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The original documents are located in Box 14, folder "Intelligence - House Select
Committee: Report and Recommendations (2)" of the Loen and Leppert Files at the
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
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The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
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Digitized from Box 14 of the Loen and Leppert Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
January 6, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.
SUBJECT:
House Select Committee
on Intelligence
Attached are some recommendations developed by the staff
of the House Select Committee for consideration of the
Committee Members for possible inclusion as recommendations
in the Committee's final report.
The recommendations concern fiscal procedures, congressional
oversight and limiting secrecy.
Attach.
CCI Max Friedersdorf
Mike Duval
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
OTIS G. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN
A. SEARLE FIELD, STAFF DIRECTOR
ROBERT N. GIAIMO, CONN.
ROBERT MC CLORY, ILL.
AARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL
JAMES V. STANTON, JHIO
DAVID C. TREEN, LA.
RONALD V. DELLUMS CALIF.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751
MORGAN F. MURPHY ILL.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.
LES ASPIN. WIS.
DALE MILFORD, TEX.
Select Committee on Intelligence
PHILIP H. HAYES, INC.
WILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.
U.S. House of Representatibes
Washington, D.C. 20515
MEMORANDUM
19 December 1975
From:
Otis Pike
To:
Members of the Committee
Re:
Possible recommendations developed by Committee staff
Attached is a brief presentation of various proposals developed by our
staff which we may wish to endorse as recommendations in our final re-
port.
Please give these proposals your careful consideration and advise the
staff as soon as possible if you approve of each of them.
Your comments and your suggestions for additional or alternative recom-
mendations will assist us in preparing a report which will accurately
reflect the concerns of the Committee.
The attached presentation does not include proposals on all the issues
which the Committee has been considering. You will receive supplemen-
tal materials as soon as they can be prepared.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Fiscal Procedures
The following proposals are submitted for the Committee's consideration:
1. Total figures for intelligence spending should be made public.
The format of the President's annual budget should include single
totals for each intelligence agency and for the intelligence acti-
vities of intelligence units in other departments and agencies.
Consequently, the Congress would vote annually on single line item
appropriations for CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, and for the intelli-
gence activities of FBI and IRS.
2. A consolidated intelligence budget should be prepared.
The Director of Central Intelligence should be required to prepare
an independent and consolidated intelligence community budget with
a view toward eliminating unnecessary duplication and suggesting
budgetary priorities for intelligence spending.
The DCI's proposed budget would provide the President with an as-
sessment of intelligence spending proposals which would be inde-
pendent of the individual intelligence agencies.
The DCI's proposed budget should also be made available to the Con-
gress to assist it in its authorization and appropriations process.
3. Funds for intelligence should be specifically authorized by Congress.
All funds for intelligence purposes should first be specifically
authorized, annually or periodically, for such use.
The current authority of the CIA to receive all its funds as trans-
fers from the accounts of other agencies should be rescinded. In-
stead, the amount that the CIA could receive by transfer should be
strictly limited, unless a larger transfer is specifically approved
by both the President and the Appropriations Committees.
4. The GAO should be authorized to review and audit intelligence spending.
At the direction of an appropriate Congressional committee, the GAO
should be empowered to examine all records of intelligence spending,
whether vouchered or unvouchered.
The intelligence agencies may retain physical custody of their re-
cords without infringing on GAO's authority to examine them. When
an agency head believes that some of its expenditure records should
be kept from the GAO, the decision shall be left to the Congressional
committee at whose request the GAO is acting.
FORD is DERALD LIBRARY
Comment: Collectively, these proposals would have the effect of bringing
the intelligence agencies- and especially the CIA--under much the same
kind of fiscal controls which apply to all other departments and agencies
of the government. Members of the Congress would learn--in gross terms--
how much money they are appropriating each year for each intelligence
agency. The public would learn how intelligence spending fits into the
President's budget and his priorities. The CIA would be compelled to
justify its programs and its budget before authorizations and appropria-
tions committees in the same manner as other agencies. CIA and other
intelligence spending would also be subject to review by the GAO at Con-
gressional direction and under appropriate security safeguards. The
ability of the Congress to exercise effective oversight would be signi-
ficantly enhanced.
FORD is LIBRAR GERALD
Congressional Oversight
The proposals concerning fiscal procedures would increase the information
available to Congress and, consequently, its ability to exercise effec-
tive oversight. In addition, the following two proposals are submitted
for the Committee's consideration.
1. A standing House Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be created.
The House should create a permanent standing Committee on Foreign
Intelligence.
The committee should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
shared oversight jurisdiction over CIA, NSA, DIA, USIB, PFIAB,
military intelligence, and the foreign intelligence activities of
all other agencies and departments, including but not limited to
the NSC, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, FBI,
DEA, and ERDA.
The head of each such department or agency should be obligated to
keep the committee fully and currently informed about is programs
and activities relating to foreign intelligence and covert foreign
operations, and to provide the committee with whatever specific
information and records it requires.
All proposed legislation--including legislation authorizing approp-
riations--concerning foreign intelligence activities should be with-
in the jurisdiction of the committee.
All proposed legislation affecting, but not directed solely to,
foreign intelligence activities should be referred to this commit-
tee for appropriate consideration and action after having been
considered by any other House committee with appropriate jurisdic-
tion.
The committee should include some members with prior or current
service on other related standing committees, but this should be
the primary committee assignment for most of its members.
No member should be allowed to serve on the committee for more than
three consecutive terms.
The question of giving the committee jurisdiction over domestic
intelligence programs and agencies should be deferred until the
95th Congress convenes.
If and when the Senate acts to establish its own committee with
comparable authority and jurisdiction, the House should then con-
sider whether its committee should become the House delegation to
a joint committee on foreign intelligence.
FORD in LIBR
2. The Congress should be fully informed before covert actions begin.
The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act should
be amended in three respects:
First, the phrase "in a timely fashion" should be eliminated--there-
by making clear that the appropriate committees of Congress are to
receive prior notification of all CIA covert operations which the
President has approved.
Second, the DCI should be required to report to the appropriate
Congressional committees, at their request, the full range and
scope of the intelligence community's clandestine activities--
to gather intelligence or influence events--in specific countries.
Third, the President should be required to keep these committees
fully and promptly informed of all decisions to begin new programs
of intelligence activities which could reasonably be expected to
influence the conduct of foreign officials and governments.
Comment: These proposals would encourage the House to continue this Com-
mittee's work. A permanent, standing committee of the House would be
established to concentrate solely on intelligence matters. It would have
legislative authority and--therefore--clout. Requiring rotation of its
members would ensure that the committee's approach remains fresh. Re-
quirements would be imposed on the DCI and the President to make sure
that the committee learns everything that it needs to know. The possi-
bility of creating a joint committee would be left open, depending on
whatever action the Senate takes.
FORD : 938870 LIBRARY
Limiting Secrecy
Previous proposals would increase the Congress' role in intelligence mat-
ters. The following proposals concerning management of sensitive infor-
mation are submitted for the Committee's consideration.
1. Procedures should be established for the Congress to release classi-
fied information.
Each committee with national security jurisdiction should estab-
lish procedures and criteria, incorporated into its published rules,
by which it identifies material in its possession which it deter-
mines must be kept secret.
Other members of the House may have access to such information only
upon majority vote of the committee, except that if access is de-
nied, a member may appeal the committee's decision to the House as
a matter of personal privilege.
Each such committee should be authorized to recommend that specific
classified facts and documents be made public, but only after soli-
citing and giving careful consideration to the judgment of the execu-
tive branch, including the President.
If an individual member of the House obtains sensitive information
from a committee's files which he believes should be made public,
he should first seek the consent of the committee.
If a member obtains classified or other sensitive information from
a source outside of the Congress which he believes should be made
public, he should first seek the advice of the committee with ap-
propriate legislative jurisdiction.
In all cases, before acting, the committee should solicit and give
careful consideration to the judgment of the executive branch.
After the committee acts, the matter should then be submitted, to-
gether with the committee's decision or recommendation, to the
Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader.
If two of the three elected leaders of the House conclude that pub-
lic disclosure of the information would jeopardize the nation's
security, the information should not be released.
The rules of the House should be amended to provide that a member
who releases sensitive information in a manner which violates or
ignores these procedures shall be subject to censure, expulsion, or
whatever other disciplinary action the House deems appropriate.
2. An independent body should be established to de-classify information.
A Security Information Review Commission should be established by
law.
FORD & , LIB
It should be composed of eleven private citizens, fewer than half
of whom may have been employed previously by the national security
agencies and departments of the government. These commissioners
should be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate
for staggered terms of ten years each.
Any document now classified should be reviewable by the Commission
upon request by any individual or group. The document may be
declassified by majority vote of the Commission, except that the
President may reverse a Commission decision only if he certifies
in writing that disclosure of a particular document would do grave
and immediate danger to the defense of the United States.
Documents classified in the future should become declassified auto-
matically after a period of five years unless the Commission, by
majority vote, determines that they should remain classified for
an additional five year period.
Comment: These proposals would provide a procedure by which the Congress
could release information on the basis of its own judgment--whether the
information comes from a committee's files or elsewhere, and whether the
initiative comes from a committee or from an individual member. They
would leave the final decision to the three elected leaders of the House,
acting as a surrogate for all the members. Members would be warned of
the responsibility they assume when they obtain sensitive information
from a committee, and of the fact that they would be subject to discip-
linary action if they violate or ignore the proposed procedures. A
body would be established--independent of the agencies which classify
documents- to decide if documents can be declassified. The presumption
would be firmly established that all documents would be made public after
five years unless the Commission could be convinced otherwise.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
RED TAG
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 7, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.
SUBJECT:
House Select Committee
on Intelligence
On January 6 I spoke with Searle Field about the Committee's
final report and at which time he stated he had called you for
a response to the Committee's requests to declassify and
release certain information relating to Angola and the Italian
elections. Field stated that he needed an answer as soon as
possible because the Administration response to the
declassification and release of such information impacted upon
the way the Committee's final report was written.
I advised Field that I would inform you of his request for a
quick response on the declassification and release matters.
With regard to the Committee's final report, Field informed
me that he was completing the draft of the first half of the
report and was in the process of editing and footnoting the
first half of the draft.
The Committee's final report, Field informed me, will be in
three parts and indexed as follows:
Part I. Committee Oversight Responsibility
A.
Access to Information
1. Delay on requests for information
2. Cut off of information
3. Silence of witnesses
4. Flank attacks
5. Deletions
6. Privileges
7. More delay and routine problems
B.
Congress and the Secrecy Dilemma
1. Oaths and agreements
2. Selective briefings
3. Special restrictions
4. Congressional release of information
Part II. The Committee's Investigative Record
A.
Cost
B.
Product
C.
Risk and control
Part III. Committee Recommendations
(See memo attached with more expected)
Field further informed me that Pike's position with regard to the
Committee's final report is that the Committee will print what
it wants to in the final report and that he was not going to set a
precedent by granting the Executive or anybody a veto on what
was printed in the Committee's final report. Field then stated
that the first half of the draft report which he was completing
would meet with some strong objections from the Administration.
I then asked Field if the Administration would be given the
opportunity to read and comment on the draft he was working on.
Field volunteered to make a copy of the draft available to me or
Mitch Regovin when he had it finished on January 9 or 12.
Field then stated that he would make the copy of the draft
available unofficially because he would attempt to balance the
report if any Administration comments warranted a redrafting
of what had been written at this time. Field was careful to point
out that the draft report was being made available with knowledge
of the Committee, but on an unofficial basis so that no precedent
was set against Pike's position and to keep any Administration
comments in some coordinated channel and low-keyed as opposed
to having all facets of the Intelligence community flood him with
comments and suggested changes.
cc: Max Friedersdorf
Attach.
FILE
January 8, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MIKE DUVAL
HARLIE REPPERT
FROM:
JACK MARSH
Referring to Charlie's meme of January 7 in reference to the
Committee Report of the House Select Committee, it occure to
me that we should review at this time what outstanding requests
we have them the Committee which have not been responded to.
For example, there to the matter involving NSID #6 which Searle
Field has called about. Are there other outstanding requests
that have not been honored?
JOM/dl
FORD is LIBRARY OFRATO
M
RED TAG
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 7, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.
SUBJECT:
House Select Committee
on Intelligence
On January 6 I spoke with Searle Field about the Committee's
final report and at which time he stated he had called you for
a response to the Committee's requests to declassify and
release certain information relating to Angola and the Italian
elections. Field stated that he needed an answer as soon as
possible because the Administration response to the
declassification and release of such information impacted upon
the way the Committee's final report was written.
I advised Field that I would inform you of his request for a
quick response on the declassification and release matters.
With regard to the Committee's final report, Field informed
me that he was completing the draft of the first half of the
report and was in the process of editing and footnoting the
first half of the draft.
The Committee's final report, Field informed me, will be in
three parts and indexed as follows:
Part I. Committee Oversight Responsibility
A. Access to Information
1. Delay on requests for information
2. Cut off of information
3. Silence of witnesses
4. Flank attacks
5. Deletions
6. Privileges
7. More delay and routine problems
FORD & BERALD LIBRARY
B.
Congress and the Secrecy Dilemma
1. Oaths and agreements
2. Selective briefings
3. Special restrictions
4. Congressional release of information
Part II. The Committee's Investigative Record
A.
Cost
B.
Product
C.
Risk and control
Part III. Committee Recommendations
(See memo attached with more expected)
Field further informed me that Pike's position with regard to the
Committee's final report is that the Committee will print what
it wants to in the final report and that he was not going to set a
precedent by granting the Executive or anybody a veto on what
was printed in the Committee's final report. Field then stated
that the first half of the draft report which he was completing
would meet with some strong objections from the Administration.
I then asked Field if the Administration would be given the
opportunity to read and comment on the draft he was working on.
Field volunteered to make a copy of the draft available to me or
Mitch Regovin when he had it finished on January 9 or 12.
Field then stated that he would make the copy of the draft
available unofficially because he would attempt to balance the
report if any Administration comments warranted a redrafting
of what had been written at this time. Field was careful to point
out that the draft report was being made available with knowledge
of the Committee, but on an unofficial basis so that no precedent
was set against Pike's position and to keep any Administration
comments in some coordinated channel and low-keyed as opposed
to having all facets of the Intelligence community flood him with
comments and suggested changes.
CC: Max Friedersdorf
Attach.
"
OTI, c. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN
A. SCAMLE FIELD. STAFF DIRECTOR
MODERT N. GIAIMS. CONN.
POSERT MCCLORY, ILL.
AARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL
JAMES V. STANTON. JHIO
DAVID C. TREEN. LA.
RONA DV. DELLUM CALIF.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751
MORGAN F MUMPHY. ILL.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.
LES AGEIN. wis.
DUE MILFORD. TEX.
Select Committee on Intelligence
PHILIP M. HAYES. 140.
WILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.
U.S. House of Representatibes
Washington, D.C. 20515
MEMORANDUM
19 December 1975
From:
Otis Pike
To:
Members of the Committee
Re:
Possible recommendations developed by Committee staff
Attached is a brief presentation of various proposals developed by our
staff which we may wish to endorse as recommendations in our final re-
port.
Please give these proposals your careful consideration and advise the
staff as soon as possible if you approve of each of them.
Your comments and your suggestions for additional or alternative recom-
mendations will assist us in preparing a report which will accurately
reflect the concerns of the Committee.
The attached presentation does not include proposals on all the issues
which the Committee has been considering. You will receive supplemen-
tal materials as soon as they can be prepared.
GERALD s FORD LIBRARY
Fiscal Procedures
The following proposals are submitted for the Committee's consideration:
1. Total figures for intelligence spending should be made public.
The format of the President's annual budget should include single
totals for each intelligence agency and for the intelligence acti-
vities of intelligence units in other departments and agencies.
Consequently, the Congress would vote annually on single line item
appropriations for CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, and for the intelli-
gence activities of FBI and IRS.
2. A consolidated intelligence budget should be prepared.
The Director of Central Intelligence should be required to prepare
an independent and consolidated intelligence community budget with
a view toward eliminating unnecessary duplication and suggesting
budgetary priorities for intelligence spending.
The DCI's proposed budget would provide the President with an as-
sessment of intelligence spending proposals which would be inde-
pendent of the individual intelligence agencies.
The DCI's proposed budget should also be made available to the Con-
gress to assist it in its authorization and appropriations process.
3.
Funds for intelligence should be specifically authorized by Congress.
All funds for intelligence purposes should first be specifically
authorized, annually or periodically, for such use.
The current authority of the CIA to receive all its funds as trans-
fers from the accounts of other agencies should be rescinded. In-
stead, the amount that the CIA could receive by transfer should be
strictly limited, unless a larger transfer is specifically approved
by both the President and the Appropriations Committees.
4. The GAO should be authorized to review and audit intelligence spending.
At the direction of an appropriate Congressional committee, the GAO
should be empowered to examine all records of intelligence spending,
whether vouchered or unvouchered.
The intelligence agencies may retain physical custody of their re-
cords without infringing on GAO's authority to examine them. When
an agency head believes that some of its expenditure records should
be kept from the GAO, the decision shall be left to the Congressional
committee at whose request the GAO is acting.
Comment: Collectively, these proposals would have the effect of bringing
the intelligence agencies and especially the CIA--under much the same
kind of fiscal controls which apply to all other departments and agencies
of the government.. Members of the Congress would learn--in gross terms--
how much money they are appropriating each year for each intelligence
agency. The public would learn how intelligence spending fits into the
President's budget and his priorities. The CIA would be compelled to
justify its programs and its budget before authorizations and appropria-
tions committees in the same manner as other agencies. CIA and other
intelligence spending would also be subject to review by the GAO at Con-
gressional direction and under appropriate security safeguards. The
ability of the Congress to exercise effective oversight would be signi-
ficantly enhanced.
Congressional Oversight
The proposals concerning fiscal procedures would increase the information
available to Congress and, consequently, its ability to exercise effec-
tive oversight. In addition, the following two proposals are submitted
for the Committee's consideration.
1. A standing House Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be created.
The House should create a permanent standing Committee on Foreign
Intelligence.
The committee should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
shared oversight jurisdiction over CIA, NSA, DIA, USIB, PFIAB,
military intelligence, and the foreign intelligence activities of
all other agencies and departments, including but not limited to
the NSC, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, FBI,
DEA, and ERDA.
The head of each such department or agency should be obligated to
keep the committee fully and currently informed about is programs
and activities relating to foreign intelligence and covert foreign
operations, and to provide the committee with whatever specific
information and records it requires.
