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Foreign Affairs - Legal Questions (1)
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Philip W. Buchen Files
Philip Buchen's General Subject Files
subjects
Panama Canal (Panama)
U.S. Agency for International Development. (04/01/1999 - )
International relations
Executive privilege (Government information)
Law and legislation
Treaties
Executive-Legislative relations
Legislation
Independent regulatory commissions
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The original documents are located in Box 17, folder "Foreign Affairs - Legal Questions
(1)" of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 17 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Memo for Mr. Buchen
- FyI
From Les Janka
RE: Executive/Legislative Relations
AMXX
Another problem we will have to
confront soon will be the recommendations of
the Murphey Commission on Foreign Policy.
As you can see from the attached draft of
their work, they are planning some sweeping
recommendation in the executive agreements
and executive privilege areas.
We have asked State to anabyze this and give
us some counter arguments.
All this has been done discretely of course since
we are not exactly entitiled to their drafts.
for
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 15, 1975
MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Commission
FROM:
William B. Spong, Jr.
they
SUBJECT:
Report of the Committee on the Congress
I enclose for the consideration of Commission members a
copy of the draft report of Committee I, together with a
special concurring opinion of Commissioner Wagner with respect
to a single recommendation, and a letter from Senator Mansfield
expressing broader reservations about the central recommendation
of the draft, and concerning other matters.
Despite these reservations, it is the sense of Committee I
that the draft should be presented to the full Commission for
review at the Commission's meeting on Monday, April 21st. It
is true that no final approval of recommendations concerning
the Congress will be possible at that time since, as Senator
Mansfield points out, the Commission will have to review its
congressional proposals in the light of its corresponding
recommendations about the Executive Branch. Nonetheless, it
seems useful to ask the Commission now to review this work of
Committee I in order to familiarize itself with potential
recommendations about the Congress, to consider their relation
to potential recommendations about the Executive Branch, and to
provide staff with guidance for the redrafting of this and
other Committee reports.
In reviewing the draft, Commission members may wish to
keep a number of points in mind. Probably the most important
is that, as Senator Mansfield's letter reflects, the Committee
is not agreed about the central recommendation embodied in the
text; that for a Joint Committee of the Congress on National
Security. This important and controversial proposal should be
reviewed with special care both for its potential implications
for the Congress, and for its appropriateness in light of the
recommendations the Commission is likely to make with respect to
the Executive Branch.
Commissioners should also bear in mind that, although the
current draft is generally a fair, accurate and complete statement
of the conclusions reached in Committee I's deliberation. it
FORDO i LIBRARY GERALD
- 2 -
will have to be modified in several respects. There are a
number of points where the rationale for recommendations will
need to be amplified -- those concerning executive agreements
and congressional staffs, for example. There is at least one
point --- the discussion of war powers -- where recent events
will require some revision in the text. There are one or two
minor errors of fact; at page 21, for example, where it is
erroneously stated that the Commission has previously approved
disclosure of the overall intelligence budget. Additionally,
one proposal made in the draft seems questionable and may go
beyond the Committee's deliberations: it is the recommendation
on page 11 that the Senate itself solicit names of potential
nominees for ambassadorial appointment.
You will also find enclosed herewith a corollation sheet
comparing some of the survey proposals in the Congressional
Survey Report given to you at the March 31st meeting with some
of the recommendations contained in the enclosed draft. You
will be reviewing the Congressional Survey along with the
enclosed draft and this comparison may be helpful to you.
Finally, the Commission may wish to consider some proposals
not approved by Committee I and therefore not reflected in the
draft, but possibly worthy of discussion. One such proposal
concerns congressional representation on an enlarged National
Security Council. That particular proposal, which Dean Wilcox
believes deserves a hearing, will be offered by him for
consideration at the April 21st meeting.
Enclosures:
ULTALD FORD LIBRARY
DRAFT
PLS/abs/3/24/75
DRAFT REPORT OF CONNITTEE I: Proposals on the Organization
of the Congress and Congressional-Executive Relations
"The relations between the Executive and
Legislative Branches of our Government
were not designed to be restful. We must
not be disturþed and think that things
have gone amiss when power striking against
power, and being restrained, produces
sparks.
We have described in the opening pages of this report
two beliefs about the future challenges to American foreign
policy and the probable inadequacy of current organizational
arrangements to meet those challenges. The first is that the
major foreign policy problems of the future will increasingly
arise from the tightening economic and physical interdependence
of nations, but the structure of our Government for the making
of foreign policy still reflects the preoccupation with military
problems which dominated the post-war years in which that
structure was designed. The second is that problems of inter-
dependence will sharply affect the domestic economy of this
country and therefore merge with domestic political issues,
but the processes of our foreign policymaking are still de-
signed as though.foreign and domestic policy are distinct,
and that politics can and should "stop at the water's edge." "
These two beliefs place a special burden on the
Commission to examine Congressional-Executive relationships
RALD
LIBRAR
Dean Acheson, "Legislative-Executive Relations, Yale Law
Review, June 1956
- 2 -
and the internal organization of the Congress. The Com-
mission believes that, even with respect to the traditional
diplomatic and national security issues of foreign policy,
the Congress until very recently has deferred excessively
to Executive leadership, though a better balance is now in
the process of being struck. But if we are correct as to the
probable shape of future foreign policy problems --- if these
are likely to be dominated not by such questions as the
recognition or non-recognition of foreign regimes, the over-
seas basing of U.S. forces, or levels of supporting assistance
to allied governments, but instead by problems of global
resource access, labor migration, commodity pricing, the
relations of currencies, protection of the global environment
and the like --- then foreign policy will far more intimately
affect domestic politics and the domestic economy. It will
touch the American public more directly, and will necessarily
involve the Congress more deeply. The Congress, then, must
be prepared to play, effectively and responsibly, a broader
role than before in those issues with both foreign and domestic
dimensions.
The Commission notes with gratification that this con-
clusion seems to be at least broadly accepted by the Congress
itself. The Commission conducted an extended survey of the
views of Members of Congress on the making of U.S. foreign
policy. (The survey is reproduced 1n full as Appendi
GURALA FORD VIBRARY
- 3 -
to this report.) A number of the views expressed in the
survey will be referred to in this report; but the central
theme of thoseviews was a dissatisfaction with the current
role of Congress in the making of foreign policy, and the
desire that Congress play a larger foreign policy role.
