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FY 1976 - 12/23/74 - Final Issues for Decision
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FY 1976 - 12/23/74 - Final Issues for Decision
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White House Special Files Unit Files
Budget Review Decision Papers
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Department of State. 9/1789-
Department of Defense. Department of the Army. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Ohio River Division. U.S. Army Engineer District, Pittsburgh. (6/14/1979 - 4/1997)
Department of State. Agency for International Development. Bureau for Private and Development Cooperation. Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. (1978 - 10/1/1979)
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The original documents are located in Box 8, folder "FY 1976 - 12/23/74, Final Issues for
Decision" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
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domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 8 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
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budget book, 1976 final iasues for decision, 12/23/84
la. memo
Ash to th3 President
5 pages
12/23/74
A
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PL 480 1975 program alternatives
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PL 480 alternatives and country programs
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Ash to the Preisdent
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Issue 11b
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If. memo
Kissinger to the President
2 pages
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1h. memo
Kissinger to the President
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FILE LOCATION
Special Files, Budget Decision Books
FY 1976, 12/23/74, Final Issues for Decision (box 8)
plc 4/19/84
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12065 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 1-81)
MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENTIAL HANDWRITING
FILE CODE
DATE:
12/23/74
SUBJECT: 1976 Budget Final Issues for Decision, 12/23/74
RECOMMENDED
LETTER
MEMO
PHONE CALL
NEWS SUMMARY
NEWS CLIPPING
OTHER
NOTEBOOK
TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROY ASH
NOTE: Above removed from Special Files Box #4
CHECKMARK ONLY
SENSITIVE - NO HANDWRITING
handwasting P.E.E
CRISTICAL I IN
GENALD
Removed from Special Files Box #4,
FORD
Binder "1976 Budget Final Issues for
Decision, 12/23/74"
LIBRARY
12-23-74
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Don R.)
in Atudy. 0 Country,
2 found This
out of date,
ORIGINAL IN PRESIDENTIAL
HANDWRITING PILE
the LIBREST
1976 Budget
Final Issues For
Decision
12/23/74 ORIGINAL IN PRESIDENTIAL
HANDWRITING FILE
O
P.L.#480
#480
ORIGINAL IN PRESIDENTIAL
HANDWRITING FILE
ABI
UNIVER HAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
December 23, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROY L. ASH
SUBJECT:
Budget Decision for P.L. 480 Food
Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1975
Because of restrictive provisions in the recently enacted
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, the alternatives for a
1975 P.L. 480 program which were presented to you earlier
are no longer feasible. The Act includes:
A congressional direction that during 1975 "not
more than 30 percent of concessional food aid
should be allocated to countries other than
those which are most seriously affected by food
shortages, unless the President demonstrates to
the appropriate Committees of the Congress that
the use of such food assistance is solely for
humanitarian food purposes."
An effective limitation of $77 million in P.L. 480
for Cambodia within the overall aid limitation of
$377 million, of which no more than $200 million
is available for military aid and of which $100
million is available solely for dollar economic
aid.
Although the 30 percent limitation technically is not
legally binding, it is a strong sense of Congress state-
ment. Its precise meaning, however, is subject to two
interpretations because of conflicts in its legislative
history. The more restrictive interpretation was set
forth with precision in a colloquy between Senators Hatfield
and Humphrey on the Senate floor: no more than 30 percent
of Title I sales should go to countries which are not among
the most seriously affected (MSA's). The more liberal in-
terpretation was set forth by Rep. Frelinghuysen: the amount
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)
White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AND NARS, Date 6/27/85
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
of Title I credit sales to countries other than the
MSA's should not exceed 30 percent of the total P.L. 480
program including Title II grants. Chairman Morgan was
much less precise in the floor debate and left at least
two Congressmen (Brown of California and Symington) with
the understanding that the restrictive interpretation
was the correct one. A copy of these statements is at-
tached at Tab A. We are informally advised by AID
lawyers that while the legal point is technically
arguable, proponents of the restrictive interpretation
have the stronger case because of the legislative history,
particularly the clear statement of Senator Humphrey, who
was the originator of the section.
We have, therefore, developed two new alternative pro-
grams, presented below. Alternative A is consistent
with the restrictive interpretations of the 30 percent
rule; Alternative B is consistent only with the more liberal
Frelinghuysen interpretation. Country details are pre-
sented at Tab B. The earlier four alternatives are at
Tab C for your reference.
Alternative A falls between the earlier alternatives #2
and #3 in both commodity and budget terms. It exceeds
by 230,000 tons the December 4 USDA commodity availa-
bility level for wheat of 2.7 million tons in the earlier
Alternative #2 and thus could lead to some risk of price
rises, and it adds $39 million to the old Alternative #2,
bringing outlays to $1,133 million. This alternative
limits shipments to the countries not seriously affected
by economic disruption to thirty percent of the Title I
program -- excluding "carry-in" commodities approved
last year but actually shipped very early this year.
The program, therefore, is oriented to humanitarian need
particularly in South Asia--India, Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka. It would be responsive to the concerns of
Senators Humphrey and Hatfield.
With respect to the countries restricted by the 30 per-
cent limitation, this alternative would:
Substantially meet needs in the Middle East --
Egypt, Syria, Israel and Jordan -- permitting
additional shipments to the first two countries,
and providing about the same amounts in the
earlier Alternatives #2 and #3.
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
Cut back Vietnam from the $101 million in the
previous alternatives to $62 million, although
if their crops are good even this reduced level
will be higher than actual needs. If, however,
the security situation in the Mekong Delta
deteriorates, more may be needed.
Hold Chile to $33 million and Korea to $30 mil-
lion, the amounts already committed, and
Not permit any shipments to Indonesia.
Among the countries not subject to the 30 percent limi-
tation:
Cambodia would be held to the $77 million ceil-
ing under the Foreign Assistance Act. If that
ceiling is raised in the next session of Congress,
more would be shipped to Cambodia and less to
South Asia.
Pakistan would receive $35 million, providing
almost 80 percent of the amount for that country
in the old Alternative #3.
South Asia would receive very large scale ship-
ments totalling $475 million, much higher than
in any of the earlier alternatives.
Alternative B is at the dollar and commodity levels of
the previous Alternative #3. It would exceed the
December 4 USDA wheat availability by 400,000 tons.
Compared to Alternative A, it would increase and raise
budget outlays by $32 million to $1,165 million.
This alternative would increase the amount for countries
subject to the 30 percent limitation from $258 million
under Alternative A to $373 million.
Specifically:
The Vietnam program would rise to the original
$101 million level, all of which may not be
needed, thus providing a larger margin for
contingencies elsewhere.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
Shipments to Korea would rise to $85 million,
compared to the $106 million in the earlier
Alternative #3.
Shipments to Chile would rise to $53 million,
the same as in the earlier Alternatives # 2 and #3.
With respect to countries not subject to the 30 percent
limitation:
Pakistan would receive $44 million, the same as
in the earlier Alternative #3 and $9 million
higher than in Alternative A.
South Asia could have as much as $381 million,
higher than in any of the earlier alternatives,
but significantly lower than Alternative A's
$475 million.
Your choice is thus between a heavily humanitarian pro-
gram for which there is strong Congressional support and
a program which, while still containing a very substantial
humanitarian element, meets to the extent possible your
security and political objectives.
Agency Positions
In preparing these new alternatives OMB and NSC staff did
not re-survey the other agencies about their positions.
Based on their views on the earlier alternatives, how-
ever, we believe it is fair to conclude that:
CEA and CIEP would support Alternative A, which
OMB recommends.
State, AID, and Agriculture would support
Alternative B,, which NSC recommends.
Treasury, while preferring the program emphasis
of Alternative B, would sharply cut back the
level of wheat shipments proposed.
Because of the need to schedule shipments for the in-
creased commodities under both alternatives and because
of the budget printing schedule, an early decision is
needed.
FORD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
Decision:
Alternative A: $1,133 million, with strong humanitarian
emphasis and consistent with the restric-
tive Hatfield-Humphrey interpretation of
the 30 percent limitation.
Approve
Alternative B: $1,165, with greater emphasis on other
foreign policy objectives, but relying
on the weaker case for the Frelinghuysen
interpretation of the limitation
Approve
If you approve Alternative B, we believe that you should
inform Senators Hatfield and Humphrey of that decision
and your reliance on the literal words of the 30 percent
limitation and Rep. Frelinghuysen's statement.
Attachments
Note: The Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice,
has reviewed the legislative history of the 30
percent limitation provision and considers the
restrictive interpretation to be correct.
FORD
LIBRAR.
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB A
HUMPHREY-HATFIELD COLLOQUY ON P.L. 480
Debate on Foreign Assistance Act Conference Report
Congressional Record, December 17, 1974, p. S21794
MR. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to direct an
inquiry to the manager of the bill, the distinguished
Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Humphrey) regarding section 49
of the Senate bill, and its disposition by the conference.
I note that the conference has agreed to set a limit of 30
percent on concessional food assistance to nations not on
the U.N. list of 32 countries "most seriously affected" by
the current global economic crisis. As the Senator knows,
I have had a very deep concern about the continued diversion
of concessional sales under title I of Public Law 480 to
nations who are not in deep need of food, but who are re-
ceiving such aid for purely political purposes. It is un-
conscionable to me that at this time, when the needy nations
of the world face a grain deficit of 7.5 million tons in the
next 6 months, that we should continue to divert large por-
tions of our food aid to nations for purely political pur-
poses. Now, my question to the Senator is to what does this
30-percent limitation figure apply?
MR. HUMPHREY. The 30-percent figure applies only to con-
cessional sales.
