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3112
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 717
418
418 U.S. 717, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069
to impose a multidistrict remedy for sin-
4. School
William G. MILLIKEN, Governor of
gle-district de jure segregation in the
Whil
Michigan, et al., Petitioners,
absence of findings that the other in-
bridged
V.
cluded districts had failed to operate un-
tional
Ronald BRADLEY and Richard Bradley,
itary school systems or had committed
relief
by their mother and next friend,
acts that effected segregation, in the ab-
may
be
Verda Bradley, et al.
sence of any claim or finding that school
mere
district boundary lines were established
trarys
ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS et al.,
with the purpose of fostering racial seg-
United
Petitioners,
regation, and without affording a mean-
5. School
V.
ingful opportunity for the included
Sch
Ronald BRADLEY and Richard Bradley,
neighboring districts to present evidence
laws wit
by their mother and next friend,
or be heard on the propriety of a multi-
sacros
Verda Bradley, et al.
district remedy or on the question of
Fourtee
constitutional violations by those dis-
have dut
tricts.
The GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL
dies.
SYSTEM, Petitioner,
Reversed and remanded.
6. School
V.
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred and
Bef
Ronald BRADLEY and Richard Bradley,
by their mother and next friend,
filed opinion.
autonom
aside: by
Verda Bradley, et al.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented and
remedial
Nos. 73-434, 73-435 and 73-436.
filed opinion.
district
that the
Argued Feb. 27, 1974.
Mr. Justice White dissented and
tion WI
Decided July 25, 1974.
filed opinion in which Mr. Justice Doug-
signific
las, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
district
Marshall, joined.
that rac
Parents, children and others insti-
or loca
Mr. Justice Marshall dissented and
tuted a class action against various state
school
and school district officials seeking re-
filed opinion in which Mr. Justice Doug-
cause of
lief from alleged illegal racial segrega-
las, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
tion in the Detroit public school system.
White, joined.
7. Scho
On remand after two prior appeals, 433
Dis
F.2d 897 and 438 F.2d 945, the United
multidi
1. Constitutional Law -220
States District Court for the Eastern
Doctrine of "separate but equal"
plan tc
District of Michigan ruled that the sys-
has no place in field of public education,
segrega
tem was an illegally segregated one, 338
since separate educational facilities are
school
F.Supp. 582, and, after the Court of Ap-
inherently unequal. U.S.C.A.Const.
of find
peals dismissed appeals from orders re-
had fai
Amend. 14.
quiring submission of desegregation
tems 0
plans, 468 F.2d 902, directed preparation
2. Schools and School Districts =13
ed segn
of a metropolitan desegregation plan,
Finding of district court that De-
sence €
345 F.Supp. 914, and purchase of
troit public school system was illegally
district
school buses. The Court of Appeals
segregated on basis of race was not
with p
affirmed the holding that a constitu-
plain error. Supreme Court Rules, rules
tion, a
tionally adequate system of desgregat-
23, subd. 1(c), 40, subd. (d) (2), 28 U.
R.
FORD
opport
ed schools could not be established
S.C.A.
distric
within the Detroit school district's geo-
on prc
graphic limits and that a multidistrict
3. Schools and School Districts -13
on qu'
metropolitan plan was necessary, 484 F.
Desegregation, in sense of disman-
by the
2d 215, and defendants appealed. The
tling dual school system, does not re-
340.27
Supreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice Burg-
quire any particular racial balance in
340.14
er, held, inter alia, that it was improper
each school, grade or classroom.
192, {
418 U.S. 717
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3113
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
4. Schools and School Districts -13
340.567, 340.569, 340.574, 340.575, 340.-
While boundary lines may be
582, 340.583-340.586, 340.589, 340.591,
bridged where there was been constitu-
340.594, 340.605, 340.609, 340.613; 340.-
tional violation calling for interdistrict
614, 340.643a, 340.711 et seq., 340.882,
relief, notion that school district lines
388.171a et seq., 388.182, 388.851; U.S.
may be casually ignored or treated as
C.A.Const. Amend. 14; M.C.L.A.Const.
mere administrative convenience is con-
1963, art. 8, § 2; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
trary to history of public education in
rules 19, 24 (a, b), 28 U.S.C.A.; 28 U.S.
United States.
C.A. § 1291 (b) Supreme Court Rules,
5. Schools and School Districts -13
rules 23, subd. 1(c), 40, subd. 1(d) (2),
School district lines and present
28 U.S.C.A.
laws with respect to local control are not
8. Schools and School Districts -13
sacrosanct, and if they conflict with
Constitutional right of Negro chil-
Fourteenth Amendment, federal courts
dren residing in Detroit public school
have duty to prescribe appropriate reme-
district was only to attend unitary
dies. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
school system in that district, and unless
officials drew district lines in discrimi-
6. Schools and School Districts 33
Before boundaries of separate and
natory fashion or arranged for white
autonomous school districts may be set
students residing in district to attend
aside by consolidating separate units for
schools in neighboring districts, they
remedial purposes or by imposing cross-
were under no constitutional duty to
district remedy, it must first be shown
make provisions for Negro students to
attend such schools.
that there has been constitutional viola-
tion within one district that produces
9. Schools and School Districts =13
significant segregative effect in another
It is not true that, whatever racial
district; specifically, it must be shown
make-up of school district population
that racially discriminatory acts of state
may be and however neutrally district
or local school districts, or of single
lines have been drawn and administered,
school district, have been substantial
schools are never "desegregated" as long
cause of interdistrict segregation.
as Negro students are in majority.
7. Schools and School Districts -13
10. Schools and School Districts -13
District court's action in ordering
Even accepting arguendo the cor-
multidistrict metropolitan desegregation
rectness of the theory that State of
plan to remedy single-district de jure
Michigan was derivatively responsible
segregation found in Detroit public
for Detroit board of education's actions
school system was improper in absence
which resulted in illegal racial segrega-
of findings that other included districts
tion within its school system, that deriv-
had failed to operate unitary school sys-
ative responsibility of State did not con-
tems or had committed acts that effect-
stitutionally justify or require adoption
ed segregation in Detroit system, in ab-
of multidistrict metropolitan desegrega-
sence of any claim or finding that school
tion plan involving neighboring districts
district boundary lines were established
which had nòt been affected by board's
with purpose of fostering racial segrega-
actions.
tion, and without affording meaningful
opportunity for included neighboring
11. Schools and School Districts
districts to present evidence or be heard
-13, 159½
on propriety of multidistrict remedy or
Isolated instance wherein one sub-
on question of constitutional violations
urban school district contracted with il-
by those districts. M.C.L.A. §§ 340.26,
legally segregated urban district to have
340.27, 340.55, 340.77, 340.107, 340.113,
Negro high school students sent to pre-
340.148, 340.149, 340.165, 340.188, 340.-
dominantly Negro school in urban dis-
192, 340.352, 340.355, 340.356, 340.563,
trict did not justify adoption of multi-
S.Ct.-32
3114
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 717
418
district metropolitan desegregation plan
evidence that the suburban school dis-
fostering
potentially embracing 52 districts hav-
tricts had committed acts of de jure seg-
is
no
ing no responsibility for such allegedly
regation, the court appointed a panel to
included
segregative plan.
submit a plan for the Detroit schools
718,
to presen
that would encompass an entire desig-
propriet
Syllabus*
nated desegregation area consisting of
on theiqu
Respondents brought this class ac-
53 of the 85 suburban school districts
tions by
tion, alleging that the Detroit public
plus Detroit, and ordered the Detroit
(a)
school system is racially segregated as a
Board to acquire at least 295 school bus-
ing as
result of the official policies and actions
es to provide transportation under an in-
of develoi
of petitioner state and city officials, and
terim plan to be developed for the
plan whie
seeking implementation of a plan to
1972-1973 school year. The Court of
leave
eliminate the segregation and establish a
Appeals, affirming in part, held that the
unitary nonracial school system. The
record supported the District Court's
to the ove
District Court, after concluding that
finding as to the constitutional viola-
of the
various acts by the petitioner Detroit
tions committed by the Detroit Board
The clear
Board of Education had created and per-
and the state officials; that therefore
Mecklenbu
the District Court was authorized and
petuated school segregation in Detroit,
U.S. 1,
and that the acts of the Board, as a sub-
required to take effective measures to
that deses
ordinate entity of the State, were attrib-
desegregate the Detroit school system;
mantling
utable to the State, ordered the Board to
and that a metropolitan area plan em-
require an
submit Detroit-only desegregation plans.
bracing the 53 outlying districts was the
3125
The court also ordered the state officials
only feasible solution and was within the
to submit desegregation plans encom-
District Court's equity powers. But the
1719
(b)
court remanded so that all suburban
passing the three-county metropolitan
bridged
area, despite the fact that the 85 outlying
school districts that might be affected
has been
school districts in these three counties
by a metropolitan remedy could be made
ing for
were not parties to the action and there
parties and have an opportunity to be
trict lines
was no claim that they had committed
heard as to the scope and implementa-
or treated
constitutional violations. Subsequently,
tion of such a remedy, and vacated the
venience
outlying school districts were allowed to
order as to the bus acquisitions, subject
public edu
intervene, but were not permitted to as-
to its reimposition at an appropriate
deeply roo
sert any claim or defense on issues pre-
time. Held: The relief ordered by the
viously adjudicated or to reopen any is-
District Court and affirmed by the
(c)+T
sue previously decided, but were allowed
Court of Appeals was based upon erro-
extensively
merely to advise the court as to the pro-
neous standards and was unsupported by
ture of
record evidence that acts of the outlying
priety of a metropolitan plan and to sub-
since that
mit any objections, modifications, or al-
districts had any impact on the discrimi-
fect, conse
nation found to exist in the Detroit
ternatives to any such plan. Thereafter,
school disti
the District Court ruled that it was
schools. A federal court may not impose
as separat
proper to consider metropolitan plans
a multidistrict, areawide remedy for
that Detroit-only plans submitted by the
single-district de jure school segregation
vast new
Board and respondents were inadequate
violations, where there is no finding
since-enti
that the other included school districts
problems
to accomplish desegregation, and that
have failed to operate unitary school
tation of
therefore it would seek a solution be-
yond the limits of the Detroit School Dis-
systems or have committed acts that ef-
would gene
trict, and concluded that "[s]chool dis-
fected segregation within the other dis-
administra
trict lines are simply matters of political
tricts, there is no claim or finding
of this nes
convenience and may not be used to deny
that the school district boundary lines
(d)
F
constitutional rights." Without having
were established with the purpose of
trict plan
structuring
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
venience of the reader. See United States v.
trict laws,
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,
by the Reporter of Decisions for the con-
337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
come, first
418 U.S. 720
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3115
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
fostering racial segregation, and there
thority" to resolve the complex opera-
is no meaningful opportunity for the
tional problems involved and thereafter
included neighboring school districts
a "school superintendent" for the entire
to present evidence or be heard on the
area, a task which few, if any, judges
propriety of a multidistrict remedy or
are qualified to perform and one which
on the question of constitutional viola-
would deprive the people of local control
tions by those districts. Pp. 3123-3131.
of schools through elected school boards.
(a) The District Court erred in us-
P. 3126.
ing as a standard the declared objective
(e) Before the boundaries of sepa-
of development of a metropolitan area
rate and autonomous school districts
plan which, upon implementation, would
may be set aside by consolidating the sep-
leave "no school, grade or classroom
arate units for remedial purposes or by
substantially disproportionate
imposing a cross-district remedy, it
to the overall pupil racial composition"
must be first shown that there has been
of the metropolitan area as a whole.
a constitutional violation within one dis-
The clear import of Swann V. Charlotte-
trict that produces a significant segre-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
gative effect in another district; i. e.,
U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554, is
specifically, it must be shown that ra-
that desegregation, in the sense of dis-
cially discriminatory acts of the state or
mantling a dual school system, does not
local school districts, or of a single
require any particular racial balance. P.
school district have been a substantial
3125.
cause of interdistrict segregation. P.
3127.
1
(b) While boundary lines may be
bridged in circumstances where there
(f) With no showing of significant
has been a constitutional violation call-
violation by the 53 outlying school dis-
ing for inter-district relief, school dis-
tricts and no evidence of any interdis-
trict lines may not be casually ignored
trict violation or effect, the District
or treated as a mere administrative con-
Court transcended the original theory of
venience; substantial local control of
the case as framed by the pleadings, and
public education in this country is a
mandated a metropolitan area remedy,
deeply rooted tradition. Pp. 3125.
the approval of which would impose on
the outlying districts, not shown to have
(c) The interdistrict remedy could
committed any constitutional violation, a
extensively disrupt and alter the struc-
standard not previously hinted at in any
ture of public education in Michigan,
holding of this Court. P. 3127.
since that remedy would require, in ef-
(g) Assuming, arguendo, that the
fect, consolidation of 54 independent
State was derivatively responsible for
school districts historically administered
Detroit's segregated school conditions, it
as separate governmental units into a
does not follow that an interdistrict 720
vast new super school district, and,
remedy is constitutionally justified or
since-entirely apart from the logistical
required, since there has been virtually
problems attending large-scale transpor-
no showing that either the State or any
tation of students-the consolidation
of the 85 outlying districts engaged in
would generate other problems in the
any activity that had a cross-district ef-
fect. P. 3129.
administration, financing, and operation
of this new school system. P. 3125.
(h) An isolated instance of a possi-
ble segregative effect as between two of
(d) From the scope of the interdis-
the school districts involved would not
trict plan itself, absent a complete re-
justify the broad metropolitanwide rem-
structuring of the Michigan school dis-
edy contemplated, particularly since that
trict laws, the District Court would be-
remedy embraced 52 districts having no
come, first, a de fucto "legislative au-
responsibility for the arrangement and
3116
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 720
418
potentially involved 503,000 pupils in ad-
the Advancement of Colored People 2
dition to Detroit's 276,000 pupils. P.
and individual parents and students, on
3129.
behalf of a class later defined by order
484 F.2d 215, reversed and remand-
of the United States District Court for
ed.
the Eastern District of Michigan, dated
February 16, 1971, to include "all school
children in the City of Detroit, Michigan,
Frank J. Kelley, Lansing, Mich., for
and all Detroit resident parents who
petitioners William G. Milliken et al.
have children of school age." The named
fo
William M. Saxton, Detroit, Mich., for
defendants in the District Court in-
M
petitioners Allen Park Public Schools
cluded the Governor of Michigan, the
19
and Grosse Pointe Public School System
Attorney General, the State Board of
et al.
Education, the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction, the Board of Educa-
Solicitor Gen. Robert H. Bork for the
tion of the city of Detroit, its members,
Fo
United States, as amicus curiae, by spe-
the city's and its former superintendent
cial leave of Court.
of schools. The State of Michigan as
J. Harold Flannery, Cambridge, Mass.,
such is not a party to this litigation and
and Nathaniel R. Jones, New York City,
references to the State must be read as
for respondents.
references to the public officials, state
and local, through whom the State is
721 Mr. Chief Justice BURGER delivered
alleged to have acted. In their com-
the opinion of the Court.
plaint respondents attacked the consti-
We granted certiorari in these consoli-
tutionality of a statute of the State
dated cases to determine whether a fed-
of Michigan known as Act 48 of the
eral court may impose a multidistrict,
1970 Legislature on the ground that
areawide remedy to a single-district de
it put the State of Michigan in the posi-
jure segregation problem absent any
tion of unconstitutionally interfering
finding that the other included school
with the execution and operation of a
districts have failed to operate unitary
voluntary plan of partial high school de-
Bo
school systems within their districts, ab-
segregation, known as the April 7, 1970,
sent any claim or finding that the
Plan, which had been adopted by the De-
boundary lines of any affected school
troit Board of Education to be effective
district were established with the pur-
beginning with the fall 1970 semester. 723
pose of fostering racial segregation in
The complaint also alleged that the De-
724
public schools, absent any finding that
troit Public School System was and is
the included districts committed acts
segregated on the basis of race as a re-
which effected segregation within the
sult of the official policies and actions
722
other districts, and absent ajmeaningful
of the defendants and their predecessors
opportunity for the included neighboring
in office, and called for the implementa-
school districts to present evidence or be
tion of a plan that would eliminate "the
heard on the propriety of a multidistrict
racial identity of every school in the
remedy or on the question of constitu-
[Detroit] system and
main-
tional violations by those neighboring
tain now and hereafter a unitary, nonra-
districts.¹
cial school system."
Initially the matter was tried on re-
I
spondents' motion for a preliminary in-
The action was commenced in August
junction to restrain the enforcement of
1970 by the respondents, the Detroit
Act 48 so as to permit the April 7 Plan
Branch of the National Association for
to be implemented. On that issue, the
1. 484 F.2d 215 (CA6), cert. granted, 414 U.S.
2. The standing of the NAACP as a proper
1038, 94 S.Ct. 538, 38 L.Ed.2d 329 (1973).
party plaintiff was not contested in the trial
court and is not an issue in this case.
418 U.S. 725
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3117
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
District Court ruled that respondents
finding that "Governmental actions and
were not entitled to a preliminary in-
inaction at all levels, federal, state and
junction since at that stage there was no
local, have combined, with those of
proof that Detroit had a dual segregated
private organizations, such as loaning
school system. On appeal, the Court of
institutions and real estate associations
Appeals found that the "implementation
and brokerage firms, to establish and
of the April 7 plan was [unconstitu-
to maintain the pattern of residential
tionally] thwarted by State action in the
segregation' throughout the Detroit
form of the Act of the Legislature of
metropolitan area." 338 F.Supp. 582,
Michigan," 433 F.2d 897, 902 (CA6
587 (ED Mich.1971). While still ad-
1970), and that such action could not be
dressing a Detroit-only violation, the
interposed to delay, obstruct, or nullify
District Court reasoned:
steps lawfully taken for the purpose of
protecting rights guaranteed by the
"While it would be unfair to charge
Fourteenth Amendment. The case was
the present defendants with what oth-
remanded to the District Court for an
er governmental officers or agencies
expedited trial on the merits.
have done, it can be said that the ac-
tions or the failure to act by the re-
On remand, the respondents moved for
sponsible school authorities, both city
immediate implementation of the April 7
and state, were linked to that of these
Plan in order to remedy the deprivation
other governmental units. When we
of the claimed constitutional rights. In
speak of governmental action we
response, the School Board suggested two
should not view the different agencies
other plans, along with the April 7 Plan,
as a collection of unrelated units.
and urged that top priority be assigned
Perhaps the most that can be said is
to the so-called "Magnet Plan" which
that all of them, including the school
was "designed to attract children to a
authorities, are, in part, responsible
school because of its superior curricu-
for the segregated condition which ex-
lum." The District Court approved the
ists. And we note that just as there
Board's Magnet Plan, and respondents
is an interaction between residential
again appealed to the Court of Appeals,
patterns and the racial composition of
moving for summary reversal. The
the schools, SO there is a corresponding
Court of Appeals refused to pass on the
effect on the residential pattern by
merits of the Magnet Plan and ruled
the racial composition of the schools."
724 that the District Court had not abused
Ibid.
its discretion in refusing to adopt the
April 7 Plan without an evidentiary
The District Court found that the De-
725
hearing. The case was again remanded
troit Board of Education created and
with instructions to proceed immediately
maintained optional attendance zones 3
to a trial on the merits of respondents'
within Detroit neighborhoods undergo-
substantive allegations concerning the
ing racial transition and between high
Detroit school system. 438 F.2d 945
school attendance areas of opposite pre-
(CA6 1971).
dominant racial compositions. These
zones, the court found, had the "natural,
The trial of the issue of segregation
probable, foreseeable and actual effect"
in the Detroit school system began on
of allowing white pupils to escape iden-
April 6, 1971, and continued through
tifiably Negro schools. Ibid. Similar-
July 22, 1971, consuming some 41 trial
ly, the District Court found that Detroit
days. On September 27, 1971, the Dis-
school attendance zones had been drawn
trict Court issued its findings and con-
along north-south boundary lines despite
clusions on the issue of segregation,
the Detroit Board's awareness that
3. Optional zones, sometimes referred to as
choice of attendance at one of two high
dual zones or dual overlapping zones, pro-
schools.
vide pupils living within certain areas a
3118
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 725
418
drawing boundary lines in an east-
great majority of schools being built in
and effect
west direction would result in signifi-
either overwhelmingly all-Negro or all-
tion
cantly greater desegregation. Again,
white neighborhoods SO that the new
The
the District Court concluded, the nat-
schools opened as predominantly one-
acts
ural and actual effect of these acts
race schools. Thus, of the 14 schools
as a Haub?
was the creation and perpetuation of
which opened for use in 1970-1971, 11
werelattri
school segregation within Detroit.
opened over 90% Negro and one opened
gan, the
less than 10% Negro.
The District Court found that in the
the part
operation of its school transportation
law, Mich
The District Court also found that the
program, which was designed to relieve
for examp
State of Michigan had committed several
plans had
overcrowding, the Detroit Board had ad-
constitutional violations with respect to
Board
mittedly bused Negro Detroit pupils to
the exercise of its general responsibil-
the State
predominantly Negro schools which were
ity for, and supervision of, public
authorit
beyond or away from closer white
education.5 The State, for example, was
lections
schools with available space.4 This
found to have failed, until the 1971 Ses-
fect of
practice was found to have continued in
sion of the Michigan Legislature, to pro-
recent years despite the Detroit Board's
728 program.
vide authorization or funds for the 1727
largely
avowed policy, adopted in 1967, of utiliz-
transportation of pupils within Detroit
ing transportation to increase desegre-
sponsibilit
regardless of their poverty or distance
gation:
from the school to which they were as-
6.
"Seca
signed; during this same period the
tendance
"With one exception (necessitated by
State provided many neighboring, most-
year deti
the burning of a white school), de-
district
ly white, suburban districts the full
726
fendant Board has never bused white
date of
range of state-supported transportation.
first clas
children to predominantly black
under tlx
schools. The Board has not bused
The District Court found that the
but such
white pupils to black schools despite
State, through Act 48, acted to "impede,
of anyma
the enormous amount of space availa-
delay and minimize racial integration in
ment pri
ble in inner-city schools. There were
Detroit schools." The first sentence of
tendance
22,961 vacant seats in schools 90% or
§ 12 of Act 48 was designed to delay the
practical
more black." Id., at 588.
April 7, 1970, desegregation plan origi-
§
12.
nally adopted by the Detroit Board.
Laws
With respect to the Detroit Board of
The remainder of § 12 sought to pre-
7. The
Education's practices in school construc-
scribe for each school in the eight dis-
possibilit
tion, the District Court found that De-
tricts criteria of "free choice" and
persons)
troit school construction generally tend-
"neighborhood schools," which, the Dis-
patternal
ed to have a segregative effect with the
trict Court found, "had as their purpose
which
whitere
4. The Court of Appeals found record evi-
"The legislature shall maintain and support
hoods
dence that in at least one instance during
a system of free public elementary and second-
It
the period 1957-1958, Detroit served a sub-
ary schools as defined by law."
urban school district by contracting with it
tices gre
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court has
to educate its Negro high school students
in the
stated: "The school district is a State
by transporting them away from nearby
agency. Moreover, it is of legislative crea-
1970)
suburban white high schools, and past De-
tion.
" Attorney General ex rel.
on the
troit high schools which were predominantly
Kies V. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W.
removed
white, to all-Negro or predominantly Negro
289, 290 (1902) : "Education in Michigan
ernment
Detroit schools. 484 F.2d, at 231.
belongs to the State. It is no part of the local
have a
self-government inherent in the township or
the con
5. School districts in the State of Michigan
municipality. except SO far as the Legislature
know, tl
are instrumentalities of the State and subor-
may choose to make it such. The Constitu-
ly infre
dinate to its State Board of Education and
tion has turned the whole subject over to
and VA
legislature. The Constitution of the State of
the Legislature.
Attorney Gen-
Michigan, Art. S, § 2, provides in rele-
mainten.
eral ex rel. Zacharias v. Detroit Board of
vant part:
Education, 154 Mich. 584. 590, 118 N.W. 606,
i. e., r:
609 (1908).
The con
Supp. 5
418 U.S. 729
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3119
Cite as It S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
and effect the maintenance of segrega-
Turning to the question of an appro-
tion." 338 F.Supp., at 589.6
priate remedy for these several constitu-
The District Court also held that the
tional violations, the District Court de-
acts of the Detroit Board of Education,
ferred a pending motion 8 by intervening
as a subordinate entity of the State,
parent defendants to join as additional 729
were attributable to the State of Michi-
parties defendant the 85 outlying school
gan, thus creating a vicarious liability on
districts in the three-county Detroit met-
the part of the State. Under Michigan
ropolitan area on the ground that effec-
law, Mich.Comp.Laws § 388.851 (1970),
tive relief could not be achieved without
for example, school building construction
their presence.9 The District Court con-
plans had to be approved by the State
cluded that this motion to join was "pre-
Board of Education, and, prior to 1962,
mature," since it "has to do with relief"
the State Board had specific statutory
and no reasonably specific desegregation
authority to supervise school-site se-
plan was before the court. 338 F.Supp.,
lection. The proofs concerning the ef-
at 595. Accordingly, the District Court
fect of Detroit's school construction
proceeded to order the Detroit Board of
728 program were, therefore, found to be
Education to submit desegregation plans
largely applicable to show state re-
limited to the segregation problems
sponsibility for the segregative results.⁷
found to be existing within the city of
6. "Sec. 12. The implementation of any at-
Thus, the District Court concluded:
tendance provisions for the 1970-71 school
"The affirmative obligation of the defendant
year determined by any first class school
Board has been and is to adopt and imple-
district board shall be delayed pending the
ment pupil assignment practices and policies
date of commencement of functions by the
that compensate for and avoid incorporation
first class school district boards established
into the school system the effects of resi-
dential racial segregation." Id., at 593.
under the provisions of this amendatory act
The Court of Appeals, however, expressly
but such provision shall not impair the right
noted that:
of any such board to determine and imple-
"In affirming the District Judge's findings of
ment prior to such date such changes in at-
constitutional violations by the Detroit
tendance provisions as are mandated by
Board of Education and by the State defend-
practical necessity.
" Act No. 48,
ants resulting in segregated schools in De-
§ 12, Mich.Pub. Acts of 1970; Mich.Comp.
troit, we have not relied at all upon testimo-
Laws § 388.182 (1970).
ny pertaining to segregated housing except
as school construction programs helped
7. The District Court briefly alluded to the
cause or maintain such segregation." 484
possibility that the State, along with private
F.2d, at 242.
persons, had caused, in part, the housing
Accordingly, in its present posture, the case
does not present any question concerning
patterns of the Detroit metropolitan area
possible state housing violations.
which, in turn, produced the predominantly
8. On March 22, 1971, a group of Detroit res-
white and predominantly Negro neighbor-
hoods that characterize Detroit
idents, who were parents of children enrolled
in the Detroit public schools, were permitted
"It is no answer to say that restricted prac-
to intervene as parties defendant. On June
tices grew gradually (as the black population
24, 1971, the District Judge alluded to the
in the area increased between 1920 and
"possibility" of a metropolitan school system
1970), or that since 1948 racial restrictions
stating: "[A]s I have said to several witness-
on the ownership of real property have been
es in this case: "How do you desegrate a
removed. The policies pursued by both gov-
black city, or a black school system." Peti-
tioners' Appendix 243a (hereinafter Pat.
ernment and private persons and agencies
App.). Subsequently, on July 16, 1971, vari-
have a continuing and present effect upon
ous parents filed a motion to require joinder
the complexion of the community-as we
of all of the 85 outlying independent school
know. the choice of a residence is a relative-
districts within the tri-county area.
ly infrequent affair. For many years FHA
9. The respondents, as plaintiffs below, op-
and VA openly advised and advocated the
posed the motion to join the additional
maintenance of 'harmonious' neighborhoods.
school districts, arguing that the presence of
i. e., racially and economically harmonious.
the state defendants was sufficient and all
The conditions created continue." 338 F.
that was required, even if. in shaping a rem-
Supp. 582. 587 (ED Mich.1971).
edy, the affairs of these other districts was
to be affected. 338 F.Supp. at 595.
3120
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 729
418
Detroit. At the same time, however, the
vene under advisement pending submis-
state defendants were directed to submit
sion of the requested desegregation
desegregation plans encompassing the
plans by Detroit and the state officials.
three-county metropolitan area 10 despite
On March 7, 1972, the District Court no-
1730 the fact that the 85 outlying school dis-
tified all parties and the petitioner
tricts of these three counties were not
school districts seeking intervention,
parties to the action and despite the fact
that March 14, 1972, was the deadline
5
that there had been no claim that these
for submission of recommendations for
vene
outlying districts had committed constitu-
conditions of intervention and the date 731
Cour
tional violations. 11 An effort to appeal
of the commencement of hearings on De-
nors
these orders to the Court of Appeals was
troit-only desegregation plans. On the
Marc
dismissed on the ground that the orders
second day of the scheduled hearings,
ing d
were not appealable. 468 F.2d 902 (CA
March 15, 1972, the District Court
"met
6), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844, 93 S.Ct. 45,
granted the motions of the intervenor
and,
34 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972). The sequence of
school districts 12 subject, inter alia, to
school
the ensuing actions and orders of the
the following conditions:
must
District Court are significant factors and
732
issue
will therefore be catalogued in some
"1. No intervenor will be permit-
comp
detail.
ted to assert any claim or defense pre-
only
viously adjudicated by the court.
Cour
Following the District Court's abrupt
"2. No intervenor shall reopen any
the P
announcement that it planned to consid-
question or issue which has previously
peals
er the implementation of a multidistrict,
been decided by the court.
W
metropolitan area remedy to the segre-
(a)
gation problems identified within the
er th
city of Detroit, the District Court was
"7. New intervenors are granted
Distr
again requested to grant the outlying
intervention for two principal pur-
quest
school districts intervention as of right
poses: (a) To advise the court, by
relief
on the ground that the District Court's
brief, of the legal propriety or impro-
plan,
new request for multidistrict plans
priety of considering a metropolitan
Detr
"may, as a practical matter, impair or
plan; (b) To review any plan or plans
itan
impede [the intervenors'] ability to pro-
for the desegregation of the so-called
ants'
tect" the welfare of their students. The
larger Detroit Metropolitan area, and
cause
District Court took the motions to inter-
submitting objections, modifications
school
distr
10. At the time of the 1970 census, the popu-
relief
legally distinct school districts within the
lation of Michigan was 8,875,083, almost half
tri-county area, having a total enrollment of
urbar
of which, 4,199,931. resided in the tri-county
approximately 1,000,000 children. In 1970,
ted v
area of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb. Oak-
the Detroit Board of Education operated 319
land and Macomb Counties abut Wayne
schools with approximately 276,000 students.
"D
County to the north, and Oakland County
11. In its formal opinion, subsequently an-
sid
abuts Macomb County to the west. These
nounced, the District Court candidly recog-
counties cover 1,952 square miles, Michigan
wa
nized:
Statistical Abstract (9th ed. 1972). and the
pul
"It should be noted that the court has taken
area is approximately the size of the State
no proofs with respect to the establishment
pre
of Delaware (2,057 square miles), more than
of the boundaries of the 86 public school
bef
half again the size of the State of Rhode 1s-
districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland
land (1,214 square miles) and almost 30
cou
and Macomb, nor on the issue of whether,
times the size of the District of Columbia
equal
with the exclusion of the city of Detroit school
(67 square miles). Statistical Abstract of the
the
district, such school districts have committed
United States (93d ed. 1972). The popula-
acts of de jnre segregation." 345 F.Supp.
red
tions of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Coun-
914, 920 (ED Mich.1972).
ren
ties were 2,666,751 907,871; and 625,309, re-
spectively. in 1970. Detroit. the State's larg-
12. According to the District Court, interven-
Ap
est city, is located in Wayne County.
tion was permitted under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.
In the 1970-1971 school year. there were
24(a). "Intervention of Right," and also un-
13. T
2,157,449 children enrolled in school dis-
der Rule 24(b), "Permissive Intervention."
was
tricts in Michigan. There are S6 independent,
Dist
418 U.S. 733
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3121
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
or alternatives to it or them, and in
(b) On March 28, 1972, the District
accordance with the requirements of
Court issued its findings and conclusions
the United States Constitution and the
on the three Detroit-only plans sub-
prior orders of this court." 1 Joint
mitted by the city Board and the re-
Appendix 206 (hereinafter App.).
spondents. It found that the best of the
three plans "would make the Detroit
Upon granting the motion to inter-
school system more identifiably Black
vene, on March 15, 1972, the District
thereby increasing the flight of
Court advised the petitioning interve-
Whites from the city and the system."
nors that the court had previously set
Id., at 55a. From this the court con-
March 22, 1972, as the date for the fil-
cluded that the plan "would not ac-
ing of briefs on the legal propriety of a
complish desegregation
within
"metropolitan" plan of desegregation
the corporate geographical limits of the
and, accordingly, that the intervening
city." Id., at 56a. Accordingly, the Dis-
school districts would have one week to
trict Court held that it "must look beyond
muster their legal arguments on the
the limits of the Detroit school district 733
732 issue. 13 Thereafter, and following the
for a solution to the problem," and that
completion of hearings on the Detroit-
"[s]chool district lines are simply mat-
only desegregation plans, the District
ters of political convenience and may not
Court issued the four rulings that were
be used to deny constitutional rights."
the principal issues in the Court of Ap-
Id., at 57a.
peals.
(c) During the period from March 28
(a) On March 24, 1972, two days aft-
to April 14, 1972, the District Court
er the intervenors' briefs were due, the
conducted hearings on a metropolitan
District Court issued its ruling on the
plan. Counsel for the petitioning in-
question of whether it could "consider
tervenors was allowed to participate in
relief in the form of a metropolitan
these hearings, but he was ordered to
plan, encompassing not only the City of
confine his argument to "the size and
Detroit, but the larger Detroit metropol-
expanse of the metropolitan plan" with-
itan area." It rejected the state defend-
out addressing the intervenors' opposi-
ants' arguments that no state action
tion to such a remedy or the claim that
caused the segregation of the Detroit
a finding of a constitutional violation by
schools, and the intervening suburban
the intervenor districts was an essential
districts' contention that interdistrict
predicate to any remedy involving them.
relief was inappropriate unless the sub-
Thereafter, on June 14, 1972, the Dis-
urban districts themselves had commit-
trict Court issued its ruling on the "de-
ted violations. The court concluded:
segregation area" and related findings
and conclusions. The court acknowl-
"[I]t is proper for the court to con-
edged at the outset that it had "taken no
sider metropolitan plans directed to-
proofs with respect to the establishment
ward the desegregation of the Detroit
of the boundaries of the 86 public school
public schools as an alternative to the
districts in the counties [in the Detroit
present intra-city desegregation plans
area], nor on the issue of whether, with
before it and, in the event that the
the exclusion of the city of Detroit
court finds such intra-city plans inad-
school districts, such school districts have
equate to desegregate such schools,
committed acts of de jure segregation."
the court is of the opinion that it is
Nevertheless, the court designated 53 of
required to consider a metropolitan
the 85 suburban school districts plus De-
remedy for desegregation." Pet.
troit as the "desegregation area" and
App. 51a.
appointed a panel to prepare and submit
13. This rather abbreviated briefing schedule
a motion made eight months earlier, to bring
was maintained despite the fact that the
the suburban districts into the case. See text
District Court had deferred consideration of
accompanying 11. S supra.
3122
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 733
418
"an effective desegregation plan" for
238, and by the state defendants, id.,
plan
the Detroit schools that would encom-
at 239-241.16 It stated that the acts
plan
pass the entire desegregation area. 14
of racial discrimination shown in the
735
the
The plan was to be based on 15 clusters,
record are "causally related to the sub-
ment
each containing part of the Detroit sys-
stantial amount of segregation found
to
tem and two or more suburban districts,
in the Detroit school system," id., at
out
734 and was to "achieve the greatest degree
241, and that "the District Court was
any
of actual desegregation to the end that,
therefore authorized and required to
cons
upon implementation, no school, grade or
take effective measures to desegregate
736 ing
classroom [would be] substantially dis-
the Detroit Public School System." Id.,
no
proportionate to the overall pupil racial
at 242.
allow
composition." 345 F.Supp. 914, 918 (ED
Mich.1972).
The Court of Appeals also agreed with
the District Court that "any less com-
(d) On July 11, 1972, and in accord-
prehensive a solution than a metropoli-
St
ance with a recommendation by the
tan' area plan would result in an all
court-appointed desegregation panel, the
black school system immediately sur-
District Court ordered the Detroit
rounded by practically all white subur-
Board of Education to purchase or lease
ban school systems, with an overwhelm-
"at least" 295 school buses for the pur-
An
ingly white majority population in the to-
pose of providing transportation under
to be
tal metropolitan area." Id., at 245.
an interim plan to be developed for the
Distr
The court went on to state that it
1972-1973 school year. The costs of
could "[not] see how such segregation
this acquisition were to be borne by the
can be any less harmful to the minority
view
state defendants. Pet.App. 106a-107a.
students than if the same result were
Cour
On June 12, 1973, a divided Court of
accomplished within one school district."
"dese
Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed in
Ibid.
subu
part, vacated in part, and remanded for
affect
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
further proceedings. 484 F.2d 215
dy
concluded that "the only feasible deseg-
(CA6).15 The Court of Appeals held,
be
regation plan involves the crossing of
first, that the record supported the
mand
the boundary lines between the Detroit
hear
District Court's findings and conclusions
School District and adjacent or nearby
plem
on the constitutional violations commit-
school districts for the limited purpose
2d,
ted by the Detroit Board, id., at 221-
of providing an effective desegregation
reml
14. As of 1970. the 53 school districts outside
city Board is an instrumentality of the State
not
the city of Detroit that were included in the
and subordinate to the State Board, the seg-
dent
court's "desegration area" had a combined stu-
regative actions of the Detroit Board "are
Det
dent population of approximately 503,000
the actions of an agency of the State," id.,
Deti
students compared to Detroit's approximate-
at 23S; (2) that the state legislation
Iv 276,000 students. Nevertheless, the Dis-
rescinding Detroit's voluntary desegregation
of
trict Court directed that the intervening dis-
plan contributed to increasing segregation in
comm
tricts should be represented by only one
the Detroit schools, ibid.; (3) that under
tiona
member on the desegregation panel while the
state law prior to 1962 the State Board had
Id
Detroit Board of Education was granted
authority over school construction plans and
three panel members. 345 F.Supp., at 917.
therefore had to be held responsible "for the
peals
15. The District Court had certified most of
segregative results," ibid.; (4) that the
"State statutory scheme of support of trans-
buses
the foregoing rulings for interlocutory re-
view pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1
portation for school children directly dis-
trict
App. 265-266) and the case was initially de-
criminated against Detroit: id., at 240,
order
cided on the merits by a panel of three
by not providing transportation funds to
Detroit on the same basis as funds were
judges. However. the panel's opinion and
provided to surburban districts, id., at 238;
judgment were vacated when it was deter-
17.
mined to rehear the case en bane. 484 F.2d,
and (5) that the transportation of Negro
School
students from one suburban district to a Negro
at 218.
school in Detroit must have had the "ap-
16. With respect to the State's violations, the
proval, tacit or express. of the State Board
36
Court of Appeals held: (1) that, since the
of Education," ibid.
the
418 U.S. 737
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3123
Cite as 91 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
plan." Id., It reasoned that such a
II
737
plan would be appropriate because of
the State's violations, and could be imple-
[1] Ever since Brown V. Board of
mented because of the State's authority
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98
to control local school districts. With-
L.Ed. 873 (1954), judicial consideration
out further elaboration, and without
of school desegregation cases has begun
with the standard:
any discussion of the claims that no
constitutional violation by the outly-
"[I]n the field of public education the
1736 ing districts had been shown and that
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
no evidence on that point had been
place. Separate educational facilities
allowed, the Court of Appeals held:
are inherently unequal." Id., at 495,
74 S.Ct., at 692.
"[T]he State has committed de jure
This has been reaffirmed time and
acts of segregation and
the
State controls the instrumentalities
again as the meaning of the Constitu-
whose action is necessary to remedy
tion and the controlling rule of law.
the harmful effects of the State acts."
The target of the Brown holding was
Ibid.
clear and forthright: the elimination of
An interdistrict remedy was thus held
state-mandated or deliberately main-
to be "within the equity powers of the
tained dual school systems with certain
District Court." Id., at 250.¹⁷
schools for Negro pupils and others for
white pupils. This duality and racial
The Court of Appeals expressed no
segregation were held to violate the Con-
views on the propriety of the District
stitution in the cases subsequent to
Court's composition of the metropolitan
1954, including particularly Green V.
"desegregation area." It held that all
County School Board of New Kent Coun-
suburban school districts that might be
ty, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.
affected by any metropolitanwide reme-
2d 716 (1968) Raney V. Board of Edu-
dy should, under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 19,
cation, 391 U.S. 443, 88 S.Ct. 1697, 20
be made parties to the case on re-
L.Ed.2d 727 (1968) ; Monroe V. Board
mand and be given an opportunity to be
of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 88 S.Ct.
heard with respect to the scope and im-
1700, 20 L.Ed.2d 733 (1968) ; Swann V.
plementation of such a remedy. 484 F.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
2d, at 251-252. Under the terms of the
tion, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.
remand, however, the District Court was
2d 554 (1971) ; Wright V. Council of the
not "required" to receive further evi-
City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct.
dence on the issue of segregation in the
2196, 33 L.Ed.2d 51 (1972) ; United
Detroit schools or on the propriety of a
States V. Scotland Neck City Board of
Detroit-only remedy, or on the question
Education, 407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214,
of whether the affected districts had
33 L.Ed.2d 75 (1972).
committed any violation of the constitu-
tional rights of Detroit pupils or others.
The Swann case, of course, dealt
Id., at 252. Finally, the Court of Ap-
"with the problem of defining in more
peals vacated the District Court's or-
precise terms than heretofore the
der directing the acquisition of school
scope of the duty of school authorities
buses, subject to the right of the Dis-
and district courts in implementing
trict Court to consider reimposing the
Brown I and the mandate to eliminate
order "at the appropriate time." Ibid.
dual systems and establish unitary
17. The court sought to distingnish Bradiey V.
an actual consolidation of three school dis-
School Board of the City of Richmond. 462
triets and that Virginia's Constitution and
F.2d 1058 (CA4 1972). aff'd by an equally
statutes, unlike Michigan's gave the local
divided Court, 412 U.S. 92, 93 S.Ct. 1952.
boards exclusive power to operate the public
36 L.Ed.2d 771 (1973), on the grounds that
schools. 484 F.2d. at 251.
the District Court in that case had ordered
3124
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 737
418 T
systems at once." 402 U.S., at 6, 91 only plans on the ground that "while
S.Ct., at 1271.
[they] would provide a racial mix more
in keeping with the Black-White propor-
In Brown V. Board of Education, 349 U.
tions of the student population [they]
S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083
would accentuate the racial identifiabili-
(1955) (Brown II), the Court's first en-
ty of the Detroit] district as a Black
739
seem
counter with the problem of remedies in
school system, and would not accomplish
the
school desegregation cases, the Court
desegregation." Pet.App., 56a. "[T]he
740
mar
noted:
racial composition of the student body is
the
"In fashioning and effectuating the
such," said the court, "that the plan's
their
decrees, the courts will be guided by
implementation would clearly make the
of
equitable principles. Traditionally,
entire Detroit public school system ra-
balan
738
equity has been characterized by a
cially identifiable" (Id., at 54a), "leav-
ble
practical flexibility in shaping its
[ing] many of its schools 75 to 90 per
summ
remedies and by a facility for adjust-
cent Black." Id., at 55a. Consequent-
not
ing and reconciling public and private
ly, the court reasoned, it was impera-
of
needs." Id., at 300, 75 S.Ct., at 756
tive to "look beyond the limits of the
less
Detroit school district for a solution
(footnotes omitted).
body
to the problem of segregation in the De-
ed
In further refining the remedial process,
troit public schools
since
tion
Swann held, the task is to correct, by a
"[s]chool district lines are simply mat-
The
balancing of the individual and collective
ters of political convenience and may not
as
De
interests, "the condition that offends the
be used to deny constitutional rights."
distri
Constitution." A federal remedial pow-
Id., at 57a. Accordingly, the District
the
er may be exercised "only on the basis
Court proceeded to redefine the relevant
emplo
of a constitutional violation" and, "[a]s
area to include areas of predominantly
express
with any equity case, the nature of the
white pupil population in order to ensure
tution
violation determines the scope of the
that "upon implementation, no school,
remedy." 402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct.,
grade or classroom [would be] substan-
at 1276.
tially disproportionate to the overall pu-
tra
pil racial composition" of the entire met-
[2] Proceeding from these basic
the
ropolitan area.
principles, we first note that in the Dis-
12
trict Court the complainants sought a
While specifically acknowledging that
of
remedy aimed at the condition alleged to
the District Court's findings of a condi-
tha
offend the Constitution-the segregation
tion of segregation were limited to De-
within the Detroit City School District. 18
troit, the Court of Appeals approved the
tial
The court acted on this theory 'of the
use of a metropolitan remedy largely on
put
case and in its initial ruling on the "De-
the grounds that it is
Su
segregation Area" stated:
"impossible to declare 'clearly erro-
In
neous' the District Judge's conclusion
of
"The task before this court, there-
has always
that any Detroit only segregation plan
the €
fore, is now, and
will lead directly to a single segregat-
been, how to desegregate the Detroit
ed Detroit school district overwhelm-
19.
public schools." 345 F.Supp., at 921.
pils
ingly black in all of its schools, sur-
tute
Thereafter, however, the District Court
rounded by a ring of suburbs and sub-
outs
abruptly rejected the proposed Detroit-
urban school districts overwhelmingly
coul
ty
18. Although the list of issues presented for
(c) and 40(1) (d) (2), at a minimum limit
Swi
our review to the Detroit violation findings
larg
review in petitioners' briefs and petitions for
writs of certiorari do not include arguments
to "plain error," and. under our decision last
on the findings of segregative violations on
Term in Keyes V. School District No. 1, Den-
the part of the Detroit defendants, two of the
ver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686,
for
petitioners argue in brief that these findings
37 L.Ed.2d 548 1973). the findings appear
tem
son
constitute error. This Court's Rules 23(1)
to be correct.
418 U.S. 742
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3125
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
white in composition in a State in
"If we were to read the holding of the
which the racial composition is 87 per
District Court to require, as a matter
cent white and 13 per cent black." 484
of substantive constitutional right,
F.2d, at 249.
any particular degree of racial balance
[3] Viewing the record as a whole, it
or mixing, that approach would be dis-
seems clear that the District Court and
approved and we would be obliged to
the Court of Appeals shifted the pri-
reverse." 402 U.S., at 24, 91 S.Ct., at
1280.