We seek no radical shift in power between the two
Branches. The Commission believes that in the future, as
in the past, the Executive Branch must bear the lead respon-
sibility for the management of our relations with other
countries. But to assure a better sharing of responsibilities
in that broad region where both branches must act, and to
better equip the Congress to perform its own growing role
in foreign affairs, we propose recommendations of three kinds.
The first group of recommendations concerns the relation of
the Executive to the Congress. The second proposes several
means of strengthening Congressional performance. The third
group seeks to improve the ability of Congress to take more
fully into account the foreign implications of issues which
might otherwise be decided principally in light of their
domestic significance. The Commission has been gratified to
find that the Congress has already make substantial progress
in dealing with all three areas. Indeed many of our recom-
mendations seek merely to strengthen or qualify steps already
taken or proposed.
I. TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE SHARING OF AUTHORITY
R. FORD LIBRABYA
Both the Constitution and the political realities of our
- 4 -
system require that major issues of foreign policy be re-
solved only on the basis of shared participation and responsi-
bility between the Congress and the Executive. The Commission
offers a number of proposals to facilitate that sharing.
War Powers. The Commission has reviewed the efforts already
made to ensure joint action with respect to the nation's war
powers, and it endorses the principles of the Resolution of
1973. We recognize that the Resolution by itself cannot
ensure the appropriate relation between the branches, and that
a practice of close consultation between the Executive and
the Congress on matters involving the use of force must evolve
before the Resolution can accomplish its purposes. That
practice has not yet evolved, and the recent decision of the
Department of State to treat the Cyprus evacuation of August
1974 as falling outside the scope of the Resolution is not a
promising sign. The Commission recommends no alteration in
the terms of the Resolution. The Commission does urge, how-
ever, that the Executive Branch comply ungrudgingly with the
spirit as well as the letter of the Resolution, and that the
Congress fully meet its own new responsibilities under the
Resolution. In the later discussion of a new Joint Committee,
we suggest one device for assisting the Congress to meet
responsibilities.
DERALD those LIBRARY
Executive Agreements. The Commission believes that the broad
use of Executive Agreements with foreign governments derogates
- 5 -
the role of Congress and serves the nation poorly. We be-
lieve that the freedom of the Executive to enter into such
arrangements must be balanced against the necessity for public
understanding, review and --- through the Congress ---- recourse
as to their terms. Congressional views, as indicated in the
Survey, are similar.
Accordingly, we propose that the Congress should by
statute require that all Executive Agreements -- i.e.; all
bilateral or multilateral international agreements other than
treaties, be transmitted to the Congress within 30 days of
their signing, to come into effect 60 days following trans-
mittal, if neither House has disapproved by simple majority
vote.
The statute should make clear that, notwithstanding such
submission to the Congress, no Executive Agreement can con-
stitute a commitment to assist a foreign government or people
by the use either of armed forces or financial aid. Such a
national commitment should result only from affirmative action
in the form of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution
specifically embodying such a commitment.
Emergency Powers. The scope of a third set of Executive powers,
and the procedures appropriate to their use should also, we
believe, be established by the Congress. These are the powers
deriving from national emergencies. As the work of the Special
Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency has
GERALD ? FORD
- 6 -
shown, four Senate proclamations of national emergency are
currently in effect. Of these, two -- declared in 1950 by
President Truman in response to the Korean conflict, and in
1971 by President Nixon to implement currency restrictions
and enforce controls on foreign trade -- were generated by
problems of foreign relations.
Pursuant to these proclamations, over 470 provisions of
federal law have come into effect, delegating extraordinary
authority to the Executive. The emergencies have now ended,
but the formal states of emergency endure and the country
remains in a state of emergency rule. The matter is no mere
technicality; the prolonged continuation of such powers
diminishes the constitutional role of Congress in foreign
policy, and puts at unnecessary risk the Constitutional
balance of government.
The Commission believes, therefore, that the states of
national emergency should be repealed and that all statutes
delegating authority in time of national emergency should be
repealed or revised to conform to the provisions of the pro-
posed National Emergencies Act. The Commission further
recommends that, as that Act provides, any future declarations
of national emergency should specify the statutory powers
required to meet such an emergency; and that all national
emergencies should be terminable at any time by concurrent
resolution or by Presidential proclamation, and in the
absence of extension by Congress, they should terminat
BERAFD FORD LIBRABY
automatically 6 months after their proclamation.
- 7 -
Two final recsmmendations in this section concern the
availability to the Congress and the public of information
relating to foreign policy. As Congressional responses to
the survey questions indicate, Congress appears deeply con-
cerned about the inadequacy of its information concerning
foreign policy issues. A number of the recommendations made
in this report seek to address that problem. Here we present
two such recommendations: the first concerning Executive
privilege; the second relating to the security classification
system.
Executive Privilege. One of the bars to Congressional
access to information relevant to U.S. foreign policy has
been the claim of Executive privilege. The Commission
recognizes that there exist circumstances in which Presidential
confidentiality should be preserved, but it believes such circumstan
should be specified and limited by statute. Congress has
the power to establish by legislation the limits and scope of
Executive privilege with respect to Congressional requests for
information, subject to judicial review; the Commission be-
lieves that the public interest would be well served by such
legislation.
The Commission therefore recommends that the Congress
FORD i LIBRARY
enact legislation providing that any Federal agency, includ-
ing the President, shall make available information requested
by either House of Congress or any committee having jurisdiction
- 8 -
of the matters involved, subject to claims of privilege
concerning information of two types which may be asserted
by the President personally:
(1) Advice concerning policy choices but not covering
factual information underlying or included within such advice.
(2) Information as to which any Congressional need is
substantially outweighed by the harm which disclosure would
effect upon the vital interests of the United States.
The legislation should further provide that, if any such
claim of privilege is determined by the House or Committee
in question to lack justification, the House or Committee may
file suit in Federal District Court to compel disclosure.
