive authority of the United
States was so weakened by a series of crises that many
of the building blocks that were in place in 1973 could not
be used as rapidly as I would have hoped, and that
perhaps more energy had to be spent on preserving what
existed than on building what might have been possible.
I could list specific things that were dis-
appointing -- as you would expect in an eight-year
period -- but if you want it on a general plane, these would
be what I consider the accomplishments and what I consider
the sadnesses.
I
More specifically, Mr. Kissinger, are
you disappointed that the United States did not establish
full diplomatic relations with mainland China before
Mao Tse-tung's death and that perhaps now this period is
going to be a longer peridd because of the transition that
mainland China is going through?
FORD
518/116
LIBRARY
25
A
I think that the process of normalization is
one to which we're committed and which we intend to
carry out. I don't think it is tied, nor has it ever
been tied by the Chinese, to a personality or to a
specific leader. And I believe that that process can
continue.
Q
When will it be completed, or what's
holding it up now?
A
Well, what has held it up is to discuss
the modalities about the future of Taiwan,
which will have to be discussed with the new leadership.
Q
Mr. Secretary --
PROF. FAIRBANK: We have a half hour.
Is there a last question or two?
Q
This is the last, bringing you back to
something else, Mr. Secretary -- if you don't mind.
A
One more.
Q
I'll give a scenario to you. Suppose that
you do get your walking papers from the electorate in
November. You say you don't know what job you're going
to take. But most of us, I think, would concede in all
probability you will receive an offer to write your memoires
or write a book on your eight years.
518/116
26
On balance, given equal office space and
background, would you rather write that on the banks of the
Potomac or the banks of the Charles? (Laughter.)
A
Almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac.
(Laughter.) Where else, I don't know, but almost certainly not
on the banks of the Potomac.
I
Mr. Secretary --
A
You'll get the last question. Go ahead.
You ask a question and let this lady speak.
No -- you go ahead. You ask your question
first.
2
O.K. Recently I have read that Mexico was going
to Communism, quoting from one declaration of one of the Senators
of the United States.
What is your point of view about that? Do you think
Mexico is really going to the Communists?
A
Absolutely not. I know Mexico a little. I know
its leaders very well. I know its incumbent President
well. I know the President-elect well.
Of course, Mexico is given to heroic rhetoric,
which may not always be literally understood in the
United States (laughter) -- but Mexico is not going
towards Communism, and I know no leader in Mexico who
has any Communist biases, though, of course, the Mexican
revolution produces a certain sympathy for Third World causes
518/116
27
and inevitably when a country has as powerful a neighbor
as the United States, there are going to be many points
of friction. But the fact is we usually solve our
points of friction. And we have repeatedly rejected this
accusation that has been made by several Congressmen
and Senators.
Q
Thank you.
A
Now this lady has the last question.
I
A few minutes ago you said that public
opinion polls are not the ultimate test for a Secretary
of State.
A
Of a Secretary of State.
Q
Yes. If they are not, what is the ultimate
test?
A
I think the ultimate test of a Secretary
of State -- the obligation of a Secretary of State is to
give his best judgment to the President as to what is in the
national interest. And if he is responsible, he 11 understand
that the national interest cannot be separated from the
world interest. The President then has to make the political
decision as to how this judgment can be carried out within
the American political context. It's the President who
has to make that decision.
518/116
28
I don't think a Secretary of State should
take his own public opinion polls as to his own
popularity. The Secretary of State ought to be expendable
and usually is expended (laughter), but he should
not worry about his own popularity primarily. He
should advise the President. Then the President has
to make the judgment. And eventually he 11 be judged
by
history and whether he's left the world somewhat
more peaceful and perhaps more progressive than he
found it.
A
Thank you very much.
PROF. FAIRBANK: Thank you.
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"ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 3, folder \"Third Debate: Issue Papers - Foreign\nPolicy\" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential\nLibrary.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 3 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n::\nMr. President, you recently stated that Governor\nCarter slandered the good name of the United States\nwhen he said that we have lost respect throughout\nthe world. However, a recent overseas poll by the\nU.S.I.A. now reveals that respect for the United\nStates among the people of Western Europe has sunk\nto its lowest point in 22 years. Don't you owe\nMr.\nMr. Carter an apology?\nA:\nI did indeed state that Mr. Carter slandered the good\nnum lost Mrun\nname of the United States and I repeat that statement\nnow.\nLet me remind you what Mr. Carter said about\nhis own country - speaking to all the world by satellite\ntelevision: he not only said that we are \"not strong\nany more\", that we are not \"respected any more\" -\nlisten to what else he says: he made the grave\ncharge that we overthrew the elected government in\nChile. He even said this was a \"typical example\" and\nthere \"may be many others\".\nHe even charged that we \"tried to start a new\nViet Nam in Angola\", - those were his words.\n-2-\nA: (cont'd. )\nThese allegations against his own country are\nabsolutely false and Mr. Carter knew they were\nfalse when he made them.\nNnen\nTonight he will again be speaking to a world\nwide audience and I call upon him now to either\nprove those charges or to retract them here on\nthis podium tonight.\n*\n*\n*\n*\n(The above might be a good place to end and\nlet Carter worry about an instant reply. If there\nis a follow-up question or if the President would\nlike to end on a more affirmative note, I suggest\nsomething like the following. )\n* * * *\nIt would be easy for a President to\nwin Gallup Polls in a foreign country if that's what\nhe cares about: all he has to do is say yes to every-\nthing they ask for.\nBut the policies of this administration are\ndetermined by the best interests of the United\nStates, both domestically and as the recognized\nleader of the free world. Our policies- our strength\n- our morality have maintained peace in a very\n-3- -\ntroubled world and peace will continue to be our\nFORD LIBRARY 97VR7\nobjective regardless of any Gallup Polls in other\ncountries.\nITEM: It is ironic that Carter made his derogatory\nremarks just before the United States made the\nfirst clean sweep in the 75 year history of the\nNobel prizes: Chemistry, Physics, Medicine,\nEconomics and Literature. I think this tells us\nmore about the United States' position in the world\nthan any opinion poll.\nFORD & LIBRARY\nUS PRESTIGE IN EUROPE\nä\nMr. President, what is your reaction to the USIA poll which\nit was reported yesterday shows US prestige in Western Europe\nat its lowest point in 22 years?\nA:\nAmerica's greatest international strength lies in our close ties\nof friendship and alliance with the nations of Western Europe. In\nthe Atlantic Community, our solidarity is being more impressively\nshown than at any time in the past two decades. Our prestige is\nhigh. Our friendship has never been better.\nI am not speaking from the basis of any one poll -- and I would\nnote, first, my understanding that the evaluation of the poll you\nrefer to has not even been completed and, second, that it was made\navailable to the press -- as the reporter acknowledges -- for partisan\npolitical reasons. I could cite a German poll conducted last\nRabia\nsummer which stated that friendship with the United States was at\nthe highest in the 18 years that the poll has been taken. So there\nare polls and polls.\nThe simple facts are Western Europe values American\nleadership. Western Europe respects America. Over the first\ntwo years of my Presidency, we have clearly demonstrated the\ncapacity of the West to provide for the common defense and to deal\nwith common problems, and over the next four years we will build\non this progress. The most significant measure of our relations\nis the attitude of the European leaders with whom we must work,\n- 2 -\nFORD & LIBRARY\nand their unanimous public comments as they came here this\nyear to help us celebrate our Bicentennial testify unmistakably\nto the closeness of our relations and the esteem in which the US\nis held.\nThere is trust, there is respect, there is confidence and\nthere is optimism. This is reflected at all levels of our government-\nto-government dealings, and it is reflected in the frienship between\nthe American and European peoples.\nNOTE: Over the two years of your Presidency you have met\nwith 124 foreign leaders (more than any other President over a\ncomparable period), including 58 leaders of Western Europe.\nFROM USIS, BONN\n11630\nBRENT\nJuly 9, 1976\nFORD\nSubject: Wickert Poll on Friendship with U.S.\n67 per cent of the West German citizens polled\nLIBRARY\nduring the past two weeks consider friendship between\nthe FRG and the US as \"most important,\" the Wickert\nPublic Opinion Institute disclosed July 6.\nThis marks highest response favoring US in the 18 years\nthe Institute has been sampling German adult opinion\non the subject.\nRunners up:\nFrance\n17 per cent\nGreat Britain\n13 per cent\nUSSR\n3 per cent\nMonsen:\nInterested in micss /not polls.\nR558R A4894) 1WYDWYDRYR\nPOPULARITY\nHylandoth\nWASHINGTON, OCT 20, REUTER - AMERICAN \"POPULARITY\"\" AMONG\nWESTERN EUROPEANS HAS FALLEN TO ITS LOWEST POINT IN 22 YEARS,\nACCORDING TO POLLS TAKEN FOR THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION\nAGENCY, OFFICIAL SOURCES SAID TODAY.\nTHE POLLS WERE TAKEN LAST SUMMER IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY\nAND WEST GERMANY AND WERE THE LATEST IN A SERIES CONDUCTED\nROUGHLY EVERY THREE YEARS.\nU.S.I.A. SOURCES SAID DATA WAS STILL BEING ANALYZED AND\nTHEY COULD NOT RELEASE DETAILS OF THE RAW RESULTS.\nBUT THE MAIN TREND, THEY SAID, WAS A SHIFT AMONG\nRESPONDENTS AWAY FROM A POSITIVE FEELING ABOUT THE UNITED\nSTATES AND INTO A FEELING OF \"\"NO OPINION.\"\nIN THIS SENSE, U.S. '\"POPULARITY\"' ABROAD DECLINED. BUT THERE\nWAS NO COMPARABLE INCREASE IN \"\"BAD FEELING\" ABOUT THE U.S.\nTHE POLL, EVEN THOUGH THE INFORMATION IS PRELIMINARY, IS\nLIKELY TO BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,\nNOW IN ITS FINAL TWO WEEKS.\nDEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE JIMMY CARTER HAS CLAIMED THAT AMERICAN\nPRESTIGE AROUND THE WORLD WAS AT AN ALL-TIME LOW. PRESIDENT\nDRD HAS DENIED THE ASSERTION AND ALLEGED HIS OPPONENT WAS\nSLANDERING\" THE GOOD NAME OF THE UNITED STATES.\nMORE 2341\nR559R A8006)LWYDWYDIYC\nPOPULARITY 2 WASHINGTON\nA SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.S.I.A., THE GOVERNMENT\"S INFORMATION\nARM ABROAD, DECLINED ANY OFFICIAL COMMENT BEYOND SAYING THAT\nTHE RESULTS OF SIMILAR POLLS HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN PREVIOUS\nYEARS.