Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
6283037
label
Science and Technology Adviser: February 6 - April 17, 1975
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
6283037
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Science and Technology Adviser: February 6 - April 17, 1975
citationUrl
collections
White House Special Files Unit Files
Issue Decision Papers for the President
subjects
President (1974-1977 : Ford). Office of Science and Technology Policy. (5/11/1976 - 1/20/1977)
Legislation
Presidential advisors
Science
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
6283037
coverageEndDate
day
21
logicalDate
1975-05-21
month
5
year
1975
coverageStartDate
day
8
logicalDate
1974-10-08
month
10
year
1974
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
7c8ab8af4eeed5e3
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 7, folder "Science and Technology Adviser:
February 6 - April 17, 1975" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 7 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 12, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
FROM:
JIM CAVANAUGH
SUBJECT:
Science and Technology in the Executive
Office of the President
This memorandum (a) identifies arguments for and against the science
advisory arrangements recommended by the Vice President's staff,
(b) discusses and assesses other alternatives, and (c) recommends an
alternative plan for assuring that adequate scientific and technical advice
is available for you and your advisers.
Background
The Vice President's staff recommendations (Tab A) call for the creation
by law of an Office of Technology and Science (OTS) in the Executive Office
of the President, with the head of the office also designated as the
President's science and technology adviser. In addition to the Director,
there would be a deputy, five assistant directors, up to 12 professional
staff, and additional supporting staff. The Director and office would be
assisted by ad hoc panels of experts from outside the government.
The recommended arrangements are quite comparable to the science
advisory apparatus which was abolished in July 1973 -- which included the
Office of Science and Technology, with the Director designated as Science
Adviser, and the President's Science Advisory Committee which included
experts from outside the government. In 1973 the civilian functions were
transferred to the National Science Foundation and its Director has
served as Science Adviser.
Except for the single Director rather than a three member Council as the
leadership, the Vice President's staff recommendations are like those
recommended in June 1974 by a National Academy of Sciences Committee
chaired by James Killian and provided for in a bill passed last November
by the Senate (the Kennedy bill). There are a number of advantages and
disadvantages of this proposal, and there are other alternatives that
warrant consideration.
- 2 -
Critical Considerations
LIBRARY
Critical considerations that bear upon a decision on science advisory
arrangements include:
1.
Integration of staff advice. There are few problems and issues
requiring Presidential or Executive Office attention that involve only
scientific and technical considerations. A group limited primarily to
scientists and engineers is not well equipped to deal with other perti-
nent considerations -- economic, social, legal, political, intergovern-
mental, etc. Thus, the output of a scientific and technical group, even
if it reports to the President, must be integrated with the work of others
to provide a full analysis of a problem or issue and a full range of
alternatives -- not limited to scientific and technical alternatives.
2. Focus of special purpose offices. Past experience with special
purpose offices in the Executive Office indicates that they tend to
become "special pleaders" or advocates for particular alternatives
or programs, thus making more difficult the job of reaching balanced
decisions among competing interests. For example, they advocate
programs which involve additional funding for their constituancy.
3. Scientific community views. Pressure is growing steadily from
scientific community leaders for action to restore some science
presence in the White House. Arguments are often more emotional
than substantive. (If not resolved this year, the subject could even
be a campaign issue for scientists in 1976.)
4.
Congressional action. There is a good chance that Congress will act
on its own initiative this year to create some new Executive Office
organization.
Alternatives
There are four principal alternatives that have been advanced for
organizing scientific and technical advice.
Alt. #1 Propose legislation to create an Office of Technology and Science
(as recommended in the Vice President's staff report, Tab A)
Arguments for:
Would be fully responsive to the scientific and technical
community.
Would defuse the pressures in Congress to mandate their
solution.
- 3 -
Having independent scientific and technical advice immediately
available could be useful on occasions.
Arguments against:
As in the case of the arrangements existing prior to July 1973,
there will be problems of integrating the work of this single
purpose group with other elements of the Executive Office.
Reestablishes the special interest problem.
Would add substantially to the White House staff and would
be costly.
Would be viewed as Administration endorsement of Senator
Kennedy's bill. Establishes a permanent and rigid structure.
Alt. #2 Continue the existing arrangements, wherein the Director of NSF
also serves as Science Adviser. Or strengthen it with a formal
Science Adviser to the President designation and involve him in
more issues, perhaps through Presidential assignment.
Arguments for:
White House scientific oversight is less important now than
in the 1950's and 1960's, because line agencies and NSF are
much better staffed to deal with technical considerations.
The Science Adviser can devote more staff and funding
resources to the function since he can draw upon all NSF
resources.
The Science Adviser has functioned principally as an adviser
to the OMB. His advice is integrated with other inputs -
avoiding the "special pleader" problem.
Arguments against:
The arrangement is not satisfactory to the scientific community
which has complained of three principal weaknesses:
- The Science Adviser is not involved in national defense
LISHARY
issues, thus there is essentially no scientific and technical
review from outside DOD. (In fact, NSC established in 1973
a scientific advisory apparatus consisting of technical staff
and 25 technical consultants.)
- The Science Adviser is too far removed from the President.
- The Science Adviser has a "conflict of interest" in that he
must seek and defend before OMB NSF's request for R&D
funds while also evaluating R&D requests of other agencies.
Elements of the Executive Office other than OMB have received
relatively little help from the Science Adviser.
The selection of this alternative will probably result in
legislation such as the Kennedy bill.