In such a suit the Court should be empowered to hear and rule
on the matter expeditiously and, if necessary, to utilize
in camera proceedings.
A Classification System Based on Statute. One assertion on
which virtually all observers of the conduct of U. S. foreign
affairs agree is that far too much information has been classi-
fied, classified too highly, and classified too long. As a
result of the wide consensus on this point, a number of
corrective actions have recently been taken, most notably the
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974. These reforms,
however, have not touched what we regard as the root of the
problem; namely, that the current classification system operates
without any statutory basis. We believe that procedures
GERALD
so
- 9 -
important and potentially so dangerous as those which re-
strict the ability of a free people to review the operations
of its own Executive departments must be defined and circum-
scribed by law. We believe, moreover, that the provisions of
such a law should balance the Executive's needs for secrecy
and the nation's requirements for knowledge more equally.
Accordingly, we propose that the Congress enact legislation
establishing a comprehensive system for classification based
on the following principles:*
The mandatory classification, in one of several
degrees of classification, of specified types of
information relating principally to the national
defense.
The mandatory exemption from classification of
specified other types of information, relating
principally to U.S. actions in violation of
internal law.
The discretion, to be exercised only by officials
of Assistant Secretary or equivalent rank and
above, to clàssify or exempt from classification
all other information, on the basis of specified
criteria which balance the need for secrecy
against the potential value of disclosure.
A comprehensive system of automatic downgrading
and declassification, specifying the periods
i
FORD
Several of these principles go beyond those discussed NALD in the
LIBRARY
Committee. Staff believes they deserve presentation and is
prepared to brief Committee or Commission Members on the basis
for them.
- .10 -
after which information must be downgraded and
declassified.
The application of specified sanctions to persons
violating the terms of the system, including
administrative sanctions applicable to over-
classification.
The availability of legal process to challenge
classification decisions.
Oversight of this system, once established, should become
the responsibility of the Joint Committee on National Security
which is proposed elsewhere in this report.
II. STRENGTHENING CONGRESSIONAL PERFORMANCE
Striking a better balance between Executive and Con-
gressional roles in our foreign relations is not enough.
Indeed, by requiring more of the Congress, such a balance
simply increases the need to ensure that the Congress is
organized and equipped to play its part effectively. The
recommendations presented here address those needs.
Congress and the Appointment Process. In recent years the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee has made several changes
in the process of confirmation of Ambassadors and other
FOR
and suitability of nominees, and to ensure their greater
foreign policy officials designed both to improve the competence GERALE
responsiveness to later inquiries from the Congress. The
- 11 -
Commission endorses these measures. It believes that nominees
should be closely questioned concerning possible conflicts of
interest and political contributions, and that, as the
Committee now requires, they should provide assurance of
willingness to later appear, provide requested information,
and express personal as well as administration views.
To further this process, the Commission proposes an
additional measure. As to Ambassadorial appointments, we
propose that the Foreign Relations Committee, prior to sub-
mission by the Executive of nominees, systematically seek the
advice of qualified private citizens and public officials as
to suitable candidates. .We believe that such a process would
more fully prepare the Senate to meet its responsibility to
"advise" as well as "consent" to hominees, and might improve
the caliber of nominees originally proposed by the Executive.
In both the review of candidates and in the consideration of
nominees, the Senate should continue to require of persons
under consideration familiarity either with the country to
which the nominee is to be accredited, or experience in the
formulation or practice of U. S. foreign policy, or some other
substantial and relevant qualification.
On a related issue, the Commission notes a practice which
tends to erode the Constitution's requirements for Senate FORD
approval of "
Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and
LIBRARY
Consuls. If The number of foreign policy positions of major
- 12 -
responsibility has increased in recent years, but the
occupants of some of these positions have not been subject
to Senate confirmation. In 1973, the Senate required con-
firmation of future hominees for the positions of Executive
Director of the Council on International Economic Policy and
the National Security Council Executive Secretary, but not
for the Executive Director of the NSC. The Commission be-
lieves that the requirement of confirmation should be applied
systematically, and therefore recommends that the Senate
require the confirmation of all Executive officials appointed
to positions having foreign policy responsibilities equivalent
or greater in importance than the responsibilities now discharged
by Assistant Secretaries of State, except in cases where the
personal rank of ambassador or minister is conferred in
connection with special missions of less than 6 months duration.
Modifications of Committee Jurisdictions. Since economic
relations seem certain to constitute a growing proportion of
future foreign policy, the Commission has considered how to
improve the ability of the Congress to consider economic
questions in the light of their foreign implications. We
conclude that some adjustment in Committee jurisdictions may
be helpful.*
We propose that in the House, the Committee on International
Relations be accorded legislative jurisdiction over reciprocal
FORD
tariff agreements, and oversight over all other aspects, ERAED of
trade policy issues. Moreover, we believe it important that,
LIBRARY
The Congressional Survey revealed widespread dissatisfaction
with Committee jurisdictions in general, but did not seek
responses to the proposal made here.
- 13 -
with increasing reliance on foreign trade instead of aid,
and with more use of international financial organizations
to dispense foreign aid funds, the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations should exercise concurrent legislative
oversight over international financial organizations, together
with the House Committee on Banking and Currency. We believe
that these changes will substantially improve the ability of
the House to act on the spectrum of foreign economic issues
in full awareness of their implications for our relations with
other countries as well as their domestic significance.
In the Senate, Committee jurisdictions seem more nearly
satisfactory. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
considerably broader jurisdiction than the Committee on Inter-
national Relations, including trade and international financial
institutions. The Senate, furthermore, has far greater
jurisdictional flexibility under its rules which allow for
referral of legislation to two or more committees. However,
Senate committee jurisdiction and workloads have not been
systematically reviewed for nearly 30 years (the last review
culminated in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946).
And despite the workloads that spread the Senators thin,
the number of subcommittees has increased since then from 34
to more than 120 ---- many with overlapping foreign policy
responsibilities.