All proposed legislation--including legislation authorizing approp-
riations--concerning foreign intelligence activities should be with-
in the jurisdiction of the committee.
All proposed legislation affecting, but not directed solely to,
foreign intelligence activities should be referred to this commit-
tee for appropriate consideration and action after having been
considered by any other House committee with appropriate jurisdic-
tion.
The committee should include some members with prior or current
service on other related standing committees, but this should be
the primary committee assignment for most of its members.
No member should be allowed to serve on the committee for more than
three consecutive terms.
The question of giving the committee jurisdiction over domestic
intelligence programs and agencies should be deferred until the
95th Congress convenes.
If and when the Senate acts to establish its own committee with
comparable authority and jurisdiction, the House should then con-
sider whether its committee should become the House delegation to
a joint committee on foreign intelligence.
2. The Congress should be fully informed before covert actions begin.
The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act should
be amended in three respects:
First, the phrase "in a timely fashion" should be eliminated- there-
by making clear that the appropriate committees of Congress are to
receive prior notification of all CIA covert operations which the
President has approved.
Second, the DCI should be required to report to the appropriate
Congressional committees, at their request, the full range and
scope of the intelligence community's clandestine activities--
to gather intelligence or influence events--in specific countries.
Third, the President should be required to keep these committees
fully and promptly informed of all decisions to begin new programs
of intelligence activities which could reasonably be expected to
influence the conduct of foreign officials and governments.
Comment: These proposals would encourage the House to continue this Com-
mittee's work. A permanent, standing committee of the House would be
established to concentrate solely on intelligence matters. It would have
legislative authority and--therefore--clout. Requiring rotation of its
members would ensure that the committee's approach remains fresh. Re-
quirements would be imposed on the DCI and the President to make sure
that the committee learns everything that it needs to know. The possi-
bility of creating a joint committee would be left open, depending on
whatever action the Senate takes.
Limiting Secrecy
Previous proposals would increase the Congress' role in intelligence mat-
ters. The following proposals concerning management of sensitive infor-
mation are submitted for the Committee's consideration.
1. Procedures should be established for the Congress to release classi-
fied information.
Each committee with national security jurisdiction should estab-
lish procedures and criteria, incorporated into its published rules,
by which it identifies material in its possession which it deter-
mines must be kept secret.
Other members of the House may have access to such information only
upon majority vote of the committee, except that if access is de-
nied, a member may appeal the committee's decision to the House as
a matter of personal privilege.
Each such committee should be authorized to recommend that specific
classified facts and documents be made public, but only after soli-
citing and giving careful consideration to the judgment of the execu-
tive branch, including the President.
If an individual member of the House obtains sensitive information
from a committee's files which he believes should be made public,
he should first seek the consent of the committee.
If a member obtains classified or other sensitive information from
a source outside of the Congress which he believes should be made
public, he should first seek the advice of the committee with ap-
propriate legislative jurisdiction.
In all cases, before acting, the committee should solicit and give
careful consideration to the judgment of the executive branch.
After the committee acts, the matter should then be submitted, to-
gether with the committee's decision or recommendation, to the
Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader.
If two of the three elected leaders of the House conclude that pub-
lic disclosure of the information would jeopardize the nation's
security, the information should not be released.
The rules of the House should be amended to provide that a member
who releases sensitive information in a manner which violates or
ignores these procedures shall be subject to censure, expulsion, or
whatever other disciplinary action the House deems appropriate.
2. An independent body should be established to de-classify information.
A Security Information Review Commission should be established by
law.
It should be composed of eleven private citizens, fewer than half
of whom may have been employed previously by the national security
agencies and departments of the government. These commissioners
should be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate
for staggered terms of ten years each.
Any document now classified should be reviewable by the Commission
upon request by any individual or group. The document may be
declassified by majority vote of the Commission, except that the
President may reverse a Commission decision only if he certifies
in writing that disclosure of a particular document would do grave
and immediate danger to the defense of the United States.
Documents classified in the future should become declassified auto-
matically after a period of five years unless the Commission, by
majority vote, determines that they should remain classified for
an additional five year period.
Comment: These proposals would provide a procedure by which the Congress
could release information on the basis of its own judgment--whether the
information comes from a committee's files or elsewhere, and whether the
initiative comes from a committee or from an individual member. They
would leave the final decision to the three elected leaders of the House,
acting as a surrogate for all the members. Members would be warned of
the responsibility they assume when they obtain sensitive information
from a committee, and of the fact that they would be subject to discip-
linary action if they violate or ignore the proposed procedures. A
body would be established--independent of the agencies which classify
documents-to decide if documents can be declassified. The presumption
would be firmly established that all documents would be made public after
five years unless the Commission could be convinced otherwise.
JAN 13 1976
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 12, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. CA.
SUBJECT:
House Select Committee on
Intelligence
Attached are Rep. Bob McClory's comments to the staff recommenda-
tions which I sent to you by memo dated January 6, 1976.
cc: Max Friedersdorf
Mike Duval
"
FORD j LIBRARY GERALD
ROBERT McCLORY
DISTRICT OFFICES
13TH DISTRICT. ILLINOIS
KANE COUNTY
MUNICIPAL BUILDING
ROOM 2452
150 DEXTER COURT
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 225-5221
Congress of the United States
ELGIN, ILLINOIS 60120
(312) 697-5005
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
house of Representatives
LAKE COUNTY
POST OFFICE BUILDING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
Washington, D.C. 20515
326 NORTH GENESEE STREET
WAUKEGAN, ILLINOIS 60085
(312) 336-4554
U.S. INTERPARLIAMENTARY
UNION DELEGATION
MEMORANDUM
MCHENRY COUNTY
MCHENRY COUNTY COURTHOUSE
2200 SEMINARY ROAD
WOODSTOCK, ILLINOIS 60098
January 7, 1976
(815) 338-2040
From:
Robert McClory
To:
Members of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Re:
The Committee's Recommendations
Shortly before Christmas, the Chairman distributed a memorandum prepared
by the Committee staff which described various proposals for our consid-
eration. Before the Committee meets to consider its recommendations, I
would like to make my own thinking clear on several points.
Fiscal procedures
In the absence of any compelling evidence to the contrary, I think we
must be guided by the intelligence agencies' concern that publication of
even single overall dollar totals for their annual budgets would reveal
vital information of benefit to hostile foreign interests and would have
a detrimental effect on their operations. Full budgetary information
must, of course, be available to the Congress. I fully support the pro-
posal that the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a consoli-
dated budget for the intelligence community as a whole, which would include
a comprehensive statement of intelligence and intelligence-related costs,
as well as a full accounting of the number of public and contract employees
FORD i SERALD LIBRARY
- 2 -
as well as proprietary entities which are engaged in intelligence activi-
ties. This budget should be available to the appropriations and intelli-
gence oversight committees of the Congress, but it should not be made public.
I also concur with the suggestion that funds for intelligence should
be authorized by the Congress in the same manner that we authorize funds
for other executive agencies. To prevent intelligence spending from being
made public, authorizations for intelligence should be considered in execu-
tive sessions of the intelligence oversight committee or committees and
then included in authorization legislation, in the same manner as intelli-
gence appropriations are now included in defense appropriations bills.
Congressional oversight
I support the creation of a permanent Committee on Foreign Intelligence
within the House. This committee should be given legislative jurisdiction,
and it should have access to the information it needs--so long as effective
security procedures are established. Because of the necessary secrecy in
which the committee must work, it is essential that it enjoy the full confi-
dence of the House and that it avoid even the appearance of partisanship.
I urge, therefore, that the committee include members from both parties in
equal or near-equal numbers. I also have serious reservations about the
proposal to rotate members on and off the intelligence committee for fear
that adoption of this procedure would deprive the committee of the expertise
which the committee must possess to function effectively.
With regard to Congressional oversight of covert action operations,
I believe that it would be inappropriate for the Congress to have a veto
power over such programs, unless they involve supplying arms, directly or
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
- 3 -
indirectly, to a foreign nation or group. However, programs which involve
or support para-military activities would seem to impinge on the Congress'
constitutional power to declare war. My present thinking is that they
should not be undertaken without the approval of the intelligence oversight
committee in the House.
Limiting secrecy
The Committee's final report should strongly and positively affirm
the responsibility of the Congress to meet the highest standards of respect
for the confidentiality of national secrets. The primary responsibility
for classifying and declassifying information must rest with the executive
branch. It would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Congress
to assume the responsibility for deciding if and when each classified docu-
ment should be made public.
If the Congress reserves to itself the right to release some classi-
fied information, it should be made clear that this authority does not
extend to diplomatic exchanges, dialogues between heads of state, and
intra-departmental communications. Further, in obtaining classified
information for its own confidential use, the Congress should act with
great restraint and secure only those records which are truly necessary
for thorough and effective oversight.
There are other subjects on which I believe this Committee must offer
reconmendations. Of particular importance is the future organization of
the intelligence community within the executive branch. For example,
I would support recommendations to increase the authority of the Director
FORD & LIBRARY
- 4 -
of Central Intelligence as the central coordinator of the intelligence
community, and to establish the National. Security Agency by statute
independent of the Department of Defense. The management of daily intelli-
gence activities must remain a function of the executive branch. Improving
executive branch organization and control will go hand in hand with improv-
ing oversight of intelligence within the Congress.
I hope that each of you will give these thoughts your careful consideration
before the Committee meets. I would be glad to discuss them with you at
any time.
FORD is LIBRARY
agenda.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
&
January 6, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. CLp
SUBJECT:
House Select Committee
on Intelligence
Attached are some recommendations developed by the staff
of the House Select Committee for consideration of the
Committee Members for possible inclusion as recommendations
in the Committee's final report.
The recommendations concern fiscal procedures, congressional
oversight and limiting secrecy.
Attach.
cc: Max Friedersdorf
Mike Duval
FORD & LIBRARY
off, c. PIKE. N. Y., CHAIRMAN
A. SCAPLE FIELD, STAFF DIRECTOR
ROBERT N, CIAIMS. CONN.
POREPT MOCLORY. ILL.
AARON B, DONNER. COUNSEL
JAMES V. STANTON. THIO
DAVID C. TOGEN, LA.
RONALD ,, DELLUM CALIF.
JAMES P. COMNSON, COLO.
TELEPHONE: (zez) 225-9751
MORGAN F. MUMPHY ILL.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, 1R., W13.
LES ASPIN. VIS
DILE MILFORD TEX.
Select Committee on Intelligence
PHILIP H. HAVES. IND.
WILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.
U.S. House of Representatibes
Washington, D.C. 20515
MEMORANDUM
19 December 1975
From:
Otis Pike
To:
Members of the Committee
Re:
Possible recommendations developed by Committee staff
Attached is a brief presentation of various proposals developed by our
staff which we may wish to endorse as recommendations in our final re-
port.
Please give these proposals your careful consideration and advise the
staff as soon as possible if you approve of each of them.
Your comments and your suggestions for additional or alternative recom-
mendations will assist us in preparing a report which will accurately
reflect the concerns of the Committee.
The attached presentation does not include proposals on all the issues
which the Committee has been considering. You will receive supplemen-
tal materials as soon as they can be prepared.
FORD is LIBRARY
Fiscal Procedures
The following proposals are submitted for the Committee's consideration:
1. Total figures for intelligence spending should be made public.
The format of the President's annual budget should include single
totals for each intelligence agency and for the intelligence acti-
vities of intelligence units in other departments and agencies.
Consequently, the Congress would vote annually on single line item
appropriations for CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, and for the intelli-
gence activities of FBI and IRS.
2. A consolidated intelligence budget should be prepared.
The Director of Central Intelligence should be required to prepare
an independent and consolidated intelligence community budget with
a view toward eliminating unnecessary duplication and suggesting
budgetary priorities for intelligence spending.
The DCI's proposed budget would provide the President with an as-
sessment of intelligence spending proposals which would be inde-
pendent of the individual intelligence agencies.
The DCI's proposed budget should also be made available to the Con-
gress to assist it in its authorization and appropriations process.
3. Funds for intelligence should be specifically authorized by Congress.
All funds for intelligence purposes should first be specifically
authorized, annually or periodically, for such use.
The current authority of the CIA to receive all its funds as trans-
fers from the accounts of other agencies should be rescinded. In-
stead, the amount that the CIA could receive by transfer should be
strictly limited, unless a larger transfer is specifically approved
by both the President and the Appropriations Committees.
4. The GAO should be authorized to review and audit intelligence spending.
At the direction of an appropriate Congressional committee, the GAO
should be empowered to examine all records of intelligence spending,
whether vouchered or unvouchered.
The intelligence agencies may retain physical custody of their re-
cords without infringing on GAO's authority to examine them. When
an agency head believes that some of its expenditure records should
be kept from the GAO, the decision shall be left to the Congressional
committee at whose request the GAO is acting.
FORD & LIBRARY 07V835
Comment: Coliectively, these proposals would have the effect of bringing
the intelligence agencies-- and especially the CIA under much the same
kind of fiscal controls which apply to all other departments and agencies
of the government. Members of the Congress would learn--in gross terms--
how much money they are appropriating each year for each intelligence
agency. The public would learn how intelligence spending fits into the
President's budget and his priorities. The CIA would be compelled to
justify its programs and its budget before authorizations and appropria-
tions committees in the same manner as other agencies. CIA and other
intelligence spending would also be subject to review by the GAO at Con-
gressional direction and under appropriate security safeguards. The
ability of the Congress to exercise effective oversight would be signi-
ficantly enhanced.
FORD & 07V830 LIBRARY
Congressional Oversight
The proposals concerning fiscal procedures would increase the information
available to Congress and, consequently, its ability to exercise effec-
tive oversight. In addition, the following two proposals are submitted
for the Committee's consideration.
1. A standing House Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be created.
The House should create a permanent standing Committee on Foreign
Intelligence.
The committee should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
shared oversight jurisdiction over CIA, NSA, DIA, USIB, PFIAB,
military intelligence, and the foreign intelligence activities of
all other agencies and departments, including but not limited to
the NSC, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, FBI,
DEA, and ERDA.
The head of each such department or agency should be obligated to
keep the committee fully and currently informed about is programs
and activities relating to foreign intelligence and covert foreign
operations, and to provide the committee with whatever specific
information and records it requires.
All proposed legislation--including legislation authorizing approp-
riations--concerning foreign intelligence activities should be with-
in the jurisdiction of the committee.
All proposed legislation affecting, but not directed solely to,
foreign intelligence activities should be referred to this commit-
tee for appropriate consideration and action after having been
considered by any other House committee with appropriate jurisdic-
tion.
The committee should include some members with prior or current
service on other related standing committees, but this should be
the primary committee assignment for most of its members.
No member should be allowed to serve on the committee for more than
three consecutive terms.
The question of giving the committee jurisdiction over domestic
intelligence programs and agencies should be deferred until the
95th Congress convenes.
If and when the Senate acts to establish its own committee with
comparable authority and jurisdiction, the House should then con-
sider whether its committee should become the House delegation to
a joint committee on foreign intelligence.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
2. The Congress should be fully informed before covert actions begin.
The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act should
be amended in three respects:
First, the phrase "in a timely fashion" should be eliminated--there-
by making clear that the appropriate committees of Congress are to
receive prior notification of all CIA covert operations which the
President has approved.
Second, the DCI should be required to report to the appropriate
Congressional committees, at their request, the full range and
scope of the intelligence community's clandestine activities--
to gather intelligence or influence events--in specific countries.
Third, the President should be required to keep these committees
fully and promptly informed of all decisions to begin new programs
of intelligence activities which could reasonably be expected to
influence the conduct of foreign officials and governments.
Comment: These proposals would encourage the House to continue this Com-
mittee's work. A permanent, standing committee of the House would be
established to concentrate solely on intelligence matters. It would have
legislative authority and--therefore--clout. Requiring rotation of its
members would ensure that the committee's approach remains fresh. Re-
quirements would be imposed on the DCI and the President to, make sure
that the committee learns everything that it needs to know. The possi-
bility of creating a joint committee would be left open, depending on
whatever action the Senate takes.
FORD is LIBRARY 076839
Limiting Secrecy
Previous proposals would increase the Congress' role in intelligence nat-
ters. The following proposals concerning management of sensitive infor-
mation are submitted for the Committee's consideration.
1. Procedures should be established for the Congress to release classi-
fied information.
Each committee with national security jurisdiction should estab-
lish procedures and criteria, incorporated into its published rules,
by which it identifies material in its possession which it deter-
mines must be kept secret.
Other members of the House may have access to such information only
upon majority vote of the committee, except that if access is de-
nied, a member may appeal the committee's decision to the House as
a matter of personal privilege.
Each such committee should be authorized to recommend that specific
classified facts and documents be made public, but only after soli-
citing and giving careful consideration to the judgment of the execu-
tive branch, including the President.
If an individual member of the House obtains sensitive information
from a committee's files which he believes should be made public,
he should first seek the consent of the committee.
If a member obtains classified or other sensitive information from
a source outside of the Congress which he believes should be made
public, he should first seek the advice of the committee with ap-
propriate legislative jurisdiction.
In all cases, before acting, the committee should solicit and give
careful consideration to the judgment of the executive branch.
After the committee acts, the matter should then be submitted, to-
gether with the committee's decision or recommendation, to the
Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader.
If two of the three elected leaders of the House conclude that pub-
lic disclosure of the information would jeopardize the nation's
security, the information should not be released.
The rules of the House should be amended to provide that a member
who releases sensitive information in a manner which violates or
ignores these procedures shall be subject to censure, expulsion, or
whatever other disciplinary action the House deems appropriate.
2. An independent body should be established to de-classify information.
A Security Information Review Commission should be established by
law.
FORD LIBRARY
It should be composed of eleven private citizens, fewer than half
of whom may have been employed previously by the national security
agencies and departments of the government. These commissioners
should be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate
for staggered terms of ten years each.
Any document now classified should be reviewable by the Commission
upon request by any individual or group. The document may be
declassified by majority vote of the Commission, except that the
President may reverse a Commission decision only if he certifies
in writing that disclosure of a particular document would do grave
and immediate danger to the defense of the United States.
Documents classified in the future should become declassified auto-
matically after a period of five years unless the Commission, by
majority vote, determines that they should remain classified for
an additional five year period.