\nBUT U.S.I.A. SOURCES SAID THIS YEAR\"S POLL ALSO WOULD BE\nPUBLISHED AFTER ANALYSIS IS COMPLETED.\nTHEY SAID TWO SETS OF ANALYSTS HAD BEEN GIVEN THE RAW DATA\nBUT HAD COME TO SOMEWHAT DIFFERING VIEWS AND OFFICIALS WERE NOW\nTRYING TO RECONCILE THEM.\nTHE SOURCES SAID THE POLL WAS TAKEN LAST JULY AND AUGUST\nAS \"\"RIDERS\"\" TO SURVEYS BEING CONDUCTED BY U.S. POLLING\nORGANIZATIONS ON OTHER TOPICS.\nTHEY SAID THERE WERE SIX QUESTIONS, SOME RELATING TO\nOPINION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES IN GENERAL AND OTHERS TO\nINTERNAL EVENTS IN AMERICA.\nALTHOUGH OVERALL FAVORABLE OPINION ABOUT THE UNITED\nSTATES HAD DECLINED, EUROPEANS WERE GENERALLY AFFIRMATIVE WHEN\nASKED IF THEY THOUGHT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WAS FUNCTIONING\nIN THE UNITED STATES AND IF THE COUNTRY COULD SOLVE ITS OWN\nPROBLEMS.\nREUTER 2344\nSOVIET EMIGRATION\nTORD\nLIBRARY\nQ:\nMr. President, you have been accused of defaulting on\nimportant humanitarian issues, including the issue of Soviet\nemigration. Governor Carter has been active on this issue\nand has told us that only this week, he sent the following\ntelegram to Vladimer Slepak:\n\"I have read with great concern about the treatment\nthat you and some of your colleagues suffered\nrecently. As you know, I have spoken out on this\nmatter as Governor and during this campaign and have\nreferred to your case by name. I want you to know\nof my deep personal interest in the treatment that\nyou and your colleagues receive. Sincerely,\nJimmy Carter\"\nHow do you answer this charge, Mr. President?\nA:\nI am firmly convinced the best way to deal with this problem\nis through quiet efforts rather than a publicity campaign.\nLet's look at the record of Jewish emigration from the Soviet\nUnion. In 1968 the rate was 400 a year. Through sustained\nbut unpublicized efforts we were able to increase that rate\nto 35,000. However, once it became a major public issue and\na subject of legislation linked to trade, emigration fell off\nto its current rate of about 12,000 which is still far above\nthe 1968 level. Our quiet efforts have also been successful\nin securing the release of a number of special hardship cases, but\nto mention names could jeopardize the chances of any future\nefforts. I believe this is the way to deal with this problem.\nThe kind of telegram you refer to may make good publicity, but\nit is not likely to be helpful in solving the problem and\ncould be quite harmful.\n10/17/76\n7:00 pm\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nMORALITY AND MORALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY\nFORD\nAmericans are today in the throes of the quadrennial\nLIBRARY\ndebate about our past, our present, and the future we hope\nto create. In a world where too many are dominated by oppressive\nregimes and intolerant ideologies, it is a dramatic demonstration\nof the strength of our democracy and the greatness of our nation.\nWhatever the outcome, Americans should take pride that we\nhave once again experienced the reality of a free and democratic\nsystem which gives hope to those countless millions around the\nworld who yearn for freedom,\nIt is also, let us be honest, a time of confusion and of\nexaggeration. Some tell us we are weak; others tell us we are\nstrong. Some tell us that our prestige is declining; others assert\n-2-\nthat our global influence for peace and progress has never been\ngreater. Some tell us we are in retreat around the world;\nothers tell us we have never been more respected, more\nsuccessful abroad than we are today.\nAs Secretary of State I am, of course, detached\nfrom partisan debate, although I will admit that my sympathies\nand in my view; the truth, tend to lie with the \"others\" rather\nthan the \"some. \"\nBut no matter how strongly Americans may disagree on\nspecific issues, the history of the post-war period has left\nno doubt about the nature of our global responsibility. Without\nAmerica's commitment there can be no security. Without our\ndedication there can be no progress. Without our strength,\n-3-\npeoples throughout the world will live in fear. Without our\nfaith, the world will live without hope.\nAll of us here are deeply concerned about the survival\nand security of Israel. But we also know that the fate of even\nour closest friends cannot be assured in a vaccum. Peace,\nand\njustice, security,/progress will not be securely won for America\nor Israel unless they are embedded in a peaceful, just, secure\nand progressive international order. The task of building such\nan order is the fundamental challenge of our time.\nAmerica's unique contribution to\nworld affairs\nhas been our conviction that while history is often cruel, fate\ncan be shaped by human faith and courage. Our optimism has\nmade us understand better than many more jaded civilizations\n-4-\nthat all great achievements were a dream before they became\na reality and that in this sense all that is creative is ultima tely\na moral affirmation -- the faith that dares in the absence of proof;\nthe courage to go forward when results are uncertain.\nNo people has experienced more of man's exaltation\nthan the Jewish people; few have suffered more from man's\ndeprevity. The Jewish people know that survival requires\nunending struggle. But they know as well that peace, if it is\nto be more than a prophet' S dream, must rest on the conscience\nof mankind translated into concrete efforts by all peoples and\nall nations.\nAmerica , because of its own heritage, is perennially\nengaged in such a search of its conscience. What is the relationship\nbetween morality and foreign policy? How can America carry\n-5-\nforward its role as human example and champion of justice?\nand\nHow do we secure our existence/that of our allies and friends\nin a world in which power remains a crucial arbiter? How do\nwe reconcile ends and means, principle and survival?\nThese questions have been asked throughout\nour history and they are being posed again today. But we should\nbeware of simple answers and easy slogans. There is no doubt that\npolicy without moral purpose is like a ship without a rudder\ndrifting aimlessly from crisis to crisis. A policy of pure\ncalculation will be empty of vision and humanity. It will\nlack not only direction, but also roots and heart. This country\nhas always had a sense of moral mission; Americans have always\nheld the view that America stood for something above and beyond\nits material achievements.\n-6-\nBut we must never forget that policy is the art\nof the possible; the science of the relative. We live in a world\nof 150 sovereign states, profound ideological differences and\nnuclear weapons. Our power is enormous, but it is still\nfinite. \"A wise policy must transcend rhetoric. A truly moral\npolicy must relate ends to means and commitments to capabilities.\nWe must keep our eyes on distant horizons; we must also keep\nour feet planted firmly in reality. We must learn to distinguish\nmorality from moralizing. An attempt to impose our values\non all other societies will lead to either a restless interventionism\nbeyond our resources and what our people will support or to\na withdrawal from the world. We should never forget that the\ninvocation of abstract principles has in our history led as frequently.\n-7-\nto abdication as to overextension. Both tendencies would be-\ndisastrous to all prospects of international order.\nOur challenge is to be true to both these impulses\n--\nto live up to America's usual promise while fulfilling the\nstill\npractical needs of world order. This challenge will/be\nwith us when the campaign rhetoric ends two short weeks hence;\nindeed we will face it for as far ahead as we can see. How\nwe meet it will determine the peace and progress of America\nand of the world.\nWith your permission, it is this subject that I would\nlike to discuss today.\nAmerican Ideals and American Foreign Policy\nBecause of our history and geography, foreign policy\nhas never been central to American life, as it has been for many\n-8-\nother countries. The history of our foreign policy has been an\nexperience of learning and of exploring. The tension between\nimpulse and experience has been a creative force but also an\nunresolved dilemma in our perception of foreign policy.\nAs the United States has grown into the role of\nworld power, the morality of our actions abroad has been a\nrecurrent subj ect of the debate -- before World War I, between\nthe wars, in the 50's and 60's, and again now. The very issues\nwe hear discussed today -- openness in negotiation, distaste for\narmaments and tyrants, fear of involvement, preference for\nhumanitarian endeavors -- were the focus of equally heated debate\nin the 1920's when the affirmation of high moral principle caused\nus to opt for isolationism.\n-9-\nFORD LIBRARY\n-\nFrom its beginnings, Americans have always\nbelieved that this country had a moral significance that\ntranscended its geographic, military or economic power. Unique\namong the nations of the world, America was created as a conscious\nact by men dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles\nthey believed to be of universal applicability. Small wonder,\nthen, that Santayana concluded, \"Being an American is, of itself,\nalmost a moral condition. \"\nBut this idealism has also been in constant tension\nwith another deep-seated strain in our history and experience.\nSince Tocqueville, it has been frequently observed that we are\npragmatic people -- common-sensical, undogmatic, and undoctrinaire --\na nation of practical energy, ingenuity and spirit. We have\n-10-\nmade tolerance and compromise the basis of our domestic\npolitical life. While we have defined our basic principles --\njustice, liberty, equality and progress -- in universal terms,\ndomestically we have sought to enlarge opportunity and freedom\nrather than coerce a uniform standar d of conduct.\nAmerica has been most effective internationally when\nwe have combined our idealistic with our pragmatic tradition.\nThe Founding Fathers were idealists who launched a new experiment\nin human liberty. But they were also sophisticated men of the\nworld; they understood the European balance of power and\nmanipulated it brilliantly to secure their independence. For\na century thereafter, we devoted our energies to the development of\nour continent, content to influence the world b y moral example\nFORD\n-11-\nLIBRAR\nalone. Shielded by two oceans and the British Navy, and blessed\nby a bountiful nature, we tended to believe our special situation\nwas universally valid, even for nations whose narrower margin\nof survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited\nthan our own. We disparaged power even as we grew strong;\nwe tended to see our successes and the product not of fortunate\ncircumstance but of virtue and purity of motive.\nAs our strength grew, we became uncomfortable with\nthe uses and responsibilities of power and impatient with the\nrequirements of day-to-day diplomacy. Our rise to the status\nof a great power was feared and resisted by many Americans who\nforesaw only a process of deepening involvene nt in a morally\nquestionable world.\n- 12 -\nIn the early decades of this century we sought to\nreconcile the tension between ideals and interests by\nconfining ourselves to humanitarian efforts and resort\nto our belief in the preeminence of law. We pioneered\nrelief programs; we championed free trade and openness\nto foreign investment. We attempted to legislate solutions\nto international conflicts -- we experimented with\narbitration, conciliation, legal arrangements, neutrality\nlegislation, collective security systems.