1740 mary focus from a Detroit remedy to
the metropolitan area only because of
The clear import of this language from
their conclusion that total desegregation
Swann is that desegregation, in the
of Detroit would not produce the racial
sense of dismantling a dual school sys-
balance which they perceived as desira-
tem, does not require any particular ra-
ble. Both courts proceeded on an as-
cial balance in each "school, grade or 741
sumption that the Detroit schools could
classroom." 19 See Spencer V. Kugler,
not be truly desegregated-in their view
404 U.S. 1027, 92 S.Ct. 707, 30 L.Ed.2d
of what constituted desegregation-un-
723 (1972).
less the racial composition of the student
body of each school substantially reflect-
[4] Here the District Court's ap-
ed the racial composition of the popula-
proach to what constituted "actual de-
tion of the metropolitan area as a whole.
segregation" raises the fundamental
The metropolitan area was then defined
question, not presented in Swann, as to
as Detroit plus 53 of the outlying school
the circumstances in which a federal
districts. That this was the approach
court may order desegregation relief
the District Court expressly and frankly
that embraces more than a single school
employed is shown by the order which
district. The court's analytical starting
expressed the court's view of the consti-
point was its conclusion that school dis-
tutional standard:
trict lines are no more than arbitrary
lines on a map drawn "for political con-
"Within the limitations of reasonable
venience." Boundary lines may be
travel time and distance factors, pupil
bridged where there has been a constitu-
reassignments shall be effected within
tional violation calling for interdistrict
the clusters described in Exhibit P.M.
relief, but the notion that school district
12 so as to achieve the greatest degree
lines may be casually ignored or treated
of actual desegregation to the end
as a mere administrative convenience is
that, upon implementation, no school,
contrary to the history of public educa-
grade or classroom [will be] substan-
tion in our country. No single tradition
tially disproportionate to the overall
in public education is more deeply rooted
pupil racial composition.", 345 F.
than local control over the operation of
Supp., at 918 (emphasis added).
schools; local autonomy has long been
In Swann, which arose in the context
thought essential both to the mainte-
of a single independent school district,
nance of community concern and support
the Court held:
for public schools and tolquality of the 742
19. Disparity in the racial composition of pu-
one race [the school authority has] the bur-
pils within a single district may well consti-
den of showing that such school assignments
tute a "signal" to a district court at the
are genuinely nondiscriminatory." 402 U.S.,
outset, leading to inquiry into the causes ac-
at 26, 91 S.Ct., at 1281. See also Keyes, su-
counting for a pronounced racial identifiabili-
pra, at 208, 93 S.Ct.. at 2697. However, the
ty of schools within one school system. In
use of significant racial imbalance in schools
Swann, for example, we were dealing with a
within an autonomous school district as
large but single independent school system,
a signal which operates simply to shift
and a unanimous Court noted
the burden of proof, is a very different mat-
"Where the school authority's proposed plan
ter from equating racial imbalance with a
for conversion from a dual to a unitary sys-
constitutional violation calling for a remedy.
tem contemplates the continued existence of
Keyes, supra, also involved a remedial order
some schools that are all or predominantly of
within a single autonomous school district.
3126
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 742
418
educational process. See Wright V.
children of Detroit be within the ju-
plex
Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S.,
risdiction and operating control of a
perint
at 469, 92 S.Ct., at 2206. Thus, in San
school board elected by the parents and
is a:
Antonio Independent School District V.
residents of other districts? What
qualif
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50, 93 S.Ct. 1278,
board or boards would levy taxes for
would
1305, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), we observed
school operations in these 54 districts
schoo
that local control over the educational
constituting the consolidated metropoli-
tives
process affords citizens an opportunity
tan area? What provisions could be
to participate in decision-making, per-
made for assuring substantial equality
[5]
mits the structuring of school programs
in tax levies among the 54 districts, if
the
to fit local needs, and encourages "ex-
this were deemed requisite? What pro-
and
perimentation, innovation, and a healthy
visions would be made for financing?
cal
competition for educational excellence."
Would the validity of long-term bonds be
they
jeopardized unless approved by all of the
Amen
The Michigan educational structure
component districts as well as the
to pr
involved in this case, in common with
State? What body would determine
e. g.,
most States, provides for a large mea-
that portion of the curricula now left to
Empc
sure of local control,20 and a review of
the discretion of local school boards
L.Ed.
the scope and character of these local
Who would establish attendance zones,
Scotl:
powers indicates the extent to which the
purchase school equipment, locate and
407 1
interdistrict remedy approved by the
construct new schools, and indeed attend
75 (1
two courts could disrupt and alter the
to all the myriad day-to-day decisions
vente
1743 structure of public education in Michi-
that are necessary to school operations
distri
gan. The metropolitan remedy would
affecting potentially more than three-
was
require, in effect, consolidation of 54 in-
quarters of a million pupils? See n.
schoo
dependent school districts historically
10, supra.
Boar
administered as separate units into a
ty, 4
vast new super school district. See n.
It may be suggested that all of these
contr
10, supra. Entirely apart from the lo-
vital operational problems are yet to be
draw
gistical and other serious problems at-
resolved by the District Court, and that
ed S
tending large-scale transportation of
this is the purpose of the Court of Ap-
students, the consolidation would give
peals' proposed remand. But it is ob-
(ED.
rise to an array of other problems in fi-
vious from the scope of the interdistrict
(CA5
nancing and operating this new school
remedy itself that absent a complete re-
gar
system. Some of the more obvious ques-
structuring of the laws of Michigan re-
S.Ct.
tions would be: What would be the sta-
lating to school districts the District
or in
tus and authority of the present popu-
Court will become first, a de facto "leg- 1744
main
larly elected school boards Would the
islative authority" to resolve these com-
holdi
and
20. Under the Michigan School Code of 1955,
340.583; to provide a kindergarten program,
trict.
the local school district is an autonomous
§ 340.584; to establish and operate vocation-
the f
political body corporate, operating through a
al schools, § 340.585; to offer adult educa-
mand
Board of Education popularly elected.
tion programs, § 340.586 to establish attend-
Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 340.27, 340.55, 340.-
ance areas, § 340.589 to arrange for trans-
trict
107, 340.148, 340.149, 340.188. As such,
portation of nonresident students, § 340.591;
of se
the day-to-day affairs of the school district
to acquire transportation equipment, § 340.-
distri
are determined at the local level in accord-
594; to receive gifts and bequests for educa-
ance with the plenary power to acquire real
tional purposes, § 340.605 to employ an at-
and personal property, §§ 340.26, 340.77. 340.-
torney, § 340.609 to suspend or expel stu-
[6]
113, 340.165, 340.192, 340.352: to hire and
dents. § 340.613 to make rules and regula-
ently
contract with personnel, §§ 340.569, 340.574;
tions for the operation of schools, § 340.614
the S
to levy taxes for operations, § 340.563; to
to cause to be levied authorized millage, §
by th
borrow against receipts, § 340.567 to deter-
340.643a: to acquire property by eminent do-
tiona
mine the length of school terms, § 340.575 to
main, § 340.711 et seq.; and to approve and
control the admission of nonresident students,
select textbooks, § 340.882.
16, 9
§ 340.582; to determine courses of study, §
aries
distr
418 U.S. 745
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3127
Cité as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
plex questions, and then the "school su-
dating the separate units for remedi-
perintendent" for the entire area. This
al purposes or by imposing a cross-
is a task which few, if any, judges are
district remedy, it must first be 745
qualified to perform and one which
shown that there has been a con-
would deprive the people of control of
stitutional violation within one dis-
schools through their elected representa-
trict that produces a significant segre-
tives.
gative effect in another district. Spe-
cifically, it must be shown that racially
[5] Of course, no state law is above
discriminatory acts of the state or loca[
the Constitution. School district lines
school districts, or of a single school dis-
and the present laws with respect to lo-
trict have been a substantial cause of in-
cal control, are not sacrosanct and if
terdistrict segregation. Thus an inter-
they conflict with the Fourteenth
district remedy might be in order where
Amendment federal courts have a duty
the racially discriminatory acts of one or
to prescribe appropriate remedies. See,
more school districts caused racial segre-
e. g., Wright V. Council of the City of
gation in an adjacent district, or where
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct. 2196, 33
district lines have been deliberately
L.Ed.2d 51 (1972) United States V.
drawn on the basis of race. In such cir-
Scotland Neck City Board of Education,
cumstances an interdistrict remedy
407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214, 33 L.Ed.2d
would be appropriate to eliminate the in-
75 (1972) (state or local officials pre-
terdistrict segregation directly caused
vented from carving out a new school
by the constitutional violation. Con-
district from an existing district that
versely, without an interdistrict viola-
was in process of dismantling a dual
tion and interdistrict effect, there is no
school system); cf. Haney V. County
constitutional wrong calling for an in-
Board of Education of Sevier Coun-
terdistrict remedy.
ty, 429 F.2d 364 (CA8 1970) (State
contributed to separation of races by
[7] The record before us, volumi-
drawing of school district lines) ; Unit-
nous as it is, contains evidence of de
ed States V. Texas, 321 F.Supp. 1043
jure segregated conditions only in the
(ED Tex.1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441
Detroit schools; indeed, that was the
(CA5 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Ed-
theory on which the litigation was ini-
gar V. United States, 404 U.S. 1016, 92
tially based and on which the District
Court took evidence. See supra at 3117-
S.Ct. 675, 30 L.Ed.2d 663 (1972) (one
3118. With no showing of significant
or more school districts created and
violation by the 53 outlying school dis-
maintained for one race). But our prior
tricts and no evidence of any interdis-
holdings have been confined to violations
trict violation or effect, the court went
and remedies within a single school dis-
beyond the original theory of the case as
trict. We therefore turn to address, for
framed by the pleadings and mandated a
the first time, the validity of a remedy
metropolitan area remedy. To approve
mandating cross-district or interdis-
the remedy ordered by the court would
trict consolidation to remedy a condition
impose on the outlying districts, not
of segregation found to exist in only one
shown to have committed any constitu-
district.
tional violation, a wholly impermissible
remedy based on a standard not hinted
[6] The controlling principle consist-
at in Brown I and II or any holding of
ently expounded in our holdings is that
this Court.
the scope of the remedy is determined
by the nature and extent of the constitu-
In dissent, Mr. Justice WHITE and
tional violation. Swann, 402 U.S., at
Mr. Justice MARSHALL undertake to
16, 91 S.Ct., at 1276. Before the bound-
demonstrate that agencies having state-
aries of separate and autonomous school
wide authority participated in maintain-
districts may be set aside by consoli-
ing the dual school system found to exist
3128
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 745
in Detroit. They are apparently of the
within the Detroit school system, and
748
view that once such participation is
not elsewhere, and on this record the
1746 shown, the District Court should have a
remedy must be limited to that system.
relatively free hand to reconstruct school
Swann, supra, 402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct.,
districts outside of Detroit in fashioning
at 1276.
relief. Our assumption, arguendo, see
infra, p. 3129, that state agencies did-par-
[8, 9] The constitutional right of the
ticipate in the maintenance of the De-
Negro respondents residing in Detroit is
troit system, should make it clear that it
to attend a unitary school system in that
is not on this point that we part
district. Unless petitioners drew the
company.21 The difference between us
district lines in a discriminatory fashion,
arises instead from established doctrine
or arranged for white students resid-
747
laid down by our cases. Brown, supra;
ing in the Detroit district to attend
Green, supra; Swann, supra; Scotland
schools in Oakland and Macomb Coun-
Neck, supra; and Emporia, supra, each
ties, they were under no constitution-
addressed the issue of constitutional
al duty to make provisions for Negro
wrong in terms of an established geo-
students to do so. The view of the
graphic and administrative school sys-
dissenters, that the existence of a dual
tem populated by both Negro and white
system in Detroit can be made the
children. In such a context, terms such
basis for a decree requiring cross-dis-
as "unitary" and "dual" systems, and
"racially identifiable schools," have
trict transportation of pupils, cannot be
meaning, and the necessary federal au-
supported on the grounds that it repre-
Boar
thority to remedy the constitutional
sents merely the devising of a suitably
tions
wrong is firmly established. But the
flexible remedy for the violation of
of
remedy is necessarily designed, as all
rights already established by our prior
State
remedies are, to restore the victims of
decisions. It can be supported only by
discriminatory conduct to the position
drastic expansion of the constitutional
they would have occupied in the absence
right itself, an expansion without any
the
of such conduct. Disparate treatment of
support in either constitutional principle
that
white and Negro students occurred
or precedent. 22
21. Since the Court has held that a resident of
schools within the district having a racial
a school district has a fundamental right pro-
composition of 57% Negro and 43% White.
tected by the Federal Constitution to vote in
In Wright V. Council of the City of Empo-
a district election, it would seem incongruous
ria, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct. 2196. 33 L.Ed.2d
to disparage the importance of the school dis-
51 (1972), the optimal desegregation plan
trict in a different context. Kramer V. Union
would have resulted in the schools' being
Free School District No. 15. 395 U.S. 621,
66% Negro and 34% white, substantially
nou
626, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d 583
the same percentages as could be obtained
(1969). While the district there involved was
under one of the plans involved in this case.
located in New York, none of the facts in our
And in United States V. Scotland Neck City
possession suggest that the relation of school
Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484, 491 n. 5,
districts to the State is significantly differ-
92 S.Ct. 2214, 2218, 33 L.Ed.2d 75 (1972), a
ent in New York from that in Michigan.
desegregation plan was implicitly approved
for a school district which had a racial com-
22. The suggestion in the dissent of Mr. Jus-
tice MARSHALL that schools which have a
position of 77% Negro and 22% white. In
none of these cases was it even intimated
majority of Negro students are not "deseg-
regated," whatever the racial makeup of the
that "actual desegregation" could not be ac-
school district's population and however neu-
complished as long as the number of Negro
trally the district lines have been drawn and
students was greater than the number of
white students.
administered, finds no support in our prior
The dissents also seem to attach impor-
23
cases. In Green V. County School Board of
New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 8S S.Ct.
tance to the metropolitan character of De-
1689. 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), for example,
troit and neighboring school districts. But
this Court approved a desegregation plan
the constitutional principles applicable in
which would have resulted in each of the
school desegregation cases cannot vary in
418 U.S. 749
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3129
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
III
748
original boundaries of the Detroit
We recognize that the six-volume
School District, or any other school dis-
record presently under consideration
trict in Michigan, were established for
contains language and some specific in-
the purpose of creating, maintaining, or
cidental findings thought by the District
perpetuating segregation of races.
Court to afford a basis for interdistrict
There is no claim and there is no evi-
relief. However, these comparatively
dence hinting that petitioner outlying
isolated findings and brief comments
schools districts and their predecessors, 749
concern only one possible interdistrict
or the 30-odd other school districts in
violation and are found in the context of
the tricounty area-but outside the Dis-
a proceeding that, as the District Court
trict Court's "desegregation area"-have
conceded, included no proof of segrega-
ever maintained or operated anything
tion practiced by any of the 85 suburban
but unitary school systems. Unitary
school districts surrounding Detroit.
school systems have been required for
The Court of Appeals, for example, re-
more than a century by the Michigan
lied on five factors which, it held,
Constitution as implemented by state
amounted to unconstitutional state ac-
law.23 Where the schools of only one
tion with respect to the violations found
district have been affected, there is
in the Detroit system:
no constitutional power in the courts
to decree relief balancing the racial
[10] (1) It held the State deriva-
composition of that district's schools
tively responsible for the Detroit
with those of the surrounding districts.
Board's violations on the theory that ac-
tions of Detroit as a political subdivision
[11] (2) There was evidence intro-
of the State were attributable to the
duced at trial that, during the late
State. Accepting, arguendo, the correct-
1950's, Carver School District, a predom-
ness of this finding of state responsibil-
inantly Negro suburban district, con-
ity for the segregated conditions within
tracted to have Negro high school stu-
the city of Detroit, it does not follow
dents sent to a predominantly Negro
that an interdistrict remedy is constitu-
school in Detroit. At the time, Carver
tionally justified or required. With a
was an independent school district that
single exception, discussed later, there
had no high school because, according to
has been no showing that either the
the trial evidence, "Carver District
State or any of the 85 outlying districts
did not have a place for ade-
engaged in activity that had a cross-dis-
quate high school facilities." 484 F.2d.,
trict effect. The boundaries of the De-
at 231. Accordingly, arrangements were
made with Northern High School in
troit School District, which are cotermi-
the abutting Detroit School District
nous with the boundaries of the city of
so that the Carver high school stu-
Detroit, were established over a century
dents could obtain a secondary school edu-
ago by neutral legislation when the city
cation. In 1960 the Oak Park School Dis-
was incorporated; there is no evidence
trict, a predominantly white suburban
in the record, nor is there any sugges-
district, annexed the predominantly Ne-
tion by the respondents, that either the
gro Carver School District, through the
accordance with the size or population dis-
as to religion, creed, race, color or national
persal of the particular city, county. or
origin," Mich.Const.1963, Art. 8, § 2; that
school district as compared with neighboring
"no separate school or department shall be
areas.
kept for any person or persons on account
of race or color." Mich.Comp.Laws § 340.-
23. People ex rel. Workman V. Board of Edu-
355; and that "[a]ll persons, residents of
cation of Detroit, 18 Mich. 400 (1869) ; Act
a school district
shall have an
34. § 28. Mich.Pub.Acts of 1867. The Mich-
equal right to attend school therein," id.,
igan Constitution and laws provide that
§ 340.356. See also Act 319, Part II, c. 2,
"every school district shall provide for the
$ 9, Mich.Pub.Acts of 1927.
education of its pupils without discrimination
3130
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 749
750
initiative of local officials. Ibid. There
1949 and 1962 the State Board of Educa-
751
is, of course, no claim that the 1960 an-
tion exercised general authority as over-
nexation had a segregative purpose or re-
seer of site acquisitions by local boards
sult or that Oak Park now maintains a
for new school construction, and sug-
dual system.
gested that this state-approved school
construction "fostered segregation
According to the Court of Appeals,
throughout the Detroit Metropolitan
the arrangement during the late 1950's
area." 484 F.2d, at 241. This brief
which allowed Carver students to be ed-
comment, however, is not supported by
ucated within the Detroit District was
the evidence taken at trial since that ev-
dependent upon the "tacit or express"
idence was specifically limited to proof
approval of the State Board of Educa-
that schoolsite acquisition and school
tion and was the result of the refusal of
construction within the city of Detroit
the white suburban districts to accept
produced de jure segregation within the
the Carver students. Although there is
city itself. Id., at 235-238. Thus,
nothing in the record supporting the
there was no evidence suggesting that
Court of Appeals' supposition that sub-
the State's activities with respect to
urban white schools refused to accept
either school construction or site acqui-
the Carver students, it appears that this
sition within Detroit affected the racial
situation, whether with or without the
composition of the school population out-
State's consent, may have had a segrega-
side Detroit or, conversely, that the
tive effect on the school populations of
State's school construction and site ac-
the two districts involved. However,
quisition activities within the outlying
since "the nature of the violation deter-
districts affected the racial composition
mines the scope of the remedy," Swann,
of the schools within Detroit.
402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct., at 1276, this iso-
lated instance affecting two of the
(5) The Court of Appeals also relied
school districts would not justify the
upon the District Court's finding:
broad metropolitanwide remedy contem-
plated by the District Court and ap-
"This and other financial limitations,
proved by the Court of Appeals, particu-
such as those on bonding and the
larly since it embraced potentially 52
working of the state aid formula
districts having no responsibility for the
whereby suburban districts were able
arrangement and involved 503,000 pupils
to make far larger per pupil expendi-
in addition to Detroit's 276,000 students.
tures despite less tax effort, have cre-
(3) The Court of Appeals cited the
ated and perpetuated systematic edu-
enactment of state legislation (Act 48)
cational inequalities." Id., at 239.
which had the effect of rescinding De-
troit's voluntary desegregation plan (the
However, neither the Court of Appeals
April 7 Plan). That plan, however, af-
nor the District Court offered any indi-
fected only 12 of 21 Detroit high schools
cation in the record or in their opinions
and had no causal connection with the
as to how, if at all, the availability of
distribution of pupils by race between
state-financed aid for some Michigan
Detroit and the other school districts
students outside Detroit, but not for
within the tricounty area.
those within Detroit, might have affect-
ed the racial character of any of the
(4) The court relied on the State's
State's school districts. Furthermore, as
authority to supervise schoolsite selec-
the respondents recognize, the applica-
tion and to approve building construc-
tion of our recent ruling in San Antonio
tion as a basis for holding the State re-
School District V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
sponsible for the segregative results of
93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), to
the school construction program in De-
this state education financing system is
troit. Specifically, the Court of Appeals
questionable, and this issue was not1ad- [752
asserted that during the period between
dressed by either the Court of Appeals
418 U.S. 754
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3131
Cite as S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
or the District Court. This, again, un- the Court of Appeals is reversed and the
derscores the crucial fact that the theory
case is remanded for further proceed-
upon which the the case proceeded relat-
ings consistent with this opinion leading
ed solely to the establishment of Detroit
to prompt formulation of a decree di-
city violations as a basis for desegregat-
rected to eliminating the segregation
ing Detroit schools and that, at the time
found to exist in Detroit city schools, a
of trial, neither the parties nor the trial
remedy which has been delayed since
judge was concerned with a foundation
1970.
for interdistrict relief.2⁴
Reversed and remanded.
IV
Mr. Justice STEWART, concurring.
Petitioners have urged that they were
denied due process by the manner in
In joining the opinion of the Court, I
which the District Court limited their
think it appropriate, in view of some of
participation after intervention was al-
the extravagant language of the dissent-
lowed, thus precluding adequate opportu-
ing opinions, to state briefly my under-
nity to present evidence that they had
standing of what it is that the Court de-
committed no acts having a segregative
cides today.
effect in Detroit. In light of our hold-
ing that, absent an interdistrict viola-
The respondents commenced this suit
tion, there is no basis for an interdis-
in 1970, claiming only that a constitu-
trict remedy, we need not reach these
tionally impermissible allocation of edu-
claims. It is clear; however, that the
cational facilities along racial lines had
District Court, with the approval of the
occurred in public schools within a sin-
Court of Appeals, has provided an in-
gle school district whose lines were co-
terdistrict remedy in the face of a
terminous with those of the city of De-
record which shows no constitutional vi-
troit. In the course of the subsequent
olations that would call for equitable re-
proceedings, the District Court found
lief except within the city of Detroit.
that public school officials had contrib-
In these circumstances there was no oc-
uted to racial segregation within that
casion for the parties to address, or for
district by means of improper use of
the District Court to consider whether
zoning and attendance patterns, optional-
there were racially discriminatory acts
attendance areas, and building and site
for which any of the 53 outlying dis-
selection. This finding of a violation of
tricts. were responsible and which had
the Equal Protection Clause was upheld
direct and significant segregative effect
by the Court of Appeals, and is accepted
on schools of more than one district.
by this Court today. See ante, at 3124 n.
18. In the present posture of the case,
We conclude that the relief ordered by
therefore, the Court does not deal with
the District Court and affirmed by the
questions of substantive constitutional
Court of Appeals was based upon an er-
law. The basic issue now before the
roneous standard and was unsupported
Court concerns, rather, the appropriate
by record evidence that acts of the
exercise of federal equity jurisdiction.¹
outlying districts effected the discrimi-
nation found to exist in the schools of
No evidence was adduced and no find-
754
753 Detroit. Accordingly, the judgment of
ings were made in the District Court
24. Apparently, when the District Court sua
756, 99 L.Ed. 1083: "[E]quity has been
sponte, abruptly altered the theory of the
characterized by a practical flexibility in
case to include the possibility of multidis-
shaping its remedies and by a facility for ad-
trict relief, neither the plaintiffs nor the
justing and reconciling public and private
trial judge considered amending the com-
needs. These [school desegregation] cases
plaint to embrace t.e new theory.
call for the exercise of these traditional at-
tributes of equity power."
1. As this Court stated in Brown V. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S.Ct. 753,
3132
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 754
4182U
concerning the activities of school offi-
198-205, 93 S.Ct., at 2692-2696. But in
prop
cials in districts outside the city of De-
this case the Court of Appeals approved
scho
troit, and no school officials from the
the concept of a remedial decree that
fact
outside districts even participated in the
would go beyond the boundaries of the
cont
suit until after the District Court had
district where the constitutional viola-
or
made the initial determination that is
tion was found, and include schools and
the focus of today's decision. In spite
schoolchildren in many other school dis-
sho
of the limited scope of the inquiry and
tricts that have presumptively been ad-
po
the findings, the District Court conclud-
ministered in complete accord with the
Sta
ed that the only effective remedy for the
Constitution.
loy
constitutional violations found to have
sho
existed within the city of Detroit was a
The opinion of the Court convincingly
desegregation plan calling for busing
demonstrates, ante, at 3126, that tradi-
not
pupils to and from school districts out-
tions of local control of schools, together
for
side the city. The District Court found
with the difficulty of a judicially super-
abu
that any desegregation plan operating
vised restructuring of local administra-
wholly 'within the corporate geographi-
tion of schools, render improper and in-
757
cal limits of the city'' would be deficient
equitable such an interdistrict response
of
since it " 'would clearly make the entire
to a constitutional violation found to
in
have occurred only within a single school
state
Detroit public school system racially
district.
Bro
identifiable as Black.' 484 F.2d 215,
483
244, 243. The Court of Appeals, in
This is not to say, however, that an
the
affirming the decision that an interdis-
interdistrict remedy of the sort ap-
dutie
trict remedy was necessary, noted that a
proved by the Court of Appeals would
plan limited to the city of Detroit "would
not be proper, or even necessary, in oth-
cation
result in an all black school system imme-
er factual situations. Were it to be
Ed.2d
diately surrounded by practically all
shown, for example, that state officials
dress
white suburban school systems, with an
had contributed to the separation of the
reme
overwhelmingly white majority popula-
races by drawing or redrawing school
fect
tion in the total metropolitan area."
district lines, see Haney V. County
Br
Id., at 245.
Board of Education of Sevier County,
tas
The courts were in error for the sim-
429 F.2d 364; cf. Wright V. Council
of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,
tha
ple reason that the remedy they thought
necessary was not commensurate with
92 S.Ct. 2196, 33 L.Ed.2d 51; Unit-
the constitutional violation found.
ed States v. Scotland Neck City Board
Within a single school district whose of-
of Education, 407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214,
2.
ficials have been shown to have engaged
33 L.Ed.2d 75; by transfer of school un-
in unconstitutional racial segregation, a
its between districts, United States V.
remedial decree that affects every indi-
Texas, 321 F.Supp. 1043, aff'd, 447 F.2d
vidual school may be dictated by "com-
441; Turner V. Warren County Board of
mon sense," see Keyes V. School District
Education, 313 F.Supp. 380; or by pur-
No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189,
poseful racially discriminatory use of
203, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2695, 37 L.Ed.2d 548,
state housing or zoning laws, then a de-
and indeed may provide the only ef-
cree calling for transfer of pupils across
fective means to eliminate segregation
district lines or for restructuring of dis-
"root and branch," Green V. County
trict lines might well be appropriate.
School Board of New Kent County, 391
U.S. 430, 438, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1693, 20
In this case, however, no such inter-
L.Ed.2d 716, and to "effectuate a transi-
district violation was shown. Indeed, no
tion to a racially nondiscriminatory
evidence at all concerning the adminis-
755 schoolisystem." Brown V. Board of Edu-
tration of schools outside the city of De-
cation, 349 U.S. 294, 301, 75 S.Ct. 753,
troit was presented other than the fact
756, 99 L.Ed. 1083. See Keyes, supra, at
that these schools contained a higher 756
scho
418 U.S. 757
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3133
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
proportion of white pupils than did the
mines the scope of the remedy
schools within the city. Since the mere
Id., at 16, 91 S.Ct., at 1276.
fact of different racial compositions in
contiguous districts does not itself imply
The disposition of this case thus falls
or constitute a violation of the Equal
squarely under these principles. The
Protection Clause in the absence of a
only "condition that offends the Consti-
showing that such disparity was im-
tution" found by the District Court in
posed, fostered, or encouraged by the
this case is the existence of officially
State or its political subdivisions, it fol-
supported segregation in and among
lows that no interdistrict violation was
public schools in Detroit itself. There
shown in this case.2 The formulation of
were no findings that the differing ra-
an inter-district remedy was thus simply
cial composition between schools in the
not responsive to the factual record be-
city and in the outlying suburbs was
fore the District Court and was an
caused by official activity of any sort.
abuse of that court's equitable powers.
It follows that the decision to include in
the desegregation plan pupils from
757 I In reversing the decision of the Court
school districts outside Detroit was not
of Appeals this Court is in no way turn-
predicated upon any constitutional viola-
ing its back on the proscription of
tion involving those school districts. By
state-imposed segregation first voiced in
approving a remedy that would reach be-
Brown V. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
yond the limits of the city of Detroit to
483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, or on
correct a constitutional violation found
the delineation of remedial powers and
to have occurred solely within that city
duties most recently expressed in Swann
the Court of Appeals thus went beyond
V. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
the governing equitable principles estab-
cation, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.
lished in this Court's decisions.
Ed.2d 554. In Swann the Court ad-
dressed itself to the range of equitable
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.
remedies available to the courts to ef-
fectuate the desegregation mandated by
The Court of Appeals has acted re-
Brown and its progeny, noting that the
sponsibly in these cases and we should
task in choosing appropriate relief is
affirm its judgment. This was the
"to correct
the condition
fourth time the case was before it over
that offends the Constitution," and
a span of less than three years. The
that "the nature of the violation deter-
Court of Appeals affirmed the District
2. My Brother MARSHALL seems to ignore
known and perhaps unknowable factors such
this fundamental fact when he states, post
as in-migration, birth rates, economic
at 3153. that "the most essential finding
changes, or cumulative acts of private racial
[made by the District Court] was that Ne-
fears-that accounts for the "growing core
gro children in Detroit had been confined by
of Negro schools," a "core" that has grown
intentional acts of segregation to a growing
to include virtually the entire city. The
core of Negro schools surrounded by a re-
Constitution simply does not allow federal
ceding ring of white schools." This conclu-
courts to attempt to change that situation
sion is simply not substantiated by the
unless and until it is shown that the State.
record presented in this case. The record
or its political subdivisions, have contributed
here does support the claim made by the re-
to cause the situation to exist. No record
spondents that white and Negro students
has been made in this case showing that the
within Detroit who otherwise would have at-
racial composition of the Detroit school pop-
tended school together were separated by
ulation or that residential patterns within
acts of the State or its subdivision. How-
Detroit and in the surrounding areas were
ever, segregative acts within the city alone
in any significant measure caused by govern-
cannot be presumed to have produced-and
mental activity. and it follows that the situa-
no factual showing was made that they did
tion over which my dissenting Brothers ex-
produce-an increase in the number of Ne-
press concern cannot serve as the predicate
gro students in the city as a whole. It is
for the remedy adopted by the District
this essential fact of a predominantly Negro
Court and approved by the Court of Ap-
school population in Detroit-caused by m-
peals.
3134
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 758
418
758 Court on the issue of segregation and on
State supervises schoolsite selection.³
760 know
the "Detroit-only" plans of desegrega-
The construction is done through mu-
poore
tion. The Court of Appeals also ap-
nicipal bonds approved by several state
San
proved in principle the use of a metro-
agencies.4 Education in Michigan is a
guez
politan area plan, vacating and remand-
state project with very little completely
Ed:
ing only to allow the other affected
local control,5 except that the schools are
school
school districts to be brought in as par-
financed locally, not on a statewide ba-
way
ties, and in other minor respects.
sis. Indeed the proposal to put school
759
clusi
funding in Michigan on a statewide ba-
Stat
We have before us today no plan for
sis was defeated at the polls in Novem-
pay
integration. The only orders entered so
ber 1972.6 Yet the school districts by
761
far are interlocutory. No new princi-
state law are agencies of the State.⁷
meam
ples of law are presented here. Metro-
State action is indeed challenged as vio-
Equa
politan treatment of metropolitan prob-
lating the Equal Protection Clause.
schöo
lems is commonplace. If this were a
Whatever the reach of that claim may
thou
sewage problem or a water problem, or
be, it certainly is aimed at discrimina-
'sepat
an energy problem, there can be no
tion based on race.
doubt that Michigan would stay well
So
Therefore as the Court of Appeals
within federal constitutional bounds if
held there can be no doubt that as a
it sought a metropolitan remedy. In
from
matter of Michigan law the State it-
Bradley V. School Board of City of Rich-
black
self has the final say as to where and
mond, 4 Cir., 462 F.2d 1058, aff'd by an
cilities
how school district lines should be
equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92, 93 S.
treatm
drawn.8
Ct. 1952, 36 L.Ed.2d 771, we had a case
involving the Virginia school system
When we rule against the metropoli-
trict
where local school boards had "exclusive
tan area remedy we take a step that will
189,7214
jurisdiction" of the problem, not "the
likely put the problems of the blacks
37.DiEd
State Board of Education," 462 F.2d, at
and our society back to the period that
school
1067. Here the Michigan educational
antedated the "separate but equal" re-
ence be
system is unitary, maintained and sup-
gime of Plessy V. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
gation
16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256. The reason
ported by the legislature and under the
is simple.
10
general supervision of the State Board
of Education.1 The State controls the
The inner core of Detroit is now rath-
boundaries of school districts.² The
er solidly black;9 and the blacks, we
1. Mich.Const., Art. S, §§ 2, 3.
8. See 11. 2, supra.
2. See 484 F.2d 215, 247-248: Mich.Comp.
9. A tremendous change has occurred in the
Laws §§ 340.402, 340.431, 340.447, 388.681
distribution of this country's black popula-
(1970).
tion since World War I. See Hauser, Dem-
3. Mich.Comp.Laws § 388,851 (1948), as
ographic Factors in the Integration of the
Call
per
amended by Act 231. Mich.Pub.Acts of 1949,
Negro, Daedalus 847-877 (fall 1965). In
1910. 73% of all blacks lived on farms and in
and Act 175, Mich.Pub.Acts 1962.
rural areas: by 1960. 73% lived in urban
4. See Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 132.1 and 132.2
areas. mainly in the largest metropolitan
(1970) : 3 App. 157.
areas. Moreover, due to the fact that the
Yor
5. See 484 F.2d at 24S-249.
black population is younger than the white
population, the concentration of blacks in the
Great
6. See Detroit Free Press, Nov. 8. 1972. p.
cities is even more pronouneed for the school-
$1,18
1A. col. 3. Michigan has recently passed
age population. The pattern of change which
Stat
legislation which could eliminate some. but
has existed since World War I is continuing.
Final
and hence the proportion of blacks in the
catio
not all. of the inequities in school financing.
furti
See Act 101. Mich.Pub.Acts of 1973.
urban North and West will continue to in-
crease. Dept. of Health. Education. and
rent
7. See 484 F.2d, at 246-247; Mich.Const. Art.
Welfare, J. Coleman et al., Equality of Educa-
tions
distriction
S, §§ 2, 3.
tional Opportunity 39-10 (1966).
418 U.S. 762
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3135
Cite Dt S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
know, in many instances are likely tombe
action for Fourteenth Amendment pur-
poorer, 10 just as were the Chicanos in
poses when it draws the lines that con-
San Antonio School District V. Rodri-
fine it to a given area, when it builds
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.
schools at particular sites, or when it al-
Ed.2d 16. By that decision the poorer
locates students. The creation of the
school districts 11 must pay their own
school districts in Metropolitan Detroit
way. It is therefore a foregone con-
either maintained existing segregation
clusion that we have now given the
or caused additional segregation. Re-
States a formula whereby the poor must
strictive covenants maintained by state
pay their own way. 12
action or inaction build black ghettos.
761 Today's decision, given Rodriguez,
It is state action when public funds are
means that there is no violation of the
dispensed by housing agencies to build
Equal Protection Clause though the
racial ghettos. Where a community is
schools are segregated by race and
racially mixed and school authorities seg-
though the black schools are not only
regate schools, or assign black teachers to
"separate" but "inferior."
black schools or close schools in fringe
areas and build new schools in black areas
So far as equal protection is con-
and in more distant white areas, the State
cerned we are now in a dramatic retreat
creates and nurtures a segregated school
from the 7-to-1 decision in 1896 that
system, just as surely as did those States
blacks could be segregated in public fa-
involved in Brown V. Board of Educa-
cilities, provided they received equal
tion, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.
treatment.
873, when they maintained dual school
As I indicated in Keyes V. School Dis-
systems.
trict No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S.
189, 214-217, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2700-2701,
All these conditions and more were
37 L.Ed.2d 548, there is SO far as the
found by the District Court to exist.
school cases go no constitutional differ-
The issue is not whether there should be
ence between de facto and de jure segre-
racial balance but whether the State's
gation. Each school board performs state
use of various devices that end up with 762
10. There are some definite and systematic
tional need. City students, with greater
directions of difference between the schools
than average education deficiencies. consist-
attended by minorities and those attended by
ently have less money spent on their educa-
the majority. It appears to be in the most
tion and have higher pupil/teacher ratios
academically related areas that the schools
than do their high-income counterparts in
of minority pupils show the most consistent
the favored schools of suburbia." Glickstein
deficiencies." Dept. of Health, Education, and
& Want, Inequality in School Financing:
Welfare. Coleman et al., supra II. 9, at 120.
The Role of the Law, 25 Stan.L.Rev. 335,
11. That some school districts are markedly
338 (1973).
poorer than others is beyond question. The
12. Cities face all especially difficult problem
California Supreme Court has noted that
in paying the cost of education, since they
per-pupil expenditures in two different dis-
have the "municipal overburden" which re-
tricts-both located in the same county-
sults front greater costs for health, public
were $2.223 and $616. Serrano V. Priest, 5
safety, sanitation, public works, transporta-
Cal.3d 584, 600 11. 15 (1971). In New
tion, public welfare, public housing. and rec-
York the Fleischmann Commission report-
reation. Because of municipal overburden,
ed that the two Long Island districts of
cities on the average devote only about 30%
Great Neck and Levittown spent $2,078 and
of their budgets to their schools. This com-
$1.189 respectively per pupil. 1 New York
pares with the over 50% which is spent on
State Commission on the Quality, Cost. and
schools by the suburbs. J. Berke & J. Calla-
Financing of Elementary and Secondary Edu-
han, Inequities in School Finance (1971), re-
cation, Fleischmann Report 58 (1973). "A
printed in Senate Select Committee on Equal
further glaring inequity resulting from the cur-
Educational Opportunity. 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
rent systems of school finance is that varia-
Report on Issnes in School Finance 129, 142
tions in per pupil expenditures among school
(Comm. Print 1972) ; see Glickstein & Want,
districts tend to be inversely related to educa-
supra, 11. 11. at 387.
3136
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 762
black schools and white schools brought
trict and may not reach into adjoining
the Equal Protection Clause into effect.
or surrounding districts unless and until
Given the State's control over the educa-
it is proved there has been some sort of
tional system in Michigan, the fact that
"interdistrict violation"-unless uncon-
the black schools are in one district and
stitutional actions of the Detroit School
the white schools are in another is not
Board have had a segregative impact on
controlling-either constitutionally or
other districts, or unless the segregated
equitably.13 No specific plan has yet
condition of the Detroit schools has it-
been adopted. We are still at an inter-
self been influenced by segregative prac-
locutory stage of a long drawn-out judi-
tices in those surrounding districts into
cial effort at school desegregation. It is
which it is proposed to extend the reme-
conceivable that ghettos develop on their
dy.
own without any hint of state action.
But since Michigan by one device or an-
Regretfully, and for several reasons, I
other has over the years created black
can join neither the Court's judgment
school districts and white school dis-
nor its opinion. The core of my disa-
tricts, the task of equity is to provide a
greement is that deliberate acts of seg-
unitary system for the affected area
regation and their consequences will go
where, as here, the State washes its
unremedied, not because a remedy would
hands of its own creations.
be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of
the usual criteria governing school de-
Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr.
segregation cases, but because an effec-
Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice BREN-
tive remedy would cause what the Court
NAN, and Mr. Justice MARSHALL
considers to be undue administrative in-
join, dissenting.
convenience to the State. The result is
that the State of Michigan, the entity at
The District Court and the Court of
which the Fourteenth Amendment is di-
Appeals found that over a long period of
rected, has successfully insulated itself
years those in charge of the Michigan
from its duty to provide effective deseg-
public schools engaged in various prac-
regation remedies by vesting sufficient
tices calculated to effect the segregation
power over its public schools in its local
of the Detroit school system. The Court
school districts. If this is the case in
does not question these findings, nor
Michigan, it will be the case in most
could it reasonably do so. Neither does
States.
it question the obligation of the federal
courts to devise a feasible and effective
There are undoubted practical as well
remedy. But it promptly cripples the
as legal limits to the remedial powers of
ability of the judiciary to perform this
federal courts in school desegregation
task, which is of fundamental impor-
cases. The Court has made it clear that
tance to our constitutional system, by
the achievement of any particular degree
763 fashioning a strict rule that remedies in
of racial balance in the school system is
school cases must stop at the school dis-
not required by the Constitution nor
764
trict line unless certain other conditions
may it be the primary focus of a court
7653
are met. As applied here, the remedy
in devising an acceptable remedy for de
for unquestioned violations of the pro-
jure segregation. A variety of proce-
tection rights of Detroit's Negroes by
dures and techniques are available to a
the Detroit School Board and the
district court engrossed in fashioning
State of Michigan must be totally con-
remedies in a case such as this; but the
fined to the limits of the school dis-
courts must keep in mind that they are
13. Mr. Justice STEWART indicates that eq-
seem to me that the equities are stronger in
uitable factors weigh in favor of local school
favor of the children of Detroit who have
control and the avoidance of administrative
been deprived of their constitutional right to
difficulty given the lack of an "interdis-
equal treatment by the State of Michigan.
trict" violation. Antc, at 3132. It would
418 U.S. 766
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3137
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
dealing with the process of educating
fiable areas in the city. The 1970 public
the young, including the very young.
school enrollment in the city school dis-
The task is not to devise a system of
trict totaled 289,763 and was 63.6% Ne-
pains and penalties to punish constitut-
gro and 34.8% white.¹ If "racial bal-
tional violations brought to light. Rath-
ance" were achieved in every school in
er, it is to desegregate an educational
the district, each school would be ap-
system in which the races have been
proximately 64% Negro. A remedy con-
kept apart, without, at the same time,
fined to the district could achieve no
losing sight of the central educational
more desegregation. Furthermore, the
function of the schools.
proposed intracity remedies were beset
with practical problems. None of the
Viewed in this light, remedies calling
plans limited to the school district was
for school zoning, pairing, and pupil as-
satisfactory to the District Court. The
signments, become more and more sus-
most promising proposal, submitted by
pect as they require that schoolchildren
respondents, who were the plaintiffs in
spend more and more time in buses
the District Court, would "leave many of
going to and from school and that more
its schools 75 to 90 per cent Black."
and more educational dollars be diverted
484 F.2d 215, 244 (CA6 1973). Trans-
to transportation systems. Manifestly,
portation on a "vast scale" would be
these considerations are of immediate
required; 900 buses would have to be
and urgent concern when the issue is the
purchased for the transportation of pu-
desegregation of a city school system
pils who are not now bused. Id., at
where residential patterns are predomi-
243. The District Court also found that
nantly segregated and the respective
the plan "would change a school system
areas occupied by blacks and whites are
which is now Black and White to one
heavily populated and geographically ex-
that would be perceived as Black, there-
tensive. Thus, if one postulates a met-
by increasing the flight of Whites from
ropolitan school system covering a suffi-
the city and the system, thereby increas-
ciently large area, with the population
ing the Black student population." Id.,
evenly divided between whites and Ne-
at 244. For the District Court, "[t]he
groes and with the races occupying iden-
conclusion, under the evidence in this
tifiable residential areas, there will be
case, is inescapable that relief of segre-
very real practical limits on the extent
to which racially identifiable schools can
gation in the public schools of the City 766
of Detroit cannot be accomplished with-
be eliminated within the school district.
in the corporate geographical limits of
It is also apparent that the larger the
the city." Ibid.
proportion of Negroes in the area, the
more difficult it would be to avoid hav-
ing a substantial number of all-black or
The District Court therefore consid-
nearly all-black schools.
ered extending its remedy to the sub-
urbs. After hearings, it concluded that
The Detroit school district is both
a much more effective desegregation
large and heavily populated. It covers
plan could be implemented if the subur-
765 139.6 square miles, encireles twolentirely
ban districts were included. In proceed-
separate cities and school districts, and
ing to design its plan on the basis that
surrounds a third city on three sides.
student bus rides to and from school
Also, whites and Negroes live in identi-
should not exceed 40 minutes each way
I. The percentage of Negro pupils in the De-
ployees in the Detroit Public Schools, October
troit student population rose to 64.9% in
1972, and October 1973: 484 F.2d 215. 250.
1971, to 67.3% in 1972, and to 69.8% in
1973, amid a metropolitan school population
2. The District Court's ruling on the De-
whose racial composition in 1970 was 81%
troit-only desegregation plans is set out in
white and 19% Negro. 5 App. 16; Racial-
full by the Court of Appeals, id., at 242-
Ethnic Distribution of Students and Em-
245, and is not otherwise officially reported.
3138
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 766
as a general matter, the court's express
(1896)," and "would be opening a way
finding was that "[f]or all the reasons
to nullify Brown V. Board of Education
stated heretofore-including time, dis-
which overruled Plessy.
tance, and transportation factors-de-
484 F.2d, at 249.
segregation within the area described is
physically easier and more practicable
This Court now reverses the Court of
and feasible, than desegregation efforts
Appeals. It does not question the Dis-
limited to the corporate geographic lim-
trict Court's findings that any feasible
its of the city of Detroit." 345 F.Supp.
Detroit-only plan would leave many
914, 930 (ED Mich.1972).
schools 75 to 90 percent black and that
the district would become progressively
The Court of Appeals agreed with the
more black as whites left the city. Nei-
District Court that the remedy must ex-
ther does the Court suggest that includ-
tend beyond the city limits of Detroit. It
ing the suburbs in a desegregation plan
concluded that "[i]n the instant case the
would be impractical or infeasible be-
only feasible desegregation plan involves
cause of educational considerations, be-
the crossing of the boundary lines be-
cause of the number of children requir-
tween the Detroit School District and
ing transportation, or because of the
adjacent or nearby school districts for
length of their rides. Indeed, the Court
the limited purpose of providing an ef-
leaves unchallenged the District Court's
fective desegregation plan." 484 F.2d,
conclusion that a plan including the sub-
at 249. (Emphasis added.) It also
urbs would be physically easier and
agreed that "any Detroit only desegre-
more practical and feasible than a De-
gation plan will lead directly to a single
troit-only plan. Whereas the most
segregated Detroit school district over-
promising Detroit-only plan, for exam-
whelmingly black in all of its schools,
ple, would have entailed the purchase of
surrounded by a ring of suburbs and
900 buses, the metropolitan plan would
suburban school districts overwhelming-
involve the acquisition of no more than
ly white in composition in a State in
350 new vehicles.
which the racial composition is 87 per
cent white and 13 per cent black." Ibid.
Despite the fact that a metropolitan
1769
There was "more than ample support for
remedy, if the findings of the District
the District Judge's findings of uncon-
Court accepted by the Court of Appeals
stitutional segregation by race resulting
are to be credited, would more effective-
in major part from action and inaction
ly desegregate the Detroit schools, would
of public authorities, both local and
prevent resegregation,3 and would be
State.