Comment: These proposals would provide a procedure by which the Congress
could release information on the basis of its own judgment--whether the
information comes from a committee's files or elsewhere, and whether the
initiative comes from a committee or from an individual member. They
would leave the final decision to the three elected leaders of the House,
acting as a surrogate for all the members. Members would be warned of
the responsibility they assume when they obtain sensitive information
from a committee, and of the fact that they would be subject to discip-
linary action if they violate or ignore the proposed procedures. A
body would be established--independent of the agencies which classify
documents--to decide if documents can be declassified. The presumption
would be firmly established that all documents would be made public after
five years unless the Commission could be convinced otherwise.
FORD 076839 LIBRARY
It should be composed of eleven private citizens, fewer than half
of whom may have been employed previously by the national security
agencies and departments of the government. These commissioners
should be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate
for staggered terms of ten years each.
Any document now classified should be reviewable by the Commission
upon request by any individual or group. The document may be
declassified by majority vote of the Commission, except that the
President may reverse a Commission decision only if he certifies
in writing that disclosure of a particular document would do grave
and immediate danger to the defense of the United States.
Documents classified in the future should become declassified auto-
matically after a period of five years unless the Commission, by
majority vote, determines that they should remain classified for
an additional five year period.
Comment: These proposals would provide a procedure by which the Congress
could release information on the basis of its own judgment--whether the
information comes from a committee's files or elsewhere, and whether the
initiative comes from a committee or from an individual member. They
would leave the final decision to the three elected leaders of the House,
acting as a surrogate for all the members. Members would be warned of
the responsibility they assume when they obtain sensitive information
from a committee, and of the fact that they would be subject to discip-
linary action if they violate or ignore the proposed procedures. A
body would be established--independent of the agencies which classify
documents-to decide if documents can be declassified. The presumption
would be firmly established that all documents would be made public after
five years unless the Commission could be convinced otherwise.
FORD i LIBRARY 070870
Limiting Secrecy
Previous proposals would increase the Congress' role in intelligence nat-
ters. The following proposals concerning management of sensitive infor-
mation are submitted for the Committee's consideration.
1. Procedures should be established for the Congress to release classi-
fied information.
Each committee with national security jurisdiction should estab-
lish procedures and criteria, incorporated into its published rules,
by which it identifies material in its possession which it deter-
mines must be kept secret.
Other members of the House may have access to such information only
upon majority vote of the committee, except that if access is de-
nied, a member may appeal the committee's decision to the House as
a matter of personal privilege.
Each such committee should be authorized to recommend that specific
classified facts and documents be made public, but only after soli-
citing and giving careful consideration to the judgment of the execu-
tive branch, including the President.
If an individual member of the House obtains sensitive information
from a committee's files which he believes should be made public,
he should first seek the consent of the committee.
If a member obtains classified or other sensitive information from
a source outside of the Congress which he believes should be made
public, he should first seek the advice of the committee with ap-
propriate legislative jurisdiction.
In all cases, before acting, the committee should solicit and give
careful consideration to the judgment of the executive branch.
After the committee acts, the matter should then be submitted, to-
gether with the committee's decision or recommendation, to the
Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader.
If two of the three elected leaders of the House conclude that pub-
lic disclosure of the information would jeopardize the nation's
security, the information should not be released.
The rules of the House should be amended to provide that a member
who releases sensitive information in a manner which violates or
ignores these procedures shall be subject to censure, expulsion, or
whatever other disciplinary action the House deems appropriate.
2. An independent body should be established to de-classify information.
A Security Information Review Commission should be established by
law.
FORD
LIBRARY
2. The Congress should be fully informed before covert actions begin.
The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act should
be amended in three respects:
First, the phrase "in a timely fashion" should be eliminated--there-
by making clear that the appropriate committees of Congress are to
receive prior notification of all CIA covert operations which the
President has approved.
Second, the DCI should be required to report to the appropriate
Congressional committees, at their request, the full range and
scope of the intelligence community's clandestine activities--
to gather intelligence or influence events--in specific countries.
Third, the President should be required to keep these committees
fully and promptly informed of all decisions to begin new programs
of intelligence activities which could reasonably be expected to
influence the conduct of foreign officials and governments.
Comment: These proposals would encourage the House to continue this Com-
mittee's work. A permanent, standing committee of the House would be
established to concentrate solely on intelligence matters. It would have
legislative authority and--therefore--clout. Requiring rotation of its
members would ensure that the committee's approach remains fresh. Re-
quirements would be imposed on the DCI and the President to make sure
that the committee learns everything that it needs to know. The possi-
bility of creating a joint committee would be left open, depending on
whatever action the Senate takes.
FORD i LIBRARY 038870
Congressional Oversight
The proposals concerning fiscal procedures would increase the information
available to Congress and, consequently, its ability to exercise effec-
tive oversight. In addition, the following two proposals are submitted
for the Committee's consideration.
1. A standing House Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be created.
The House should create a permanent standing Committee on Foreign
Intelligence.
The committee should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
shared oversight jurisdiction over CIA, NSA, DIA, USIB, PFIAB,
military intelligence, and the foreign intelligence activities of
all other agencies and departments, including but not limited to
the NSC, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, FBI,
DEA, and ERDA.
The head of each such department or agency should be obligated to
keep the committee fully and currently informed about is programs
and activities relating to foreign intelligence and covert foreign
operations, and to provide the committee with whatever specific
information and records it requires.
All proposed legislation--including legislation authorizing approp-
riations--concerning foreign intelligence activities should be with-
in the jurisdiction of the committee.
All proposed legislation affecting, but not directed solely to,
foreign intelligence activities should be referred to this commit-
tee for appropriate consideration and action after having been
considered by any other House committee with appropriate jurisdic-
tion.
The committee should include some members with prior or current
service on other related standing committees, but this should be
the primary committee assignment for most of its members.
No member should be allowed to serve on the committee for more than
three consecutive terms.
The question of giving the committee jurisdiction over domestic
intelligence programs and agencies should be deferred until the
95th Congress convenes.
If and when the Senate acts to establish its own committee with
comparable authority and jurisdiction, the House should then con-
sider whether its committee should become the House delegation to
a joint committee on foreign intelligence.
FORD & 076839 LIBRARY
Comment: Collectively, these proposals would have the effect of bringing
the intelligence agencies--and especially the CIA--under much the same
kind of fiscal controls which apply to all other departments and agencies
of the government. Members of the Congress would learn--in gross terms--
how much money they are appropriating each year for each intelligence
agency. The public would learn how intelligence spending fits into the
President's budget and his priorities. The CIA would be compelled to
justify its programs and its budget before authorizations and appropria-
tions committees in the same manner as other agencies. CIA and other
intelligence spending would also be subject to review by the GAO at Con-
gressional direction and under appropriate security safeguards. The
ability of the Congress to exercise effective oversight would be signi-
ficantly enhanced.
FORD is LIBRARY 07V839
Fiscal Procedures
The following proposals are submitted for the Committee's consideration:
1. Total figures for intelligence spending should be made public.
The format of the President's annual budget should include single
totals for each intelligence agency and for the intelligence acti-
vities of intelligence units in other departments and agencies.
Consequently, the Congress would vote annually on single line item
appropriations for CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, and for the intelli-
gence activities of FBI and IRS.
2. A consolidated intelligence budget should be prepared.
The Director of Central Intelligence should be required to prepare
an independent and consolidated intelligence community budget with
a view toward eliminating unnecessary duplication and suggesting
budgetary priorities for intelligence spending.
The DCI's proposed budget would provide the President with an as-
sessment of intelligence spending proposals which would be inde-
pendent of the individual intelligence agencies.
The DCI's proposed budget should also be made available to the Con-
gress to assist it in its authorization and appropriations process.
3. Funds for intelligence should be specifically authorized by Congress.
All funds for intelligence purposes should first be specifically
authorized, annually or periodically, for such use.
The current authority of the CIA to receive all its funds as trans-
fers from the accounts of other agencies should be rescinded. In-
stead, the amount that the CIA could receive by transfer should be
strictly limited, unless a larger transfer is specifically approved
by both the President and the Appropriations Committees.
4. The GAO should be authorized to review and audit intelligence spending.
At the direction of an appropriate Congressional committee, the GAO
should be empowered to examine all records of intelligence spending,
whether vouchered or unvouchered.
The intelligence agencies may retain physical custody of their re-
cords without infringing on GAO's authority to examine them. When
an agency head believes that some of its expenditure records should
be kept from the GAO, the decision shall be left to the Congressional
committee at whose request the GAO is acting.
FORD i 8.798 LIBRARY
ones C. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN
A. SEARLE FIELD. STAFF DIRECTOR
ROBERT N. GIAIMS. CONN.
POBERT MCCLORY, ILL.
AARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL
JAMES V. STANTON. OHIO
DAVID C. TREEN, LA.
RONALD v. DELLUMS. CALIF.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751
MORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., W13.
LES ASPIN. WIS.
DALE MILFORD. TEX.
Select Committee on Intelligence
PHILIP H. HAYES. INC.
WILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
MEMORANDUM
19 December 1975
From:
Otis Pike
To:
Members of the Committee
Re:
Possible recommendations developed by Committee staff
Attached is a brief presentation of various proposals developed by our
staff which we may wish to endorse as recommendations in our final re-
port.
Please give these proposals your careful consideration and advise the
staff as soon as possible if you approve of each of them.
Your comments and your suggestions for additional or alternative recom-
mendations will assist us in preparing a report which will accurately
reflect the concerns of the Committee.
The attached presentation does not include proposals on all the issues
which the Committee has been considering. You will receive supplemen-
tal materials as soon as they can be prepared.
FORD & LIBRARY 07V830
January 12, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.
SUBJECT:
House Select Committee on
Intelligence
Attached are Rep. Bob McClory's comments to the staff recommenda-
tions which I sent to you by memo dated January 6, 1976.
CC: Max Friedersdorf
Mike Duval
FORD is LIBRARY 038870
ROBERT McCLORY
DISTRICT OFFICES
13TH DISTRICT. ILLINOIS
KANS COUNTY
MUNICIPAL BUILDING
ROOM 2452
150 DEXTER COURT
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 225-5221
Congress of the United States
ELGIN, ILLINOIS 60120
(312) 697-5005
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
house of Representatives
LAKE COUNTY
POST OFFICE BUILDING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
Mashington, D.C. 20515
326 NORTH GENESES STREET
WAUKEGAN, ILLINOIS 60085
(312) 336-4554
U.S. INTERPARLIAMENTARY
UNION DELEGATION
MEMORANDUM
MCHENRY COUNTY
MCHENRY COUNTY COURTHOUSE
2200 SEMINARY ROAD
WOODSTOCK. ILLINOIS 60098
January 7, 1976
(815) 338-2040
From:
Robert McClory
To:
Members of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Re:
The Committee's Recommendations
Shortly before Christmas, the Chairman distributed a memorandum prepared
by the Committee staff which described various proposals for our consid-
eration. Before the Committee meets to consider its recommendations, I
would like to make my own thinking clear on several points.
Fiscal procedures
In the absence of any compelling evidence to the contrary, I think we
must be guided by the intelligence agencies' concern that publication of
even single overall dollar totals for their annual budgets would reveal
vital information of benefit to hostile foreign interests and would have
a detrimental effect on their operations. Full budgetary information
must, of course, be available to the Congress. I fully support the pro-
posal that the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a consoli-
dated budget for the intelligence community as a whole, which would include
a comprehensive statement of intelligence and intelligence-related costs,
as well as a full accounting of the number of public and contract employees
GERALD FORD LIBRKET
-- 2 -
as well as proprietary entities which are engaged in intelligence activi-
ties. This budget should be available to the appropriations and intelli-
gence oversight committees of the Congress, but it should not be made public.
I also concur with the suggestion that funds for intelligence should
be authorized by the Congress in the same manner that we authorize funds
<
for other executive agencies. To prevent intelligence spending from being
made public, authorizations for intelligence should be considered in execu-
tive sessions of the intelligence oversight committee or committees and
then included in authorization legislation, in the same manner as intelli-
gence appropriations are now included in defense appropriations bills.
Congressional oversight
I support the creation of a permanent Committee on Foreign Intelligence
within the House. This committee should be given legislative jurisdiction,
and it should have access to the information it needs--so long as effective
security procedures are established. Because of the necessary secrecy in
which the committee must work, it is essential that it enjoy the full confi-
dence of the House and that it avoid even the appearance of partisanship.
I urge, therefore, that the committee include members from both parties in
equal or near-equal numbers. I also have serious reservations about the
proposal to rotate members on and off the intelligence committee for fear
that adoption of this procedure would deprive the committee of the expertise
which the committee must possess to function effectively.
With regard to Congressional oversight of covert action operations,
I believe that it would be inappropriate for the Congress to have a veto
power over such programs, unless thev involve supplying arms, directly or
FORD is LIBRARY 938470
- 3 -
indirectly, to a foreign nation or group. However, programs which involve
or support para-military activities would seem to impinge on the Congress'
constitutional power to declare war. My present thinking is that they
should not be undertaken without the approval of the intelligence oversight
committee in the House.
Limiting secrecy
The Committee's final report should strongly and positively affirm
the responsibility of the Congress to meet the highest standards of respect
for the confidentiality of national secrets. The primary responsibility
for classifying and declassifying information must rest with the executive
branch. It would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Congress
to assume the responsibility for deciding if and when each classified docu-
ment should be made public.
If the Congress reserves to itself the right to release some classi-
fied information, it should be made clear that this authority does not
extend to diplomatic exchanges, dialogues between heads of state, and
intra-departmental communications. Further, in obtaining classified
information for its own confidential use, the Congress should act with
great restraint and secure only those records which are truly necessary
for thorough and effective oversight.
There are other subjects on which I believe this Committee must offer
reconmendations. Of particular importance is the future organization of
the intelligence community within the executive branch. For example,
I would support recommendations to increase the authority of the Director
FORD i LIBRARY 078839
- 4 -
of Central Intelligence as the central coordinator of the intelligence
community, and to establish the National. . Security Agency by statute
independent of the Department of Defense. The management of daily intelli-
gence activities must remain a function of the executive branch. Improving
executive branch organization and control will go hand in hand with improv-
ing oversight of intelligence within the Congress.
I hope that each of you will give these thoughts your careful consideration
before the Committee meets. I would be glad to discuss them with you at
any time.
FORD & LIBRARY 07VU30
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 20, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
THRU:
MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF
VERN LOEN
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.
Car
SUBJECT:
McClory's Incomplete Additional Views
to Pike Committee Report
Attached is a copy of Rep. McClory's incomplete additional minority
views to the proposed Pike Committee report. McClory requests the
Administration to review and comment on these additional views.
McClory requests that these additional views be closely held at this
time and he would like to receive the Administration comments as
soon as possible.
Attachment
cc: Tom Loeffler
Mike Duval
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARIA
draft of proposed additional Comments
clase hald
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR.
The Select Committee on Intelligence was established by a bi-partisan
vote of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation which far
transcends in importance any temptation for momentary partisan advantage.
The members of the Committee have reflected the full range of philosophies
represented in the Congress. But every member has recognized the critical
need for an effective intelligence capability, operating in a manner con-
sistent with both the realities of the international situation and the
requirements of democratic accountability.
During the past months of the Committee's inquiry, we have consistently
pressed for an objective, balanced, and thorough investigation. We have
always believed that attempting to evaluate the performance of individual
officials or to fix blame for particular intelligence failures would only
detract from fulfilling our primary responsibility: evaluating the struc-
ture, organization, and performance of the intelligence comunity to de-
termine what systemic changes, if any, should be made. It has been im-
portant for the Committee to identify past deficiencies and failures, not
simply to criticize and demonstrate the wisdom of hindsight, but to deter-
mine how future intelligence performance may be improved.
We consider it particularly unfortunate and inappropriate, therefore,
that the Committee's hearings and investigations have focused so heavily
on events of the past several years. The need for a dispassionate inquiry
has been sacrificed to what must be seen as a partisan attack on the
policies of this administration. In the selection of subjects and wit-
nesses for its hearings, the Committee majority has frequently been more
FORD R. GERALD LIBRARY
interested in making a case than in learning the true facts.
(2)
We must take exception to the tone and many of the conclusions of
the majority report. It is certainly not our contention that the per-
formance of the intelligence agencies has been flawless. On the contrary,
we are convinced that there are serious systemic deficiencies for which
reforms are both appropriate and necessary. It is neither accurate nor
fair, however, to characterize the record of the intelligence community
as an unmixed record of failures and improprieties. Yet this is the
consistent implication of the majority report. By SO distorting the
record, the Committee majority makes it exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, for the American people to distinguish the intelligence agen-
cies' successes from their failures, and to appreciate the difference
between human error and structural and organizational flaws.
The tasks of the intelligence agencies are exceptionally difficult.
They are charged with acquiring information which other governments make
every effort to protect. They are expected to anticipate events in an
unpredictable world. Their failures inevitably receive greater publicity
than their successes. By concentrating on assigning blame and identifying
villains, the majority report distracts attention from what can and should
be done to improve the intelligence agencies' ability to do their job.
We also reject the manner in which the Committee's majority has
characterized the cooperation we have received from the President and
the executive branch. It is beyond dispute that this Committee received
more classified information than any other committee in the history of the
House of Representatives. There is very little, if any, information
which the Committee sought and did not ultimately receive. The President
personally assured the chairman and ranking minority member of his
desire to provide the Committee with any and all information it required.
(3)
His only concern was his justifiable interest in ensuring that legitimate
secrets would be given the protection they require. Once mutually ac-
ceptable procedures were established, the President assured the Committee
of his desire to cooperate fully. With the exception of one instance
in which the President felt compelled to assert executive privilege,
there is absolutely no support for the allegation that this administration
sought, as a matter of policy, to hinder the Committee's investigation.
Unfortunately, executive officials did not always act in a manner
consistent with the President's assurances of cooperation. There were
frequent and, in our view, unnecessary delays in providing the Committee
with documents it requested. On a number of occasions, the Committee
was compelled to issue subpoenas in order to expedite the delivery of
materials we needed for our investigation. We regret the fact that there
was not always full and prompt compliance with these subpoenas. The
Committee did not issue subpoenas frivolously; the subpoenas which were
issued merited timely compliance.
Nonetheless, we consider it inaccurate and unreasonable to attribute
to the executive branch generally or to any individual official any de-
sire to obstruct the work of this Committee. Beyond any question, our
investigation entered into some of the most sensitive and delicate matters
in which the United States has been or is now engaged. The officials of
the intelligence community are charged by law with protecting the integ-
rity of their organizations and the secrets entrusted to them. It is
only natural, therefore, for the executive branch to have been concerned
about leaks and disclosures which might have damaged the future efficacy
of their agencies.