\nThese efforts to banish the reality of power\nculminated in our involvement in two world wars.\nWhile we had a clear security interest in a\nEurope free from domination by any one power we clothed\n- 13 -\nFORD & LIBRARY\nit in assertions that we would go to battle for universal\nmoral objectives --\"a war to end all wars\" or the\nunconditional surrender of the aggressor.\nDisillusionment set in as the outcome of both world\nwars necessarily fell short of expectations. A tide of\nisolationist sentiment rose, accompanied by heightened moral\nproclamations coupled with a lowered willingness to undertake\nconcrete commitments. Many Americans began to\nconclude that foreign involvement served no purpose but\nto debase the New World into service to the Old. In\nboth world wars, total victory and an impatience with the\npolitical requirements of peace only enhanced our sense\nof moral rectitude. We were poorly prepared for a world of\n- 14 -\nimperfect security, alliances of convenience, recurrent\ncrises and the need for political structure to secure\npeace in a turbulent world.\nWe entered the decades after World War II, our\nfirst sustained period of peacetime world leadership, with\na supreme self-assurance fortunately matched by over-\nwhelming material superiority. And we faced an antagonist\nwhose political system and actions on the world scene\nexplicitly threatened, yet again, the very existence of our\nmost cherished principles.\nIn a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white\ndivisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our\ncause. Fortunately, our preponderant power gave us a broad\nmargin for error. We saw economic problems around\n- 15 -\nthe world -- which we had solved successfully in our own\ncountry -- and sought to overwhelm them with the sheer\nweight of resources. We projected our domestic experience\n;\noverseas and assumed that economic progress automatically\nled to political stability. And in the process without making\na conscious decision to do so we set about trying to shape\nthe world to our design.\nThe Complexities of the Contemporary World\nWe no longer live in so simple a world.\nWe remain the strongest nation and the largest\nsingle influence on international affairs. For thirty years,\nour leadership has sustained world peace, progress, and\njustice. Our leadership is no less needed today but it\n- 16 -\nmust be redefined to meet changing conditions. Ours\nis no longer a world of American nuclear monopoly;\nrather it is a world of substantial nuclear equivalence.\nOurs is a world of proliferating centers of power and\ninfluence, and at the same time of economic interdependence\nand common global challenges.\nToday, for the first time in the modern American\nexperience, we can neither escape from the world nor\ndominate it. We can no longer rely exclusively on massive\nresources to solve our problems. Today like all other\nnations in history we must conduct diplomacy with\nsubtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination if we are\nto preserve and forward our national goals.\n- 17 -\nWe can no longer always impose our own solutions;\nyet our action or inaction will influence events , often\ndecisively. Our leadership remains essential if the\nworld is to shape cooperative international relationships\nthat bring mankind peace and progress and human justice.\nWe cannot banish power from international affairs,\nbut we can use our own power wisely and firmly to deter\naggression and encourage restraint. We can encourage\nthe resolution of disputes through negotiation. We can\nhelp construct more equitable relations between developed\nand developing nations, and a wider community of interest\namong all nations.\nThese are worthy goals and they are achievable.\n- 18 -\nBut they require a different kind of moral conviction than in\na simpler past. They require the stamina to persevere amid\ncomplexity and endless exertion; the courage to hold fast\nto our goals while recognizing that at any one time they\nmay remain but partially fulfilled.\nThe complexity of contemporary international\naffairs has led some to seek easier answers. We are told\nthat our foreign policy is excessively concerned with\npower politics and too little concerned with human values.\nPainfully negotiated gradual steps toward bold objectives\nare dismissed as inadequate because partial. The very\nprocesses of diplomacy, necessary to achieve any\nnational objective, are disparaged as incompatible with\ndemocratic principles.\n- 19 -\nIt- is time to face the reality of our situation.\nIt\nis well to remember that it was precisely such slogans as\nprestige and influence that a decade and a half ago tempted\n:\nus into adventures that divided our country and undermined\nour international position. We should always keep in\nmind that it is only in the last few years that we have\nfinally begun to bring our commitments into line with our\ncapabilities. We must of course maintain our values and\nour principles; but we risk certain disaster unless we\nrelate them to a concept of the national interest and\ninternational order based not on impulse but on a sense\nof purpose that can be maintained by our people with\nconviction and steadiness for decades.\n- 20 -\nOur choice is not between morality and pragmatism.\nWe cannot escape either and remain true to our national\ncharacter or to the needs of peace and progress. Our\ni\ncause should be just but it must prosper in a world of\nsovereign nations and competing wills. Neither the\nrhetoric of moral purity nor an obsession with power\npolitics will produce the foreign policy worthy of our\nchallenge -- or even for our survival.\nThe Morality of Ends\nAmerica -- and the community of nations --\ntoday faces inescapable challenges:\n-21-\n-- We must maintain a secure and just peace;\n-- We must create a cooperative and beneficial\ninternational order;\n-- We must defend the rights and the dignity of man.\nEach of these challenges has both a moral and a practical\ndimension. Each involves important ends; but they are sometimes\nin conflict. When that is the case we face the real moral\ndilemma of foreign policy: the need to choose between valid\nends and of relating ends to means. And we must then be\nmature enough to face the fact that when two conflicting objectives\ncannot be achieved simultaneously one or the other will suffer at\nleast temporarily.\nIn an age when nuclear cataclysm threatens mankind's\nvery survival, peace is the first and fundamental moral imperative.\n-22-\nWithout it, nothing else we do or seek can ultimately have\nmeaning. Let there be no mistake about it -- averting the\ndanger of nuclear war, limiting the growth of destructive\nnuclear arsenals is a moral as well as political act.\nIn the nuclear age, traditional power politics, the\nstruggle for marginal advantages, the politics of prestige and\nunilateral gains must yield to a sense of responsibility\nunparalleled in history. Balances based on constant tests of\nstrength have always in history erupted into war. But in the\nnuclear age this is unacceptable. Every President, sooner or\nlater, will conclude with President Eisenhower that, \"There is no\nalternative to peace. \"\nBut peace, however crucial, cannot be our only goal. We must\nnot seek it at any price for that would render us morally\nFORD\n-23-\ndefenseless and place the world at the mercy of the most\nruthless. Mankind must do more, as Tacitus said, than\n\"make a desert and call it peace. \"\nIn the search for peace we are thus continually called\nupon to strike balances -- between strength and conciliation;\nbetween partial and total settlements; between the need to defend\nour values and our interests and the need to take into account\nthe views of others. And we must reflect this balance in our\npublic discourse. Barely four years ago many argued that\nconciliation was the only valid route to peace; today policies of\nconciliation are frequently denounced as unilateral concessions.\nThis again is too simple. There will be no stability in a world\nwhose obsession with peace leads to appeasement; but neither\nwill there be security in a world which competes only in mock\n-24-\ntough rhetoric and in the accumulation of arms. Strength\nis essential but its nature needs analysis and it should never\nbe an end in itself. Our policy must be always ready for\nconciliation. We must never lose sight of the fact that we owe\nour people a satisfactory explanation for their sacrifices and\nthat we should bequeath to future generations something more\nhopeful than a balance of terror.\nThe second moral imperative is global cooperation.\nWe now live in a world of more than 150 countries, each\nasserting sovereignty and claiming the right to fulfill its national\ngoals. Clearly no nation can realize all its goals without\nimpairing the hopes of others. Compromise and shared\nendeavors are inescapable. An age of growing interdependence\nproduces the imperative of world community made all the more\n-25-\nFORD & LIBRARY\nurgent by the danger of polarization.\nWe live in an age of division, not merely between East\nand West but between the advanced industrial nations and the\ndeveloping nations. Clearly a world in which a few nations\nconstitute islands of wealth in a sea of poverty, disease and\ndespair is morally intolerable and fundamentally insecure. But\nequally intolerable are the tactics of confrontation with which\nsome of the devel oping nations have pursued their goals.\nThe challenge of world community cannot be met by\nobsessive protestations of gui It characteristic of some advanced\nnations nor by inadequte sacrifices by the industrial nations nor by the\nbloc politics of many of the developing countries. What is required\nis a serious dedication to a spirit of cooperation.\n-26-\nThe objectives of the developing nations are clear:\nthey want economic development, a role in international\ndecisions that affect them, and an equitable share of\nglobal economic benefits. The goals of the industrial\nnations are equally tlear: widening prosperity, an open\nworld system of trade and investments with expanding\nmarkets for North and South; and reliable and equitable develop-\nment of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw\nmaterials.\n- 27 -\nThe goals of both sides can be achieved only if they\nare seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. The\nprocess of building a new era of international economic\nrelationships will continue through the rest of this century.\nIt will require compromise and negotiation among diverse\nand contending interests. Above all it requires a moral\nact: a willingness on the part of the rich to make the\nrelatively small sacrifices which can contribute to a sense\nwhile there is still time for conciliation and\nof community now/before the world is inevitably split into\ncontending camps; a readiness on the part of the weak and\nthe poor to recognize the difference between rhetoric\nand progress and a willingness to refrain from blackmail\nor extortion. Only in this manner can we build\n- 28 -\nFORD\nLIBRARY\na stable and creative world which all nations -- new and\nold, weak and strong, rich and poor -- have a stake in\npreserving because they had a part in building it.