- 4 -
Alt. #3 Appoint a Science Adviser to the President on the White House
staff. Provide him with a few (1 to 3) professional assistants
and expect him to draw upon scientific and technical expertise
in agencies and from non-Federal ad hoc committees -- much
the way Bob Goldwin functions with the academic community.
The Science Adviser would continue to draw upon NSF for staff
support. NSC's existing staff and advisory group would be
continued and would work closely with the Science Adviser.
Arguments for:
Provides a "science presence" in the White House.
Provides additional expertise for addressing critical issues
that involve scientific and technical considerations.
Avoids institutionalizing another large special purpose staff.
Arguments against:
This limited arrangement may not be adequate to satisfy the
scientific community (e.g., it might not meet the criticism
that the President needs technical advice independent of NSC
and DOD on defense matters) or head off Congressional
action.
Once created, pressure may still be strong to expand it to a
full-blown office or council.
The Science Adviser may become a special interest advocate.
Alt. #4 Expand significantly and restructure the policy analysis capability
of the Executive Office of the President by creating a more broadly
based analytical or planning group which includes scientific and
engineering experts.
Arguments for:
The policy analysis and long range planning capabilities of the
Executive Office are not adequate and should be expanded.
Scientific and technical expertise should be integrated with
LISHARY
other parts of the policy analysis and decision making structure.
Arguments against:
This would involve rethinking and restructuring the roles of
OMB, NSC and Domestic Council and has not been developed
adequately to permit serious consideration at this time.
Such expanded White House-Executive Office capability probably
would be opposed on the Hill and by line agencies.
Probably would not be acceptable to the scientific community
which tends to view integration of its advice at some level below
the President as de facto subordination of scientific advice.
- 5 -
Recommendation
From the standpoint of substantive contribution to improve decisions, I
do not believe that it is necessary to provide new scientific and technical
capability in the White House or Executive Office. However, the growing
pressures from the scientific community and the Congress are compelling
reasons for some action. I believe Alternative #3 (Science Adviser with
small staff) is the best course of action and recommend that you direct that
further development of this alternative be undertaken. I also recommend
that you meet with leaders of the community before deciding a course of
action.
Brent Scowcroft, Jim Lynn (Paul O'Neill), Phil Areeda and Phil Buchen
also recommend Alternative #3.
Decision
Proceed with the development of a detailed proposal to:
Create an Office of Technology and Science (Alt. #1)
Strengthen existing arrangements (Alt. #2)
Appoint a Science Adviser with limited staff (Alt. #3)
Explore further the development of a broad policy
analysis capability (Alt. #4)
LIBRARY
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Recommendations
LIBRARY
February 5, 1975
February 5, 1975
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Recommendations
1.
There should be a scientific and technological
capability directly available to the President
(a) Many issues that come to the President, either
for decision or for initiative, involve science
and technology, sometimes to a very high degree,
in the analytical and judgmental process.
(b) While the federal departments and agencies have,
and should have, scientific and technological
competence of high quality. the President should
have available to him an independent source of
scientific and technological judgment of the very
highest quality. The organization set up to pro-
vide such a source for the President must not be,
or be perceived as, the representative of the
scientific and technical community in the
President's office.
(c) While the present need for such a capability is
clear, in our complex and technologically varied
society, the need to draw upon science and
technology to meet urgent problems and oppor-
tunities will be even greater in the decades ahead.
- 2 -
2.
This capability should be lodged in
an Office of Technology and Science
(a) An Office of Technology and Science should be
established by Congressional action and should
be headed by a Director who should also have the
title of Science and Technology Advisor to the
President.
(b) An Office, better than a single Advisor, or a
Council or Committee of Advisors, can
-- cover the full range of necessary competence
without seeming to subordinate one area to another;
-- interact with (and "translate" the reports of)
ad hoc expert task forces of consultants drawn
from a variety of disciplines in and out of
science and technology;
-- call on and utilize the best scientific,
technological and professional talents in the
country for specific tasks relevant to the
President's responsibilites;
-- resist the pressures to make the President's
Science Advisor the "spokesman for science and
technology" as distinguished from the President's
need for scientific competence in meeting his
national responsibilities.
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
- 3 -
3.
The areas of potential activity for the Office
of Technology and Science should be principally:
[Note: Not all of the following activities need
be undertaken at the outset. The func-
tions of the Office should be allowed
to grow as the President may require,
as relationships with the departments
and agencies of government develop,
and as emerging national programs,
policies and issues may make desir-
able and useful. ]
(a) To respond on scientific and technical matters
to requests from the President with respect to
issues that are before him for decision, or
new initiatives.
(b) To help the President resolve conflicting
advice involving scientific matters that come
to the President from departments, agencies
or the Congress.
(c) To organize ad hoc panels of consultants to
assist in the collection and evaluation of
relevant data with respect to particular
technical and scientific issues.
The membership of such panels would be
drawn from the special competence available
in the private and public sectors including
universities, the National Academies, industry,
CORD
LIBRARY
and government laboratories.
(d) To provide the President with early warning
of either
-- opportunities, or
-- problems
- 4 -
that have a scientific or technological com-
ponent, including some longer range forecasting
of such opportunities, problems or developments.
(e) To identify and report on any gaps in scientific
research and technological development in the
public or private sectors that merit attention.
(f) To consult with the President on the appoint-
ments of various scientific and technical
officials in the federal agencies.
(g) To stay in contact with the professional staffs
of the federal departments and agencies, and of
state and local governments, as well as with
private sector organizations involved in science
and technology.