(4)
Instead of berating the executive branch for the disagreements and
delays which did arise, the Committee majority should have made proper
note of the extraordinary cooperation we did receive. In particular, the
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Colby, went to unprecedented lengths
to cooperate with the Committee. He appeared before the Committee in
public session on at least five occasions, and in executive sessions even
more frequently. In addition, other CIA officials and representatives
provided us with extensive testimony and assistance at his direction.
It is well worth emphasizing that the overwhelming bulk of the in-
formation which this Committee obtained was provided by the intelligence
agencies themselves. For example, the Committee investigated the per-
formance of the foreign intelligence agencies before and during crises in
the Middle East, Vietnam, Cyprus, and Portugal. In each instance, the
Committee found that the intelligence comunity itself had already con-
ducted extensive post-mortems on its own performance in order to identify
and correct whatever weaknesses had emerged. Instead of merely publici-
zing the failures which the intelligence agencies had already identified
for themselves, the Committee majority should have congratulated the in-
telligence community for its willingness to examine its own performance
with an objectivity and detachment uncharacteristic of the federal
bureaucracy.
In short, we find that the majority report offers a distorted and
unbalanced assessment of intelligence community performance and execu-
tive branch cooperation. We deplore the fact that the report seems more
concerned with finding fault than with seeking the truth.
(5)
Of primary concern to us are the measures which should be adopted
to improve the performance of the intelligence comunity in the future,
and to bring the individual intelligence agencies under better control,
both within the executive branch and by the Congress.
In the past, most members of Congress have preferred to remain at
a distance from the intelligence comunity. Consequently, Congressional
oversight of intelligence tended to be sporadic and superficial. The
intelligence agencies complied with the reporting requirements imposed
on them, and individual members of both houses were briefed regularly.
However, the prevalent attitude within the Congress was to grant the ex-
ecutive branch greater discretion with regard to intelligence than with
regard to other administrative activities. Today, both circumstances
and attitudes have changed. What has been adequate and acceptable in
the past will not be appropriate for the future. We believe that the
Congress should make changes in its own procedures at the same time that
it recommends changes in executive organization and policies.
The committees of the House which are now charged with intelligence
oversight have other major responsibilities as well. In particular, the
Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary are perhaps more heavily
burdened than any other legislative committees. We consider it approp-
riate, therefore, to concentrate the responsibility for intelligence
legislation and oversight in a new committee which will have the time
and resources which will be required. Our experience on this Select Com-
mittee have convinced us that it is simply unrealistic to demand more
continuing Congressional oversight without providing the structure that
will make it possible.
LISBARY GERALD ? FORD
Therefore, we join in recommending the creation of a permanent c'om-
(6)
mittee of the House on intelligence affairs. This committee should have
exclusive jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities of the
federal government and all agencies and components of the government with
responsibility for collecting, analyzing, and producing intelligence
concerning America's international relations. All proposed legislation--
including bills which authorize appropriations of funds--should be re-
ferred to the committee for its consideration and recommendations. Be-
cause there are instances in which foreign and domestic intelligence
activities impinge on each other, we also recommend that the committee
be given shared oversight jurisdiction over domestic intelligence acti-
vities, especially the counter-intelligence and internal security programs
of the FBI.
In order for this committee to function effectively, it must have
access to the information it requires. For this purpose, the heads of
all appropriate departments and agencies should be required by law to
keep the committee fully and currently informed concerning their programs
and activities, and to provide the committee with whatever specific in-
formation and records it considers essential.
A committee with such authority will bear a heavy responsibility
for the protection of the information it receives. It is imperative
that its members adhere to the highest standards of conduct and that
procedures and facilities be established to ensure that sensitive in-
formation can be given to the committee without jeopardizing its sec-
recy. The rules of the House should be amended to make absolutely
clear that any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence will be grounds
for punitive action by the House.
-6A-
In this regard, we recommend that any Committee of the House which has
access to classified information in pursuit of its legislative and over-
sight responsibilities be given the authority to discipline any Member
which it reasonably believes has disclosed or publicized such information.
Specifically, these Committees ought to be delegated authority by the
full House to enable them to take appropriate action against a Member who
violates the Committee's rules of confidentiality and non-disclosure by
a vote of a majority of the Majority Members and a majority of the Minority
Members. In some cases, it might be appropriate to bar the offending Member
from Executive Sessions of the Committee and from the right to inspect the
Committee files containing classified information. For a more serious
violation, it might be necessary to expel the Member from the Committee
altogether. Under the rules of the House, a Member against whom such
disciplinary action has been taken, might reserve a right of appeal to the
full House or to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. At the
very least, the rules of the House ought to be revised to provide for the
ultimate sanctions of censure and expulsion for any Member who can be
proven to have violated the confidentiality of any Executive Session meeting
of any House Committee.
(7)
It has been our experience that the executive branch, including the
intelligence agencies, tends to classify documents routinely and exces-
sively. Unfortunately, this tendency undermines public and Congressional
appreciation for the fact that there are in fact documents and information
which, if disclosed, could significantly jeopardize the nation's security.
If executive officials exercise greater restraint and selectivity in the
future, they will be better able to protect materials which must legi-
timately remain secret.
The primary responsibility for classifying and declassifying docu-
ments must remain with the executive branch. It would be both impractical
and inappropriate for the Congress to assume the responsibility for de-
ciding if and when each classified document should be made public. What-
ever excesses now exist should be remedied by administrative reform, not
by improper Congressional intervention into the day-to-day administrative
details of the executive branch. At the same time, we wish to emphasize
that such reforms are needed. We urge the President and the leaders of
the intelligence community to re-examine their classification practices
in the interest of better informing the American people.
If the Congress reserves to itself the right to release certain
classified information in specific instances, it should be made clear
that this authority does not extend to diplomatic exchanges, dialogues
between heads of state, and intra-departmental communications. Further,
in all such cases, the greatest deference should be given to the expert
judgment of the intelligence agencies and the President, who is charged
under the Constitution with seeing to the faithful execution of the laws.
There is a delicate balance which must be struck between pre-
serving
legitimate state secrets and ensuring that the American
(8)
people are adequately informed about what their government is doing. It
is unlikely that any general rules can be developed which will be approp-
riate in all cases. Instead, case by case judgments must be made in an
atmosphere of comity between the executive and legislative branches. The
President and the Congress must view themselves as partners in a common
enterprise, rather than as adversaries engaged in a struggle for power.
This is the spirit which we have consistently sought to foster during
the lifetime of this Committee. We continue to believe that the American
people will be better served by compromise than by confrontation.
In general, we support the principle that specific decisions to
implement national policies must be left to the discretion of the execu-
tive branch--subject, of course, to the rigors of Congressional oversight.
With respect to covert action programs conducted by the CIA, however, we
believe that a more active Congressional role is necessary and justified.
The Constitution charges the Congress with the right and responsibility
to declare war. With the recent passage of war powers legislation, the
Congress recognized, and made provision for the fact, that the Congress
must play a comparable role in instances, short of a declared state of war,
in which the United States undertakes significant interventions in the
affairs of other nations. This same principle should now be extended to
certain covert actions undertaken by the CIA at the direction of the
President.
In 1974, the Congress required by law that the President must cer-
tify and that the appropriate Congressional committees must receive
timely notification of all CIA operations in foreign countries, "other
than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence."
(9)
On the basis of this Committee's investigation, we now conclude that
timely notification after the fact is not sufficient when the United
States contemplates military or paramilitary covert operations, or when
the government intends to covertly provide arms or funds which will be
used to obtain arms. Such policies impinge directly and immediately
on the war powers of the Congress. They should not be undertaken with-
out prior approval by the appropriate committees of the Congress.
We believe that it is an unreasonable construction of the Constitu-
tion to assert that the President may take unilateral action in secret
which would require Congressional approval if taken publicly. There-
fore, a requirement that Congress give prior approval to covert operations
with military consequences is nothing more than a legislative implemen-
tation of what the Constitution was meant to require. Moreover, it is
our conviction that prior Congressional consultation in such cases will
also provide the President with the judgment of elected officials with
no vested interest in perpetuating or expanding covert paramilitary opera-
tions. Consequently, there will be less likelihood of covert paramilitary
operations being undertaken which will be unacceptable to the American
people.
Traditionally, one of the most effective Congressional controls of
administrative activity has been its "power of the purse"--its Constitu-
tional authority to determine how the taxpayers' money should be spent.
We therefore concur with various recommendations in the majority report
for improving fiscal oversight of the intelligence comunity. Funds for
intelligence should be authorized by the Congress in the same manner
R
FORD
that we now authorize funds for other executive agencies and department GERAL
(10)
and the Congress must receive full budgetary information on which to base
its decisions. We also support the proposal that the head of the intel-
ligence community should prepare a consolidated budget for the intelligence
comunity as a whole, which would include a comprehensive statement of
intelligence and intelligence-related costs, as well as a full accounting
of the number of public and contract employees and proprietary entities
which are engaged in intelligence activities. This budget should also
be available to the appropriate committees of Congress. Finally, we agree
that the General Accounting Office should be authorized to audit intel-
ligence spending on behalf of the Congress--subject, of course, to secur-
ity arrangements to protect the secrecy of intelligence sources and methods.
In the absence of any compelling evidence to the contrary, however,
we believe that the Congress must be guided by the intelligence agencies'
concern that publication of any budgetary information would reveal vital
information of benefit to hostile foreign interests and would have a
detrimental effect on American intelligence operations. We have concluded
from the Committee's investigation that intelligence work involves a
painstaking process of analyzing and assembling individual facts which
may appear inconsequential when taken separately. We recommend, there-
fore, that the Congress must continue to consider intelligence spending
in executive session, lest we inadvertently reveal critical information
about U.S. intelligence trends and developments.
Collectively, our recommendations constitute a reasonable and effec-
tive program for improving Congressional oversight of intelligence ac-
tivities and ensuring that they are conducted in a manner compatible with
democratic principles. However, the primary responsibility for managing
the intelligence community will and must rest with the President and
(11)
his intelligence advisors and officials. It is important to note that,
on its own initiative, the executive branch has conducted frequent studies
of intelligence community organization and performance, ranging from post-
mortems after specific events to wide-ranging examinations of agency per-
formance and community coordination. Most recently, the Rockefeller and
Murphy Commission reports have demonstrated presidential commitment to
making improvements in the intelligence community. We applaud the work
of these commissions and generally support their recommendations. They
have been of great assistance to our Committee, as a source of information
and expert judgment. The recommendations made by the two presidential
commissions deserve the most serious consideration.
We are also gratified by the President's determination to initiate
organizational and structural improvements within the intelligence commun-
ity. Although the work of this Committee, and its Senate counterpart,
have received the greatest publicity, we are aware that the executive
branch has simultaneously been conducting its own evaluation of what
reforms should be instituted. Before the Congress takes any action on
this Committee's recommendations, it should await and carefully consider
the fruits of the President's initiative.
Reforms within the executive branch will have the greatest and most
immediate effect on the daily management and coordination of intelligence
activities. Both the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions, for example,
have recommended a strengthened and expanded role for the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We fully concur with this recom-
mendation. At a minimum, the Board should be provided with a full-time
staff which will enable it to play a more continuing and significant
(12)
role in analyzing and evaluating intelligence comunity performance. An
effort should also be made to better integrate the Board into the organi-
zation of the community, perhaps by designating the operating head and
coordinator of the intelligence community as the Board's chairman.
We also believe that significant improvements must be made in the
organization and management of defense intelligence activities. We have
seen compelling evidence that the intelligence operations of the Depart-
ment of Defense are characterized by excessive duplication and a severe
lack of coordination. In part, the problem lies in the very size and
extent of defense activities. For this reason, we recommend that the
Congress enact a statutory charter for the National Security Agency (now
established by presidential directive) which would establish the NSA as
an independent civilian agency, but also provide the means for effective
coordination with the military services.
We are also convinced that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
has thus far been unable to provide the coordination within the military
intelligence comunity for which the Agency was established. Stream-
lining within the Defense Department is obviously necessary. On the
basis of the evidence received by the Committee, we believe this might
best be accomplished by either eliminating DIA or reducing it to a much
smaller analytical staff attached directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Centralized responsibility for intelligence matters would be vested in
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) or his successor, who
would coordinate activities among the service secretaries and serve as
the Secretary's principal assistant for intelligence.
Of even greater importance will be improvements in the manner in
which the intelligence community as a whole is directed and coordinated.
(13)
For these purposes, we concur with the recommendation in the majority
report that the current dual roles of the Director of Central Intelligence
be divided between two officials--one to serve as the coordinator of the
intelligence community generally, and the other to serve as the head of
the CIA specifically. The DCI is presently in the anomalous position of
coordinating the activities of various agencies--without the authority
such coordination requires--while simultaneously serving as manager of
one of these agencies. Under these circumstances, we have found that the
daily demands of managing the CIA prevents the DCI from giving proper
attention to his responsibilities as community coordinator.
We recommend, therefore, that a new office of the Director of Foreign
Intelligence be established as an independent office within the Executive
Office of the President, the DFI to be subject to confirmation by the
Senate and to become a statutory member of the National Security Council.
We believe that the President would be well served if he established the
DFI as his principal advisor on intelligence matters and as a participant
in Cabinet consideration of international affairs.
In order to coordinate foreign intelligence activities effectively,
the DFI should be directed, by statute or presidential directive, to pre-
pare the consolidated foreign intelligence budget recommended above. He
should also be assigned the staff and responsibility to investigate al-
legations of improprieties and inefficiencies within individual intelli-
gence agencies. Further, the DFI should be assigned the task of overseeing
the preparation of community-wide National Intelligence Estimates for
consideration by the President and the Congress. With such authority,
the DFI will be better placed to both discover and remedy future deficien-
cies and duplications in both the collection of raw information and the
(14)
production of finished intelligence.
Under current law, the Director of Central Intelligence is assigned
responsibility without comparable authority. His dual functions are
beyond the capability of any single individual, no matter how skilled and
well-intentioned. The creation of an independent Director of Foreign
Intelligence will promote greater emphasis on coordination, economy, and
long-range planning. It will also establish responsibility within the
executive branch for ensuring the integrity of intelligence operations
and preventing the recurrence of the abuses which stimulated this Commit-
tee's creation.
We believe that implementation of these recommendations will sub-
stantially improve both the efficiency and the quality of intelligence
operations in the future. They will also provide for better executive-
legislative cooperation and understanding--a need which is now fully
recognized both on Capitol Hill and in the White House. If such reforms
are instituted, then the work of this Select Committee will be judged
a success, notwithstanding our objections and disappointments over the
majority's procedures and conclusions.