Under this record a re-
easier and more feasible from many
medial order of a court of equity which
standpoints, the Court fashions out of 768
left the Detroit school system over-
whole cloth an arbitrary rule that reme-
767 whelmingly black (for the foreseeable
dies for constitutional violations occur-
future) surrounded by suburban school
ring in a single Michigan school district
systems overwhelmingly white cannot
must stop at the school district line.
correct the constitutional violations
Apparently, no matter how much less
herein found." Id., at 250. To conclude
burdensome or more effective and effi-
otherwise, the Court of Appeals an-
cient in many respects, such as transpor-
nounced, would call up "haunting mémo-
tation, the metropolitan plan might be,
ries of the now long overruled and dis-
the school district line may not be
credited 'separate but equal doctrine' of
crossed. Otherwise, it seems, there
Plessy V. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 [16 S.
would be too much disruption of the
Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256]
Michigan scheme for managing its edu-
3. The Court has previously disapproved the
Monroe V. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S.
implementation of proposed desegregation
450, 459-460. SS S.Ct. 1700, 1705, 20 L.Ed.
plans which operate to permit resegregation.
2d 733 (1968), ("free transfer" plan).
418 U.S. 770
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3139
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
cational system, too much confusion, and
undue difficulties for the State in the
too much administrative burden.
management of its public schools. In
The District Court, on the scene and
the area of what constitutes an accepta-
familiar with local conditions, had a
ble desegregation plan, "we must of ne-
wholly different view. The Court of
cessity rely to a large extent, as this
Appeals also addressed itself at length
Court has for more than 16 years, on
to matters of local law and to the prob-
the informed judgment of the district
courts in the first instance and on
lems that interdistrict remedies might
present to the State of Michigan. Its
courts of appeals." Swann V. Char-
conclusion, flatly contrary to that of this
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
Court, was that "the constitutional right
402 U.S. 1, 28, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1282, 28
to equality before the law [is not]
L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Obviously, what-
hemmed in by the boundaries of a school
ever difficulties there might be, they are
district" and that an interdistrict reme-
surmountable; for the Court itself con-
dy
cedes that, had there been sufficient evi-
dence of an interdistrict violation, the
"is supported by the status of school
District Court could have fashioned a
districts under Michigan law and by
single remedy for the districts implicat-
the historical control exercised over
ed rather than a different remedy for
local school districts by the legislature
each district in which the violation had 770
of Michigan and by State agencies
occurred or had an impact.
and officials
[I]t is well
established under the Constitution and
I am even more mystified as to how the
laws of Michigan that the public
Court can ignore the legal reality that
school system is a State function and
the constitutional violations, even if oc-
that local school districts are instru-
curring locally, were committed by gov-
ernmental entities for which the State is
mentalities of the State created for
administrative convenience." 484
responsible and that it is the State that
F.2d, at 245-246.
must respond to the command of the
Fourteenth Amendment. An interdis-
769 I am surprised that the Court, sitting
trict remedy for the infringements that
at this distance from the State of Michi-
occurred in this case is well within the
gan, claims better insight than the
confines and powers of the State, which
Court of Appeals and the District Court
is the governmental entity ultimately re-
as to whether an interdistrict remedy
sponsible for desegregating its schools.
for equal protection violations practiced
The Michigan Supreme Court has ob-
by the State of Michigan would involve
served that "[t]he school district is a
4. The Court of Appeals also noted several
segregation plan by the Detroit Board of
specific instances of school district mergers
Education as evidencing state control over
ordered by the State Board of Education for
local school district affairs. Ibid. Finally,
financial reasons. 484 F.2d, at 247. Liini-
it is also relevant to note that the District
tations on the authority of local school dis-
Court found that the school district bounda-
triets were also outlined by the Court of
ries in that segment of the metropolitan area
Appeals:
preliminarily designated as the desegregation
"Local school districts, unless they have
area "in general bear no relationship to oth-
the approval of the State Board of Educa-
er municipal, county, or special district gov-
tion or the Superintendent of Public Instrue-
ernments, needs or services," that some edu-
tion. cannot consolidate with another school
cational services are already provided to stu-
district, annex territory. divide or attach
dents on an interdistrict basis requiring
parts of other districts, borrow monies in an-
their travel from one district to another, and
ticipation of State aid, or construct, recon-
that local communities in the metropolitan
struet or remodel school buildings or addi-
area share nonedneational interests in com-
tions to them." Id., at 249. (Footnotes and
mon, which do not adhere to school district
supporting statutory citations omitted.)
lines, and have applied metropolitan solu-
And the Court of Appeals properly consid-
tions to other governmental needs. 345 F.
cred the State's statutory attempt to undo
Supp. 914, 934-935 (E.D.Mich:1972).
the adoption of a voluntary high school de-
3140
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 770
State agency," Attorney General ex) rel.
troit Board of Education, a local instru-
Kies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.
mentality of the State, violated the con-
W. 289, 290 (1902), and that '[e]duca-
stitutional rights of the Negro students
tion in Michigan belongs to the State.
in Detroit's public schools and required
It is no part of the local self-government
equitable relief sufficient to accomplish
inherent in the township or municipality,
the maximum, practical desegregation
except so far as the legislature may
within the power of the political body
choose to make it such. The Constitu-
against which the Fourteenth Amend-
tion has turned the whole subject over
ment directs its proscriptions. No
to the legislature.
Attor-
"State" may deny any individual the
ney General ex rel. Lacharias v. Detroit
equal protection of the laws; and if the
Board of Education, 154 Mich. 584, 590,
Constitution and the Supremacy Clause
118 N.W. 606, 609 (1908).
are to have any substance at all, the
courts must be free to devise workable
It is unnecessary to catalogue at
remedies against the political entity with
length the various public misdeeds found
the effective power to determine local
by the District Court and the Court of
choice. It is also the case here that the
Appeals to have contributed to the
State's legislative interdiction of De-
present segregation of the Detroit public
troit's voluntary effort to desegregate its
schools. The legislature contributed di-
school system was unconstitutional. See
rectly by enacting a statute overriding a
North Carolina State Board of Education
no
partial high school desegregation plan
V. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 28
Cou
voluntarily adopted by the Detroit Board
L.Ed.2d 586 (1971).
of Education. Indirectly, the trial court
found the State was accountable for the
The Court draws the remedial line at
tem
thinly disguised, pervasive acts of segre-
the Detroit school district boundary,
gation committed by the Detroit Board,5
even though the Fourteenth Amendment
tions
771
for Detroit's school construction plans
is addressed to the State and even though
that would promote segregation, and for
the State denies equal protection of the
772
with
the Detroit school district's not having
laws when its public agencies, acting in
of
funds for pupil transportation within
its behalf, invidiously discriminate. The
S.G
the district. The State was also charge-
State's default is "the condition that of-
able with responsibility for the trans-
fends the Constitution," Swann V. Char-
portation of Negro high school students
773
cour
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
rem
in the late 1950's from the suburban
supra, 402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct. at 1277,
Ferndale School District, past closer sub-
and state officials may therefore be
the
urban and Detroit high schools with pre-
ordered to take the necessary measures
dominantly white student bodies, to a
to completely eliminate from the Detroit
int
predominantly Negro high school within
public schools "all vestiges of state-im-
of
Detroit. Swann V. Charlotte-Mecklen-
posed segregation." Id., at 15, 91 S.Ct.
lic
burg Board of Education, supra, 402 U.
at 1275. I cannot understand, nor does
S., at 20-21, 91 S.Ct. at 1278, and Keyes
the majority satisfactorily explain, why
756
V. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo-
a federal court may not order an appro-
was
rado, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.
priate interdistrict remedy, if this is nec-
Ed.2d 548 (1973), make abundantly
essary or more effective to accomplish
sis
clear that the tactics employed by the De-
this constitutionally mandated task. As
of
5. These included the creation and alteration
schools, the use of optional attendance areas
unlas
of attendance zones and feeder patterns
in neighborhoods in which Negro families
from the elementary to the secondary
had recently begun to settle to permit white
on
schools in a manner naturally and predicta-
students to transfer to predominantly white
of
bly perpetuating racial segregation of stu-
schools nearer the city limits, and the con-
Brown
dents, the transportation of Negro students
struction of schools in the heart of residen-
bility
beyond predominantly white schools with
tially segregated areas, thereby maximizing
available space to predominantly Negro
school segregation.
segre
418 U.S. 774
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3141
Cite as It S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
the Court unanimously observed in
tive effect which the condition of segre-
Swann: "Once a right and a violation
gation in one school district might have
have been shown, the scope of a district
had on the schools of a neighboring dis-
court's equitable powers to remedy past
trict. The same situation obtains here
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexi-
and the same remedial power is available
bility are inherent in equitable rem-
to the District Court.
edies." Ibid. In this case, both the
Later cases reinforced the clearly es-
right and the State's Fourteenth Amend-
sential rules that state officials are fully
ment violation have concededly been
answerable for unlawfully caused condi-
fully established, and there is no ac-
tions of school segregation which can ef-
ceptable reason for permitting the party
fectively be controlled only by steps be-
responsible for the constitutional viola-
yond the authority of local school dis-
tion to contain the remedial powers of
tricts to take, and that the equity power
the federal court within administrative
of the district courts includes the ability
boundaries over which the transgressor
to order such measures implemented.
itself has plenary power.
When the highest officials of the State
The unwavering decisions of this
of Arkansas impeded a federal court or-
Court over the past 20 years support the
der to desegregate the public schools un-
assumption of the Court of Appeals that
der the immediate jurisdiction of the
the District Court's remedial power does
Little Rock School Board, this Court
not cease at the school district line. The
refused to accept the local board's asser-
Court's first formulation of the remedial
tion of its good faith as a legal excuse
principles to be followed in disestablish-
for delay in implementing the desegre-
ing racially discriminatory school sys-
gation order. The Court emphasized
tems recognized the variety of problems
that "from the point of view of the
arising from different local school condi-
Fourteenth Amendment, they [the local
tions and the necessity for that "practi-
school board members] stand in this liti-
cal flexibility" traditionally associated
gation as the agents of the State." Coop-
with courts of equity. Brown V. Board
er V. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16, 78 S.Ct. 1401,
of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299-301, 75
1408, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958). Perhaps 774
S.Ct. 753, 755-756, 99 L.Ed. 1083,
more importantly for present purposes,
(1955) (Brown II). Indeed, the district
the Court went on to state:
1773 courts to which the Brown cases were
"The record before us clearly estab-
remanded for the formulation of remedial
lishes that the growth of the Board's
decrees were specifically instructed that
difficulties to a magnitude beyond its
they might consider, inter alia, "revision
unaided power to control is the prod-
of school districts and attendance areas
uct of state action. Those difficulties
into compact units to achieve a system
can also be brought under con-
of determining admission to the pub-
trol by state action." Ibid.
lic schools on a nonracial basis
Id., at 300-301, 75 S.Ct. at
See also Griffin V. School Board, 377
756. The malady addressed in Brown II
U.S. 218, 228, 233-234, 84 S.Ct. 1226,
was the statewide policy of requiring or
1231, 1234-1235, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964).
permitting school segregation on the ba-
In the context of dual school systems,
sis of race, while the record here con-
the Court subsequently made clear the
cerns segregated schools only in the city
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps
of Detroit. The obligation to rectify the
might be necessary to convert to a uni-
unlawful condition nevertheless rests
tary system in which racial discrimina-
on the State. The permissible revision
tion would be eliminated root and
of school districts contemplated in
branch" and to come forward with a de-
Brown II rested on the State's responsi-
segregation plan that "promises realisti-
bility for desegregating its unlawfully
cally to work now." Green V. County
segregated schools, not on any segrega-
School Board of New Kent County, 391
3142
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 774
418TH
U.S. 430, 437-438, 439, 88 S.Ct. 1689,
at 1281. Nor was there any dispute
creat
1694, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). "Freedom
that to break up the dual school system,
ina
of choice" plans were rejected as ac-
it was within the District Court's
pro
ceptable desegregation measures where
"broad remedial powers" to employ a
ten
"reasonably available other ways
"frank-and sometimes drastic-gerry-
men
promising speedier and more effective
mandering of school districts and at-
the
conversion to a unitary, nonracial school
tendance zones," as well as "pairing,
sch
system
exist. Id., at 441, 88 S.
'clustering,' or 'grouping' of schools," to
tan
Ct., at 1696. Imperative insistence on
desegregate the "formerly all-Negro
immediate full desegregation of dual
schools," despite the fact that these
of
school systems "to operate now and here-
zones might not be compact or contig-
after only unitary schools" was reiterated
coul
uous and might be "on opposite ends of
men
in Alexander V. Holmes County Board of
the city." Id., at 27, 91 S.Ct. at 1282.
Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20, 90 S.Ct. 29, 24
exter
The school board in that case had juris-
L.Ed.2d 19 (1969), and Carter V. West
sive
diction over a 550-square-mile area en-
Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S.
the
compassing the city of Charlotte and sur-
dese
290, 90 S.Ct. 608, 24 L.Ed.2d 477
rounding Mecklenburg County, North
tati
(1970).
Carolina. The Mobile County, Alabama,
era
The breadth of the equitable authority
board in Davis embraced a 1,248-square-
had
of the district courts to accomplish these
mile area, including the city of Mobile.
fect
comprehensive tasks was reaffirmed in
Yet the Court approved the District
Amer
much greater detail in Swann V. Char-
Court's authority to award countywide
or
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
relief in each case in order to accomplish
cated
supra, and the companion case of Davis
desegregation of the dual school system.
the
V. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402
U.S. 33, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 28 L.Ed.2d 577
Even more recently, the Court specifi-
dise
cally rejected the claim that a new
Unti
(1971), where there was unanimous as-
sent to the following propositions:
school district, which admittedly would
to
operate a unitary school system within
777
ing
"Having once found a violation, the
its borders, was beyond the reach of a
cessi
district judge or school authorities
haza
court-ordered desegregation plan for
776
775
should make every effort to achieve
other school districts, where the effec-
dren
the greatest possible degree of actual
the
tiveness of the plan as to the other dis-
desegregation, taking into account the
the
tricts depended upon the availability of
practicalities of the situation. A dis-
the facilities and student population of
pell
trict court may and should consider
the
the new district. In Wright V. Council
the use of all available techniques in-
tio
of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 470,
cluding restructuring of attendance
87
92 S.Ct. 2196, 2207, 33 L.Ed.2d 51
zones and both contiguous and noncon-
th
(1972), we held "that a new school dis-
tiguous attendance zones.
trict may not be created where its effect
The measure of any desegregation
lik
would be to impede the process of dis-
plan is its effectiveness." Id., at 37,
SC
mantling a dual system." Mr. Justice
91 S.Ct. at 1292.
th
Stewart's opinion for the Court made
No suggestion was made that interdis-
del
clear that if a proposal to erect new dis-
trict relief was not an available tech-
stat
trict boundary lines "would impede the
nique. In Swann V. Charlotte-Mecklen-
par
dismantling of the [pre-existing] dual
burg Board of Education itself, the
pro
system, then a district court, in the ex-
Court, without dissent, recognized that
to
ercise of its remedial discretion, may en-
dual
the District Judge, in fulfilling his obli-
join it from being carried out." Id., at
less
gation to "make every effort to achieve
460, 92 S.Ct. at 2203. In United States
for
the greatest possible degree of actual de-
V. Scotland Neck Board of Education,
segregation[,] will thus necessarily be
407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214, 33 L.Ed.
ence
concerned with the elimination of one-
2d 75 (1972), this same standard was
latte
race schools." 402 U.S., at 26, 91 S.Ct.,
applied to forbid North Carolina from
418 U.S. 778
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3143
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
creating a new city school district with-
The result reached by the Court cer-
in a larger district which was in the
tainly cannot be supported by the theory
process of dismantling a dual school sys-
that the configuration of local govern-
tem. The Court noted that if establish-
mental units is immune from alteration
ment of the new district were permitted,
when necessary to redress constitutional
the "traditional racial identities of the
violations. In addition to the well-estab-
schools in the area would be main-
lished principles already noted, the
tained," id., at 490, 92 S.Ct., at 2717.
Court has elsewhere required the public
bodies of a State to restructure the
Until today, the permissible contours
State's political subdivisions to remedy
of the equitable authority of the district
infringements of the constitutional
courts to remedy the unlawful establish-
rights of certain members of its popu-
ment of a dual school system have been
lace, notably in the reapportionment cas-
extensive, adaptable, and fully respon-
es. In Reynolds V. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
sive to the ultimate goal of achieving
84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964),
"the greatest possible degree of actual
for example, which held that equal pro-
desegregation." There are indeed limi-
tection of the laws demands that the
tations on the equity powers of the fed-
seats in both houses of a bicameral state
eral judiciary, but until now the Court
legislature be apportioned on a popula-
had not accepted the proposition that ef-
tion basis, thus necessitating wholesale
fective enforcement of the Fourteenth
revision of Alabama's voting districts,
Amendment could be limited by political
the Court remarked:
or administrative boundary lines demar-
"Political subdivisions of States—
cated by the very State responsible for
the constitutional violation and for the
counties, cities, or whatever-never
were and never have been considered 778
disestablishment of the dual system.
Until now the Court has instead looked
as sovereign entities. Rather, they
have been traditionally regarded as
to practical considerations in effectuat-
subordinate governmental instrumen-
1777 ing a desegregation decree, such as ex-
talities created by the State to assist
cessive distance, transportation time, and
hazards to the safety of the schoolchil-
in the carrying out of state govern-
mental functions." Id., at 575, 84 S.
dren involved in a proposed plan. That
these broad principles have developed in
Ct., at 1389.
the context of dual school systems com-
And even more pointedly, the Court de-
pelled or authorized by state statute at
clared in Gomillion V. Lightfoot, 364 U.
the time of Brown V. Board of Educa-
S. 339, 344-345, 81 S.Ct. 125, 129, 5 L.
tion, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.
Ed.2d 110 (1960), that [l]egislative
873 (1954) (Brown I), does not lessen
control of municipalities, no less than
their current applicability to dual sys-
other state power, lies within the scope
tems found to exist in other contexts,
of relevant limitations imposed by the
like that in Detroit, where intentional
United States Constitution.
school segregation does not stem from
Nor does the Court's conclusion follow
the compulsion of state law, but from
from the talismanic invocation of the de-
deliberate individual actions of local and
sirability of local control over education.
state school authorities directed at a
Local autonomy over school affairs, in
particular school system. The majority
the sense of the community's participa-
properly does not suggest that the duty
tion in the decisions affecting the educa-
to eradicate completely the resulting
tion of its children, is, of course, an im-
dual system in the latter context is any
portant interest. But presently consti-
less than in the former. But its reason
tuted school district lines do not delimit
for incapacitating the remedial authori-
fixed and unchangeable areas of a local
ty of the federal judiciary in the pres-
educational community. If restructur-
ence of school district perimeters in the
ing is required to meet constitutional re-
latter context is not readily apparent.
quirements, local authority may simply
3144
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 778
be redefined in terms of whatever con-
groes and whites would have been going
figuration is adopted, with the parents
to school together. There would have
of the children attending schools in the
been no, or at least not as many, recog-
newly demarcated district or attendance
nizable Negro schools and no, or at least
zone continuing their participation in
not as many, white schools, but "just
the policy management of the schools
schools," and neither Negroes nor whites
with which they are concerned most di-
would have suffered from the effects of
rectly. The majority's suggestion that
segregated education, with all its short-
judges should not attempt to grapple
comings. Surely the Court's remedy
with the administrative problems attend-
will not restore to the Negro community,
ant on a reorganization of school attend-
stigmatized as it was by the dual school
ance patterns is wholly without founda-
system, what it would have enjoyed over
tion. It is precisely this sort of task
all or most of this period if the remedy
which the district courts have been
is confined to present-day Detroit; for
properly exercising to vindicate the con-
the maximum remedy available within
stitutional rights of Negro students
that area will leave many of the schools
since Brown I and which the Court has
almost totally black, and the system it-
never suggested they lack the capacity
self will be predominantly black and will
to perform. Intradistrict revisions of
become increasingly so. Moreover, when
781
attendance zones, and pairing and
a State has engaged in acts of official
grouping of schools, are techniques
segregation over a lengthy period of
780
unanimously approved in Swann V. Char-
time, as in the case before us, it is un-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
realistic to suppose that the children
779 which entail the same sensitivity to the
who were victims of the State's uncon-
interest of parents in the education their
stitutional conduct could now be pro-
children receive as would an interdis-
vided the benefits of which they were
trict plan which is likely to employ the
wrongfully deprived. Nor can the bene-
obli
very same methods. There is no reason
fits which accrue to school systems in
to suppose that the District Court,
which schoolchildren have not been of-
which has not yet adopted a final plan
ficially segregated, and to the communi-
of desegregation, would not be as capa-
ties supporting such school systems, be
ble of giving or as likely to give sufficient
fully and immediately restored after a
weight to the interest in community par-
substantial period of unlawful segrega-
ticipation in schools in an interdistrict
tion. The education of children of dif-
setting, consistent with the dictates of
ferent races in a desegregated environ-
the Fourteenth Amendment. The ma-
ment has unhappily been lost, along with
jority's assumption that the District
the social, economic, and political advan-
Court would act otherwise is a radical
tages which accompany a desegregated
departure from the practical flexibility
school system as compared with an un-
previously left to the equity powers of
constitutionally segregated system. It is
the federal judiciary.
for these reasons that the Court has con-
sistently followed the course of requir-
Finally, I remain wholly unpersuaded
ing the effects of past official segrega-
by the Court's assertion that "the reme-
tion to be eliminated "root and branch"
dy is necessarily designed, as all reme-
by imposing, in the present, the duty to
dies are, to restore the victims of dis-
provide a remedy which will achieve
criminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of
"the greatest possible degree of actual
such conduct." Ante, p. 3128. In the
desegregation, taking into account the
first place, under this premise the
practicalities of the situation." It is
App
Court's judgment is itself infirm; for
also for these reasons that once a consti-
had the Detroit school system not fol-
tutional violation has been found, the
ties
lowed an official policy of segregation
district judge obligated to provide such
the
throughout the 1950's and 1960's, Ne-
a remedy "will thus necessarily be con-
ban
418 U.S. 782
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3145
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
cerned with the elimination of one-race
I am therefore constrained to record
schools." These concerns were properly
my disagreement and dissent.
taken into account by the District Judge
in this case. Confining the remedy to
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom
the boundaries of the Detroit district is
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice
quite unrelated either to the goal of
BRENNAN, and Mr. Justice WHITE
achieving maximum desegregation or to
join, dissenting.
those intensely practical considerations,
In Brown V. Board of Education, 347
such as the extent and expense of trans-
U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873
portation, that have imposed limits on
(1954), this Court held that segregation
remedies in cases such as this. The
of children in public schools on the basis
Court's remedy, in the end, is essentially
of race deprives minority group children
arbitrary and will leave serious viola-
of equal educational opportunities and
tions of the Constitution substantially
therefore denies them the equal protec-
unremedied.
tion of the laws under the Fourteenth
782
Amendment. This Court recognized
I agree with my Brother DOUGLAS
then that remedying decades of segrega-
that the Court of Appeals has acted re-
tion in public education would not be an
sponsibly in these cases. Regretably,
easy task. Subsequent events, unfortu-
the majority's arbitrary limitation on
nately, have seen that prediction bear
the equitable power of federal district
bitter fruit. But however imbedded old
courts, based on the invisible borders of
ways, however ingrained old prejudices,
local school districts, is unrelated to the
this Court has not been diverted from
State's responsibility for remedying the
its appointed task of making "a living
constitutional wrongs visited upon the
truth" of our constitutional ideal of
Negro schoolchildren of Detroit. It is
equal justice under law. Cooper v. Aar-
oblivious to the potential benefits of
on, 358 U.S. 1, 20, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1410, 3
metropolitan relief, to the noneducation-
L.Ed.2d 5 (1958).
al communities of interest among neigh-
After 20 years of small, often diffi-
borhoods located in and sometimes
cult steps toward that great end, the
bridging different school districts, and
Court today takes a giant step back-
to the considerable interdistrict coopera-
wards. Notwithstanding a record show-
tion already existing in various educa-
ing widespread and pervasive racial seg-
tional areas. Ultimately, it is unrespon-
regation in the educational system pro-
sive to the goal of attaining the utmost
vided by the State of Michigan for chil-
actual desegregation consistent with re-
dren in Detroit, this Court holds that
straints of practicability and thus au-
the District Court was powerless to re-
gurs the frequent frustration of the re-
quire the State to remedy its constitu-
medial powers of the federal courts.
tional violation in any meaningful fash-
Here the District Court will be forced
ion. Ironically purporting to base its
to impose an intracity desegregation
result on the principle that the scope of
plan more expensive to the district, more
the remedy in a desegregation case
burdensome for many of Detroit's Ne-
should be determined by the nature and
gro students, and surely more conducive
the extent of the constitutional violation,
to white flight than a metropolitan plan
the Court's answer is to provide no rem-
would be-all of this merely to avoid
edy at all for the violation proved in this
what the Detroit School Board, the Dis-
case, thereby guaranteeing that Negro
trict Court, and the en banc Court of
children in Detroit will receive the same
Appeals considered to be the very man-
separate and inherently unequal educa-
ageable and quite surmountable difficul-
tion in the future as they have been un-
ties that would be involved in extending
constitutionally afforded in the past.
the desegregation remedy to the subur-
I cannot subscribe to this emascula-
ban school districts.
tion of our constitutional guarantee of
3146
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 782
418AT
equal protection of the laws and must
schools, a remedy which has been de-
the
respectfully dissent. Our precedents, in
layed since 1970." Ante, at 3131.
in
my view, firmly establish that where, as
The majority, however, seems to have
seg
here, state-imposed segregation has been
forgotten the District Court's explicit
demonstrated, it becomes the duty of the
finding that a Detroit-only decree, the
785
is
State to eliminate root and branch all
only remedy permitted under today's de-
tee
vestiges of racial discrimination and to
cision, "would not accomplish desegrega-
of
achieve the greatest possible degree of
tion."
den
actual desegregation. I agree with both
the District Court and the Court of Ap-
Nowhere in the Court's opinion does
784
Se
peals that, under the facts of this case,
the majority confront, let alone respond
D
this duty cannot be fulfilled unless the
to, the District Court's conclusion that a
268
remedy limited to the city of Detroit
bat
783
Statejof Michigan involves outlying met-
ropolitan area school districts in its de-
would not effectively desegregate the
tial
segregation remedy. Furthermore, I
Detroit city schools. I, for one, find the
whi
perceive no basis either in law or in the
District Court's conclusion well support-
atte
practicalities of the situation justifying
ed by the record and its analysis com-
miz
the State's interposition of school dis-
pelled by our prior cases. Before turn-
scho
trict boundaries as absolute barriers to
ing to these questions, however, it is
zone
the implementation of an effective de-
best to begin by laying to rest some mis-
der
segregation remedy. Under established
characterizations in the Court's opinion
whit
and frequently used Michigan proce-
with respect to the basis for the District
tion
dures, school district lines are both flex-
Court's decision to impose a metropoli-
crov
ible and permeable for a wide variety of
tan remedy.
awa
purposes, and there is no reason why
availa
The Court maintains that while the
they must now stand in the way of mean-
school
initial focus of this lawsuit was the con-
ingful desegregation relief.
school
dition of segregation within the Detroit
tained
The rights at issue in this case are
city schools, the District Court abruptly
seeat
too fundamental to be abridged on
shifted focus in mid-course and altered
gro
grounds as superficial as those relied on
its theory of the case. This new theory,
School
by the majority today. We deal here
in the majority's words, was "equating
tion
with the right of all of our children,
racial imbalance with a constitutional vi-
the
whatever their race, to an equal start in
olation calling for a remedy." Ante, at
one
life and to an equal opportunity to reach
3125, n. 19. As the following review of
iden
their full potential as citizens. Those
the District Court's handling of the case
child
children who have been denied that
demonstrates, however, the majority's
tor
right in the past deserve better than to
characterization is totally inaccurate.
gro
see fences thrown up to deny them that
Nowhere did the District Court indicate
reced
right in the future. Our Nation, I fear,
that racial imbalance between school dis-
will be ill served by the Court's refusal
tricts in the Detroit metropolitan area or
to remedy separate and unequal educa-
within the Detroit School District consti-
Cour
tion, for unless our children begin to
tuted constitutional violation calling for
a
learn together, there is little hope that
interdistrict relief. The focus of this
not
our people will ever learn to live togeth-
case was from the beginning, and has re-
ther
er.
mained, the segregated system of educa-
school
I
tion in the Detroit city schools and the
school
steps necessary to cure that condition
is
The great irony of the Court's opinion
which offends the Fourteenth Amend-
affective
and, in my view, its most serious analyt-
ment.
student
ical flaw may be gleaned from its con-
The District Court's consideration of
ties
cluding sentence, in which the Court re-
mands for "prompt formulation of a de-
this case began with its finding, which
cree directed to eliminating the segre-
the majority accepts, that the State of
S.C.
lation
gation found to exist in Detroit city
Michigan, through its instrumentality,
418 U.S. 786
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3147
Cite as 9KS.Ct. 3112 (1974)
the Detroit Board of Education, engaged
facto racial imbalance, but rather the
in widespread purposeful acts of racial
purposeful, intentional, massive, de jure
segregation in the Detroit School Dis-
segregation of the Detroit city schools,
trict. Without belaboring the details, it
which under our decision in Keyes, 786
785
is sufficient to note that the various
forms "a predicate for a finding of the
techniques used in Detroit were typical
existence of a dual school system," ibid.,
of methods employed to segregate stu-
93 S.Ct., at 2694, and justifies "all-out
dents by race in areas where no statuto-
desegregation." Id., at 214, 93 S.Ct.,
ry dual system of education has existed.
at 2700.
See, e. g., Keyes V. School District No. 1,
Having found a de jure segregated
Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct.
public school system in operation in the
2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973). Exacer-
city of Detroit, the District Court
bating the effects of extensive residen-
turned next to consider which officials
tial segregation between Negroes and
and agencies should be assigned the af-
whites, the school board consciously drew
firmative obligation to cure the constitu-
attendance zones along lines which maxi-
tional violation. The court concluded
mized the segregation of the races in
that responsibility for the segregation in
schools as well. Optional attendance
the Detroit city schools rested not only
zones were created for neighborhoods un-
with the Detroit Board of Education,
dergoing racial transition SO as to allow
but belonged to the State of Michigan
whites in these areas to escape integra-
itself and the state defendants in this
tion. Negro students in areas with over-
case-that is, the Governor of Michigan,
crowded schools were transported past or
the Attorney General, the State Board
away from closer white schools with
of Education, and the State Superin-
available space to more distant Negro
tendent of Public Instruction. While
schools. Grade structures and feeder-
the validity of this conclusion will merit
school patterns were created and main-
more extensive analysis below, suffice it
tained in a manner which had the fore-
for now to say that it was based on
seeable and actual effect of keeping Ne-
three considerations. First, the evi-
gro and white pupils in separate schools.
dence at trial showed that the State it-
Schools were also constructed in loca-
self had taken actions contributing to
tions and in sizes which ensured that
the segregation within the Detroit
they would open with predominantly
schools. Second, since the Detroit Board
one-race student bodies. In sum, the ev-
of Education was an agency of the State
idence adduced below showed that Negro
of Michigan, its acts of racial discrimi-
children had been intentionally confined
nation were acts of the State for pur-
to an expanding core of virtually all-Ne-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
gro schools immediately surrounded by a
Finally, the District Court found that
receding band of all-white schools.
under Michigan law and practice, the
system of education was in fact a state
Contrary to the suggestions in the
Court's opinion, the basis for affording
school system, characterized by relative-
ly little local control and a large degree
a desegregation remedy in this case was
of centralized state regulation, with re-.
not some perceived racial imbalance ei-
ther between schools within a single
spect to both educational policy and the
school district or between independent
structure and operation of school dis-
tricts.
school districts. What we confront here
is "a systematic program of segregation
Having concluded, then, that the
affecting a substantial portion of the
school system in the city of Detroit was
students, schools
and facili-
a de jure segregated system and that the
ties within the school system
State of Michigan had the affirmative
Id., 413 U.S., at 201, 93
duty to remedy that condition of segre-
S.Ct., at 2694. The constitutional vio-
gation, the District Court then turned to
lation found here was not some de
the difficult task of devising an effec-
3148
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 786
tive remedy. It bears repeating that the
concluded that it "must look beyond the
District Court's focus at this stage of
limits of the Detroit school district for a
1787
the litigation remained what it had|been
solution to the problem of segregation in
at the beginning-the condition of seg-
the Detroit public schools
regation within the Detroit city schools.
In seeking to define the appropriate
As the District Court stated: "From
scope of that expanded desegregation
the initial ruling [on segregation] to
area, however, the District Court contin-
this day, the basis of the proceedings
ued to maintain as its sole focus the con-
has been and remains the violation: de
dition shown to violate the Constitution.
jure school segregation.
The
in this case-the segregation of the De-
task before this court, therefore, is now,
troit school system. As it stated, the
and
has always been, how to de-
primary question "remains the determi-
segregate the Detroit public schools."
nation of the area necessary and practic-
The District Court first considered
able effectively to eliminate 'root and
three desegregation plans limited to the
branch' the effects of state-imposed and
geographical boundaries of the city of
supported segregation and to desegre-
Detroit. All were rejected as ineffective
gate the Detroit public schools."
to desegregate the Detroit city schools.
There is simply no foundation in the
Specifically, the District Court deter-
record, then, for the majority's accusa-
mined that the racial composition of the
tion that the only basis for the District
Detroit student body is such that imple-
Court's order was some desire to achieve
mentation of any Detroit-only plan
a racial balance in the Detroit metropoli-
"would clearly make the entire Detroit
tan area.¹ In fact, just the contrary is
public school system racially identifiable
the case. In considering proposed de-
as Black" and would "leave many of its
segregation areas, the District Court
schools 75 to 90 per cent Black." The
had occasion to criticize one of the
District Court also found that a De-
State's proposals specifically because it
troit-only plan "would change a school
had no basis other than its "particular
system which is now Black and White to
racial ratio" and did not focus on "rele-
one that would be perceived as Black,
vant factors, like eliminating racially
thereby increasing the flight of Whites
identifiable schools [and] accomplishing
from the city and the system, thereby in-
maximum actual desegregation of the
creasing the Black student population."
Detroit public schools." Similarly, in
Based on these findings, the District
rejecting the Detroit School Board's pro-
Court reasoned that "relief of segrega-
posed desegregation area, even though it
tion in the public schools of the City of
included more all-white districts and
Detroit cannot be accomplished within
therefore achieved a higher white-Negro
the corporate geographical limits of the
ratio, the District Court commented:
city" because a Detroit-only decree
"There is nothing in the record which
"would accentuate the racial identifiabil-
suggests that these districts need be
ity of the district as a Black school sys-
included in the desegregation area in
tem, and would not accomplish desegre-
order to disestablish the racial identi-
gation." The District Court therefore
fiability of the Detroit public schools.
1. Contrary to the Court's characterization,
deviate from a pure mathematical approach.
the use of racial ratios in this case in no
Indeed, the District Court's most recent or-
way differed from that in Swann V. Char-
der appointing a panel of experts to draft
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
an interdistriet plan requires only that the
U.S. 1. 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554
plan be designed "to achieve the greatest de-
(1971). Here, as there, mathematical ratios
gree of actual desegregation
were used simply as "a starting point in the
[w]ithin the limitations of reasonable travel
process of shaping a remedy, rather than an
time and distance factors." 345 F.Supp. 914,
inflexible requirement." 1d., at 25, 91
918 (ED Mich.1972). Cf. 402 U.S., at 23,
S.Ct., at 1280. It may be expected that a
91 S.Ct., at 1279.
final desegregation plan in this case would
418 U.S. 791
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3149
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
From the evidence, the primary rea-
city of Detroit. The District Court de-
son for the Detroit School Board's in-
termined that interdistrict relief was
terest in the inclusion of these school
necessary and appropriate only because
districts is not racial desegregation
it found that the condition of segrega-
but to increase the average socio-eco-
tion within the Detroit school system
nomic balance of all the schools in the
could not be cured with a Detroit-only
abutting regions and clusters."
remedy. It is on this theory that the in-
terdistrict relief must stand or fall.
The Court also misstates the basis for
Unlike the Court, I perceive my task to
the District Court's order by suggesting
be to review the District Court's order
that since the only segregation proved at
for what it is, rather than to criticize it
trial was within the Detroit school sys-
for what it manifestly is not.
tem, any relief which extended beyond
the jurisdiction of the Detroit Board of
II
Education would be inappropriate be-
As the foregoing demonstrates, the
cause it would impose a remedy on
District Court's decision to expand its
outlying districts "not shown to have
desegregation decree beyond the geo-
committed any constitutional violation."
graphical limits of the city of Detroit
Ante, at 3127.2 The essential founda-
rested in large part on its conclusions
tion of interdistrict relief in this case
(A) that the State of Michigan was ulti-
was not to correct conditions within
mately responsible for curing the condi-
outlying districts which themselves en-
tion of segregation within the Detroit
gaged in purposeful segregation. In-
city schools, and (B) that a Detroit-only
stead, interdistrict relief was seen as
remedy would not accomplish this task.
a necessary part of any meaningful
In my view, both of these conclusions
effort by the State of Michigan to rem-
are well supported by the facts of this
edy the state-caused segregation within
case and by this Court's precedents.
the city of Detroit.
A
Rather than consider the propriety of
interdistrict relief on this basis, how-
To begin with, the record amply sup-
ever, the Court has conjured up a large-
ports the District Court's findings that
ly fictional account of what the District
the State of Michigan, through state of-
Court was attempting to accomplish.
ficers and state agencies, had engaged in
With all due respect, the Court, in my
purposeful acts which created or aggra-
view, does a great disservice to the Dis-
vated segregation in the Detroit schools.
trict Judge who labored long and hard
The State Board of Education, for ex-
with this complex litigation by accusing
ample, prior to 1962, exercised its au-
him of changing horses in midstream
thority to supervise local schoolsite se-
and shifting the focus of this case from
lection in a manner which contributed
the pursuit of a remedy for the condi-
to segregation. 484 F.2d 215, 238 (CA6
790 tion of segregation within the Detroit
1973). Furthermore, the State's con-
school system to some unprincipled at-
tinuing authority, after 1962, to approve
791
tempt to impose his own philosophy of
school building construction plans 3 had
racial balance on the entire Detroit met-
intertwined the State with site-selection
ropolitan area. See ante, at 3124. The
decisions of the Detroit Board of Educa-
focus of this case has always been the
tion which had the purpose and effect of
segregated system of education in the
maintaining segregation.
2. It does not appear that even the majority
see ante, at 3127, thus allowing interdistrict
places any real weight on this consideration
relief to touch districts which have not
since it recognizes that interdistrict relief
themselves violated the Constitution.
would be proper where a constitutional vio-
lation within one district produces a signifi-
3. See Mich.Comp.Laws § 3SS.S51 (1970).
cant segregative effect in another district,
3150
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 791
The State had also stood in the way of
sive statutory powers of the State Board
past efforts to desegregate the Detroit
of Education over contractual arrange-
city schools. In 1970, for example, the
ments between school districts in the en-
Detroit School Board had begun imple-
rollment of students on a nonresident tu-
mentation of its own desegregation plan
ition basis, including certification of the
for its high schools, despite considerable
number of pupils involved in the trans-
public and official resistance. The State
fer and the amount of tuition charged,
Legislature intervened by enacting Act
over the review of transportation routes
48 of the Public Acts of 1970, specifical-
and distances, and over the disburse-
ly prohibiting implementation of the de-
ment of transportation funds,5 the State
segregation plan and thereby continuing
Board inevitably knew and understood
the growing segregation of the Detroit
the significance of this discriminatory
school system. Adequate desegregation
act.
of the Detroit system was also hampered
80
Aside from the acts of purposeful seg-
by discriminatory restrictions placed by
regation committed by the State Legisla-
the State on the use of transportation
ture and the State Board of Education,
within Detroit. While state aid for
the District Court also concluded that
transportation was provided by statute
the State was responsible for the many
for suburban districts, many of which
intentional acts of segregation commit-
were highly urbanized, aid for intracity
ted by the Detroit Board of Education,
transportation was excepted. One of the
an agency of the State. The majority is
effects of this restriction was to encour-
only willing to accept this finding ar-
age the construction of small walk-in
guendo. See ante, at 3129. I have no
neighborhood schools in Detroit, thereby
doubt, however, as to its validity under
lending aid to the intentional policy of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
creating a school system which reflected,
to the greatest extent feasible, extensive
"The command of the Fourteenth
residential segregation. Indeed, that
Amendment," it should be recalled, "is
one of the purposes of the transporta-
that no 'State' shall deny to any person
tion restriction was to impede desegre-
within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
gation was evidenced when the Michigan
tion of the laws." Cooper V. Aaron, 358
Legislature amended the State Trans-
U.S. 1, 16, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1409, 3 L.Ed.2d
portation Aid Act to cover intracity
5 (1958). While a State can act only
transportation but expressly prohibited
through "the officers or agents by
the allocation of funds for cross-busing
whom its powers are exerted," Ex parte
of students within a school district to
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347, 25 L.Ed. 676
achieve racial balance.4 Cf. North Caro-
(1880), actions by an agent or officer of
lina State Board of Education V. Swann,
the State are encompassed by the Four-
793
teenth Amendment for, "as he acts in
794
402 U.S. 43, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 28 L.Ed.2d
586 (1971).
the name and for the State, and is
clothed with the State's power, his act is
792 Also significant was the State's in-
that of the State." Ibid. See also Coop-
volvement during the 1950's in the
er V. Aaron, supra; Virginia V. Rives,
transportation of Negro high school stu-
dents from the Carver School- District
100 U.S. 313, 318, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880) ;
past a closer white high school in the
Shelley V. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14, 68
Oak Park District to a more distant Ne-
S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948).
gro high school in the Detroit system.
Under Michigan law a "school district
Certainly the District Court's finding
is an agency of the City of State govern-
that the State Board of Education had
ment." School District of Lansing V.
knowledge of this action and had given
State Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591,
its tacit or express approval was not
600, 116 N.W.2d 866, 870 (1962). It is
clearly erroneous. Given the comprehen-
"a legal division of territory, created by
4. See § 388.1179.
5. See §§ 388.629 and 340.600.
418 U.S. 795
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3151
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
the State for educational purposes, to
S.Ct. 27, 29, 50 L.Ed. 167 (1905). The
which the State has granted such powers
courts of the State have repeatedly em-
as are deemed necessary to permit the
phasized that education in Michigan is
district to function as a State agency."
not a local governmental concern, but a
Detroit Board of Education V. Super-
state function.
intendent of Public Instruction, 319
"Unlike the delegation of other pow-
Mich. 436, 450, 29 N.W.2d 902, 908
ers by the legislature to local govern-
(1947). Racial discrimination by the
ments, education is not inherently a
school district, an agency of the State,
part of the local self-government of a
is therefore racial discrimination by the
municipality
Control of
State itself, forbidden by the Fourteenth
our public school system is a State
Amendment. See, e. g., Pennsylvania V.
matter delegated and lodged in the
Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 77 S.Ct.
State legislature by the Constitution.
806, 1 L.Ed.2d 792 (1957).
The policy of the State has been to re-
We recognized only last Term in
tain control of its school system, to be
Keyes that it was the State itself which
administered throughout the State un-
was ultimately responsible for de jure
der State laws by local State agencies
acts of segregation committed by a local
organized with plenary powers to car-
school board. A deliberate policy of seg-
ry out the delegated functions given
regation by the local board, we held,
[them] by the legislature." School
amounted to "state-imposed segrega-
District of the City of Lansing V.
tion." 413 U.S., at 200, 93 S.Ct., at
State Board of Education, supra, at
2693. Wherever a dual school system
595, 116 N.W.2d, at 868.
exists, whether compelled by state stat-
The Supreme Court of Michigan has
ute or created by a local board's system-
noted the deep roots of this policy:
atic program of segregation, "the State
automatically assumes an affirmative
"It has been settled by the Ordi-
duty 'to effectuate a transition to a ra-
nance of 1787, the several Constitu-
cially nondiscriminatory school system'
tions adopted in this state, by its uni-
[and] to eliminate from the public
form course of legislation, and by the
schools within their school system 'all
decisions of this court, that education
vestiges of state-imposed segregation.'
in Michigan is a matter of state con-
Ibid. (emphasis added).
cern, that it is no part of the local
self-government of a particular town-
Vesting responsibility with the State
ship or municipality
The
795
of Michigan for Detroit's segregated
legislature has always dictated the ed-
schools is particularly appropriate as
ucational policy of the state." In re
794 Michigan, unlike some other States, op-
School District No. 6, 284 Mich. 132,
erates a single statewide system of edu-
145-146, 278 N.W. 792, 797 (1938).
cation rather than several separate and
The State's control over education is
independent local school systems. The
reflected in the fact that, contrary to
majority's emphasis on local governmen-
the Court's implication, there is little or
tal control and local autonomy of school
no relationship between school districts
districts in Michigan will come as a sur-
and local political units. To take the 85
prise to those with any familiarity with
outlying local school districts in the De-
that State's system of education. School
troit metropolitan area as examples, 17
districts are not separate and distinct
districts lie in two counties, two in three
sovereign entities under Michigan law,
counties. One district serves five munic-
but rather are "auxiliaries of the
ipalities; other suburban municipalities
State,' subject to its "absolute power."
are fragmented into as many as six
Attorney General of Michigan ex rel.
school districts. Nor is there any ap-
Kies V. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 240, 26
parent state policy with regard to the
3152
94 SUPREME COURT-REPORTER
418 U.S. 795
418 L
size of school districts, as they now
citizenry. 16 See, e. g., Attorney Gener-
16
range from 2,000 to 285,000 students.
al ex rel. Kies, V. Lowrey; 131 Mich. 639,
Sta
Centralized state control manifests it-
92 N.W. 289 (1902), aff'd, 199 U.S. 233,
209
self in practice as well as in theory.
26 S.Ct. 27, 50 L.Ed. 167 (1905). In-
Fle
The State controls the financing of edu>
deed, recent years have witnessed an ac-
N.P
cation in several ways. The legislature
celerated program of school district con-
Soe
contributes a substantial portion of most
solidations, mergers, and annexations,
tric
school districts' operating budgets with
many of which were state imposed.
100
funds appropriated from the State's
Whereas the State had 7,362 local dis-
for
General Fund revenues raised through
tricts in 1912, the number had been re-
Cor
statewide taxation.⁶ The State's power
duced to 1,438 in 1964 and to 738 in
Con
over the purse can be and is in fact used
1968.1 By June 1972, only 608 school
to enforce the State's powers over local
districts remained. Furthermore, the
system
districts. In addition, although local
State has broad powers to transfer prop-
series
districts obtain funds through local
erty from one district to another, again
Michig
property taxation, the State has assumed
without the consent of the local school
tution
the responsibility to ensure equalized
districts affected by the transfer. 18 See,
property valuations throughout the
e. g., School District of the City of Lans- 797
alesce
796 State.⁸ The State also establishespstand-
ing V. State Board of Education, supra;
ruling
ards for teacher certification and teach-
Imlay Township District V. State Board
itself no
er tenure;9 determines part of the re-
of Education, 359 Mich. 478, 102 N.W.2d
Education
quired curriculum; 10 sets the minimum
720 (1960).
curing
school term; 11 approves bus routes,
within th
equipment, and drivers; 12 approves
Whatever may be the history of public
tions of
textbooks; 13 and establishes procedures
education in other parts of our Nation,
uted
for student discipline.¹ The State Su-
it simply flies in the face of reality to
the Four
perintendent of Public Instruction and
say, as does the majority, that in Michi-
ultimatel
the State Board of Education have the
gan, "[n]o single tradition in public
its local
power to remove local school board mem-
education is more deeply rooted than
the
bers from office for neglect of their
local control over the operation of schools
system
duties.
15
"
Ante, as 3125. As the State's
798
viewed
Most significantly for present pur-
Supreme Court has said: "We have re-
and
poses, the State has wide-ranging pow-
peatedly held that education in this state
a sin
ers to consolidate and merge school dis-
subst
is not a matter of local concern, but be-
be
tricts, even without the consent of the
longs to the state at large." Collins V.
districts themselves or of the local
City of Detroit, 195 Mich. 330, 335-336,
6. See § 388.611. The State contributed
11. § 340.575.
an average of 34% of the operating bud-
Cour
gets of the 54 school districts included in
12. § 388.1171.
to
the original proposed desegregation area.
13. § 340.887(1).
tion
In 11 of these districts, state contribu-
word
tions exceeded 50% of the operating budg-
14. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 4705 (July 7, 1970),
ets.
1969-1970 Report of the Attorney General
cials
156 (Kelley).
remed
7. See, e. g., id., § 340.575. See also 1949-
Not.onj
1950 Report of the Attorney General 104
15. See Mich.Comp.Laws § 340.253.
(Roth) : Vol. 1, 1955 Report of the Attorney
of race
General 561 (Kavanagh) ; 1961-1962 Report
16. See generally, §§ 340.401-340.415 (con-
school.on
of the Attorney General 533 (Kelley).
solidations). 340.431-340.449 (annexations).
19.
8. See Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 211.34 and 340.681.
17. See 1 Michigan Senate Jonrnal, 1968, P.
the
423.
ring 17
9. § 340.569.
18. See generally Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 340.461-
ally
10. §§ 257.811(c), 340.361, 340.781, 340.782,
340.468.
388.371.
3146
418 U.S. 799
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3153
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
161 N.W. 905, 907 (1917). See also with the affirmative duty to take what-
Sturgis V. County of Allegan, 343 Mich.
ever steps might be necessary to convert
209, 215, 72 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1955) Van
to a unitary system in which racial dis-
Fleet V. Oltman, 244 Mich. 241, 244, 221
crimination would be eliminated root
N.W. 299, 300 (1928) Child Welfare
and branch." Green V. County School
Society of Flint v. Kennedy School Dis-
Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
trict, 220 Mich. 290, 296, 189 N.W. 1002,
430, 437-438, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1694, 20
1004 (1922). Indeed, a study prepared
L.Ed.2d 716. (1968). See also Lee V.
for the 1961 Michigan Constitutional
Macon County Board of Education, 267
Convention noted that the Michigan
F.Supp. 458 (MD Ala.), aff'd sub nom.
Constitution's articles on education had
Wallace V. United States, 389 U.S. 215,
resulted in "the establishment of a state
88 S.Ct. 415, 19 L.Ed.2d 422 (1967). Ne-
system of education in contrast to a
gro students are not only entitled to
series of local school systems." Elemen-
neutral nondiscriminatory treatment in
Michigan Constitution, Michigan Consti-
the future. They must receive "what
tutional Convention Studies 1 (1961).
Brown II promised them: a school sys-
In sum, several factors in this case co-
tem in which all vestiges of enforced ra-
alesce to support the District Court's
cial segregation have been eliminated."
ruling that it was the State of Michigan
Wright V. Council of the City of Emporia,
itself, not simply the Detroit Board of
407 U.S. 451, 463, 92 S.Ct. 2196, 2203, 33
Education, which bore the obligation of
L.Ed.2d 51 (1972). See also Swann V.
curing the condition of segregation
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
within the Detroit city schools. The ac-
cation, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267,
tions of the State itself directly contrib-
1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). These re-
uted to Detroit's segregation. Under
medial standards are fully applicable not
the Fourteenth Amendment, the State is
only to school districts where a dual sys-
ultimately responsible for the actions of
tem was compelled by statute, but also
its local agencies. And, finally, given
where, as here, a dual system was the
the structure of Michigan's educational
product of purposeful and intentional
system, Detroit's segregation cannot be
state action. See Keyes, 413 U.S., at
1798 viewed as the problem of an independent
200-201, 93 S.Ct., at 2693-2694.
and separate entity. Michigan operates
After examining three plans limited
a single statewide system of education, a
to the city of Detroit, the District Court
substantial part of which was shown to
correctly concluded that none would
be segregated in this case.
eliminate root and branch the vestiges
B
of unconstitutional segregation. The 799
plans' effectiveness, of course, had to be
What action, then, could the District
evaluated in the context of the District
Court require the State to take in order
Court's findings as to the extent of seg-
to cure Detroit's condition of segrega-
tion? Our prior cases have not minced
regation in the Detroit city schools. As
words as to what steps responsible offi-
indicated earlier, the most essential
cials and agencies must take in order to
finding was that Negro children in De-
remedy segregation in the public schools.
troit had been confined by intentional
Not only must distinctions on the basis
acts of segregation to a growing core of
of race be terminated for the future, but
Negro schools surrounded by a receding
school officials are also "clearly charged
ring of white schools.¹⁹ Thus, in 1960,
19. Despite Mr. Justice STEWART's claim to
STEWART acknowledges that intentional
the contrary, ante, at 3133, n. 2, of his concur-
acts of segregation by the State have separated
ring opinion, the record fully supports my
white and Negro students within the city, and
statement that Negro students were intention-
that the resulting core of all-Negro schools
ally confined to a core of Negro schools with-
has grown to encompass most of the city. In
in the city of Detroit. See, e. g., supra, at
suggesting that my approval of an interdis-
3146-3147, 3149-3150. Indeed, Mr. Justice
triet remedy rests on a further conclusion
3154
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 799
418,
of Detroit's 251 regular attendance
levels and would leave elementary
short
800 schools, 100 were 90% or more white
schools segregated. Plan B, the plain-
syste
and 71 were 90% or more Negro. In
tiffs' plan, though requiring the trans-
tinu
1970, of Detroit's 282 regular attendance
portation of 82,000 pupils and the acqui-
were
schools, 69 were 90% or more white and
sition of 900 school buses, would make
dual
133 were 90% or more Negro. While in
little headway in rooting out the ves- 801
1960, 68% of all schools were 90% or
tiges of segregation. To begin with, be-
more one race, by 1970, 71.6% of the
cause of practical limitations, the Dis-
prop
schools fell into that category. The
trict Court found that the plan would
int
growing core of all-Negro schools was
leave many of the Detroit city schools 75
froi
further evidenced in total school district
to 90% Negro. More significantly,
fort
population figures. In 1960 the Detroit
the District Court recognized that in
cree
system had 46% Negro students and
the context of a community which his-
flig
54% white students, but by 1970, 64%
torically had a school system marked by
timo
of the students were Negro and only
rigid de jure segregation, the likely ef-
citie
36% were white. This increase in the
fect of a Detroit-only plan would be to
We
proportion of Negro students was the
white
"change a school system which is now
highest of any major Northern city.
the
Black and White to one that would be
in
It was with these figures in the back-
perceived as Black
"
The re-
Distr
ground that the District Court evaluated
sult of this changed perception, the Dis-
of
the adequacy of the three Detroit-only
trict Court found, would be to increase
from
plans submitted by the parties. Plan A,
the flight of whites from the city to the
tem.nit
proposed by the Detroit Board of Educa-
outlying suburbs, compounding the ef-
groes
tion, desegregated the high schools and
fects of the present rate of increase in
about a fifth of the middle-level schools.
1802 prop
the proportion of Negro students in the
may dr
It was deemed inadequate, however, be-
cause it did not desegregate elementary
Detroit system. Thus, even if a plan
privan
schools and left the middle-level schools
were adopted which, at its outset, pro-
at:464
vided in every school a 65% Negro-35%
nore
not included in the plan more segregated
than ever. Plan C, also proposed by the
white racial mix in keeping with the Ne-
legal
tabli
Detroit Board, was deemed inadequate
gro-white proportions of the total stu-
spon
because it too covered only some grade
dent population, such a system would, in
dual
also
that the State or its political subdivisions
remedial stage must engage in a second in-
have been responsible for the increasing per-
quiry to determine whether additional state
per
centage of Negro students in Detroit. my
action exists to justify a particular remedy.
See
Brother STEWART misconceives the thrust
Rather, once a constitutional violation has
127
of this dissent. In light of the high concen-
been shown, the District Court is duty-
tration of Negro students in Detroit, the
bound to formulate an effective remedy and,
District Judge's finding that a Detroit-only
in SO doing, the court is entitled-indeed, it
of
remedy cannot effectively cure the constitu-
is required-to consider all the factual cir-
170
tional violation within the city should be
cuinstances relevant to the framing of an ef-
enough to support the choice of an interdis-
fective decree. Thus, in Swann V. Charlotte-
triet remedy. Whether state action is re-
Mecklenburg Board of Education we held that
del
sponsible for the growth of the core of all-
the District Court must take into account
thom
Negro schools in Detroit is, in my view,
the existence of extensive residential segre-
quite irrelevant.
gation in determining whether a racially neu-
achi
The difficulty with Mr. Justice STEW-
tral "neighborhood school" attendance plan
actus
ART's position is that he. like the Court.
was an adequate desegregation remedy, re-
S.C.
confuses the inquiry required to determine
gardless of whether this residential segrega-
dard
whether there has been a substantive consti-
tion was caused by state action. So here,
Comm
tutional violation with that necessary to for-
the District Court was required to consider
mulate an appropriate remedy once a consti-
the facts that the Detroit school system was
tutional violation has been shown. While a
already predominantly Negro and would like-
(1971)
finding of state action is of course a prereq-
ly become all-Negro upon issuance of a De-
ing
uisite to finding a violation, we have never
troit-only decree in framing an effective de-
ities
held that after unconstitutional state action
segregation remedy, regardless of state re-
has been shown, the District Court at the
sponsibility for this situation.
all
418 U.S. 803
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3155
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
short order, devolve into an all-Negro
gro and white children in fact go to
system. The net result would be a con-
school together. This is, in the final an-
tinuation of the all-Negro schools which
alysis, what desegregation of the public
were the hallmarks of Detroit's former
schools is all about.
dual system of one-race schools.
Because of the already high and rap-
Under our decisions, it was clearly
idly increasing percentage of Negro stu-
dents in the Detroit system, as well as
proper for the District Court to take
into account the so-called "white flight"
the prospect of white flight, a Detroit-
from the city schools which would be
only plan simply has no hope of achiev-
forthcoming from any Detroit-only de-
ing actual desegregation. Under such a
plan white and Negro students will not
cree. The court's prediction of white
go to school together. Instead, Negro
flight was well supported by expert tes-
children will continue to attend all-Ne-
timony based on past experience in other
gro schools. The very evil that Brown I
cities undergoing desegregation relief.
was aimed at will not be cured, but will
We ourselves took the possibility of
white flight into account in evaluating
be perpetuated for the future.
the effectiveness of a desegregation plan
Racially identifiable schools are one of
in Wright, supra, where we relied on the
the primary vestiges of state-imposed
District Court's finding that if the city
segregation which an effective desegre-
of Emporia were allowed to withdraw
gation decree must attempt to eliminate.
from the existing system, leaving a sys-
In Swann, supra, for example, we held
tem with a higher proportion of Ne-
that "[t]he district judge or school au-
groes, it " 'may be anticipated that the
thorities
will thus necessarily
802 proportion of whites in county schools
be concerned with the elimination of one-
may drop as those who can register in
race schools." 402 U.S., at 26, 91 S.Ct., 803
private academies'
407 U.S.,
at 1281. There is "a presumption," we
at 464, 92 S.Ct., at 2204. One cannot ig-
stated, "against schools that are sub-
nore the white-flight problem, for where
stantially disproportionate in their ra-
legally imposed segregation has been es-
cial composition." Ibid. And in evalu-
tablished, the District Court has the re-
ating the effectiveness of desegregation
sponsibility to see to it not only that the
plans in prior cases, we ourselves have
dual system is terminated at once but
considered the extent to which they dis-
also that future events do not serve to
continued racially identifiable schools.
perpetuate or re-establish segregation.
See, e. g., Green V. County School Board
See Swann, 402 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct., at
of New Kent County, supra; Wright V.
1278. See also Green, 391 U.S., at 438
Council of the City of Emporia, supra.
n. 4, 88 S.Ct., at 1694; Monroe V. Board
For a principal end of any deseg-
of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459, 88 S.Ct.
regation remedy is to ensure that
1700, 1705, 20 L.Ed.2d 733 (1968).
it is no longer "possible to identify
a 'white school' or a 'Negro school."
We held in Swann, supra, that where
Swann, supra, 402 U.S., at 18, 91 S.Ct.,
de jure segregation is shown, school au-
at 1277. The evil to be remedied in the
thorities must make "every effort to
dismantling of a dual system is the
achieve the greatest possible degree of
"[r]acial identification of the system's
actual desegregation." 402 U.S., at 26, 91
schools." Green, supra, 391 U.S., at 435,
S.Ct., at 1281. This is the operative stan-
88 S.Ct., at 1693. The goal is a system
dard re-emphasized in Davis V. School
without white schools or Negro schools
Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33,
-a system with "just schools." Id., at
37, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 1292, 28 L.Ed.2d 577
442, 88 S.Ct., at 1696. A school authori-
(1971). If these words have any mean-
ty's remedial plan or a district court's
ing at all, surely it is that school author-
remedial decree is to be judged by its
ities must, to the extent possible, take
effectiveness in achieving this end. See
all practicable steps to ensure that Ne-
Swann, 402 U.S., at 25, 91 S.Ct., at 1280;
3156
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 803
Davis, supra, 402 U.S., at 37, 91 S.Ct., at
The Federal Government has classified
1292; Green, supra, 391 U.S., at 439, 88
the tri-county area as a Standard Metro-
S.Ct., at 1694.
politan Statistical Area, indicating that
it is an area of "economic and social in-
We cautioned in Swann, of course,
tegration." United States V. Connecti-
that the dismantling of a segregated
cut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 670, 94
school system does not mandate any par-
S.Ct. 2788, 2797, 41 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1974).
ticular racial balance. 402 U.S., at 24,
91 S.Ct., at 1280. We also concluded
Under a Detroit-only decree, Detroit's.
that a remedy under which there would
schools will clearly remain racially iden-
remain a small number of racially iden-
tifiable in comparison with neighboring
tifiable schools was only presumptively
schools in the metropolitan community.
inadequate and might be justified. Id.,
Schools with 65% and more Negro stu-
at 26, 91 S.Ct., at 1281. But this is a
dents will stand in sharp and obvious
totally different case. The flaw of a
contrast to schools in neighboring dis-
Detroit-only decree is not that it does
tricts with less than 2% Negro enroll-
not reach some ideal degree of racial
ment. Negro students will continue to
balance or mixing. It simply does not
perceive their schools as segregated edu-
promise to achieve actual desegregation
cational facilities and this perception
at all. It is one thing to have a system
will only be increased when whites react
where a small number of students re-
to a Detroit-only decree by fleeing to the
main in racially identifiable schools. It
suburbs to avoid integration. School
806
is something else entirely to have a sys-
district lines, however innocently drawn,
em where all students continue to attend
will surely be perceived as fences to sep-
such schools.
arate the races when, under a Detroit-
only decree, white parents withdraw
The continued racial identifiability of
their children from the Detroit city 805
the Detroit schools under a Detroit-only
schools and move to the suburbs in order
remedy is not simply a reflection of
to continue them in all-white schools.
their high percentage of Negro students.
The message of this action will not es-
1804
What is or is not a racially identifiable
cape the Negro children in the city of
vestige of de jure segregation must nec-
Detroit. See Wright, 407 U.S., at
essarily depend on several factors. Cf.
466, 92 S.Ct., at 2205. It will be of
Keyes, 413 U.S., at 196, 93 S.Ct.,
scant significance to Negro children who
at 2691. Foremost among these should
have for years been confined by de jure
be the relationship between the schools
acts of segregation to a growing core of
in question and the neighboring commu-
all-Negro schools surrounded by a ring
nity. For these purposes the city of De-
of all-white schools that the new divid-
troit and its surrounding suburbs must
ing line between the races is the school
be viewed as a single community. De-
district boundary.
troit is closely connected to its suburbs
in many ways, and the metropolitan area
Nor can it be said that the State is
is viewed as a single cohesive unit by its
free from any responsibility for the dis-
residents. About 40% of the residents
parity between the racial makeup of De-
the
of the two suburban counties included in
troit and its surrounding suburbs. The
the desegregation plan work in Wayne
State's creation, through de jure acts of
bl
County; in which Detroit is situated.
segregation, of a growing core of all-Ne-
Many residents of the city work in the
gro schools inevitably acted as a magnet
suburbs. The three counties participate
to attract Negroes to the areas served
the
in a wide variety of cooperative govern-
by such schools and to deter them from
Distr
mental ventures on a metropolitan-wide
settling either in other areas of the city
and
basis, including a metropolitan transit
or in the suburbs. By the same token,
to
system, park authority, water and sewer
the growing core of all-Negro schools in-
State
system, and council of governments.
evitably helped drive whites to other
to
418 U.S. 807
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3157
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
areas of the city or to the suburbs.
As
aration of the races it achieved in the
we recognized in Swann:
past by purposeful state action.
"People gravitate toward school facili-
The majority asserts, however, that
ties, just as schools are located in re-
involvement of outlying districts would
sponse to the needs of people. The lo-
do violence to the accepted principle that
cation of schools may thus influence
"the nature of the violation determines
the patterns of residential develop-
the scope of the remedy." Swann, supra,
ment of a metropolitan area and have
402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct., at 1276. See
important impact on composition of
ante, at 3127. Not only is the majority's
inner-city neighborhoods.
attempt to find in this single phrase the
[Action taken] to maintain the sepa-
answer to the complex and difficult ques-
ration of the races with a minimum
tions presented in this case hopelessly
departure from the formal principles
simplistic, but more important, the Court
of 'neighborhood zoning'
reads these words in a manner which
does more than simply influence the
perverts their obvious meaning. The
short-run composition of the student
nature of a violation determines the
body
It may well pro-
scope of the remedy simply because the
mote segregated residential patterns
function of any remedy is to cure the vi-
which, when combined with 'neighbor-
olation to which it is addressed. In
hood zoning,' further lock the school
school segregationjcases, as in other eq- 807
system into the mold of separation of
uitable causes, a remedy which effective-
806
the races. Upon a showing a
ly cures the violation is what is re-
district court may consider this in
quired. See Green, 391 U.S., at 439, 88
fashioning a remedy." 402 U.S., at
S.Ct., at 1694; Davis, 402 U.S., at 37,
20-21, 91 S.Ct., at 1278.
91 S.Ct., at 1292. No more is necessary,
See also Keyes, 413 U.S., at 202, 93 S.Ct.,
but we can tolerate no less. To read
at 2694. The rippling effects on residen-
this principle as barring a district
tial patterns caused by purposeful acts of
court from imposing the only ef-
segregation do not automatically subside
fective remedy for past segregation and
at the school district border. With rare
remitting the court to a patently inef-
exceptions, these effects naturally
fective alternative is, in my view, to
spread through all the residential neigh-
turn a simple commonsense rule into a
borhoods within a metropolitan area.
cruel and meaningless paradox. Ironi-
See id., at 202-203, 93 S.Ct., at 2694-
cally, by ruling out an interdistrict
2695.
remedy, the only relief which promises
The State must also bear part of the
to cure segregation in the Detroit public
blame for the white flight to the sub-
schools, the majority flouts the very
urbs which would be forthcoming from a
principle on which it purports to rely.
Detroit-only decree and would render
Nor should it be of any significance
such a remedy ineffective. Having cre-
that the suburban school districts were
ated a system where whites and Negroes
not shown to have themselves taken any
were intentionally kept apart so that
direct action to promote segregation of
they could not become accustomed to
the races. Given the State's broad pow-
learning together, the State is responsi-
ers over local school districts, it was well
ble for the fact that many whites will
within the State's powers to require
react to the dismantling of that segre-
those districts surrounding the Detroit
gated system by attempting to flee to
school district to participate in a metro-
the suburbs. Indeed, by limiting the
politan remedy. The State's duty should
District Court to a Detroit-only remedy
be no different here than in cases where
and allowing that flight to the suburbs
it is shown that certain of a State's vot-
to succeed, the Court today allows the
ing districts are malapportioned in vio-
State to profit from its own wrong and
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
to perpetuate for years to come the sep-
See Reynolds V. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84
3158
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 807
418
S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Ov-
educational facilities are inherently un-
Jud
errepresented electoral districts are re-
equal and of Swann's unequivocal man-
to
quired to participate in reapportionment
date that the answer to de jure segrega-
die
although their only "participation" in
tion is the greatest possible degree of
to
the violation was to do nothing about it.
actual desegregation.
tio
Similarly, electoral districts which them-
sub
selves meet representation standards
III
must frequently be redrawn as part of a
to
remedy for other over- and under-inclu-
One final set of problems remains to
be considered. We recognized in Brown
sive districts. No finding of fault on
As
II, and have re-emphasized ever since,
the part of each electoral district and no
finding of a discriminatory effect on
that in fashioning relief in desegrega-
bu
tion cases, "the courts will be guided by
each district is a prerequisite to its in-
volvement in the constitutionally re-
equitable principles. Traditionally, equi-
po
dei
quired remedy. By the same logic, no
ty has been characterized by a practical
finding of fault on the part of the sub-
flexibility in shaping its remedies and
1810
1808 urban school districts in this case and
by a facility for adjusting and reconcil-
1809
no finding of a discriminatory effect on
ing public and private needs." Brown
each district should be a prerequisite to
II, 349 U.S., at 300, 75 S.Ct., at 756. See
their involvement in the constitutionally
also Swann, supra.
required remedy.
Though not resting its holding on this
point, the majority suggests that various
Cow
It is the State, after all, which bears
equitable considerations militate against
ticip
the responsibility under Brown of af-
interdistrict relief. The Court, for ex-
senti
fording a nondiscriminatory system of
education. The State, of course, is ordi-
ample, refers to financing and adminis-
to
Fun
narily free to choose any decentralized
trative problems, the logistical problems
framework for education it wishes, so
attending large-scale transportation of
the
long as it fulfills that Fourteenth
students, and the prospect of the Dis-
bilit
Amendment obligation. But the State
trict Court's becoming a "de facto 'legis-
final
should no more be allowed to hide be-
lative authority" and "'school super-
hind its delegation and compartmental-
intendent' for the entire area." Ante,
reli
ization of school districts to avoid its
at 3127. The entangling web of problems
constitutional obligations to its children
woven by the Court, however, appears
than it could hide behind its political
on further consideration to be construct-
ed of the flimsiest of threads.
con
subdivisions to avoid its obligations to
its voters. Reynolds V. Sims, at 575,
I deal first with the last of the prob-
84 S.Ct., at 1388. See also Gomillion V.
lems posed by the Court—the specter of
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5
the District Court qua "school superin-
L.Ed.2d 110 (1960).
tendent" and "legislative authority"-
tio
It is a hollow remedy indeed where
for analysis of this problem helps put
"after supposed 'desegregation' the
the other issues in proper perspective.
Di
Our cases, of course, make clear that the
de
schools remained segregated in fact."
Hobson V. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 495
initial responsibility for devising an ad-
por
(D.D.C. 1967). We must do better than
equate desegregation plan belongs with
"
the
'substitute
one segregated
school authorities, not with the District
school system for another segregated
Court. The court's primary role is to
20
school system." Wright, 407 U.S., at
review the adequacy of the school au-
456, 92 S.Ct., at 2200. To suggest, as
thorities' efforts and to substitute its
does the majority, that a Detroit-
own plan only if and to the extent they
only plan somehow remedies the ef-
default. See Swann, 402 U.S., at 16,
fects of de jure segregation of the races
91 S.Ct., at 1276; Green, 391 U.S., at
is, in my view, to make a solemn mock-
439, 88 S.Ct., at 1294. Contrary to the
ery of Brown I's holding that separate
majority's suggestions, the District
418 U.S. 811
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3159
Cite as 94S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
Judge in this case consistently adhered
dations have yet been submitted by the
to these procedures and there is every in-
state defendants on financial and admin-
dication that he would have continued
istrative arrangements. In sum, the
to do SO. After finding de jure segrega-
practicality of a final metropolitan plan
tion the court ordered the parties to
is simply not before us at the present
submit proposed Detroit-only plans.
time. Since the State and the panel of
The state defendants were also ordered
experts have not yet had an opportunity
to submit a proposed metropolitan plan
to come up with a workable remedy,
extending beyond Detroit's boundaries.
there is no foundation for the majority's
As the District Court stated, "the State
suggestion of the impracticality of in-
defendants
bear the initial
terdistrict relief. Furthermore, there
burden of coming forward with a pro-
is no basis whatever for assuming that
posal that promises to work." The state
the District Court will inevitably be
defendants defaulted in this obligation,
forced to assume the role of legislature
810 however. Rather than submit a com-
or school superintendent. 20 Were we to
811
plete plan, the State Board of Education
hold that it was its constitutional duty
submitted six proposals, none of which
to do so, there is every indication that
was in fact a desegregation plan. It
the State of Michigan would fulfill its
was only upon this default that the Dis-
obligation and develop a plan which is
trict Court began to take steps to devel-
workable, administrable, financially
op its own plan. Even then the District
sound, and, most important, in the best
Court maximized school authority par-
interest of quality education for all of
ticipation by appointing a panel repre-
the children in the Detroit metropolitan
senting both plaintiffs and defendants
area.
to develop a plan. Pet.App. 99a-100a.
Furthermore, the District Court still left
Since the Court chooses, however, to
the state defendants the initial responsi-
speculate on the feasibility of a metro-
bility for developing both interim and
politan plan, I feel constrained to com-
final financial and administrative ar-
ment on the problem areas it has target-
rangements to implement interdistrict
ed. To begin with, the majority's ques-
relief. Id., at 104a-105a. The Court of
tions concerning the practicality of con-
solidation of school districts need not
Appeals further protected the interests
of local school authorities by ensuring
give us pause. The State clearly has the
that the outlying suburban districts
power, under existing law, to effect a
could fully participate in the proceed-
consolidation if it is ultimately deter-
ings to develop a metropolitan remedy.
mined that this offers the best prospect
for a workable and stable desegregation
These processes have not been allowed
plan. See supra, at 3152. And given the
to run their course. No final desegrega-
1,000 or so consolidations of school dis-
tion plan has been proposed by the panel
of experts, let alone approved by the
tricts which have taken place in the
District Court. We do not know in any
past, it is hard to believe that the State
detail how many students will be trans-
has not already devised means of solving
ported to effect a metropolitan remedy,
most, if not all, of the practical problems
and we do not know how long or how far
which the Court suggests consolidation
they will have to travel. No recommen-
would entail.
20. In fact, the District Court remarked "that
operate now and hereafter in a racially uni-
this court's task is to enforce constitutional
fied, non-discriminatory fashion. Within
rights not to act as a schoolmaster ; the
that framework the body politic, educators,
court's task is to protect the constitutional
parents, and most particularly the children
rights here found violated with as little in-
must be given the maximum opportunity to
trusion into the education process as possi-
experiment and secure a high quality, and
ble. The court's objective is to establish
equal, educational opportunity." Pet.App.
the minimum constitutional framework with-
82a.
in which the system of public schools may
3160
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
418 U.S. 811
41830
Furthermore, the majority ignores
statewide, 35%-40% of all students
requir
long-established Michigan procedures
already arrive at school on a bus. In
fect
under which school districts may enter
those school districts in the tri-county
The
into contractual agreements to educate
Detroit metropolitan area eligible for
has
their pupils in other districts using state
state reimbursement of transportation
of
or local funds to finance nonresident
costs, 42%-52% of all students rode
ine
education. Such agreements could
buses to school. In the tri-county areas
vent
1812 form anjeasily administrable framework
as a whole, approximately 300,000 pupils 1813
cre
for interdistrict relief short of outright
arrived at school on some type of bus,
inti
consolidation of the school districts.
with about 60,000 of these apparently
four
The District Court found that interdis-
using regular public transit. In compar-
814
wou
trict procedures like these were fre-
ison, the desegregation plan, according
thir
quently used to provide special educa-
to its present rough outline, would in-
Oth
tional services for handicapped children,
volve the transportation of 310,000 stu-
dy
and extensive statutory provision is also
dents, about 40% of the population
poss
made for their use in vocational
within the desegregation area.
neal
education. Surely if school districts
whit
are willing to engage in interdistrict
With respect to distance and amount
pres
programs to help those unfortunate chil-
of time traveled, 17 of the outlying
Sor
dren crippled by physical or mental
school districts involved in the plan are
evitab
handicaps, school districts can be re-
contiguous to the Detroit district. The
decre
quired to participate in an inter-district
rest are all within 8 miles of the Detroit
district
program to help those children in the
city limits. The trial court, in defining
we said
city of Detroit whose educations and
the desegregation area, placed a ceiling
very futures have been crippled by pur-
of 40 minutes one way on the amount of
poseful state segregation.
travel time, and many students will ob-
ther
viously travel for far shorter periods.
ort
Although the majority gives this last
As to distance, the average statewide
matter only fleeting reference, it is
bus trip is 8½ miles one way, and in
with
plain that one of the basic emotional and
some parts of the tri-county area, stu-
migl
legal issues underlying these cases con-
dents already travel for one and a quar-
pil
cerns the propriety of transportation of
ter hours or more each way. In sum,
Bu
students to achieve desegregation.
with regard to both the number of stu-
ter
While others may have retreated from
dents transported and the time and dis-
its standards, see, e. g., Keyes,
tances involved, the outlined desegrega-
413 U.S., at 217, 93 S.Ct., at 2701 (Pow-
tion plan "compares favorably with the
ell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
transportation plan previously operated
in part), I continue to adhere to the
Swann, 402 U.S., at 30, 91
guidelines set forth in Swann on this is-
S.Ct., at 1283.
sue. See 402 U.S., at 29-31, 91 S.Ct., at
1282-1283. And though no final deseg-
As far as economics are concerned, a
regation plan is presently before us, to
metropolitan remedy would actually be
the extent the outline of such a plan is
more sensible than a Detroit-only reme-
now visible, it is clear that the transpor-
dy. Because of prior transportation aid
tation it would entail will be fully con-
restrictions, see at 3150, Detroit largely
sistent with these guidelines.
relied on public transport, at stu-
First of all, the metropolitan plan
dent expense, for those students who
would not involve the busing of substan-
lived too far away to walk to school.
tially more students than already ride
Since no inventory of school buses exist-
buses. The District Court found that,
ed, a Detroit-only plan was estimated to
21. See, c. g., Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 340.69, 22. See id., §§ 340.330-340.330n.
340.121 (d), 340.359, 340.582. 340.5S2a, 340.-
590.
418 U.S. 815
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY
3161
Cite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)
require the purchase of 900 buses to ef-
structed and maintained to enforce ra-
fectuate the necessary transportation.
cial segregation. The remedy for
The tri-county area, in contrast, already
such segregation may be administra-
has an inventory of 1,800 buses, many
tively awkward, inconvenient, and even
of which are now under-utilized. Since
bizarre in some situations and may
increased utilization of the existing in-
impose burdens on some; but all awk-
ventory can take up much of the in-
wardness and inconvenience cannot be
crease in transportation involved in the
avoided
"
402 U.S., at
interdistrict remedy, the District Court
28, 91 S:Ct., at 1282.
found that only 350 additional buses
would probably be needed, almost two-
Desegregation is not and was never
1814
thirds fewer than a Detroit-only remedy.
expected to be an easy task. Racial atti-
Other features of an interdistrict reme-
tudes ingrained in our Nation's child-
dy bespeak its practicality, such as the
hood and adolescence are not quickly
possibility of pairing up Negro schools
thrown aside in its middle years. But
near Detroit's boundary with nearby
just as the inconvenience of some cannot
white schools on the other side of the
be allowed to stand in the way of the
present school district line.
rights of others, so public opposition, no
matter how strident, cannot be permit-
Some disruption, of course, is the in-
ted to divert this Court from the en-
evitable product of any desegregation
forcement of the constitutional princi-
decree, whether it operates within one
ples at issue in this case. Today's hold-
district or on an interdistrict basis. As
ing, I fear, is more a reflection of a per-
we said in Swann, however:
ceived public mood that we have gone
"Absent a constitutional violation
far enough in enforcing the Constitu-
there would be no basis for judicially
tion's guarantee of equal justice than it
ordering assignment of students on a
is the product of neutral principles of
racial basis. All things being equal,
law. In the short run, it may seem to [815
with no history of discrimination, it
be the easier course to allow our great
might well be desirable to assign pu-
metropolitan areas to be divided up each
pils to schools nearest their homes.
into two cities-one white, the other
But all things are not equal in a sys-
black-but it is a course, I predict, our
tem that has been deliberately con-
people will ultimately regret. I dissent.
94 S.Ct-33
H
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 9, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DICK CHELEY
FROM:
EDWARD SCHMULTS
SUBJECT:
Justice Department Involvement in
Private School Bias Litigation
You requested some background for the President on this morning's
news story concerning the position of the Justice Department in certain
litigation affecting the right of private schools to discriminate on the
basis of race. The material under "Background" and "Justice Depart-
ment Involvement" was furnished to Dick Parsons by the Solicitor
General.
BACKGROUND
The case in question was commenced by two private parties against
several private schools in Virginia which discriminated in their
administration policies on the basis of race. The contention of the
plaintiffs was that such discrimination violated Section 1981 of the
United States Code, which derives from the old Civil Rights Act of
1866. This law prohibits racial discrimination in the making of
private contracts. The defendants in this case argue that Section 1981
could not be applied to private schools and, in the alternative, that if
this section were applicable to private schools it was unconstitutional.
The lower court and the U. S. Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit) held
for the plaintiffs. The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court
by the defendants.
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INVOLVEMENT
When the constitutionality of a federal statute is challenged in litigation
before the Supreme Court, it is required that the Department of Justice
be notified of the litigation, the statute in question and the nature of the
constitutional challenge. As a general rule, the Department will defend,
amicus curiae, the constitutionality of the statute, unless a constitutional
prerogative of the President is being diminished.
FORD LIBRARY
-2-
I have been advised by the Solicitor General that it is clear from
previous cases that Section 1981 is constitutional.
If the President is asked about this situation, I think he should respond
that:
(1) The Justice Department is participating in this case because of its
duty is defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress; the Department
believes its position is mandated by the statute and previous judicial
decisions;
(2) He has been advised that the Department's position is that the
statute applies only to most sweeping forms of segregation;
(3) According to the Department, the statute would not be applicable
to religious schools or those organized on some other right of
association; and
(4) We should bear in mind the case involves a statute which is within
the power of Congress to change.

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"ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 4, folder \"Busing Background Book (5)\" of the\nWhite House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 4 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n3112\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 717\n418\n418 U.S. 717, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069\nto impose a multidistrict remedy for sin-\n4. School\nWilliam G. MILLIKEN, Governor of\ngle-district de jure segregation in the\nWhil\nMichigan, et al., Petitioners,\nabsence of findings that the other in-\nbridged\nV.\ncluded districts had failed to operate un-\ntional\nRonald BRADLEY and Richard Bradley,\nitary school systems or had committed\nrelief\nby their mother and next friend,\nacts that effected segregation, in the ab-\nmay\nbe\nVerda Bradley, et al.\nsence of any claim or finding that school\nmere\ndistrict boundary lines were established\ntrarys\nALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS et al.,\nwith the purpose of fostering racial seg-\nUnited\nPetitioners,\nregation, and without affording a mean-\n5. School\nV.\ningful opportunity for the included\nSch\nRonald BRADLEY and Richard Bradley,\nneighboring districts to present evidence\nlaws wit\nby their mother and next friend,\nor be heard on the propriety of a multi-\nsacros\nVerda Bradley, et al.\ndistrict remedy or on the question of\nFourtee\nconstitutional violations by those dis-\nhave dut\ntricts.\nThe GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL\ndies.\nSYSTEM, Petitioner,\nReversed and remanded.\n6. School\nV.\nMr. Justice Stewart concurred and\nBef\nRonald BRADLEY and Richard Bradley,\nby their mother and next friend,\nfiled opinion.\nautonom\naside: by\nVerda Bradley, et al.\nMr. Justice Douglas dissented and\nremedial\nNos. 73-434, 73-435 and 73-436.\nfiled opinion.\ndistrict\nthat the\nArgued Feb. 27, 1974.\nMr. Justice White dissented and\ntion WI\nDecided July 25, 1974.\nfiled opinion in which Mr. Justice Doug-\nsignific\nlas, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice\ndistrict\nMarshall, joined.\nthat rac\nParents, children and others insti-\nor loca\nMr. Justice Marshall dissented and\ntuted a class action against various state\nschool\nand school district officials seeking re-\nfiled opinion in which Mr. Justice Doug-\ncause of\nlief from alleged illegal racial segrega-\nlas, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice\ntion in the Detroit public school system.\nWhite, joined.\n7. Scho\nOn remand after two prior appeals, 433\nDis\nF.2d 897 and 438 F.2d 945, the United\nmultidi\n1. Constitutional Law -220\nStates District Court for the Eastern\nDoctrine of \"separate but equal\"\nplan tc\nDistrict of Michigan ruled that the sys-\nhas no place in field of public education,\nsegrega\ntem was an illegally segregated one, 338\nsince separate educational facilities are\nschool\nF.Supp. 582, and, after the Court of Ap-\ninherently unequal. U.S.C.A.Const.\nof find\npeals dismissed appeals from orders re-\nhad fai\nAmend. 14.\nquiring submission of desegregation\ntems 0\nplans, 468 F.2d 902, directed preparation\n2. Schools and School Districts =13\ned segn\nof a metropolitan desegregation plan,\nFinding of district court that De-\nsence €\n345 F.Supp. 914, and purchase of\ntroit public school system was illegally\ndistrict\nschool buses. The Court of Appeals\nsegregated on basis of race was not\nwith p\naffirmed the holding that a constitu-\nplain error. Supreme Court Rules, rules\ntion, a\ntionally adequate system of desgregat-\n23, subd. 1(c), 40, subd. (d) (2), 28 U.\nR.\nFORD\nopport\ned schools could not be established\nS.C.A.\ndistric\nwithin the Detroit school district's geo-\non prc\ngraphic limits and that a multidistrict\n3. Schools and School Districts -13\non qu'\nmetropolitan plan was necessary, 484 F.\nDesegregation, in sense of disman-\nby the\n2d 215, and defendants appealed. The\ntling dual school system, does not re-\n340.27\nSupreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice Burg-\nquire any particular racial balance in\n340.14\ner, held, inter alia, that it was improper\neach school, grade or classroom.\n192, {\n418 U.S. 717\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3113\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\n4. Schools and School Districts -13\n340.567, 340.569, 340.574, 340.575, 340.-\nWhile boundary lines may be\n582, 340.583-340.586, 340.589, 340.591,\nbridged where there was been constitu-\n340.594, 340.605, 340.609, 340.613; 340.-\ntional violation calling for interdistrict\n614, 340.643a, 340.711 et seq., 340.882,\nrelief, notion that school district lines\n388.171a et seq., 388.182, 388.851; U.S.\nmay be casually ignored or treated as\nC.A.Const. Amend. 14; M.C.L.A.Const.\nmere administrative convenience is con-\n1963, art. 8, § 2; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.\ntrary to history of public education in\nrules 19, 24 (a, b), 28 U.S.C.A.; 28 U.S.\nUnited States.\nC.A. § 1291 (b) Supreme Court Rules,\n5. Schools and School Districts -13\nrules 23, subd. 1(c), 40, subd. 1(d) (2),\nSchool district lines and present\n28 U.S.C.A.\nlaws with respect to local control are not\n8. Schools and School Districts -13\nsacrosanct, and if they conflict with\nConstitutional right of Negro chil-\nFourteenth Amendment, federal courts\ndren residing in Detroit public school\nhave duty to prescribe appropriate reme-\ndistrict was only to attend unitary\ndies. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.\nschool system in that district, and unless\nofficials drew district lines in discrimi-\n6. Schools and School Districts 33\nBefore boundaries of separate and\nnatory fashion or arranged for white\nautonomous school districts may be set\nstudents residing in district to attend\naside by consolidating separate units for\nschools in neighboring districts, they\nremedial purposes or by imposing cross-\nwere under no constitutional duty to\ndistrict remedy, it must first be shown\nmake provisions for Negro students to\nattend such schools.\nthat there has been constitutional viola-\ntion within one district that produces\n9. Schools and School Districts =13\nsignificant segregative effect in another\nIt is not true that, whatever racial\ndistrict; specifically, it must be shown\nmake-up of school district population\nthat racially discriminatory acts of state\nmay be and however neutrally district\nor local school districts, or of single\nlines have been drawn and administered,\nschool district, have been substantial\nschools are never \"desegregated\" as long\ncause of interdistrict segregation.\nas Negro students are in majority.\n7. Schools and School Districts -13\n10. Schools and School Districts -13\nDistrict court's action in ordering\nEven accepting arguendo the cor-\nmultidistrict metropolitan desegregation\nrectness of the theory that State of\nplan to remedy single-district de jure\nMichigan was derivatively responsible\nsegregation found in Detroit public\nfor Detroit board of education's actions\nschool system was improper in absence\nwhich resulted in illegal racial segrega-\nof findings that other included districts\ntion within its school system, that deriv-\nhad failed to operate unitary school sys-\native responsibility of State did not con-\ntems or had committed acts that effect-\nstitutionally justify or require adoption\ned segregation in Detroit system, in ab-\nof multidistrict metropolitan desegrega-\nsence of any claim or finding that school\ntion plan involving neighboring districts\ndistrict boundary lines were established\nwhich had nòt been affected by board's\nwith purpose of fostering racial segrega-\nactions.\ntion, and without affording meaningful\nopportunity for included neighboring\n11. Schools and School Districts\ndistricts to present evidence or be heard\n-13, 159½\non propriety of multidistrict remedy or\nIsolated instance wherein one sub-\non question of constitutional violations\nurban school district contracted with il-\nby those districts. M.C.L.A. §§ 340.26,\nlegally segregated urban district to have\n340.27, 340.55, 340.77, 340.107, 340.113,\nNegro high school students sent to pre-\n340.148, 340.149, 340.165, 340.188, 340.-\ndominantly Negro school in urban dis-\n192, 340.352, 340.355, 340.356, 340.563,\ntrict did not justify adoption of multi-\nS.Ct.-32\n3114\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 717\n418\ndistrict metropolitan desegregation plan\nevidence that the suburban school dis-\nfostering\npotentially embracing 52 districts hav-\ntricts had committed acts of de jure seg-\nis\nno\ning no responsibility for such allegedly\nregation, the court appointed a panel to\nincluded\nsegregative plan.\nsubmit a plan for the Detroit schools\n718,\nto presen\nthat would encompass an entire desig-\npropriet\nSyllabus*\nnated desegregation area consisting of\non theiqu\nRespondents brought this class ac-\n53 of the 85 suburban school districts\ntions by\ntion, alleging that the Detroit public\nplus Detroit, and ordered the Detroit\n(a)\nschool system is racially segregated as a\nBoard to acquire at least 295 school bus-\ning as\nresult of the official policies and actions\nes to provide transportation under an in-\nof develoi\nof petitioner state and city officials, and\nterim plan to be developed for the\nplan whie\nseeking implementation of a plan to\n1972-1973 school year. The Court of\nleave\neliminate the segregation and establish a\nAppeals, affirming in part, held that the\nunitary nonracial school system. The\nrecord supported the District Court's\nto the ove\nDistrict Court, after concluding that\nfinding as to the constitutional viola-\nof the\nvarious acts by the petitioner Detroit\ntions committed by the Detroit Board\nThe clear\nBoard of Education had created and per-\nand the state officials; that therefore\nMecklenbu\nthe District Court was authorized and\npetuated school segregation in Detroit,\nU.S. 1,\nand that the acts of the Board, as a sub-\nrequired to take effective measures to\nthat deses\nordinate entity of the State, were attrib-\ndesegregate the Detroit school system;\nmantling\nutable to the State, ordered the Board to\nand that a metropolitan area plan em-\nrequire an\nsubmit Detroit-only desegregation plans.\nbracing the 53 outlying districts was the\n3125\nThe court also ordered the state officials\nonly feasible solution and was within the\nto submit desegregation plans encom-\nDistrict Court's equity powers. But the\n1719\n(b)\ncourt remanded so that all suburban\npassing the three-county metropolitan\nbridged\narea, despite the fact that the 85 outlying\nschool districts that might be affected\nhas been\nschool districts in these three counties\nby a metropolitan remedy could be made\ning for\nwere not parties to the action and there\nparties and have an opportunity to be\ntrict lines\nwas no claim that they had committed\nheard as to the scope and implementa-\nor treated\nconstitutional violations. Subsequently,\ntion of such a remedy, and vacated the\nvenience\noutlying school districts were allowed to\norder as to the bus acquisitions, subject\npublic edu\nintervene, but were not permitted to as-\nto its reimposition at an appropriate\ndeeply roo\nsert any claim or defense on issues pre-\ntime. Held: The relief ordered by the\nviously adjudicated or to reopen any is-\nDistrict Court and affirmed by the\n(c)+T\nsue previously decided, but were allowed\nCourt of Appeals was based upon erro-\nextensively\nmerely to advise the court as to the pro-\nneous standards and was unsupported by\nture of\nrecord evidence that acts of the outlying\npriety of a metropolitan plan and to sub-\nsince that\nmit any objections, modifications, or al-\ndistricts had any impact on the discrimi-\nfect, conse\nnation found to exist in the Detroit\nternatives to any such plan. Thereafter,\nschool disti\nthe District Court ruled that it was\nschools. A federal court may not impose\nas separat\nproper to consider metropolitan plans\na multidistrict, areawide remedy for\nthat Detroit-only plans submitted by the\nsingle-district de jure school segregation\nvast new\nBoard and respondents were inadequate\nviolations, where there is no finding\nsince-enti\nthat the other included school districts\nproblems\nto accomplish desegregation, and that\nhave failed to operate unitary school\ntation of\ntherefore it would seek a solution be-\nyond the limits of the Detroit School Dis-\nsystems or have committed acts that ef-\nwould gene\ntrict, and concluded that \"[s]chool dis-\nfected segregation within the other dis-\nadministra\ntrict lines are simply matters of political\ntricts, there is no claim or finding\nof this nes\nconvenience and may not be used to deny\nthat the school district boundary lines\n(d)\nF\nconstitutional rights.\" Without having\nwere established with the purpose of\ntrict plan\nstructuring\n* The syllabus constitutes no part of the\nvenience of the reader. See United States v.\ntrict laws,\nopinion of the Court but has been prepared\nDetroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,\nby the Reporter of Decisions for the con-\n337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.\ncome, first\n418 U.S. 720\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3115\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nfostering racial segregation, and there\nthority\" to resolve the complex opera-\nis no meaningful opportunity for the\ntional problems involved and thereafter\nincluded neighboring school districts\na \"school superintendent\" for the entire\nto present evidence or be heard on the\narea, a task which few, if any, judges\npropriety of a multidistrict remedy or\nare qualified to perform and one which\non the question of constitutional viola-\nwould deprive the people of local control\ntions by those districts. Pp. 3123-3131.\nof schools through elected school boards.\n(a) The District Court erred in us-\nP. 3126.\ning as a standard the declared objective\n(e) Before the boundaries of sepa-\nof development of a metropolitan area\nrate and autonomous school districts\nplan which, upon implementation, would\nmay be set aside by consolidating the sep-\nleave \"no school, grade or classroom\narate units for remedial purposes or by\nsubstantially disproportionate\nimposing a cross-district remedy, it\nto the overall pupil racial composition\"\nmust be first shown that there has been\nof the metropolitan area as a whole.\na constitutional violation within one dis-\nThe clear import of Swann V. Charlotte-\ntrict that produces a significant segre-\nMecklenburg Board of Education, 402\ngative effect in another district; i. e.,\nU.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554, is\nspecifically, it must be shown that ra-\nthat desegregation, in the sense of dis-\ncially discriminatory acts of the state or\nmantling a dual school system, does not\nlocal school districts, or of a single\nrequire any particular racial balance. P.\nschool district have been a substantial\n3125.\ncause of interdistrict segregation. P.\n3127.\n1\n(b) While boundary lines may be\nbridged in circumstances where there\n(f) With no showing of significant\nhas been a constitutional violation call-\nviolation by the 53 outlying school dis-\ning for inter-district relief, school dis-\ntricts and no evidence of any interdis-\ntrict lines may not be casually ignored\ntrict violation or effect, the District\nor treated as a mere administrative con-\nCourt transcended the original theory of\nvenience; substantial local control of\nthe case as framed by the pleadings, and\npublic education in this country is a\nmandated a metropolitan area remedy,\ndeeply rooted tradition. Pp. 3125.\nthe approval of which would impose on\nthe outlying districts, not shown to have\n(c) The interdistrict remedy could\ncommitted any constitutional violation, a\nextensively disrupt and alter the struc-\nstandard not previously hinted at in any\nture of public education in Michigan,\nholding of this Court. P. 3127.\nsince that remedy would require, in ef-\n(g) Assuming, arguendo, that the\nfect, consolidation of 54 independent\nState was derivatively responsible for\nschool districts historically administered\nDetroit's segregated school conditions, it\nas separate governmental units into a\ndoes not follow that an interdistrict 720\nvast new super school district, and,\nremedy is constitutionally justified or\nsince-entirely apart from the logistical\nrequired, since there has been virtually\nproblems attending large-scale transpor-\nno showing that either the State or any\ntation of students-the consolidation\nof the 85 outlying districts engaged in\nwould generate other problems in the\nany activity that had a cross-district ef-\nfect. P. 3129.\nadministration, financing, and operation\nof this new school system. P. 3125.\n(h) An isolated instance of a possi-\nble segregative effect as between two of\n(d) From the scope of the interdis-\nthe school districts involved would not\ntrict plan itself, absent a complete re-\njustify the broad metropolitanwide rem-\nstructuring of the Michigan school dis-\nedy contemplated, particularly since that\ntrict laws, the District Court would be-\nremedy embraced 52 districts having no\ncome, first, a de fucto \"legislative au-\nresponsibility for the arrangement and\n3116\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 720\n418\npotentially involved 503,000 pupils in ad-\nthe Advancement of Colored People 2\ndition to Detroit's 276,000 pupils. P.\nand individual parents and students, on\n3129.\nbehalf of a class later defined by order\n484 F.2d 215, reversed and remand-\nof the United States District Court for\ned.\nthe Eastern District of Michigan, dated\nFebruary 16, 1971, to include \"all school\nchildren in the City of Detroit, Michigan,\nFrank J. Kelley, Lansing, Mich., for\nand all Detroit resident parents who\npetitioners William G. Milliken et al.\nhave children of school age.\" The named\nfo\nWilliam M. Saxton, Detroit, Mich., for\ndefendants in the District Court in-\nM\npetitioners Allen Park Public Schools\ncluded the Governor of Michigan, the\n19\nand Grosse Pointe Public School System\nAttorney General, the State Board of\net al.\nEducation, the State Superintendent of\nPublic Instruction, the Board of Educa-\nSolicitor Gen. Robert H. Bork for the\ntion of the city of Detroit, its members,\nFo\nUnited States, as amicus curiae, by spe-\nthe city's and its former superintendent\ncial leave of Court.\nof schools. The State of Michigan as\nJ. Harold Flannery, Cambridge, Mass.,\nsuch is not a party to this litigation and\nand Nathaniel R. Jones, New York City,\nreferences to the State must be read as\nfor respondents.\nreferences to the public officials, state\nand local, through whom the State is\n721 Mr. Chief Justice BURGER delivered\nalleged to have acted. In their com-\nthe opinion of the Court.\nplaint respondents attacked the consti-\nWe granted certiorari in these consoli-\ntutionality of a statute of the State\ndated cases to determine whether a fed-\nof Michigan known as Act 48 of the\neral court may impose a multidistrict,\n1970 Legislature on the ground that\nareawide remedy to a single-district de\nit put the State of Michigan in the posi-\njure segregation problem absent any\ntion of unconstitutionally interfering\nfinding that the other included school\nwith the execution and operation of a\ndistricts have failed to operate unitary\nvoluntary plan of partial high school de-\nBo\nschool systems within their districts, ab-\nsegregation, known as the April 7, 1970,\nsent any claim or finding that the\nPlan, which had been adopted by the De-\nboundary lines of any affected school\ntroit Board of Education to be effective\ndistrict were established with the pur-\nbeginning with the fall 1970 semester. 723\npose of fostering racial segregation in\nThe complaint also alleged that the De-\n724\npublic schools, absent any finding that\ntroit Public School System was and is\nthe included districts committed acts\nsegregated on the basis of race as a re-\nwhich effected segregation within the\nsult of the official policies and actions\n722\nother districts, and absent ajmeaningful\nof the defendants and their predecessors\nopportunity for the included neighboring\nin office, and called for the implementa-\nschool districts to present evidence or be\ntion of a plan that would eliminate \"the\nheard on the propriety of a multidistrict\nracial identity of every school in the\nremedy or on the question of constitu-\n[Detroit] system and\nmain-\ntional violations by those neighboring\ntain now and hereafter a unitary, nonra-\ndistricts.¹\ncial school system.\"\nInitially the matter was tried on re-\nI\nspondents' motion for a preliminary in-\nThe action was commenced in August\njunction to restrain the enforcement of\n1970 by the respondents, the Detroit\nAct 48 so as to permit the April 7 Plan\nBranch of the National Association for\nto be implemented. On that issue, the\n1. 484 F.2d 215 (CA6), cert. granted, 414 U.S.\n2. The standing of the NAACP as a proper\n1038, 94 S.Ct. 538, 38 L.Ed.2d 329 (1973).\nparty plaintiff was not contested in the trial\ncourt and is not an issue in this case.\n418 U.S. 725\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3117\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nDistrict Court ruled that respondents\nfinding that \"Governmental actions and\nwere not entitled to a preliminary in-\ninaction at all levels, federal, state and\njunction since at that stage there was no\nlocal, have combined, with those of\nproof that Detroit had a dual segregated\nprivate organizations, such as loaning\nschool system. On appeal, the Court of\ninstitutions and real estate associations\nAppeals found that the \"implementation\nand brokerage firms, to establish and\nof the April 7 plan was [unconstitu-\nto maintain the pattern of residential\ntionally] thwarted by State action in the\nsegregation' throughout the Detroit\nform of the Act of the Legislature of\nmetropolitan area.\" 338 F.Supp. 582,\nMichigan,\" 433 F.2d 897, 902 (CA6\n587 (ED Mich.1971). While still ad-\n1970), and that such action could not be\ndressing a Detroit-only violation, the\ninterposed to delay, obstruct, or nullify\nDistrict Court reasoned:\nsteps lawfully taken for the purpose of\nprotecting rights guaranteed by the\n\"While it would be unfair to charge\nFourteenth Amendment. The case was\nthe present defendants with what oth-\nremanded to the District Court for an\ner governmental officers or agencies\nexpedited trial on the merits.\nhave done, it can be said that the ac-\ntions or the failure to act by the re-\nOn remand, the respondents moved for\nsponsible school authorities, both city\nimmediate implementation of the April 7\nand state, were linked to that of these\nPlan in order to remedy the deprivation\nother governmental units. When we\nof the claimed constitutional rights. In\nspeak of governmental action we\nresponse, the School Board suggested two\nshould not view the different agencies\nother plans, along with the April 7 Plan,\nas a collection of unrelated units.\nand urged that top priority be assigned\nPerhaps the most that can be said is\nto the so-called \"Magnet Plan\" which\nthat all of them, including the school\nwas \"designed to attract children to a\nauthorities, are, in part, responsible\nschool because of its superior curricu-\nfor the segregated condition which ex-\nlum.\" The District Court approved the\nists. And we note that just as there\nBoard's Magnet Plan, and respondents\nis an interaction between residential\nagain appealed to the Court of Appeals,\npatterns and the racial composition of\nmoving for summary reversal. The\nthe schools, SO there is a corresponding\nCourt of Appeals refused to pass on the\neffect on the residential pattern by\nmerits of the Magnet Plan and ruled\nthe racial composition of the schools.\"\n724 that the District Court had not abused\nIbid.\nits discretion in refusing to adopt the\nApril 7 Plan without an evidentiary\nThe District Court found that the De-\n725\nhearing. The case was again remanded\ntroit Board of Education created and\nwith instructions to proceed immediately\nmaintained optional attendance zones 3\nto a trial on the merits of respondents'\nwithin Detroit neighborhoods undergo-\nsubstantive allegations concerning the\ning racial transition and between high\nDetroit school system. 438 F.2d 945\nschool attendance areas of opposite pre-\n(CA6 1971).\ndominant racial compositions. These\nzones, the court found, had the \"natural,\nThe trial of the issue of segregation\nprobable, foreseeable and actual effect\"\nin the Detroit school system began on\nof allowing white pupils to escape iden-\nApril 6, 1971, and continued through\ntifiably Negro schools. Ibid. Similar-\nJuly 22, 1971, consuming some 41 trial\nly, the District Court found that Detroit\ndays. On September 27, 1971, the Dis-\nschool attendance zones had been drawn\ntrict Court issued its findings and con-\nalong north-south boundary lines despite\nclusions on the issue of segregation,\nthe Detroit Board's awareness that\n3. Optional zones, sometimes referred to as\nchoice of attendance at one of two high\ndual zones or dual overlapping zones, pro-\nschools.\nvide pupils living within certain areas a\n3118\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 725\n418\ndrawing boundary lines in an east-\ngreat majority of schools being built in\nand effect\nwest direction would result in signifi-\neither overwhelmingly all-Negro or all-\ntion\ncantly greater desegregation. Again,\nwhite neighborhoods SO that the new\nThe\nthe District Court concluded, the nat-\nschools opened as predominantly one-\nacts\nural and actual effect of these acts\nrace schools. Thus, of the 14 schools\nas a Haub?\nwas the creation and perpetuation of\nwhich opened for use in 1970-1971, 11\nwerelattri\nschool segregation within Detroit.\nopened over 90% Negro and one opened\ngan, the\nless than 10% Negro.\nThe District Court found that in the\nthe part\noperation of its school transportation\nlaw, Mich\nThe District Court also found that the\nprogram, which was designed to relieve\nfor examp\nState of Michigan had committed several\nplans had\novercrowding, the Detroit Board had ad-\nconstitutional violations with respect to\nBoard\nmittedly bused Negro Detroit pupils to\nthe exercise of its general responsibil-\nthe State\npredominantly Negro schools which were\nity for, and supervision of, public\nauthorit\nbeyond or away from closer white\neducation.5 The State, for example, was\nlections\nschools with available space.4 This\nfound to have failed, until the 1971 Ses-\nfect of\npractice was found to have continued in\nsion of the Michigan Legislature, to pro-\nrecent years despite the Detroit Board's\n728 program.\nvide authorization or funds for the 1727\nlargely\navowed policy, adopted in 1967, of utiliz-\ntransportation of pupils within Detroit\ning transportation to increase desegre-\nsponsibilit\nregardless of their poverty or distance\ngation:\nfrom the school to which they were as-\n6.\n\"Seca\nsigned; during this same period the\ntendance\n\"With one exception (necessitated by\nState provided many neighboring, most-\nyear deti\nthe burning of a white school), de-\ndistrict\nly white, suburban districts the full\n726\nfendant Board has never bused white\ndate of\nrange of state-supported transportation.\nfirst clas\nchildren to predominantly black\nunder tlx\nschools. The Board has not bused\nThe District Court found that the\nbut such\nwhite pupils to black schools despite\nState, through Act 48, acted to \"impede,\nof anyma\nthe enormous amount of space availa-\ndelay and minimize racial integration in\nment pri\nble in inner-city schools. There were\nDetroit schools.\" The first sentence of\ntendance\n22,961 vacant seats in schools 90% or\n§ 12 of Act 48 was designed to delay the\npractical\nmore black.\" Id., at 588.\nApril 7, 1970, desegregation plan origi-\n§\n12.\nnally adopted by the Detroit Board.\nLaws\nWith respect to the Detroit Board of\nThe remainder of § 12 sought to pre-\n7. The\nEducation's practices in school construc-\nscribe for each school in the eight dis-\npossibilit\ntion, the District Court found that De-\ntricts criteria of \"free choice\" and\npersons)\ntroit school construction generally tend-\n\"neighborhood schools,\" which, the Dis-\npatternal\ned to have a segregative effect with the\ntrict Court found, \"had as their purpose\nwhich\nwhitere\n4. The Court of Appeals found record evi-\n\"The legislature shall maintain and support\nhoods\ndence that in at least one instance during\na system of free public elementary and second-\nIt\nthe period 1957-1958, Detroit served a sub-\nary schools as defined by law.\"\nurban school district by contracting with it\ntices gre\nSimilarly, the Michigan Supreme Court has\nto educate its Negro high school students\nin the\nstated: \"The school district is a State\nby transporting them away from nearby\nagency. Moreover, it is of legislative crea-\n1970)\nsuburban white high schools, and past De-\ntion.\n\" Attorney General ex rel.\non the\ntroit high schools which were predominantly\nKies V. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W.\nremoved\nwhite, to all-Negro or predominantly Negro\n289, 290 (1902) : \"Education in Michigan\nernment\nDetroit schools. 484 F.2d, at 231.\nbelongs to the State. It is no part of the local\nhave a\nself-government inherent in the township or\nthe con\n5. School districts in the State of Michigan\nmunicipality. except SO far as the Legislature\nknow, tl\nare instrumentalities of the State and subor-\nmay choose to make it such. The Constitu-\nly infre\ndinate to its State Board of Education and\ntion has turned the whole subject over to\nand VA\nlegislature. The Constitution of the State of\nthe Legislature.\nAttorney Gen-\nMichigan, Art. S, § 2, provides in rele-\nmainten.\neral ex rel. Zacharias v. Detroit Board of\nvant part:\nEducation, 154 Mich. 584. 590, 118 N.W. 606,\ni. e., r:\n609 (1908).\nThe con\nSupp. 5\n418 U.S. 729\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3119\nCite as It S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nand effect the maintenance of segrega-\nTurning to the question of an appro-\ntion.\" 338 F.Supp., at 589.6\npriate remedy for these several constitu-\nThe District Court also held that the\ntional violations, the District Court de-\nacts of the Detroit Board of Education,\nferred a pending motion 8 by intervening\nas a subordinate entity of the State,\nparent defendants to join as additional 729\nwere attributable to the State of Michi-\nparties defendant the 85 outlying school\ngan, thus creating a vicarious liability on\ndistricts in the three-county Detroit met-\nthe part of the State. Under Michigan\nropolitan area on the ground that effec-\nlaw, Mich.Comp.Laws § 388.851 (1970),\ntive relief could not be achieved without\nfor example, school building construction\ntheir presence.9 The District Court con-\nplans had to be approved by the State\ncluded that this motion to join was \"pre-\nBoard of Education, and, prior to 1962,\nmature,\" since it \"has to do with relief\"\nthe State Board had specific statutory\nand no reasonably specific desegregation\nauthority to supervise school-site se-\nplan was before the court. 338 F.Supp.,\nlection. The proofs concerning the ef-\nat 595. Accordingly, the District Court\nfect of Detroit's school construction\nproceeded to order the Detroit Board of\n728 program were, therefore, found to be\nEducation to submit desegregation plans\nlargely applicable to show state re-\nlimited to the segregation problems\nsponsibility for the segregative results.⁷\nfound to be existing within the city of\n6. \"Sec. 12. The implementation of any at-\nThus, the District Court concluded:\ntendance provisions for the 1970-71 school\n\"The affirmative obligation of the defendant\nyear determined by any first class school\nBoard has been and is to adopt and imple-\ndistrict board shall be delayed pending the\nment pupil assignment practices and policies\ndate of commencement of functions by the\nthat compensate for and avoid incorporation\nfirst class school district boards established\ninto the school system the effects of resi-\ndential racial segregation.\" Id., at 593.\nunder the provisions of this amendatory act\nThe Court of Appeals, however, expressly\nbut such provision shall not impair the right\nnoted that:\nof any such board to determine and imple-\n\"In affirming the District Judge's findings of\nment prior to such date such changes in at-\nconstitutional violations by the Detroit\ntendance provisions as are mandated by\nBoard of Education and by the State defend-\npractical necessity.\n\" Act No. 48,\nants resulting in segregated schools in De-\n§ 12, Mich.Pub. Acts of 1970; Mich.Comp.\ntroit, we have not relied at all upon testimo-\nLaws § 388.182 (1970).\nny pertaining to segregated housing except\nas school construction programs helped\n7. The District Court briefly alluded to the\ncause or maintain such segregation.\" 484\npossibility that the State, along with private\nF.2d, at 242.\npersons, had caused, in part, the housing\nAccordingly, in its present posture, the case\ndoes not present any question concerning\npatterns of the Detroit metropolitan area\npossible state housing violations.\nwhich, in turn, produced the predominantly\n8. On March 22, 1971, a group of Detroit res-\nwhite and predominantly Negro neighbor-\nhoods that characterize Detroit\nidents, who were parents of children enrolled\nin the Detroit public schools, were permitted\n\"It is no answer to say that restricted prac-\nto intervene as parties defendant. On June\ntices grew gradually (as the black population\n24, 1971, the District Judge alluded to the\nin the area increased between 1920 and\n\"possibility\" of a metropolitan school system\n1970), or that since 1948 racial restrictions\nstating: \"[A]s I have said to several witness-\non the ownership of real property have been\nes in this case: \"How do you desegrate a\nremoved. The policies pursued by both gov-\nblack city, or a black school system.\" Peti-\ntioners' Appendix 243a (hereinafter Pat.\nernment and private persons and agencies\nApp.). Subsequently, on July 16, 1971, vari-\nhave a continuing and present effect upon\nous parents filed a motion to require joinder\nthe complexion of the community-as we\nof all of the 85 outlying independent school\nknow. the choice of a residence is a relative-\ndistricts within the tri-county area.\nly infrequent affair. For many years FHA\n9. The respondents, as plaintiffs below, op-\nand VA openly advised and advocated the\nposed the motion to join the additional\nmaintenance of 'harmonious' neighborhoods.\nschool districts, arguing that the presence of\ni. e., racially and economically harmonious.\nthe state defendants was sufficient and all\nThe conditions created continue.\" 338 F.\nthat was required, even if. in shaping a rem-\nSupp. 582. 587 (ED Mich.1971).\nedy, the affairs of these other districts was\nto be affected. 338 F.Supp. at 595.\n3120\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 729\n418\nDetroit. At the same time, however, the\nvene under advisement pending submis-\nstate defendants were directed to submit\nsion of the requested desegregation\ndesegregation plans encompassing the\nplans by Detroit and the state officials.\nthree-county metropolitan area 10 despite\nOn March 7, 1972, the District Court no-\n1730 the fact that the 85 outlying school dis-\ntified all parties and the petitioner\ntricts of these three counties were not\nschool districts seeking intervention,\nparties to the action and despite the fact\nthat March 14, 1972, was the deadline\n5\nthat there had been no claim that these\nfor submission of recommendations for\nvene\noutlying districts had committed constitu-\nconditions of intervention and the date 731\nCour\ntional violations. 11 An effort to appeal\nof the commencement of hearings on De-\nnors\nthese orders to the Court of Appeals was\ntroit-only desegregation plans. On the\nMarc\ndismissed on the ground that the orders\nsecond day of the scheduled hearings,\ning d\nwere not appealable. 468 F.2d 902 (CA\nMarch 15, 1972, the District Court\n\"met\n6), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844, 93 S.Ct. 45,\ngranted the motions of the intervenor\nand,\n34 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972). The sequence of\nschool districts 12 subject, inter alia, to\nschool\nthe ensuing actions and orders of the\nthe following conditions:\nmust\nDistrict Court are significant factors and\n732\nissue\nwill therefore be catalogued in some\n\"1. No intervenor will be permit-\ncomp\ndetail.\nted to assert any claim or defense pre-\nonly\nviously adjudicated by the court.\nCour\nFollowing the District Court's abrupt\n\"2. No intervenor shall reopen any\nthe P\nannouncement that it planned to consid-\nquestion or issue which has previously\npeals\ner the implementation of a multidistrict,\nbeen decided by the court.\nW\nmetropolitan area remedy to the segre-\n(a)\ngation problems identified within the\ner th\ncity of Detroit, the District Court was\n\"7. New intervenors are granted\nDistr\nagain requested to grant the outlying\nintervention for two principal pur-\nquest\nschool districts intervention as of right\nposes: (a) To advise the court, by\nrelief\non the ground that the District Court's\nbrief, of the legal propriety or impro-\nplan,\nnew request for multidistrict plans\npriety of considering a metropolitan\nDetr\n\"may, as a practical matter, impair or\nplan; (b) To review any plan or plans\nitan\nimpede [the intervenors'] ability to pro-\nfor the desegregation of the so-called\nants'\ntect\" the welfare of their students. The\nlarger Detroit Metropolitan area, and\ncause\nDistrict Court took the motions to inter-\nsubmitting objections, modifications\nschool\ndistr\n10. At the time of the 1970 census, the popu-\nrelief\nlegally distinct school districts within the\nlation of Michigan was 8,875,083, almost half\ntri-county area, having a total enrollment of\nurbar\nof which, 4,199,931. resided in the tri-county\napproximately 1,000,000 children. In 1970,\nted v\narea of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb. Oak-\nthe Detroit Board of Education operated 319\nland and Macomb Counties abut Wayne\nschools with approximately 276,000 students.\n\"D\nCounty to the north, and Oakland County\n11. In its formal opinion, subsequently an-\nsid\nabuts Macomb County to the west. These\nnounced, the District Court candidly recog-\ncounties cover 1,952 square miles, Michigan\nwa\nnized:\nStatistical Abstract (9th ed. 1972). and the\npul\n\"It should be noted that the court has taken\narea is approximately the size of the State\nno proofs with respect to the establishment\npre\nof Delaware (2,057 square miles), more than\nof the boundaries of the 86 public school\nbef\nhalf again the size of the State of Rhode 1s-\ndistricts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland\nland (1,214 square miles) and almost 30\ncou\nand Macomb, nor on the issue of whether,\ntimes the size of the District of Columbia\nequal\nwith the exclusion of the city of Detroit school\n(67 square miles). Statistical Abstract of the\nthe\ndistrict, such school districts have committed\nUnited States (93d ed. 1972). The popula-\nacts of de jnre segregation.\" 345 F.Supp.\nred\ntions of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Coun-\n914, 920 (ED Mich.1972).\nren\nties were 2,666,751 907,871; and 625,309, re-\nspectively. in 1970. Detroit. the State's larg-\n12. According to the District Court, interven-\nAp\nest city, is located in Wayne County.\ntion was permitted under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.\nIn the 1970-1971 school year. there were\n24(a). \"Intervention of Right,\" and also un-\n13. T\n2,157,449 children enrolled in school dis-\nder Rule 24(b), \"Permissive Intervention.\"\nwas\ntricts in Michigan. There are S6 independent,\nDist\n418 U.S. 733\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3121\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nor alternatives to it or them, and in\n(b) On March 28, 1972, the District\naccordance with the requirements of\nCourt issued its findings and conclusions\nthe United States Constitution and the\non the three Detroit-only plans sub-\nprior orders of this court.\" 1 Joint\nmitted by the city Board and the re-\nAppendix 206 (hereinafter App.).\nspondents. It found that the best of the\nthree plans \"would make the Detroit\nUpon granting the motion to inter-\nschool system more identifiably Black\nvene, on March 15, 1972, the District\nthereby increasing the flight of\nCourt advised the petitioning interve-\nWhites from the city and the system.\"\nnors that the court had previously set\nId., at 55a. From this the court con-\nMarch 22, 1972, as the date for the fil-\ncluded that the plan \"would not ac-\ning of briefs on the legal propriety of a\ncomplish desegregation\nwithin\n\"metropolitan\" plan of desegregation\nthe corporate geographical limits of the\nand, accordingly, that the intervening\ncity.\" Id., at 56a. Accordingly, the Dis-\nschool districts would have one week to\ntrict Court held that it \"must look beyond\nmuster their legal arguments on the\nthe limits of the Detroit school district 733\n732 issue. 13 Thereafter, and following the\nfor a solution to the problem,\" and that\ncompletion of hearings on the Detroit-\n\"[s]chool district lines are simply mat-\nonly desegregation plans, the District\nters of political convenience and may not\nCourt issued the four rulings that were\nbe used to deny constitutional rights.\"\nthe principal issues in the Court of Ap-\nId., at 57a.\npeals.\n(c) During the period from March 28\n(a) On March 24, 1972, two days aft-\nto April 14, 1972, the District Court\ner the intervenors' briefs were due, the\nconducted hearings on a metropolitan\nDistrict Court issued its ruling on the\nplan. Counsel for the petitioning in-\nquestion of whether it could \"consider\ntervenors was allowed to participate in\nrelief in the form of a metropolitan\nthese hearings, but he was ordered to\nplan, encompassing not only the City of\nconfine his argument to \"the size and\nDetroit, but the larger Detroit metropol-\nexpanse of the metropolitan plan\" with-\nitan area.\" It rejected the state defend-\nout addressing the intervenors' opposi-\nants' arguments that no state action\ntion to such a remedy or the claim that\ncaused the segregation of the Detroit\na finding of a constitutional violation by\nschools, and the intervening suburban\nthe intervenor districts was an essential\ndistricts' contention that interdistrict\npredicate to any remedy involving them.\nrelief was inappropriate unless the sub-\nThereafter, on June 14, 1972, the Dis-\nurban districts themselves had commit-\ntrict Court issued its ruling on the \"de-\nted violations. The court concluded:\nsegregation area\" and related findings\nand conclusions. The court acknowl-\n\"[I]t is proper for the court to con-\nedged at the outset that it had \"taken no\nsider metropolitan plans directed to-\nproofs with respect to the establishment\nward the desegregation of the Detroit\nof the boundaries of the 86 public school\npublic schools as an alternative to the\ndistricts in the counties [in the Detroit\npresent intra-city desegregation plans\narea], nor on the issue of whether, with\nbefore it and, in the event that the\nthe exclusion of the city of Detroit\ncourt finds such intra-city plans inad-\nschool districts, such school districts have\nequate to desegregate such schools,\ncommitted acts of de jure segregation.\"\nthe court is of the opinion that it is\nNevertheless, the court designated 53 of\nrequired to consider a metropolitan\nthe 85 suburban school districts plus De-\nremedy for desegregation.\" Pet.\ntroit as the \"desegregation area\" and\nApp. 51a.\nappointed a panel to prepare and submit\n13. This rather abbreviated briefing schedule\na motion made eight months earlier, to bring\nwas maintained despite the fact that the\nthe suburban districts into the case. See text\nDistrict Court had deferred consideration of\naccompanying 11. S supra.\n3122\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 733\n418\n\"an effective desegregation plan\" for\n238, and by the state defendants, id.,\nplan\nthe Detroit schools that would encom-\nat 239-241.16 It stated that the acts\nplan\npass the entire desegregation area. 14\nof racial discrimination shown in the\n735\nthe\nThe plan was to be based on 15 clusters,\nrecord are \"causally related to the sub-\nment\neach containing part of the Detroit sys-\nstantial amount of segregation found\nto\ntem and two or more suburban districts,\nin the Detroit school system,\" id., at\nout\n734 and was to \"achieve the greatest degree\n241, and that \"the District Court was\nany\nof actual desegregation to the end that,\ntherefore authorized and required to\ncons\nupon implementation, no school, grade or\ntake effective measures to desegregate\n736 ing\nclassroom [would be] substantially dis-\nthe Detroit Public School System.\" Id.,\nno\nproportionate to the overall pupil racial\nat 242.\nallow\ncomposition.\" 345 F.Supp. 914, 918 (ED\nMich.1972).\nThe Court of Appeals also agreed with\nthe District Court that \"any less com-\n(d) On July 11, 1972, and in accord-\nprehensive a solution than a metropoli-\nSt\nance with a recommendation by the\ntan' area plan would result in an all\ncourt-appointed desegregation panel, the\nblack school system immediately sur-\nDistrict Court ordered the Detroit\nrounded by practically all white subur-\nBoard of Education to purchase or lease\nban school systems, with an overwhelm-\n\"at least\" 295 school buses for the pur-\nAn\ningly white majority population in the to-\npose of providing transportation under\nto be\ntal metropolitan area.\" Id., at 245.\nan interim plan to be developed for the\nDistr\nThe court went on to state that it\n1972-1973 school year. The costs of\ncould \"[not] see how such segregation\nthis acquisition were to be borne by the\ncan be any less harmful to the minority\nview\nstate defendants. Pet.App. 106a-107a.\nstudents than if the same result were\nCour\nOn June 12, 1973, a divided Court of\naccomplished within one school district.\"\n\"dese\nAppeals, sitting en banc, affirmed in\nIbid.\nsubu\npart, vacated in part, and remanded for\naffect\nAccordingly, the Court of Appeals\nfurther proceedings. 484 F.2d 215\ndy\nconcluded that \"the only feasible deseg-\n(CA6).15 The Court of Appeals held,\nbe\nregation plan involves the crossing of\nfirst, that the record supported the\nmand\nthe boundary lines between the Detroit\nhear\nDistrict Court's findings and conclusions\nSchool District and adjacent or nearby\nplem\non the constitutional violations commit-\nschool districts for the limited purpose\n2d,\nted by the Detroit Board, id., at 221-\nof providing an effective desegregation\nreml\n14. As of 1970. the 53 school districts outside\ncity Board is an instrumentality of the State\nnot\nthe city of Detroit that were included in the\nand subordinate to the State Board, the seg-\ndent\ncourt's \"desegration area\" had a combined stu-\nregative actions of the Detroit Board \"are\nDet\ndent population of approximately 503,000\nthe actions of an agency of the State,\" id.,\nDeti\nstudents compared to Detroit's approximate-\nat 23S; (2) that the state legislation\nIv 276,000 students. Nevertheless, the Dis-\nrescinding Detroit's voluntary desegregation\nof\ntrict Court directed that the intervening dis-\nplan contributed to increasing segregation in\ncomm\ntricts should be represented by only one\nthe Detroit schools, ibid.; (3) that under\ntiona\nmember on the desegregation panel while the\nstate law prior to 1962 the State Board had\nId\nDetroit Board of Education was granted\nauthority over school construction plans and\nthree panel members. 345 F.Supp., at 917.\ntherefore had to be held responsible \"for the\npeals\n15. The District Court had certified most of\nsegregative results,\" ibid.; (4) that the\n\"State statutory scheme of support of trans-\nbuses\nthe foregoing rulings for interlocutory re-\nview pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1\nportation for school children directly dis-\ntrict\nApp. 265-266) and the case was initially de-\ncriminated against Detroit: id., at 240,\norder\ncided on the merits by a panel of three\nby not providing transportation funds to\nDetroit on the same basis as funds were\njudges. However. the panel's opinion and\nprovided to surburban districts, id., at 238;\njudgment were vacated when it was deter-\n17.\nmined to rehear the case en bane. 484 F.2d,\nand (5) that the transportation of Negro\nSchool\nstudents from one suburban district to a Negro\nat 218.\nschool in Detroit must have had the \"ap-\n16. With respect to the State's violations, the\nproval, tacit or express. of the State Board\n36\nCourt of Appeals held: (1) that, since the\nof Education,\" ibid.\nthe\n418 U.S. 737\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3123\nCite as 91 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nplan.\" Id., It reasoned that such a\nII\n737\nplan would be appropriate because of\nthe State's violations, and could be imple-\n[1] Ever since Brown V. Board of\nmented because of the State's authority\nEducation, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98\nto control local school districts. With-\nL.Ed. 873 (1954), judicial consideration\nout further elaboration, and without\nof school desegregation cases has begun\nwith the standard:\nany discussion of the claims that no\nconstitutional violation by the outly-\n\"[I]n the field of public education the\n1736 ing districts had been shown and that\ndoctrine of 'separate but equal' has no\nno evidence on that point had been\nplace. Separate educational facilities\nallowed, the Court of Appeals held:\nare inherently unequal.\" Id., at 495,\n74 S.Ct., at 692.\n\"[T]he State has committed de jure\nThis has been reaffirmed time and\nacts of segregation and\nthe\nState controls the instrumentalities\nagain as the meaning of the Constitu-\nwhose action is necessary to remedy\ntion and the controlling rule of law.\nthe harmful effects of the State acts.\"\nThe target of the Brown holding was\nIbid.\nclear and forthright: the elimination of\nAn interdistrict remedy was thus held\nstate-mandated or deliberately main-\nto be \"within the equity powers of the\ntained dual school systems with certain\nDistrict Court.\" Id., at 250.¹⁷\nschools for Negro pupils and others for\nwhite pupils. This duality and racial\nThe Court of Appeals expressed no\nsegregation were held to violate the Con-\nviews on the propriety of the District\nstitution in the cases subsequent to\nCourt's composition of the metropolitan\n1954, including particularly Green V.\n\"desegregation area.\" It held that all\nCounty School Board of New Kent Coun-\nsuburban school districts that might be\nty, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.\naffected by any metropolitanwide reme-\n2d 716 (1968) Raney V. Board of Edu-\ndy should, under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 19,\ncation, 391 U.S. 443, 88 S.Ct. 1697, 20\nbe made parties to the case on re-\nL.Ed.2d 727 (1968) ; Monroe V. Board\nmand and be given an opportunity to be\nof Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 88 S.Ct.\nheard with respect to the scope and im-\n1700, 20 L.Ed.2d 733 (1968) ; Swann V.\nplementation of such a remedy. 484 F.\nCharlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-\n2d, at 251-252. Under the terms of the\ntion, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.\nremand, however, the District Court was\n2d 554 (1971) ; Wright V. Council of the\nnot \"required\" to receive further evi-\nCity of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct.\ndence on the issue of segregation in the\n2196, 33 L.Ed.2d 51 (1972) ; United\nDetroit schools or on the propriety of a\nStates V. Scotland Neck City Board of\nDetroit-only remedy, or on the question\nEducation, 407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214,\nof whether the affected districts had\n33 L.Ed.2d 75 (1972).\ncommitted any violation of the constitu-\ntional rights of Detroit pupils or others.\nThe Swann case, of course, dealt\nId., at 252. Finally, the Court of Ap-\n\"with the problem of defining in more\npeals vacated the District Court's or-\nprecise terms than heretofore the\nder directing the acquisition of school\nscope of the duty of school authorities\nbuses, subject to the right of the Dis-\nand district courts in implementing\ntrict Court to consider reimposing the\nBrown I and the mandate to eliminate\norder \"at the appropriate time.\" Ibid.\ndual systems and establish unitary\n17. The court sought to distingnish Bradiey V.\nan actual consolidation of three school dis-\nSchool Board of the City of Richmond. 462\ntriets and that Virginia's Constitution and\nF.2d 1058 (CA4 1972). aff'd by an equally\nstatutes, unlike Michigan's gave the local\ndivided Court, 412 U.S. 92, 93 S.Ct. 1952.\nboards exclusive power to operate the public\n36 L.Ed.2d 771 (1973), on the grounds that\nschools. 484 F.2d. at 251.\nthe District Court in that case had ordered\n3124\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 737\n418 T\nsystems at once.\" 402 U.S., at 6, 91 only plans on the ground that \"while\nS.Ct., at 1271.\n[they] would provide a racial mix more\nin keeping with the Black-White propor-\nIn Brown V. Board of Education, 349 U.\ntions of the student population [they]\nS. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083\nwould accentuate the racial identifiabili-\n(1955) (Brown II), the Court's first en-\nty of the Detroit] district as a Black\n739\nseem\ncounter with the problem of remedies in\nschool system, and would not accomplish\nthe\nschool desegregation cases, the Court\ndesegregation.\" Pet.App., 56a. \"[T]he\n740\nmar\nnoted:\nracial composition of the student body is\nthe\n\"In fashioning and effectuating the\nsuch,\" said the court, \"that the plan's\ntheir\ndecrees, the courts will be guided by\nimplementation would clearly make the\nof\nequitable principles. Traditionally,\nentire Detroit public school system ra-\nbalan\n738\nequity has been characterized by a\ncially identifiable\" (Id., at 54a), \"leav-\nble\npractical flexibility in shaping its\n[ing] many of its schools 75 to 90 per\nsumm\nremedies and by a facility for adjust-\ncent Black.\" Id., at 55a. Consequent-\nnot\ning and reconciling public and private\nly, the court reasoned, it was impera-\nof\nneeds.\" Id., at 300, 75 S.Ct., at 756\ntive to \"look beyond the limits of the\nless\nDetroit school district for a solution\n(footnotes omitted).\nbody\nto the problem of segregation in the De-\ned\nIn further refining the remedial process,\ntroit public schools\nsince\ntion\nSwann held, the task is to correct, by a\n\"[s]chool district lines are simply mat-\nThe\nbalancing of the individual and collective\nters of political convenience and may not\nas\nDe\ninterests, \"the condition that offends the\nbe used to deny constitutional rights.\"\ndistri\nConstitution.\" A federal remedial pow-\nId., at 57a. Accordingly, the District\nthe\ner may be exercised \"only on the basis\nCourt proceeded to redefine the relevant\nemplo\nof a constitutional violation\" and, \"[a]s\narea to include areas of predominantly\nexpress\nwith any equity case, the nature of the\nwhite pupil population in order to ensure\ntution\nviolation determines the scope of the\nthat \"upon implementation, no school,\nremedy.\" 402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct.,\ngrade or classroom [would be] substan-\nat 1276.\ntially disproportionate to the overall pu-\ntra\npil racial composition\" of the entire met-\n[2] Proceeding from these basic\nthe\nropolitan area.\nprinciples, we first note that in the Dis-\n12\ntrict Court the complainants sought a\nWhile specifically acknowledging that\nof\nremedy aimed at the condition alleged to\nthe District Court's findings of a condi-\ntha\noffend the Constitution-the segregation\ntion of segregation were limited to De-\nwithin the Detroit City School District. 18\ntroit, the Court of Appeals approved the\ntial\nThe court acted on this theory 'of the\nuse of a metropolitan remedy largely on\nput\ncase and in its initial ruling on the \"De-\nthe grounds that it is\nSu\nsegregation Area\" stated:\n\"impossible to declare 'clearly erro-\nIn\nneous' the District Judge's conclusion\nof\n\"The task before this court, there-\nhas always\nthat any Detroit only segregation plan\nthe €\nfore, is now, and\nwill lead directly to a single segregat-\nbeen, how to desegregate the Detroit\ned Detroit school district overwhelm-\n19.\npublic schools.\" 345 F.Supp., at 921.\npils\ningly black in all of its schools, sur-\ntute\nThereafter, however, the District Court\nrounded by a ring of suburbs and sub-\nouts\nabruptly rejected the proposed Detroit-\nurban school districts overwhelmingly\ncoul\nty\n18. Although the list of issues presented for\n(c) and 40(1) (d) (2), at a minimum limit\nSwi\nour review to the Detroit violation findings\nlarg\nreview in petitioners' briefs and petitions for\nwrits of certiorari do not include arguments\nto \"plain error,\" and. under our decision last\non the findings of segregative violations on\nTerm in Keyes V. School District No. 1, Den-\nthe part of the Detroit defendants, two of the\nver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686,\nfor\npetitioners argue in brief that these findings\n37 L.Ed.2d 548 1973). the findings appear\ntem\nson\nconstitute error. This Court's Rules 23(1)\nto be correct.\n418 U.S. 742\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3125\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nwhite in composition in a State in\n\"If we were to read the holding of the\nwhich the racial composition is 87 per\nDistrict Court to require, as a matter\ncent white and 13 per cent black.\" 484\nof substantive constitutional right,\nF.2d, at 249.\nany particular degree of racial balance\n[3] Viewing the record as a whole, it\nor mixing, that approach would be dis-\nseems clear that the District Court and\napproved and we would be obliged to\nthe Court of Appeals shifted the pri-\nreverse.\" 402 U.S., at 24, 91 S.Ct., at\n1280.\n1740 mary focus from a Detroit remedy to\nthe metropolitan area only because of\nThe clear import of this language from\ntheir conclusion that total desegregation\nSwann is that desegregation, in the\nof Detroit would not produce the racial\nsense of dismantling a dual school sys-\nbalance which they perceived as desira-\ntem, does not require any particular ra-\nble. Both courts proceeded on an as-\ncial balance in each \"school, grade or 741\nsumption that the Detroit schools could\nclassroom.\" 19 See Spencer V. Kugler,\nnot be truly desegregated-in their view\n404 U.S. 1027, 92 S.Ct. 707, 30 L.Ed.2d\nof what constituted desegregation-un-\n723 (1972).\nless the racial composition of the student\nbody of each school substantially reflect-\n[4] Here the District Court's ap-\ned the racial composition of the popula-\nproach to what constituted \"actual de-\ntion of the metropolitan area as a whole.\nsegregation\" raises the fundamental\nThe metropolitan area was then defined\nquestion, not presented in Swann, as to\nas Detroit plus 53 of the outlying school\nthe circumstances in which a federal\ndistricts. That this was the approach\ncourt may order desegregation relief\nthe District Court expressly and frankly\nthat embraces more than a single school\nemployed is shown by the order which\ndistrict. The court's analytical starting\nexpressed the court's view of the consti-\npoint was its conclusion that school dis-\ntutional standard:\ntrict lines are no more than arbitrary\nlines on a map drawn \"for political con-\n\"Within the limitations of reasonable\nvenience.\" Boundary lines may be\ntravel time and distance factors, pupil\nbridged where there has been a constitu-\nreassignments shall be effected within\ntional violation calling for interdistrict\nthe clusters described in Exhibit P.M.\nrelief, but the notion that school district\n12 so as to achieve the greatest degree\nlines may be casually ignored or treated\nof actual desegregation to the end\nas a mere administrative convenience is\nthat, upon implementation, no school,\ncontrary to the history of public educa-\ngrade or classroom [will be] substan-\ntion in our country. No single tradition\ntially disproportionate to the overall\nin public education is more deeply rooted\npupil racial composition.\", 345 F.\nthan local control over the operation of\nSupp., at 918 (emphasis added).\nschools; local autonomy has long been\nIn Swann, which arose in the context\nthought essential both to the mainte-\nof a single independent school district,\nnance of community concern and support\nthe Court held:\nfor public schools and tolquality of the 742\n19. Disparity in the racial composition of pu-\none race [the school authority has] the bur-\npils within a single district may well consti-\nden of showing that such school assignments\ntute a \"signal\" to a district court at the\nare genuinely nondiscriminatory.\" 402 U.S.,\noutset, leading to inquiry into the causes ac-\nat 26, 91 S.Ct., at 1281. See also Keyes, su-\ncounting for a pronounced racial identifiabili-\npra, at 208, 93 S.Ct.. at 2697. However, the\nty of schools within one school system. In\nuse of significant racial imbalance in schools\nSwann, for example, we were dealing with a\nwithin an autonomous school district as\nlarge but single independent school system,\na signal which operates simply to shift\nand a unanimous Court noted\nthe burden of proof, is a very different mat-\n\"Where the school authority's proposed plan\nter from equating racial imbalance with a\nfor conversion from a dual to a unitary sys-\nconstitutional violation calling for a remedy.\ntem contemplates the continued existence of\nKeyes, supra, also involved a remedial order\nsome schools that are all or predominantly of\nwithin a single autonomous school district.\n3126\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 742\n418\neducational process. See Wright V.\nchildren of Detroit be within the ju-\nplex\nCouncil of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S.,\nrisdiction and operating control of a\nperint\nat 469, 92 S.Ct., at 2206. Thus, in San\nschool board elected by the parents and\nis a:\nAntonio Independent School District V.\nresidents of other districts? What\nqualif\nRodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50, 93 S.Ct. 1278,\nboard or boards would levy taxes for\nwould\n1305, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), we observed\nschool operations in these 54 districts\nschoo\nthat local control over the educational\nconstituting the consolidated metropoli-\ntives\nprocess affords citizens an opportunity\ntan area? What provisions could be\nto participate in decision-making, per-\nmade for assuring substantial equality\n[5]\nmits the structuring of school programs\nin tax levies among the 54 districts, if\nthe\nto fit local needs, and encourages \"ex-\nthis were deemed requisite? What pro-\nand\nperimentation, innovation, and a healthy\nvisions would be made for financing?\ncal\ncompetition for educational excellence.\"\nWould the validity of long-term bonds be\nthey\njeopardized unless approved by all of the\nAmen\nThe Michigan educational structure\ncomponent districts as well as the\nto pr\ninvolved in this case, in common with\nState? What body would determine\ne. g.,\nmost States, provides for a large mea-\nthat portion of the curricula now left to\nEmpc\nsure of local control,20 and a review of\nthe discretion of local school boards\nL.Ed.\nthe scope and character of these local\nWho would establish attendance zones,\nScotl:\npowers indicates the extent to which the\npurchase school equipment, locate and\n407 1\ninterdistrict remedy approved by the\nconstruct new schools, and indeed attend\n75 (1\ntwo courts could disrupt and alter the\nto all the myriad day-to-day decisions\nvente\n1743 structure of public education in Michi-\nthat are necessary to school operations\ndistri\ngan. The metropolitan remedy would\naffecting potentially more than three-\nwas\nrequire, in effect, consolidation of 54 in-\nquarters of a million pupils? See n.\nschoo\ndependent school districts historically\n10, supra.\nBoar\nadministered as separate units into a\nty, 4\nvast new super school district. See n.\nIt may be suggested that all of these\ncontr\n10, supra. Entirely apart from the lo-\nvital operational problems are yet to be\ndraw\ngistical and other serious problems at-\nresolved by the District Court, and that\ned S\ntending large-scale transportation of\nthis is the purpose of the Court of Ap-\nstudents, the consolidation would give\npeals' proposed remand. But it is ob-\n(ED.\nrise to an array of other problems in fi-\nvious from the scope of the interdistrict\n(CA5\nnancing and operating this new school\nremedy itself that absent a complete re-\ngar\nsystem. Some of the more obvious ques-\nstructuring of the laws of Michigan re-\nS.Ct.\ntions would be: What would be the sta-\nlating to school districts the District\nor in\ntus and authority of the present popu-\nCourt will become first, a de facto \"leg- 1744\nmain\nlarly elected school boards Would the\nislative authority\" to resolve these com-\nholdi\nand\n20. Under the Michigan School Code of 1955,\n340.583; to provide a kindergarten program,\ntrict.\nthe local school district is an autonomous\n§ 340.584; to establish and operate vocation-\nthe f\npolitical body corporate, operating through a\nal schools, § 340.585; to offer adult educa-\nmand\nBoard of Education popularly elected.\ntion programs, § 340.586 to establish attend-\nMich.Comp.Laws §§ 340.27, 340.55, 340.-\nance areas, § 340.589 to arrange for trans-\ntrict\n107, 340.148, 340.149, 340.188. As such,\nportation of nonresident students, § 340.591;\nof se\nthe day-to-day affairs of the school district\nto acquire transportation equipment, § 340.-\ndistri\nare determined at the local level in accord-\n594; to receive gifts and bequests for educa-\nance with the plenary power to acquire real\ntional purposes, § 340.605 to employ an at-\nand personal property, §§ 340.26, 340.77. 340.-\ntorney, § 340.609 to suspend or expel stu-\n[6]\n113, 340.165, 340.192, 340.352: to hire and\ndents. § 340.613 to make rules and regula-\nently\ncontract with personnel, §§ 340.569, 340.574;\ntions for the operation of schools, § 340.614\nthe S\nto levy taxes for operations, § 340.563; to\nto cause to be levied authorized millage, §\nby th\nborrow against receipts, § 340.567 to deter-\n340.643a: to acquire property by eminent do-\ntiona\nmine the length of school terms, § 340.575 to\nmain, § 340.711 et seq.; and to approve and\ncontrol the admission of nonresident students,\nselect textbooks, § 340.882.\n16, 9\n§ 340.582; to determine courses of study, §\naries\ndistr\n418 U.S. 745\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3127\nCité as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nplex questions, and then the \"school su-\ndating the separate units for remedi-\nperintendent\" for the entire area. This\nal purposes or by imposing a cross-\nis a task which few, if any, judges are\ndistrict remedy, it must first be 745\nqualified to perform and one which\nshown that there has been a con-\nwould deprive the people of control of\nstitutional violation within one dis-\nschools through their elected representa-\ntrict that produces a significant segre-\ntives.\ngative effect in another district. Spe-\ncifically, it must be shown that racially\n[5] Of course, no state law is above\ndiscriminatory acts of the state or loca[\nthe Constitution. School district lines\nschool districts, or of a single school dis-\nand the present laws with respect to lo-\ntrict have been a substantial cause of in-\ncal control, are not sacrosanct and if\nterdistrict segregation. Thus an inter-\nthey conflict with the Fourteenth\ndistrict remedy might be in order where\nAmendment federal courts have a duty\nthe racially discriminatory acts of one or\nto prescribe appropriate remedies. See,\nmore school districts caused racial segre-\ne. g., Wright V. Council of the City of\ngation in an adjacent district, or where\nEmporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct. 2196, 33\ndistrict lines have been deliberately\nL.Ed.2d 51 (1972) United States V.\ndrawn on the basis of race. In such cir-\nScotland Neck City Board of Education,\ncumstances an interdistrict remedy\n407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214, 33 L.Ed.2d\nwould be appropriate to eliminate the in-\n75 (1972) (state or local officials pre-\nterdistrict segregation directly caused\nvented from carving out a new school\nby the constitutional violation. Con-\ndistrict from an existing district that\nversely, without an interdistrict viola-\nwas in process of dismantling a dual\ntion and interdistrict effect, there is no\nschool system); cf. Haney V. County\nconstitutional wrong calling for an in-\nBoard of Education of Sevier Coun-\nterdistrict remedy.\nty, 429 F.2d 364 (CA8 1970) (State\ncontributed to separation of races by\n[7] The record before us, volumi-\ndrawing of school district lines) ; Unit-\nnous as it is, contains evidence of de\ned States V. Texas, 321 F.Supp. 1043\njure segregated conditions only in the\n(ED Tex.1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441\nDetroit schools; indeed, that was the\n(CA5 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Ed-\ntheory on which the litigation was ini-\ngar V. United States, 404 U.S. 1016, 92\ntially based and on which the District\nCourt took evidence. See supra at 3117-\nS.Ct. 675, 30 L.Ed.2d 663 (1972) (one\n3118. With no showing of significant\nor more school districts created and\nviolation by the 53 outlying school dis-\nmaintained for one race). But our prior\ntricts and no evidence of any interdis-\nholdings have been confined to violations\ntrict violation or effect, the court went\nand remedies within a single school dis-\nbeyond the original theory of the case as\ntrict. We therefore turn to address, for\nframed by the pleadings and mandated a\nthe first time, the validity of a remedy\nmetropolitan area remedy. To approve\nmandating cross-district or interdis-\nthe remedy ordered by the court would\ntrict consolidation to remedy a condition\nimpose on the outlying districts, not\nof segregation found to exist in only one\nshown to have committed any constitu-\ndistrict.\ntional violation, a wholly impermissible\nremedy based on a standard not hinted\n[6] The controlling principle consist-\nat in Brown I and II or any holding of\nently expounded in our holdings is that\nthis Court.\nthe scope of the remedy is determined\nby the nature and extent of the constitu-\nIn dissent, Mr. Justice WHITE and\ntional violation. Swann, 402 U.S., at\nMr. Justice MARSHALL undertake to\n16, 91 S.Ct., at 1276. Before the bound-\ndemonstrate that agencies having state-\naries of separate and autonomous school\nwide authority participated in maintain-\ndistricts may be set aside by consoli-\ning the dual school system found to exist\n3128\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 745\nin Detroit. They are apparently of the\nwithin the Detroit school system, and\n748\nview that once such participation is\nnot elsewhere, and on this record the\n1746 shown, the District Court should have a\nremedy must be limited to that system.\nrelatively free hand to reconstruct school\nSwann, supra, 402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct.,\ndistricts outside of Detroit in fashioning\nat 1276.\nrelief. Our assumption, arguendo, see\ninfra, p. 3129, that state agencies did-par-\n[8, 9] The constitutional right of the\nticipate in the maintenance of the De-\nNegro respondents residing in Detroit is\ntroit system, should make it clear that it\nto attend a unitary school system in that\nis not on this point that we part\ndistrict. Unless petitioners drew the\ncompany.21 The difference between us\ndistrict lines in a discriminatory fashion,\narises instead from established doctrine\nor arranged for white students resid-\n747\nlaid down by our cases. Brown, supra;\ning in the Detroit district to attend\nGreen, supra; Swann, supra; Scotland\nschools in Oakland and Macomb Coun-\nNeck, supra; and Emporia, supra, each\nties, they were under no constitution-\naddressed the issue of constitutional\nal duty to make provisions for Negro\nwrong in terms of an established geo-\nstudents to do so. The view of the\ngraphic and administrative school sys-\ndissenters, that the existence of a dual\ntem populated by both Negro and white\nsystem in Detroit can be made the\nchildren. In such a context, terms such\nbasis for a decree requiring cross-dis-\nas \"unitary\" and \"dual\" systems, and\n\"racially identifiable schools,\" have\ntrict transportation of pupils, cannot be\nmeaning, and the necessary federal au-\nsupported on the grounds that it repre-\nBoar\nthority to remedy the constitutional\nsents merely the devising of a suitably\ntions\nwrong is firmly established. But the\nflexible remedy for the violation of\nof\nremedy is necessarily designed, as all\nrights already established by our prior\nState\nremedies are, to restore the victims of\ndecisions. It can be supported only by\ndiscriminatory conduct to the position\ndrastic expansion of the constitutional\nthey would have occupied in the absence\nright itself, an expansion without any\nthe\nof such conduct. Disparate treatment of\nsupport in either constitutional principle\nthat\nwhite and Negro students occurred\nor precedent. 22\n21. Since the Court has held that a resident of\nschools within the district having a racial\na school district has a fundamental right pro-\ncomposition of 57% Negro and 43% White.\ntected by the Federal Constitution to vote in\nIn Wright V. Council of the City of Empo-\na district election, it would seem incongruous\nria, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct. 2196. 33 L.Ed.2d\nto disparage the importance of the school dis-\n51 (1972), the optimal desegregation plan\ntrict in a different context. Kramer V. Union\nwould have resulted in the schools' being\nFree School District No. 15. 395 U.S. 621,\n66% Negro and 34% white, substantially\nnou\n626, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d 583\nthe same percentages as could be obtained\n(1969). While the district there involved was\nunder one of the plans involved in this case.\nlocated in New York, none of the facts in our\nAnd in United States V. Scotland Neck City\npossession suggest that the relation of school\nBoard of Education, 407 U.S. 484, 491 n. 5,\ndistricts to the State is significantly differ-\n92 S.Ct. 2214, 2218, 33 L.Ed.2d 75 (1972), a\nent in New York from that in Michigan.\ndesegregation plan was implicitly approved\nfor a school district which had a racial com-\n22. The suggestion in the dissent of Mr. Jus-\ntice MARSHALL that schools which have a\nposition of 77% Negro and 22% white. In\nnone of these cases was it even intimated\nmajority of Negro students are not \"deseg-\nregated,\" whatever the racial makeup of the\nthat \"actual desegregation\" could not be ac-\nschool district's population and however neu-\ncomplished as long as the number of Negro\ntrally the district lines have been drawn and\nstudents was greater than the number of\nwhite students.\nadministered, finds no support in our prior\nThe dissents also seem to attach impor-\n23\ncases. In Green V. County School Board of\nNew Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 8S S.Ct.\ntance to the metropolitan character of De-\n1689. 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), for example,\ntroit and neighboring school districts. But\nthis Court approved a desegregation plan\nthe constitutional principles applicable in\nwhich would have resulted in each of the\nschool desegregation cases cannot vary in\n418 U.S. 749\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3129\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nIII\n748\noriginal boundaries of the Detroit\nWe recognize that the six-volume\nSchool District, or any other school dis-\nrecord presently under consideration\ntrict in Michigan, were established for\ncontains language and some specific in-\nthe purpose of creating, maintaining, or\ncidental findings thought by the District\nperpetuating segregation of races.\nCourt to afford a basis for interdistrict\nThere is no claim and there is no evi-\nrelief. However, these comparatively\ndence hinting that petitioner outlying\nisolated findings and brief comments\nschools districts and their predecessors, 749\nconcern only one possible interdistrict\nor the 30-odd other school districts in\nviolation and are found in the context of\nthe tricounty area-but outside the Dis-\na proceeding that, as the District Court\ntrict Court's \"desegregation area\"-have\nconceded, included no proof of segrega-\never maintained or operated anything\ntion practiced by any of the 85 suburban\nbut unitary school systems. Unitary\nschool districts surrounding Detroit.\nschool systems have been required for\nThe Court of Appeals, for example, re-\nmore than a century by the Michigan\nlied on five factors which, it held,\nConstitution as implemented by state\namounted to unconstitutional state ac-\nlaw.23 Where the schools of only one\ntion with respect to the violations found\ndistrict have been affected, there is\nin the Detroit system:\nno constitutional power in the courts\nto decree relief balancing the racial\n[10] (1) It held the State deriva-\ncomposition of that district's schools\ntively responsible for the Detroit\nwith those of the surrounding districts.\nBoard's violations on the theory that ac-\ntions of Detroit as a political subdivision\n[11] (2) There was evidence intro-\nof the State were attributable to the\nduced at trial that, during the late\nState. Accepting, arguendo, the correct-\n1950's, Carver School District, a predom-\nness of this finding of state responsibil-\ninantly Negro suburban district, con-\nity for the segregated conditions within\ntracted to have Negro high school stu-\nthe city of Detroit, it does not follow\ndents sent to a predominantly Negro\nthat an interdistrict remedy is constitu-\nschool in Detroit. At the time, Carver\ntionally justified or required. With a\nwas an independent school district that\nsingle exception, discussed later, there\nhad no high school because, according to\nhas been no showing that either the\nthe trial evidence, \"Carver District\nState or any of the 85 outlying districts\ndid not have a place for ade-\nengaged in activity that had a cross-dis-\nquate high school facilities.\" 484 F.2d.,\ntrict effect. The boundaries of the De-\nat 231. Accordingly, arrangements were\nmade with Northern High School in\ntroit School District, which are cotermi-\nthe abutting Detroit School District\nnous with the boundaries of the city of\nso that the Carver high school stu-\nDetroit, were established over a century\ndents could obtain a secondary school edu-\nago by neutral legislation when the city\ncation. In 1960 the Oak Park School Dis-\nwas incorporated; there is no evidence\ntrict, a predominantly white suburban\nin the record, nor is there any sugges-\ndistrict, annexed the predominantly Ne-\ntion by the respondents, that either the\ngro Carver School District, through the\naccordance with the size or population dis-\nas to religion, creed, race, color or national\npersal of the particular city, county. or\norigin,\" Mich.Const.1963, Art. 8, § 2; that\nschool district as compared with neighboring\n\"no separate school or department shall be\nareas.\nkept for any person or persons on account\nof race or color.\" Mich.Comp.Laws § 340.-\n23. People ex rel. Workman V. Board of Edu-\n355; and that \"[a]ll persons, residents of\ncation of Detroit, 18 Mich. 400 (1869) ; Act\na school district\nshall have an\n34. § 28. Mich.Pub.Acts of 1867. The Mich-\nequal right to attend school therein,\" id.,\nigan Constitution and laws provide that\n§ 340.356. See also Act 319, Part II, c. 2,\n\"every school district shall provide for the\n$ 9, Mich.Pub.Acts of 1927.\neducation of its pupils without discrimination\n3130\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 749\n750\ninitiative of local officials. Ibid. There\n1949 and 1962 the State Board of Educa-\n751\nis, of course, no claim that the 1960 an-\ntion exercised general authority as over-\nnexation had a segregative purpose or re-\nseer of site acquisitions by local boards\nsult or that Oak Park now maintains a\nfor new school construction, and sug-\ndual system.\ngested that this state-approved school\nconstruction \"fostered segregation\nAccording to the Court of Appeals,\nthroughout the Detroit Metropolitan\nthe arrangement during the late 1950's\narea.\" 484 F.2d, at 241. This brief\nwhich allowed Carver students to be ed-\ncomment, however, is not supported by\nucated within the Detroit District was\nthe evidence taken at trial since that ev-\ndependent upon the \"tacit or express\"\nidence was specifically limited to proof\napproval of the State Board of Educa-\nthat schoolsite acquisition and school\ntion and was the result of the refusal of\nconstruction within the city of Detroit\nthe white suburban districts to accept\nproduced de jure segregation within the\nthe Carver students. Although there is\ncity itself. Id., at 235-238. Thus,\nnothing in the record supporting the\nthere was no evidence suggesting that\nCourt of Appeals' supposition that sub-\nthe State's activities with respect to\nurban white schools refused to accept\neither school construction or site acqui-\nthe Carver students, it appears that this\nsition within Detroit affected the racial\nsituation, whether with or without the\ncomposition of the school population out-\nState's consent, may have had a segrega-\nside Detroit or, conversely, that the\ntive effect on the school populations of\nState's school construction and site ac-\nthe two districts involved. However,\nquisition activities within the outlying\nsince \"the nature of the violation deter-\ndistricts affected the racial composition\nmines the scope of the remedy,\" Swann,\nof the schools within Detroit.\n402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct., at 1276, this iso-\nlated instance affecting two of the\n(5) The Court of Appeals also relied\nschool districts would not justify the\nupon the District Court's finding:\nbroad metropolitanwide remedy contem-\nplated by the District Court and ap-\n\"This and other financial limitations,\nproved by the Court of Appeals, particu-\nsuch as those on bonding and the\nlarly since it embraced potentially 52\nworking of the state aid formula\ndistricts having no responsibility for the\nwhereby suburban districts were able\narrangement and involved 503,000 pupils\nto make far larger per pupil expendi-\nin addition to Detroit's 276,000 students.\ntures despite less tax effort, have cre-\n(3) The Court of Appeals cited the\nated and perpetuated systematic edu-\nenactment of state legislation (Act 48)\ncational inequalities.\" Id., at 239.\nwhich had the effect of rescinding De-\ntroit's voluntary desegregation plan (the\nHowever, neither the Court of Appeals\nApril 7 Plan). That plan, however, af-\nnor the District Court offered any indi-\nfected only 12 of 21 Detroit high schools\ncation in the record or in their opinions\nand had no causal connection with the\nas to how, if at all, the availability of\ndistribution of pupils by race between\nstate-financed aid for some Michigan\nDetroit and the other school districts\nstudents outside Detroit, but not for\nwithin the tricounty area.\nthose within Detroit, might have affect-\ned the racial character of any of the\n(4) The court relied on the State's\nState's school districts. Furthermore, as\nauthority to supervise schoolsite selec-\nthe respondents recognize, the applica-\ntion and to approve building construc-\ntion of our recent ruling in San Antonio\ntion as a basis for holding the State re-\nSchool District V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,\nsponsible for the segregative results of\n93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), to\nthe school construction program in De-\nthis state education financing system is\ntroit. Specifically, the Court of Appeals\nquestionable, and this issue was not1ad- [752\nasserted that during the period between\ndressed by either the Court of Appeals\n418 U.S. 754\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3131\nCite as S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nor the District Court. This, again, un- the Court of Appeals is reversed and the\nderscores the crucial fact that the theory\ncase is remanded for further proceed-\nupon which the the case proceeded relat-\nings consistent with this opinion leading\ned solely to the establishment of Detroit\nto prompt formulation of a decree di-\ncity violations as a basis for desegregat-\nrected to eliminating the segregation\ning Detroit schools and that, at the time\nfound to exist in Detroit city schools, a\nof trial, neither the parties nor the trial\nremedy which has been delayed since\njudge was concerned with a foundation\n1970.\nfor interdistrict relief.2⁴\nReversed and remanded.\nIV\nMr. Justice STEWART, concurring.\nPetitioners have urged that they were\ndenied due process by the manner in\nIn joining the opinion of the Court, I\nwhich the District Court limited their\nthink it appropriate, in view of some of\nparticipation after intervention was al-\nthe extravagant language of the dissent-\nlowed, thus precluding adequate opportu-\ning opinions, to state briefly my under-\nnity to present evidence that they had\nstanding of what it is that the Court de-\ncommitted no acts having a segregative\ncides today.\neffect in Detroit. In light of our hold-\ning that, absent an interdistrict viola-\nThe respondents commenced this suit\ntion, there is no basis for an interdis-\nin 1970, claiming only that a constitu-\ntrict remedy, we need not reach these\ntionally impermissible allocation of edu-\nclaims. It is clear; however, that the\ncational facilities along racial lines had\nDistrict Court, with the approval of the\noccurred in public schools within a sin-\nCourt of Appeals, has provided an in-\ngle school district whose lines were co-\nterdistrict remedy in the face of a\nterminous with those of the city of De-\nrecord which shows no constitutional vi-\ntroit. In the course of the subsequent\nolations that would call for equitable re-\nproceedings, the District Court found\nlief except within the city of Detroit.\nthat public school officials had contrib-\nIn these circumstances there was no oc-\nuted to racial segregation within that\ncasion for the parties to address, or for\ndistrict by means of improper use of\nthe District Court to consider whether\nzoning and attendance patterns, optional-\nthere were racially discriminatory acts\nattendance areas, and building and site\nfor which any of the 53 outlying dis-\nselection. This finding of a violation of\ntricts. were responsible and which had\nthe Equal Protection Clause was upheld\ndirect and significant segregative effect\nby the Court of Appeals, and is accepted\non schools of more than one district.\nby this Court today. See ante, at 3124 n.\n18. In the present posture of the case,\nWe conclude that the relief ordered by\ntherefore, the Court does not deal with\nthe District Court and affirmed by the\nquestions of substantive constitutional\nCourt of Appeals was based upon an er-\nlaw. The basic issue now before the\nroneous standard and was unsupported\nCourt concerns, rather, the appropriate\nby record evidence that acts of the\nexercise of federal equity jurisdiction.¹\noutlying districts effected the discrimi-\nnation found to exist in the schools of\nNo evidence was adduced and no find-\n754\n753 Detroit. Accordingly, the judgment of\nings were made in the District Court\n24. Apparently, when the District Court sua\n756, 99 L.Ed. 1083: \"[E]quity has been\nsponte, abruptly altered the theory of the\ncharacterized by a practical flexibility in\ncase to include the possibility of multidis-\nshaping its remedies and by a facility for ad-\ntrict relief, neither the plaintiffs nor the\njusting and reconciling public and private\ntrial judge considered amending the com-\nneeds. These [school desegregation] cases\nplaint to embrace t.e new theory.\ncall for the exercise of these traditional at-\ntributes of equity power.\"\n1. As this Court stated in Brown V. Board of\nEducation, 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S.Ct. 753,\n3132\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 754\n4182U\nconcerning the activities of school offi-\n198-205, 93 S.Ct., at 2692-2696. But in\nprop\ncials in districts outside the city of De-\nthis case the Court of Appeals approved\nscho\ntroit, and no school officials from the\nthe concept of a remedial decree that\nfact\noutside districts even participated in the\nwould go beyond the boundaries of the\ncont\nsuit until after the District Court had\ndistrict where the constitutional viola-\nor\nmade the initial determination that is\ntion was found, and include schools and\nthe focus of today's decision. In spite\nschoolchildren in many other school dis-\nsho\nof the limited scope of the inquiry and\ntricts that have presumptively been ad-\npo\nthe findings, the District Court conclud-\nministered in complete accord with the\nSta\ned that the only effective remedy for the\nConstitution.\nloy\nconstitutional violations found to have\nsho\nexisted within the city of Detroit was a\nThe opinion of the Court convincingly\ndesegregation plan calling for busing\ndemonstrates, ante, at 3126, that tradi-\nnot\npupils to and from school districts out-\ntions of local control of schools, together\nfor\nside the city. The District Court found\nwith the difficulty of a judicially super-\nabu\nthat any desegregation plan operating\nvised restructuring of local administra-\nwholly 'within the corporate geographi-\ntion of schools, render improper and in-\n757\ncal limits of the city'' would be deficient\nequitable such an interdistrict response\nof\nsince it \" 'would clearly make the entire\nto a constitutional violation found to\nin\nhave occurred only within a single school\nstate\nDetroit public school system racially\ndistrict.\nBro\nidentifiable as Black.' 484 F.2d 215,\n483\n244, 243. The Court of Appeals, in\nThis is not to say, however, that an\nthe\naffirming the decision that an interdis-\ninterdistrict remedy of the sort ap-\ndutie\ntrict remedy was necessary, noted that a\nproved by the Court of Appeals would\nplan limited to the city of Detroit \"would\nnot be proper, or even necessary, in oth-\ncation\nresult in an all black school system imme-\ner factual situations. Were it to be\nEd.2d\ndiately surrounded by practically all\nshown, for example, that state officials\ndress\nwhite suburban school systems, with an\nhad contributed to the separation of the\nreme\noverwhelmingly white majority popula-\nraces by drawing or redrawing school\nfect\ntion in the total metropolitan area.\"\ndistrict lines, see Haney V. County\nBr\nId., at 245.\nBoard of Education of Sevier County,\ntas\nThe courts were in error for the sim-\n429 F.2d 364; cf. Wright V. Council\nof the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,\ntha\nple reason that the remedy they thought\nnecessary was not commensurate with\n92 S.Ct. 2196, 33 L.Ed.2d 51; Unit-\nthe constitutional violation found.\ned States v. Scotland Neck City Board\nWithin a single school district whose of-\nof Education, 407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214,\n2.\nficials have been shown to have engaged\n33 L.Ed.2d 75; by transfer of school un-\nin unconstitutional racial segregation, a\nits between districts, United States V.\nremedial decree that affects every indi-\nTexas, 321 F.Supp. 1043, aff'd, 447 F.2d\nvidual school may be dictated by \"com-\n441; Turner V. Warren County Board of\nmon sense,\" see Keyes V. School District\nEducation, 313 F.Supp. 380; or by pur-\nNo. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189,\nposeful racially discriminatory use of\n203, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2695, 37 L.Ed.2d 548,\nstate housing or zoning laws, then a de-\nand indeed may provide the only ef-\ncree calling for transfer of pupils across\nfective means to eliminate segregation\ndistrict lines or for restructuring of dis-\n\"root and branch,\" Green V. County\ntrict lines might well be appropriate.\nSchool Board of New Kent County, 391\nU.S. 430, 438, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1693, 20\nIn this case, however, no such inter-\nL.Ed.2d 716, and to \"effectuate a transi-\ndistrict violation was shown. Indeed, no\ntion to a racially nondiscriminatory\nevidence at all concerning the adminis-\n755 schoolisystem.\" Brown V. Board of Edu-\ntration of schools outside the city of De-\ncation, 349 U.S. 294, 301, 75 S.Ct. 753,\ntroit was presented other than the fact\n756, 99 L.Ed. 1083. See Keyes, supra, at\nthat these schools contained a higher 756\nscho\n418 U.S. 757\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3133\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nproportion of white pupils than did the\nmines the scope of the remedy\nschools within the city. Since the mere\nId., at 16, 91 S.Ct., at 1276.\nfact of different racial compositions in\ncontiguous districts does not itself imply\nThe disposition of this case thus falls\nor constitute a violation of the Equal\nsquarely under these principles. The\nProtection Clause in the absence of a\nonly \"condition that offends the Consti-\nshowing that such disparity was im-\ntution\" found by the District Court in\nposed, fostered, or encouraged by the\nthis case is the existence of officially\nState or its political subdivisions, it fol-\nsupported segregation in and among\nlows that no interdistrict violation was\npublic schools in Detroit itself. There\nshown in this case.2 The formulation of\nwere no findings that the differing ra-\nan inter-district remedy was thus simply\ncial composition between schools in the\nnot responsive to the factual record be-\ncity and in the outlying suburbs was\nfore the District Court and was an\ncaused by official activity of any sort.\nabuse of that court's equitable powers.\nIt follows that the decision to include in\nthe desegregation plan pupils from\n757 I In reversing the decision of the Court\nschool districts outside Detroit was not\nof Appeals this Court is in no way turn-\npredicated upon any constitutional viola-\ning its back on the proscription of\ntion involving those school districts. By\nstate-imposed segregation first voiced in\napproving a remedy that would reach be-\nBrown V. Board of Education, 347 U.S.\nyond the limits of the city of Detroit to\n483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, or on\ncorrect a constitutional violation found\nthe delineation of remedial powers and\nto have occurred solely within that city\nduties most recently expressed in Swann\nthe Court of Appeals thus went beyond\nV. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-\nthe governing equitable principles estab-\ncation, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.\nlished in this Court's decisions.\nEd.2d 554. In Swann the Court ad-\ndressed itself to the range of equitable\nMr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.\nremedies available to the courts to ef-\nfectuate the desegregation mandated by\nThe Court of Appeals has acted re-\nBrown and its progeny, noting that the\nsponsibly in these cases and we should\ntask in choosing appropriate relief is\naffirm its judgment. This was the\n\"to correct\nthe condition\nfourth time the case was before it over\nthat offends the Constitution,\" and\na span of less than three years. The\nthat \"the nature of the violation deter-\nCourt of Appeals affirmed the District\n2. My Brother MARSHALL seems to ignore\nknown and perhaps unknowable factors such\nthis fundamental fact when he states, post\nas in-migration, birth rates, economic\nat 3153. that \"the most essential finding\nchanges, or cumulative acts of private racial\n[made by the District Court] was that Ne-\nfears-that accounts for the \"growing core\ngro children in Detroit had been confined by\nof Negro schools,\" a \"core\" that has grown\nintentional acts of segregation to a growing\nto include virtually the entire city. The\ncore of Negro schools surrounded by a re-\nConstitution simply does not allow federal\nceding ring of white schools.\" This conclu-\ncourts to attempt to change that situation\nsion is simply not substantiated by the\nunless and until it is shown that the State.\nrecord presented in this case. The record\nor its political subdivisions, have contributed\nhere does support the claim made by the re-\nto cause the situation to exist. No record\nspondents that white and Negro students\nhas been made in this case showing that the\nwithin Detroit who otherwise would have at-\nracial composition of the Detroit school pop-\ntended school together were separated by\nulation or that residential patterns within\nacts of the State or its subdivision. How-\nDetroit and in the surrounding areas were\never, segregative acts within the city alone\nin any significant measure caused by govern-\ncannot be presumed to have produced-and\nmental activity. and it follows that the situa-\nno factual showing was made that they did\ntion over which my dissenting Brothers ex-\nproduce-an increase in the number of Ne-\npress concern cannot serve as the predicate\ngro students in the city as a whole. It is\nfor the remedy adopted by the District\nthis essential fact of a predominantly Negro\nCourt and approved by the Court of Ap-\nschool population in Detroit-caused by m-\npeals.\n3134\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 758\n418\n758 Court on the issue of segregation and on\nState supervises schoolsite selection.³\n760 know\nthe \"Detroit-only\" plans of desegrega-\nThe construction is done through mu-\npoore\ntion. The Court of Appeals also ap-\nnicipal bonds approved by several state\nSan\nproved in principle the use of a metro-\nagencies.4 Education in Michigan is a\nguez\npolitan area plan, vacating and remand-\nstate project with very little completely\nEd:\ning only to allow the other affected\nlocal control,5 except that the schools are\nschool\nschool districts to be brought in as par-\nfinanced locally, not on a statewide ba-\nway\nties, and in other minor respects.\nsis. Indeed the proposal to put school\n759\nclusi\nfunding in Michigan on a statewide ba-\nStat\nWe have before us today no plan for\nsis was defeated at the polls in Novem-\npay\nintegration. The only orders entered so\nber 1972.6 Yet the school districts by\n761\nfar are interlocutory. No new princi-\nstate law are agencies of the State.⁷\nmeam\nples of law are presented here. Metro-\nState action is indeed challenged as vio-\nEqua\npolitan treatment of metropolitan prob-\nlating the Equal Protection Clause.\nschöo\nlems is commonplace. If this were a\nWhatever the reach of that claim may\nthou\nsewage problem or a water problem, or\nbe, it certainly is aimed at discrimina-\n'sepat\nan energy problem, there can be no\ntion based on race.\ndoubt that Michigan would stay well\nSo\nTherefore as the Court of Appeals\nwithin federal constitutional bounds if\nheld there can be no doubt that as a\nit sought a metropolitan remedy. In\nfrom\nmatter of Michigan law the State it-\nBradley V. School Board of City of Rich-\nblack\nself has the final say as to where and\nmond, 4 Cir., 462 F.2d 1058, aff'd by an\ncilities\nhow school district lines should be\nequally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92, 93 S.\ntreatm\ndrawn.8\nCt. 1952, 36 L.Ed.2d 771, we had a case\ninvolving the Virginia school system\nWhen we rule against the metropoli-\ntrict\nwhere local school boards had \"exclusive\ntan area remedy we take a step that will\n189,7214\njurisdiction\" of the problem, not \"the\nlikely put the problems of the blacks\n37.DiEd\nState Board of Education,\" 462 F.2d, at\nand our society back to the period that\nschool\n1067. Here the Michigan educational\nantedated the \"separate but equal\" re-\nence be\nsystem is unitary, maintained and sup-\ngime of Plessy V. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,\ngation\n16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256. The reason\nported by the legislature and under the\nis simple.\n10\ngeneral supervision of the State Board\nof Education.1 The State controls the\nThe inner core of Detroit is now rath-\nboundaries of school districts.² The\ner solidly black;9 and the blacks, we\n1. Mich.Const., Art. S, §§ 2, 3.\n8. See 11. 2, supra.\n2. See 484 F.2d 215, 247-248: Mich.Comp.\n9. A tremendous change has occurred in the\nLaws §§ 340.402, 340.431, 340.447, 388.681\ndistribution of this country's black popula-\n(1970).\ntion since World War I. See Hauser, Dem-\n3. Mich.Comp.Laws § 388,851 (1948), as\nographic Factors in the Integration of the\nCall\nper\namended by Act 231. Mich.Pub.Acts of 1949,\nNegro, Daedalus 847-877 (fall 1965). In\n1910. 73% of all blacks lived on farms and in\nand Act 175, Mich.Pub.Acts 1962.\nrural areas: by 1960. 73% lived in urban\n4. See Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 132.1 and 132.2\nareas. mainly in the largest metropolitan\n(1970) : 3 App. 157.\nareas. Moreover, due to the fact that the\nYor\n5. See 484 F.2d at 24S-249.\nblack population is younger than the white\npopulation, the concentration of blacks in the\nGreat\n6. See Detroit Free Press, Nov. 8. 1972. p.\ncities is even more pronouneed for the school-\n$1,18\n1A. col. 3. Michigan has recently passed\nage population. The pattern of change which\nStat\nlegislation which could eliminate some. but\nhas existed since World War I is continuing.\nFinal\nand hence the proportion of blacks in the\ncatio\nnot all. of the inequities in school financing.\nfurti\nSee Act 101. Mich.Pub.Acts of 1973.\nurban North and West will continue to in-\ncrease. Dept. of Health. Education. and\nrent\n7. See 484 F.2d, at 246-247; Mich.Const. Art.\nWelfare, J. Coleman et al., Equality of Educa-\ntions\ndistriction\nS, §§ 2, 3.\ntional Opportunity 39-10 (1966).\n418 U.S. 762\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3135\nCite Dt S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nknow, in many instances are likely tombe\naction for Fourteenth Amendment pur-\npoorer, 10 just as were the Chicanos in\nposes when it draws the lines that con-\nSan Antonio School District V. Rodri-\nfine it to a given area, when it builds\nguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.\nschools at particular sites, or when it al-\nEd.2d 16. By that decision the poorer\nlocates students. The creation of the\nschool districts 11 must pay their own\nschool districts in Metropolitan Detroit\nway. It is therefore a foregone con-\neither maintained existing segregation\nclusion that we have now given the\nor caused additional segregation. Re-\nStates a formula whereby the poor must\nstrictive covenants maintained by state\npay their own way. 12\naction or inaction build black ghettos.\n761 Today's decision, given Rodriguez,\nIt is state action when public funds are\nmeans that there is no violation of the\ndispensed by housing agencies to build\nEqual Protection Clause though the\nracial ghettos. Where a community is\nschools are segregated by race and\nracially mixed and school authorities seg-\nthough the black schools are not only\nregate schools, or assign black teachers to\n\"separate\" but \"inferior.\"\nblack schools or close schools in fringe\nareas and build new schools in black areas\nSo far as equal protection is con-\nand in more distant white areas, the State\ncerned we are now in a dramatic retreat\ncreates and nurtures a segregated school\nfrom the 7-to-1 decision in 1896 that\nsystem, just as surely as did those States\nblacks could be segregated in public fa-\ninvolved in Brown V. Board of Educa-\ncilities, provided they received equal\ntion, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.\ntreatment.\n873, when they maintained dual school\nAs I indicated in Keyes V. School Dis-\nsystems.\ntrict No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S.\n189, 214-217, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2700-2701,\nAll these conditions and more were\n37 L.Ed.2d 548, there is SO far as the\nfound by the District Court to exist.\nschool cases go no constitutional differ-\nThe issue is not whether there should be\nence between de facto and de jure segre-\nracial balance but whether the State's\ngation. Each school board performs state\nuse of various devices that end up with 762\n10. There are some definite and systematic\ntional need. City students, with greater\ndirections of difference between the schools\nthan average education deficiencies. consist-\nattended by minorities and those attended by\nently have less money spent on their educa-\nthe majority. It appears to be in the most\ntion and have higher pupil/teacher ratios\nacademically related areas that the schools\nthan do their high-income counterparts in\nof minority pupils show the most consistent\nthe favored schools of suburbia.\" Glickstein\ndeficiencies.\" Dept. of Health, Education, and\n& Want, Inequality in School Financing:\nWelfare. Coleman et al., supra II. 9, at 120.\nThe Role of the Law, 25 Stan.L.Rev. 335,\n11. That some school districts are markedly\n338 (1973).\npoorer than others is beyond question. The\n12. Cities face all especially difficult problem\nCalifornia Supreme Court has noted that\nin paying the cost of education, since they\nper-pupil expenditures in two different dis-\nhave the \"municipal overburden\" which re-\ntricts-both located in the same county-\nsults front greater costs for health, public\nwere $2.223 and $616. Serrano V. Priest, 5\nsafety, sanitation, public works, transporta-\nCal.3d 584, 600 11. 15 (1971). In New\ntion, public welfare, public housing. and rec-\nYork the Fleischmann Commission report-\nreation. Because of municipal overburden,\ned that the two Long Island districts of\ncities on the average devote only about 30%\nGreat Neck and Levittown spent $2,078 and\nof their budgets to their schools. This com-\n$1.189 respectively per pupil. 1 New York\npares with the over 50% which is spent on\nState Commission on the Quality, Cost. and\nschools by the suburbs. J. Berke & J. Calla-\nFinancing of Elementary and Secondary Edu-\nhan, Inequities in School Finance (1971), re-\ncation, Fleischmann Report 58 (1973). \"A\nprinted in Senate Select Committee on Equal\nfurther glaring inequity resulting from the cur-\nEducational Opportunity. 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,\nrent systems of school finance is that varia-\nReport on Issnes in School Finance 129, 142\ntions in per pupil expenditures among school\n(Comm. Print 1972) ; see Glickstein & Want,\ndistricts tend to be inversely related to educa-\nsupra, 11. 11. at 387.\n3136\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 762\nblack schools and white schools brought\ntrict and may not reach into adjoining\nthe Equal Protection Clause into effect.\nor surrounding districts unless and until\nGiven the State's control over the educa-\nit is proved there has been some sort of\ntional system in Michigan, the fact that\n\"interdistrict violation\"-unless uncon-\nthe black schools are in one district and\nstitutional actions of the Detroit School\nthe white schools are in another is not\nBoard have had a segregative impact on\ncontrolling-either constitutionally or\nother districts, or unless the segregated\nequitably.13 No specific plan has yet\ncondition of the Detroit schools has it-\nbeen adopted. We are still at an inter-\nself been influenced by segregative prac-\nlocutory stage of a long drawn-out judi-\ntices in those surrounding districts into\ncial effort at school desegregation. It is\nwhich it is proposed to extend the reme-\nconceivable that ghettos develop on their\ndy.\nown without any hint of state action.\nBut since Michigan by one device or an-\nRegretfully, and for several reasons, I\nother has over the years created black\ncan join neither the Court's judgment\nschool districts and white school dis-\nnor its opinion. The core of my disa-\ntricts, the task of equity is to provide a\ngreement is that deliberate acts of seg-\nunitary system for the affected area\nregation and their consequences will go\nwhere, as here, the State washes its\nunremedied, not because a remedy would\nhands of its own creations.\nbe infeasible or unreasonable in terms of\nthe usual criteria governing school de-\nMr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr.\nsegregation cases, but because an effec-\nJustice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice BREN-\ntive remedy would cause what the Court\nNAN, and Mr. Justice MARSHALL\nconsiders to be undue administrative in-\njoin, dissenting.\nconvenience to the State. The result is\nthat the State of Michigan, the entity at\nThe District Court and the Court of\nwhich the Fourteenth Amendment is di-\nAppeals found that over a long period of\nrected, has successfully insulated itself\nyears those in charge of the Michigan\nfrom its duty to provide effective deseg-\npublic schools engaged in various prac-\nregation remedies by vesting sufficient\ntices calculated to effect the segregation\npower over its public schools in its local\nof the Detroit school system. The Court\nschool districts. If this is the case in\ndoes not question these findings, nor\nMichigan, it will be the case in most\ncould it reasonably do so. Neither does\nStates.\nit question the obligation of the federal\ncourts to devise a feasible and effective\nThere are undoubted practical as well\nremedy. But it promptly cripples the\nas legal limits to the remedial powers of\nability of the judiciary to perform this\nfederal courts in school desegregation\ntask, which is of fundamental impor-\ncases. The Court has made it clear that\ntance to our constitutional system, by\nthe achievement of any particular degree\n763 fashioning a strict rule that remedies in\nof racial balance in the school system is\nschool cases must stop at the school dis-\nnot required by the Constitution nor\n764\ntrict line unless certain other conditions\nmay it be the primary focus of a court\n7653\nare met. As applied here, the remedy\nin devising an acceptable remedy for de\nfor unquestioned violations of the pro-\njure segregation. A variety of proce-\ntection rights of Detroit's Negroes by\ndures and techniques are available to a\nthe Detroit School Board and the\ndistrict court engrossed in fashioning\nState of Michigan must be totally con-\nremedies in a case such as this; but the\nfined to the limits of the school dis-\ncourts must keep in mind that they are\n13. Mr. Justice STEWART indicates that eq-\nseem to me that the equities are stronger in\nuitable factors weigh in favor of local school\nfavor of the children of Detroit who have\ncontrol and the avoidance of administrative\nbeen deprived of their constitutional right to\ndifficulty given the lack of an \"interdis-\nequal treatment by the State of Michigan.\ntrict\" violation. Antc, at 3132. It would\n418 U.S. 766\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3137\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\ndealing with the process of educating\nfiable areas in the city. The 1970 public\nthe young, including the very young.\nschool enrollment in the city school dis-\nThe task is not to devise a system of\ntrict totaled 289,763 and was 63.6% Ne-\npains and penalties to punish constitut-\ngro and 34.8% white.¹ If \"racial bal-\ntional violations brought to light. Rath-\nance\" were achieved in every school in\ner, it is to desegregate an educational\nthe district, each school would be ap-\nsystem in which the races have been\nproximately 64% Negro. A remedy con-\nkept apart, without, at the same time,\nfined to the district could achieve no\nlosing sight of the central educational\nmore desegregation. Furthermore, the\nfunction of the schools.\nproposed intracity remedies were beset\nwith practical problems. None of the\nViewed in this light, remedies calling\nplans limited to the school district was\nfor school zoning, pairing, and pupil as-\nsatisfactory to the District Court. The\nsignments, become more and more sus-\nmost promising proposal, submitted by\npect as they require that schoolchildren\nrespondents, who were the plaintiffs in\nspend more and more time in buses\nthe District Court, would \"leave many of\ngoing to and from school and that more\nits schools 75 to 90 per cent Black.\"\nand more educational dollars be diverted\n484 F.2d 215, 244 (CA6 1973). Trans-\nto transportation systems. Manifestly,\nportation on a \"vast scale\" would be\nthese considerations are of immediate\nrequired; 900 buses would have to be\nand urgent concern when the issue is the\npurchased for the transportation of pu-\ndesegregation of a city school system\npils who are not now bused. Id., at\nwhere residential patterns are predomi-\n243. The District Court also found that\nnantly segregated and the respective\nthe plan \"would change a school system\nareas occupied by blacks and whites are\nwhich is now Black and White to one\nheavily populated and geographically ex-\nthat would be perceived as Black, there-\ntensive. Thus, if one postulates a met-\nby increasing the flight of Whites from\nropolitan school system covering a suffi-\nthe city and the system, thereby increas-\nciently large area, with the population\ning the Black student population.\" Id.,\nevenly divided between whites and Ne-\nat 244. For the District Court, \"[t]he\ngroes and with the races occupying iden-\nconclusion, under the evidence in this\ntifiable residential areas, there will be\ncase, is inescapable that relief of segre-\nvery real practical limits on the extent\nto which racially identifiable schools can\ngation in the public schools of the City 766\nof Detroit cannot be accomplished with-\nbe eliminated within the school district.\nin the corporate geographical limits of\nIt is also apparent that the larger the\nthe city.\" Ibid.\nproportion of Negroes in the area, the\nmore difficult it would be to avoid hav-\ning a substantial number of all-black or\nThe District Court therefore consid-\nnearly all-black schools.\nered extending its remedy to the sub-\nurbs. After hearings, it concluded that\nThe Detroit school district is both\na much more effective desegregation\nlarge and heavily populated. It covers\nplan could be implemented if the subur-\n765 139.6 square miles, encireles twolentirely\nban districts were included. In proceed-\nseparate cities and school districts, and\ning to design its plan on the basis that\nsurrounds a third city on three sides.\nstudent bus rides to and from school\nAlso, whites and Negroes live in identi-\nshould not exceed 40 minutes each way\nI. The percentage of Negro pupils in the De-\nployees in the Detroit Public Schools, October\ntroit student population rose to 64.9% in\n1972, and October 1973: 484 F.2d 215. 250.\n1971, to 67.3% in 1972, and to 69.8% in\n1973, amid a metropolitan school population\n2. The District Court's ruling on the De-\nwhose racial composition in 1970 was 81%\ntroit-only desegregation plans is set out in\nwhite and 19% Negro. 5 App. 16; Racial-\nfull by the Court of Appeals, id., at 242-\nEthnic Distribution of Students and Em-\n245, and is not otherwise officially reported.\n3138\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 766\nas a general matter, the court's express\n(1896),\" and \"would be opening a way\nfinding was that \"[f]or all the reasons\nto nullify Brown V. Board of Education\nstated heretofore-including time, dis-\nwhich overruled Plessy.\ntance, and transportation factors-de-\n484 F.2d, at 249.\nsegregation within the area described is\nphysically easier and more practicable\nThis Court now reverses the Court of\nand feasible, than desegregation efforts\nAppeals. It does not question the Dis-\nlimited to the corporate geographic lim-\ntrict Court's findings that any feasible\nits of the city of Detroit.\" 345 F.Supp.\nDetroit-only plan would leave many\n914, 930 (ED Mich.1972).\nschools 75 to 90 percent black and that\nthe district would become progressively\nThe Court of Appeals agreed with the\nmore black as whites left the city. Nei-\nDistrict Court that the remedy must ex-\nther does the Court suggest that includ-\ntend beyond the city limits of Detroit. It\ning the suburbs in a desegregation plan\nconcluded that \"[i]n the instant case the\nwould be impractical or infeasible be-\nonly feasible desegregation plan involves\ncause of educational considerations, be-\nthe crossing of the boundary lines be-\ncause of the number of children requir-\ntween the Detroit School District and\ning transportation, or because of the\nadjacent or nearby school districts for\nlength of their rides. Indeed, the Court\nthe limited purpose of providing an ef-\nleaves unchallenged the District Court's\nfective desegregation plan.\" 484 F.2d,\nconclusion that a plan including the sub-\nat 249. (Emphasis added.) It also\nurbs would be physically easier and\nagreed that \"any Detroit only desegre-\nmore practical and feasible than a De-\ngation plan will lead directly to a single\ntroit-only plan. Whereas the most\nsegregated Detroit school district over-\npromising Detroit-only plan, for exam-\nwhelmingly black in all of its schools,\nple, would have entailed the purchase of\nsurrounded by a ring of suburbs and\n900 buses, the metropolitan plan would\nsuburban school districts overwhelming-\ninvolve the acquisition of no more than\nly white in composition in a State in\n350 new vehicles.\nwhich the racial composition is 87 per\ncent white and 13 per cent black.\" Ibid.\nDespite the fact that a metropolitan\n1769\nThere was \"more than ample support for\nremedy, if the findings of the District\nthe District Judge's findings of uncon-\nCourt accepted by the Court of Appeals\nstitutional segregation by race resulting\nare to be credited, would more effective-\nin major part from action and inaction\nly desegregate the Detroit schools, would\nof public authorities, both local and\nprevent resegregation,3 and would be\nState.\nUnder this record a re-\neasier and more feasible from many\nmedial order of a court of equity which\nstandpoints, the Court fashions out of 768\nleft the Detroit school system over-\nwhole cloth an arbitrary rule that reme-\n767 whelmingly black (for the foreseeable\ndies for constitutional violations occur-\nfuture) surrounded by suburban school\nring in a single Michigan school district\nsystems overwhelmingly white cannot\nmust stop at the school district line.\ncorrect the constitutional violations\nApparently, no matter how much less\nherein found.\" Id., at 250. To conclude\nburdensome or more effective and effi-\notherwise, the Court of Appeals an-\ncient in many respects, such as transpor-\nnounced, would call up \"haunting mémo-\ntation, the metropolitan plan might be,\nries of the now long overruled and dis-\nthe school district line may not be\ncredited 'separate but equal doctrine' of\ncrossed. Otherwise, it seems, there\nPlessy V. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 [16 S.\nwould be too much disruption of the\nCt. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256]\nMichigan scheme for managing its edu-\n3. The Court has previously disapproved the\nMonroe V. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S.\nimplementation of proposed desegregation\n450, 459-460. SS S.Ct. 1700, 1705, 20 L.Ed.\nplans which operate to permit resegregation.\n2d 733 (1968), (\"free transfer\" plan).\n418 U.S. 770\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3139\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\ncational system, too much confusion, and\nundue difficulties for the State in the\ntoo much administrative burden.\nmanagement of its public schools. In\nThe District Court, on the scene and\nthe area of what constitutes an accepta-\nfamiliar with local conditions, had a\nble desegregation plan, \"we must of ne-\nwholly different view. The Court of\ncessity rely to a large extent, as this\nAppeals also addressed itself at length\nCourt has for more than 16 years, on\nto matters of local law and to the prob-\nthe informed judgment of the district\ncourts in the first instance and on\nlems that interdistrict remedies might\npresent to the State of Michigan. Its\ncourts of appeals.\" Swann V. Char-\nconclusion, flatly contrary to that of this\nlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,\nCourt, was that \"the constitutional right\n402 U.S. 1, 28, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1282, 28\nto equality before the law [is not]\nL.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Obviously, what-\nhemmed in by the boundaries of a school\never difficulties there might be, they are\ndistrict\" and that an interdistrict reme-\nsurmountable; for the Court itself con-\ndy\ncedes that, had there been sufficient evi-\ndence of an interdistrict violation, the\n\"is supported by the status of school\nDistrict Court could have fashioned a\ndistricts under Michigan law and by\nsingle remedy for the districts implicat-\nthe historical control exercised over\ned rather than a different remedy for\nlocal school districts by the legislature\neach district in which the violation had 770\nof Michigan and by State agencies\noccurred or had an impact.\nand officials\n[I]t is well\nestablished under the Constitution and\nI am even more mystified as to how the\nlaws of Michigan that the public\nCourt can ignore the legal reality that\nschool system is a State function and\nthe constitutional violations, even if oc-\nthat local school districts are instru-\ncurring locally, were committed by gov-\nernmental entities for which the State is\nmentalities of the State created for\nadministrative convenience.\" 484\nresponsible and that it is the State that\nF.2d, at 245-246.\nmust respond to the command of the\nFourteenth Amendment. An interdis-\n769 I am surprised that the Court, sitting\ntrict remedy for the infringements that\nat this distance from the State of Michi-\noccurred in this case is well within the\ngan, claims better insight than the\nconfines and powers of the State, which\nCourt of Appeals and the District Court\nis the governmental entity ultimately re-\nas to whether an interdistrict remedy\nsponsible for desegregating its schools.\nfor equal protection violations practiced\nThe Michigan Supreme Court has ob-\nby the State of Michigan would involve\nserved that \"[t]he school district is a\n4. The Court of Appeals also noted several\nsegregation plan by the Detroit Board of\nspecific instances of school district mergers\nEducation as evidencing state control over\nordered by the State Board of Education for\nlocal school district affairs. Ibid. Finally,\nfinancial reasons. 484 F.2d, at 247. Liini-\nit is also relevant to note that the District\ntations on the authority of local school dis-\nCourt found that the school district bounda-\ntriets were also outlined by the Court of\nries in that segment of the metropolitan area\nAppeals:\npreliminarily designated as the desegregation\n\"Local school districts, unless they have\narea \"in general bear no relationship to oth-\nthe approval of the State Board of Educa-\ner municipal, county, or special district gov-\ntion or the Superintendent of Public Instrue-\nernments, needs or services,\" that some edu-\ntion. cannot consolidate with another school\ncational services are already provided to stu-\ndistrict, annex territory. divide or attach\ndents on an interdistrict basis requiring\nparts of other districts, borrow monies in an-\ntheir travel from one district to another, and\nticipation of State aid, or construct, recon-\nthat local communities in the metropolitan\nstruet or remodel school buildings or addi-\narea share nonedneational interests in com-\ntions to them.\" Id., at 249. (Footnotes and\nmon, which do not adhere to school district\nsupporting statutory citations omitted.)\nlines, and have applied metropolitan solu-\nAnd the Court of Appeals properly consid-\ntions to other governmental needs. 345 F.\ncred the State's statutory attempt to undo\nSupp. 914, 934-935 (E.D.Mich:1972).\nthe adoption of a voluntary high school de-\n3140\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 770\nState agency,\" Attorney General ex) rel.\ntroit Board of Education, a local instru-\nKies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.\nmentality of the State, violated the con-\nW. 289, 290 (1902), and that '[e]duca-\nstitutional rights of the Negro students\ntion in Michigan belongs to the State.\nin Detroit's public schools and required\nIt is no part of the local self-government\nequitable relief sufficient to accomplish\ninherent in the township or municipality,\nthe maximum, practical desegregation\nexcept so far as the legislature may\nwithin the power of the political body\nchoose to make it such. The Constitu-\nagainst which the Fourteenth Amend-\ntion has turned the whole subject over\nment directs its proscriptions. No\nto the legislature.\nAttor-\n\"State\" may deny any individual the\nney General ex rel. Lacharias v. Detroit\nequal protection of the laws; and if the\nBoard of Education, 154 Mich. 584, 590,\nConstitution and the Supremacy Clause\n118 N.W. 606, 609 (1908).\nare to have any substance at all, the\ncourts must be free to devise workable\nIt is unnecessary to catalogue at\nremedies against the political entity with\nlength the various public misdeeds found\nthe effective power to determine local\nby the District Court and the Court of\nchoice. It is also the case here that the\nAppeals to have contributed to the\nState's legislative interdiction of De-\npresent segregation of the Detroit public\ntroit's voluntary effort to desegregate its\nschools. The legislature contributed di-\nschool system was unconstitutional. See\nrectly by enacting a statute overriding a\nNorth Carolina State Board of Education\nno\npartial high school desegregation plan\nV. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 28\nCou\nvoluntarily adopted by the Detroit Board\nL.Ed.2d 586 (1971).\nof Education. Indirectly, the trial court\nfound the State was accountable for the\nThe Court draws the remedial line at\ntem\nthinly disguised, pervasive acts of segre-\nthe Detroit school district boundary,\ngation committed by the Detroit Board,5\neven though the Fourteenth Amendment\ntions\n771\nfor Detroit's school construction plans\nis addressed to the State and even though\nthat would promote segregation, and for\nthe State denies equal protection of the\n772\nwith\nthe Detroit school district's not having\nlaws when its public agencies, acting in\nof\nfunds for pupil transportation within\nits behalf, invidiously discriminate. The\nS.G\nthe district. The State was also charge-\nState's default is \"the condition that of-\nable with responsibility for the trans-\nfends the Constitution,\" Swann V. Char-\nportation of Negro high school students\n773\ncour\nlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,\nrem\nin the late 1950's from the suburban\nsupra, 402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct. at 1277,\nFerndale School District, past closer sub-\nand state officials may therefore be\nthe\nurban and Detroit high schools with pre-\nordered to take the necessary measures\ndominantly white student bodies, to a\nto completely eliminate from the Detroit\nint\npredominantly Negro high school within\npublic schools \"all vestiges of state-im-\nof\nDetroit. Swann V. Charlotte-Mecklen-\nposed segregation.\" Id., at 15, 91 S.Ct.\nlic\nburg Board of Education, supra, 402 U.\nat 1275. I cannot understand, nor does\nS., at 20-21, 91 S.Ct. at 1278, and Keyes\nthe majority satisfactorily explain, why\n756\nV. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo-\na federal court may not order an appro-\nwas\nrado, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.\npriate interdistrict remedy, if this is nec-\nEd.2d 548 (1973), make abundantly\nessary or more effective to accomplish\nsis\nclear that the tactics employed by the De-\nthis constitutionally mandated task. As\nof\n5. These included the creation and alteration\nschools, the use of optional attendance areas\nunlas\nof attendance zones and feeder patterns\nin neighborhoods in which Negro families\nfrom the elementary to the secondary\nhad recently begun to settle to permit white\non\nschools in a manner naturally and predicta-\nstudents to transfer to predominantly white\nof\nbly perpetuating racial segregation of stu-\nschools nearer the city limits, and the con-\nBrown\ndents, the transportation of Negro students\nstruction of schools in the heart of residen-\nbility\nbeyond predominantly white schools with\ntially segregated areas, thereby maximizing\navailable space to predominantly Negro\nschool segregation.\nsegre\n418 U.S. 774\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3141\nCite as It S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nthe Court unanimously observed in\ntive effect which the condition of segre-\nSwann: \"Once a right and a violation\ngation in one school district might have\nhave been shown, the scope of a district\nhad on the schools of a neighboring dis-\ncourt's equitable powers to remedy past\ntrict. The same situation obtains here\nwrongs is broad, for breadth and flexi-\nand the same remedial power is available\nbility are inherent in equitable rem-\nto the District Court.\nedies.\" Ibid. In this case, both the\nLater cases reinforced the clearly es-\nright and the State's Fourteenth Amend-\nsential rules that state officials are fully\nment violation have concededly been\nanswerable for unlawfully caused condi-\nfully established, and there is no ac-\ntions of school segregation which can ef-\nceptable reason for permitting the party\nfectively be controlled only by steps be-\nresponsible for the constitutional viola-\nyond the authority of local school dis-\ntion to contain the remedial powers of\ntricts to take, and that the equity power\nthe federal court within administrative\nof the district courts includes the ability\nboundaries over which the transgressor\nto order such measures implemented.\nitself has plenary power.\nWhen the highest officials of the State\nThe unwavering decisions of this\nof Arkansas impeded a federal court or-\nCourt over the past 20 years support the\nder to desegregate the public schools un-\nassumption of the Court of Appeals that\nder the immediate jurisdiction of the\nthe District Court's remedial power does\nLittle Rock School Board, this Court\nnot cease at the school district line. The\nrefused to accept the local board's asser-\nCourt's first formulation of the remedial\ntion of its good faith as a legal excuse\nprinciples to be followed in disestablish-\nfor delay in implementing the desegre-\ning racially discriminatory school sys-\ngation order. The Court emphasized\ntems recognized the variety of problems\nthat \"from the point of view of the\narising from different local school condi-\nFourteenth Amendment, they [the local\ntions and the necessity for that \"practi-\nschool board members] stand in this liti-\ncal flexibility\" traditionally associated\ngation as the agents of the State.\" Coop-\nwith courts of equity. Brown V. Board\ner V. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16, 78 S.Ct. 1401,\nof Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299-301, 75\n1408, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958). Perhaps 774\nS.Ct. 753, 755-756, 99 L.Ed. 1083,\nmore importantly for present purposes,\n(1955) (Brown II). Indeed, the district\nthe Court went on to state:\n1773 courts to which the Brown cases were\n\"The record before us clearly estab-\nremanded for the formulation of remedial\nlishes that the growth of the Board's\ndecrees were specifically instructed that\ndifficulties to a magnitude beyond its\nthey might consider, inter alia, \"revision\nunaided power to control is the prod-\nof school districts and attendance areas\nuct of state action. Those difficulties\ninto compact units to achieve a system\ncan also be brought under con-\nof determining admission to the pub-\ntrol by state action.\" Ibid.\nlic schools on a nonracial basis\nId., at 300-301, 75 S.Ct. at\nSee also Griffin V. School Board, 377\n756. The malady addressed in Brown II\nU.S. 218, 228, 233-234, 84 S.Ct. 1226,\nwas the statewide policy of requiring or\n1231, 1234-1235, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964).\npermitting school segregation on the ba-\nIn the context of dual school systems,\nsis of race, while the record here con-\nthe Court subsequently made clear the\ncerns segregated schools only in the city\n\"affirmative duty to take whatever steps\nof Detroit. The obligation to rectify the\nmight be necessary to convert to a uni-\nunlawful condition nevertheless rests\ntary system in which racial discrimina-\non the State. The permissible revision\ntion would be eliminated root and\nof school districts contemplated in\nbranch\" and to come forward with a de-\nBrown II rested on the State's responsi-\nsegregation plan that \"promises realisti-\nbility for desegregating its unlawfully\ncally to work now.\" Green V. County\nsegregated schools, not on any segrega-\nSchool Board of New Kent County, 391\n3142\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 774\n418TH\nU.S. 430, 437-438, 439, 88 S.Ct. 1689,\nat 1281. Nor was there any dispute\ncreat\n1694, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). \"Freedom\nthat to break up the dual school system,\nina\nof choice\" plans were rejected as ac-\nit was within the District Court's\npro\nceptable desegregation measures where\n\"broad remedial powers\" to employ a\nten\n\"reasonably available other ways\n\"frank-and sometimes drastic-gerry-\nmen\npromising speedier and more effective\nmandering of school districts and at-\nthe\nconversion to a unitary, nonracial school\ntendance zones,\" as well as \"pairing,\nsch\nsystem\nexist. Id., at 441, 88 S.\n'clustering,' or 'grouping' of schools,\" to\ntan\nCt., at 1696. Imperative insistence on\ndesegregate the \"formerly all-Negro\nimmediate full desegregation of dual\nschools,\" despite the fact that these\nof\nschool systems \"to operate now and here-\nzones might not be compact or contig-\nafter only unitary schools\" was reiterated\ncoul\nuous and might be \"on opposite ends of\nmen\nin Alexander V. Holmes County Board of\nthe city.\" Id., at 27, 91 S.Ct. at 1282.\nEducation, 396 U.S. 19, 20, 90 S.Ct. 29, 24\nexter\nThe school board in that case had juris-\nL.Ed.2d 19 (1969), and Carter V. West\nsive\ndiction over a 550-square-mile area en-\nFeliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S.\nthe\ncompassing the city of Charlotte and sur-\ndese\n290, 90 S.Ct. 608, 24 L.Ed.2d 477\nrounding Mecklenburg County, North\ntati\n(1970).\nCarolina. The Mobile County, Alabama,\nera\nThe breadth of the equitable authority\nboard in Davis embraced a 1,248-square-\nhad\nof the district courts to accomplish these\nmile area, including the city of Mobile.\nfect\ncomprehensive tasks was reaffirmed in\nYet the Court approved the District\nAmer\nmuch greater detail in Swann V. Char-\nCourt's authority to award countywide\nor\nlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,\nrelief in each case in order to accomplish\ncated\nsupra, and the companion case of Davis\ndesegregation of the dual school system.\nthe\nV. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402\nU.S. 33, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 28 L.Ed.2d 577\nEven more recently, the Court specifi-\ndise\ncally rejected the claim that a new\nUnti\n(1971), where there was unanimous as-\nsent to the following propositions:\nschool district, which admittedly would\nto\noperate a unitary school system within\n777\ning\n\"Having once found a violation, the\nits borders, was beyond the reach of a\ncessi\ndistrict judge or school authorities\nhaza\ncourt-ordered desegregation plan for\n776\n775\nshould make every effort to achieve\nother school districts, where the effec-\ndren\nthe greatest possible degree of actual\nthe\ntiveness of the plan as to the other dis-\ndesegregation, taking into account the\nthe\ntricts depended upon the availability of\npracticalities of the situation. A dis-\nthe facilities and student population of\npell\ntrict court may and should consider\nthe\nthe new district. In Wright V. Council\nthe use of all available techniques in-\ntio\nof City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 470,\ncluding restructuring of attendance\n87\n92 S.Ct. 2196, 2207, 33 L.Ed.2d 51\nzones and both contiguous and noncon-\nth\n(1972), we held \"that a new school dis-\ntiguous attendance zones.\ntrict may not be created where its effect\nThe measure of any desegregation\nlik\nwould be to impede the process of dis-\nplan is its effectiveness.\" Id., at 37,\nSC\nmantling a dual system.\" Mr. Justice\n91 S.Ct. at 1292.\nth\nStewart's opinion for the Court made\nNo suggestion was made that interdis-\ndel\nclear that if a proposal to erect new dis-\ntrict relief was not an available tech-\nstat\ntrict boundary lines \"would impede the\nnique. In Swann V. Charlotte-Mecklen-\npar\ndismantling of the [pre-existing] dual\nburg Board of Education itself, the\npro\nsystem, then a district court, in the ex-\nCourt, without dissent, recognized that\nto\nercise of its remedial discretion, may en-\ndual\nthe District Judge, in fulfilling his obli-\njoin it from being carried out.\" Id., at\nless\ngation to \"make every effort to achieve\n460, 92 S.Ct. at 2203. In United States\nfor\nthe greatest possible degree of actual de-\nV. Scotland Neck Board of Education,\nsegregation[,] will thus necessarily be\n407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214, 33 L.Ed.\nence\nconcerned with the elimination of one-\n2d 75 (1972), this same standard was\nlatte\nrace schools.\" 402 U.S., at 26, 91 S.Ct.,\napplied to forbid North Carolina from\n418 U.S. 778\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3143\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\ncreating a new city school district with-\nThe result reached by the Court cer-\nin a larger district which was in the\ntainly cannot be supported by the theory\nprocess of dismantling a dual school sys-\nthat the configuration of local govern-\ntem. The Court noted that if establish-\nmental units is immune from alteration\nment of the new district were permitted,\nwhen necessary to redress constitutional\nthe \"traditional racial identities of the\nviolations. In addition to the well-estab-\nschools in the area would be main-\nlished principles already noted, the\ntained,\" id., at 490, 92 S.Ct., at 2717.\nCourt has elsewhere required the public\nbodies of a State to restructure the\nUntil today, the permissible contours\nState's political subdivisions to remedy\nof the equitable authority of the district\ninfringements of the constitutional\ncourts to remedy the unlawful establish-\nrights of certain members of its popu-\nment of a dual school system have been\nlace, notably in the reapportionment cas-\nextensive, adaptable, and fully respon-\nes. In Reynolds V. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,\nsive to the ultimate goal of achieving\n84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964),\n\"the greatest possible degree of actual\nfor example, which held that equal pro-\ndesegregation.\" There are indeed limi-\ntection of the laws demands that the\ntations on the equity powers of the fed-\nseats in both houses of a bicameral state\neral judiciary, but until now the Court\nlegislature be apportioned on a popula-\nhad not accepted the proposition that ef-\ntion basis, thus necessitating wholesale\nfective enforcement of the Fourteenth\nrevision of Alabama's voting districts,\nAmendment could be limited by political\nthe Court remarked:\nor administrative boundary lines demar-\n\"Political subdivisions of States—\ncated by the very State responsible for\nthe constitutional violation and for the\ncounties, cities, or whatever-never\nwere and never have been considered 778\ndisestablishment of the dual system.\nUntil now the Court has instead looked\nas sovereign entities. Rather, they\nhave been traditionally regarded as\nto practical considerations in effectuat-\nsubordinate governmental instrumen-\n1777 ing a desegregation decree, such as ex-\ntalities created by the State to assist\ncessive distance, transportation time, and\nhazards to the safety of the schoolchil-\nin the carrying out of state govern-\nmental functions.\" Id., at 575, 84 S.\ndren involved in a proposed plan. That\nthese broad principles have developed in\nCt., at 1389.\nthe context of dual school systems com-\nAnd even more pointedly, the Court de-\npelled or authorized by state statute at\nclared in Gomillion V. Lightfoot, 364 U.\nthe time of Brown V. Board of Educa-\nS. 339, 344-345, 81 S.Ct. 125, 129, 5 L.\ntion, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.\nEd.2d 110 (1960), that [l]egislative\n873 (1954) (Brown I), does not lessen\ncontrol of municipalities, no less than\ntheir current applicability to dual sys-\nother state power, lies within the scope\ntems found to exist in other contexts,\nof relevant limitations imposed by the\nlike that in Detroit, where intentional\nUnited States Constitution.\nschool segregation does not stem from\nNor does the Court's conclusion follow\nthe compulsion of state law, but from\nfrom the talismanic invocation of the de-\ndeliberate individual actions of local and\nsirability of local control over education.\nstate school authorities directed at a\nLocal autonomy over school affairs, in\nparticular school system. The majority\nthe sense of the community's participa-\nproperly does not suggest that the duty\ntion in the decisions affecting the educa-\nto eradicate completely the resulting\ntion of its children, is, of course, an im-\ndual system in the latter context is any\nportant interest. But presently consti-\nless than in the former. But its reason\ntuted school district lines do not delimit\nfor incapacitating the remedial authori-\nfixed and unchangeable areas of a local\nty of the federal judiciary in the pres-\neducational community. If restructur-\nence of school district perimeters in the\ning is required to meet constitutional re-\nlatter context is not readily apparent.\nquirements, local authority may simply\n3144\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 778\nbe redefined in terms of whatever con-\ngroes and whites would have been going\nfiguration is adopted, with the parents\nto school together. There would have\nof the children attending schools in the\nbeen no, or at least not as many, recog-\nnewly demarcated district or attendance\nnizable Negro schools and no, or at least\nzone continuing their participation in\nnot as many, white schools, but \"just\nthe policy management of the schools\nschools,\" and neither Negroes nor whites\nwith which they are concerned most di-\nwould have suffered from the effects of\nrectly. The majority's suggestion that\nsegregated education, with all its short-\njudges should not attempt to grapple\ncomings. Surely the Court's remedy\nwith the administrative problems attend-\nwill not restore to the Negro community,\nant on a reorganization of school attend-\nstigmatized as it was by the dual school\nance patterns is wholly without founda-\nsystem, what it would have enjoyed over\ntion. It is precisely this sort of task\nall or most of this period if the remedy\nwhich the district courts have been\nis confined to present-day Detroit; for\nproperly exercising to vindicate the con-\nthe maximum remedy available within\nstitutional rights of Negro students\nthat area will leave many of the schools\nsince Brown I and which the Court has\nalmost totally black, and the system it-\nnever suggested they lack the capacity\nself will be predominantly black and will\nto perform. Intradistrict revisions of\nbecome increasingly so. Moreover, when\n781\nattendance zones, and pairing and\na State has engaged in acts of official\ngrouping of schools, are techniques\nsegregation over a lengthy period of\n780\nunanimously approved in Swann V. Char-\ntime, as in the case before us, it is un-\nlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education\nrealistic to suppose that the children\n779 which entail the same sensitivity to the\nwho were victims of the State's uncon-\ninterest of parents in the education their\nstitutional conduct could now be pro-\nchildren receive as would an interdis-\nvided the benefits of which they were\ntrict plan which is likely to employ the\nwrongfully deprived. Nor can the bene-\nobli\nvery same methods. There is no reason\nfits which accrue to school systems in\nto suppose that the District Court,\nwhich schoolchildren have not been of-\nwhich has not yet adopted a final plan\nficially segregated, and to the communi-\nof desegregation, would not be as capa-\nties supporting such school systems, be\nble of giving or as likely to give sufficient\nfully and immediately restored after a\nweight to the interest in community par-\nsubstantial period of unlawful segrega-\nticipation in schools in an interdistrict\ntion. The education of children of dif-\nsetting, consistent with the dictates of\nferent races in a desegregated environ-\nthe Fourteenth Amendment. The ma-\nment has unhappily been lost, along with\njority's assumption that the District\nthe social, economic, and political advan-\nCourt would act otherwise is a radical\ntages which accompany a desegregated\ndeparture from the practical flexibility\nschool system as compared with an un-\npreviously left to the equity powers of\nconstitutionally segregated system. It is\nthe federal judiciary.\nfor these reasons that the Court has con-\nsistently followed the course of requir-\nFinally, I remain wholly unpersuaded\ning the effects of past official segrega-\nby the Court's assertion that \"the reme-\ntion to be eliminated \"root and branch\"\ndy is necessarily designed, as all reme-\nby imposing, in the present, the duty to\ndies are, to restore the victims of dis-\nprovide a remedy which will achieve\ncriminatory conduct to the position they\nwould have occupied in the absence of\n\"the greatest possible degree of actual\nsuch conduct.\" Ante, p. 3128. In the\ndesegregation, taking into account the\nfirst place, under this premise the\npracticalities of the situation.\" It is\nApp\nCourt's judgment is itself infirm; for\nalso for these reasons that once a consti-\nhad the Detroit school system not fol-\ntutional violation has been found, the\nties\nlowed an official policy of segregation\ndistrict judge obligated to provide such\nthe\nthroughout the 1950's and 1960's, Ne-\na remedy \"will thus necessarily be con-\nban\n418 U.S. 782\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3145\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\ncerned with the elimination of one-race\nI am therefore constrained to record\nschools.\" These concerns were properly\nmy disagreement and dissent.\ntaken into account by the District Judge\nin this case. Confining the remedy to\nMr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom\nthe boundaries of the Detroit district is\nMr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice\nquite unrelated either to the goal of\nBRENNAN, and Mr. Justice WHITE\nachieving maximum desegregation or to\njoin, dissenting.\nthose intensely practical considerations,\nIn Brown V. Board of Education, 347\nsuch as the extent and expense of trans-\nU.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873\nportation, that have imposed limits on\n(1954), this Court held that segregation\nremedies in cases such as this. The\nof children in public schools on the basis\nCourt's remedy, in the end, is essentially\nof race deprives minority group children\narbitrary and will leave serious viola-\nof equal educational opportunities and\ntions of the Constitution substantially\ntherefore denies them the equal protec-\nunremedied.\ntion of the laws under the Fourteenth\n782\nAmendment. This Court recognized\nI agree with my Brother DOUGLAS\nthen that remedying decades of segrega-\nthat the Court of Appeals has acted re-\ntion in public education would not be an\nsponsibly in these cases. Regretably,\neasy task. Subsequent events, unfortu-\nthe majority's arbitrary limitation on\nnately, have seen that prediction bear\nthe equitable power of federal district\nbitter fruit. But however imbedded old\ncourts, based on the invisible borders of\nways, however ingrained old prejudices,\nlocal school districts, is unrelated to the\nthis Court has not been diverted from\nState's responsibility for remedying the\nits appointed task of making \"a living\nconstitutional wrongs visited upon the\ntruth\" of our constitutional ideal of\nNegro schoolchildren of Detroit. It is\nequal justice under law. Cooper v. Aar-\noblivious to the potential benefits of\non, 358 U.S. 1, 20, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1410, 3\nmetropolitan relief, to the noneducation-\nL.Ed.2d 5 (1958).\nal communities of interest among neigh-\nAfter 20 years of small, often diffi-\nborhoods located in and sometimes\ncult steps toward that great end, the\nbridging different school districts, and\nCourt today takes a giant step back-\nto the considerable interdistrict coopera-\nwards. Notwithstanding a record show-\ntion already existing in various educa-\ning widespread and pervasive racial seg-\ntional areas. Ultimately, it is unrespon-\nregation in the educational system pro-\nsive to the goal of attaining the utmost\nvided by the State of Michigan for chil-\nactual desegregation consistent with re-\ndren in Detroit, this Court holds that\nstraints of practicability and thus au-\nthe District Court was powerless to re-\ngurs the frequent frustration of the re-\nquire the State to remedy its constitu-\nmedial powers of the federal courts.\ntional violation in any meaningful fash-\nHere the District Court will be forced\nion. Ironically purporting to base its\nto impose an intracity desegregation\nresult on the principle that the scope of\nplan more expensive to the district, more\nthe remedy in a desegregation case\nburdensome for many of Detroit's Ne-\nshould be determined by the nature and\ngro students, and surely more conducive\nthe extent of the constitutional violation,\nto white flight than a metropolitan plan\nthe Court's answer is to provide no rem-\nwould be-all of this merely to avoid\nedy at all for the violation proved in this\nwhat the Detroit School Board, the Dis-\ncase, thereby guaranteeing that Negro\ntrict Court, and the en banc Court of\nchildren in Detroit will receive the same\nAppeals considered to be the very man-\nseparate and inherently unequal educa-\nageable and quite surmountable difficul-\ntion in the future as they have been un-\nties that would be involved in extending\nconstitutionally afforded in the past.\nthe desegregation remedy to the subur-\nI cannot subscribe to this emascula-\nban school districts.\ntion of our constitutional guarantee of\n3146\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 782\n418AT\nequal protection of the laws and must\nschools, a remedy which has been de-\nthe\nrespectfully dissent. Our precedents, in\nlayed since 1970.\" Ante, at 3131.\nin\nmy view, firmly establish that where, as\nThe majority, however, seems to have\nseg\nhere, state-imposed segregation has been\nforgotten the District Court's explicit\ndemonstrated, it becomes the duty of the\nfinding that a Detroit-only decree, the\n785\nis\nState to eliminate root and branch all\nonly remedy permitted under today's de-\ntee\nvestiges of racial discrimination and to\ncision, \"would not accomplish desegrega-\nof\nachieve the greatest possible degree of\ntion.\"\nden\nactual desegregation. I agree with both\nthe District Court and the Court of Ap-\nNowhere in the Court's opinion does\n784\nSe\npeals that, under the facts of this case,\nthe majority confront, let alone respond\nD\nthis duty cannot be fulfilled unless the\nto, the District Court's conclusion that a\n268\nremedy limited to the city of Detroit\nbat\n783\nStatejof Michigan involves outlying met-\nropolitan area school districts in its de-\nwould not effectively desegregate the\ntial\nsegregation remedy. Furthermore, I\nDetroit city schools. I, for one, find the\nwhi\nperceive no basis either in law or in the\nDistrict Court's conclusion well support-\natte\npracticalities of the situation justifying\ned by the record and its analysis com-\nmiz\nthe State's interposition of school dis-\npelled by our prior cases. Before turn-\nscho\ntrict boundaries as absolute barriers to\ning to these questions, however, it is\nzone\nthe implementation of an effective de-\nbest to begin by laying to rest some mis-\nder\nsegregation remedy. Under established\ncharacterizations in the Court's opinion\nwhit\nand frequently used Michigan proce-\nwith respect to the basis for the District\ntion\ndures, school district lines are both flex-\nCourt's decision to impose a metropoli-\ncrov\nible and permeable for a wide variety of\ntan remedy.\nawa\npurposes, and there is no reason why\navaila\nThe Court maintains that while the\nthey must now stand in the way of mean-\nschool\ninitial focus of this lawsuit was the con-\ningful desegregation relief.\nschool\ndition of segregation within the Detroit\ntained\nThe rights at issue in this case are\ncity schools, the District Court abruptly\nseeat\ntoo fundamental to be abridged on\nshifted focus in mid-course and altered\ngro\ngrounds as superficial as those relied on\nits theory of the case. This new theory,\nSchool\nby the majority today. We deal here\nin the majority's words, was \"equating\ntion\nwith the right of all of our children,\nracial imbalance with a constitutional vi-\nthe\nwhatever their race, to an equal start in\nolation calling for a remedy.\" Ante, at\none\nlife and to an equal opportunity to reach\n3125, n. 19. As the following review of\niden\ntheir full potential as citizens. Those\nthe District Court's handling of the case\nchild\nchildren who have been denied that\ndemonstrates, however, the majority's\ntor\nright in the past deserve better than to\ncharacterization is totally inaccurate.\ngro\nsee fences thrown up to deny them that\nNowhere did the District Court indicate\nreced\nright in the future. Our Nation, I fear,\nthat racial imbalance between school dis-\nwill be ill served by the Court's refusal\ntricts in the Detroit metropolitan area or\nto remedy separate and unequal educa-\nwithin the Detroit School District consti-\nCour\ntion, for unless our children begin to\ntuted constitutional violation calling for\na\nlearn together, there is little hope that\ninterdistrict relief. The focus of this\nnot\nour people will ever learn to live togeth-\ncase was from the beginning, and has re-\nther\ner.\nmained, the segregated system of educa-\nschool\nI\ntion in the Detroit city schools and the\nschool\nsteps necessary to cure that condition\nis\nThe great irony of the Court's opinion\nwhich offends the Fourteenth Amend-\naffective\nand, in my view, its most serious analyt-\nment.\nstudent\nical flaw may be gleaned from its con-\nThe District Court's consideration of\nties\ncluding sentence, in which the Court re-\nmands for \"prompt formulation of a de-\nthis case began with its finding, which\ncree directed to eliminating the segre-\nthe majority accepts, that the State of\nS.C.\nlation\ngation found to exist in Detroit city\nMichigan, through its instrumentality,\n418 U.S. 786\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3147\nCite as 9KS.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nthe Detroit Board of Education, engaged\nfacto racial imbalance, but rather the\nin widespread purposeful acts of racial\npurposeful, intentional, massive, de jure\nsegregation in the Detroit School Dis-\nsegregation of the Detroit city schools,\ntrict. Without belaboring the details, it\nwhich under our decision in Keyes, 786\n785\nis sufficient to note that the various\nforms \"a predicate for a finding of the\ntechniques used in Detroit were typical\nexistence of a dual school system,\" ibid.,\nof methods employed to segregate stu-\n93 S.Ct., at 2694, and justifies \"all-out\ndents by race in areas where no statuto-\ndesegregation.\" Id., at 214, 93 S.Ct.,\nry dual system of education has existed.\nat 2700.\nSee, e. g., Keyes V. School District No. 1,\nHaving found a de jure segregated\nDenver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct.\npublic school system in operation in the\n2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973). Exacer-\ncity of Detroit, the District Court\nbating the effects of extensive residen-\nturned next to consider which officials\ntial segregation between Negroes and\nand agencies should be assigned the af-\nwhites, the school board consciously drew\nfirmative obligation to cure the constitu-\nattendance zones along lines which maxi-\ntional violation. The court concluded\nmized the segregation of the races in\nthat responsibility for the segregation in\nschools as well. Optional attendance\nthe Detroit city schools rested not only\nzones were created for neighborhoods un-\nwith the Detroit Board of Education,\ndergoing racial transition SO as to allow\nbut belonged to the State of Michigan\nwhites in these areas to escape integra-\nitself and the state defendants in this\ntion. Negro students in areas with over-\ncase-that is, the Governor of Michigan,\ncrowded schools were transported past or\nthe Attorney General, the State Board\naway from closer white schools with\nof Education, and the State Superin-\navailable space to more distant Negro\ntendent of Public Instruction. While\nschools. Grade structures and feeder-\nthe validity of this conclusion will merit\nschool patterns were created and main-\nmore extensive analysis below, suffice it\ntained in a manner which had the fore-\nfor now to say that it was based on\nseeable and actual effect of keeping Ne-\nthree considerations. First, the evi-\ngro and white pupils in separate schools.\ndence at trial showed that the State it-\nSchools were also constructed in loca-\nself had taken actions contributing to\ntions and in sizes which ensured that\nthe segregation within the Detroit\nthey would open with predominantly\nschools. Second, since the Detroit Board\none-race student bodies. In sum, the ev-\nof Education was an agency of the State\nidence adduced below showed that Negro\nof Michigan, its acts of racial discrimi-\nchildren had been intentionally confined\nnation were acts of the State for pur-\nto an expanding core of virtually all-Ne-\nposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.\ngro schools immediately surrounded by a\nFinally, the District Court found that\nreceding band of all-white schools.\nunder Michigan law and practice, the\nsystem of education was in fact a state\nContrary to the suggestions in the\nCourt's opinion, the basis for affording\nschool system, characterized by relative-\nly little local control and a large degree\na desegregation remedy in this case was\nof centralized state regulation, with re-.\nnot some perceived racial imbalance ei-\nther between schools within a single\nspect to both educational policy and the\nschool district or between independent\nstructure and operation of school dis-\ntricts.\nschool districts. What we confront here\nis \"a systematic program of segregation\nHaving concluded, then, that the\naffecting a substantial portion of the\nschool system in the city of Detroit was\nstudents, schools\nand facili-\na de jure segregated system and that the\nties within the school system\nState of Michigan had the affirmative\nId., 413 U.S., at 201, 93\nduty to remedy that condition of segre-\nS.Ct., at 2694. The constitutional vio-\ngation, the District Court then turned to\nlation found here was not some de\nthe difficult task of devising an effec-\n3148\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 786\ntive remedy. It bears repeating that the\nconcluded that it \"must look beyond the\nDistrict Court's focus at this stage of\nlimits of the Detroit school district for a\n1787\nthe litigation remained what it had|been\nsolution to the problem of segregation in\nat the beginning-the condition of seg-\nthe Detroit public schools\nregation within the Detroit city schools.\nIn seeking to define the appropriate\nAs the District Court stated: \"From\nscope of that expanded desegregation\nthe initial ruling [on segregation] to\narea, however, the District Court contin-\nthis day, the basis of the proceedings\nued to maintain as its sole focus the con-\nhas been and remains the violation: de\ndition shown to violate the Constitution.\njure school segregation.\nThe\nin this case-the segregation of the De-\ntask before this court, therefore, is now,\ntroit school system. As it stated, the\nand\nhas always been, how to de-\nprimary question \"remains the determi-\nsegregate the Detroit public schools.\"\nnation of the area necessary and practic-\nThe District Court first considered\nable effectively to eliminate 'root and\nthree desegregation plans limited to the\nbranch' the effects of state-imposed and\ngeographical boundaries of the city of\nsupported segregation and to desegre-\nDetroit. All were rejected as ineffective\ngate the Detroit public schools.\"\nto desegregate the Detroit city schools.\nThere is simply no foundation in the\nSpecifically, the District Court deter-\nrecord, then, for the majority's accusa-\nmined that the racial composition of the\ntion that the only basis for the District\nDetroit student body is such that imple-\nCourt's order was some desire to achieve\nmentation of any Detroit-only plan\na racial balance in the Detroit metropoli-\n\"would clearly make the entire Detroit\ntan area.¹ In fact, just the contrary is\npublic school system racially identifiable\nthe case. In considering proposed de-\nas Black\" and would \"leave many of its\nsegregation areas, the District Court\nschools 75 to 90 per cent Black.\" The\nhad occasion to criticize one of the\nDistrict Court also found that a De-\nState's proposals specifically because it\ntroit-only plan \"would change a school\nhad no basis other than its \"particular\nsystem which is now Black and White to\nracial ratio\" and did not focus on \"rele-\none that would be perceived as Black,\nvant factors, like eliminating racially\nthereby increasing the flight of Whites\nidentifiable schools [and] accomplishing\nfrom the city and the system, thereby in-\nmaximum actual desegregation of the\ncreasing the Black student population.\"\nDetroit public schools.\" Similarly, in\nBased on these findings, the District\nrejecting the Detroit School Board's pro-\nCourt reasoned that \"relief of segrega-\nposed desegregation area, even though it\ntion in the public schools of the City of\nincluded more all-white districts and\nDetroit cannot be accomplished within\ntherefore achieved a higher white-Negro\nthe corporate geographical limits of the\nratio, the District Court commented:\ncity\" because a Detroit-only decree\n\"There is nothing in the record which\n\"would accentuate the racial identifiabil-\nsuggests that these districts need be\nity of the district as a Black school sys-\nincluded in the desegregation area in\ntem, and would not accomplish desegre-\norder to disestablish the racial identi-\ngation.\" The District Court therefore\nfiability of the Detroit public schools.\n1. Contrary to the Court's characterization,\ndeviate from a pure mathematical approach.\nthe use of racial ratios in this case in no\nIndeed, the District Court's most recent or-\nway differed from that in Swann V. Char-\nder appointing a panel of experts to draft\nlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402\nan interdistriet plan requires only that the\nU.S. 1. 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554\nplan be designed \"to achieve the greatest de-\n(1971). Here, as there, mathematical ratios\ngree of actual desegregation\nwere used simply as \"a starting point in the\n[w]ithin the limitations of reasonable travel\nprocess of shaping a remedy, rather than an\ntime and distance factors.\" 345 F.Supp. 914,\ninflexible requirement.\" 1d., at 25, 91\n918 (ED Mich.1972). Cf. 402 U.S., at 23,\nS.Ct., at 1280. It may be expected that a\n91 S.Ct., at 1279.\nfinal desegregation plan in this case would\n418 U.S. 791\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3149\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nFrom the evidence, the primary rea-\ncity of Detroit. The District Court de-\nson for the Detroit School Board's in-\ntermined that interdistrict relief was\nterest in the inclusion of these school\nnecessary and appropriate only because\ndistricts is not racial desegregation\nit found that the condition of segrega-\nbut to increase the average socio-eco-\ntion within the Detroit school system\nnomic balance of all the schools in the\ncould not be cured with a Detroit-only\nabutting regions and clusters.\"\nremedy. It is on this theory that the in-\nterdistrict relief must stand or fall.\nThe Court also misstates the basis for\nUnlike the Court, I perceive my task to\nthe District Court's order by suggesting\nbe to review the District Court's order\nthat since the only segregation proved at\nfor what it is, rather than to criticize it\ntrial was within the Detroit school sys-\nfor what it manifestly is not.\ntem, any relief which extended beyond\nthe jurisdiction of the Detroit Board of\nII\nEducation would be inappropriate be-\nAs the foregoing demonstrates, the\ncause it would impose a remedy on\nDistrict Court's decision to expand its\noutlying districts \"not shown to have\ndesegregation decree beyond the geo-\ncommitted any constitutional violation.\"\ngraphical limits of the city of Detroit\nAnte, at 3127.2 The essential founda-\nrested in large part on its conclusions\ntion of interdistrict relief in this case\n(A) that the State of Michigan was ulti-\nwas not to correct conditions within\nmately responsible for curing the condi-\noutlying districts which themselves en-\ntion of segregation within the Detroit\ngaged in purposeful segregation. In-\ncity schools, and (B) that a Detroit-only\nstead, interdistrict relief was seen as\nremedy would not accomplish this task.\na necessary part of any meaningful\nIn my view, both of these conclusions\neffort by the State of Michigan to rem-\nare well supported by the facts of this\nedy the state-caused segregation within\ncase and by this Court's precedents.\nthe city of Detroit.