\nThe third moral imperative is the nurturing of\nhuman values. Today the tools of modern technology are\nused not onlyfor mankind's betterment, but to intimidate,\nterrorize, and control. It is the tragedy of our times\nthat the very forces of change that have made ours the\nmost productive century in the history of man have also\nserved to subject millions the world over to a new dimension\nof intimidation and suffering.\nIndividual freedom of conscience and expression\nis the proudest heritage of our civilization. All we do in\n- 29 -\nthe world. -- in the search for peace, for greater political\ni\ncooperation, for a fair and flourishing international economy --\nmust be rooted in fundamental liberties which permit the\nfullest expression of mankind's creativity. Technological\nprogress without justice mocks humanity; national unity\nwithout freedom is the unity of regimentätion; nationalism\nwithout a consciousness of human community -- including\na shared concern for human rights -- can become an instrument\nof oppression and a force for evil. The United States,\nto be true to its values, has an obligation to stand for\nthe defense of human rights.\nBut responsibility compels also a recognition of\nour limits. Our alliances and political relationships serve\n- 30 -\nregional and world security. If well conceived, they are not\nfavors to other governments, but reflect a recognition of\nmutual and global interests. They should be withdrawn only\n:\nwhen these interests change and not, as a general rule, as\na punishment for acts with which we do not agree. In\nmany countries, like South Korea, whatever the internal\nstructure, thè populations are unified in seeking our\nprotection against outside aggression. In many countries,\nsuch as Greece, Portugal and Spain, our foreign policy\nrelationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces\nof change. And in many countries it is the process of\nAmerican disengagement that has eroded their sense of\nsecurity and created the perception that there is a need for\n- 31 -\ngreater internal discipline, while at the same time\ndiminishing our ability to influence the domestic practices\nwe criticize.\nThere are no simple answers to this dilemma.\nThe painful experience of the last decade should have\ntaught us that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to\nforesee, let alone to shape, social and political change in\nother societies. Therefore let me restate the principles\nthat have guided our actions:\n--\nHuman rights are a legitimate international\nconcern and have been so defined in international\nagreementsfor more than a generation.\n- 32 -\n;\n-\nThe United States will stand up for human\nrights in appropriate international forums\nand in exchanges with other governments.\n--\nWe will be mindful of the limits of our reach;\nwe will be conscious of the difference between\npublic postures that satisfy our self-esteem\nand policies that bring positive results.\nWe thus return to our central problem which\naffects each of the moral imperatives of our time -- peace,\nglobal community, and human dignity. In foreign policy, at\nany one time, only partial solutions are possible. If\nevery nation of the world presses for the immediate\nimplementation of all of its values, hopes and desires, eternal\nconflict is inevitable. If we insist that others accept all\n- 33 -\nour moral preferences are we then ready to use military\nforce to assist those who do as we demand? And if we\n\"punish\" those who refuse our prescriptions by\nwithholding support or assistance, what will we do\nif. the isolation of this government tempts external pressures.\nIf we overextend our moral claims and back them up we\nwill have maneuvered ourselves into the role of the\nworld's policeman -- a role which the American people\nrejected in a decade of turmoil. But if we fail to back up\nthese claims we will lose relevance and credibility.\nWe will be conducting a policy of self-gratification without\neffectiveness.\nLadies and Gentlemen: it is essential to recognize\n- 34 -\ninevitable and inescapable tension between our moral\naims -- which of necessity are stated in universal terms --\nand the constant necessity for choice that is imposed on the\npolicymaker by competing goals and finite resources.\nThe making and implementing of foreign policy is,\nlike life, a constant effort to strike the right balance\nbetween the best we want and the best we can have -- between\nthe ends we seek and the means we adopt.\nThe Morality of Means\nThe task of statesmen is to find that balance:\nto strive with all his heart and mind toward the values\nAmerica seeks; even when individual measures must fall short\n-35-\nof the final goal. The moral aspect of foreign policy thus\ninvolves not only a challenge of ends but of means as well.\nStatesmen must understand that there are certain\nexperiments that cannot be tried -- not because the goals\nare undesirable but because the consequences of failure would\nbe SO severe that not even the most elevated goal can justify\nthe risk.\nThe Middle East is a vivid example. No people yearn\nfor comprehensive peace more than the people of Israel whose\nexistence has not been recognized by any of its neighbors\nthroughout its history. There are those who argue that in the\naftermath of the 1973 war the entire complex of Arab-Israeli\nissues -- borders, peace obligations, refugees -- should all\nhave been approached simultaneously at one large scale conference.\nBut at the time such a cour se would probably have proved\ndisastrous: the United States had no diplomatic relations with\n-36-\nseveral key Arab countries; the Soviet Union was in effect\nthe lawyer for Arab causes; an oil embargo still prevailed;\nand hostility between the Arab states and Israel remained at\nthe flash point. The chances for success of a comprehensive\napproach were slight; the penalties for failure were far-reaching --\na continuation of the oil embargo, a continued freeze in US\nrelations with the Arab world, corresponding growth of Soviet\ninfluence and the likelihood of a resumption of the Middle East\nwar in difficult circumstances.\nWe chose to proceed step-by-step on issues where room\nfor agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new\nrelationship in the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity\nfor exploiting tensions and to build confidence of the parties\n-37- -\nFORD LIBRARY\ndirectly involved SO that comprehensive solutions would\nsomeday be possible. We approached peace in stages but with\nthe intention of ultimately merging these steps into an overall\nsolution.\nIn the space of eighteen months three agreements were\nreached -- two between Egypt and Israel and one between Syria\nand Israel. As a result, the possibilities of achieving a compre\nhensive peace are greater today than they have ever been before.\nDeep suspicions remain but the first important steps have\nbeen taken. The beginnings of mutual trust -- never before in\nevidence -- are emerging. Some Arab states are for the first\ntime openly speaking of peace and ending a generation of conflict.\nThe nations of the Middle East are now in a position to negotiate\namong themselves with confidence that the scope of outside\n-38-\npressures has been substantially reduced. The step-by-step\napproach ha S thus brought us to a point where comprehensive\napproa ches are the logical next step. The decision before\nus now is not whether but how the next phase of negotiations\nshould be launched. And we will engage in it -- together with\nour Israeli friends =- with new hope and confidence.\n:\nAnother issue involving means that deserves the\ncreative attention of the American people is the potential\ntension between the democratic process and the process of\ndiplomacy.\nA great deal is being said about openness and secrecy\nin the conduct of our foreign affairs. It is an important issue;\nit is in fact critical both for the future of our democracy\nand our foreign policy. It deserves more careful examination\n-39- -\nthan it has received.\nThe American people mus t know the direction their foreign,\npolicy is taking; they must understand their government's\npurposes; they must know that its decisions reflect their values.\nOur Constitution demands it; our commitment to government of and\nby the people compels it. And despite what you may hear in\nsome quarters, I am deeply committed to an open foreign policy.\nI have personally testified formally before Congressional committees\nin the past three years more than eighty times; I have met\ninforma 11y with members of Congress over 100 times; I have given\nmore than fifty public speeches in thirty cities across the country;\nI have held nearly 100 press conferences since coming to office.\nSenior State Department officials, since I have been Secretary of\nState, have visited more than 30 cities to explain and solicit\n-40-\npublic views about our foreign policy. I am proud of that\nrecord.\nBut on the other hand, it is important to be clear about\nthe nature of openness. Modern government is highly complex;\nit must deal daily with a wide range of extremely technical\nissues. Some of them -- especially these dealing with modern\nweaponry -- require long study. To contend that all decisions --\nespecially when they deal with subjects of great sensitivity -- can\nbe publicly arrived at is an absurdity. The public can be misled\nby a flood of partial or irrelevant information as effectively as by\nthe withholding of relevant information. Moreover if all ideas, how\never inadvertantly advanced, became the subjects of public debate,\nminute examination by the media; and the object of political attack,\nthe whole process of decision making will be corrupted and the\n-41 -\nfree exchange of opinion so essential to\neffective and\ncreative Presidential decisions will dry up. Caution and\ninflexibility will reign. There will be a dearth of new initiatives\nand independent views.\nThe impact of excessive concern with \"secrecy\" on the\nprocess of negotiations can be equally pernicious. There is no\nquestion tha t the Congress and the public must be told the aims\nof any important negotiation before it is undertaken. The\nfinal results of a negotiation -- the costs involved, including\nall the national commitments promised -- must be made known\nto the people and submitted to their representatives for approval\nor ratification. But selective or partial revelations during the\ncourse of an ongoing diplomatic process will only serve to distort\nthe over-all picture and thwart progress.\nIt has often been the case in the history of democracy\n-42-\nthat governments may be more interested in compromise\nthan their publics. Publicly expressed pressures often represent\nspecial interests, bureaucratic or private. It is difficult\nenough for a government to ma ke concessions in the context of\na balanced agreement; it is even harder if concession S are\ndisclosed before the reciprocal concessions from the other\nside are available. In such conditions, leaks of information\nare almost always tendentious, and weapons in a bureaucratic\nbattle. Public disclosure can become a weapon to destroy\nnegotiating flexibility and undermine the possibilities of\ncompromise.\nThis is not a call for secrecy, it is a call for\nresponsibility. Unwarrented secrecy is intolerable; mechanical\ndoctrinaire openness is self-defeating and stultifying. The\n-43-\nAmerican people and their government must find this\nbalance together with mutual confidence and a consciousness\nthat we are engaged in a common enterprise some of whose\naspects require the same degree of confidentiality extended\nto any lawyer or doctor on the performance of his trust --\nthe ability to achieve an agreed end by the most appropriate\nproper means.