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"ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 14, folder \"Intelligence - House Select\nCommittee: Report and Recommendations (2)\" of the Loen and Leppert Files at the\nGerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 14 of the Loen and Leppert Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nJanuary 6, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJACK MARSH\nFROM:\nCHARLES LEPPERT, JR.\nSUBJECT:\nHouse Select Committee\non Intelligence\nAttached are some recommendations developed by the staff\nof the House Select Committee for consideration of the\nCommittee Members for possible inclusion as recommendations\nin the Committee's final report.\nThe recommendations concern fiscal procedures, congressional\noversight and limiting secrecy.\nAttach.\nCCI Max Friedersdorf\nMike Duval\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nOTIS G. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN\nA. SEARLE FIELD, STAFF DIRECTOR\nROBERT N. GIAIMO, CONN.\nROBERT MC CLORY, ILL.\nAARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL\nJAMES V. STANTON, JHIO\nDAVID C. TREEN, LA.\nRONALD V. DELLUMS CALIF.\nJAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.\nTELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751\nMORGAN F. MURPHY ILL.\nROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.\nLES ASPIN. WIS.\nDALE MILFORD, TEX.\nSelect Committee on Intelligence\nPHILIP H. HAYES, INC.\nWILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.\nU.S. House of Representatibes\nWashington, D.C. 20515\nMEMORANDUM\n19 December 1975\nFrom:\nOtis Pike\nTo:\nMembers of the Committee\nRe:\nPossible recommendations developed by Committee staff\nAttached is a brief presentation of various proposals developed by our\nstaff which we may wish to endorse as recommendations in our final re-\nport.\nPlease give these proposals your careful consideration and advise the\nstaff as soon as possible if you approve of each of them.\nYour comments and your suggestions for additional or alternative recom-\nmendations will assist us in preparing a report which will accurately\nreflect the concerns of the Committee.\nThe attached presentation does not include proposals on all the issues\nwhich the Committee has been considering. You will receive supplemen-\ntal materials as soon as they can be prepared.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nFiscal Procedures\nThe following proposals are submitted for the Committee's consideration:\n1. Total figures for intelligence spending should be made public.\nThe format of the President's annual budget should include single\ntotals for each intelligence agency and for the intelligence acti-\nvities of intelligence units in other departments and agencies.\nConsequently, the Congress would vote annually on single line item\nappropriations for CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, and for the intelli-\ngence activities of FBI and IRS.\n2. A consolidated intelligence budget should be prepared.\nThe Director of Central Intelligence should be required to prepare\nan independent and consolidated intelligence community budget with\na view toward eliminating unnecessary duplication and suggesting\nbudgetary priorities for intelligence spending.\nThe DCI's proposed budget would provide the President with an as-\nsessment of intelligence spending proposals which would be inde-\npendent of the individual intelligence agencies.\nThe DCI's proposed budget should also be made available to the Con-\ngress to assist it in its authorization and appropriations process.\n3. Funds for intelligence should be specifically authorized by Congress.\nAll funds for intelligence purposes should first be specifically\nauthorized, annually or periodically, for such use.\nThe current authority of the CIA to receive all its funds as trans-\nfers from the accounts of other agencies should be rescinded. In-\nstead, the amount that the CIA could receive by transfer should be\nstrictly limited, unless a larger transfer is specifically approved\nby both the President and the Appropriations Committees.\n4. The GAO should be authorized to review and audit intelligence spending.\nAt the direction of an appropriate Congressional committee, the GAO\nshould be empowered to examine all records of intelligence spending,\nwhether vouchered or unvouchered.\nThe intelligence agencies may retain physical custody of their re-\ncords without infringing on GAO's authority to examine them. When\nan agency head believes that some of its expenditure records should\nbe kept from the GAO, the decision shall be left to the Congressional\ncommittee at whose request the GAO is acting.\nFORD is DERALD LIBRARY\nComment: Collectively, these proposals would have the effect of bringing\nthe intelligence agencies- and especially the CIA--under much the same\nkind of fiscal controls which apply to all other departments and agencies\nof the government. Members of the Congress would learn--in gross terms--\nhow much money they are appropriating each year for each intelligence\nagency. The public would learn how intelligence spending fits into the\nPresident's budget and his priorities. The CIA would be compelled to\njustify its programs and its budget before authorizations and appropria-\ntions committees in the same manner as other agencies. CIA and other\nintelligence spending would also be subject to review by the GAO at Con-\ngressional direction and under appropriate security safeguards. The\nability of the Congress to exercise effective oversight would be signi-\nficantly enhanced.\nFORD is LIBRAR GERALD\nCongressional Oversight\nThe proposals concerning fiscal procedures would increase the information\navailable to Congress and, consequently, its ability to exercise effec-\ntive oversight. In addition, the following two proposals are submitted\nfor the Committee's consideration.\n1. A standing House Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be created.\nThe House should create a permanent standing Committee on Foreign\nIntelligence.\nThe committee should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction and\nshared oversight jurisdiction over CIA, NSA, DIA, USIB, PFIAB,\nmilitary intelligence, and the foreign intelligence activities of\nall other agencies and departments, including but not limited to\nthe NSC, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, FBI,\nDEA, and ERDA.\nThe head of each such department or agency should be obligated to\nkeep the committee fully and currently informed about is programs\nand activities relating to foreign intelligence and covert foreign\noperations, and to provide the committee with whatever specific\ninformation and records it requires.\nAll proposed legislation--including legislation authorizing approp-\nriations--concerning foreign intelligence activities should be with-\nin the jurisdiction of the committee.\nAll proposed legislation affecting, but not directed solely to,\nforeign intelligence activities should be referred to this commit-\ntee for appropriate consideration and action after having been\nconsidered by any other House committee with appropriate jurisdic-\ntion.\nThe committee should include some members with prior or current\nservice on other related standing committees, but this should be\nthe primary committee assignment for most of its members.\nNo member should be allowed to serve on the committee for more than\nthree consecutive terms.\nThe question of giving the committee jurisdiction over domestic\nintelligence programs and agencies should be deferred until the\n95th Congress convenes.\nIf and when the Senate acts to establish its own committee with\ncomparable authority and jurisdiction, the House should then con-\nsider whether its committee should become the House delegation to\na joint committee on foreign intelligence.\nFORD in LIBR\n2. The Congress should be fully informed before covert actions begin.\nThe Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act should\nbe amended in three respects:\nFirst, the phrase \"in a timely fashion\" should be eliminated--there-\nby making clear that the appropriate committees of Congress are to\nreceive prior notification of all CIA covert operations which the\nPresident has approved.\nSecond, the DCI should be required to report to the appropriate\nCongressional committees, at their request, the full range and\nscope of the intelligence community's clandestine activities--\nto gather intelligence or influence events--in specific countries.\nThird, the President should be required to keep these committees\nfully and promptly informed of all decisions to begin new programs\nof intelligence activities which could reasonably be expected to\ninfluence the conduct of foreign officials and governments.\nComment: These proposals would encourage the House to continue this Com-\nmittee's work. A permanent, standing committee of the House would be\nestablished to concentrate solely on intelligence matters. It would have\nlegislative authority and--therefore--clout. Requiring rotation of its\nmembers would ensure that the committee's approach remains fresh. Re-\nquirements would be imposed on the DCI and the President to make sure\nthat the committee learns everything that it needs to know. The possi-\nbility of creating a joint committee would be left open, depending on\nwhatever action the Senate takes.\nFORD : 938870 LIBRARY\nLimiting Secrecy\nPrevious proposals would increase the Congress' role in intelligence mat-\nters. The following proposals concerning management of sensitive infor-\nmation are submitted for the Committee's consideration.\n1. Procedures should be established for the Congress to release classi-\nfied information.\nEach committee with national security jurisdiction should estab-\nlish procedures and criteria, incorporated into its published rules,\nby which it identifies material in its possession which it deter-\nmines must be kept secret.\nOther members of the House may have access to such information only\nupon majority vote of the committee, except that if access is de-\nnied, a member may appeal the committee's decision to the House as\na matter of personal privilege.\nEach such committee should be authorized to recommend that specific\nclassified facts and documents be made public, but only after soli-\nciting and giving careful consideration to the judgment of the execu-\ntive branch, including the President.\nIf an individual member of the House obtains sensitive information\nfrom a committee's files which he believes should be made public,\nhe should first seek the consent of the committee.\nIf a member obtains classified or other sensitive information from\na source outside of the Congress which he believes should be made\npublic, he should first seek the advice of the committee with ap-\npropriate legislative jurisdiction.\nIn all cases, before acting, the committee should solicit and give\ncareful consideration to the judgment of the executive branch.\nAfter the committee acts, the matter should then be submitted, to-\ngether with the committee's decision or recommendation, to the\nSpeaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader.\nIf two of the three elected leaders of the House conclude that pub-\nlic disclosure of the information would jeopardize the nation's\nsecurity, the information should not be released.\nThe rules of the House should be amended to provide that a member\nwho releases sensitive information in a manner which violates or\nignores these procedures shall be subject to censure, expulsion, or\nwhatever other disciplinary action the House deems appropriate.\n2. An independent body should be established to de-classify information.\nA Security Information Review Commission should be established by\nlaw.\nFORD & , LIB\nIt should be composed of eleven private citizens, fewer than half\nof whom may have been employed previously by the national security\nagencies and departments of the government. These commissioners\nshould be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate\nfor staggered terms of ten years each.\nAny document now classified should be reviewable by the Commission\nupon request by any individual or group. The document may be\ndeclassified by majority vote of the Commission, except that the\nPresident may reverse a Commission decision only if he certifies\nin writing that disclosure of a particular document would do grave\nand immediate danger to the defense of the United States.\nDocuments classified in the future should become declassified auto-\nmatically after a period of five years unless the Commission, by\nmajority vote, determines that they should remain classified for\nan additional five year period.\nComment: These proposals would provide a procedure by which the Congress\ncould release information on the basis of its own judgment--whether the\ninformation comes from a committee's files or elsewhere, and whether the\ninitiative comes from a committee or from an individual member. They\nwould leave the final decision to the three elected leaders of the House,\nacting as a surrogate for all the members. Members would be warned of\nthe responsibility they assume when they obtain sensitive information\nfrom a committee, and of the fact that they would be subject to discip-\nlinary action if they violate or ignore the proposed procedures. A\nbody would be established--independent of the agencies which classify\ndocuments- to decide if documents can be declassified. The presumption\nwould be firmly established that all documents would be made public after\nfive years unless the Commission could be convinced otherwise.\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nRED TAG\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJanuary 7, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJACK MARSH\nFROM:\nCHARLES LEPPERT, JR.\nSUBJECT:\nHouse Select Committee\non Intelligence\nOn January 6 I spoke with Searle Field about the Committee's\nfinal report and at which time he stated he had called you for\na response to the Committee's requests to declassify and\nrelease certain information relating to Angola and the Italian\nelections. Field stated that he needed an answer as soon as\npossible because the Administration response to the\ndeclassification and release of such information impacted upon\nthe way the Committee's final report was written.\nI advised Field that I would inform you of his request for a\nquick response on the declassification and release matters.\nWith regard to the Committee's final report, Field informed\nme that he was completing the draft of the first half of the\nreport and was in the process of editing and footnoting the\nfirst half of the draft.\nThe Committee's final report, Field informed me, will be in\nthree parts and indexed as follows:\nPart I. Committee Oversight Responsibility\nA.\nAccess to Information\n1. Delay on requests for information\n2. Cut off of information\n3. Silence of witnesses\n4. Flank attacks\n5. Deletions\n6. Privileges\n7. More delay and routine problems\nB.\nCongress and the Secrecy Dilemma\n1. Oaths and agreements\n2. Selective briefings\n3. Special restrictions\n4. Congressional release of information\nPart II. The Committee's Investigative Record\nA.\nCost\nB.\nProduct\nC.\nRisk and control\nPart III. Committee Recommendations\n(See memo attached with more expected)\nField further informed me that Pike's position with regard to the\nCommittee's final report is that the Committee will print what\nit wants to in the final report and that he was not going to set a\nprecedent by granting the Executive or anybody a veto on what\nwas printed in the Committee's final report. Field then stated\nthat the first half of the draft report which he was completing\nwould meet with some strong objections from the Administration.\nI then asked Field if the Administration would be given the\nopportunity to read and comment on the draft he was working on.\nField volunteered to make a copy of the draft available to me or\nMitch Regovin when he had it finished on January 9 or 12.\nField then stated that he would make the copy of the draft\navailable unofficially because he would attempt to balance the\nreport if any Administration comments warranted a redrafting\nof what had been written at this time. Field was careful to point\nout that the draft report was being made available with knowledge\nof the Committee, but on an unofficial basis so that no precedent\nwas set against Pike's position and to keep any Administration\ncomments in some coordinated channel and low-keyed as opposed\nto having all facets of the Intelligence community flood him with\ncomments and suggested changes.\ncc: Max Friedersdorf\nAttach.\nFILE\nJanuary 8, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nMIKE DUVAL\nHARLIE REPPERT\nFROM:\nJACK MARSH\nReferring to Charlie's meme of January 7 in reference to the\nCommittee Report of the House Select Committee, it occure to\nme that we should review at this time what outstanding requests\nwe have them the Committee which have not been responded to.\nFor example, there to the matter involving NSID #6 which Searle\nField has called about. Are there other outstanding requests\nthat have not been honored?\nJOM/dl\nFORD is LIBRARY OFRATO\nM\nRED TAG\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJanuary 7, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJACK MARSH\nFROM:\nCHARLES LEPPERT, JR.\nSUBJECT:\nHouse Select Committee\non Intelligence\nOn January 6 I spoke with Searle Field about the Committee's\nfinal report and at which time he stated he had called you for\na response to the Committee's requests to declassify and\nrelease certain information relating to Angola and the Italian\nelections. Field stated that he needed an answer as soon as\npossible because the Administration response to the\ndeclassification and release of such information impacted upon\nthe way the Committee's final report was written.\nI advised Field that I would inform you of his request for a\nquick response on the declassification and release matters.\nWith regard to the Committee's final report, Field informed\nme that he was completing the draft of the first half of the\nreport and was in the process of editing and footnoting the\nfirst half of the draft.\nThe Committee's final report, Field informed me, will be in\nthree parts and indexed as follows:\nPart I. Committee Oversight Responsibility\nA. Access to Information\n1. Delay on requests for information\n2. Cut off of information\n3. Silence of witnesses\n4. Flank attacks\n5. Deletions\n6. Privileges\n7. More delay and routine problems\nFORD & BERALD LIBRARY\nB.\nCongress and the Secrecy Dilemma\n1. Oaths and agreements\n2. Selective briefings\n3. Special restrictions\n4. Congressional release of information\nPart II. The Committee's Investigative Record\nA.\nCost\nB.\nProduct\nC.\nRisk and control\nPart III. Committee Recommendations\n(See memo attached with more expected)\nField further informed me that Pike's position with regard to the\nCommittee's final report is that the Committee will print what\nit wants to in the final report and that he was not going to set a\nprecedent by granting the Executive or anybody a veto on what\nwas printed in the Committee's final report. Field then stated\nthat the first half of the draft report which he was completing\nwould meet with some strong objections from the Administration.\nI then asked Field if the Administration would be given the\nopportunity to read and comment on the draft he was working on.\nField volunteered to make a copy of the draft available to me or\nMitch Regovin when he had it finished on January 9 or 12.\nField then stated that he would make the copy of the draft\navailable unofficially because he would attempt to balance the\nreport if any Administration comments warranted a redrafting\nof what had been written at this time. Field was careful to point\nout that the draft report was being made available with knowledge\nof the Committee, but on an unofficial basis so that no precedent\nwas set against Pike's position and to keep any Administration\ncomments in some coordinated channel and low-keyed as opposed\nto having all facets of the Intelligence community flood him with\ncomments and suggested changes.\nCC: Max Friedersdorf\nAttach.\n\"\nOTI, c. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN\nA. SCAMLE FIELD. STAFF DIRECTOR\nMODERT N. GIAIMS. CONN.\nPOSERT MCCLORY, ILL.\nAARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL\nJAMES V. STANTON. JHIO\nDAVID C. TREEN. LA.\nRONA DV. DELLUM CALIF.\nJAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.\nTELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751\nMORGAN F MUMPHY. ILL.\nROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.\nLES AGEIN. wis.\nDUE MILFORD. TEX.\nSelect Committee on Intelligence\nPHILIP M. HAYES. 140.\nWILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.\nU.S. House of Representatibes\nWashington, D.C. 20515\nMEMORANDUM\n19 December 1975\nFrom:\nOtis Pike\nTo:\nMembers of the Committee\nRe:\nPossible recommendations developed by Committee staff\nAttached is a brief presentation of various proposals developed by our\nstaff which we may wish to endorse as recommendations in our final re-\nport.\nPlease give these proposals your careful consideration and advise the\nstaff as soon as possible if you approve of each of them.\nYour comments and your suggestions for additional or alternative recom-\nmendations will assist us in preparing a report which will accurately\nreflect the concerns of the Committee.\nThe attached presentation does not include proposals on all the issues\nwhich the Committee has been considering. You will receive supplemen-\ntal materials as soon as they can be prepared.\nGERALD s FORD LIBRARY\nFiscal Procedures\nThe following proposals are submitted for the Committee's consideration:\n1. Total figures for intelligence spending should be made public.\nThe format of the President's annual budget should include single\ntotals for each intelligence agency and for the intelligence acti-\nvities of intelligence units in other departments and agencies.\nConsequently, the Congress would vote annually on single line item\nappropriations for CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, and for the intelli-\ngence activities of FBI and IRS.\n2. A consolidated intelligence budget should be prepared.\nThe Director of Central Intelligence should be required to prepare\nan independent and consolidated intelligence community budget with\na view toward eliminating unnecessary duplication and suggesting\nbudgetary priorities for intelligence spending.\nThe DCI's proposed budget would provide the President with an as-\nsessment of intelligence spending proposals which would be inde-\npendent of the individual intelligence agencies.\nThe DCI's proposed budget should also be made available to the Con-\ngress to assist it in its authorization and appropriations process.\n3.\nFunds for intelligence should be specifically authorized by Congress.\nAll funds for intelligence purposes should first be specifically\nauthorized, annually or periodically, for such use.\nThe current authority of the CIA to receive all its funds as trans-\nfers from the accounts of other agencies should be rescinded. In-\nstead, the amount that the CIA could receive by transfer should be\nstrictly limited, unless a larger transfer is specifically approved\nby both the President and the Appropriations Committees.\n4. The GAO should be authorized to review and audit intelligence spending.\nAt the direction of an appropriate Congressional committee, the GAO\nshould be empowered to examine all records of intelligence spending,\nwhether vouchered or unvouchered.\nThe intelligence agencies may retain physical custody of their re-\ncords without infringing on GAO's authority to examine them. When\nan agency head believes that some of its expenditure records should\nbe kept from the GAO, the decision shall be left to the Congressional\ncommittee at whose request the GAO is acting.\nComment: Collectively, these proposals would have the effect of bringing\nthe intelligence agencies and especially the CIA--under much the same\nkind of fiscal controls which apply to all other departments and agencies\nof the government.. Members of the Congress would learn--in gross terms--\nhow much money they are appropriating each year for each intelligence\nagency. The public would learn how intelligence spending fits into the\nPresident's budget and his priorities. The CIA would be compelled to\njustify its programs and its budget before authorizations and appropria-\ntions committees in the same manner as other agencies. CIA and other\nintelligence spending would also be subject to review by the GAO at Con-\ngressional direction and under appropriate security safeguards. The\nability of the Congress to exercise effective oversight would be signi-\nficantly enhanced.