While precise congruence between House and Senate
FORD is LIBRAR
jurisdiction is not essential, recent House changes affecting
- 1.4 -
foreign policy matters may require some adjustments in the
Senate. From the point of view of improving Congress' ability
to consider foreign policy matters efficiently and effectively,
therefore, a review by the Senate of its own committee system
now seems appropriáte. The Commission recommends such a re-
view.
Responsibility for Multinational Corporations. The Commission
finds that the increasing number and influence of multinational
corporations have potentially serious implications for the
conduct of American foreign as well as domestic policy. It
recommends, therefore, that the activities of such corporations
and their effects on the making of American foreign policy
should be a major and continuing focus of Congressional
attention. But, because multinational corporations affect
domestic as well as foreign policy, current Senate and House
procedures permitting consideration of these issues by several
committees, each with a specialized perspective, seem correct.
Vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Foreign and International
Relations Committees over multinational corporations would
not be appropriate, but those Committees [sharing jurisdiction
over multinational corporations should take an active role in
initiating and considering legislation concerning those aspects
of multinational corporate activities which particularly affect
the conduct of American Foreign policy.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
- 15 -
The Use of Subcommittees. The Commission is gratified to
observe the increased use of foreign policy subcommittees in
the Congress. Subcommittees offer distinct advantages over
full Committees as working units. They can respond more
quickly to changing foreign policy developments. Their pro-
cedures can be relatively informal, facilitating discourse
among Members and between Members and witnesses. They present
greater opportunities for Members to develop expertise and to
establish direct relationships with Executive branch officials.
Finally, they facilitate the holding of joint hearings, both
within and among committees. Even in the Senate, where
competing demands make it difficult for Members to participate
fully in all the subcommittees to which they are assigned,
hearings and preliminary legislative action by even two or
three interested Senators in subcommittee is preferable to
less frequent and detailed deliberations at full committee
level. In short, despite practical limitations, particularly
in the Senate, active subcommittees can increase both the scope
and depth of Congressional consideration of foreign policy
matters.
The Commission therefore recommends fuller utilization
of subcommittees to strengthen the basis of committee action,
and to provide greater interchange with working-level Executive
officials. It also recommends increased use of joint hearings
by subcommittees to meet part of the need, expressed clearly
GERALD LIBRAGY
- 16 -
in Congressional responses to the Survey, for better co-
ordination of the actions of the Congress.
In view of the growing links between nations, and the
growing importance of problems ---- like resource access, arms
sales, oceans policy, food and population -- which affect
many states, the Commission believes that these subcommittees
may be most useful if organized on a functional rather than
a regional basis. The Commission therefore commends the
experimental use of such functional subcommittees by the
Committee on International Relations.
A New Joint Committee. However useful the recommendations
above concerning committee jurisdictions may prove, and how-
ever powerfully they may be reinforced by the proposals made
below concerning committee staffs and analytic support, those
recommendations leave untouched at least two major problems.
One is that since political, military and economic aspects of
foreign policy have become interlocked ---- and since many
foreign and domestic policy issues threaten to become so -----
the Congress should contain some forum in which those inter-
relations can be directly weighed, particularly in time of
crisis when specialized standing committees, pressed for
action, might benefit from help in appreciating how particular
aspects of policy decisions relate to those being considered
by other committees.
The second is that the Congress is -- properly ---
FORD is LIBRARY 076839
requiring increasing consultation with senior foreign policy
officials of the Executive Branch at the same time that an
- 17 -
increasing number of specialized committees are necessarily
concerning themselves with the foreign aspects of their
responsibilities. The result is the potential for an unsustain-
able demand on senior executive officials for multiple
appearances before Congress -- a problem particularly severe
when fast-moving events require the full and direct attention
of the same officials.
Neither efficiency nor effective policy coordination have
been Congress' particular strengths --- nor should they be.
The greater contribution of the legislative process is its
unique ability to explore policy alternatives and to weigh
and resolve widely disparate points of view. Its strength
as deliberator, however, does not relieve Congress of
rèsponsibility for reasonable efficiency and coordinating
capacity. Indeed, if Congress is to play the greater foreign
policy role which this Commission endorses, those capacities
will increasingly be demanded of it. And as the staff survey
of Congressional views indicates, most Members, while regard-
ing policy coordination primarily as the responsibility of
the Executive, also favor changes to improve Congress' own
efficiency in coordination.
With these problems in mind, the Commission considered a
number of proposals. It concluded that a single innovation FUND
may be materially helpful.
GERALD
LIBRARY
In the Commission's view, a Joint Committee on National
Security should be established to perform for the Congress
- 18 -
the kinds of policy review and coordination now performed
in the Executive Branch by the National Security Council,
and to serve as a Congressional watchdog of the National
Security Council and the critical issues it deals with. The
Committee should serve as the initial recipient and reviewer
of reports and information from the Executive Branch on
matters of greatest urgency and sensitivity directly affecting
the security of the nation. It should advise the party leaders
and relevant standing committees of both Houses of Congress
on appropriate legislative action in matters affecting the
national security, and should assist in making available to
them the full range of information and analysis needed to
enable them to legislate in a prompt and comprehensive manner.
The existence and activities of such a Joint Committee should
in no way substitute either for direct consultation between
the President and Congressional party leaders, or for the
regular legislative and investigative functions of the present
standing committees in each House. Rather, it should supple-
ment these -- providing a more systematic and comprehensive
exchange of information, analysis and opinion than has proved
possible under the existing committee and leadership system.
For both operational and security reasons, the Joint
Committee should be small -- containing not more than 20
Members. It should include the leaders of the key foreign FORD
military, and international economic policy committees from
LIBRARY
- 19 -
each House, and several Members-at-Large appointed by the
party leaders to represent them and to enhance the Committee's
representativeness of the Congress as a whole.
The Commission recommends that the Joint Committee be
vested with the following specific jurisdictions and
authorities:
1. Receipt, analysis and referral (along with
any recommendations it may consider appro-
priate) of reports from the President under
the War Powers Act.
2. Receipt and review of all regular analytic
products of the intelligence community ex-
cepting the so-called "President's Daily
Briefing."
3. Oversight (in conjunction with the Executive
Branch) of the system of information
classification discussed above.