It applies, therefore, only to title I of the Public Law
480 program. Title II, which is purely grants, is not in-
cluded in figuring this limitation.
MR. HATFIELD. I am pleased to hear that. Does this mean,
then, that the administration is limited in this current
fiscal year to giving only 30 percent of title I, Public
Law 480 loans for concessional sales to nations that are
not on the U.N. list of "most seriously affected.'
MR. HUMPHREY. That is exactly correct. In determining
the 30-percent figure, we had clearly in mind 30 percent of
the title I budget under Public Law 480. We did not in-
clude title II within the limitation since the title II
program of grants, given through voluntary agencies pri-
marily, is clearly humanitarian. We were not interested,
therefore, in limiting its allocation because of its evi-
dent humanitarian nature. That is why the limitation
applies only to title I.
TAB A
- 2 -
MR. HATFIELD. That is as I had hoped, and how I un-
derstand the actions of the conference committee. How-
ever, I have wanted them to be interpreted explicitly so
as to prevent any misunderstanding. In that regard, let
me point out to the Senator that the language agreed to
by the conference in this matter reads "30 percent of
concessional food aid." In this instance, then, "con-
cessional food aid" refers to title I, and title I only
of Public Law 480. It does not include, for the purposes
of interpreting this law, the Public Law 480 title II pro-
gram.
MR. HUMPHREY. The Senator is absolutely correct. This
limitation applies only to the concessional sales and loans
operating under title I of Public Law 480. That is what
the language means, and there should be absolutely no am-
biguity in anybody's mind about it.
MR. HATFIELD. I understand that the administration has
under its consideration a total of Public Law 480 program of
about $1.2 billion for this fiscal year. Of that amount,
about $350 would be available for grants under title II, and
about $850 would be available under concessional loans under
title I. Now, if that particular budget, which we are using
here as an example, were adopted, then, as I understand what
the Senator has said as to the conference committee language,
there would be a 30 percent limitation on the $850 million
title I program, for nations not on the U.N. list. There-
fore, under this budget and limiting formula, only $255
million would be available for nations not on the U.N. list
under title I. Is that correct? Was that the intent of
the conference committee?
MR. HUMPHREY. Again, the Senator is totally correct in his
understanding of the action taken by the conference committee.
And I should like to commend the Senator for his diligent and
detailed interest in this very critical subject.
MR. HATFIELD. I want to thank the Senator very deeply,
and commend him for his outstanding leadership in this en-
tire issue. As the original author of the amendment, which
has been accepted by the conference with the one change we
have noted, the Senator has shown a continued and steadfast
desire to limit the use of our food aid for political pur-
poses during this time of great human need.
TAB A
- 3 -
I would point out, further, that this limitation will
allow the administration to fulfill its political commit-
ments of food aid to the Middle East and elsewhere. But
it will establish a meaningful limit on the political use
of such aid. It will prevent major portions of food aid going
to nations such as Korea, Indonesia, and Chile, whose people
do not face the threat of starvation in the way that those
in Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere do. By
limiting the food aid which can flow to nations for political
purposes, we can increase the levels of food aid given to
save the lives of millions in the next 6 months. I have
calculated that $100 million worth of food aid, if given to
nations facing unmet grain deficits before the next harvest,
can support 3 million people through the next 6 months. So
that is the true significance of the action which we have
taken here.
The Senator knows that in the past I have not voted for
the foreign aid bill because of my objections to particularly
the military aid portions of it. But in light of the action
taken by the conference committee on this critical issue, I
shall vote for passage of the conference committee report.
TAB A
- 4 -
FRELINGHUYSEN STATEMENT ON P.L. 480
Congressional Record, December 18, 1974, p. H 12211
MR. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the
conference report and commend the conferees for a job well
done.
This does seem to constitute a good balance between
political and humanitarian considerations, but I am es-
pecially interested in the humanitarian aspect.
With reference to food aid, the conference report
properly, focuses in my judgment, on the food needs of the
countries most seriously affected by the world economic
crisis.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman
from New Jersey, the ranking minority member of our com-
mittee, who is retiring, for all his outstanding work and
for his good representation in this conference.
I would like to thank him for his support of the pro-
position that a large proportion of our development
assistance and food aid will go to the countries most
seriously affected by the food crisis.
MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman
for his remarks.
I should like to say that the report seeks to reflect
a balance between political and humanitarian considera-
tions. As has just been indicated, we have provided that
agricultural development aid should be concentrated on
countries with per capita income of less $300.
In section 55 of the conference report, which is found
on page 28, we have directed that:
Not more than 30 percent of concessional food aid should
be allocated to countries other than those which are most
seriously affected by current food shortages.
In my opinion, this language clearly directs that the
President should provide to the countries most seriously
affected by the food crisis at least 70 percent of all food
assistance. This aid includes both grants and credit sales
under title I and title II of Public Law 480.
LIBRARY
Best Possible Scan from Poor Quality Original
TAB A
- 5 -
The House confereees agreed to these provisions, to
.re that the gentleman's humanitarian concerns are met.
STATEMENTS OF CHAIRMAN MORGAN
AND REPRESENTATIVE BROWN OF CALIFORNIA
AND SYMINGTON
Congressional Record, December 18, 1974
PP. H 12210, 12211, 12213
MR. BROWN. of California. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished
rman of the committee mentioned the colloquy with the
leman from Missouri (Mr. Symington) with regard to
d for Peace," which occurred on the floor of the House
1 the bill was before us, and there is a similar colloquy
en Senators Hatfield and Humphrey as reflected in
:erday's Record on page S21794 with regard to the per-
:age of the title I Food for Peace which will be allo-
ed to the countries which are not on the U.N. list of
countries "most seriously affected" by the current world
1 crisis.
I wish to ask the distinguished chairman of the commit-
if he is in agreement with the interpretation contained
:he remarks of Senator Hatfield with regard to the pro-
.ons in the conference report.
MR. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman remembers,
House bill had no similar provision dealing with food
MR. BROWN. of California. That is right.
MR. MORGAN. Our committee of conference, however, adopted
Senate language favoring more food for those who need more
). We believe the language in the conference report moves
that direction. It puts emphasis on food assistance to the
rest countries.
TAB A
- 6 -
MR. SYMINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I take this opportunity
to refer again to the food-for-peaceprovisions of the bill.
The record is now explicit with respect to what is meant
by concessional food aid, in section 55 (a) (5).
It is clear from the colloquy that occurred in the
other body, and here, that what is meant by that sub-
section is that not more than 30 percent of title I con-
cessional food sales may be allocated to countries other
than those most seriously affected by food shortages.
The word concessional is a term of art. It only refers to
title I sales for foreign currency. It means sales on con-
cessional terms. It is not used redundantly in this or any
other section. It is not used with respect to title II,
the title which deals with grant programs.
It is quite important that we nail this down for the
record. We are not talking about 30 percent of the total
of food aid under title II plus concessional aid under
title I, but only of title I concessional food aid. For
the coming fiscal year, this would be restricted to the
amount of $255 million. I am glad both bodies have ac-
cepted this interpretation.
SUBJ: LEG-6
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, GA., CHAIRMAN
JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS.
CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.
As /PB
GEORGE MC GOVERN, S. DAK.
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
JAMES D. ALLEN, ALA.
MILTON R. YOUNG, N. DAK.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
ROBERT DOLE, KANS.
VALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
HENRY BELLMON, OKLA.
Bride
ICK CLARK, IOWA
JESSE HELMS, N.C.
United States Senate
COTYS M. MOUSER, CHIEF CLERK
COMMITTEE ON
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
December 23, 1974
ang
Due 12/26
ACTION: GC for Murphy sig
INFO: Parker log
Murphy log
AA/LEG, C/FFP,
AA/PPC, LEG/LPCS
The Honorable Daniel Parker
Administrator
Agency for International Development
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20523
Dear Dan:
May we offer our warm thanks for your assistance during the
consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act. Your patience
and cooperation throughout our work on this legislation was
most appreciated by all of those involved.
It is our understanding that some question has been raised
concerning the interpretation of Section 55 of the Foreign
Assistance Authorization Bill as reported by our Conference
Committee and passed by the Congress. Section 55(a) (5)
provides that "not more than 30 percent of concessional food
aid should be allocated to countries other than those most
seriously affected by current food shortages, unless the
President demonstrates to the appropriate committees of the
Congress that the use of such food assistance is solely for
humanitarian food purposes. "
It is the clear intent of the author, Conference Committee,
and the Congress, as duly demonstrated in various colloquys
on the issue, that the 30 percent limitation apply solely
to Title I of PL 480. While the denotation of the word
"concessional" might be interpreted to apply to both conces-
sional sales and grants the connotation of the word as
applied to our food assistance programs is that referring
to sales and loans only. In offering this provision, the
author's intent was that the 30 percent limitation apply to
Title I of PL 480 only and using Title I program funds as a
base upon which the 30 percent limitation is applied.
The Honorable Daniel Parker
Page Two
December 23, 1974
Since this was a Senate provision, drafted by Senator Humphrey
and clarified specifically in our colloquy, it should be clear
that there is no room for any other interpretation. As the
Senate was the initiator of this amendment, and as it was our
position which was accepted in the Conference, there is no
possibility for doubt over its meaning.
Our interest in including this restriction is not to encumber
the program with permanent programming mandates nor to dis-
courage political uses of food assistance with modesty in time
when international supply conditions permit. Rather, our con-
cern is that a sense of balance between political and humani-
tarian objectives be restored in our Food for Peace programs.