\nFinally there is our commitment to human freedom.\nThere is perhaps no more difficult, no more painful\nissue about means than this.\n- 44 -\nWe have a moral as well as a practical obligation\nto vindicate our values and combat injustice. Those who\nspeak out for freedom and expose the transgressions of\nrepressive regimes do so in the best American tradition.\nThey can have -- and on occasion have had -- a dramatic\nand heartening impact. But there can also be times when\nrhetoric becomes a substitute for action, or tragically\ndrives those it seeks to influence into even greater acts\nof repression.\nThis Administration has believed that quiet\ndiplomacy is generally the best way to further the cause of\nhuman rights. Our objective has been results, not publicity.\nWe were concerned that when such sensitive issues are\nFORD\nLIBRARY\n- 45 -\nturned into tests of strength between governments the\nconcern for national prestige can defeat the most worthy\ngoals. And we have generally opposed attempts to deal\nwith sensitive human rights issues through legislation --\nnot because of the moral view expressed, which we\nshare, but because it usually lacks the flexibility necessary\nto accomplish what it seeks, and because it is almost always\ntoo challenging to the government whose actions it\nseeks to change.\nBy using the tactics of quiet diplomacy this Admin-\nistration has brought about the release or parole of hundreds\nof prisoners throughout the world, and mitigated\nrepressive conditions in numerous countries. We have\n- 46 -\nnot often, in keeping with our insistence on quiet diplomacy,\npublicized these successes.\nThe most striking example of the two contrasting\napproaches to the issues of human rights is the case of\nJewis emigration from the Soviet Inion. The number of\nemigrant Soviet Jews who were permitted to emigrate in\n1968 was 400;- in 1973 that number had risen to 35,000.\nThe reason for this quantum leap lies in our persistent but\nprivate approaches to the Soviet Government and the\nparallel overall improvement in U.S. -Soviet relations.\nHundreds of hardship cases were dealt with in quiet personal\ndiscussions by the President or his senior officials. No\n- 47 -\npublic announcement or confrontation ever took place. But\nwhen results were sought by confrontation and legislation --\nprogress was reversed. Today Jewish emigration from the\nSoviet Union has dropped to some 10,000 a year. I\nstress this not to score debating points against men whose\ndedication to Jewish emigration is unquestioned. Rather\nit is to stress that moral ends require the selection\nof appropriate means and that this cannot always be\ndeduced from public declarations.\nConclusion\nI have discussed the dilemmas of moral choice\nnot to counsel resignation but as a message of hope.\nFond as we are of self-flagellation especially in years\ndivisible by four, Americans can take pride in the moral\n- 48 -\nachievements of their foreign policy in recent years:\n--\nWe have ended the war we found and\npreserved the peace;\n--\nWe have restructured and strengthened\nour partnerships with the industrial\ndemocracies and our sister republics in\nthis hemisphere;\n--\nWe have opened new relationships with\nadversaries;\n--\nWe have begun to curb the race in\nnuclear arms;\n--\nWe have helped to SOW the seeds of peace\nin the Middle East and begun the process of\nconciliation in Africa;\n- 49 -\n--\nWe have put forth a comprehensive agenda\nfor cooperation between the industrial and\ndeveloping worlds;\nWe have worked with others on new global\nchallenges that transcend boundaries and\nideologies;\nWe have defended our values and interests\naround the globe while preserving the peace\nBut our agenda will inevitably remain unfinished.\nGreat opportunities lie before us:\n--\nWe have an early opportunity to place a\nceiling on strategic nuclear arsenals and\nmove on from there to reduce them.\n- 50 ..\nWe have the possibility of major progress\ntowards peace in the Middle East.\n--\nWe can help the peoples of Africa\nreach for conciliation, human justice, and\ndevelopment rather than violence and hatred.\nWe can build on the promising foundations\nof the new relationship with the People's\nRepublic of China.\n--\nWe can see to it that the atom is used for\nmankind's benefit not its destruction.\n--\nThe industrial democracies can usher in a\nnew and dynamic period of creativity based\non equality and mutual respect.\nvoro\n- 51 -\nLIGRARY\nThe developing countries can become true\npartners in the international community.\n--\nAll countries can work together to fashion\na global community both on land and\nin the vast domains of the oceans.\nIn pursuing these goals, the question is not\nwhether our values should affect our foreign policy, but how.\nWe must have the courage to face complexity and the inner\nconviction to deal with ambiguity; we must be prepared to look\nbehind easy slogans and recognize that great goals can only\nbe reached by patience, and often only in gradual stages.\nA world of turmoil and danger cries out for\nstructure and leadership. The opportunities that we\n- 52 -\nface as a. nation to help shape a more just international\norder depend more than ever on a steady, resolute, and\nself-assured America. This requires confidence -- the\nleaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence\nin its government, and the nation's collective confidence in\nthe war th of its objectives. It is time to remind ourselves\nthat while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all\nhave the same ultimate objective -- peace, prosperity, and\njustice in our country and in the world.\nWe remain the only force capable of protecting\nand furthering the process of liberating the human\nrace from the tyranny it has all too often imposed upon itself.\nFor the weak such responsibility would be a burden beyond\n- 53 -\nbearing. But America is a nation born in idealism, reared in\nthe knowledge that a frontier was something to be\nchallenged and crossed, and matured in the knowledge that\nthe ideals that had so set us apart from others implied an\nobligation that we made untiring efforts to implement them.\nMany years ago Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that\nno nation could long endure \"half slave and half free,\nand touched the conscience of a nation. Today people\nthe world over cry out for liberty, and look with hope\nand longing to America, for we have touched the conscience of\nall mankind. If we hold to our ideals, if we persevere in\nthe day-to-day task of building a better world, there will\ncome a time when the generations that come after us will be\nable to say that no man is a slave and no man a master.\nSALT\nFORD LIBRARY & 078230\nQ:\nLast winter (January, February) SALT seemed to be moving\nahead at the time of Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow.\nAnd then, suddenly, you abolished the word \"detente, \" and\nSALT became stalled. Wasn't this simply a political decision\nof your during the campaign against Reagan?\nA:\nI think it is important first that we put this whole thing\ninto perspective and understand the nature of the problem.\nThe first and overwhelming factor is that the United States\nand the Soviet Union each have the capability of destroying the\nworld. This is the first time in human history that such a\nsituation has existed and it not only makes US-Soviet relations\nunique but places an awesome responsibility on them.\nIt is also important to understand that while we have a\nvital interest in the reduction of tensions and improvement\nof relations with the Soviet Union, we are not prepared to\nfollow a \"peace at any price\" philosophy. In the end, a more\nstable, more peaceful world can result only from US strength\nand certain knowledge on the part of the Soviet Union that we\nwill respond if challenged. It is true that something happened\nto US-Soviet relations early this year. What happened was\nthat the Soviet Union intervened massively with military\nequipment and Cuban troops in Angola. I warned them publicly\nand clso sent Secretary Kissinger to Moscow in January in part\n- 2 -\nto convey directly and in private the depth of our concerns.\nThe cooling of US-Soviet relations was directly related to\ntheir intervention in Angola. They cannot be allowed to get\nthe impression that adventures of this sort are without cost.\nOn SALT itself, Mr. Carter says we have made no progress.\nThat simply is another demonstration that he does not know what\nhe is talking about. We made a fundamental breakthrough at\nVladivostok -- achieving an agreement on equality in numbers,\nat a level which required Soviet reduction. Since then we have\ncontinued our work and we are about 90 percent of the way to the\nachievement of a new SALT agreement. This is not the place\nto get into the incredibly complex details of such an agreement\nbut there are basically only two issues left -- backfire bomber\nand cruise missiles. They are difficult issues in that they\nare both weapon systems that do not fall neatly into any\nparticular category. But we have made progress on them.\nFORD\nARAB BOYCOTT\nLIBRARY\nQ:\nMr. President, Governor Carter has said that if he is\nelected he will put an end to Arab boycott practices. Would\nyou comment.\nA:\nThe basic problem here is the bitter antagonism between\nthe Arab countries and Israel. Unless we attack that problem\nand try to solve it, it is misleading to the Ame rican people to\nthink that the boycott will simply be ended because we say it\nshould be. The answer to the problem of the Arab boycott is\nto get a lasting peace in the Middle East. That is the objective\nwe have pursued over the last two years and we now may have\nfavorable prospects in the period ahead.\nIt is important to understand that any discrimination by\nAmerican trading firms on the basis of race, religion, or national\norigin has been totally and completely ended by my actions last\nNovember. The boycott itself was established by the Arab\ngovernments; only they can end it. What the U.S. Government\ncan do is to take action to deal with its effects. The actions we\nhave taken, including my recent decision to make public reports\nof boycott activity, will go a long way toward inhibiting partici-\npati on and reducing its effect, so the answer must be sought in\na comprehensive peace settlement. I am sure Governor Carter\nknows this and any other approach is simply another impossible\npromise.\nFORD\nGRAIN DEAL WITH ISRAEL\nä\nMr. President, did the State Department inform Israel\nthat it would not be possible to sign a long-term grain\nagreement with them? If so, why?\nA:\nThere have been ongoing discussions with the Israeli\nGovernment on US supply of agricultural commodities to\nthat country. With respect to the agreement you refer to,\nany problems are purely technical. The issue is not\nwhether or not we will provide sufficient grain and other\nagricultural commodities to Israel. Of course the United\nStates will provide Israel all the grain Israel requires to\nmeet her needs.\nWe anticipate shipments to Israel of approximately\n2 million metric tons of grain products in 1977.\n1977 (thousands of metric tons)\nWheat\n450-500\nSorghum\n700\nCorn\n300\nSoybean\n400\nSoybean Oil\nUp to 10\n1,900,000\nFORD\nCOMPUTER SALE TO THE PRC\nQ:\nAccording to Aviation Week Magazine, Control Data Corporation\nis negotiating the sale of highly advanced computers to the PRC.\nThis sale is reported to be favored by the State Department but\nopposed by DOD and ERDA. Can you confirm that report?\nA:\nA number of American companies have been discussing the\nsale of oil exploration equipment, including computers for the\nprocessing of seismic data, with the PRC. It would be\ninappropriate to comment on the details of any specific license\napplication. Businesses provide such information to the\ngovernment in confidence. Any export license application will\nbe handled in accordance with the provisions of the Export\nAdministration regulations, as continued in force by Executive\nOrder. Under these laws and regulations, such proposed exports\nare subject to extensive inter-agency review designed to assure\nthat no exports occur which would be detrimental to the national\nsecurity of the US. The views of all the agencies affected,\nincluding the Department of Defense, ERDA as well as State\nare reflected in this review.\nNAMIBIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL\nQ:\nWhy did the U.S. veto the resolution on Namibia in the UN Security\nCouncil on October 19?\nA:\nAs Governor Scranton said in his explanation of the\nAmerican vote, the U.S. concern with the Namibia problem has\nbeen demonstrated dramatically by our continuing efforts to assist\nthe parties involved in finding a peaceful solution. Negotiations are\ncurrently actively under way. While the sensitive process of\nconsultation is going on I did not believe it would serve a useful\npurpose for the Security Council to take new initiatives on the\nNamibian question. After many years of frustration in trying to\nbring about independence for Namibia, the prospect for results\nexists now for the first time. The proposed resolution risked\nupsetting the progress already made.\nIt is important to note however that the U.S. has continued\nto enforce its own arms embargo towards South Africa since 1962,\na year before the UN Security Council called for a voluntary embargo.\n[The Security Council vote was 10 in favor; 3 opposed (U.S.,\nU.K. and France) and 2 abstentions (Italy and Japan). The three\nopposing votes are all vetos since they were all by permanent\nmembers of the UN Security Council. ]\nOctober 20, 1976\nStrategic Stockpile Policy\nQ:\nSenator Proxmire has accused the administration of wasting the\ntaxpayers' money on a new strategic stockpile policy. What is the\nbasis for our new policy, and have we consulted with the Congress in\nmaking these changes?\nA:\nOur strategic materials stockpile provides an important source of\ncritical materials needed in the production of military equipment and\nother key items in a wartime economy. Because of U.S. dependence upon\noverseas suppliers for many new materials, wartime availability can be\ncurtailed or cut off completely. Even though foreign suppliers may be\nfriendly nations, it may be impossible to move materials to the U.S.\nduring actual hostilities.\nstrongly supported by other other Congressmen on cognizant committees,\nThe President's revised stockpile policy has included a\ncomprehensive review of the basic materials needed in the construction\nof today's complex military weaponry and those materials needed to\ninsure the continued health of the civilian economy during wartime. Our\nnew stockpile goals are based upon a complex analysis of industry\nrequirements, processing plant capabilities, reliability of foreign\nsupply, and degree of substitutability by other materials. Because these\nmany variables can change, the President has directed that stockpile\npurchases and sales be reviewed annually, and that a comprehensive\npolicy review be conducted every four years. In conducting this past\nyear's interagency stockpile study, the administration has consulted\nclosely with the appropriate Congressional committees (including\nSenator Proxmire's).\n[FYI: General Leslie Bray, Federal Preparedness Agency Director, will\ntestify before Proxmire next month on the stockpile. This session has\nbeen planned for some time. ]\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nOctober 19, 1976\nMr. President:\nAttached is the transcript you\nrequested of the press conference\nHenry gave in Boston on Friday,\nOctober 15.\nBo\nBrent Scowcroft\nPRESS\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nOCTOBER 15, 1976\nNO. 518\nPC 116\nPRESS CONFERENCE\nBY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER\nSECRETARY OF STATE\nHARVARD UNIVERSITY\nCAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS\nFORD LIBRARY &\nOCTOBER 15, 1976\nFor further information contact:\n518/116\nFORD LIBRARY & SERVIC\nPROF. FAIRBANK: Ladies and gentlemen, I am\nJohn Fairbank, representing Harvard University.\nHarvard has called this press conference and\nis extremely glad that Secretary Kissinger is able to\ncome here today, because we have an interest in East\nAsia that we think is absolutely essential to develop in the\npublic interest. The Secretary is helping us in this way\nat our request. We appreciate it very much. I hope each of you\nwill identify your paper as you ask questions.\nQ\nMr. Secretary, what is this Administration\ndoing at this moment to secure a final accounting of\nAmerican servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and\nalso a comment from you on the cooperation of the present\ngovernment in Viet-Nam on this matter?\nA\n(Secretary Kissinger) We have made it clear to\nthe Government of Viet-Nam that progress towards normalization\nand progress towards better relations with the United\nStates absolutely depends on an accounting for the missing\nin action. We are prepared to discuss this with the\nVietnamese. We've had diplomatic exchanges in Paris,\n518/116\n2\nand we expect to start some discussions with them in\nthe near future on that subject.\nNow, so far, the Vietnamese Government has not\nbeen particularly cooperative. They have been feeding\nout just a few names to influence particular decisions, but we\nthink that as a question of principle we cannot let the\nVietnamese Government blackmail American families with an\nanguish that has been going on for years, in order to\ndo something that they should have done under the Armistice\nAgreement to begin with.\nSo we hope that in the future that we will get\na complete accounting for the Missing in Action and that\nwill then permit progress towards normalization.\nI\nJust a follow up on that: Is this\nAdministration prepared to veto the entrance of the Government\nof Viet Nam into the United Nations until this matter\nis resolved?\nA\nWell, we have vetoed it before. We have\nmade it clear that we would veto it before, and the President\nhas stated that this is a precondition.\nQ\nMr. Secretary, how is the State Department\nresponding to Fidel Castro's\n518/116\n3\nstatement that his country is cancelling the 1973 Sky-\njacking Agreement with the United States?\nA\nFirst, in my speech to the United Nations\nI condemned terrorism as an instrument of national policy\npursued by any nation, for whatever cause. The United States\nis not engaged in any activity of this kind, and the charge\nby Fidel Castro that the United States or its government, or\nany agency of the government had anything to do with the\nexplosion of that airliner is totally false.\nSecondly, we think that it is an act of complete\nirresponsibility to encourage hijacking at this moment\nat a time when the -- when one of the biggest of human\nproblems is the taking of hostages that cannot possibly\ninfluence political decisions or foreign policy decisions.\nAnd we have stated today, and I repeat\nagain, that we will hold the Cuban Government accountable\nfor any actions that result from their decision.\nI\nMr. Kissinger,\nThe Democratic Presidential nominee, Jimmy Carter, says\nthat when it comes to foreign policy that you, in fact, are\nthe President of the United States; in that particular\narea that you really have the responsibility that President\nFord apparently has very little input in foreign policy\n518/116\n4\nFORD\nmatters. Could you respond to that?\nLIBRARY\nA\nI will respond to that question.\nBut could I ask you to\n-- in your other\nquestions to leave them out of the partisan areas. You\ncan mention criticisms and ask me to comment on criticisms\nbut don't get me into specific references to personalities.\nIn this particular case I think I would have to\nsay that this shows that Mr. Carter has more experience as\na Governor than at the Federal level.\nThere is no such thing -- Dean Acheson used to say\nthat there can be a strong President and a strong Secretary\nof State as long as the Secretary of State knows who is\nPresident.\nThe final decisions are always made by the\nPresident.\nI see the President three or four times a\nweek. I am on the telephone with him constantly.\nThere is no major decision that is taken which is not\nmade by the President.\nIn the day to day conduct of foreign policy\nevery President has to delegate certain tactical decisions\nto somebody -- to his Security Advisor, to his Secretary\nof State -- and that, too, has happened with every\n518/116\n5\nPresident in the post-war period.\nPresident Ford\nand I have had a very close working relationship and it\nis in the nature of such a relationship that the points\nof view of the two partners merge.\nBut it is always clear who is the senior partner\nand who is the junior partner.\nI\nMr. Secretary, isn't it true that in a\nsense when President Ford admittedly made a blunder\nduring the second debate with Jimmy Carter on the Eastern\nEuropean situation, that that indicated that he was not\non top of the situation -- that he wasn't aware fully\nof certain foreign policy issues?\nA\nNo. That indicated that under the pressure\nof a debate he did not make a point as felicitously as he\nmight have made it -- as he has since admitted.\nNobody who knows his record could believe\nthat on this particular issue he did not know exactly what\nthe facts were. He had one thing in mind and he\nexpressed it in a manner that created the wrong impression\nand he has stated that publicly and has clarified it.\nBut there was no misapprehension in his mind\nas to the presence of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe\nA 6\nAnd we have been negotiating for years to reduce\nthe number of those divisions; and he has personally\nvisited three East European countries.\nI\nMr. President,\nA\nI appreciate the promotion but -- [Laughter. ]\nthere's a constitutional provision against it --\nI\nMr. Secretary, what was your reaction to\nCarter's remarks on the Panama Canal, and has that\naffected the negotiations in any way?\nA\nCould you leave names out of these questions?\n[Laughter. ]\nIt has not affected the negotiations which\nare just on the verge of resuming.\nWe have stated repeatedly that with respect to\nthe Panama Canal it is not an issue between the United\nStates and Panama. It is an issue of the United States\nposition with respect to the Western Hemisphere and\nultimately with respect to all of the new nations in\nthe world.\nIf there is a consensus in the Western Hemisphere\non any point, it is that the existing arrangements in\nPanama are to be changed. And if the United States\n518/116\n7\nrelies simply on the physical assertion of its power --\nwhich we have, and of course we are stronger than Panama --\nthen we are going to mortgage the possibilities of a\nmore creative relationship in the Western Hemisphere.\nSo therefore, the problem is whether we can\nassure access through the Canal -- free and unimpeded\naccess through the Canal -- by arrangements different from\nthose that now exist.\nThis is the essence of the negotiation and\nI do not think it helps to make extreme statements in\nthis regard.\nAny agreement that we make -- first of all, there's\nno doubt -- not one line of an agreement exists at this\nmoment. Once a concept of an agreement is agreed\nto, it will be discussed with the Congress.\nOnce the Treaty exists, it will have to be approved by\ntwo thirds of the Senate.\nSo there is plenty of opportunity for a full\ndebate and it will take an overwhelming majority to pass\nit. And we believe that the negotiations are in the\n518/116\n8\nnational interest and I believe that any President\nwill come to the same conclusion that every President has\ncome to since 1964, namely that these negotiations should\nbe continued and that all possibilities should be\nexplored.\nQ\nMr. Secretary, could you tell us a little\nbit about the Southeast Asia Conference and why it is\nimportant for you to be meeting with businessmen?\nWill you give us a little bit of your concept of the role of\nmultinationals in East Asia?\nA\nWell, first of all, I am meeting with this\nConference primarily because my friend John Fairbank has\nasked me to meet with it. And I did not call the\nConference nor did I have anything to do with the\nmembership of the Conference.\nAs I understood it, Harvard is calling a conference\nof Americans with interests in Asia and attempts to bring\nthat group together with faculty members that have been\nstudying the problems of Asia.\nNow I believe that this is an excellent idea.\nI think that Americans who are active in Asia ought\nto understand the cultural, political and economic\nconditions of the area. And I believe that professors\n518/116\n9\nwho are studying the area can benefit from some of the\npractical experiences which some of these corporations\nand others who are interested in the area have. I\nhave always believed that one of the problems in our\nsociety is to bring together those who have an\nopportunity to reflect about the problems with those\nwho have to be active in the area.\nSo I have welcomed this opportunity and, as\nyou know, I am speaking OFF THE RECORD. I am not using\nit to make any public pronouncement. I am doing it to\nhelp my former colleagues at Harvard and my old\ninstitution to engage in a worthwhile program.\nI Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us\nif you or President Ford have plans for visiting the\nnew Chinese leader at any time in the near future?\nAnd could you also give us your assessment of the kind of\nrelations we are likely to have with the new government?\nA There are no plans now for either President\nFord or myself to visit China, because while we have\nno doubt about the election, there is a certain decorum\nabout making plans -- (Laughter) until the results are\nclear.\n518/116\n10\nFORD\nIt has been more or less an annual event that\nLIBRARY\nthe Secretary of State would visit China at some point\nduring the year -- and that could happen, although no\nplans exist now.\nThere are no plans whatever for the President\nto visit China. And there is something to be said\nfor perhaps having a return visit at some point, or to\nmeet at some other place.\nBut this, I think, has to be decided after the\nelection.\nAs for the impact of changes in leadership on\npolicy, the long term policy of any country, and\nespecially of a country that moves with the care and\nthoughtfulness of the Peoples Republic of China\ndoesn't depend so much on personalities as on a\nperception of their interests and of their values.\nI think that the basic factors that brought\nthe United States and China into contact with each other\nare still operating and are likely to continue.\nOf course personalities affect the style\nof diplomacy and may affect how certain things are carried out,\n518/116\n11\nbut I do not expect a fundamental change in the\nrelationship and it is too early for us to\ntell what differences of style might emerge.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, in reference to South Africa,\nwhy do you refuse SO far to meet with key African\nliberation organizations, particularly the African\nNational Congress and the Pan African Congress? And why\ndo you schedule meetings excluding these\nlegitimate organizations, spokespersors for the\nAfrican people in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and\nSouth Africa?\nA\nLet's separate the liberation movements\nin Rhodesia - Zimbabwe -- from those in Namibia, for a\nmoment.\nWhen I visited Africa in April, I met with the\nPresidents of the so-called \"front line states\". They\nall felt at the time that the experience of Angola should\nnot be repeated. Thatis to say, they did not want any of the\noutside powers to back one particular liberation movement and\nthereby get a fight started among the liberation movements.\nI then agreed with President Nyerere and President\nKaunda and President Khama that the United States would\nnot get in touch directly with the liberation movements\n518/116\n12\nin order to permit the African problems to be dealt\nwith by Africans.\nAnd we agreed to deal with these liberation\nmovements through the front line Presidents,\nprovided that all other countries did the same.\nThey have seen to it that these liberation move-\nments would not become the plaything of great power\nrivalry and it is not failure to recognize these\nmovements -- it is, rather, our attempt to insulate the\nproblem from superpower rivalry.\nNow that they are going to Geneva, we will\nof course deal with them and our whole policy has been\nto put these liberation movements into a position where they\ncould negotiate directly for the future of their own\ncountry.\nWith respect to the liberation movement in\nNamibia, which is to say SWAPO. I have met with Nujomo\nand my representatives have met with Nujomo.\nIn that case, we do not have the special conditions of\nmany movements, since as one movement he deals also with\nCommunist countries. And we deal with him and we have\nrecognized him as an important factor -- as a key\n518/116\n13\nfactor in the Begotiations.\nIn fact we are\njust now waiting for him to come back to New York from\nAfrica, before I have another meeting with him.\nWith respect to -- again to the Rhodesian movements--\nI want to repeat, we recognize them. We\naccept them. We do not want to choose among them.\nThat is to say, we want the African presidents and the\nleaders, themselves, to determine their own relationships\nbut we will recognize them and we support them.\nI\nWell is it not a fact that the\nState Department has had a preference for Joshua Nkomo\nin Zimbabwe?\nA\nThat is not a fact.\nI\nThat is not a fact.\nA\nNo. Nkomo was recognized by all of\nthe movements as the chief negotiator at the last\nnegotiation, in February, which broke down.\nAt this moment, we are meticulously staying away\nfrom indicating any preference; and when Mr.\nSchaufele visted Salisbury he was in touch with Muzorewa\nas well as with Nkomo, as well as with representatives of\nMugabe.\n518/116\n14\nQ\nMr. Kissinger, on the\nhijacking question do you feel at this\npoint that these incidents of skyjacking will increase?\nAnd also what can the United States do about it\nnow that Castro has cancelled the arrangement?\nA\nI don't want to speculate what exactly\nCastro intends to do with this arrangement, and what\nit means with respect to his actual performance.\nTheoretically he could carry out the same\nobligations, which is to say to return the\nskyjackers without having the formal obligation to do SO.\nIf he, however, deliberately encourages skyjackings\nto Cuba, it would be an act of extraordinary irresponsi-\nbility, because I think whatever the disputes between countries\nmay be, no country should use the suffering of innocent\npeople who, I repeat, have absolutelv no\npossibility of affecting events for the sort of rivalrv\nthat now exists.\n518/116\n15\nI\nWhat can the United States do about that?\nA\nWell, I said we will hold them accountable.\nWhat we will do we will have to study.\nI\nDr. Kissinger, because you are returning to\nhelp Harvard for the East Asian Conference, would you\ngive any thought to returning to Harvard in any capacity\nafter you leave office?\nA\nWell, this won't be a problem before 1981, SO\nwe will have many opportunities to discuss this. (Laughter.)\nI Dr. Kissinger, last night the President said\nthat Jimmy Carter had slandered the name of the United\nStates when he criticized American foreign policy under your-\nself in the Ford Administration. How far can a Democratic\ncandidate go in his criticism before the President\nhas to go run and hide behind the American flag to defend\nagainst it.\nA\nWell, I consider the office of the\nSecretary of State essentially a non-partisan office;\nand I think the candidates have to determine for\nthemselves how far they should go and what they can say.\nQ Mr. Secretary, in your answers you gave before\nabout staying on until 1981 --\nA That was a joke. (Laughter.) That was to\n518/116\nFORD LIBRARY\n16\ndemoralize my staff.\nQ Does that mean you are prepared to stay with\nPresident Ford if he is re-elected?\nA No. I've said repeatedly that eight years is a\nlong time -- especially eight years as turbulent as these have\nbeen -- that I did not want to state before the election was over\nwhat I would do before the President has talked to me,\nbut that on the whole I thought that eight years is a long\ntime. So I have not made my final decision. I want to wait\nuntil the President has talked to me.\nI Mr. Kissinger, aren't you in fact saying you'd\nprefer to leave, although you will serve at his request if he's\nre-elected?\nA I haven't really stated what I will do\nbecause I want to look at it under the conditions that\nthen exist, and I owe the President\nthe opportunity to discuss it with me.\nQ Is there any other job you prefer to take?\nA No.\nQ Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you:\nIs it true that -- is it possible that recent arms sales by the\nUnited States to Israel were motivated by political\nconsiderations before the election?\n518/116\n17\nA Well, I think the President has answered\nthis yesterday. These items have been before the\nAdministration for several months. They come up for\nan almost monthly review. And the President decided to\nact because he thought, as he pointed out yesterday, that\nit was in the best interests of the United States.\nQ Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up on\nMr. Krimer's question of before, since you said your answer\nto that was a joke. Taking for granted that you\nwill at some point leave the State Department, would\nyou at that point consider returning to Harvard? And,\nif so, have you at any time discussed that possibility\nwith any member of the Harvard administration?\nA I haven't discussed it with any member\nof the Harvard administration, and I have really not\ngiven any systematic thought to what I'm going to do when\nI leave this position. I have taken the view that after\nI've announced my resignation, or after the voters announce\nmy resignation for me (laughter), I can then make the\ndecision on what I might want to do. But I think it's\ninappropriate for somebody in my office to discuss his\nfuture with anybody until he's resigned.\n518/116\n18\nI\nMr. Kissinger, I understand the United\nStates is investigating the cause of the crash of the\nCuban plane off Barbados.\nA\nYes.\n2\nCan you tell me who is doing the investigating,\nwhat the investigation has learned so far?\nA\nTo the best of my information, we have\nasked the CIA to check into it. I don't know whether\nthe FBI is. making a formal investigation of it. We have\noffered the governments concerned any assistance that\nthey might request since it did not occur on American\nsoil.\nBut I can state categorically that no official\nof the United States Government -- nobody paid by the\nAmerican Government, nobody in contact with the\nAmerican Government -- has had anything to do with this\ncrash of the airliner. We consider actions like this\ntotally reprehensible.\nI\nMr. Secretary, speaking of the CIA, the CIA\nhas been accused by some Southeast Asia observers of\nmore or less manipulating the recent military takeover\nin Thailand. Now, have the United States interests gone\nso far as to try to emulate the type of military dictatorship\nFORD & LIBRARY\n518/116\n19\nthat was set up in Chile? Are we talking about that\ntopic?\nA\n\"Emulate,\" you mean? We have had absolutely\nnothing to do with the upheaval in Thailand, and therefore\nthere's no point comparing it with Chile. We had\nabsolutely nothing to do with it. We didn't know about\nit beforehand.\n2\nIs Chile still an issue?\nA\nThat depends with whom.\n2\nWith the United States, with the recent\ncar blow-up in Washington, D. C.?\nA\nWell, we of course totally condemn the\nmurder of former Ambassador Letelier, whom I knew\npersonally and respected, even when we had our differences.\nWe have seen no evidence yet as to who was behind this\nassassination. But whoever was behind it, it is an\nabsolutely outrageous act.\nWe also had nothing to do -- as the Church\nCommittee said -- with the overthrow of the Chilean\nGovernment. We had nothing to do with the military\njunta that overthrew it.\n2\nDespite some of the evidence to the\n518/116\n20\ncontrary?\nA\nThe Church Committee made clear that\nwe had nothing to do with the military junta. What\nwe were attempting to do was to strengthen the\ndemocratic parties, who in turn had nothing to do with the\noverthrow, for the 1976 election. That was a different matter.\n0\nCan we say without a doubt that the United\nStates had nothing to do with the recent bombing in\nWashington, D. C.?\nA\nYou mean of Letelier?\n0\nExactly.\nA\nAbsolutely.\nI\nThank you.\nQ\nYou mentioned earlier that you're going\nto consider your fate following the election, and perhaps that\nfate might be decided by the voters. How much of an impact\ndo you, yourself, feel your performance during the last\neight years will have on this election?\nA\nWell, foreign policy is inevitably an\nissue in any election, and that's inevitable. These have\nbeen eight turbulent years. I believe that they were the\nperiod in which we had to make the change from a belief\n518/116\n21\nin American omnipotence, in which we could overwhelm\nevery problem with our power, to a period in which we\nhave to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have\nhad to conduct it throughout history -- with a\nconsciousness of a national purpose, a choice of means --\nwhere we have had to establish new relationships with\nold allies open new relationships with old adversaries,\nliquidate vestiges of a war which we found, and deal\nsimultaneously with a revolution that is represented\nby these new nations.\nI don't want to judge myself how effectively\nall of this has been done, and I don't frankly believe\nthat candidates are in the best position to judge that\neither -- although, obviously, they must make their\ncases.\nWe will leave to history what the ultimate\nassessment is. But without doubt, an eight-year record in\nforeign policy will be subject to discussion.\nI\nWill you be an asset to Gerald Ford\non Election Day or a liability?\nA\nI don't go into the public opinion or\npolling business, and I can't judge it. My obligation\nis, under the direction of the President, to conduct foreign\nFORD\n518/116\nLIBRARY\n22\npolicy and to advise the President as to what I believe\nto be in the best interests of the United States and\nworld peace.\nNow, I understand that most polls show that I\nhave an adequate public support, but this is not the ultimate\ntest of a Secretary of State.\nI\nSecretary Kissinger, do you think that\nat some point the United States should or might sell\narms to China -- provide any kind of defense\nequipment to China?\nA\nWe have never had any request\nfor the sale of arms to China. We have never had any\ndiscussions with China about the sale of arms. We believe\nthat the territorial integrity and sovereignty of\nChina is very important to the world equilibrium, and\nwe would consider it a grave matter if this were threatened\nby an outside power. But we have never had any defense\ndiscussions with China. I don't foresee any, but\nI do have to state our general view that it would not be\ntaken lightly if there were a massive assault on China.\nI\nIs it correct, as former Secretary\nSchlesinger has said, that the State Department withheld\ninvitations for him to visit China?\n518/116\n23\nA\nI don't believe that Secretary Schlesinger\nsaid this, and the only formal invitation to\nSecretary Schlesinger that was issued happened to coincide\nwith his departure from the Government so that the\nproblem of withholding it did not arise.\nI\nHe said that two invitations were extended\npreviously.\nA\nWell, with respect to the first -- I don't\nthink he said it. I think a member of his\nparty must have misunderstood; there was no formal\ninvitation the year before.\nQ\nMr. Secretary, if this' does turn out to\nbe your last year in office, could you look back and think\nabout what might be the major disappointment and major accom-\nplishment during your period as Secretary of State?\nA\nYou know, when you are in this sort of a\nposition, you perform almost like an athlete, in the\nsense of reacting to the series of situations that develop\nvery rapidly. I would think that I would be much more re--\nflective about it after I'm out of office than while\nI'm in office. I would think that the major accomplishment\nwould be the attempt to shift American foreign policy\nfrom a perception that we could do everything simultaneously\n518/116\n24\nto an attempt to relate our commitments to our means\nand our purposes and to our possibilities.\nThis involved recasting our relationships\nwith allies, developing new relationships with adversaries,\nand beginning new approaches to the new countries.\nThe disappointment has been that in the period\nafter 1973, the Executive authority of the United\nStates was so weakened by a series of crises that many\nof the building blocks that were in place in 1973 could not\nbe used as rapidly as I would have hoped, and that\nperhaps more energy had to be spent on preserving what\nexisted than on building what might have been possible.\nI could list specific things that were dis-\nappointing -- as you would expect in an eight-year\nperiod -- but if you want it on a general plane, these would\nbe what I consider the accomplishments and what I consider\nthe sadnesses.\nI\nMore specifically, Mr. Kissinger, are\nyou disappointed that the United States did not establish\nfull diplomatic relations with mainland China before\nMao Tse-tung's death and that perhaps now this period is\ngoing to be a longer peridd because of the transition that\nmainland China is going through?\nFORD\n518/116\nLIBRARY\n25\nA\nI think that the process of normalization is\none to which we're committed and which we intend to\ncarry out. I don't think it is tied, nor has it ever\nbeen tied by the Chinese, to a personality or to a\nspecific leader. And I believe that that process can\ncontinue.\nQ\nWhen will it be completed, or what's\nholding it up now?\nA\nWell, what has held it up is to discuss\nthe modalities about the future of Taiwan,\nwhich will have to be discussed with the new leadership.\nQ\nMr. Secretary --\nPROF. FAIRBANK: We have a half hour.\nIs there a last question or two?\nQ\nThis is the last, bringing you back to\nsomething else, Mr. Secretary -- if you don't mind.\nA\nOne more.\nQ\nI'll give a scenario to you. Suppose that\nyou do get your walking papers from the electorate in\nNovember. You say you don't know what job you're going\nto take. But most of us, I think, would concede in all\nprobability you will receive an offer to write your memoires\nor write a book on your eight years.\n518/116\n26\nOn balance, given equal office space and\nbackground, would you rather write that on the banks of the\nPotomac or the banks of the Charles? (Laughter.)\nA\nAlmost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac.\n(Laughter.) Where else, I don't know, but almost certainly not\non the banks of the Potomac.\nI\nMr. Secretary --\nA\nYou'll get the last question. Go ahead.\nYou ask a question and let this lady speak.\nNo -- you go ahead. You ask your question\nfirst.\n2\nO.K. Recently I have read that Mexico was going\nto Communism, quoting from one declaration of one of the Senators\nof the United States.\nWhat is your point of view about that? Do you think\nMexico is really going to the Communists?\nA\nAbsolutely not. I know Mexico a little. I know\nits leaders very well. I know its incumbent President\nwell. I know the President-elect well.\nOf course, Mexico is given to heroic rhetoric,\nwhich may not always be literally understood in the\nUnited States (laughter) -- but Mexico is not going\ntowards Communism, and I know no leader in Mexico who\nhas any Communist biases, though, of course, the Mexican\nrevolution produces a certain sympathy for Third World causes\n518/116\n27\nand inevitably when a country has as powerful a neighbor\nas the United States, there are going to be many points\nof friction. But the fact is we usually solve our\npoints of friction. And we have repeatedly rejected this\naccusation that has been made by several Congressmen\nand Senators.\nQ\nThank you.\nA\nNow this lady has the last question.\nI\nA few minutes ago you said that public\nopinion polls are not the ultimate test for a Secretary\nof State.\nA\nOf a Secretary of State.\nQ\nYes. If they are not, what is the ultimate\ntest?\nA\nI think the ultimate test of a Secretary\nof State -- the obligation of a Secretary of State is to\ngive his best judgment to the President as to what is in the\nnational interest. And if he is responsible, he 11 understand\nthat the national interest cannot be separated from the\nworld interest. The President then has to make the political\ndecision as to how this judgment can be carried out within\nthe American political context. It's the President who\nhas to make that decision.\n518/116\n28\nI don't think a Secretary of State should\ntake his own public opinion polls as to his own\npopularity. The Secretary of State ought to be expendable\nand usually is expended (laughter), but he should\nnot worry about his own popularity primarily. He\nshould advise the President. Then the President has\nto make the judgment. And eventually he 11 be judged\nby\nhistory and whether he's left the world somewhat\nmore peaceful and perhaps more progressive than he\nfound it.\nA\nThank you very much.\nPROF. FAIRBANK: Thank you."
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