(h) To be available for participation in reviews
of policies and programs of the departments
and agencies having technical responsibilities
and thus to assist in the formulation of national
policy on technical and scientific matters.
(i) To assist the Domestic Council, the National
Security Council and the OMB in reviewing de-
LIBRARY
department and agency programs that have techni-
cal and scientific content.
(j) To have a modest budget to initiate analyses
and studies in support of the ad hoc panels
mentioned in subparagraph (c) above. These
analyses and studies would be performed in
- 5 -
universities, private industry or federally
supported institutions.
4.
Organization of the Office
(a)
The full-time Director of the Office should
serve at the pleasure of the President.
(b)
The Director should have a full-time deputy
responsible for the administration of the
Office who need not be a scientist.
(c)
There should be provision for a flexible number
of full-time Assitant Directors (up to five)
so as to cover a decent range of professional
disciplines without trying for "representation"
of every professional discipline or interest.
and to respond to the possible growth in
Presidential needs for special competence.
(d)
Provision should be made for a flexible number
of full-time professionally qualified staff
(up to a dozen) as well as a clerical staff
to meet the responsibilities of the Office
as they may develop.
(e)
The ad hoc advisory panels (mentioned in para-
graph 3 above) which are central to the effective
functioning of the Office should:
-- 6 -
(i) be exempt from the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.
Frank and objective advice cannot be
expected to be available if exposed to con-
tinuous and public scrutiny and controversy.
(ii) have their members, in general, appointed
by the President.
(iii) serve on a part-time basis for a limited
term;
(f) The Director would maintain close relationships
with the National Academies of Science and of
Engineering and the Institute of Medicine and,
in establishing ad hoc panels, would make full
use of their membership, as well as of academic
faculties and such organizations as the Social
Science Research Council.
(g) The Office in its initial full year of operation
should have an annual budget in the $1 to $3 mil-
lion range.
(h) Since science and technology are profoundly inter-
related (not only among the scientific disciplines
themselves, but with domestic and foreign social
and political issues and the intellectual activity
of the nation) the area of the Office's con-
cern should be broad and include:
- 7 -
-- social and behavioral sciences
-- physical and life sciences
-- medicine
-- engineering
-- military applications
-- international aspects of science and technology
-- science and technology in the private sector
-- education and training of scientific manpower
5. The Qualifications of the Director
The Director must have, or be the type of
person who can readily gain, the personal confidence
of the President.
He or she should be a scientist, engineer or
medical person of proven scientific or technical
capability, have some experience in public service
or administration, and should preferably be a member
of one of the National Academies of Science or
Technology or the Institute of Medicine.
2/13/75
1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Don R.
On paper #3 # 3 mg
like an Censured but
Congress sum (not only Ted ) Thanks K.
but Trips Trague he
smothing more should
done
\
Gola At
2 Think Jash m or mat should
Before we land m #3
~
L.
I
check with Tegat
as
to be Tempelator, it
be #1.
I
to
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
of
1 \ Gola S2-5-7 THE loff WASHINGTON WHITE Prot not HOUSE 5 GERATE 17-
30
/
runol
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BILL WALKER
FROM:
JERRY JONES
The Vice President has recommended four people
as potential candidates to be the Science Advisor
to the President or to be members of a National
Science Advisory Board. While the President has not
yet decided what type of organizational structure
required to provide scientific advice here in the
White House, I am forwarding these names to
you for your information. You should find it
helpful for recruiting purposes once the
decision is made. These names are attached.
LIBRARY
Attachment
MAR 05 1975
March 5, 1975
DICK:
Ask Jerry Jones where we stand on the Science Advisor
question.
DR
RALD BERALD LISTANT FORD
I
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DR
is funding
kxxboxx
3-10-25
I show all science advisor papers
to the President through my system
outstanding -- still with the P Pres.
OK
FORDO & LIBRARY
any No! luck?
A
File
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 13, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DON RUMSFELD
FROM:
JERRY H. JONES
Just a reminder that you were going to look for the
science advisor paper that had been sent into the
President.
GLRAL FORD LIBRARY
4/4/75
Don:
I'd appreciate your getting
this letter to the President.
Many thanks.
Ed David
EDWARD E. DAVID, JR.
1000 INTERNATIONAL TOWER BUILDING
8550 WEST BRYN MAWR AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60631
April 3, 1975
Dear Mr. President:
I am taking the liberty of writing to you directly concerning
science in the White House. You may recall that we discussed
this matter some months ago when you were Vice President.
Subsequently, I wrote to you detailing my thoughts during that
conversation.
I am aware that events regarding science in the White House
have progressed, and am knowledgeable about some of the
relevant private discussions. Furthermore, within the
scientific and engineering community itself, there have been
many symposia, conferences, and rump discussions. Still
further, the Congress has moved and bills are in train in
both the House and Senate. All of this activity has revealed
additional dimensions of the problem which were not evident
at the time of our earlier discussion.
To outline the situation as I now see it, let me oversimplify
somewhat. Remembering our previous discussion, I assume
you are still anxious to have sound scientific influences in
Presidential policy-making and execution. The technical
community is unanimous in wanting to see scientific and
technological inputs for government processes at the top
level. However, the community is not unanimous on how
this should be done, though they are anxious to serve. The
White House staff and Executive Offices (particularly OMB,
NSC, and the Domestic Council) have in many instances
taken on technical advisers of their own and have operated
satisfactorily with them. Thus, they are reluctant to
relinquish their capabilities to any new science mechanism.
The White House staff has become well knit, and no one that
I have spoken with there sees clearly how a new independent
technical element would fit into the staff, nor what its
function would be. The Congress feels that something is
needed, but is not anxious to legislate a mechansim for the
Executive.
Mr. President - 2
Taking all this into account, it seems to me that the problem
is how to establish a science mechanism which has an accepted
function to perform and sits at a high enough level in government
that it can ensure that the nation's profound technical capabilities
can be brought to bear for our benefit.
This puzzle has a solution, I believe, along the following lines.
Appoint a Counsellor for Science and Technology with a small
staff. He would have two assigned functions: First, have all
federal R&D budgets funneled through his office for approval and
submission to OMB for further action. Second, have the R&D-
intensive agencies "report" to the Counsellor on your behalf.
These agencies are NSF, NASA, ERDA, NOAA, and NBS. Note
that no R&D activity vital to the function of any existing
department would be included. The R&D arms of DOD, HEW,
Interior, Agriculture, and so on would remain in place to
perform their service. Nevertheless, the aggregation under
the Counsellor could be pictured as a budding department of
government, as proposed in the Teague-Mosher bill now in the
House. If the aggregation eventually were legislated as a new
Department of Science and Technology, it could function as
such. Meanwhile, it could provide a focal point for science
and technology. This would be a statesmanlike move and would
I believe satisfy most of the constituencies. At the same time
it would provide you with one of the tools you desire to aid
you in getting the job done.
The question of candidates for the Counsellorship will be a
critical one. I would be happy to advise Mr. Rumsfeld and
his personnel chief Walker in this task should you so desire.
I would be privileged to discuss this matter with you more fully
and to clear up any remaining points.
Yours very truly,
EdwardE David
The Honorable Gerald M. Ford
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
ACTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 7, 1975
100)
GERALD
TIERATY
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CAVANAUGH
SUBJECT:
Science and Technology in the Executive
Office of the President
This memorandum (a) identifies arguments for and against the science
advisory arrangements recommended by the Vice President's staff,
(b) discusses and assesses other alternatives, and (c) recommends an
alternative plan for assuring that adequate scientific and technical advice
is available for you and your advisers.
Background
The Vice President's staff recommendations (Tab A) call for the creation
by law of an Office of Technology and Science (OTS) in the Executive Office
of the President, with the head of the office also designated as the
President's science and technology adviser. In addition to the Director,
there would be a deputy, five assistant directors, up to 12 professional
staff, and additional supporting staff. The Director and office would be
assisted by ad hoc panels of experts from outside the government.
The recommended arrangements are quite comparable to the science
advisory apparatus which was abolished in July 1973 -- which included the
Office of Science and Technology, with the Director designated as Science
Adviser, and the President's Science Advisory Committee which included
experts from outside the government. In 1973 the civilian functions were
transferred to the National Science Foundation and its Director has
served as Science Adviser.
Except for the single Director rather than a three member Council as the
leadership, the Vice President's staff recommendations are like those
recommended in June 1974 by a National Academy of Sciences Committee
chaired by James Killian and provided for in a bill passed last November
by the Senate (the Kennedy bill). There are a number of advantages and
disadvantages of this proposal, and there are other alternatives that
warrant consideration.
- 2 -
Critical Considerations
Critical considerations that bear upon a decision on science advisory
FORD LIBRARY
arrangements include:
1.
Integration of staff advice. There are few problems and issues
requiring Presidential or Executive Office attention that involve only
scientific and technical considerations. A group limited primarily to
scientists and engineers is not well equipped to deal with other perti-
nent considerations -- economic, social, legal, political, intergovern-
mental, etc. Thus, the output of a scientific and technical group, even
if it reports to the President, must be integrated with the work of others
to provide a full analysis of a problem or issue and a full range of
alternatives -- not limited to scientific and technical alternatives.
2. Focus of special purpose offices. Past experience with special
purpose offices in the Executive Office indicates that they tend to
become "special pleaders" or advocates for particular alternatives
or programs, thus making more difficult the job of reaching balanced
decisions among competing interests. For example, they advocate
programs which involve additional funding for their constituancy.
3. Scientific community views. Pressure is growing steadily from
scientific community leaders for action to restore some science
presence in the White House. Arguments are often more emotional
than substantive. (If not resolved this year, the subject could even
be a campaign issue for scientists in 1976.)
4.
Congressional action. There is a good chance that Congress will act
on its own initiative this year to create some new organization.
Alternatives
There are four principal alternatives that have been advanced for
organizing scientific and technical advice.
Alt. #1 Propose legislation to create an Office of Technology and Science
(as recommended in the Vice President's staff report, Tab A)
Arguments for:
Would be fully responsive to the scientific and technical
community.
Would defuse the pressures in Congress to mandate their
solution.
Having independent scientific and technical advice immediately
available could be useful on occasions.
Arguments against:
As in the case of the arrangements existing prior to July 1973,
there will be problems of integrating the work of the group
- 3 -
with other elements of the Executive Office and with the
scientific capacity in the line agencies.
Reestablishes the special interest problem.
Would add substantially to the White House staff and would
be costly.
Would be viewed as Administration endorsement of Senator
Kennedy's bill.
Alt. #2 Continue the existing arrangements, wherein the Director of NSF
also serves as Science Adviser. Or strengthen it with a formal
Science Adviser to the President designation and involve him in
more issues, perhaps through Presidential assignment.
Arguments for:
White House scientific oversight is less important now than in
the 1950's and 1960's, because line agencies and NSF are much
better staffed to deal with technical considerations. The
Science Adviser can devote more staff and funding resources
to the function since he can draw upon all NSF resources.
The Science Adviser has functioned principally as an adviser
to the OMB. His advice is integrated with other inputs --
avoiding the "special pleader" problem.
Arguments against:
The arrangement is not satisfactory to the scientific community
which has complained of three principal weaknesses:
- The Science Adviser is not involved in national defense
issues, thus there is essentially no scientific and technical
review from outside DOD. (NSC does have some scientific
staff. )
- The Science Adviser is too far removed from the President.
- The Science Adviser has a "conflict of interest" in that he
must seek and defend before OMB NSF's requests for R&D
funds while also evaluating R&D requests of other agencies.
Elements of the Executive Office other than OMB have received
relatively little help from the Science Adviser.
The selection of this alternative will probably result in
legislation such as the Kennedy bill.
Alt. #3 Appoint a Science Adviser to the President on the White House staff.
Provide him with a few (1 to 3) professional assistants and expect
him to draw upon scientific and technical expertise in agencies and
from non-Federal ad hoc committees -- much the way Bob Goldwin
functions with the academic community.
Arguments for:
Provides a "science presence" in the White House.
Provides additional expertise for addressing critical issues
that involve scientific and technical considerations.
Avoids institutionalizing another large special purpose staff.
- 4 -
Arguments against:
This limited arrangement may not be adequate to satisfy the
scientific community (e. g., it would not meet the defense R&D
oversight criticism) or head off Congressional action.
Once created, pressure may still be strong to expand it to a
full-blown office or council.
The Science Adviser may become a special interest advocate.
(Note: This alternative could modified by ating the
Science Adviser's small staff into the Domestic Council
staff. Nais would provide better coordination and control. )
Alt. #4 Expand significantly and restructure the policy analysis capability
of the Executive Office of the President by creating a more broadly
based analytical or planning group which includes scientific and
engineering experts.
Arguments for:
The policy analysis and long range planning capabilities of the
Executive Office are not adequate and should be expanded.
Scientific and technical expertise should be integrated with
other parts of the policy analysis and decision making structure.
Arguments against:
This would involve rethinking and restructuring the roles of
OMB, NSC and Domestic Council and has not been developed
adequately to permit serious consideration at this time.
Such expanded White House-Executive Office capability probably
would be opposed on the Hill and by line agencies.
Probably would not be acceptable to the scientific community
which tends to view integration of its advice at some level below
the President as de facto subordination of scientific advice.
Recommendation
From the standpoint of substantive contribution to improve decisions, I do not
believe that it is necessary to provide new scientific and technical capability
in the White House or Executive Office. However, the growing pressures from
the scientific community and the Congress are compelling reasons for some
action. I believe Alternative #3 (Science Adviser with small staff) is the best
course of action and recommend that you direct that further development of
this alternative be undertaken. I also recommend that you meet with leaders
of the community before deciding a course of action.
Decision
Proceed with the development of a detailed proposal to:
create an Office of Technology and Science (Alt. #1)
strengthen existing arrangements (Alt. #2)
appoint a Science Adviser with limited staff (Alt. #3)
explore further the development of a broad policy analysis
capability (Alt. #4)
THE WHITE
ACTION MEMORANDUM
WASHINGTON
Date:
February 5, 1975
Time:
FOR ACTION: Phil Buchen gr
CC (for information):
Jim Cavanaugh
Jack Marsh
Paul O'Neill
Brent Scowcroft
FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY
DUE: Date: Friday, February 7, 1975
Time: 2:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Attached paper entitled "Science, Technology
ROTA . LIBRARY 47V833
and the President's Executive Office"
ACTION REQUESTED:
For Necessary Action
X For Your Recommendations
Prepare Agenda and Brief
Draft Reply
X For Your Comments
Draft Remarks
2/7 REMARKS: 230 Cavanaugh will be late the afternom
3ʳᵈ Scrwcroft betypung
PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any questions or if you anticipate a
delay in submitting the required material, please
Jerry H. Jones
telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.
Staff Secretary
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Recommendations
February 5, 1975
February 5, 1975
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Recommendations
1.
There should be a scientific and technological
capability directly available to the President
(a) Many issues that come to the President, either
for decision or for initiative, involve science
and technology, sometimes to a very high degree,
in the analytical and judgmental process.
(b) While the federal departments and agencies have,
and should have, scientific and technological
competence of high quality, the President should
have available to him an independent source of
scientific and technological judgment of the very
highest quality. The organization set up to pro-
vide such a source for the President must not be,
or be perceived as, the representative of the
scientific and technical community in the
President's office.
(c) While the present need for such a capability is
clear, in our complex and technologically varied
society, the need to draw upon science and
technology to meet urgent problems and oppor-
tunities will be even greater in the decades ahead.
- 2 -
2.
This capability should be lodged in
an Office of Technology and Science
GERALD
(a) An Office of Technology and Science should be
established by Congressional action and should
be headed by a Director who should also have the
title of Science and Technology Advisor to the
President.
(b) An Office, better than a single Advisor, or a
Council or Committee of Advisors, can
-- cover the full range of necessary competence
without seeming to subordinate one area to another;
-- interact with (and "translate" the reports of)
ad hoc expert task forces of consultants drawn
from a variety of disciplines in and out of
science and technology;
-- call on and utilize the best scientific,
technological and professional talents in the
country for specific tasks relevant to the
President's responsibilites;
-- resist the pressures to make the President's
Science Advisor the "spokesman for science and
technology" as distinguished from the President's
need for scientific competence in meeting his
national responsibilities.
- 3 -
3.
The areas of potential activity for the Office
of Technology and Science should be principally:
[Note: Not all of the following activities need
be undertaken at the outset. The func-
tions of the Office should be allowed
to grow as the President may require,
as relationships with the departments
and agencies of government develop,
and as emerging national programs,
policies and issues may make desir-
able and useful.]
(a) To respond on scientific and technical matters
to requests from the President with respect to
issues that are before him for decision, or
new initiatives.
(b) To help the President resolve conflicting
advice involving scientific matters that come
to the President from departments, agencies
or the Congress.
(c) To organize ad hoc panels of consultants to
assist in the collection and evaluation of
relevant data with respect to particular
technical and scientific issues.
The membership of such panels would be
drawn from the special competence available
in the private and public sectors including
universities, the National Academies, industry,
and government laboratories.
(d) To provide the President with early warning
of either
-- opportunities, or
-- problems
- 4 -
that have a scientific or technological com-
ponent, including some longer range forecasting
of such opportunities, problems or developments.
(e) To identify and report on any gaps in scientific
research and technological development in the
public or private sectors that merit attention.
(f) To consult with the President on the appoint-
ments of various scientific and technical
officials in the federal agencies.
(g) To stay in contact with the professional staffs
of the federal departments and agencies, and of
state and local governments, as well as with
private sector organizations involved in science
and technology.
(h) To be available for participation in reviews
of policies and programs of the departments
and agencies having technical responsibilities
and thus to assist in the formulation of national
policy on technical and scientific matters.
(i) To assist the Domestic Council, the National
Security Council and the OMB in reviewing de-
department and agency programs that have techni-
cal and scientific content.
(j) To have a modest budget to initiate analyses
and studies in support of the ad hoc panels
mentioned in subparagraph (c) above. These
analyses and studies would be performed in
- 5 -
universities, private industry or federally
supported institutions.
4.
Organization of the Office
(a) The full-time Director of the Office should
serve at the pleasure of the President.
(b)
The Director should have a full-time deputy
responsible for the administration of the
Office who need not be a scientist.
(c)
There should be provision for a flexible number
of full-time Assitant Directors (up to five)
so as to cover a decent range of professional
disciplines without trying for "representation"
of every professional discipline or interest.
and to respond to the possible growth in
Presidential needs for special competence.
(d)
Provision should be made for a flexible number
of full-time professionally qualified staff
(up to a dozen) as well as a clerical staff
to meet the responsibilities of the Office
as they may develop.
(e)
The ad hoc advisory panels (mentioned in para-
graph 3 above) which are central to the effective
functioning of the Office should:
- 6 --
(i) be exempt from the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.
Frank and objective advice cannot be
expected to be available if exposed to con-
tinuous and public scrutiny and controversy.
(ii) have their members, in general, appointed
by the President.
(iii) serve on a part-time basis for a limited
term;
(f) The Director would maintain close relationships
with the National Academies of Science and of
Engineering and the Institute of Medicine and,
in establishing ad hoc panels, would make full
use of their membership, as well as of academic
faculties and such organizations as the Social
Science Research Council.
(g) The Office in its initial full year of operation
should have an annual budget in the $1 to $3 mil-
lion range.
(h) Since science and technology are profoundly inter-
related (not only among the scientific disciplines
themselves, but with domestic and foreign social
and political issues and the intellectual activity
of the nation) the area of the Office's con-
cern should be broad and include:
- 7 -
-- social and behavioral sciences
-- physical and life sciences
-- medicine
-- engineering
-- military applications
-- international aspects of science and technology
-- science and technology in the private sector
-- education and training of scientific manpower
5. The Qualifications of the Director
The Director must have, or be the type of
person who can readily gain, the personal confidence
of the President.
He or she should be a scientist, engineer or
medical person of proven scientific or technical
capability, have some experience in public service
or administration, and should preferably be a member
of one of the National Academies of Science or
Technology or the Institute of Medicine.
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION MEMORANDUM
WASHINGTON
LOG NO.:
Date:
February 5, 1975
Time:
FOR ACTION Phil Buchen
CC (for information):
Jim Cavanaugh
Jack Marsh
CERAL
Paul O'Neill
Brent Scowcroft
FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY
DUE: Date: Friday, February 7, 1975
Time: 2:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Attached paper entitled "Science, Technology
and the President's Executive Office"
ACTION REQUESTED:
For Necessary Action
X
For Your Recommendations
Prepare Agenda and Brief
Draft Reply
X
For Your Comments
Draft Remarks
REMARKS:
This proposal is exceedingly unwise m the following respects
(1) Statutory regdnization of such advisory bodies is too permanent and inflexible.
The President should not adapt this proposal.
(3) A office that includes social and behavioral incence is broad a w thout
(2) A Science advisor (with a a deputy) 10, far preferable to d large Science lemit. Office
P. Aueda
T.Buckn
PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any questions or if you anticipate a
delay in submitting the required material, please
Jerry H. Jones
telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.
Staff Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 8, 1975
GERALD 3)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
DONALD RUMSFELD
SUBJECT:
White House Science Adviser
Early last week the Vice President submitted his recommen-
dations to you for the organization of a Science and
Technology function in the Executive Office of the
President (see Tab A). You asked that these recommenda-
tions be staffed to the key White House policy offices.
This staffing has now been completed and the views were
unanimously negative (see the Domestic Council response at
Tab B, the NSC response at Tab C, and Dr. Robert Machol's
recommendation at Tab D. Dr. Machol is a recognized
scientific authority whom I asked to submit views).