Frankly, unless such a balance is attained the future of the
program may be jeopardized as confidence in the humanitarian
aspect of the program is lost.
We are most anxious to work with you in the spirit of coopera-
tion which has characterized the passage of the Foreign Aid
Bill and, therefore, want you to be totally clear about the
intent and effect of this aspect of legislation which the
Congress has passed.
Sincerely,
Hubert #
2mg
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
MARK 0. HATFIELD
TAB B
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB B
P.L. 480 1975 PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
By White DOD Guide Lines, Feb. 3.4 (b)
DECLASSIFIED
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT RECENT
(Outlays in millions of dollars)
NARS, Date 6/27/85 24, 1983
01d
Alt. #3
Alt. A
Alt. B
(for ref-
E I COMMODITIES
erence only)
Carry-in
53
56
56
Allocated in 1975:
1.
Subject to 30% limit
Middle East
139
133
133
Vietnam
101
62
101
Chile
53
33
53
Korea
106
30
85
Indonesia
30
Other
10
2
2
Subtotal
439
258
373
2.
Not subject to 30%
limit
Cambodia
158
77
77
Pakistan
44
35
44
South Asia
237
475
381
Other
16
16
16
Subtotal
455
603
518
Total 1975 Allocations
894
861
891
TOTAL TITLE I COMMODITIES
947
917
947
TOTAL TITLE II COMMODITIES
352
352
352
TOTAL COMMODITIES
1,299
1,269
1,299
Freight costs
140
138
140
Deduct receipts
-274
-274
-274
TOTAL P.L. 480
1,165
1,133
1,165
Commodity quantities:
(millions of tons)
Wheat
3.1
2.9
3.1
Rice
1.0
1.0
1.0
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB C
P.L. 480 1975 FUNDING ALTERNATIVES
AND COUNTRY PROGRAMS
($ millions)
Alt. #1
Alt. # 2
Alt. #3
Alt. # 4
TITLE I COMMODITIES
Southeast Asia:
Cambodia
158
158
158
158
Vietnam
101
101
101
101
Subtotal
259
259
259
259
Middle East:
Egypt
88
88
88
88
Israel
9
9
14
26
Jordan
4
4
5
7
Syria
32
32
32
32
Subtotal
133
133
139
153
Traditional Recipients:
Chile
53
53
53
65
Korea
30
30
106
124
Indonesia
-
-
30
43
(
Pakistan
18
18
44
53
Subtotal
101
101
233
285
Asian Subcontinent:
Bangladesh
98
171
138
191
India
88
116
88
169
Sri Lanka
-
11
11
11
Subtotal
186
298
237
371
Other Countries and Carry-In:
Other Countries
9
19
27
35
Carry-In
53
53
53
53
Reserve
-
15
-
I
Subtotal
62
87
80
88
TOTAL TITLE I COMMODITIES
741
878
947
1,155
TITLE II COMMODITIES
352
352
352
352
TOTAL COMMODITIES
1,093
1,230
1,299
1,507
Freight Costs
134
136
140
147
Deduct: Receipts
- 274
-274
-274
-274
PUBLIC LAW 480 - TOTAL
953
1,092
1,165
1,380
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)
12/7/74
White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983
CONTIDENTIAL
ACTD
NARS, Date
6/27/85
By
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
December 23, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROY L. ASH
SUBJECT:
1976 P.L. 480 Budget Decision
Attached at Tab A is the issue paper provided to you earlier on
P.L. 480 food aid for 1976, on the basis of which you decided upon
Alternative #2--budget outlays of $861 million and 4.7 tons of
grain shipments. Dr. Kissinger in the memorandum attached at
Tab B asks that you reconsider your decision and choose Alterna-
tive #1, which has budget outlays of $1.18 billion and provides
grain shipments of 6.2 million tons.
The points that Dr. Kissinger's memorandum raises and OMB's views
on them are as follows:
1. His memorandum suggests that the price effects of the larger
program which he proposes will not be significant. This is based on
the assumption that world-wide weather conditions next year will be
normal to better than normal.
As our experience of the past two years has shown, however, we cannot
count on good weather. Had we done so this year and moved forward with
a large scale food aid program, prices might well be considerably higher
than they are today, possibly sufficiently high to create irresistible
pressure for export controls. Even relatively small increases in food
aid can lead to rather large price swings. If, on the other hand,
we have good crops, falling prices may permit us to ship a larger
volume of food under Alternative #2 than seems possible now.
2. Dr. Kissinger believes that the higher Alternative #1 level of
food aid will be strongly supportive of our international interests,
particularly as they relate to a U.S. leadership position in follow-
ing up on the World Food Conference.
OMB believes that the Alternative #2 level also supports our interna-
tional efforts to emphasize food production and is more consistent with
our efforts to shift part of the burden of food aid to other countries.
Your initial decision on 4.7 million tons of grain constitutes 47 per-
cent of the World Food Conference target of 10 million tons of grain
for all food aid donors including the oil rich countries. Raising the
U.S. program to 6.2 million tons under Alternative #2 would offer little
room and little incentive for other countries to do more.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)
White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983
SECRET
By
NW
NARS,
Date
6/27/85
SECRET
2
3. His memorandum states that the higher level would win strong
support from domestic proponents of food aid who support its use for
humanitarian purposes.
The larger program under Alternative #1 would not, however, provide
additional food to those countries with a humanitarian need, but to
the Middle East and Korea where there is no pressing food requirement.
The higher program would raise the proportion of food aid going to
countries less seriously affected by rising prices for oil and food
to almost half of Title I concessional sales. This is far above the
30 percent limit set by Congress for these countries in 1975. Thus,
approving this level would surely elicit a strong adverse reaction from
the Congress and probably lead to tighter legislative restrictions on
food aid.
4. Dr. Kissinger points out that the dollar level of Alternative #2
may well be lower than in 1975, leading to the charge that the United
States is doing less food aid.
As the World Food Conference demonstrated, however, food aid recipients
are most concerned about the quantities of food that they are likely to
receive. Alternative #2, which you earlier approved, exceeds the
quantitative levels you are considering for this year by 5-10 percent
and, in addition, allocates a much larger proportion of the program to
countries most in need of food aid.
Decision:
Approve Secretary Kissinger's appeal ($1.18 billion)
Reaffirm your decision of $861 million (OMB
recommendation
Attachments
SECRET
(
CONFIDENTIAL
54
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
1976 Budget
Issue 11b: P.L. 480 Food Aid Program for 1976
Statement of Issue
What should the level and composition of food aid be in 1976
in view of uncertainties in commodity availabilities and con-
tinuing pressures for a sizable increase in the U.S. food aid
program particularly for humanitarian purposes?
P.L. 480 Outlays
1974
1975
1976
Alt.#1 A11.#4
Alt. #1
Alt. # Alc.#3 #
AID
OMB.
USDA
Req.
Rec.
Req.
($ millions)
Title I Commodity
(
Costs
568
741
1155
921
662
617
Title II Commodity
Costs
283
352
352
326
283
262
Subtotal
851
1093
1507
1247
945
879
Freight Costs
112
134
147
180
151
138
Receipts (-)
324
274
274
246
235
235
Total
639
953
1380
1181
861
782
Grain Equivalent
3.1
3.8
5.3
6.2
4.7
3.8
(million metric
tons)
Background
Members of Congress, the public and foreign governments will be
watching the level of food aid planned for in 1976 compared with
that chosen for 1975 as an indication of U.S. intentions regarding
the future of food aid. In that contex1, the commodity level of
food aid chosen for 1975 sets a minimum for the 1976 program if
the Administration is to signal its resporsiveness to continuing
pressures for large scale food aid.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)
White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1933
By
AAP
LIBRARY
NARS,
Date
6/27/85
55
USDA plans no acreage limitations on P.L. 480 commodities in
1976. Thus, with normal weather conditions, supply is expected
to ease and prices to fall below current levels by roughly 20%.
However, major uncertainties remain regarding commodity avail-
abilities and prices as well as the likely needs abroad for
food aid in 1976.
Alternatives
#1
Undertake a large scale food aid program of
$1,181 million (State /AID Req.)
#2
Provide for a program of $861 million (OMB
Rec.)
#3
Mount a P.L. 480 program of $782 million
(USDA Req. )
Analysis
The Level
The major focus of recent public and Congressional pressures
to increase food aid has been largely on expanding commodity
levels; comparisons between the levels of food aid in 1975
and 1976 are likely to be on the same basis. An additional
element in considering the level for 1976 is fulfillment of
the U.S. pledge at the World Food Conference to participate
in providing ten million tons of grain for food aid; the
U.S. share in the global commitment, to be negotiated in
early 1976, is likely to be about 40% or four million tons.
P.L. 480 Levels
1976
State
1975
USDA OMB AID
Alt. Alt.#2 Alt.#3 Alt.#4
Req.
Rec.
Req.
Commodity Levels
3.8
4.1
4.5
5.3
3.8
4.7
6.2
(million metric
tons of grain)
Budget Outlays
953
1092
1165
1380
782
861
1181
The higher grain level per dollar in 1976 reflects the lower USDA
price estimates for that year.
PERALD R. FORD LIBRART
56
Program Composition
Only the State/AID request and the OMB recommendation for 1976
include proposed program composition by country. They both:
Provide full needs for Southeast Asia.
Provide substantial food aid for possible needs in
South Asia and for five smaller country programs.
Provide the full request level for Chile and a
sizable worldwide reserve for contingencies.