\nA\nRather than consider the propriety of\ninterdistrict relief on this basis, how-\nTo begin with, the record amply sup-\never, the Court has conjured up a large-\nports the District Court's findings that\nly fictional account of what the District\nthe State of Michigan, through state of-\nCourt was attempting to accomplish.\nficers and state agencies, had engaged in\nWith all due respect, the Court, in my\npurposeful acts which created or aggra-\nview, does a great disservice to the Dis-\nvated segregation in the Detroit schools.\ntrict Judge who labored long and hard\nThe State Board of Education, for ex-\nwith this complex litigation by accusing\nample, prior to 1962, exercised its au-\nhim of changing horses in midstream\nthority to supervise local schoolsite se-\nand shifting the focus of this case from\nlection in a manner which contributed\nthe pursuit of a remedy for the condi-\nto segregation. 484 F.2d 215, 238 (CA6\n790 tion of segregation within the Detroit\n1973). Furthermore, the State's con-\nschool system to some unprincipled at-\ntinuing authority, after 1962, to approve\n791\ntempt to impose his own philosophy of\nschool building construction plans 3 had\nracial balance on the entire Detroit met-\nintertwined the State with site-selection\nropolitan area. See ante, at 3124. The\ndecisions of the Detroit Board of Educa-\nfocus of this case has always been the\ntion which had the purpose and effect of\nsegregated system of education in the\nmaintaining segregation.\n2. It does not appear that even the majority\nsee ante, at 3127, thus allowing interdistrict\nplaces any real weight on this consideration\nrelief to touch districts which have not\nsince it recognizes that interdistrict relief\nthemselves violated the Constitution.\nwould be proper where a constitutional vio-\nlation within one district produces a signifi-\n3. See Mich.Comp.Laws § 3SS.S51 (1970).\ncant segregative effect in another district,\n3150\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 791\nThe State had also stood in the way of\nsive statutory powers of the State Board\npast efforts to desegregate the Detroit\nof Education over contractual arrange-\ncity schools. In 1970, for example, the\nments between school districts in the en-\nDetroit School Board had begun imple-\nrollment of students on a nonresident tu-\nmentation of its own desegregation plan\nition basis, including certification of the\nfor its high schools, despite considerable\nnumber of pupils involved in the trans-\npublic and official resistance. The State\nfer and the amount of tuition charged,\nLegislature intervened by enacting Act\nover the review of transportation routes\n48 of the Public Acts of 1970, specifical-\nand distances, and over the disburse-\nly prohibiting implementation of the de-\nment of transportation funds,5 the State\nsegregation plan and thereby continuing\nBoard inevitably knew and understood\nthe growing segregation of the Detroit\nthe significance of this discriminatory\nschool system. Adequate desegregation\nact.\nof the Detroit system was also hampered\n80\nAside from the acts of purposeful seg-\nby discriminatory restrictions placed by\nregation committed by the State Legisla-\nthe State on the use of transportation\nture and the State Board of Education,\nwithin Detroit. While state aid for\nthe District Court also concluded that\ntransportation was provided by statute\nthe State was responsible for the many\nfor suburban districts, many of which\nintentional acts of segregation commit-\nwere highly urbanized, aid for intracity\nted by the Detroit Board of Education,\ntransportation was excepted. One of the\nan agency of the State. The majority is\neffects of this restriction was to encour-\nonly willing to accept this finding ar-\nage the construction of small walk-in\nguendo. See ante, at 3129. I have no\nneighborhood schools in Detroit, thereby\ndoubt, however, as to its validity under\nlending aid to the intentional policy of\nthe Fourteenth Amendment.\ncreating a school system which reflected,\nto the greatest extent feasible, extensive\n\"The command of the Fourteenth\nresidential segregation. Indeed, that\nAmendment,\" it should be recalled, \"is\none of the purposes of the transporta-\nthat no 'State' shall deny to any person\ntion restriction was to impede desegre-\nwithin its jurisdiction the equal protec-\ngation was evidenced when the Michigan\ntion of the laws.\" Cooper V. Aaron, 358\nLegislature amended the State Trans-\nU.S. 1, 16, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1409, 3 L.Ed.2d\nportation Aid Act to cover intracity\n5 (1958). While a State can act only\ntransportation but expressly prohibited\nthrough \"the officers or agents by\nthe allocation of funds for cross-busing\nwhom its powers are exerted,\" Ex parte\nof students within a school district to\nVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347, 25 L.Ed. 676\nachieve racial balance.4 Cf. North Caro-\n(1880), actions by an agent or officer of\nlina State Board of Education V. Swann,\nthe State are encompassed by the Four-\n793\nteenth Amendment for, \"as he acts in\n794\n402 U.S. 43, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 28 L.Ed.2d\n586 (1971).\nthe name and for the State, and is\nclothed with the State's power, his act is\n792 Also significant was the State's in-\nthat of the State.\" Ibid. See also Coop-\nvolvement during the 1950's in the\ner V. Aaron, supra; Virginia V. Rives,\ntransportation of Negro high school stu-\ndents from the Carver School- District\n100 U.S. 313, 318, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880) ;\npast a closer white high school in the\nShelley V. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14, 68\nOak Park District to a more distant Ne-\nS.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948).\ngro high school in the Detroit system.\nUnder Michigan law a \"school district\nCertainly the District Court's finding\nis an agency of the City of State govern-\nthat the State Board of Education had\nment.\" School District of Lansing V.\nknowledge of this action and had given\nState Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591,\nits tacit or express approval was not\n600, 116 N.W.2d 866, 870 (1962). It is\nclearly erroneous. Given the comprehen-\n\"a legal division of territory, created by\n4. See § 388.1179.\n5. See §§ 388.629 and 340.600.\n418 U.S. 795\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3151\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nthe State for educational purposes, to\nS.Ct. 27, 29, 50 L.Ed. 167 (1905). The\nwhich the State has granted such powers\ncourts of the State have repeatedly em-\nas are deemed necessary to permit the\nphasized that education in Michigan is\ndistrict to function as a State agency.\"\nnot a local governmental concern, but a\nDetroit Board of Education V. Super-\nstate function.\nintendent of Public Instruction, 319\n\"Unlike the delegation of other pow-\nMich. 436, 450, 29 N.W.2d 902, 908\ners by the legislature to local govern-\n(1947). Racial discrimination by the\nments, education is not inherently a\nschool district, an agency of the State,\npart of the local self-government of a\nis therefore racial discrimination by the\nmunicipality\nControl of\nState itself, forbidden by the Fourteenth\nour public school system is a State\nAmendment. See, e. g., Pennsylvania V.\nmatter delegated and lodged in the\nBoard of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 77 S.Ct.\nState legislature by the Constitution.\n806, 1 L.Ed.2d 792 (1957).\nThe policy of the State has been to re-\nWe recognized only last Term in\ntain control of its school system, to be\nKeyes that it was the State itself which\nadministered throughout the State un-\nwas ultimately responsible for de jure\nder State laws by local State agencies\nacts of segregation committed by a local\norganized with plenary powers to car-\nschool board. A deliberate policy of seg-\nry out the delegated functions given\nregation by the local board, we held,\n[them] by the legislature.\" School\namounted to \"state-imposed segrega-\nDistrict of the City of Lansing V.\ntion.\" 413 U.S., at 200, 93 S.Ct., at\nState Board of Education, supra, at\n2693. Wherever a dual school system\n595, 116 N.W.2d, at 868.\nexists, whether compelled by state stat-\nThe Supreme Court of Michigan has\nute or created by a local board's system-\nnoted the deep roots of this policy:\natic program of segregation, \"the State\nautomatically assumes an affirmative\n\"It has been settled by the Ordi-\nduty 'to effectuate a transition to a ra-\nnance of 1787, the several Constitu-\ncially nondiscriminatory school system'\ntions adopted in this state, by its uni-\n[and] to eliminate from the public\nform course of legislation, and by the\nschools within their school system 'all\ndecisions of this court, that education\nvestiges of state-imposed segregation.'\nin Michigan is a matter of state con-\nIbid. (emphasis added).\ncern, that it is no part of the local\nself-government of a particular town-\nVesting responsibility with the State\nship or municipality\nThe\n795\nof Michigan for Detroit's segregated\nlegislature has always dictated the ed-\nschools is particularly appropriate as\nucational policy of the state.\" In re\n794 Michigan, unlike some other States, op-\nSchool District No. 6, 284 Mich. 132,\nerates a single statewide system of edu-\n145-146, 278 N.W. 792, 797 (1938).\ncation rather than several separate and\nThe State's control over education is\nindependent local school systems. The\nreflected in the fact that, contrary to\nmajority's emphasis on local governmen-\nthe Court's implication, there is little or\ntal control and local autonomy of school\nno relationship between school districts\ndistricts in Michigan will come as a sur-\nand local political units. To take the 85\nprise to those with any familiarity with\noutlying local school districts in the De-\nthat State's system of education. School\ntroit metropolitan area as examples, 17\ndistricts are not separate and distinct\ndistricts lie in two counties, two in three\nsovereign entities under Michigan law,\ncounties. One district serves five munic-\nbut rather are \"auxiliaries of the\nipalities; other suburban municipalities\nState,' subject to its \"absolute power.\"\nare fragmented into as many as six\nAttorney General of Michigan ex rel.\nschool districts. Nor is there any ap-\nKies V. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 240, 26\nparent state policy with regard to the\n3152\n94 SUPREME COURT-REPORTER\n418 U.S. 795\n418 L\nsize of school districts, as they now\ncitizenry. 16 See, e. g., Attorney Gener-\n16\nrange from 2,000 to 285,000 students.\nal ex rel. Kies, V. Lowrey; 131 Mich. 639,\nSta\nCentralized state control manifests it-\n92 N.W. 289 (1902), aff'd, 199 U.S. 233,\n209\nself in practice as well as in theory.\n26 S.Ct. 27, 50 L.Ed. 167 (1905). In-\nFle\nThe State controls the financing of edu>\ndeed, recent years have witnessed an ac-\nN.P\ncation in several ways. The legislature\ncelerated program of school district con-\nSoe\ncontributes a substantial portion of most\nsolidations, mergers, and annexations,\ntric\nschool districts' operating budgets with\nmany of which were state imposed.\n100\nfunds appropriated from the State's\nWhereas the State had 7,362 local dis-\nfor\nGeneral Fund revenues raised through\ntricts in 1912, the number had been re-\nCor\nstatewide taxation.⁶ The State's power\nduced to 1,438 in 1964 and to 738 in\nCon\nover the purse can be and is in fact used\n1968.1 By June 1972, only 608 school\nto enforce the State's powers over local\ndistricts remained. Furthermore, the\nsystem\ndistricts. In addition, although local\nState has broad powers to transfer prop-\nseries\ndistricts obtain funds through local\nerty from one district to another, again\nMichig\nproperty taxation, the State has assumed\nwithout the consent of the local school\ntution\nthe responsibility to ensure equalized\ndistricts affected by the transfer. 18 See,\nproperty valuations throughout the\ne. g., School District of the City of Lans- 797\nalesce\n796 State.⁸ The State also establishespstand-\ning V. State Board of Education, supra;\nruling\nards for teacher certification and teach-\nImlay Township District V. State Board\nitself no\ner tenure;9 determines part of the re-\nof Education, 359 Mich. 478, 102 N.W.2d\nEducation\nquired curriculum; 10 sets the minimum\n720 (1960).\ncuring\nschool term; 11 approves bus routes,\nwithin th\nequipment, and drivers; 12 approves\nWhatever may be the history of public\ntions of\ntextbooks; 13 and establishes procedures\neducation in other parts of our Nation,\nuted\nfor student discipline.¹ The State Su-\nit simply flies in the face of reality to\nthe Four\nperintendent of Public Instruction and\nsay, as does the majority, that in Michi-\nultimatel\nthe State Board of Education have the\ngan, \"[n]o single tradition in public\nits local\npower to remove local school board mem-\neducation is more deeply rooted than\nthe\nbers from office for neglect of their\nlocal control over the operation of schools\nsystem\nduties.\n15\n\"\nAnte, as 3125. As the State's\n798\nviewed\nMost significantly for present pur-\nSupreme Court has said: \"We have re-\nand\nposes, the State has wide-ranging pow-\npeatedly held that education in this state\na sin\ners to consolidate and merge school dis-\nsubst\nis not a matter of local concern, but be-\nbe\ntricts, even without the consent of the\nlongs to the state at large.\" Collins V.\ndistricts themselves or of the local\nCity of Detroit, 195 Mich. 330, 335-336,\n6. See § 388.611. The State contributed\n11. § 340.575.\nan average of 34% of the operating bud-\nCour\ngets of the 54 school districts included in\n12. § 388.1171.\nto\nthe original proposed desegregation area.\n13. § 340.887(1).\ntion\nIn 11 of these districts, state contribu-\nword\ntions exceeded 50% of the operating budg-\n14. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 4705 (July 7, 1970),\nets.\n1969-1970 Report of the Attorney General\ncials\n156 (Kelley).\nremed\n7. See, e. g., id., § 340.575. See also 1949-\nNot.onj\n1950 Report of the Attorney General 104\n15. See Mich.Comp.Laws § 340.253.\n(Roth) : Vol. 1, 1955 Report of the Attorney\nof race\nGeneral 561 (Kavanagh) ; 1961-1962 Report\n16. See generally, §§ 340.401-340.415 (con-\nschool.on\nof the Attorney General 533 (Kelley).\nsolidations). 340.431-340.449 (annexations).\n19.\n8. See Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 211.34 and 340.681.\n17. See 1 Michigan Senate Jonrnal, 1968, P.\nthe\n423.\nring 17\n9. § 340.569.\n18. See generally Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 340.461-\nally\n10. §§ 257.811(c), 340.361, 340.781, 340.782,\n340.468.\n388.371.\n3146\n418 U.S. 799\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3153\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\n161 N.W. 905, 907 (1917). See also with the affirmative duty to take what-\nSturgis V. County of Allegan, 343 Mich.\never steps might be necessary to convert\n209, 215, 72 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1955) Van\nto a unitary system in which racial dis-\nFleet V. Oltman, 244 Mich. 241, 244, 221\ncrimination would be eliminated root\nN.W. 299, 300 (1928) Child Welfare\nand branch.\" Green V. County School\nSociety of Flint v. Kennedy School Dis-\nBoard of New Kent County, 391 U.S.\ntrict, 220 Mich. 290, 296, 189 N.W. 1002,\n430, 437-438, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1694, 20\n1004 (1922). Indeed, a study prepared\nL.Ed.2d 716. (1968). See also Lee V.\nfor the 1961 Michigan Constitutional\nMacon County Board of Education, 267\nConvention noted that the Michigan\nF.Supp. 458 (MD Ala.), aff'd sub nom.\nConstitution's articles on education had\nWallace V. United States, 389 U.S. 215,\nresulted in \"the establishment of a state\n88 S.Ct. 415, 19 L.Ed.2d 422 (1967). Ne-\nsystem of education in contrast to a\ngro students are not only entitled to\nseries of local school systems.\" Elemen-\nneutral nondiscriminatory treatment in\nMichigan Constitution, Michigan Consti-\nthe future. They must receive \"what\ntutional Convention Studies 1 (1961).\nBrown II promised them: a school sys-\nIn sum, several factors in this case co-\ntem in which all vestiges of enforced ra-\nalesce to support the District Court's\ncial segregation have been eliminated.\"\nruling that it was the State of Michigan\nWright V. Council of the City of Emporia,\nitself, not simply the Detroit Board of\n407 U.S. 451, 463, 92 S.Ct. 2196, 2203, 33\nEducation, which bore the obligation of\nL.Ed.2d 51 (1972). See also Swann V.\ncuring the condition of segregation\nCharlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-\nwithin the Detroit city schools. The ac-\ncation, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267,\ntions of the State itself directly contrib-\n1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). These re-\nuted to Detroit's segregation. Under\nmedial standards are fully applicable not\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, the State is\nonly to school districts where a dual sys-\nultimately responsible for the actions of\ntem was compelled by statute, but also\nits local agencies. And, finally, given\nwhere, as here, a dual system was the\nthe structure of Michigan's educational\nproduct of purposeful and intentional\nsystem, Detroit's segregation cannot be\nstate action. See Keyes, 413 U.S., at\n1798 viewed as the problem of an independent\n200-201, 93 S.Ct., at 2693-2694.\nand separate entity. Michigan operates\nAfter examining three plans limited\na single statewide system of education, a\nto the city of Detroit, the District Court\nsubstantial part of which was shown to\ncorrectly concluded that none would\nbe segregated in this case.\neliminate root and branch the vestiges\nB\nof unconstitutional segregation. The 799\nplans' effectiveness, of course, had to be\nWhat action, then, could the District\nevaluated in the context of the District\nCourt require the State to take in order\nCourt's findings as to the extent of seg-\nto cure Detroit's condition of segrega-\ntion? Our prior cases have not minced\nregation in the Detroit city schools. As\nwords as to what steps responsible offi-\nindicated earlier, the most essential\ncials and agencies must take in order to\nfinding was that Negro children in De-\nremedy segregation in the public schools.\ntroit had been confined by intentional\nNot only must distinctions on the basis\nacts of segregation to a growing core of\nof race be terminated for the future, but\nNegro schools surrounded by a receding\nschool officials are also \"clearly charged\nring of white schools.¹⁹ Thus, in 1960,\n19. Despite Mr. Justice STEWART's claim to\nSTEWART acknowledges that intentional\nthe contrary, ante, at 3133, n. 2, of his concur-\nacts of segregation by the State have separated\nring opinion, the record fully supports my\nwhite and Negro students within the city, and\nstatement that Negro students were intention-\nthat the resulting core of all-Negro schools\nally confined to a core of Negro schools with-\nhas grown to encompass most of the city. In\nin the city of Detroit. See, e. g., supra, at\nsuggesting that my approval of an interdis-\n3146-3147, 3149-3150. Indeed, Mr. Justice\ntriet remedy rests on a further conclusion\n3154\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 799\n418,\nof Detroit's 251 regular attendance\nlevels and would leave elementary\nshort\n800 schools, 100 were 90% or more white\nschools segregated. Plan B, the plain-\nsyste\nand 71 were 90% or more Negro. In\ntiffs' plan, though requiring the trans-\ntinu\n1970, of Detroit's 282 regular attendance\nportation of 82,000 pupils and the acqui-\nwere\nschools, 69 were 90% or more white and\nsition of 900 school buses, would make\ndual\n133 were 90% or more Negro. While in\nlittle headway in rooting out the ves- 801\n1960, 68% of all schools were 90% or\ntiges of segregation. To begin with, be-\nmore one race, by 1970, 71.6% of the\ncause of practical limitations, the Dis-\nprop\nschools fell into that category. The\ntrict Court found that the plan would\nint\ngrowing core of all-Negro schools was\nleave many of the Detroit city schools 75\nfroi\nfurther evidenced in total school district\nto 90% Negro. More significantly,\nfort\npopulation figures. In 1960 the Detroit\nthe District Court recognized that in\ncree\nsystem had 46% Negro students and\nthe context of a community which his-\nflig\n54% white students, but by 1970, 64%\ntorically had a school system marked by\ntimo\nof the students were Negro and only\nrigid de jure segregation, the likely ef-\ncitie\n36% were white. This increase in the\nfect of a Detroit-only plan would be to\nWe\nproportion of Negro students was the\nwhite\n\"change a school system which is now\nhighest of any major Northern city.\nthe\nBlack and White to one that would be\nin\nIt was with these figures in the back-\nperceived as Black\n\"\nThe re-\nDistr\nground that the District Court evaluated\nsult of this changed perception, the Dis-\nof\nthe adequacy of the three Detroit-only\ntrict Court found, would be to increase\nfrom\nplans submitted by the parties. Plan A,\nthe flight of whites from the city to the\ntem.nit\nproposed by the Detroit Board of Educa-\noutlying suburbs, compounding the ef-\ngroes\ntion, desegregated the high schools and\nfects of the present rate of increase in\nabout a fifth of the middle-level schools.\n1802 prop\nthe proportion of Negro students in the\nmay dr\nIt was deemed inadequate, however, be-\ncause it did not desegregate elementary\nDetroit system. Thus, even if a plan\nprivan\nschools and left the middle-level schools\nwere adopted which, at its outset, pro-\nat:464\nvided in every school a 65% Negro-35%\nnore\nnot included in the plan more segregated\nthan ever. Plan C, also proposed by the\nwhite racial mix in keeping with the Ne-\nlegal\ntabli\nDetroit Board, was deemed inadequate\ngro-white proportions of the total stu-\nspon\nbecause it too covered only some grade\ndent population, such a system would, in\ndual\nalso\nthat the State or its political subdivisions\nremedial stage must engage in a second in-\nhave been responsible for the increasing per-\nquiry to determine whether additional state\nper\ncentage of Negro students in Detroit. my\naction exists to justify a particular remedy.\nSee\nBrother STEWART misconceives the thrust\nRather, once a constitutional violation has\n127\nof this dissent. In light of the high concen-\nbeen shown, the District Court is duty-\ntration of Negro students in Detroit, the\nbound to formulate an effective remedy and,\nDistrict Judge's finding that a Detroit-only\nin SO doing, the court is entitled-indeed, it\nof\nremedy cannot effectively cure the constitu-\nis required-to consider all the factual cir-\n170\ntional violation within the city should be\ncuinstances relevant to the framing of an ef-\nenough to support the choice of an interdis-\nfective decree. Thus, in Swann V. Charlotte-\ntriet remedy. Whether state action is re-\nMecklenburg Board of Education we held that\ndel\nsponsible for the growth of the core of all-\nthe District Court must take into account\nthom\nNegro schools in Detroit is, in my view,\nthe existence of extensive residential segre-\nquite irrelevant.\ngation in determining whether a racially neu-\nachi\nThe difficulty with Mr. Justice STEW-\ntral \"neighborhood school\" attendance plan\nactus\nART's position is that he. like the Court.\nwas an adequate desegregation remedy, re-\nS.C.\nconfuses the inquiry required to determine\ngardless of whether this residential segrega-\ndard\nwhether there has been a substantive consti-\ntion was caused by state action. So here,\nComm\ntutional violation with that necessary to for-\nthe District Court was required to consider\nmulate an appropriate remedy once a consti-\nthe facts that the Detroit school system was\ntutional violation has been shown. While a\nalready predominantly Negro and would like-\n(1971)\nfinding of state action is of course a prereq-\nly become all-Negro upon issuance of a De-\ning\nuisite to finding a violation, we have never\ntroit-only decree in framing an effective de-\nities\nheld that after unconstitutional state action\nsegregation remedy, regardless of state re-\nhas been shown, the District Court at the\nsponsibility for this situation.\nall\n418 U.S. 803\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3155\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nshort order, devolve into an all-Negro\ngro and white children in fact go to\nsystem. The net result would be a con-\nschool together. This is, in the final an-\ntinuation of the all-Negro schools which\nalysis, what desegregation of the public\nwere the hallmarks of Detroit's former\nschools is all about.\ndual system of one-race schools.\nBecause of the already high and rap-\nUnder our decisions, it was clearly\nidly increasing percentage of Negro stu-\ndents in the Detroit system, as well as\nproper for the District Court to take\ninto account the so-called \"white flight\"\nthe prospect of white flight, a Detroit-\nfrom the city schools which would be\nonly plan simply has no hope of achiev-\nforthcoming from any Detroit-only de-\ning actual desegregation. Under such a\nplan white and Negro students will not\ncree. The court's prediction of white\ngo to school together. Instead, Negro\nflight was well supported by expert tes-\nchildren will continue to attend all-Ne-\ntimony based on past experience in other\ngro schools. The very evil that Brown I\ncities undergoing desegregation relief.\nwas aimed at will not be cured, but will\nWe ourselves took the possibility of\nwhite flight into account in evaluating\nbe perpetuated for the future.\nthe effectiveness of a desegregation plan\nRacially identifiable schools are one of\nin Wright, supra, where we relied on the\nthe primary vestiges of state-imposed\nDistrict Court's finding that if the city\nsegregation which an effective desegre-\nof Emporia were allowed to withdraw\ngation decree must attempt to eliminate.\nfrom the existing system, leaving a sys-\nIn Swann, supra, for example, we held\ntem with a higher proportion of Ne-\nthat \"[t]he district judge or school au-\ngroes, it \" 'may be anticipated that the\nthorities\nwill thus necessarily\n802 proportion of whites in county schools\nbe concerned with the elimination of one-\nmay drop as those who can register in\nrace schools.\" 402 U.S., at 26, 91 S.Ct., 803\nprivate academies'\n407 U.S.,\nat 1281. There is \"a presumption,\" we\nat 464, 92 S.Ct., at 2204. One cannot ig-\nstated, \"against schools that are sub-\nnore the white-flight problem, for where\nstantially disproportionate in their ra-\nlegally imposed segregation has been es-\ncial composition.\" Ibid. And in evalu-\ntablished, the District Court has the re-\nating the effectiveness of desegregation\nsponsibility to see to it not only that the\nplans in prior cases, we ourselves have\ndual system is terminated at once but\nconsidered the extent to which they dis-\nalso that future events do not serve to\ncontinued racially identifiable schools.\nperpetuate or re-establish segregation.\nSee, e. g., Green V. County School Board\nSee Swann, 402 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct., at\nof New Kent County, supra; Wright V.\n1278. See also Green, 391 U.S., at 438\nCouncil of the City of Emporia, supra.\nn. 4, 88 S.Ct., at 1694; Monroe V. Board\nFor a principal end of any deseg-\nof Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459, 88 S.Ct.\nregation remedy is to ensure that\n1700, 1705, 20 L.Ed.2d 733 (1968).\nit is no longer \"possible to identify\na 'white school' or a 'Negro school.\"\nWe held in Swann, supra, that where\nSwann, supra, 402 U.S., at 18, 91 S.Ct.,\nde jure segregation is shown, school au-\nat 1277. The evil to be remedied in the\nthorities must make \"every effort to\ndismantling of a dual system is the\nachieve the greatest possible degree of\n\"[r]acial identification of the system's\nactual desegregation.\" 402 U.S., at 26, 91\nschools.\" Green, supra, 391 U.S., at 435,\nS.Ct., at 1281. This is the operative stan-\n88 S.Ct., at 1693. The goal is a system\ndard re-emphasized in Davis V. School\nwithout white schools or Negro schools\nComm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33,\n-a system with \"just schools.\" Id., at\n37, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 1292, 28 L.Ed.2d 577\n442, 88 S.Ct., at 1696. A school authori-\n(1971). If these words have any mean-\nty's remedial plan or a district court's\ning at all, surely it is that school author-\nremedial decree is to be judged by its\nities must, to the extent possible, take\neffectiveness in achieving this end. See\nall practicable steps to ensure that Ne-\nSwann, 402 U.S., at 25, 91 S.Ct., at 1280;\n3156\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 803\nDavis, supra, 402 U.S., at 37, 91 S.Ct., at\nThe Federal Government has classified\n1292; Green, supra, 391 U.S., at 439, 88\nthe tri-county area as a Standard Metro-\nS.Ct., at 1694.\npolitan Statistical Area, indicating that\nit is an area of \"economic and social in-\nWe cautioned in Swann, of course,\ntegration.\" United States V. Connecti-\nthat the dismantling of a segregated\ncut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 670, 94\nschool system does not mandate any par-\nS.Ct. 2788, 2797, 41 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1974).\nticular racial balance. 402 U.S., at 24,\n91 S.Ct., at 1280. We also concluded\nUnder a Detroit-only decree, Detroit's.\nthat a remedy under which there would\nschools will clearly remain racially iden-\nremain a small number of racially iden-\ntifiable in comparison with neighboring\ntifiable schools was only presumptively\nschools in the metropolitan community.\ninadequate and might be justified. Id.,\nSchools with 65% and more Negro stu-\nat 26, 91 S.Ct., at 1281. But this is a\ndents will stand in sharp and obvious\ntotally different case. The flaw of a\ncontrast to schools in neighboring dis-\nDetroit-only decree is not that it does\ntricts with less than 2% Negro enroll-\nnot reach some ideal degree of racial\nment. Negro students will continue to\nbalance or mixing. It simply does not\nperceive their schools as segregated edu-\npromise to achieve actual desegregation\ncational facilities and this perception\nat all. It is one thing to have a system\nwill only be increased when whites react\nwhere a small number of students re-\nto a Detroit-only decree by fleeing to the\nmain in racially identifiable schools. It\nsuburbs to avoid integration. School\n806\nis something else entirely to have a sys-\ndistrict lines, however innocently drawn,\nem where all students continue to attend\nwill surely be perceived as fences to sep-\nsuch schools.\narate the races when, under a Detroit-\nonly decree, white parents withdraw\nThe continued racial identifiability of\ntheir children from the Detroit city 805\nthe Detroit schools under a Detroit-only\nschools and move to the suburbs in order\nremedy is not simply a reflection of\nto continue them in all-white schools.\ntheir high percentage of Negro students.\nThe message of this action will not es-\n1804\nWhat is or is not a racially identifiable\ncape the Negro children in the city of\nvestige of de jure segregation must nec-\nDetroit. See Wright, 407 U.S., at\nessarily depend on several factors. Cf.\n466, 92 S.Ct., at 2205. It will be of\nKeyes, 413 U.S., at 196, 93 S.Ct.,\nscant significance to Negro children who\nat 2691. Foremost among these should\nhave for years been confined by de jure\nbe the relationship between the schools\nacts of segregation to a growing core of\nin question and the neighboring commu-\nall-Negro schools surrounded by a ring\nnity. For these purposes the city of De-\nof all-white schools that the new divid-\ntroit and its surrounding suburbs must\ning line between the races is the school\nbe viewed as a single community. De-\ndistrict boundary.\ntroit is closely connected to its suburbs\nin many ways, and the metropolitan area\nNor can it be said that the State is\nis viewed as a single cohesive unit by its\nfree from any responsibility for the dis-\nresidents. About 40% of the residents\nparity between the racial makeup of De-\nthe\nof the two suburban counties included in\ntroit and its surrounding suburbs. The\nthe desegregation plan work in Wayne\nState's creation, through de jure acts of\nbl\nCounty; in which Detroit is situated.\nsegregation, of a growing core of all-Ne-\nMany residents of the city work in the\ngro schools inevitably acted as a magnet\nsuburbs. The three counties participate\nto attract Negroes to the areas served\nthe\nin a wide variety of cooperative govern-\nby such schools and to deter them from\nDistr\nmental ventures on a metropolitan-wide\nsettling either in other areas of the city\nand\nbasis, including a metropolitan transit\nor in the suburbs. By the same token,\nto\nsystem, park authority, water and sewer\nthe growing core of all-Negro schools in-\nState\nsystem, and council of governments.\nevitably helped drive whites to other\nto\n418 U.S. 807\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3157\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nareas of the city or to the suburbs.\nAs\naration of the races it achieved in the\nwe recognized in Swann:\npast by purposeful state action.\n\"People gravitate toward school facili-\nThe majority asserts, however, that\nties, just as schools are located in re-\ninvolvement of outlying districts would\nsponse to the needs of people. The lo-\ndo violence to the accepted principle that\ncation of schools may thus influence\n\"the nature of the violation determines\nthe patterns of residential develop-\nthe scope of the remedy.\" Swann, supra,\nment of a metropolitan area and have\n402 U.S., at 16, 91 S.Ct., at 1276. See\nimportant impact on composition of\nante, at 3127. Not only is the majority's\ninner-city neighborhoods.\nattempt to find in this single phrase the\n[Action taken] to maintain the sepa-\nanswer to the complex and difficult ques-\nration of the races with a minimum\ntions presented in this case hopelessly\ndeparture from the formal principles\nsimplistic, but more important, the Court\nof 'neighborhood zoning'\nreads these words in a manner which\ndoes more than simply influence the\nperverts their obvious meaning. The\nshort-run composition of the student\nnature of a violation determines the\nbody\nIt may well pro-\nscope of the remedy simply because the\nmote segregated residential patterns\nfunction of any remedy is to cure the vi-\nwhich, when combined with 'neighbor-\nolation to which it is addressed. In\nhood zoning,' further lock the school\nschool segregationjcases, as in other eq- 807\nsystem into the mold of separation of\nuitable causes, a remedy which effective-\n806\nthe races. Upon a showing a\nly cures the violation is what is re-\ndistrict court may consider this in\nquired. See Green, 391 U.S., at 439, 88\nfashioning a remedy.\" 402 U.S., at\nS.Ct., at 1694; Davis, 402 U.S., at 37,\n20-21, 91 S.Ct., at 1278.\n91 S.Ct., at 1292. No more is necessary,\nSee also Keyes, 413 U.S., at 202, 93 S.Ct.,\nbut we can tolerate no less. To read\nat 2694. The rippling effects on residen-\nthis principle as barring a district\ntial patterns caused by purposeful acts of\ncourt from imposing the only ef-\nsegregation do not automatically subside\nfective remedy for past segregation and\nat the school district border. With rare\nremitting the court to a patently inef-\nexceptions, these effects naturally\nfective alternative is, in my view, to\nspread through all the residential neigh-\nturn a simple commonsense rule into a\nborhoods within a metropolitan area.\ncruel and meaningless paradox. Ironi-\nSee id., at 202-203, 93 S.Ct., at 2694-\ncally, by ruling out an interdistrict\n2695.\nremedy, the only relief which promises\nThe State must also bear part of the\nto cure segregation in the Detroit public\nblame for the white flight to the sub-\nschools, the majority flouts the very\nurbs which would be forthcoming from a\nprinciple on which it purports to rely.\nDetroit-only decree and would render\nNor should it be of any significance\nsuch a remedy ineffective. Having cre-\nthat the suburban school districts were\nated a system where whites and Negroes\nnot shown to have themselves taken any\nwere intentionally kept apart so that\ndirect action to promote segregation of\nthey could not become accustomed to\nthe races. Given the State's broad pow-\nlearning together, the State is responsi-\ners over local school districts, it was well\nble for the fact that many whites will\nwithin the State's powers to require\nreact to the dismantling of that segre-\nthose districts surrounding the Detroit\ngated system by attempting to flee to\nschool district to participate in a metro-\nthe suburbs. Indeed, by limiting the\npolitan remedy. The State's duty should\nDistrict Court to a Detroit-only remedy\nbe no different here than in cases where\nand allowing that flight to the suburbs\nit is shown that certain of a State's vot-\nto succeed, the Court today allows the\ning districts are malapportioned in vio-\nState to profit from its own wrong and\nlation of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nto perpetuate for years to come the sep-\nSee Reynolds V. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84\n3158\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 807\n418\nS.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Ov-\neducational facilities are inherently un-\nJud\nerrepresented electoral districts are re-\nequal and of Swann's unequivocal man-\nto\nquired to participate in reapportionment\ndate that the answer to de jure segrega-\ndie\nalthough their only \"participation\" in\ntion is the greatest possible degree of\nto\nthe violation was to do nothing about it.\nactual desegregation.\ntio\nSimilarly, electoral districts which them-\nsub\nselves meet representation standards\nIII\nmust frequently be redrawn as part of a\nto\nremedy for other over- and under-inclu-\nOne final set of problems remains to\nbe considered. We recognized in Brown\nsive districts. No finding of fault on\nAs\nII, and have re-emphasized ever since,\nthe part of each electoral district and no\nfinding of a discriminatory effect on\nthat in fashioning relief in desegrega-\nbu\ntion cases, \"the courts will be guided by\neach district is a prerequisite to its in-\nvolvement in the constitutionally re-\nequitable principles. Traditionally, equi-\npo\ndei\nquired remedy. By the same logic, no\nty has been characterized by a practical\nfinding of fault on the part of the sub-\nflexibility in shaping its remedies and\n1810\n1808 urban school districts in this case and\nby a facility for adjusting and reconcil-\n1809\nno finding of a discriminatory effect on\ning public and private needs.\" Brown\neach district should be a prerequisite to\nII, 349 U.S., at 300, 75 S.Ct., at 756. See\ntheir involvement in the constitutionally\nalso Swann, supra.\nrequired remedy.\nThough not resting its holding on this\npoint, the majority suggests that various\nCow\nIt is the State, after all, which bears\nequitable considerations militate against\nticip\nthe responsibility under Brown of af-\ninterdistrict relief. The Court, for ex-\nsenti\nfording a nondiscriminatory system of\neducation. The State, of course, is ordi-\nample, refers to financing and adminis-\nto\nFun\nnarily free to choose any decentralized\ntrative problems, the logistical problems\nframework for education it wishes, so\nattending large-scale transportation of\nthe\nlong as it fulfills that Fourteenth\nstudents, and the prospect of the Dis-\nbilit\nAmendment obligation. But the State\ntrict Court's becoming a \"de facto 'legis-\nfinal\nshould no more be allowed to hide be-\nlative authority\" and \"'school super-\nhind its delegation and compartmental-\nintendent' for the entire area.\" Ante,\nreli\nization of school districts to avoid its\nat 3127. The entangling web of problems\nconstitutional obligations to its children\nwoven by the Court, however, appears\nthan it could hide behind its political\non further consideration to be construct-\ned of the flimsiest of threads.\ncon\nsubdivisions to avoid its obligations to\nits voters. Reynolds V. Sims, at 575,\nI deal first with the last of the prob-\n84 S.Ct., at 1388. See also Gomillion V.\nlems posed by the Court—the specter of\nLightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5\nthe District Court qua \"school superin-\nL.Ed.2d 110 (1960).\ntendent\" and \"legislative authority\"-\ntio\nIt is a hollow remedy indeed where\nfor analysis of this problem helps put\n\"after supposed 'desegregation' the\nthe other issues in proper perspective.\nDi\nOur cases, of course, make clear that the\nde\nschools remained segregated in fact.\"\nHobson V. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 495\ninitial responsibility for devising an ad-\npor\n(D.D.C. 1967). We must do better than\nequate desegregation plan belongs with\n\"\nthe\n'substitute\none segregated\nschool authorities, not with the District\nschool system for another segregated\nCourt. The court's primary role is to\n20\nschool system.\" Wright, 407 U.S., at\nreview the adequacy of the school au-\n456, 92 S.Ct., at 2200. To suggest, as\nthorities' efforts and to substitute its\ndoes the majority, that a Detroit-\nown plan only if and to the extent they\nonly plan somehow remedies the ef-\ndefault. See Swann, 402 U.S., at 16,\nfects of de jure segregation of the races\n91 S.Ct., at 1276; Green, 391 U.S., at\nis, in my view, to make a solemn mock-\n439, 88 S.Ct., at 1294. Contrary to the\nery of Brown I's holding that separate\nmajority's suggestions, the District\n418 U.S. 811\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3159\nCite as 94S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nJudge in this case consistently adhered\ndations have yet been submitted by the\nto these procedures and there is every in-\nstate defendants on financial and admin-\ndication that he would have continued\nistrative arrangements. In sum, the\nto do SO. After finding de jure segrega-\npracticality of a final metropolitan plan\ntion the court ordered the parties to\nis simply not before us at the present\nsubmit proposed Detroit-only plans.\ntime. Since the State and the panel of\nThe state defendants were also ordered\nexperts have not yet had an opportunity\nto submit a proposed metropolitan plan\nto come up with a workable remedy,\nextending beyond Detroit's boundaries.\nthere is no foundation for the majority's\nAs the District Court stated, \"the State\nsuggestion of the impracticality of in-\ndefendants\nbear the initial\nterdistrict relief. Furthermore, there\nburden of coming forward with a pro-\nis no basis whatever for assuming that\nposal that promises to work.\" The state\nthe District Court will inevitably be\ndefendants defaulted in this obligation,\nforced to assume the role of legislature\n810 however. Rather than submit a com-\nor school superintendent. 20 Were we to\n811\nplete plan, the State Board of Education\nhold that it was its constitutional duty\nsubmitted six proposals, none of which\nto do so, there is every indication that\nwas in fact a desegregation plan. It\nthe State of Michigan would fulfill its\nwas only upon this default that the Dis-\nobligation and develop a plan which is\ntrict Court began to take steps to devel-\nworkable, administrable, financially\nop its own plan. Even then the District\nsound, and, most important, in the best\nCourt maximized school authority par-\ninterest of quality education for all of\nticipation by appointing a panel repre-\nthe children in the Detroit metropolitan\nsenting both plaintiffs and defendants\narea.\nto develop a plan. Pet.App. 99a-100a.\nFurthermore, the District Court still left\nSince the Court chooses, however, to\nthe state defendants the initial responsi-\nspeculate on the feasibility of a metro-\nbility for developing both interim and\npolitan plan, I feel constrained to com-\nfinal financial and administrative ar-\nment on the problem areas it has target-\nrangements to implement interdistrict\ned. To begin with, the majority's ques-\nrelief. Id., at 104a-105a. The Court of\ntions concerning the practicality of con-\nsolidation of school districts need not\nAppeals further protected the interests\nof local school authorities by ensuring\ngive us pause. The State clearly has the\nthat the outlying suburban districts\npower, under existing law, to effect a\ncould fully participate in the proceed-\nconsolidation if it is ultimately deter-\nings to develop a metropolitan remedy.\nmined that this offers the best prospect\nfor a workable and stable desegregation\nThese processes have not been allowed\nplan. See supra, at 3152. And given the\nto run their course. No final desegrega-\n1,000 or so consolidations of school dis-\ntion plan has been proposed by the panel\nof experts, let alone approved by the\ntricts which have taken place in the\nDistrict Court. We do not know in any\npast, it is hard to believe that the State\ndetail how many students will be trans-\nhas not already devised means of solving\nported to effect a metropolitan remedy,\nmost, if not all, of the practical problems\nand we do not know how long or how far\nwhich the Court suggests consolidation\nthey will have to travel. No recommen-\nwould entail.\n20. In fact, the District Court remarked \"that\noperate now and hereafter in a racially uni-\nthis court's task is to enforce constitutional\nfied, non-discriminatory fashion. Within\nrights not to act as a schoolmaster ; the\nthat framework the body politic, educators,\ncourt's task is to protect the constitutional\nparents, and most particularly the children\nrights here found violated with as little in-\nmust be given the maximum opportunity to\ntrusion into the education process as possi-\nexperiment and secure a high quality, and\nble. The court's objective is to establish\nequal, educational opportunity.\" Pet.App.\nthe minimum constitutional framework with-\n82a.\nin which the system of public schools may\n3160\n94 SUPREME COURT REPORTER\n418 U.S. 811\n41830\nFurthermore, the majority ignores\nstatewide, 35%-40% of all students\nrequir\nlong-established Michigan procedures\nalready arrive at school on a bus. In\nfect\nunder which school districts may enter\nthose school districts in the tri-county\nThe\ninto contractual agreements to educate\nDetroit metropolitan area eligible for\nhas\ntheir pupils in other districts using state\nstate reimbursement of transportation\nof\nor local funds to finance nonresident\ncosts, 42%-52% of all students rode\nine\neducation. Such agreements could\nbuses to school. In the tri-county areas\nvent\n1812 form anjeasily administrable framework\nas a whole, approximately 300,000 pupils 1813\ncre\nfor interdistrict relief short of outright\narrived at school on some type of bus,\ninti\nconsolidation of the school districts.\nwith about 60,000 of these apparently\nfour\nThe District Court found that interdis-\nusing regular public transit. In compar-\n814\nwou\ntrict procedures like these were fre-\nison, the desegregation plan, according\nthir\nquently used to provide special educa-\nto its present rough outline, would in-\nOth\ntional services for handicapped children,\nvolve the transportation of 310,000 stu-\ndy\nand extensive statutory provision is also\ndents, about 40% of the population\nposs\nmade for their use in vocational\nwithin the desegregation area.\nneal\neducation. Surely if school districts\nwhit\nare willing to engage in interdistrict\nWith respect to distance and amount\npres\nprograms to help those unfortunate chil-\nof time traveled, 17 of the outlying\nSor\ndren crippled by physical or mental\nschool districts involved in the plan are\nevitab\nhandicaps, school districts can be re-\ncontiguous to the Detroit district. The\ndecre\nquired to participate in an inter-district\nrest are all within 8 miles of the Detroit\ndistrict\nprogram to help those children in the\ncity limits. The trial court, in defining\nwe said\ncity of Detroit whose educations and\nthe desegregation area, placed a ceiling\nvery futures have been crippled by pur-\nof 40 minutes one way on the amount of\nposeful state segregation.\ntravel time, and many students will ob-\nther\nviously travel for far shorter periods.\nort\nAlthough the majority gives this last\nAs to distance, the average statewide\nmatter only fleeting reference, it is\nbus trip is 8½ miles one way, and in\nwith\nplain that one of the basic emotional and\nsome parts of the tri-county area, stu-\nmigl\nlegal issues underlying these cases con-\ndents already travel for one and a quar-\npil\ncerns the propriety of transportation of\nter hours or more each way. In sum,\nBu\nstudents to achieve desegregation.\nwith regard to both the number of stu-\nter\nWhile others may have retreated from\ndents transported and the time and dis-\nits standards, see, e. g., Keyes,\ntances involved, the outlined desegrega-\n413 U.S., at 217, 93 S.Ct., at 2701 (Pow-\ntion plan \"compares favorably with the\nell, J., concurring in part and dissenting\ntransportation plan previously operated\nin part), I continue to adhere to the\nSwann, 402 U.S., at 30, 91\nguidelines set forth in Swann on this is-\nS.Ct., at 1283.\nsue. See 402 U.S., at 29-31, 91 S.Ct., at\n1282-1283. And though no final deseg-\nAs far as economics are concerned, a\nregation plan is presently before us, to\nmetropolitan remedy would actually be\nthe extent the outline of such a plan is\nmore sensible than a Detroit-only reme-\nnow visible, it is clear that the transpor-\ndy. Because of prior transportation aid\ntation it would entail will be fully con-\nrestrictions, see at 3150, Detroit largely\nsistent with these guidelines.\nrelied on public transport, at stu-\nFirst of all, the metropolitan plan\ndent expense, for those students who\nwould not involve the busing of substan-\nlived too far away to walk to school.\ntially more students than already ride\nSince no inventory of school buses exist-\nbuses. The District Court found that,\ned, a Detroit-only plan was estimated to\n21. See, c. g., Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 340.69, 22. See id., §§ 340.330-340.330n.\n340.121 (d), 340.359, 340.582. 340.5S2a, 340.-\n590.\n418 U.S. 815\nMILLIKEN V. BRADLEY\n3161\nCite as 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)\nrequire the purchase of 900 buses to ef-\nstructed and maintained to enforce ra-\nfectuate the necessary transportation.\ncial segregation. The remedy for\nThe tri-county area, in contrast, already\nsuch segregation may be administra-\nhas an inventory of 1,800 buses, many\ntively awkward, inconvenient, and even\nof which are now under-utilized. Since\nbizarre in some situations and may\nincreased utilization of the existing in-\nimpose burdens on some; but all awk-\nventory can take up much of the in-\nwardness and inconvenience cannot be\ncrease in transportation involved in the\navoided\n\"\n402 U.S., at\ninterdistrict remedy, the District Court\n28, 91 S:Ct., at 1282.\nfound that only 350 additional buses\nwould probably be needed, almost two-\nDesegregation is not and was never\n1814\nthirds fewer than a Detroit-only remedy.\nexpected to be an easy task. Racial atti-\nOther features of an interdistrict reme-\ntudes ingrained in our Nation's child-\ndy bespeak its practicality, such as the\nhood and adolescence are not quickly\npossibility of pairing up Negro schools\nthrown aside in its middle years. But\nnear Detroit's boundary with nearby\njust as the inconvenience of some cannot\nwhite schools on the other side of the\nbe allowed to stand in the way of the\npresent school district line.\nrights of others, so public opposition, no\nmatter how strident, cannot be permit-\nSome disruption, of course, is the in-\nted to divert this Court from the en-\nevitable product of any desegregation\nforcement of the constitutional princi-\ndecree, whether it operates within one\nples at issue in this case. Today's hold-\ndistrict or on an interdistrict basis. As\ning, I fear, is more a reflection of a per-\nwe said in Swann, however:\nceived public mood that we have gone\n\"Absent a constitutional violation\nfar enough in enforcing the Constitu-\nthere would be no basis for judicially\ntion's guarantee of equal justice than it\nordering assignment of students on a\nis the product of neutral principles of\nracial basis. All things being equal,\nlaw. In the short run, it may seem to [815\nwith no history of discrimination, it\nbe the easier course to allow our great\nmight well be desirable to assign pu-\nmetropolitan areas to be divided up each\npils to schools nearest their homes.\ninto two cities-one white, the other\nBut all things are not equal in a sys-\nblack-but it is a course, I predict, our\ntem that has been deliberately con-\npeople will ultimately regret. I dissent.\n94 S.Ct-33\nH\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nApril 9, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nDICK CHELEY\nFROM:\nEDWARD SCHMULTS\nSUBJECT:\nJustice Department Involvement in\nPrivate School Bias Litigation\nYou requested some background for the President on this morning's\nnews story concerning the position of the Justice Department in certain\nlitigation affecting the right of private schools to discriminate on the\nbasis of race. The material under \"Background\" and \"Justice Depart-\nment Involvement\" was furnished to Dick Parsons by the Solicitor\nGeneral.\nBACKGROUND\nThe case in question was commenced by two private parties against\nseveral private schools in Virginia which discriminated in their\nadministration policies on the basis of race. The contention of the\nplaintiffs was that such discrimination violated Section 1981 of the\nUnited States Code, which derives from the old Civil Rights Act of\n1866. This law prohibits racial discrimination in the making of\nprivate contracts. The defendants in this case argue that Section 1981\ncould not be applied to private schools and, in the alternative, that if\nthis section were applicable to private schools it was unconstitutional.\nThe lower court and the U. S. Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit) held\nfor the plaintiffs. The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court\nby the defendants.\nJUSTICE DEPARTMENT INVOLVEMENT\nWhen the constitutionality of a federal statute is challenged in litigation\nbefore the Supreme Court, it is required that the Department of Justice\nbe notified of the litigation, the statute in question and the nature of the\nconstitutional challenge. As a general rule, the Department will defend,\namicus curiae, the constitutionality of the statute, unless a constitutional\nprerogative of the President is being diminished.\nFORD LIBRARY\n-2-\nI have been advised by the Solicitor General that it is clear from\nprevious cases that Section 1981 is constitutional.\nIf the President is asked about this situation, I think he should respond\nthat:\n(1) The Justice Department is participating in this case because of its\nduty is defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress; the Department\nbelieves its position is mandated by the statute and previous judicial\ndecisions;\n(2) He has been advised that the Department's position is that the\nstatute applies only to most sweeping forms of segregation;\n(3) According to the Department, the statute would not be applicable\nto religious schools or those organized on some other right of\nassociation; and\n(4) We should bear in mind the case involves a statute which is within\nthe power of Congress to change."
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