4. Establishment and maintenance of facilities
and procedures for storage and handling of
classified materials supplied to the Congress.
5. Making recommendations to the Senate concerning
the confirmation of the Executive Director OFORD
the National Security Council.
GERALD, LISAVEY
The Commission gave careful consideration to whether the
responsibilities of the Joint Committee should include broad
oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency and the larger
- 20 -
intelligence community. Recent creation in both House and
Senate of Select Committees to investigate certain activities
of the intelligence community would seem, for the moment at
least, to preclude assigning any other Congressional body
intelligence oversight responsibility. The terms of these
Select Committees, however, are limited. The Commission feels
that more systematic arrangements for oversight of the intelli-
gence community are needed on a permanent basis, and that such
oversight must be conducted by a body capable of assessing
intelligence products and activities in the context of our
total foreign military and economic priorities. The Joint
Committee seems logical and appropriate for that task. But
the Commission believes that any final decision to assign
permanent intelligence oversight should await the outcome of
the deliberations of the two Select Committees.
The experience of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
illustrates the usefulness of legislative authority in helping
assure a Committee's effectiveness. This Commission does not
recommend that the proposed Joint Committee be vested with
broad authority to report proposed legislation to the House
and Senate. In general, any legislative recommendations of
the Joint Committee should be reported to relevant standing
committees for their consideration. The Commission finds,
LIBRARY
however, two narrow and specific areas in which the Joint
Committee might usefully have authority to report legislation
directly to the floor of each House just as the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy is empowered to do. Those are:
- 21 -
(1) creation of a statutory system of information classi-
fication, and (2) annual authorization of funds for the
intelligence community.
The Commission has recommended above that the current
system of information classification with respect to foreign
affairs and national security be transformed from one based
upon executive order to one based upon statute, thereby
clarifying and limiting the system, and making it more
responsive to Congressional requirements. Creation, review
and implementation (in cooperation with the Executive Branch)
of such a statute would blend logically with the other re-
sponsibilities and jurisdictions of the proposed Joint
Committee.
Similarly, the Commission has recommended elsewhere
that the total amount of funds devoted annually to intelli-
gence activities should no longer be withheld from the public.
Total expenditures for intelligence should be known so as to
make possible the assessment of their priority relative to
other foreign and domestic requirements. Such a review of
total expenditures for intelligence in relation to other needs
might best be achieved by subjecting intelligence expenditures
to an annual authorizing process. No such broad intelligence
authorizing legislation is currently considered by any
Committee of the Congress. The Commission, therefore
recommends that if the Joint Committee on National
Security FORD LIBRARY
OF
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is assigned the role of intelligence oversight, that it
then also be assigned responsibility annually to recommend
legislation to each House authorizing total funding for the
intelligence community.
The Commission well understands that neither establishing
such a Joint Committee nor making it function effectively
will be easy. While the staff survey indicates majority
support among Members for greater joint efforts in Congress,
it also reveals many doubts and practical problems. The
Commission has carefully considered these difficulties. It
concludes, nevertheless, that the likely impact of the Joint
Committee upon Congress' capacity to play a more meaningful
foreign policy role fully justifies the efforts and con-
cessions necessary to create it and to make it work.
Use of the Budget Process. [NOTE: The Committee approved
recommendations concerning implementation of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974, and the desirability of unifying all
budget categories relating to foreign affairs.
To insure that these recommendations are cast in
the most useful form, and to insure consistency
with the Committee's other recommendations, staff
has commissioned a brief study of two questions:
what configuration of authorization bills would
be most likely to produce systematic Congressional
consideration of foreign affairs resource issues;
and what pattern of presentation of the foreign
policy-related programs of the executive budget
would best assist the Congress in assessing those
programs. Pending the outcome of the study theford
full statement of these recommendations is de-
ferred. Not under review is the Committee's
further budget recommendation concerning member-
LIBRARY
ship on the House and Senate Budget Committees.
The discussion and recommendations on this point
follows. ]
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As foreign and domestic issues merge and interact, it
will prove important that the foreign affairs perspective
be represented in decision-making on all major policy issues,
and especially those of resource allocation. Accordingly,
the Commission recómmends that the major foreign policy
legislative committees have representation on the Budget
Committees of both Houses of the Congress.
The Commission believes that the necessity for closer
supervision of foreign programs and policies is not limited
to the intelligence field. We find that many programs outlive
the circumstances which made them useful, and we expect that
in the future, as the world changes at increasing rates,
many more will do so. We believe, therefore, that the Con-
gress must meet far more systematically its responsibilities
for the evaluation and review of major programs, and of the
policies on which they are based. To that end, we offer a
number of related proposals.
Increased Use of Report-Back and Time-Limit Provisions.
Review and oversight, the Commission recognizes, is a
subtle and complex process. Much of the most effective over-
sight is necessarily performed informally. Nevertheless,
two specific devices -- and approaches to their use -- seem.
likely to improve Congressional review and oversight per
formance. The Commission recommends greater use of report-back
FORD LIBRARY BERRED
- 24 -
requirements for both Executive testimony and written
reports from Executive officials to the Congress, and
more frequent incorporation of statutory time limits,
particularly on new programs and policies.
At present, Executive officials rarely know when or
whether they will be required to account to the Congress
for their actions in implementing particular foreign
policy programs or policies. The use of legislative
"contracts" --- statutory provisions incorporated in
authorizing legislation, and binding key officials to
appear before appropriate committees at specific times
to testify on program performance --- better assures the
timely appearance of such officials, and increases their
accountability to Congress. Similarly, greater use of
statutory provisions automatically terminating program
and policy authority in the absence of Congressional
renewal establishes a schedule of regular and substantial
Congressional review. The Commission notes that both
practices have become more common in recent years; it.
believes that their use should become still more
comprehensive.
FORD is LIBRARY QERALD
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More Effective Use of Reports. Second, increased efforts
should be made to consolidate, rationalize, and improve the
quality and use of written reports to Congress from Executive
Branch agencies required by law. At a minimum, a central
Congressional repository for such reports, efficient pro-
cedures for making the reports available to any Members
interested in them, and convenient means for maintaining
security of classified reports, should be developed, as
proposed above, by the Joint Committee on National Security.