The OMB recommendation differs from the State/AID request by:
Eliminating the program for Korea. The Korean program
is the largest single program proposed for 1976. The
tight commodity situation in 1974 and 1975 has pre-
vented fulfillment of the U.S. commitment to provide
large scale food aid to Korea in exchange for limi-
tations on Korean textile exports to the U.S. If
the supply situation for P.L. 480 commodities should
ease in 1976, pressures will increase to resume large
scale food aid. However, by contributing to upward
pressures on prices of food and textiles in the United
States and so contributing to inflation, the Korean
textile agreement no longer serves U.S. interests.
Moreover, a $150 million program for Korea--neither
one of the neediest LDC's nor among those most
seriously affected by rising oil prices may pro-
voke public and Congressional criticism and lead to
efforts to restrict food aid to largely humanitarian
purposes.
Eliminating programs for Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and
Israel. The Middle East program for 1975 in large
part serves as an immediate and visible signal of
U.S. support for Syrian and Egyptian willingness
to take steps toward settlement while large dollar
appropriations are pending in Congress. These
funds are expected to be made available later this
fiscal year, to be disbursed in part in 1976. With
the availability of other funds from 1975 appropria-
tions and from appropriations or a Continuing Resolu-
tion in 1976 (which would include funds for the Middle
East at the level appropriated in 1975) food aid should
no longer be required for these countries.
FORD is LIBRARY
57
Reducing Title II for countries able to assume the
burden of financing their own nutrition programs.
Agency Requests
The State/AID request, Alternative #1, of $1181 million in
outlays, would continue large programs for Korea and the
Middle East. It would also be consistent with increasing
food aid over any of the 1975 alternatives and would pro-
vide 6.2 million tons of grain, well over the four million
tons of grain likely to be the U. S. contribution to the
ten million ton worldwide level of food aid.
The USDA request, Alternative #3 of $782 million in outlays
would provide only 3.8 million tons of grain, below the ex-
pected U.S. contribution to the worldwide level of food aid
and below commodity levels of all the 1975 alternatives
except Alternative #1.
The OMB Recommendation. Alternative #2 of $861 million in
outlays, would eliminate programs in Korea and the Middle
East while planning commodity levels above those of Alterna-
tives #1, 2, or 3 for 1975 but would fall below that of
Alternative #4. It would also enable the United States to
provide 4.7 million tons of grain, more than enough to meet
a four million ton world food aid commitment.
OUNT
IDENTIAL
58
PROPOSED COUNTRY
DISTRIBUTION OF P.L. 480
FUNDING LEVELS FOR
1976
($ Millions)
AID
OMB
Reg.
Rec.
Country Programs
Southeast Asia:
Cambodia
86
86
Vietnam
112
127*
Indochina Reserve
15
15
Subtotal
213
228
Middle East:
Egypt
81
--
Israel
3
:
Jordan
20
--
Syria
20
--
Subtotal
124
124
Traditional Recipients:
Chile
65
65
Korea
150
--
Pakistan
28
28
Subtotal
243
93
Asian Subcontinent:
Bangladesh
111
111
India
138
138
Sri Lanka
18
18
Subtotal
267
267
Other Countries and Reserve
Other Countries
24
24
Worldwide Reserve
50
50
TOTAL TITLE I COMMODITIES:
921
662
Title II Donations
326
283
TOTAL COMMODITIES
1247
945
Freight costs
180
151
Deduct: Receipts
118'43
246
235
PUBLIC LAW 480 - TOTAL
1181
861
*
The larger figure in the ONBARed for Cambodia reflects a shift of
commodities from Title II to Title I. The total level of commodities
for Cambodia remains the same in both options.
FORD
LIBRARY
TAB B
REMORANDUM
6139
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
December 20, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
FY 1976 PL-480 Levels
In reviewing the alternative proposals for PL-480 in FY 1976, $1.18
billion (roughly 6. 2 million tons) vs. $861 million (roughly 4.7 million
tons), you inquired if the choice of the former would have any price
effects; you were told that it would. However, it is our judgment that
these effects are likely to be so small as to be insignificant.
The difference between the two options -- 1.5 million tons of grain --
is less than one percent of this year's grain production. Next year it
is anticipated that the crop will be better. The high option figure is
approximately three percent of total production -- again a very small
post compared to domestic use and commercial expert demand. While
there are now sensitivities about the food price effect of PL-480, these
result primarily from our having just come through a very tight year.
This tightness is due, not to a larger PL-480 program, but to poor
weather which took away significant quantities of wheat and corn. If,
indeed, next year's crop proves to be as large as expected, sensitivities
:!
PL-480 exports will be far less than they are today.
A decision in favor of the higher levels of PL-480 will be strongly
supportive of our international interests and be welcomed by a strong
domestic constituency as well. The constructive position of the U.S.
at the World Food Conference placed us in an international leadership
role on the world food situation. Providing adequate amounts of food
aid is necessary, in its own right, to maintain the momentum of our
initiatives. More broadly, it strengthens our ability to secure inter-
mational cooperation in the development of an international food reserve
program, multilateral responsibility for financing food aid and for
assisting the agricultural efforts of developing countries, and greater
planning and cooperation among food exporters. In rebuilding the
SECRET
&
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)
VIVESO
White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AND NARS, Date 6/27/85
SECRET
2
international economic order and the community of interests needed
to deal with the energy situation, a forthcoming position of PL-480
will be essential. In short, the PL-480 program has an extremely
synergistic effect abroad reaping us benefits far out of proportion to
its very small significance on domestic grain prices or its budget
impact.
Domestically, a large food aid program would be extremely well re-
ceived by the many groups who support a humanitarian position in
dealing with the food situation -- Hatfield, Humphrey, Father Hesburgh,
and the many religious and civic groups who have written you on this
issue. The farm organizations would also welcome a substantial pro-
gram. There is, in my view, a wealth of sympathy for increased
American food aid to the poorer nations. While the present crop
situation has limited the amount of our FY 1975 food aid, FY 1976
provides an opportunity to provide higher levels.
The OMB recommendation of $861 million would allow a somewhat
larger quantity of food aid in FY 1976 than is contemplated in FY 1975
-- assuming grain prices decline next year as a result of the expected
good crop. However, the OMB figure would be interpreted as a decline
in U.S. food aid because of its significantly lower dollar value compared
to the FY 1975 program. It could be subject to the charge that we had
withdrawn from our pledge to do everything possible to increase our food
aid program, and would certainly be a strong disappointment to those who
favor an increase.
In light of the above, I recommend that you reconsider your PL-480
decision and that you choose the high option of $1. 18 billion (6.2 million
tons). I strongly believe this will put you in a favorable leadership
position in responding to the growing food needs abroad which are
increasingly the subject of public and Congressional interest.
SECRET
LIBRARY
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - New Issues
Summary:
Your initial 1976 budget decisions provided all that the Corps requested for construction
and maintenance, and added funds above their request for construction. Four new issues
have arisen this week:
Outlays
1975
1976
1. Whether to increase 1975 outlay ceiling because of faster
+125
- -
than expected progress in construction
2. Whether to add funds for harbor dredging because of
dredging cost increases
+40
+60
3. Whether to request a 1975 supplemental request for
flood damage repair
+30
--
4. Selection of new 1976 construction starts
--
Total increment,
+195
+60
Outlays $M
1975
1976
OMB recommendations are:
1
Base outlay ceiling - increases as needed
+125
Dredging - Request appropriation transfer authority in
1975, and increased budget request for 1976
--
+50
3
--
?
"Flood emergency" supplemental - deny and increase 1976
Budget Authority
4. New Starts - limited 1976 program
NA
(1)
Base outlays
1771
1935
Total-Corps of Engineers
1896
1985
LIBRARY
OFC#
2
Background and Discussion
Current budget decisions provide the following:
Outlays ($M)
1974
1975
1976
Construction
1,111
1,190
1/
1,354
Maintenance Dredging
208
208
212
All Other
338
372
369
Total
1,657
1,771
1,935
Issue #1 - 1975 outlays - $125 M
In September, you decided to defer enough excess in 1975 appropriations to hold 1975
outlays to $1,771 M total as part of your budget restraint package. Congress accepted
the deferral program.
Corps outlays are now $63 M above plan for this time of year and, our analysis indicates,
they will exceed target by $125 M in 1975 because:
-Better than expected weather has allowed faster construction than planned.
-Several projects held up by lawsuit or lack of local cooperation are now
able to move ahead.
-Cost increases have increased bid prices above expectations.
Because the funds have already been appropriated and the Impoundment Control Act of
1974 virtually eliminates our ability to slow this program down for fiscal reasons
without taking deferral action, alternatives are:
1. Increase the 1975 outlay target by $125 M.
2. Prepare a second deferral package of about $125 M of projects for trans-
mission to Congress.
Recommendation:
Because we do not believe another deferral package that would adversely affect construc-
tion employment is practical, we recommend alternative 1 - increasing the outlay
ceiling by $125 M.
1/ Remainder after $42 M in outlays deferred in budget constraint plan
3
Issue # 2 Dredging
The cost of dredging channels and harbors has risen drastically because of environ-
mental costs, inflation, and costs of energy. A just-completed review of the
Corps rivers and harbor channel maintenance dredging program has established that
limiting dredging operations to the amounts appropriated in 1975 plus that now
budgeted for 1976 will result in an unmanageable program and political problems.
The Corps has developed a plan that would keep major harbors, channels and waterways
in operation, and concentrate adverse effects in less economically important channels.
However, their efforts have stimulated port authorities and shippers to press
their Congressional delegations to provide additional funds for Corps dredging,
specifically for their channels.
Our review indicates that the problem will become severe in the last quarter of FY 1975
and critical in 1976 at currently budgeted levels. Alternatives are:
1975
1976
1.