\nCongressional Oversight\nThe proposals concerning fiscal procedures would increase the information\navailable to Congress and, consequently, its ability to exercise effec-\ntive oversight. In addition, the following two proposals are submitted\nfor the Committee's consideration.\n1. A standing House Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be created.\nThe House should create a permanent standing Committee on Foreign\nIntelligence.\nThe committee should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction and\nshared oversight jurisdiction over CIA, NSA, DIA, USIB, PFIAB,\nmilitary intelligence, and the foreign intelligence activities of\nall other agencies and departments, including but not limited to\nthe NSC, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, FBI,\nDEA, and ERDA.\nThe head of each such department or agency should be obligated to\nkeep the committee fully and currently informed about is programs\nand activities relating to foreign intelligence and covert foreign\noperations, and to provide the committee with whatever specific\ninformation and records it requires.\nAll proposed legislation--including legislation authorizing approp-\nriations--concerning foreign intelligence activities should be with-\nin the jurisdiction of the committee.\nAll proposed legislation affecting, but not directed solely to,\nforeign intelligence activities should be referred to this commit-\ntee for appropriate consideration and action after having been\nconsidered by any other House committee with appropriate jurisdic-\ntion.\nThe committee should include some members with prior or current\nservice on other related standing committees, but this should be\nthe primary committee assignment for most of its members.\nNo member should be allowed to serve on the committee for more than\nthree consecutive terms.\nThe question of giving the committee jurisdiction over domestic\nintelligence programs and agencies should be deferred until the\n95th Congress convenes.\nIf and when the Senate acts to establish its own committee with\ncomparable authority and jurisdiction, the House should then con-\nsider whether its committee should become the House delegation to\na joint committee on foreign intelligence.\n2. The Congress should be fully informed before covert actions begin.\nThe Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act should\nbe amended in three respects:\nFirst, the phrase \"in a timely fashion\" should be eliminated- there-\nby making clear that the appropriate committees of Congress are to\nreceive prior notification of all CIA covert operations which the\nPresident has approved.\nSecond, the DCI should be required to report to the appropriate\nCongressional committees, at their request, the full range and\nscope of the intelligence community's clandestine activities--\nto gather intelligence or influence events--in specific countries.\nThird, the President should be required to keep these committees\nfully and promptly informed of all decisions to begin new programs\nof intelligence activities which could reasonably be expected to\ninfluence the conduct of foreign officials and governments.\nComment: These proposals would encourage the House to continue this Com-\nmittee's work. A permanent, standing committee of the House would be\nestablished to concentrate solely on intelligence matters. It would have\nlegislative authority and--therefore--clout. Requiring rotation of its\nmembers would ensure that the committee's approach remains fresh. Re-\nquirements would be imposed on the DCI and the President to make sure\nthat the committee learns everything that it needs to know. The possi-\nbility of creating a joint committee would be left open, depending on\nwhatever action the Senate takes.\nLimiting Secrecy\nPrevious proposals would increase the Congress' role in intelligence mat-\nters. The following proposals concerning management of sensitive infor-\nmation are submitted for the Committee's consideration.\n1. Procedures should be established for the Congress to release classi-\nfied information.\nEach committee with national security jurisdiction should estab-\nlish procedures and criteria, incorporated into its published rules,\nby which it identifies material in its possession which it deter-\nmines must be kept secret.\nOther members of the House may have access to such information only\nupon majority vote of the committee, except that if access is de-\nnied, a member may appeal the committee's decision to the House as\na matter of personal privilege.\nEach such committee should be authorized to recommend that specific\nclassified facts and documents be made public, but only after soli-\nciting and giving careful consideration to the judgment of the execu-\ntive branch, including the President.\nIf an individual member of the House obtains sensitive information\nfrom a committee's files which he believes should be made public,\nhe should first seek the consent of the committee.\nIf a member obtains classified or other sensitive information from\na source outside of the Congress which he believes should be made\npublic, he should first seek the advice of the committee with ap-\npropriate legislative jurisdiction.\nIn all cases, before acting, the committee should solicit and give\ncareful consideration to the judgment of the executive branch.\nAfter the committee acts, the matter should then be submitted, to-\ngether with the committee's decision or recommendation, to the\nSpeaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader.\nIf two of the three elected leaders of the House conclude that pub-\nlic disclosure of the information would jeopardize the nation's\nsecurity, the information should not be released.\nThe rules of the House should be amended to provide that a member\nwho releases sensitive information in a manner which violates or\nignores these procedures shall be subject to censure, expulsion, or\nwhatever other disciplinary action the House deems appropriate.\n2. An independent body should be established to de-classify information.\nA Security Information Review Commission should be established by\nlaw.\nIt should be composed of eleven private citizens, fewer than half\nof whom may have been employed previously by the national security\nagencies and departments of the government. These commissioners\nshould be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate\nfor staggered terms of ten years each.\nAny document now classified should be reviewable by the Commission\nupon request by any individual or group. The document may be\ndeclassified by majority vote of the Commission, except that the\nPresident may reverse a Commission decision only if he certifies\nin writing that disclosure of a particular document would do grave\nand immediate danger to the defense of the United States.\nDocuments classified in the future should become declassified auto-\nmatically after a period of five years unless the Commission, by\nmajority vote, determines that they should remain classified for\nan additional five year period.\nComment: These proposals would provide a procedure by which the Congress\ncould release information on the basis of its own judgment--whether the\ninformation comes from a committee's files or elsewhere, and whether the\ninitiative comes from a committee or from an individual member. They\nwould leave the final decision to the three elected leaders of the House,\nacting as a surrogate for all the members. Members would be warned of\nthe responsibility they assume when they obtain sensitive information\nfrom a committee, and of the fact that they would be subject to discip-\nlinary action if they violate or ignore the proposed procedures. A\nbody would be established--independent of the agencies which classify\ndocuments-to decide if documents can be declassified. The presumption\nwould be firmly established that all documents would be made public after\nfive years unless the Commission could be convinced otherwise.\nJAN 13 1976\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJanuary 12, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJACK MARSH\nFROM:\nCHARLES LEPPERT, JR. CA.\nSUBJECT:\nHouse Select Committee on\nIntelligence\nAttached are Rep. Bob McClory's comments to the staff recommenda-\ntions which I sent to you by memo dated January 6, 1976.\ncc: Max Friedersdorf\nMike Duval\n\"\nFORD j LIBRARY GERALD\nROBERT McCLORY\nDISTRICT OFFICES\n13TH DISTRICT. ILLINOIS\nKANE COUNTY\nMUNICIPAL BUILDING\nROOM 2452\n150 DEXTER COURT\nRAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING\n(202) 225-5221\nCongress of the United States\nELGIN, ILLINOIS 60120\n(312) 697-5005\nJUDICIARY COMMITTEE\nhouse of Representatives\nLAKE COUNTY\nPOST OFFICE BUILDING\nSELECT COMMITTEE ON\nINTELLIGENCE\nWashington, D.C. 20515\n326 NORTH GENESEE STREET\nWAUKEGAN, ILLINOIS 60085\n(312) 336-4554\nU.S. INTERPARLIAMENTARY\nUNION DELEGATION\nMEMORANDUM\nMCHENRY COUNTY\nMCHENRY COUNTY COURTHOUSE\n2200 SEMINARY ROAD\nWOODSTOCK, ILLINOIS 60098\nJanuary 7, 1976\n(815) 338-2040\nFrom:\nRobert McClory\nTo:\nMembers of the Select Committee on Intelligence\nRe:\nThe Committee's Recommendations\nShortly before Christmas, the Chairman distributed a memorandum prepared\nby the Committee staff which described various proposals for our consid-\neration. Before the Committee meets to consider its recommendations, I\nwould like to make my own thinking clear on several points.\nFiscal procedures\nIn the absence of any compelling evidence to the contrary, I think we\nmust be guided by the intelligence agencies' concern that publication of\neven single overall dollar totals for their annual budgets would reveal\nvital information of benefit to hostile foreign interests and would have\na detrimental effect on their operations. Full budgetary information\nmust, of course, be available to the Congress. I fully support the pro-\nposal that the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a consoli-\ndated budget for the intelligence community as a whole, which would include\na comprehensive statement of intelligence and intelligence-related costs,\nas well as a full accounting of the number of public and contract employees\nFORD i SERALD LIBRARY\n- 2 -\nas well as proprietary entities which are engaged in intelligence activi-\nties. This budget should be available to the appropriations and intelli-\ngence oversight committees of the Congress, but it should not be made public.\nI also concur with the suggestion that funds for intelligence should\nbe authorized by the Congress in the same manner that we authorize funds\nfor other executive agencies. To prevent intelligence spending from being\nmade public, authorizations for intelligence should be considered in execu-\ntive sessions of the intelligence oversight committee or committees and\nthen included in authorization legislation, in the same manner as intelli-\ngence appropriations are now included in defense appropriations bills.\nCongressional oversight\nI support the creation of a permanent Committee on Foreign Intelligence\nwithin the House. This committee should be given legislative jurisdiction,\nand it should have access to the information it needs--so long as effective\nsecurity procedures are established. Because of the necessary secrecy in\nwhich the committee must work, it is essential that it enjoy the full confi-\ndence of the House and that it avoid even the appearance of partisanship.\nI urge, therefore, that the committee include members from both parties in\nequal or near-equal numbers. I also have serious reservations about the\nproposal to rotate members on and off the intelligence committee for fear\nthat adoption of this procedure would deprive the committee of the expertise\nwhich the committee must possess to function effectively.\nWith regard to Congressional oversight of covert action operations,\nI believe that it would be inappropriate for the Congress to have a veto\npower over such programs, unless they involve supplying arms, directly or\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\n- 3 -\nindirectly, to a foreign nation or group. However, programs which involve\nor support para-military activities would seem to impinge on the Congress'\nconstitutional power to declare war. My present thinking is that they\nshould not be undertaken without the approval of the intelligence oversight\ncommittee in the House.\nLimiting secrecy\nThe Committee's final report should strongly and positively affirm\nthe responsibility of the Congress to meet the highest standards of respect\nfor the confidentiality of national secrets. The primary responsibility\nfor classifying and declassifying information must rest with the executive\nbranch. It would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Congress\nto assume the responsibility for deciding if and when each classified docu-\nment should be made public.\nIf the Congress reserves to itself the right to release some classi-\nfied information, it should be made clear that this authority does not\nextend to diplomatic exchanges, dialogues between heads of state, and\nintra-departmental communications. Further, in obtaining classified\ninformation for its own confidential use, the Congress should act with\ngreat restraint and secure only those records which are truly necessary\nfor thorough and effective oversight.\nThere are other subjects on which I believe this Committee must offer\nreconmendations. Of particular importance is the future organization of\nthe intelligence community within the executive branch. For example,\nI would support recommendations to increase the authority of the Director\nFORD & LIBRARY\n- 4 -\nof Central Intelligence as the central coordinator of the intelligence\ncommunity, and to establish the National. Security Agency by statute\nindependent of the Department of Defense. The management of daily intelli-\ngence activities must remain a function of the executive branch. Improving\nexecutive branch organization and control will go hand in hand with improv-\ning oversight of intelligence within the Congress.\nI hope that each of you will give these thoughts your careful consideration\nbefore the Committee meets. I would be glad to discuss them with you at\nany time.\nFORD is LIBRARY\nagenda.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\n&\nJanuary 6, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJACK MARSH\nFROM:\nCHARLES LEPPERT, JR. CLp\nSUBJECT:\nHouse Select Committee\non Intelligence\nAttached are some recommendations developed by the staff\nof the House Select Committee for consideration of the\nCommittee Members for possible inclusion as recommendations\nin the Committee's final report.\nThe recommendations concern fiscal procedures, congressional\noversight and limiting secrecy.\nAttach.\ncc: Max Friedersdorf\nMike Duval\nFORD & LIBRARY\noff, c. PIKE. N. Y., CHAIRMAN\nA. SCAPLE FIELD, STAFF DIRECTOR\nROBERT N, CIAIMS. CONN.\nPOREPT MOCLORY. ILL.\nAARON B, DONNER. COUNSEL\nJAMES V. STANTON. THIO\nDAVID C. TOGEN, LA.\nRONALD ,, DELLUM CALIF.\nJAMES P. COMNSON, COLO.\nTELEPHONE: (zez) 225-9751\nMORGAN F. MUMPHY ILL.\nROBERT W. KASTEN, 1R., W13.\nLES ASPIN. VIS\nDILE MILFORD TEX.\nSelect Committee on Intelligence\nPHILIP H. HAVES. IND.\nWILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.\nU.S. House of Representatibes\nWashington, D.C. 20515\nMEMORANDUM\n19 December 1975\nFrom:\nOtis Pike\nTo:\nMembers of the Committee\nRe:\nPossible recommendations developed by Committee staff\nAttached is a brief presentation of various proposals developed by our\nstaff which we may wish to endorse as recommendations in our final re-\nport.\nPlease give these proposals your careful consideration and advise the\nstaff as soon as possible if you approve of each of them.\nYour comments and your suggestions for additional or alternative recom-\nmendations will assist us in preparing a report which will accurately\nreflect the concerns of the Committee.\nThe attached presentation does not include proposals on all the issues\nwhich the Committee has been considering. You will receive supplemen-\ntal materials as soon as they can be prepared.\nFORD is LIBRARY\nFiscal Procedures\nThe following proposals are submitted for the Committee's consideration:\n1. Total figures for intelligence spending should be made public.\nThe format of the President's annual budget should include single\ntotals for each intelligence agency and for the intelligence acti-\nvities of intelligence units in other departments and agencies.\nConsequently, the Congress would vote annually on single line item\nappropriations for CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, and for the intelli-\ngence activities of FBI and IRS.\n2. A consolidated intelligence budget should be prepared.\nThe Director of Central Intelligence should be required to prepare\nan independent and consolidated intelligence community budget with\na view toward eliminating unnecessary duplication and suggesting\nbudgetary priorities for intelligence spending.\nThe DCI's proposed budget would provide the President with an as-\nsessment of intelligence spending proposals which would be inde-\npendent of the individual intelligence agencies.\nThe DCI's proposed budget should also be made available to the Con-\ngress to assist it in its authorization and appropriations process.\n3. Funds for intelligence should be specifically authorized by Congress.\nAll funds for intelligence purposes should first be specifically\nauthorized, annually or periodically, for such use.\nThe current authority of the CIA to receive all its funds as trans-\nfers from the accounts of other agencies should be rescinded. In-\nstead, the amount that the CIA could receive by transfer should be\nstrictly limited, unless a larger transfer is specifically approved\nby both the President and the Appropriations Committees.\n4. The GAO should be authorized to review and audit intelligence spending.\nAt the direction of an appropriate Congressional committee, the GAO\nshould be empowered to examine all records of intelligence spending,\nwhether vouchered or unvouchered.\nThe intelligence agencies may retain physical custody of their re-\ncords without infringing on GAO's authority to examine them. When\nan agency head believes that some of its expenditure records should\nbe kept from the GAO, the decision shall be left to the Congressional\ncommittee at whose request the GAO is acting.\nFORD & LIBRARY 07V835\nComment: Coliectively, these proposals would have the effect of bringing\nthe intelligence agencies-- and especially the CIA under much the same\nkind of fiscal controls which apply to all other departments and agencies\nof the government. Members of the Congress would learn--in gross terms--\nhow much money they are appropriating each year for each intelligence\nagency. The public would learn how intelligence spending fits into the\nPresident's budget and his priorities. The CIA would be compelled to\njustify its programs and its budget before authorizations and appropria-\ntions committees in the same manner as other agencies. CIA and other\nintelligence spending would also be subject to review by the GAO at Con-\ngressional direction and under appropriate security safeguards. The\nability of the Congress to exercise effective oversight would be signi-\nficantly enhanced.\nFORD & 07V830 LIBRARY\nCongressional Oversight\nThe proposals concerning fiscal procedures would increase the information\navailable to Congress and, consequently, its ability to exercise effec-\ntive oversight. In addition, the following two proposals are submitted\nfor the Committee's consideration.\n1. A standing House Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be created.\nThe House should create a permanent standing Committee on Foreign\nIntelligence.\nThe committee should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction and\nshared oversight jurisdiction over CIA, NSA, DIA, USIB, PFIAB,\nmilitary intelligence, and the foreign intelligence activities of\nall other agencies and departments, including but not limited to\nthe NSC, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, FBI,\nDEA, and ERDA.\nThe head of each such department or agency should be obligated to\nkeep the committee fully and currently informed about is programs\nand activities relating to foreign intelligence and covert foreign\noperations, and to provide the committee with whatever specific\ninformation and records it requires.\nAll proposed legislation--including legislation authorizing approp-\nriations--concerning foreign intelligence activities should be with-\nin the jurisdiction of the committee.\nAll proposed legislation affecting, but not directed solely to,\nforeign intelligence activities should be referred to this commit-\ntee for appropriate consideration and action after having been\nconsidered by any other House committee with appropriate jurisdic-\ntion.\nThe committee should include some members with prior or current\nservice on other related standing committees, but this should be\nthe primary committee assignment for most of its members.\nNo member should be allowed to serve on the committee for more than\nthree consecutive terms.\nThe question of giving the committee jurisdiction over domestic\nintelligence programs and agencies should be deferred until the\n95th Congress convenes.\nIf and when the Senate acts to establish its own committee with\ncomparable authority and jurisdiction, the House should then con-\nsider whether its committee should become the House delegation to\na joint committee on foreign intelligence.\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n2. The Congress should be fully informed before covert actions begin.\nThe Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act should\nbe amended in three respects:\nFirst, the phrase \"in a timely fashion\" should be eliminated--there-\nby making clear that the appropriate committees of Congress are to\nreceive prior notification of all CIA covert operations which the\nPresident has approved.\nSecond, the DCI should be required to report to the appropriate\nCongressional committees, at their request, the full range and\nscope of the intelligence community's clandestine activities--\nto gather intelligence or influence events--in specific countries.\nThird, the President should be required to keep these committees\nfully and promptly informed of all decisions to begin new programs\nof intelligence activities which could reasonably be expected to\ninfluence the conduct of foreign officials and governments.\nComment: These proposals would encourage the House to continue this Com-\nmittee's work. A permanent, standing committee of the House would be\nestablished to concentrate solely on intelligence matters. It would have\nlegislative authority and--therefore--clout. Requiring rotation of its\nmembers would ensure that the committee's approach remains fresh. Re-\nquirements would be imposed on the DCI and the President to, make sure\nthat the committee learns everything that it needs to know. The possi-\nbility of creating a joint committee would be left open, depending on\nwhatever action the Senate takes.\nFORD is LIBRARY 076839\nLimiting Secrecy\nPrevious proposals would increase the Congress' role in intelligence nat-\nters. The following proposals concerning management of sensitive infor-\nmation are submitted for the Committee's consideration.\n1. Procedures should be established for the Congress to release classi-\nfied information.\nEach committee with national security jurisdiction should estab-\nlish procedures and criteria, incorporated into its published rules,\nby which it identifies material in its possession which it deter-\nmines must be kept secret.\nOther members of the House may have access to such information only\nupon majority vote of the committee, except that if access is de-\nnied, a member may appeal the committee's decision to the House as\na matter of personal privilege.\nEach such committee should be authorized to recommend that specific\nclassified facts and documents be made public, but only after soli-\nciting and giving careful consideration to the judgment of the execu-\ntive branch, including the President.\nIf an individual member of the House obtains sensitive information\nfrom a committee's files which he believes should be made public,\nhe should first seek the consent of the committee.