Better Staffing. Additionally, the Commission urges that the
trend toward professional staffing, available to both majority
and minority and under the central supervision of staff
directors, be continued in the foreign affairs oriented
Committees of the Congress. The Congressional dissatisfaction
with staff support revealed by the Survey is justified, we
believe. Solidly competent and knowledgeable staff are
essential to serious program review.
Analytic Capability. Equally important is the availability
of supporting analytic resources to supplement Committee
staffs. Over the last five years Congress has substantially
expanded the Congressional Research Service, strengthened the
General Accounting Office, and created an Office of Technology
Assessment and the Congressional Budget Office to supplement
FORD
its other facilities. But this rapid growth in research
GERALD
LIBRARY
- 26 -
capability has still not provided Congress with fully adequate
research and informational capacity for foreign policy issues.
The reasons, we believe, are several.
Attaining the Promise of CRS. The central problem is that the
Congressional Research Service has never reached the levels of
usefulness that either the Congress or CRS itself have sought.
Despite more than a doubling in size since 1970, a substantial
growth in committee requests for policy research, and the
imaginative use by CRS of automated information systems, the
relationship between CRS and the Congress is characterized on
both sides by frustration. Researchers lack the freedom and
support to address major policy issues in depth; the Congress
lacks assurance that CRS will provide timely and useful studies
of program alternatives.
The Commission finds that the major difficulty is that
there exists no body representing the interests of the Congress
as a whole, authorized to provide CRS with policy guidance,
assistance in securing resources, and some measure of in-
sulation against the lower priority concerns which deflect it
from sustained work on major issues. The Commission there-
fore recommends that Congress designate a joint committee to
be responsible for performing those functions, thus insuring
that some faction of CRS staff is able to focus steadily on
issues which Congress as a whole accords high priority.
FORD
GERALD
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Additional Authority for the GAO. Another deficiency, we
find, concerns current limitations on the General Accounting
Office. The GAO is crucial to effective Congressional review
of Executive action. The GAO provides Congress with authori-
tative financial audits, budgetary information, and evaluations
of the effectiveness of government programs. The Commission
finds, however, that certain information required by GAO to
meet its responsibilities to the Congress may now be denied
it. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that Congress
provide the GAO with authority, under careful guidelines and
Congressional review, to issue subpoenas and to initiate civil
suits to obtain information it requires from federal agencies
or from private persons or organizations working under federal
contracts.
The Commission also believes that the GAO can usefully
assist international organizations to develop more comprehensive
capabilities for financial review and program evaluation, as
GAO now has statutory authority to do. The objective review
by the Congress of the work of international organizations
should form the major basis for the support of such organiza-
tions as they come to play increasingly important roles. The
Congress should continue to press, through GAO, for more
adequate accounting of international programs to which the
U.S. has contributed.
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More Effective Use of Available Resources. The remaining
deficiencies in Congressional use of program information
and research result, we believe, from insufficient central
supervision of its own growing resources, and low levels of
Congressional use of independent non-governmental sources
of analysis. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that
the House Commission on Information and Facilities, created
as part of the Committee Reform Act of 1974, look with special
care at the research support available to Congress when
legislating in foreign policy. We also suggest that the
Information Commission seek better management of Congressional
use of research by designating a central supervisory committee
such as the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations to
oversee research organization; and that it seek to facilitate
more common use by the Congress of the policy research
capabilities of universities and non-profit research centers.
One ready means of helping achieving this last goal would
be for the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees
periodically to publish a detailed summary of their research
interests and priorities. Such a publication should specify
the major questions of fact pertinent to future foreign
policy determinations on which the Congress would most welcome
assistance. The list should include major study requests from
foreign policy committees to CRS. Such a list, we believe
FORD is 0.E.AL LIBRARY
- 29 -
would encourage many public and private research organiza-
tions to orient planned research toward Congressional con-
cerns, and thus to increase the availability of independent
analysis and information useful to the Congress without need
for additional research bureaucracies. The Commission
recommends such a publication.
III. TOWARD GREATER ATTENTIVENESS TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS
We conclude our observations on the Congress and foreign
affairs with three modest proposals intended to better equip
Congress and the public to deal knowledgeably with a world
in which foreign affairs will touch our lives in all aspects
more powerfully and directly than heretofore.
Travel. The Commission finds that foreign travel, in
familiarizing Members of Congress with overseas conditions
and foreign perspectives, has a generally beneficial effect
upon the making of U.S. foreign policy and on the ability
of Members to perform their legislative responsibilities
wisely. The benefits for public policy of Congressional travel
could, in the judgment of the Commission, be increased by
more extended travel, by greater use of Congressional staff
(particularly Foreign and International Relations Committees
investigative staff) abroad, and by increased travel by
"teams" of Members rather than individuals.
Full, written reports by staff and Members prior to
BERALD and R. FORD LIBRARY
following travel abroad, as currently required in the Foreign
- 30 -
Relations Committee under its rules, are particularly valuable
in helping assure coordinated, purposeful travel and a broad
sharing of travel findings and observations among Members
and staff who can utilize such information. Foreign travel
reporting requirements should be extended to the entire Congress,
and an improved system of circulating, monitoring, and evaluating
these reports developed. Policies issued in 1974 by each
House regarding financing of staff travel might serve as a
model and first step toward more comprehensive guidelines.
The Commission endorses detailed and timely financial
disclosure, in a form conveniently accessible to the public
and the press, of the costs of all foreign travel and the
sources of travel funds whether utilized by Members of Congress
or other Government officials.
Congressional Participation in International Negotiations.
Similarly, the Commission urges and endorses greater
participation by Members of Congress in international negotia-
tions, particularly multilateral negotiations, as a means of
increasing the first-hand information available to Members
on foreign policy and its conduct. It found persuasive, how-
ever, arguments on behalf of limiting the role of Congressional
participants in such negotiations to that of observers and
advisers, rather than plenary participants, particularly in
cases where any agreements growing out of such negotiation
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
- 31 -
may be subject to specific Congressional review or approval.
Congress should stipulate advisory participation of Members
in legislation directing or authorizing important inter-
national negotiations.