No increases
No increases
2.
Request authority to
11
Add $50 M to dredging
transfer funds from
(a) from amounts budgeted for
construction to meet
construction
critical needs
(b) add to total
3.
$20 M supplemental
Add $50 M for dredging
Recommendation:
We recommend alternative 2b, based on our understanding with the Corps that both the
program and political problems are manageable by that approach. Alternative 2a is
a fallback, but would reduce construction contract employment below 1975 levels,
and disrupt construction schedules.
Issue #3 - Emergency Flood- Supplemental - $30 M
This request was received 12-18. It is said to be for repair of damage to Corps -
built flood works in the Lower Mississippi. It has had only minimal review. Some of
the repair work has already been completed with funds borrowed from other accounts
and funds for this work have been included in the outlay change cited above. The
funds to reimburse borrowed funds need not be replaced at this time because
the Corps has sufficient planned unobligated balances to complete repairs and
carry on its program in FY 1975. The Emergency Flood Control account is required
by law to replenish borrowed funds. This will increase Budget Authority in 1976,
but will not affect planned outlays in either year.
Recommendation:
We recommend that this supplemental be denied and that appropriations to replenish
the borrowed funds be provided in the 1976 budget.
Issue # 4 - New Starts
Since our meeting on water resources construction programs, the Corps of Engineers
has provided us with a list of 36 potential new construction starts ($788 million
total cost) and 57 potential Advanced Engineering and Design starts ($1, 442 million
total cost). The Tennessee Valley Authority has proposed 3 new construction starts
($90 million total cost). The FY 1976 costs of these new starts would be minor, but the
the effect on future budgets would be substantial.
The rationale for allowing some new starts is based on our probable inability to
hold to a "no new starts" posture through the appropriations process. President
Eisenhower proposed a "no new starts" budget for FY 1960; his recommendations were
strongly opposed by the Congress who added funds for new starts, and his veto of
the Public Works Appropriations Bill was overridden.
After reviewing each of the projects on the list, we are proposing that 6 new
construction and 14 new AE and D projects be included in the 1976 budget for the
Corps of Engineers. We placed priority on urban flood control, municipal water
supply, commercial navigation and power projects which had high benefit/cost
ratios and no local or environmental problems. None of the three new construction
starts proposed by the Tennessee Valley Authority is recommended as all three rank
lower than ongoing projects under TVA's own priority ranking.
Data on the potential new starts are provided in the attached tables.
Tab A - construction and AE and D projects recommended for inclusion in the budget
Tab B - Other potential Corps of Engineers new starts
Tab C - TVA's requested new starts
FORD
LIBRARY
TAB T A
FORD
LIBRARY
CORPS 0. ENGINEERS
Projects Available for Construction in FY 1974
OMB Proposed Program
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Eenefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Alaska
Hoonah Harbor
Fishing
1.6
1.6
6.0
Stevens (R) Gravel (D)
Nav.
Young (R Al)
Metlakatla
Fishing
1.5
1.5
3.5
Stevens (R) Gravel (D)
Harbor
Nav.
Young (R A1)
Iowa
Occume
Flood
1.4
1.4
.1
Clark (D) Culver (D)
Control
Smith (D-4)
innesota
Rice River-
Flood
5.7
3.8
2.5
Humphrey (D) Mondale (D)
Souch Branch
Control
Bergland (D-7)
and Felton Ditch
Montana
Libby Additional
Peaking
2.3
2.3
102.0
Metcalf (D) Mansfield (D
Units and Re-
Power
Baucus (D-1)
gulating Dam
Ohio
Newark
Flood
3.2
1.9
2.5
Glenn (D) Taft (R)
Control
Ashbrook (R-17)
Subtotal, Proposed Construction
116.6
CORPS 01 GINEERS
Projects Available for Advanced
Engineering and Design in FY 1976
OMB Proposed Program
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7 18%
(in millions)
Arkansas
Norfolk Lake (Power Mult-
2.6
2.6
20.0
McClellan (D) Bumpers (D)
Units 384)
Purpose
Alexander (D-1)
Colorado
Arkansas River & Flood
1.05
1.05
72.7
Hart (D) Haskell (D)
Tribs. above John Control
Evans (D-3)
Martin Dam
(Phase I)
Florida
Port Everglades
Nav.
2.6
2.6
12.3
Chiles (D) Stone (D)
Harbor
Rogers (D-11) Burke (R-12
Illinois
South Beloit
Flood
3.1
.4
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
Control
Anderson (R-16)
?
Kansas Biver Nav. Nav.
2.2
2.2
4.0
Dole (R) Pearson (R)
Lawrence to Mouth
Keys (D-2) Winn (R-3)
48817
Massachusetts
North Nashua
Flood
1.6
1.1
1.6
Kennedy (D) Brooke (R)
River
Control
Early (D-3)
Projects Available for Advanced
Engineering and
D
in in FY 1976 (Cen'd)
OMB Propos
rogram
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Minnesota
Knife River Harbor
Com.
2.0
2.0
.8
Humphrey (D) Mondale (D)
Nav.
Oberstar (D-8)
Mississippi
Bowie Creek Lake
Flood
1.9
1.9
46.5
Stennis (D) Eastland (D)
Control
Lott (R-5)
Nontana
Billings (West
Flood
3.4
2.5
2.2
Mansfield (D) Metcalf (D)
Unit)
Control
Melcher (D-2)
Oklahoma
Fort Gibson
Multi-
2.6
1.44
10.2
Bartlett (R) Bellman (R)
(Power Units
purpose
Risenhoover (D-2)
5&6)
Pennsylvannia
Pottstown
Flood
2.7
2.7
2.8
Scott (R) Schweiker (R)
Control
Schulze (R-5)
Texas
Alpine, Pecos Rvr.
Flood
1.3
1.3
4.9
Tower (R) Bentsen (D)
Control
White (D-16)
Big Spring
Flood
1.4
1.3
2.5
Tower (R) Bentsen (D)
Control
Burlison (D-17)
GIWW, Relocation
Nav.
1.8
1.2
1.0
Tower (R) Bentsen (D)
in Matagorda Bay
Young (D-14)
Subtotal, Proposed AE&D
181.9
Total, Proposed Const.
298.5
& AE&D
TAB B
FORD LIBRARY
is
CORPS OF
NEERS
Other Projects Available for Construction in FY 1976
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Atkansas
Bell Foley Lake
Flood
1.7
1.16
49.0
Bumpers (D) McClellan (D)
Control
Alexander (D-1)
Lower White River, Flood
1.3
.89
17.8
Bumpers (D) McClellan (D)
Big Creek&Tribs
Control
Alexander (D-1)
California
Lakeport Lake
Water
1.4
.81
22.2
Cranston (D) Tunney (D)
Supply
Leggett (D-4)
Delaware
Dolaware Coast
Hurricane
2.0
1.2
13.7
Biden (D) Roth (R)
protection
protection
Dupont (R AL)
Florida
Dade County
Beach
5.6
3.5
35.0
Chiles (D) Stone (D)
erosion
Pepper (D-14) Burke (R-1
Duval County
Beach
2.2
1.6
11.2
Chiles (D) Stone (D)
erosion
Bennett (D-3) Chappell
(D-4
Illinois
Fulton
Flood
1.8
.95
7.6
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
Control
Railsback (R-19)
McGee Creek Dam
Flood
1.2
.68
10.2
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
Control
Anderson (R-15) Findley
(R-20)
2
Other Projects Available for Construction in FY 1976 (Con'd
Total Estimated.
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
lows
Big Sioux River at Flood
2.1
1.1
5.6
Clark (D) Culver (D)
Sioux City (SD)
Control
McGovern (D) Abourezk (
Harkin (D-5,Ia)
Pressler (R-1,SD)
Missouri River
Flood
1.3
.53
11.2
Clark (D) Culver (D)
Levee, L-246
Control
Mezvinsky (D-1) Blouin
(D-2
Kansas
Onaga Lake
Flood
2.1
1.13
53.2
Dole (R) Pearson (R)
Control
Keys (D-2)
Port Scott
Flood
1.1
.71
38.2
Dole (R) Pearson (R)
Control
Skubitz (R-5)
Kentucky
Kehoe Lake
Flood
1.4
1.2
30.5
Ford (D) Huddleston (D)
Control
Perkins (D-7)
Louisiana
GERALD Teche-
Water
1.3
1.3
11.7
Long (D) Johnston (D)
R.
Vermilion
Quality
Long (D-8) Treen (R-3)
Basins
Breaux (D7)
LIBRARY FORD Massachusetts
Saxonville
1.7
1.06
3.8
Kennedy (D) Brooke (R)
Flood
Control
Early (D-3)
3
Other Projects Available 1.. Construction in FY 1976 (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Michigan
Tawas Bay Harbor
Small
2.3
1.5
1.1
Hart (D) Griffin (R)
Boat
Ruppe (R-11)
Harbor
Cedar River
Small
1.6
1.13
1.1
Hart (D) Griffin (R)
Harbor
Boat
Ruppe (R-11)
Harbor
Missouri
Union Lake
Flood
1.3
.86
49.1
Eagleton (D)
Control
Symington (D)
Ichord (D-8)
Little Blue
Flood
1.7
.93
82.9
Eagleton (D)
River Lakes
Control
Symington (D)
Bolling (D-5)
Ohio
Huron Harbor
Nav.
3.0
2.1
5.7
Glenn (D) Taft (R)
Kindness (R-8)
Oklahoma
Candy Lake
Flood
1.6
1.1
15.8
Bellmon (R) Bartlett (R.