In addition to these comments, Paul C' Neill and OMB
endorse the Domestic Council's views and recommendations
and Phil Buchen and Phil Areeda make the following
comments:
"This proposal is exceedingly unwise in the
following respects:
1) Statutory organization of such advisory
bodies is too permanent and inflexible.
2) A science adviser (with a deputy) is far
preferable to a large science office.
3) An office that includes social and behavioral
sciences is broad without limit.
The President should not adopt this proposal.' "
-2-
In summary, the following conclusions came out of the
staffing process:
1) The Vice President's paper was not a
Presidential decision paper presenting a series of options
with an indepth analysis of each, but rather is an
advocacy paper.
2) The Vice President's paper recommends essentially
the structure that was abolished in 1973 because it was not
functioning properly and was not contributing to the
Presidential deçision making process. In essence, it is the
bill Senator Kennedy introduced in the last session.
3) You must be given the opportunity to consider
other options which potentially would be more effective.
You must make a decision quickly because the press publicity
on the Vice President's work is beginning to generate a
momentum which, given time, may limit your options to only
the Vice President's recommendation. Therefore, in addition
to this status report, I have asked that a Presidential
decision memorandum on the Science Adviser issue be
prepared immediately for your consideration.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 7, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JERRY JONES
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Comments on the Draft Paper
"Science, Technology and the
President's Executive Office"
The subject draft paper, in my estimation, should be returned for
considerable rework since it contains little analysis on which to
base a decision and no options which serve to authorize the range of
reasonable choices.
There is a body of available experience that is amenable to analysis.
For ten years, a structure (OST/PSAC, which was nearly identical
to that proposed in the draft paper) existed in the Executive Office.
OST/PSAC was abolished in 1973 and some uf its functions were
vested in NSF and NSC. It would be advisable (1) to enumerate in
fairly definitive terms the objectives of an independent science
advisory apparatus in the Executive Office, (2) consider how OST/
PSAC performed in meeting such objectives, (3) analyze the reasons
for the disestablishment of OST/PSAC and consider the relevance
of those reasons in today's context, (4) evaluate how the technical
advisory function has been carried out since 1973, and (5) detail the
function of any new science advisory mechanism in relationship to
the White House organization and process (e.g., the current draft
mentions in passing the Domestic Council and NSC but not OMB,
which through the budget has the greatest impact of any office on
federal science programs and policies). Based on such a study, a
series of organizational options could be developed, with pros and
cons, and a recommendation offered.
In addition to these general remarks, I would observe that the two
functions directly involving NSC responsibilities -- military technology
and international technology policy -- have been discharged very
satisfactorily under the system which now prevails; that is, by
technical panels operating within the NSC system. Our technical
consultants review technical issues within the context of our broader
policy interests, particularly foreign policy and international political
- 2 -
considerations, our disarmament positions, and military posture
and security relationships. Any new White House science office
would be involved in questions of military technology and inter-
national technology affairs, but there seems little reason to shift
prime responsibility for these matters from the NSC. Ed David, the
last Presidential Science Adviser, agrees with this view.
In summary, the draft memorandum needs to be thoroughly reworked
to make it a Presidential decision paper. We are willing, of course,
to provide the Vice President's staff any assistance within our com-
petence in the development of such a paper.
TORD
The Science Advisory Process
LIBRARY
The President will have some sort of Science Advisory Council. However
this need not, and should not, be the sole source of technical input to
executive decision making. Nor should it interfere with the normal
political control of allocations and budgetary decisions. There need
be no special coordination of science and technology. There should not
be a cabinet-level Department of Science and Technology, which would curb
the flexibility and diversity so necessary to science.
The Science Advisory Council should have ten to fifteen members; they
should be appointed for terms of two to three years, with possibility of
reappointment. Perhaps three will be full-time, of whom one will be the
head. This Science Advisor to the President will have visible access
to the President. He will also carry on ceremonial and titular functions,
including negotiations with such as the head of the Soviet Academy of
Science. The Council should include some active young researchers as well
as the administrators who have dominated it in the past. The scientific
"establishment", which can be reached through the academies (NAS and NAE)
and the previous science advisors, must have a voice in nominating members
of the Council and must feel they have access to it. To avoid concentration
of power, and permit separate voices, such people as the heads of the
academies should not be ex officio members of the Council. The Council
will meet regularly, and will render written reports to the President
which will be public (unless security is involved); it will also convene
panels of experts to make (public) reports to the President. The Council's
small
staff
will
service
those
pancle,
and
maintain
knowledge
of
where
expertise is lodged in the government.
Less visible but more important in bringing science and technology into
executive decision making is the routine staff work which goes on in the
White House and EOB. Bringing science to bear here requires eonscious
effort by the top-level staff more than structural bureaucratic changes.
Ideally, many of the political appointees should have technical training
note the utter falsity of the often implicit assumption that scientific
training interferes with the breadth or competence that one otherwise
brings to a political or administrative position. Next best is to have
analysts with broad technical backgrounds scattered through the executive
office ( not in one place where thev would represent a center of power).
Of course the technical competence in the agencies, OMB, the academies, etc.,
will also be used, but these analysts will be the President's own staff whose
advice will be confidential, without special bias, and hopefully not
self-serving. To familiarize the staff with these people, and for other
reasons, there should be a weekly technical briefing of the staff on a
timely issue: auto pollution, supersonic aircraft, ICBM, or whatever. What
are the known facts; what is the meadning of key terms in the controversy;
what are the areas of uncertainty; which of these are likely to be resolved
on a technical basis, and which remain in the political sphere.
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Recommendations
February 5, 1975
February 5, 1975
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Recommendations
1.
There should be a scientific and technological
capability directly available to the President
(a) Many issues that come to the President, either
for decision or for initiative, involve science
and technology, sometimes to a very high degree,
in the analytical and judgmental process.
(b) While the federal departments and agencies have,
and should have, scientific and technological
of high quality. the President should
have available to him an independent source of
scientific and technological judgment of the very
highest quality. The organization set up to pro-
vide such a source for the President must not be,
or be perceived as, the representative of the
scientific and technical community in the
President's office.
(c) While the present need for such a capability is
clear, in our complex and technologically varied
society, the need to draw upon science and
technology to meet urgent problems and oppor-
tunities will be even greater in the decades ahead.
- 2 -
2.
This capability should be lodged in
an Office of Technology and Science
(a) An Office of Technology and Science should be
established by Congressional action and should
be headed by a Director who should also have the
title of Science and Technology Advisor to the
President.
(b) An Office, better than a single Advisor, or a
Council or Committee of Advisors, can
-- cover the full range of necessary competence
without seeming to subordinate one area to another;
-- interact with (and "translate" the reports of)
ad hoc expert task forces of consultants drawn
from a variety of disciplines in and out of
science and technology;
-- call on and utilize the best scientific,
technological and professional talents in the
country for specific tasks relevant to the
President's responsibilites;
-- resist the pressures to make the President's
Science Advisor the "spokesman for science and
technology" as distinguished from the President's
need for scientific competence in meeting his
national responsibilities.
- 3 -
3. The areas of potential activity for the Office
of Technology and Science should be principally:
[Note: Not all of the following activities need
be undertaken at the outset. The func-
tions of the Office should be allowed
to grow as the President may require,
as relationships with the departments
and agencies of government develop,
and as emerging national programs,
policies and issues may make desir-
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
able and useful.]
(a) To respond on scientific and technical matters
to requests from the President with respect to
issues that are before him for decision, or
new initiatives.
(b) To help the President resolve conflicting
advice involving scientific matters that come
to the President from departments, agencies
or the Congress.
(c) To organize ad hoc panels of consultants to
assist in the collection and evaluation of
relevant data with respect to particular
technical and scientific issues.
The membership of such panels would be
drawn from the special competence available
in the private and public sectors including
universities, the National Academies, industry,
and government laboratories.
(d) To provide the President with early warning
of either
-- opportunities, or
--- problems
- 4 -
that have a scientific or technological com-
ponent, including some longer range forecasting
of such opportunities, problems or developments.
(e) To identify and report on any gaps in scientific
1
research and technological development in the
public or private sectors that merit attention.
(f) To consult with the President on the appoint-
ments of various scientific and technical
officials in the federal agencies.
(g) To stay in contact with the professional staffs
of the federal departments and agencies, and of
state and local governments, as well as with
private sector organizations involved in science
and technology.
(h) To be available for participation in reviews
of policies and programs of the departments
and agencies having technical responsibilities
and thus to assist in the formulation of national
policy on technical and scientific matters.
(i) To assist the Domestic Council, the National
Security Council and the OMB in reviewing de-
department and agency programs that have techni-
cal and scientific content.
(j) To have a modest budget to initiate analyses
and studies in support of the ad hoc panels
mentioned in subparagraph (c) above. These
analyses and studies would be performed in
- 5 -
universities, private industry or federally
supported institutions.
4.
Organization of the Office
(a)
The full-time Director of the Office should
serve at the pleasure of the President.
(b)
The Director should have a full-time deputy
responsible for the administration of the
Office who need not be a scientist.
(c)
There should be provision for a flexible number
of full-time Assitant Directors (up to five)
SO as to cover a decent range of professional
disciplines without trying for "representation"
of every professional discipline or interest.
and to respond to the possible growth in
Presidential needs for special competence.
(d)
Provision should be made for a flexible number
of full-time professionally qualified staff
(up to a dozen) as well as a clerical staff
to meet the responsibilities of the Office
as they may develop.
(e)
The ad hoc advisory panels (mentioned in para-
graph 3 above) which are central to the effective
functioning of the Office should:
- 6 -
(i) be exempt from the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.
Frank and objective advice cannot be
expected to be available if exposed to con-
tinuous and public scrutiny and controversy.
(ii) have their members, in general, appointed
YORD
by the President.
(iii) serve on a part-time basis for a limited
term;
(f) The Director would maintain close relationships
with the National Academies of Science and of
Engineering and the Institute of Medicine and,
in establishing ad hoc panels, would make full
use of their membership, as well as of academic
faculties and such organizations as the Social
Science Research Council.
(g) The Office in its initial full year of operation
should have an annual budget in the $1 to $3 mil-
lion range.
(h) Since science and technology are profoundly inter-
related (not only among the scientific disciplines
themselves, but with domestic and foreign social
and political issues and the intellectual activity
of the nation) the area of the Office's con-
cern should be broad and include:
- 7 -
-- social and behavioral sciences
-- physical and life sciences
-- medicine
-- engineering
-- military applications
-- international aspects of science and technology
-- science and technology in the private sector
-- education and training of scientific manpower
5. The Qualifications of the Director
The Director must have, or be the type of
person who can readily gain, the personal confidence
of the President.
He or she should be a scientist, engineer or
medical person of proven scientific or technical
capability, have some experience in public service
or administration, and should preferably be a member
of one of the National Academies of Science or
Technology or the Institute of Medicine.