\nIf a member obtains classified or other sensitive information from\na source outside of the Congress which he believes should be made\npublic, he should first seek the advice of the committee with ap-\npropriate legislative jurisdiction.\nIn all cases, before acting, the committee should solicit and give\ncareful consideration to the judgment of the executive branch.\nAfter the committee acts, the matter should then be submitted, to-\ngether with the committee's decision or recommendation, to the\nSpeaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader.\nIf two of the three elected leaders of the House conclude that pub-\nlic disclosure of the information would jeopardize the nation's\nsecurity, the information should not be released.\nThe rules of the House should be amended to provide that a member\nwho releases sensitive information in a manner which violates or\nignores these procedures shall be subject to censure, expulsion, or\nwhatever other disciplinary action the House deems appropriate.\n2. An independent body should be established to de-classify information.\nA Security Information Review Commission should be established by\nlaw.\nFORD LIBRARY\nIt should be composed of eleven private citizens, fewer than half\nof whom may have been employed previously by the national security\nagencies and departments of the government. These commissioners\nshould be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate\nfor staggered terms of ten years each.\nAny document now classified should be reviewable by the Commission\nupon request by any individual or group. The document may be\ndeclassified by majority vote of the Commission, except that the\nPresident may reverse a Commission decision only if he certifies\nin writing that disclosure of a particular document would do grave\nand immediate danger to the defense of the United States.\nDocuments classified in the future should become declassified auto-\nmatically after a period of five years unless the Commission, by\nmajority vote, determines that they should remain classified for\nan additional five year period.\nComment: These proposals would provide a procedure by which the Congress\ncould release information on the basis of its own judgment--whether the\ninformation comes from a committee's files or elsewhere, and whether the\ninitiative comes from a committee or from an individual member. They\nwould leave the final decision to the three elected leaders of the House,\nacting as a surrogate for all the members. Members would be warned of\nthe responsibility they assume when they obtain sensitive information\nfrom a committee, and of the fact that they would be subject to discip-\nlinary action if they violate or ignore the proposed procedures. A\nbody would be established--independent of the agencies which classify\ndocuments--to decide if documents can be declassified. The presumption\nwould be firmly established that all documents would be made public after\nfive years unless the Commission could be convinced otherwise.\nFORD 076839 LIBRARY\nIt should be composed of eleven private citizens, fewer than half\nof whom may have been employed previously by the national security\nagencies and departments of the government. These commissioners\nshould be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate\nfor staggered terms of ten years each.\nAny document now classified should be reviewable by the Commission\nupon request by any individual or group. The document may be\ndeclassified by majority vote of the Commission, except that the\nPresident may reverse a Commission decision only if he certifies\nin writing that disclosure of a particular document would do grave\nand immediate danger to the defense of the United States.\nDocuments classified in the future should become declassified auto-\nmatically after a period of five years unless the Commission, by\nmajority vote, determines that they should remain classified for\nan additional five year period.\nComment: These proposals would provide a procedure by which the Congress\ncould release information on the basis of its own judgment--whether the\ninformation comes from a committee's files or elsewhere, and whether the\ninitiative comes from a committee or from an individual member. They\nwould leave the final decision to the three elected leaders of the House,\nacting as a surrogate for all the members. Members would be warned of\nthe responsibility they assume when they obtain sensitive information\nfrom a committee, and of the fact that they would be subject to discip-\nlinary action if they violate or ignore the proposed procedures. A\nbody would be established--independent of the agencies which classify\ndocuments-to decide if documents can be declassified. The presumption\nwould be firmly established that all documents would be made public after\nfive years unless the Commission could be convinced otherwise.\nFORD i LIBRARY 070870\nLimiting Secrecy\nPrevious proposals would increase the Congress' role in intelligence nat-\nters. The following proposals concerning management of sensitive infor-\nmation are submitted for the Committee's consideration.\n1. Procedures should be established for the Congress to release classi-\nfied information.\nEach committee with national security jurisdiction should estab-\nlish procedures and criteria, incorporated into its published rules,\nby which it identifies material in its possession which it deter-\nmines must be kept secret.\nOther members of the House may have access to such information only\nupon majority vote of the committee, except that if access is de-\nnied, a member may appeal the committee's decision to the House as\na matter of personal privilege.\nEach such committee should be authorized to recommend that specific\nclassified facts and documents be made public, but only after soli-\nciting and giving careful consideration to the judgment of the execu-\ntive branch, including the President.\nIf an individual member of the House obtains sensitive information\nfrom a committee's files which he believes should be made public,\nhe should first seek the consent of the committee.\nIf a member obtains classified or other sensitive information from\na source outside of the Congress which he believes should be made\npublic, he should first seek the advice of the committee with ap-\npropriate legislative jurisdiction.\nIn all cases, before acting, the committee should solicit and give\ncareful consideration to the judgment of the executive branch.\nAfter the committee acts, the matter should then be submitted, to-\ngether with the committee's decision or recommendation, to the\nSpeaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader.\nIf two of the three elected leaders of the House conclude that pub-\nlic disclosure of the information would jeopardize the nation's\nsecurity, the information should not be released.\nThe rules of the House should be amended to provide that a member\nwho releases sensitive information in a manner which violates or\nignores these procedures shall be subject to censure, expulsion, or\nwhatever other disciplinary action the House deems appropriate.\n2. An independent body should be established to de-classify information.\nA Security Information Review Commission should be established by\nlaw.\nFORD\nLIBRARY\n2. The Congress should be fully informed before covert actions begin.\nThe Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act should\nbe amended in three respects:\nFirst, the phrase \"in a timely fashion\" should be eliminated--there-\nby making clear that the appropriate committees of Congress are to\nreceive prior notification of all CIA covert operations which the\nPresident has approved.\nSecond, the DCI should be required to report to the appropriate\nCongressional committees, at their request, the full range and\nscope of the intelligence community's clandestine activities--\nto gather intelligence or influence events--in specific countries.\nThird, the President should be required to keep these committees\nfully and promptly informed of all decisions to begin new programs\nof intelligence activities which could reasonably be expected to\ninfluence the conduct of foreign officials and governments.\nComment: These proposals would encourage the House to continue this Com-\nmittee's work. A permanent, standing committee of the House would be\nestablished to concentrate solely on intelligence matters. It would have\nlegislative authority and--therefore--clout. Requiring rotation of its\nmembers would ensure that the committee's approach remains fresh. Re-\nquirements would be imposed on the DCI and the President to make sure\nthat the committee learns everything that it needs to know. The possi-\nbility of creating a joint committee would be left open, depending on\nwhatever action the Senate takes.\nFORD i LIBRARY 038870\nCongressional Oversight\nThe proposals concerning fiscal procedures would increase the information\navailable to Congress and, consequently, its ability to exercise effec-\ntive oversight. In addition, the following two proposals are submitted\nfor the Committee's consideration.\n1. A standing House Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be created.\nThe House should create a permanent standing Committee on Foreign\nIntelligence.\nThe committee should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction and\nshared oversight jurisdiction over CIA, NSA, DIA, USIB, PFIAB,\nmilitary intelligence, and the foreign intelligence activities of\nall other agencies and departments, including but not limited to\nthe NSC, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, FBI,\nDEA, and ERDA.\nThe head of each such department or agency should be obligated to\nkeep the committee fully and currently informed about is programs\nand activities relating to foreign intelligence and covert foreign\noperations, and to provide the committee with whatever specific\ninformation and records it requires.\nAll proposed legislation--including legislation authorizing approp-\nriations--concerning foreign intelligence activities should be with-\nin the jurisdiction of the committee.\nAll proposed legislation affecting, but not directed solely to,\nforeign intelligence activities should be referred to this commit-\ntee for appropriate consideration and action after having been\nconsidered by any other House committee with appropriate jurisdic-\ntion.\nThe committee should include some members with prior or current\nservice on other related standing committees, but this should be\nthe primary committee assignment for most of its members.\nNo member should be allowed to serve on the committee for more than\nthree consecutive terms.\nThe question of giving the committee jurisdiction over domestic\nintelligence programs and agencies should be deferred until the\n95th Congress convenes.\nIf and when the Senate acts to establish its own committee with\ncomparable authority and jurisdiction, the House should then con-\nsider whether its committee should become the House delegation to\na joint committee on foreign intelligence.\nFORD & 076839 LIBRARY\nComment: Collectively, these proposals would have the effect of bringing\nthe intelligence agencies--and especially the CIA--under much the same\nkind of fiscal controls which apply to all other departments and agencies\nof the government. Members of the Congress would learn--in gross terms--\nhow much money they are appropriating each year for each intelligence\nagency. The public would learn how intelligence spending fits into the\nPresident's budget and his priorities. The CIA would be compelled to\njustify its programs and its budget before authorizations and appropria-\ntions committees in the same manner as other agencies. CIA and other\nintelligence spending would also be subject to review by the GAO at Con-\ngressional direction and under appropriate security safeguards. The\nability of the Congress to exercise effective oversight would be signi-\nficantly enhanced.\nFORD is LIBRARY 07V839\nFiscal Procedures\nThe following proposals are submitted for the Committee's consideration:\n1. Total figures for intelligence spending should be made public.\nThe format of the President's annual budget should include single\ntotals for each intelligence agency and for the intelligence acti-\nvities of intelligence units in other departments and agencies.\nConsequently, the Congress would vote annually on single line item\nappropriations for CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, and for the intelli-\ngence activities of FBI and IRS.\n2. A consolidated intelligence budget should be prepared.\nThe Director of Central Intelligence should be required to prepare\nan independent and consolidated intelligence community budget with\na view toward eliminating unnecessary duplication and suggesting\nbudgetary priorities for intelligence spending.\nThe DCI's proposed budget would provide the President with an as-\nsessment of intelligence spending proposals which would be inde-\npendent of the individual intelligence agencies.\nThe DCI's proposed budget should also be made available to the Con-\ngress to assist it in its authorization and appropriations process.\n3. Funds for intelligence should be specifically authorized by Congress.\nAll funds for intelligence purposes should first be specifically\nauthorized, annually or periodically, for such use.\nThe current authority of the CIA to receive all its funds as trans-\nfers from the accounts of other agencies should be rescinded. In-\nstead, the amount that the CIA could receive by transfer should be\nstrictly limited, unless a larger transfer is specifically approved\nby both the President and the Appropriations Committees.\n4. The GAO should be authorized to review and audit intelligence spending.\nAt the direction of an appropriate Congressional committee, the GAO\nshould be empowered to examine all records of intelligence spending,\nwhether vouchered or unvouchered.\nThe intelligence agencies may retain physical custody of their re-\ncords without infringing on GAO's authority to examine them. When\nan agency head believes that some of its expenditure records should\nbe kept from the GAO, the decision shall be left to the Congressional\ncommittee at whose request the GAO is acting.\nFORD i 8.798 LIBRARY\nones C. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN\nA. SEARLE FIELD. STAFF DIRECTOR\nROBERT N. GIAIMS. CONN.\nPOBERT MCCLORY, ILL.\nAARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL\nJAMES V. STANTON. OHIO\nDAVID C. TREEN, LA.\nRONALD v. DELLUMS. CALIF.\nJAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.\nTELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751\nMORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL.\nROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., W13.\nLES ASPIN. WIS.\nDALE MILFORD. TEX.\nSelect Committee on Intelligence\nPHILIP H. HAYES. INC.\nWILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.\nU.S. House of Representatives\nWashington, D.C. 20515\nMEMORANDUM\n19 December 1975\nFrom:\nOtis Pike\nTo:\nMembers of the Committee\nRe:\nPossible recommendations developed by Committee staff\nAttached is a brief presentation of various proposals developed by our\nstaff which we may wish to endorse as recommendations in our final re-\nport.\nPlease give these proposals your careful consideration and advise the\nstaff as soon as possible if you approve of each of them.\nYour comments and your suggestions for additional or alternative recom-\nmendations will assist us in preparing a report which will accurately\nreflect the concerns of the Committee.\nThe attached presentation does not include proposals on all the issues\nwhich the Committee has been considering. You will receive supplemen-\ntal materials as soon as they can be prepared.\nFORD & LIBRARY 07V830\nJanuary 12, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJACK MARSH\nFROM:\nCHARLES LEPPERT, JR.\nSUBJECT:\nHouse Select Committee on\nIntelligence\nAttached are Rep. Bob McClory's comments to the staff recommenda-\ntions which I sent to you by memo dated January 6, 1976.\nCC: Max Friedersdorf\nMike Duval\nFORD is LIBRARY 038870\nROBERT McCLORY\nDISTRICT OFFICES\n13TH DISTRICT. ILLINOIS\nKANS COUNTY\nMUNICIPAL BUILDING\nROOM 2452\n150 DEXTER COURT\nRAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING\n(202) 225-5221\nCongress of the United States\nELGIN, ILLINOIS 60120\n(312) 697-5005\nJUDICIARY COMMITTEE\nhouse of Representatives\nLAKE COUNTY\nPOST OFFICE BUILDING\nSELECT COMMITTEE ON\nINTELLIGENCE\nMashington, D.C. 20515\n326 NORTH GENESES STREET\nWAUKEGAN, ILLINOIS 60085\n(312) 336-4554\nU.S. INTERPARLIAMENTARY\nUNION DELEGATION\nMEMORANDUM\nMCHENRY COUNTY\nMCHENRY COUNTY COURTHOUSE\n2200 SEMINARY ROAD\nWOODSTOCK. ILLINOIS 60098\nJanuary 7, 1976\n(815) 338-2040\nFrom:\nRobert McClory\nTo:\nMembers of the Select Committee on Intelligence\nRe:\nThe Committee's Recommendations\nShortly before Christmas, the Chairman distributed a memorandum prepared\nby the Committee staff which described various proposals for our consid-\neration. Before the Committee meets to consider its recommendations, I\nwould like to make my own thinking clear on several points.\nFiscal procedures\nIn the absence of any compelling evidence to the contrary, I think we\nmust be guided by the intelligence agencies' concern that publication of\neven single overall dollar totals for their annual budgets would reveal\nvital information of benefit to hostile foreign interests and would have\na detrimental effect on their operations. Full budgetary information\nmust, of course, be available to the Congress. I fully support the pro-\nposal that the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a consoli-\ndated budget for the intelligence community as a whole, which would include\na comprehensive statement of intelligence and intelligence-related costs,\nas well as a full accounting of the number of public and contract employees\nGERALD FORD LIBRKET\n-- 2 -\nas well as proprietary entities which are engaged in intelligence activi-\nties. This budget should be available to the appropriations and intelli-\ngence oversight committees of the Congress, but it should not be made public.\nI also concur with the suggestion that funds for intelligence should\nbe authorized by the Congress in the same manner that we authorize funds\n<\nfor other executive agencies. To prevent intelligence spending from being\nmade public, authorizations for intelligence should be considered in execu-\ntive sessions of the intelligence oversight committee or committees and\nthen included in authorization legislation, in the same manner as intelli-\ngence appropriations are now included in defense appropriations bills.\nCongressional oversight\nI support the creation of a permanent Committee on Foreign Intelligence\nwithin the House. This committee should be given legislative jurisdiction,\nand it should have access to the information it needs--so long as effective\nsecurity procedures are established. Because of the necessary secrecy in\nwhich the committee must work, it is essential that it enjoy the full confi-\ndence of the House and that it avoid even the appearance of partisanship.\nI urge, therefore, that the committee include members from both parties in\nequal or near-equal numbers. I also have serious reservations about the\nproposal to rotate members on and off the intelligence committee for fear\nthat adoption of this procedure would deprive the committee of the expertise\nwhich the committee must possess to function effectively.\nWith regard to Congressional oversight of covert action operations,\nI believe that it would be inappropriate for the Congress to have a veto\npower over such programs, unless thev involve supplying arms, directly or\nFORD is LIBRARY 938470\n- 3 -\nindirectly, to a foreign nation or group. However, programs which involve\nor support para-military activities would seem to impinge on the Congress'\nconstitutional power to declare war. My present thinking is that they\nshould not be undertaken without the approval of the intelligence oversight\ncommittee in the House.\nLimiting secrecy\nThe Committee's final report should strongly and positively affirm\nthe responsibility of the Congress to meet the highest standards of respect\nfor the confidentiality of national secrets. The primary responsibility\nfor classifying and declassifying information must rest with the executive\nbranch. It would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Congress\nto assume the responsibility for deciding if and when each classified docu-\nment should be made public.\nIf the Congress reserves to itself the right to release some classi-\nfied information, it should be made clear that this authority does not\nextend to diplomatic exchanges, dialogues between heads of state, and\nintra-departmental communications. Further, in obtaining classified\ninformation for its own confidential use, the Congress should act with\ngreat restraint and secure only those records which are truly necessary\nfor thorough and effective oversight.\nThere are other subjects on which I believe this Committee must offer\nreconmendations. Of particular importance is the future organization of\nthe intelligence community within the executive branch. For example,\nI would support recommendations to increase the authority of the Director\nFORD i LIBRARY 078839\n- 4 -\nof Central Intelligence as the central coordinator of the intelligence\ncommunity, and to establish the National. . Security Agency by statute\nindependent of the Department of Defense. The management of daily intelli-\ngence activities must remain a function of the executive branch. Improving\nexecutive branch organization and control will go hand in hand with improv-\ning oversight of intelligence within the Congress.\nI hope that each of you will give these thoughts your careful consideration\nbefore the Committee meets. I would be glad to discuss them with you at\nany time.\nFORD & LIBRARY 07VU30\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJanuary 20, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJACK MARSH\nTHRU:\nMAX L. FRIEDERSDORF\nVERN LOEN\nFROM:\nCHARLES LEPPERT, JR.\nCar\nSUBJECT:\nMcClory's Incomplete Additional Views\nto Pike Committee Report\nAttached is a copy of Rep. McClory's incomplete additional minority\nviews to the proposed Pike Committee report. McClory requests the\nAdministration to review and comment on these additional views.\nMcClory requests that these additional views be closely held at this\ntime and he would like to receive the Administration comments as\nsoon as possible.\nAttachment\ncc: Tom Loeffler\nMike Duval\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRARIA\ndraft of proposed additional Comments\nclase hald\nADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR.\nThe Select Committee on Intelligence was established by a bi-partisan\nvote of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation which far\ntranscends in importance any temptation for momentary partisan advantage.\nThe members of the Committee have reflected the full range of philosophies\nrepresented in the Congress. But every member has recognized the critical\nneed for an effective intelligence capability, operating in a manner con-\nsistent with both the realities of the international situation and the\nrequirements of democratic accountability.\nDuring the past months of the Committee's inquiry, we have consistently\npressed for an objective, balanced, and thorough investigation. We have\nalways believed that attempting to evaluate the performance of individual\nofficials or to fix blame for particular intelligence failures would only\ndetract from fulfilling our primary responsibility: evaluating the struc-\nture, organization, and performance of the intelligence comunity to de-\ntermine what systemic changes, if any, should be made. It has been im-\nportant for the Committee to identify past deficiencies and failures, not\nsimply to criticize and demonstrate the wisdom of hindsight, but to deter-\nmine how future intelligence performance may be improved.\nWe consider it particularly unfortunate and inappropriate, therefore,\nthat the Committee's hearings and investigations have focused so heavily\non events of the past several years. The need for a dispassionate inquiry\nhas been sacrificed to what must be seen as a partisan attack on the\npolicies of this administration. In the selection of subjects and wit-\nnesses for its hearings, the Committee majority has frequently been more\nFORD R. GERALD LIBRARY\ninterested in making a case than in learning the true facts.