Control
Jones (D-1) Risenhoove:
(D-2)
Shidler Lake
Flood
1.5
1.06
16.5
Bellmon (R) Bartlett (R
Jones (D-1) Risenhoove
Control
(D-2)
Other Projects Available for struction in FY 1976 (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Oregon
Applegate Lake
Flood
1.4
.69
50.2
Packwood (R) Hatfield (R)
Control
Ullman (D-2)
Coos Bay
Nav.
1.4
1.4
14.4
Packwood (R) Hatfield (R)
Ullman (D-2) Weaver (D-4)
rennsvlvannia
Trexler Lake
Flood
1.5
1.1
28.5
Scott (R) Schweiker (R)
Control
Yatron (D-6) Edgar (D-7)
Biester (R-8) Shuster
Flood (D-11)
(R-9)
Coughlin (R-13)
Eshelman (R-16)
Schneebeli (R-17)
Goodling (R-19) Dent
Morgan (D-22)
(D-21)
Myers (R-25) 25)
Texas
Aquilla Lake
Flood
1.8
1.07
30.9
Tower (R) Benstan (D)
Control
Wright (D12) Teague (D-6)
Poage (D-11)
Brazos Island
Nav.
1.3
.78
11.8
Tower (R) Bensten (D)
GERALD
De LaGarza (D-15)
Corpus Christi
Beach
2.2
2.2
1.1
Tower (R) Bensten (D)
LIGHTS
FORD
Teach
Erosion
Young (D-14)
Other Projects Available for Lonstruction in FY 1976. (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Washington
Zintel Canyon
Flood
1.6
1.6
3.5
Magnuson (D) Jackson (D)
Control
McCormack (D-4)
Utah
Little Dell Lake
Water
1.08
1.6
38.3
Moss (D) Garn (R)
Supply
Howe (D-2) McKay (D-1)
Subtotal, other available construction 671.8
CORPS OF ...CINEERS
Other Projects Available for Advance Engineering and Design
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Arizona
Gila and Salt
Flood
2.3
2.3
2.6
Fannin (R) Goldwater (R)
Rivers, Cillespie
Control
Rhodes (R-1)
Dam to McDowell
Demsite
Arkansas
Posten Bayou
Flood
1.6
1.6
2.7
McClellan (D) Bumpers C
Control
Thornton (D-4)
California
Cottonwood Creek
Flood
1.4
1.14
225.0
Tunney (D) Cranston (b)
Control
Johnson (D-1)
San Luis Ray River
Flood
1.3
1.3
11.8
Tunney (D) Cranston (D)
Control
McCloskey (R-12)
Goleta and Vicinity
Flood
1.6
1.6
20.8
Tunney (D) Cranston (D)
Control
Mineta (D-13)
San Diego, Sunset
Beach
1.7
1.3
1.2
Tunney (D) Cranston (D)
Cliffs
Erosion
Hinshaw (R-40) Wilson
GERALD
Van Deerlin (D-42) (R--
Fibrida
LIBRARY
FOOD
Lucie Inlet
Beach
1.8
1.8
4.3
Chiles (D) Stone (D)
Erosion
Rogers (D-11) Bafalis
(R-10)
2
CORPS OF
NEERS
Other Projects Available for A. ance Engineering and Design (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7 / 8%
(in millions)
Georgia
Curry Creek Lake
Water
1.1
1.1
28.2
Nunn (D) Talmadge (D)
Supply
McDonald (D-7) Landrum
(D-9)
Idaho
Placer Creek
Flood
1.15
1.15
2.7
McClure (R) Church (D)
Control
Symms (R-1)
Illinois
Farmers Levee and
Flood
1.3
.87
2.1
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
Drainage District
Control
Michel (R-18)
Fort Chartres &
Flood
1.2
1.2
3.8
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
Ivy Landing
Control
Simon (D-24)
Drainage District
#5 & Stringtown #4
Eldred & Spankey
Flood
2.6
1.4
6.3
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
Drainage & Levee Dist. Control
Findley (R-20)
Nutwood Drainage
Flood
2.5
1.4
4.6
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
& Levee Dist
Control
Findley (R-20)
Rock River (Area
Flood
1.4
1.4
4.5
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
#1)
Control
Anderson (R-16)
Hillview Drainage
Flood
1.6
.85
5.9
Stevenson (D) Percy (R)
& Levee Dist.
Control
Findley (R-20)
3
CORPS OF ENGINEERS
Other Projects Available for Advance Engineering and Design (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth. @5 7/8%
(in millions)
Kanses
Douglass Lake
Flood
1.0
.75
38.4
Dole (R) Pearson (R)
Control
Skubitz (R-5)
Tawanda Lake
Flood
1.12
.82
45.3
Dole (R) Pearson (R)
Control
Skubitz (R-5)
Louisiana
Red Niver
Nav.
1.1
.73
100.0
Texas, Arkansas,
Waterway
Louisiana Delegations
Narvland
Sixes Bridge Lake
Water
1.5
1.5
37.3
Mathias (R) Beal (R)
(Phase 1)
Supply
Scott (R) Byrd (I)
D.C. Area Congressmen
Baltimore Harbor
Nav.
2.4
2.4
145.5
Mathias (R) Beal (R)
Long (D-2) Sarbanes (D-3
Holt (R-4) Mitchell (D-:
Massachusetts
Natasket Beach
Beach
2.5
2.5
1.6
Kennedy (D) Brooke (R)
Erosion
Studds (D-12)
CORPS OF INGINEERS
Other Projects Available for Advance Engineering and Design (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Michigan
Cross Village
Rec.
1.16
.78
1.6
Griffin (R) Hart (D)
Harbor
Nav.
Ruppe (R-11)
Minnesota
East Grand Forks
Flood
1.90
.97
5.8
Mondale (D) Humphrey (D)
Control
Bergland (D7)
Lock & Dam #3
Nav.
NA
2.0
Mondale (D) Humphrey (D)
Quie (R-1)
Mississippi
Yazoo River
Nav.
1.9
1.2
114.0
Stennis (D) Eastland (D)
Whitten (D-1) Bowen (D--
Montgomery (D-3) Cochre
(R-4)
Missouri
Prosperity Lake
Flood
1.10
1.10
26.8
Symington (D) Eagleton
(Phase 1)
Control
Taylor (R-7)
(D)
Pine Ford Lake
Flood
1.7
1.01
64.7
Symington (D) Eagleton
Control
Hungate (D-9)
(D)
Ichord (D-8)
Locks & Dams
Nav.
NA
6.6
Symington (D) Eagleton
24&25
Hungate (D-9)
(D)
CORPS OF ENGINEERS
Other Projects Available for Advance Engineering and Design (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth.
@5 7 18%
(in millions)
Irondale Lake
Flood
1.3
.89
32.7
Symington (D) Eagleton (D
Control
Ichord (D-8)
I-38 Lake
Flood
1.2
.80
14.4
Symington (D) Eagleton (D)
Control
Ichord (D8)
New: Mexico
Rio Grand Flood-
way
Fld.
1.0
.67
10.0
Montoya (D) Dominici (R)
Control
Runnels (D2)
New York
Port Ontario
Rec.
1.2
--
3.5
Javits (R) Buckley (-C)
Harbor
Nav.
McEwen (R-30)
North Dakota
Kindred Lake
Wat.
1.13
1.13
35.2
Young (R) Burdick (D)
Qual.
Andrews (R1)
Ohio
Geneva-on-the
Rec.
1.60
1.60
1.1
Glenn (D) Taft (R)
Lake
Nav.
Stanton (R11)
Oklahoma
Sand Lake
Fld.
1.80
1.3
13.0
Bellmon (R) Bartlett (3
Cont.
Jones (D1) Albert (D 3
6
CORPS OF
INEERS
Other Projects Available for Advance Engineering and Design (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Congressional
State and Project Purpose Auth. @5 7/8%
(in millions)
Interest
Oklahoma (Con'd)
Tuskahoma Lake
Fld.
1.09
.91
40.5
Bellmon (R) Bartlett (R)
Cont.
Albert (D3)
Boswell Lake
Fld.
1.0
.68
100.0
Bellmon (R) Bartlett (:
Cont.
Albert (D3)
Pennsylvania
Elk Creek Harbor
Rec.
1.4
1.0
1.9
Scott (R) Schweiker (R)
Nav.
Vigorito (D24)
Tamaqua
Fld.
1.06
1.06
3.8
Scott (R) Schweiker (R
Cont.
Eshleman (R16)
Rhode Island
Bristol Harbor
Rec.
1.3
.96
2.4
Pastore (D) Pell (D)
Nav.
St. Germain (D1)
Texas
Plainview
Fld.
1.05
1.01
5.8
Tower (R) Bentsen (D)
Cont.
Mahon (D19)
Clopton
Fld.
Tower (R) Bentsen (D)
Crossing (Phl)
Cont.
1.4
1.4
59.7
Pickle (D10) Krueger (D
Kazen (D23)
R.
LEARY
100ml
CORPS OF ENGI
RS
Other Projects Available for Advance Engineering and Design (Con'd)
Total Estimated
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Auth.
@5 7/8%
(in millions)
Interest
Virginia
Virginia Beach
Hur.
Byrd (I) Scott (R)
Prot.