Public Awareness. Finally the Commission notes that, in the
end, the adequacy of our foreign policy will depend on the
informed judgment of the American people. The Commission
believes that the Congress, and especially the Foreign and
International Relations Committees have a consequent re-
sponsibility to help inform the American people of the
purposes and effects of our foreign policy. History suggests,
moreover, that the public will respond to the thoughtful and
probing review of major foreign policy issues; the China
Policy hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
1966 provide an excellent model.
Those hearings, moreover, demonstrated the importance
of television coverage. The Commission feels that public
awareness of foreign policy questions requires television
coverage of major foreign policy hearings and Committee
deliberations. The Commission recommends that such tèle-
vision coverage, live or taped, be made routinely available
to private and public networks, perhaps on a gradual basis
over time as recently recommended by the Joint Committee on
Congressional Operations. The Commission believes that
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
- 32 1.
whatever strains on the normal functioning of Congress might
occur as a result would be more than offset by increased
public understanding of the foreign policy issues facing the
nation.
FORD & 938870 LIBRARY
Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted
materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to
these materials.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER
WASHINGTON
June 27, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUCHEN
FROM:
Monroe Leigh
w.L.
Subject:
Panama Negotiations
- Snyder Amendment
In accordance with your request I enclose
a copy of the Snyder Amendment as adopted
yesterday as a rider to H.R. 8121, the State
Department appropriation bill.
I also enclose for your information a
Xerox copy of pertinent pages from Professor
Henkin's treatise, Foreign Affairs and the
Constitution. As you will see, he gives a
number of examples of unconstitutional inter-
ference with the President's prerogative to
"negotiate" in the conduct of foreign affairs.
There is also a list of "unconstitutional
conditions" which have been attached to
appropriation measures in the past and have
led to either rejection by the President or
disregard by the President.
Attachments:
As stated.
FORD is LIBRARY OTVURO
TEXT OF § 104 OF H.R. 8121
STATE, COMMERCE, JUSTICE AND
THE JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS
Adopted by Floor Amendment
in the House
Thursday, June 26, 1975
None of the funds appropriated in this
Title shall be used for the purposes of
negotiating the surrender or relinquish-
ment of any U.S. rights in the Panama
Canal Zone.
FORD : LIBRARY DERALD
Healin
The Distribution of Political Power
"Executive Privilege"
gr
Presidents are frequently charged with failure to cooperate
sp
when they deny to Congress or its committees information or
Preside
documents, whether to preserve "confidentiality" of operations
usually
within the Executive Branch, or because the Executive believes
that they should be "classified" and concealed in the national in-
Uncon
terest. 61 In regard to foreign relations, in particular, Presidents
Cong
often claim that disclosure would jeopardize national policies,
dent,
offend some friendly nation, or otherwise embarrass the United
especia
States in its relations with other nations. "Executive privilege"
variou
was asserted by President Washington to withhold from the
approp
House of Representatives papers relating to the negotiation of the
acts)
Jay Treaty,62 but while he justified that in part because the
cause
House had no constitutional function in the making of treaties,
The
later Presidents refused documents and information which were
appror
indisputably relevant to legitimate Congressional concerns.63
cannot
This issue, too, has not been resolved in principle,64 but in fact
tivitie
Presidents have prevailed.⁶ Congress has never sought to en-
propri
force its demands by threat of criminal sanction or citation for
ought
contempt against executive officials.⁶⁶ In foreign affairs, in par-
the ap
ticular, Congress has itself recognized limitations, for while it has
the ao
long demanded reports of all executive departments, it has re-
ed fur
quested them of the State Department only "if not incompatible
officia
with the public interest." 67 But Presidents have been careful
would
not to deny Congress lightly, or too often.⁶⁸
"rider
Interference
ferend
Separation of powers has also contributed to charges, usually
The
by the President against Congress, of unconstitutional "interfer-
condit
ence." Differing conceptions of their respective constitutional
eign :
authority have sometimes led Congress to enjoin the President
such
in matters which he deemed not its business: Congress has di-
rected Presidents to negotiate or to denounce treaties; 69 once
*
So
Congress directed President Grant to notify certain diplomatic
tions.
resolu
and consular establishments "to close their offices." 70 A known
upon
dead letter, still on the statute books (since 1913), provides: 71
note
Hereafter the Executive shall not extend or accept
any invitation to participate in any international con-
that
112
FORD i LIBRARY OFFALD
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER
WASHINGTON
July 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUCHEN
Attached is a memorandum prepared by
Jim Michel of this office on the Legislative
History of 22 U.S.C. 2680 (b) .
It seems to me that his conclusions
are consistent with those which you had already
reached when you and I last discussed this
provision of law some weeks ago.
Throuse Seigh
Monroe Leigh
Attachment:
As stated.
FORD is LIBRARY
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
July 15, 1975
MEMORANDUM
TO
: L
- Mr. Monroe Leigh
FROM
: L/PM - James H. Michel
jum
SUBJECT: Legislative History
of 22 U.S.C. 2680 (b)
At your request, I have examined the legisla-
tive history of 22 U.S.C. 2680 (b) which provides
as follows:
The Department of State shall keep
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives fully and
currently informed with respect to all
activities and responsibilities within the
jurisdiction of these committees. Any
Federal department, agency, or independent
establishment shall furnish any information
requested by either such committee relating
to any such activity or responsibility.
The above-quoted provision originated in S. 1894
(92d Cong., 1st Sess.), introduced by Senator Fulbright
(117 Cong. Rec. 15797, May 19, 1971). This bill was
not acted upon by the Foreign Relations Committee, to
which it was referred. However, the committee
included this provision in S. 2820, the foreign
assistance bill reported on November 8, 1971.
The committee report (S. Rept. No. 92-432) in-
dicates at page 17 a dissatisfaction with Executive
Branch responses to Congressional inquiries, but does
not suggest an intent to impose any affirmative duty
upon the Department to provide specific information
not requested by the committees.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
- 2 -
The Senate debate on S. 2820, and its companion
bill, S. 2819, contains similar complaints by
Senator Fulbright about Executive Branch delays and
inadequacies in responding to Congressional requests
for information. In particular, the complaint was
an alleged lack of responsiveness on the subject of
Administration intentions relative to Cambodia by
both the Secretary of State, in testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee, and by the Department
of Defense and the Administration generally in
refusing to release to the committee its five-year
military aid plans for Cambodia. This issue was the
subject of a decision by President Nixon to invoke
Executive privilege. However, the debate does not
indicate that this particular provision was intended
to require anything more specific than an overall
improvement in Executive Branch responsiveness to the
informational needs of Congress. See 117 Cong. Rec.
40167-40170, 40174.
The House-Senate conference report (S. Rept.
No. 92-590) eliminated a feature of the original
Senate proposal which would have required the
Department of State to report to Congress on the
activities of other government agencies operating
overseas, but provides no clarification of legisla-
tive intent.
Since the enactment of 22 U.S.C. 2680 (b), I am
unaware of any Congressional requests for reports
under this statute in addition to those already
furnished under other, more specific legislation or
on a voluntary basis. Similarly, I am unaware of any
initiative by the Department to provide additional
reports on the basis of the statute.
In view of the foregoing, it would appear that
22 U.S.C. 2680 (b) may be regarded not as an additional
requirement, but as a reinforcement of the Department's
responsibilities under other laws which have been or
may be enacted to assist the concerned committees in
carrying out their responsibilities. Of course,
neither this legislation nor any other Act of Congress,
can diminish the President's constitutional authority
to withhold information in appropriate circumstances.
L/PM:JHMiche1/JMIwry:edk
ext. 20557
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHI>ON
July 21, 1975
Dear John:
I am writing with regard to an amendment which was
passed in the House of Representatives to H.R. 8121.
The intention of this amendment was to suspend our
negotiations with Panama by prohibiting the use of
State Department funds for that purpose.
As you know, during the last three administrations, the
United States has been engaged in a discussion with the
Republic of Panama relating to the Canal. The negotia-
tions, which have received the support of each adminis-
tration in turn, are continuing, with the goal of reaching
an agreement which would accommodate the needs of
both the United States and Panama, while at the same time
protecting our basic interests in defense and operation of
the Canal. Panama has engaged in these negotiations on
the assumption that the United States is operating in good
faith and that any agreement reached would be considered
on its merits according to our full constitutional process.
Suspension of these discussions now, without full consid
eration of an agreement, could seriously damage our
relations with Panama and our interests throughout
Latin America.
BERALD
devesited
LIBRARY
The provision also raises a constitutional question related
to the treaty-making process under which the President is
authorized to negotiate-with foreign countries and the
Senate to give its advice and consent to any treaty.
Our negotiations are not yet completed and a number of
questions remain unresolved. I have no intention of pro-
posing to Congress any agreement which would not protect
U.S. vital interests. We will consult with the Congress
as the negotiations proceed and of course submit any treaty
to the full constitutional process, which means that the
Senate will have an opportunity to review it under the advice
and consent procedures.
It is my hope that you and the members of the Appropriations
Committee will support me in seeing that this provision is
removed from H.R. 8121.
Sincerely,
Hereld R. Ford
The Honorable John L. McClellan
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
ford LIBRABY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1975
Dear John:
I am writing to express my concern over the provisions
of an amendment to H.R. 8121, passed by the House of
Representatives on June 26, which is intended to suspend
our negotiations with the Republic of Panama by prohibiting
the use of State Department appropriations for that purpose.
As you know, negotiations with Panama regarding the Canal
were initiated during the administration of President
Johnson and have continued under every administration
since then. They are proceeding with the goal of reaching
an agreement which would accommodate the needs of both
nations while protecting our basic interests in the defense
and operation of the Canal. Panama has always assumed
that the United States is negotiating in good faith and that
any agreement reached would receive a full hearing in
Congress based on its merits. Action to terminate the
negotiations now without consideration of the substance of
an agreement could seriously damage our relations with
Panama and our interests in the Canal area. Moreover,
it could lead to deterioration in our relations with other
Latin American countries.
This provision also raises questions of a constitutional
nature relating to the role of the Executive as well as the
Senate in the treaty-making process.
A number of difficult questions remain to be resolved in
our negotiations with Panama. I can assure you that 1 have
no intention of approving or proposing to Congress any agree-
ment which would not protect U.S. vital interests. We will
IURD
LIBRARY
- 2 -
be consulting closely with the Congress as the discussions continue.
Of course, any treaty which may be agreed upon will be submitted
to the full constitutional process, which means that the Senate will
have an opportunity to review it under the advice and consent
procedures.
I hope I can count on your support and that of other members of
the Foreign Relations Committee in removing this provision when
the Senate considers H.R. 8121.
Sincerely,
Heard R. Ford
The Honorable John Sparkman
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
FORD LISTED
NSC TALKING
PAPER
ARGUMENTS ON THE PANAMA AMENDMENT
-- The proposed Amendment to H.R. 8121 seriously endangers U.S.
relations with Panama and constitutes an unfortunate precedent which could
interfere with established constitutional processes. It represents an attempt
to:
Infringe on the President's responsibility under the
Constitution to negotiate treaties with foreign governments;
Preempt the Senate's constitutional prerogative to advise
and consent as to treaties negotiated by the Executive.
-- The United States' commitment to negotiate the Canal issue is 11 years
old. It was first made by President Johnson in consultation with former
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. It has been supported by Presidents
Nixon and Ford. To abandon it without serious consideration of the product
of these negotiations would seriously damage our credibility in foreign affairs
with Panama, Latin America, and elsewhere in the world.
--- Whatever views one may have on the treaty, its consideration should
await presentation to the Senate of the entire agreement with all its provisions.
An appropriation bill is not an appropriate vehicle for such consideration, nor
is this an appropriate time, before all the provisions can be considered.
-- Continuation of the negotiations is extremely important to our interests
in Panama. Congressional action to suspend negotiations without consideration
of a treaty on its merits would be viewed as a breach of faith and might
stimulate an extreme reaction in Panama where at least a fair hearing on a
treaty has always been assumed.
rord
1817