\n(2)\nWe must take exception to the tone and many of the conclusions of\nthe majority report. It is certainly not our contention that the per-\nformance of the intelligence agencies has been flawless. On the contrary,\nwe are convinced that there are serious systemic deficiencies for which\nreforms are both appropriate and necessary. It is neither accurate nor\nfair, however, to characterize the record of the intelligence community\nas an unmixed record of failures and improprieties. Yet this is the\nconsistent implication of the majority report. By SO distorting the\nrecord, the Committee majority makes it exceedingly difficult, if not\nimpossible, for the American people to distinguish the intelligence agen-\ncies' successes from their failures, and to appreciate the difference\nbetween human error and structural and organizational flaws.\nThe tasks of the intelligence agencies are exceptionally difficult.\nThey are charged with acquiring information which other governments make\nevery effort to protect. They are expected to anticipate events in an\nunpredictable world. Their failures inevitably receive greater publicity\nthan their successes. By concentrating on assigning blame and identifying\nvillains, the majority report distracts attention from what can and should\nbe done to improve the intelligence agencies' ability to do their job.\nWe also reject the manner in which the Committee's majority has\ncharacterized the cooperation we have received from the President and\nthe executive branch. It is beyond dispute that this Committee received\nmore classified information than any other committee in the history of the\nHouse of Representatives. There is very little, if any, information\nwhich the Committee sought and did not ultimately receive. The President\npersonally assured the chairman and ranking minority member of his\ndesire to provide the Committee with any and all information it required.\n(3)\nHis only concern was his justifiable interest in ensuring that legitimate\nsecrets would be given the protection they require. Once mutually ac-\nceptable procedures were established, the President assured the Committee\nof his desire to cooperate fully. With the exception of one instance\nin which the President felt compelled to assert executive privilege,\nthere is absolutely no support for the allegation that this administration\nsought, as a matter of policy, to hinder the Committee's investigation.\nUnfortunately, executive officials did not always act in a manner\nconsistent with the President's assurances of cooperation. There were\nfrequent and, in our view, unnecessary delays in providing the Committee\nwith documents it requested. On a number of occasions, the Committee\nwas compelled to issue subpoenas in order to expedite the delivery of\nmaterials we needed for our investigation. We regret the fact that there\nwas not always full and prompt compliance with these subpoenas. The\nCommittee did not issue subpoenas frivolously; the subpoenas which were\nissued merited timely compliance.\nNonetheless, we consider it inaccurate and unreasonable to attribute\nto the executive branch generally or to any individual official any de-\nsire to obstruct the work of this Committee. Beyond any question, our\ninvestigation entered into some of the most sensitive and delicate matters\nin which the United States has been or is now engaged. The officials of\nthe intelligence community are charged by law with protecting the integ-\nrity of their organizations and the secrets entrusted to them. It is\nonly natural, therefore, for the executive branch to have been concerned\nabout leaks and disclosures which might have damaged the future efficacy\nof their agencies.\n(4)\nInstead of berating the executive branch for the disagreements and\ndelays which did arise, the Committee majority should have made proper\nnote of the extraordinary cooperation we did receive. In particular, the\nDirector of Central Intelligence, Mr. Colby, went to unprecedented lengths\nto cooperate with the Committee. He appeared before the Committee in\npublic session on at least five occasions, and in executive sessions even\nmore frequently. In addition, other CIA officials and representatives\nprovided us with extensive testimony and assistance at his direction.\nIt is well worth emphasizing that the overwhelming bulk of the in-\nformation which this Committee obtained was provided by the intelligence\nagencies themselves. For example, the Committee investigated the per-\nformance of the foreign intelligence agencies before and during crises in\nthe Middle East, Vietnam, Cyprus, and Portugal. In each instance, the\nCommittee found that the intelligence comunity itself had already con-\nducted extensive post-mortems on its own performance in order to identify\nand correct whatever weaknesses had emerged. Instead of merely publici-\nzing the failures which the intelligence agencies had already identified\nfor themselves, the Committee majority should have congratulated the in-\ntelligence community for its willingness to examine its own performance\nwith an objectivity and detachment uncharacteristic of the federal\nbureaucracy.\nIn short, we find that the majority report offers a distorted and\nunbalanced assessment of intelligence community performance and execu-\ntive branch cooperation. We deplore the fact that the report seems more\nconcerned with finding fault than with seeking the truth.\n(5)\nOf primary concern to us are the measures which should be adopted\nto improve the performance of the intelligence comunity in the future,\nand to bring the individual intelligence agencies under better control,\nboth within the executive branch and by the Congress.\nIn the past, most members of Congress have preferred to remain at\na distance from the intelligence comunity. Consequently, Congressional\noversight of intelligence tended to be sporadic and superficial. The\nintelligence agencies complied with the reporting requirements imposed\non them, and individual members of both houses were briefed regularly.\nHowever, the prevalent attitude within the Congress was to grant the ex-\necutive branch greater discretion with regard to intelligence than with\nregard to other administrative activities. Today, both circumstances\nand attitudes have changed. What has been adequate and acceptable in\nthe past will not be appropriate for the future. We believe that the\nCongress should make changes in its own procedures at the same time that\nit recommends changes in executive organization and policies.\nThe committees of the House which are now charged with intelligence\noversight have other major responsibilities as well. In particular, the\nCommittees on Armed Services and the Judiciary are perhaps more heavily\nburdened than any other legislative committees. We consider it approp-\nriate, therefore, to concentrate the responsibility for intelligence\nlegislation and oversight in a new committee which will have the time\nand resources which will be required. Our experience on this Select Com-\nmittee have convinced us that it is simply unrealistic to demand more\ncontinuing Congressional oversight without providing the structure that\nwill make it possible.\nLISBARY GERALD ? FORD\nTherefore, we join in recommending the creation of a permanent c'om-\n(6)\nmittee of the House on intelligence affairs. This committee should have\nexclusive jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities of the\nfederal government and all agencies and components of the government with\nresponsibility for collecting, analyzing, and producing intelligence\nconcerning America's international relations. All proposed legislation--\nincluding bills which authorize appropriations of funds--should be re-\nferred to the committee for its consideration and recommendations. Be-\ncause there are instances in which foreign and domestic intelligence\nactivities impinge on each other, we also recommend that the committee\nbe given shared oversight jurisdiction over domestic intelligence acti-\nvities, especially the counter-intelligence and internal security programs\nof the FBI.\nIn order for this committee to function effectively, it must have\naccess to the information it requires. For this purpose, the heads of\nall appropriate departments and agencies should be required by law to\nkeep the committee fully and currently informed concerning their programs\nand activities, and to provide the committee with whatever specific in-\nformation and records it considers essential.\nA committee with such authority will bear a heavy responsibility\nfor the protection of the information it receives. It is imperative\nthat its members adhere to the highest standards of conduct and that\nprocedures and facilities be established to ensure that sensitive in-\nformation can be given to the committee without jeopardizing its sec-\nrecy. The rules of the House should be amended to make absolutely\nclear that any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence will be grounds\nfor punitive action by the House.\n-6A-\nIn this regard, we recommend that any Committee of the House which has\naccess to classified information in pursuit of its legislative and over-\nsight responsibilities be given the authority to discipline any Member\nwhich it reasonably believes has disclosed or publicized such information.\nSpecifically, these Committees ought to be delegated authority by the\nfull House to enable them to take appropriate action against a Member who\nviolates the Committee's rules of confidentiality and non-disclosure by\na vote of a majority of the Majority Members and a majority of the Minority\nMembers. In some cases, it might be appropriate to bar the offending Member\nfrom Executive Sessions of the Committee and from the right to inspect the\nCommittee files containing classified information. For a more serious\nviolation, it might be necessary to expel the Member from the Committee\naltogether. Under the rules of the House, a Member against whom such\ndisciplinary action has been taken, might reserve a right of appeal to the\nfull House or to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. At the\nvery least, the rules of the House ought to be revised to provide for the\nultimate sanctions of censure and expulsion for any Member who can be\nproven to have violated the confidentiality of any Executive Session meeting\nof any House Committee.\n(7)\nIt has been our experience that the executive branch, including the\nintelligence agencies, tends to classify documents routinely and exces-\nsively. Unfortunately, this tendency undermines public and Congressional\nappreciation for the fact that there are in fact documents and information\nwhich, if disclosed, could significantly jeopardize the nation's security.\nIf executive officials exercise greater restraint and selectivity in the\nfuture, they will be better able to protect materials which must legi-\ntimately remain secret.\nThe primary responsibility for classifying and declassifying docu-\nments must remain with the executive branch. It would be both impractical\nand inappropriate for the Congress to assume the responsibility for de-\nciding if and when each classified document should be made public. What-\never excesses now exist should be remedied by administrative reform, not\nby improper Congressional intervention into the day-to-day administrative\ndetails of the executive branch. At the same time, we wish to emphasize\nthat such reforms are needed. We urge the President and the leaders of\nthe intelligence community to re-examine their classification practices\nin the interest of better informing the American people.\nIf the Congress reserves to itself the right to release certain\nclassified information in specific instances, it should be made clear\nthat this authority does not extend to diplomatic exchanges, dialogues\nbetween heads of state, and intra-departmental communications. Further,\nin all such cases, the greatest deference should be given to the expert\njudgment of the intelligence agencies and the President, who is charged\nunder the Constitution with seeing to the faithful execution of the laws.\nThere is a delicate balance which must be struck between pre-\nserving\nlegitimate state secrets and ensuring that the American\n(8)\npeople are adequately informed about what their government is doing. It\nis unlikely that any general rules can be developed which will be approp-\nriate in all cases. Instead, case by case judgments must be made in an\natmosphere of comity between the executive and legislative branches. The\nPresident and the Congress must view themselves as partners in a common\nenterprise, rather than as adversaries engaged in a struggle for power.\nThis is the spirit which we have consistently sought to foster during\nthe lifetime of this Committee. We continue to believe that the American\npeople will be better served by compromise than by confrontation.\nIn general, we support the principle that specific decisions to\nimplement national policies must be left to the discretion of the execu-\ntive branch--subject, of course, to the rigors of Congressional oversight.\nWith respect to covert action programs conducted by the CIA, however, we\nbelieve that a more active Congressional role is necessary and justified.\nThe Constitution charges the Congress with the right and responsibility\nto declare war. With the recent passage of war powers legislation, the\nCongress recognized, and made provision for the fact, that the Congress\nmust play a comparable role in instances, short of a declared state of war,\nin which the United States undertakes significant interventions in the\naffairs of other nations. This same principle should now be extended to\ncertain covert actions undertaken by the CIA at the direction of the\nPresident.\nIn 1974, the Congress required by law that the President must cer-\ntify and that the appropriate Congressional committees must receive\ntimely notification of all CIA operations in foreign countries, \"other\nthan activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence.\"\n(9)\nOn the basis of this Committee's investigation, we now conclude that\ntimely notification after the fact is not sufficient when the United\nStates contemplates military or paramilitary covert operations, or when\nthe government intends to covertly provide arms or funds which will be\nused to obtain arms. Such policies impinge directly and immediately\non the war powers of the Congress. They should not be undertaken with-\nout prior approval by the appropriate committees of the Congress.\nWe believe that it is an unreasonable construction of the Constitu-\ntion to assert that the President may take unilateral action in secret\nwhich would require Congressional approval if taken publicly. There-\nfore, a requirement that Congress give prior approval to covert operations\nwith military consequences is nothing more than a legislative implemen-\ntation of what the Constitution was meant to require. Moreover, it is\nour conviction that prior Congressional consultation in such cases will\nalso provide the President with the judgment of elected officials with\nno vested interest in perpetuating or expanding covert paramilitary opera-\ntions. Consequently, there will be less likelihood of covert paramilitary\noperations being undertaken which will be unacceptable to the American\npeople.\nTraditionally, one of the most effective Congressional controls of\nadministrative activity has been its \"power of the purse\"--its Constitu-\ntional authority to determine how the taxpayers' money should be spent.\nWe therefore concur with various recommendations in the majority report\nfor improving fiscal oversight of the intelligence comunity. Funds for\nintelligence should be authorized by the Congress in the same manner\nR\nFORD\nthat we now authorize funds for other executive agencies and department GERAL\n(10)\nand the Congress must receive full budgetary information on which to base\nits decisions. We also support the proposal that the head of the intel-\nligence community should prepare a consolidated budget for the intelligence\ncomunity as a whole, which would include a comprehensive statement of\nintelligence and intelligence-related costs, as well as a full accounting\nof the number of public and contract employees and proprietary entities\nwhich are engaged in intelligence activities. This budget should also\nbe available to the appropriate committees of Congress. Finally, we agree\nthat the General Accounting Office should be authorized to audit intel-\nligence spending on behalf of the Congress--subject, of course, to secur-\nity arrangements to protect the secrecy of intelligence sources and methods.\nIn the absence of any compelling evidence to the contrary, however,\nwe believe that the Congress must be guided by the intelligence agencies'\nconcern that publication of any budgetary information would reveal vital\ninformation of benefit to hostile foreign interests and would have a\ndetrimental effect on American intelligence operations. We have concluded\nfrom the Committee's investigation that intelligence work involves a\npainstaking process of analyzing and assembling individual facts which\nmay appear inconsequential when taken separately. We recommend, there-\nfore, that the Congress must continue to consider intelligence spending\nin executive session, lest we inadvertently reveal critical information\nabout U.S. intelligence trends and developments.\nCollectively, our recommendations constitute a reasonable and effec-\ntive program for improving Congressional oversight of intelligence ac-\ntivities and ensuring that they are conducted in a manner compatible with\ndemocratic principles. However, the primary responsibility for managing\nthe intelligence community will and must rest with the President and\n(11)\nhis intelligence advisors and officials. It is important to note that,\non its own initiative, the executive branch has conducted frequent studies\nof intelligence community organization and performance, ranging from post-\nmortems after specific events to wide-ranging examinations of agency per-\nformance and community coordination. Most recently, the Rockefeller and\nMurphy Commission reports have demonstrated presidential commitment to\nmaking improvements in the intelligence community. We applaud the work\nof these commissions and generally support their recommendations. They\nhave been of great assistance to our Committee, as a source of information\nand expert judgment. The recommendations made by the two presidential\ncommissions deserve the most serious consideration.\nWe are also gratified by the President's determination to initiate\norganizational and structural improvements within the intelligence commun-\nity. Although the work of this Committee, and its Senate counterpart,\nhave received the greatest publicity, we are aware that the executive\nbranch has simultaneously been conducting its own evaluation of what\nreforms should be instituted. Before the Congress takes any action on\nthis Committee's recommendations, it should await and carefully consider\nthe fruits of the President's initiative.\nReforms within the executive branch will have the greatest and most\nimmediate effect on the daily management and coordination of intelligence\nactivities. Both the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions, for example,\nhave recommended a strengthened and expanded role for the President's\nForeign Intelligence Advisory Board. We fully concur with this recom-\nmendation. At a minimum, the Board should be provided with a full-time\nstaff which will enable it to play a more continuing and significant\n(12)\nrole in analyzing and evaluating intelligence comunity performance. An\neffort should also be made to better integrate the Board into the organi-\nzation of the community, perhaps by designating the operating head and\ncoordinator of the intelligence community as the Board's chairman.\nWe also believe that significant improvements must be made in the\norganization and management of defense intelligence activities. We have\nseen compelling evidence that the intelligence operations of the Depart-\nment of Defense are characterized by excessive duplication and a severe\nlack of coordination. In part, the problem lies in the very size and\nextent of defense activities. For this reason, we recommend that the\nCongress enact a statutory charter for the National Security Agency (now\nestablished by presidential directive) which would establish the NSA as\nan independent civilian agency, but also provide the means for effective\ncoordination with the military services.\nWe are also convinced that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)\nhas thus far been unable to provide the coordination within the military\nintelligence comunity for which the Agency was established. Stream-\nlining within the Defense Department is obviously necessary. On the\nbasis of the evidence received by the Committee, we believe this might\nbest be accomplished by either eliminating DIA or reducing it to a much\nsmaller analytical staff attached directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nCentralized responsibility for intelligence matters would be vested in\nthe Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) or his successor, who\nwould coordinate activities among the service secretaries and serve as\nthe Secretary's principal assistant for intelligence.\nOf even greater importance will be improvements in the manner in\nwhich the intelligence community as a whole is directed and coordinated.\n(13)\nFor these purposes, we concur with the recommendation in the majority\nreport that the current dual roles of the Director of Central Intelligence\nbe divided between two officials--one to serve as the coordinator of the\nintelligence community generally, and the other to serve as the head of\nthe CIA specifically. The DCI is presently in the anomalous position of\ncoordinating the activities of various agencies--without the authority\nsuch coordination requires--while simultaneously serving as manager of\none of these agencies. Under these circumstances, we have found that the\ndaily demands of managing the CIA prevents the DCI from giving proper\nattention to his responsibilities as community coordinator.\nWe recommend, therefore, that a new office of the Director of Foreign\nIntelligence be established as an independent office within the Executive\nOffice of the President, the DFI to be subject to confirmation by the\nSenate and to become a statutory member of the National Security Council.\nWe believe that the President would be well served if he established the\nDFI as his principal advisor on intelligence matters and as a participant\nin Cabinet consideration of international affairs.\nIn order to coordinate foreign intelligence activities effectively,\nthe DFI should be directed, by statute or presidential directive, to pre-\npare the consolidated foreign intelligence budget recommended above. He\nshould also be assigned the staff and responsibility to investigate al-\nlegations of improprieties and inefficiencies within individual intelli-\ngence agencies. Further, the DFI should be assigned the task of overseeing\nthe preparation of community-wide National Intelligence Estimates for\nconsideration by the President and the Congress. With such authority,\nthe DFI will be better placed to both discover and remedy future deficien-\ncies and duplications in both the collection of raw information and the\n(14)\nproduction of finished intelligence.\nUnder current law, the Director of Central Intelligence is assigned\nresponsibility without comparable authority. His dual functions are\nbeyond the capability of any single individual, no matter how skilled and\nwell-intentioned. The creation of an independent Director of Foreign\nIntelligence will promote greater emphasis on coordination, economy, and\nlong-range planning. It will also establish responsibility within the\nexecutive branch for ensuring the integrity of intelligence operations\nand preventing the recurrence of the abuses which stimulated this Commit-\ntee's creation.\nWe believe that implementation of these recommendations will sub-\nstantially improve both the efficiency and the quality of intelligence\noperations in the future. They will also provide for better executive-\nlegislative cooperation and understanding--a need which is now fully\nrecognized both on Capitol Hill and in the White House. If such reforms\nare instituted, then the work of this Select Committee will be judged\na success, notwithstanding our objections and disappointments over the\nmajority's procedures and conclusions."
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