1.6
1.6
20.0
Whitehurst (R2)
Subtotal, other available AE&D
1260.1
Total, other available
construction and AE&D
1931.9
Grand total, proposed and
other projects
2230.4
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Other Projects Available for Construction in FY 76
Total Estimated
Congressional
State and Project
Purpose
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Federal Cost
Interest
Auth. @5 7/8%
(in millions)
Senator Baker (R)
Tennessee
Senator Brock (R)
New Lock at Pick-
Nav,
5.9
5.9
81.0
Beard (R-6, Tenn.)
wick Landing
Dam
South Chickamauga
Flood
1.2
1.2
9.2
Duncan (R-2, Tenn)
Creek
Control
Poor Valley Creek
Rec.
NA
NA
0.8
Quillen (R-1, Tenn)
Project
Total, TVA request
90.0
SERALD
R.
LIBRARY 2383
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
This form marks the file location of item number 1g-1h
as listed on the pink form (GSA Form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet)
at the front of the folder.
State
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Roy L. Ash
SUBJECT:
State Department 1976 Budget Appeal
The State Department has appealed $28.6 million from your
1976 allowance of $909 million. Three issues have been
identified for your consideration.
I. Employment levels
The Department requests 124 of the 332 new positions it
originally sought. Seventy-two of these are for possible
new diplomatic missions abroad. After reducing employment
by 16% since 1967, the Department believes it can no longer
meet new requirements by transferring personnel from low
priority activities.
OMB recommends that you continue the policy followed in
recent budgets of requiring the Department to meet new
needs by reprogramming within its authorized total employ-
ment of 24,489. Experience shows that many projected new
diplomatic missions do not open as planned, and that the
closing of others and the termination of special negotia-
tions and other activities release personnel for new
functions. The Department traditionally has tried to avoid
the necessary difficult management decisions that some
reprogrammings require, out we believe that denial of the
appeal will have the baneficial effect of forcing the
Department to sort out its priorities and improve the
management of its key resource--personnel. Departing from
the current policy of no new positions will tend to encourage
requests from the Department's bureaucracy to meet each new
requirement, with little attention to low priority activities
which might be reduced.
GESALD
2
Decision:
Reaffirm no personnel increase policy (OMB rec.)
Allow 124 positions and $1.8 million
(agency appeal)
allow
II. Logistical support
Your initial allowance already provides $11 million for
discretionary increases in non-salary costs, almost three
times the amount included in the 1975 budget. However, after
reviewing the Department's appeal, OMB believes it would be
better to provide some additional logistical support to
improve Department operation, than to allow additional
personnel.
Initial
State
OMB
Allowance Appeal Recom.
(S in millions)
Non-salary costs of new diplomatic
installations: Full amount not
recommended because experience
indicates not all projected post
openings will occur
2.0
+3.0
+2.0
Communications: Appeal requests
high-speed telegraph equipment
for 14 small embassies with low
traffic volume, a portable
satellite communication system
for the Secretary while travel-
ing, and general equipment up-
grading. $3.0 could be restored
to allow the Department to
select the highest priority
0.8
+6.7
+3.0
Expenses of joint cooperation
commissions being established
by the Secretary, especially in
the Middle East
0.5
+0.9
+0.9
Improved charter air and truck
services to isolated African
posts
-
40.4
+0.4
Other discretionary increases
7.3
-
-
Total discretionary increases
10.6
411.0
+6.3
3
Decision:
Reaffirm original allowance
Restore $6.3 million, to be distributed by
the Department to the highest priorities
as it assesses them (OMB rec.)
AR7
Allow full appeal of $11.1 million
(Agency appeal)
III. Exchange of persons
The Department, on appeal from your initial decision of
$58 million, seeks $74 million, which is $21 million higher
than the 1975 appropriation of $53 million. This increase
reflects the Department's intent to begin a sharp and sus-
tained broadening and expansion of the program over the
next five years to the $135 million level by 1980.
We recommend $60 million which would cover mandatory
cost increases, some bicentennial activities and a modest
program expansion. Management limitations make an increase
to anything above $65 million not advisable. The Department
might reluctantly accept a decision of $65 million, but such
an increase would be more liberal than budget requests of
recent years.
1976
BA
OL
Agency original request
79
70
Presidential allowance
58
55
Agency appeal
74
63
OMB recommendation
60
56
Compromise alternative
65
59
Decision:
Reaffirm initial decision ($58 million)
Grant agency appeal ($74 million)
Approve OMB recommendation ($60 million)
Approve compromise alternative ($65 million)
AR7
December 19, 1974
The attached appeal memorandum from Deputy Secretary
Ingersoll, and the tables accompanying it, are inadvertently
incorrect, in referring to a budget allowance of $937 million.
The President's decision on State's budget totalled $909
million. The $28 million difference is composed of (a) $13
million for Soviet Jewish refugees not going to Israel, which
the President disallowed and which instead will be handled
by a legislative increase in the authority to transfer funds
from AID to State for that purpose and (b) $15 million for
appropriation of Japanese yen for U.S. -Japan exchanges,
which has not yet been decided.
The Department's alternative appeal -- i.e., allow $937
million but permit State to reallocate the $28 million to
other purposes -- is, therefore, not relevant. In any case,
a tradeoff between a yen appropriation which does not affect
the budget deficit and a dollar appropriation which does is
not appropriate.
The Department agrees that its memorandum is in error and
its alternative appeal is not feasible.
The OMB memorandum on the appeal deals with the correct
figures.
=
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
Dec. 1974
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From:
Robert S. Ingersoll
Subject:
FY 1976 Budget - Appeal of Budget
Allowance
The Office of Management and Budget has informed me
that you have accepted their recommendations for this
Department's level of resources for 1976.
Prior to the presentation of their recommendations
to you we evaluated their proposals and requested adjust-
ment of several of their recommendations to assure that
the approved level of\our 1976 budget would provide for
the effective conduct of foreign relations next year. It
is my understanding that our reactions to the OMB recom-
mendations were not presented to you.
I am fully cognizant of and support the need for
fiscal restraints throughout government at this time. I
do believe, however, that a limited increase or, alterna-
tively, an adjustment within the approved allowance of
$937,447,000 would provide for a more effective Department
of State in 1976.
There are three areas of concern to us. In our
regular operating expenses there is a need for an addi-
tional $12.6 million and 119 new positions. These
resources are required to permit the establishment or
upgrading of our diplomatic presence in Africa, in
recognition of the independence of new nations, increase
our representation in the Soviet Union and meet consular
requirements in Latin America. We also believe we must
strengthen our new Bureau of Oceans, Environmental and
Scientific Affairs. The cumulative effect of our budget
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
- 2 -
stringencies and staff reductions during the past years
has drastically curtailed our flexibility to obtain these
staff resources by reprogramming of current resources.
Also included in our operating expenses requirements
are funds to improve our communications capabilities
particularly in Africa and to be more responsive to the
Secretary's communication needs considering the heavy
demands for overseas negotiations.
Our second area of concern is our need to establish
representation to the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gram which is headquartered in Nairobi and to strengthen
our Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna where we have a major interest in the IAEA safe-
guards and energy programs. The adjustment required here
is small, $240,000 and 5 positions but because of the
limitations inherent in an appropriation of only $8
million these needs cannot be met by internal reprogram-
ming.
The approval of an increase of $12.8 million to
finance the shortages in our regular operating expenses
and our Missions to International Organizations activity
would resolve the need for improved representation abroad
and permit funding of our communications requirements.
Alternatively, your approval to reprogram the OMB
allowance to use the amount originally approved for the
Soviet refugee program ($13 million) for these other
purposes would permit us to budget for our estimated
priorities without increasing the current allowance.
The third area of concern relates to our important
educational exchange program. The Office of Management
and Budget has recommended a budget level $21 million
lower than our request for programs carried out under the
Pulbright-Hays Act, which is aimed at strengthening mutual
understanding and international cooperation. This strikes
a severe blow to an activity Secretary Kissinger and I
consider of the highest importance in carrying out our
foreign policy objectives.
UNCLASSIFIED
FORD
LIBRERY
UNCLASSIFIED
- 3 -
OMB's recommendation of $58 million (against our $79
million request) places our basic world-wide program at a
virtual standstill. This surprisingly low allowance would
be most damaging to the Department's ability to carry out
coherent programs in response to the Administration's
initiatives in the Middle East and Latin America. It
would also make it impossible to meet new requirements and
opportunities for cultural relations programs with high
priority areas, such as the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
and the People's Republic of China.
In addition to the $58 million, OMB has recommended
$15 million (from U.S.-owned yen) to be used exclusively
for programs with Japan and $800,000 (from U.S.-owned
rupees) to construct an American Studies Research Center
in India. While we support these additions in principle,
they would not in any way contribute to our ability to
carry out activities which we consider of even higher
priority. I propose, therefore, that you permit us to go
to Congress with a request equal to the total figure CMB
has recommended under the authority of the Fulbright-Hays
Act, $73.8 million, but without the limitation that $15.8
million of this total be expended in our programs with
Japan and India.
A $73.8 million allowance, although $5.2 million
under our request, will enable us to increase substan-
tially our programs with Japan and India, and it will
also make it possible for us to meet most of our high
priority commitments on a gobal basis.
Our request is modest measured against what it will
buy in promoting the attitudes and institutions essential
for improved understanding. This is the kind of program
which justifies a substantial increase, both on its merits
and as a signal of your Administration's responsiveness to
emerging priorities.
Recommendation:
That you authorize an increase in the .OMB Allowance
of $28.6 million (Salaries and Expenses $12.6 million,
Missions to International Organizations $.2 million,
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange $15.8 million)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
- 4 -
and 124 positions for the fiscal year 1976 budget of the
Department of State.
Approve
Disapprove
ALTERNATIVELY, that you authorize the Department to
reprogram the OMB allowance consistent with our estimate
of priorities and to increase personnel strength by 124
positions.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Analysis of 1976 requirements and
OMB Allowance
Drafted: M/FRM/BP:DCE1ler:fb
x22077 : 12/17/74
Concurrence: M/FRM - Mr Murray
&
FORD
UNCLASSIFIED
LIBRARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Analysis of 1976 Requirements and OMB Allowance
(In thousands of dollars)
OMB
Dept'l.
Appropriation
Allowance
Appeal
Difference
Salaries and Expenses
$390,660
$403,260
+$12,600
637 (b) 1/
5,548
5,548
-
Pay act supplemental
9,823
9,823
-
Total
406,031
418,631
+ 12,600
Representation
1,736
1,736
-
637 (b) 1/
40
40
-
Total
1,776
1,776
-
Foreign Buildings Program
29,727
29,727
-
Pay act supplemental
113
113
-
Total
29,840
29,840
-
Foreign Buildings Program -
Special Foreign Currency
9,785
9,785
-
Emergencies in the Diplomatic
a Consular Service
2,100
2,100
-
Y
ent to Foreign Service
rement
20,535
20,535
-
& uy act supplemental
1,900
1,900
-
Total
22,435
22,435
-
Contributions to International
Organizations
245,610
245,610
-
Missions to International
Organizations
8,288
8,528
+
240
Pay.. act supplemental
165
165
-
Total
8,453
8,693
+
240
International Conferences
7,316
7,316
-
637 (b)
212
212
-
Total
7,528
7,528
-
Trade Negotiations
2,523
2,523
-
Pay act supplemental
73
73
-
Total
2,596
2,596
-
American Sections, Int'l.
&
missions
1,507
1,507
-
Pay act supplemental
43
43
-
Total
1,550
1,550
-
OMB
Dept 1.
Appropriation
Allowance
Appeal
Difference
Ternational Fisheries
Commissions
4,700
4,700
-
Pay act supplemental
30
30
-
Total
4,730
4,730
-
Mutual Educational and Cultural
Exchange
57,440
73,240
+15,800
Pay act supplemental
560
560
-
Japan-U.S. exchanges
15,000
-
-15,000
India- (Special Foreign
Currency)
800
-
-
800
Total
73,800
73,800
-
East-West Center
9,000
9,000
-
Migration and Refugee
10,068
10,068
I
Pay act supplemental
32
32
-
Subtotal
10,100
10,100
-
Soviet Refugees not going
to Israel
13,000
-
-13,000
Total
23,100
10,100
-13,000
contributions for International
D
cekeeping:
ernational Commission for
Control and Supervision in
Vietnam
19,800
19,800
I
United Nations Force in
Cyprus
9,600
9,600
-
Permanents, Trust Funds, etc
59,713
59,713
-
Total, Department of State
(exclusive of IBWC)
937,447
937,287
-160
1/
Administrative and Other Expenses, State, Section 637 (b) to
be transfered from the Foreign Assistance Appropriation.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
DEC 23 1974
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PAUL H. O'NEILL
One
SUBJECT:
Budget Decisions
I. BACKGROUND
As we mentioned earlier, several 1976 budget issues remain
for your decision. This binder outlines issues on which
your decision is needed in the next few days.
II. RECOMMENDATION
That you give us your decision on these issues by Friday,
December 27.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROY
ASH
SUBJECT:
Additional 1976 Budget Issue on Foreign Assistance
Since we prepared the original papers for you on foreign assistance
budget issues, estimates for military assistance to South Vietnam
for both 1975 and 1976 have changed.
Attached is an issue paper on that matter to be added to the book you
now have entitled "1976 Budget Session with the President -- 12/10/74."
Attachment
FORGO 1. LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
1976 Budget
Issue#12: Military Assistance to
South Vietnam
Statement of Issue
How much grant military assistance for South Vietnam in 1975, 1976
and Transition Quarter should be requested in the 1976 budget?
1975
1976
T/Q
Total
Approp.
Suppl.
Est.
Est.
Request
($ millions)
Alt. #1 (NSC)
700
300
1293
355
2648
Alt. #2 (DOD)
700
-
1293
355
2348
Alt. #3 (OMB)
700
300
1000
250
2250
Background
Prior to December 3, there was agreement on the levels for military
assistance to South Vietnam - $700 million in 1975, $1000 million for
1976 and $238 million for the transition quarter. It was understood
that DOD probably would wish to submit a supplemental request later
for $300 million for 1975 if a sizable attack occurs in the coming
dry season.
Secretary Schlesinger, with Dr. Kissinger's agreement, has now decided
to increase his 1976 recommendation to $1,293 million, based on
recent field visits by DOD staff (Ambassador Martin's estimate was
$1,950 million.). DOD states that the additional $300 million for
1975 and $293 million for 1976 will be required whether or not there
is a major enemy attack this spring. DOD is, therefore, prepared
to assert now the need for $1,293 million for 1976, as well as an
increase of $117 million for the transition quarter (from $238
million to $355 million). However, Secretary Schlesinger does not
wish to include a request for the $300 million supplemental for 1975 in
the 1976 Budget on the grounds that the chances for securing additional
1975 funds from the Congress are poor at this time but should be
more favorable later after the anticipated North Vietnamese offensive.
Secretary Schlesinger also recommends that the President indicate in
his Budget Message that additional funds will probably be needed in
1975 although they are not being requested now.
DECLASSIFIED
E,0..12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)
White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983
CONFIDENTIAL
By
DAW NARS, Date 6/27/85
CONFIDENTIAL™
Alternatives
#1. Request $1293 million for 1976 and $355 million for the transition
period. Propose a $300 million supplemental for 1975 in the 1976
Budget.
#2.
Request $1293 million for 1976 and $355 million for the transition
period. Make no provision for. a 1975 supplemental except by
reference in the Budget Message (DOD rec.).
#3. Request $1000 million for 1976 and $250 million for the transition
period. Propose a $300 million supplemental in the 1976 Budget
(OMB rec.).
Analysis
The only apparent advantages of a 1976 request of $1293 million would
be to signal (1) to the Congress that $700 million annually clearly
is not enough to fund the war and (2) to Hanoi our intention to support
South Vietnam. This approach, however, risks antagonizing the Congress
at a time when the case for an 85% increase might be more difficult to
make than later when an offensive is under way. As for the 1975
supplemental, -failure to request the $300 million 1975 supplemental
in the Budget could make a 1976 request of $1293 million appear
unreasonably high compared to the $700 million appropriated for 1975.
Alternative #3 would assert the validity of a $1000 million level for
both 1975 and 1976, while leaving open the option to amend the 1976
request upward later if justified by events in South Vietnam.
DOD Recommendation: Alternative #2 -- Request $1293 million for 1976
and $355 million for the transition period. Defer the 1975 supplemental.
NSC Recommendation: Alternative #1 -- Request $1293 million for 1976
and $355 million for the transition period. Include a $300 million
supplemental request for 1975 in the 1976 Budget.
OMB Recommendation: Alternative #3 -- Request $1000 million for 1976
and $250 million for the transition period. Include a $300 million
supplemental request for 1975 in the 1976 Budget.
R.
CONFIDENTIAL
GERAID
FORD
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
5968
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
December 10, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
K
SUBJECT:
Foreign Assistance Requests for FY 1976
Roy Ash has completed his review of agency proposals for economic and
security assistance in the FY 1976 foreign assistance request to Congress.
I have a number of reservations about the OMB recommended levels,
which in many instances do not fully reflect the foreign policy imperatives
which I believe should be served by this vital program.
Much of my concern is derived from the basic assumption that MAP grant
aid should be terminated at the end of FY 1977. This assumption drives
many of the lower funding alternatives proposed by OMB. The State De-
partment proposal recommended a phased shift to FMS credit from grant
MAP but continuation of most MAP grant programs beyond FY 1977;
OMB favors an explicit policy to terminate all regular grant programs
after FY 1977 and shift to FMS credit, except where active hostilities or
special circumstances warrant grant aid.
Grant assistance is an important diplomatic tool for the achievement of
our own interests. The U.S. needs it as quid pro quo for political support,
use of bases and facilities and, to a limited degree, to strengthen allies
with shared national security interests. In many cases the use of MAP
provides the only leverage with nations faced with real or potential threats
to their security. Elimination of MAP would destroy a valuable instru-
ment of foreign policy. Moreover, I do not subscribe to the OMB thesis
that by presenting to the Congress a fully programmed phase-out we will
buy any real measure of support for what we seek in any given year. If
our programs are unsupportable on their merits, we deserve to forfeit
Congressional support for them. However, if they are needed and serve
our interests, we should present them and should make a maximum effort
in their defense.
With the exception of the issue of termination of MAP grant assistance
and the reduced funding levels associated with that termination, the NSC
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
6:
FORD
DATO,6127185
LIBRAST
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
2
staff and the OMB staff have worked closely together in the preparation
of Roy Ash's review. The NSC and the State positions are fairly pre-
sented in the paper.
The major differences stem from differences in the political necessity
and diplomatic value placed on various programs. The NSC positions
reflect my personal judgments on what the programs should be, and
before considering any reductions I urge that each reduction be weighed
in terms of its impact on our security interests. My own judgment is
that, with the exception of the two cases indicated below, reductions
would pose substantial risks to important security relationships.
With regard to development assistance to Indonesia and Morocco, I agree
with Roy Ash. His recommendation that the development loans for these
two countries ($25 million total) be eliminated is based on an accumulation
of foreign exchange earnings of considerable magnitude in both cases. I
believe our foreign policy and national security interests can be adequately
served with the modest military assistance programs proposed for each.
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS