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Nuclear Policy Statement - Meeting with the President and Congressmen, September 17, 1976
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Nuclear Policy Statement - Meeting with the President and Congressmen, September 17, 1976
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The original documents are located in Box 25, folder "Nuclear Policy Statement - Meeting
with the President and Congressmen, September 17, 1976" of the James M. Cannon Files
at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 25 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
I
12 NOON - PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH
CONGRESSMEN NUCLEAR NON
PROLIFERATION
Cabinet Room (1/2 hour)
12 NOON
Friday, September 17, 1976
Peny: Gut a handle
on provibution. -
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and avoid personation
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people runi indivented global
will conflict.
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2
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS
AND OTHERS ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
Friday, September 17, 1976
12:00 Noon (15 Minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Brent Scowcroft
I.
PURPOSE
At Senator Percy's request, to seek agreement on a compromise
nuclear non-proliferation bill.
Also, we recommend using this meeting to make clear your
position that the NFAA is critical to any serious attempt to
deal with proliferation.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: Thus far, we have no information on the nature of
the compromise that Senator Percy may wish to propose. We
assume that it may be some compromise on a bill reported earlier
this week by the JCAE (H.R. 15419, originally introduced by
Anderson and Price) which we believe to be acceptable, but barely
so; and one of two other unacceptable bills that are being pushed
by Senators Ribicoff, Glenn and Percy.
The several bills making up the complex legislative picture are
listed and described briefly at Tab A. As you had agreed in your
earlier meeting with Senator Pastore, the Administration has
worked through Administrator Seamans in support of the JCAE
drafting activity to produce a technically and substantively better
bill. This was done, however, without any commitment to support
or accept the final bill.
Senator Percy, Ribicoff, and Glenn have shown no serious
recognition of the fact that uranium enrichment is the critical
element of any serious non-proliferation action by the United States.
However, it is conceivable that they will bring up, or expect you
2
to bring up, the NFAA as a part of a compromise package. If
they propose such a package, it is almost certain to involve a
non-proliferation bill substantially less acceptable than the one
reported Tuesday by the Joint Committee -- making agreement to a
compromise very difficult. Accordingly, we recommend that you
take a position which:
-- makes passage of the NFAA an essential element, and
-- makes clear that any non-proliferation legislation more
restrictive than last Tuesday's JCAE bill is unacceptable.
Yesterday, the Senate tabled for this session any further
consideration of nuclear energy bills, including the NFAA. That
action seems subject to reversal.
If the NFAA is discussed, Senator Glenn may argue that the
additional enrichment capacity is not needed. If so, Bob Fri
will be prepared to discuss this point. Bob has also been leading
Administration work on the various non-proliferation bills.
B. Participants: Senators Percy, Ribicoff, Glenn, Pastore, Javits;
Representatives Price and Anderson; ERDA Administrator Seamans,
ERDA Deputy Administrator Fri, and EPA Administrator Train.
(Senator Pastore may be late for the meeting because he is being
honored at a breakfast for the Italian-American award he received
Thursday night.) Deputy Secretary of State Robinson.
C. Press Arrangements: Press photo session. Meeting to be
announced.
3
III.
TALKING POINTS
1.
Gentlemen, I believe we share the same objectives in trying
to control nuclear proliferation and I have been following
developments on the Hill in this area very closely.
2.
I am convinced that the principal tool we have available to us
to influence other nations is to remain a reliable and competitive
supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment for peaceful purposes.
For this reason, I give highest priority to the Nuclear Fuel
Assurance Act (NFAA) which we must have to expand uranium
enrichment capacity in this country.
3.
My view here is underscored by the recent announcement by the
French to proceed with another large enrichment plant. The
French indicated that they are moving ahead because of the
indecision in the U.S. on this matter and their intention of
taking over the markets we would supply.
4.
For this reason, I find it hard to understand the 15-month delay
by the Congress in passing the NFAA. I know the Senate has tabled the
NFAA for this session but I assume that action is reversible.
5.
I generally favor some toughening in the controls we require
as a part of our agreements with others to supply nuclear fuel
and equipment. However, this is an area where we must be very
careful lest we act in a way that merely drives our customers to
other suppliers who are less concerned than we are about
proliferation.
6.
Administration people have been working closely with the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and others to come up with
an acceptable bill. While I have not seen the details, my advisors
tell me that the bill reported last Tuesday by the JCAE may be
an acceptable way of moving forward. They have also warned me
that going beyond this bill could be counterproductive to our non-
proliferation goals.
7.
I am willing to work with the Congress on this issue but we should
begin with a commitment to pass the NFAA and with non-proliferation
legislation that is at least as acceptable as the bill reported last
Tuesday by the JCAE.
4
8.
However, I should make clear that my strong interest in the
NFAA will not prompt me to accept a non-proliferation bill that I find
contrary to U.S. interests. I would be reluctant to see new
requirements added beyond the bill reported by the JCAE.
9.
I am concerned about the bills favored by the Senate Government
Operations Committee because they could undermine our credibility as
a nuclear partner, force us to a position of isolation and allow other
suppliers to take over who are less concerned about proliferation.
On the other hand, the goals, criteria and procedures incorporated
in the JCAE bill seem to overcome many of these problems. I
would like to express to John (Pastore), Mel (Price) and John
Anderson my appreciation for their response to the points that
Bob Seamans has brought to their attention on behalf of the
Administration.
Current Status of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Legislation
SENATE
Senate Government Operations Committee
In May, reported S. 1439, the Nuclear Export Reorganization Act.
Pushed by Senators Percy, Ribicoff, and Glenn. Deals largely
with responsibilities of State, NRC, and other agencies; and
makes Congress the referee of disputes between State and NRC
on nuclear exports. This bill is totally unacceptable.
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Met three weeks ago to consider S. 3770 (introduced by Baker
and Pastore) but refused to report it. This bill is unacceptable.
=
On Tuesday, September 14, ordered reported a revised version
of a bill introduced by Price and Anderson. Administration
officials worked closely with the JCAE on this bill and they
consider it acceptable. Nuclear industry people believe it is too
restrictive and oppose this or any other legislation this session.
Senate Foreign Relations
About three weeks ago, reported out S. 3770 as a substitute for
S. 1439, the Government Operations Committee bill.
Floor Action
S. 1439 was scheduled for consideration on September 16, but the
Senate (with very few members present) decided on September 15
to table for this session all nuclear bills, including the NFAA as
well as non-proliferation legislation.
- 2 -
HOUSE
--
Price and Anderson are seeking a rule on the bill reported
Tuesday, September 14, by the JCAE. (As indicated above,
Administration officials believe this bill is acceptable.)
The extension of the Export Administration Act, which received
a rule on Wednesday, includes an amendment by Zablocki which
is unacceptable. Briefly, it requires the State Department to
make some technically unachievable certifications before it con-
curs in the adequacy of safeguards as applied to foreign nuclear
reprocessing requiring US approval. ERDA is working with
Congressman Anderson to improve the text, which may come to
the Floor momentarily.
Principal Provisions of Price-Anderson Bill (as Reported by JCAE)
A statement of policy that U.S. will be a timely and reliable
supplier for nations adopting comprehensive non-proliferation
policies;
A statement of non-proliferation commitments which the U.S.
will seek to negotiate with all other nations, including strict
limits upon further development of national reprocessing and
enrichment facilities;
A statement of strong support for the International Atomic
Energy Agency;
Revised procedures (urged by Senator Symington) for Congressional
review of new atomic energy agreements, including consideration
by Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International
Relations Committee;
Policy guidance (in the form of principles) to be applied by NRC
in deciding whether to issue export licenses, and provisions for
tightening these principles when other nations agree to stricter
non-proliferation commitments;
Authority for the President to authorize an export which NRC
has denied if the export is necessary to achieve U.S. non-
proliferation objectives (a critical provision);
Detailed reports to be furnished to Congress on progress in
achieving non-proliferation goals.
[sept
PROBLEMS WITH TWO SENATE NON-PROLIFERATION BILLS
S.1439 as Reported in May by Senate Government and Operations
Committee
Provides only for reshuffling of agency responsibilities
relating to nuclear exports amond ERDA, NRC, State, Commerce
and ACDA.
Gives responsibility to NRC to develop on its own criteria
governing nuclear exports. Provides no legislative guidance.
NRC has been unable to develop criteria and is seeking
legislative guidance.
Sets up Congress as the ultimate referee in disputes between
Executive Branch and the NRC on export licenses.
Requires a NEPA-like "nuclear proliferation assessment statement"
prepared by ACDA.
The Version of S.1439 Reported by Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Which is the Same as S.3770 Introduced by -- and Then
Disowned -- Senators Pastore and Baker.
Constitutes a unilateral declaration of non-proliferation con-
trols which must be accepted by other nations as a condition
of U.S. nuclear exports.
-- sets up immediate binding criteria for exports which
ERDA and State believe will prevent exports under all
30 existing agreements for nuclear cooperation. ERDA
believes that, even if the language is stretched to
its limits, current agreements with IAEA, Canada, and
with EURATOM would not qualify.
-- gives the President 18 months to get new agreements
with all trading partners.
-- other nations can cut off imports from the U.S. merely
by refusing to accept the statutory requirements. Other
suppliers are ready to satisfy demands without such
restrictions.
-- the bill seeks to provide escape clauses to permit some
leeway in applying the immediate criteria and for delays in
the 18 months deadline. However, this is considered
worthless for practical purposes because:
the exceptions are subject to Congressional reversal.
it creates an export policy of exceptions rather than
rules.
-2-
Requires an ACDA nuclear proliferation assessment statement.
Overrides Executive privilege by requiring the President to
provide to the Congress advice on exports he receives from
the Secretary of State and Administrator of ERDA, as well
as ACDA.
Requires the President to provide information that will
antagonize trading partners (e.g., identifying specifically
the controls that other nations have not yet adopted -- thus,
portraying those nations publicly as not sufficiently
concerned about proliferation) .
[sept. 1976]
COMPARISON OF GOALS -- S-3770 and H.R. 15419 as amended
Interim Principles
S-3770
H.R. 15419
1. Safeguards on all fuel
Yes
Yes
2. No explosives pledge
Yes
yes
3. Adequate physical security on U.S.
Yes
Yes
export
4. U.S. Acceptance of retransfer
conditions on our fuel and
Yes
Yes
equipment.
5. Reprocessing Assurance
Prior U.S. Approval
Enlarge options avail
able to recipient
country to permit si{
ing
long term fuel
service contracts wi-
international reprocessing
ventures, removing requirer
for specific U.S. approval
each fuel loading.
6. No replication pledge
Yes
Yes
Long Term principles
1. Safeguards on all activities
Yes
Yes
2. No explosives pledge
Yes
Yes
3. Adequate physical security on
all activities.
Yes
YES
4." No retransfers to anybody unless
they agree to safeguard everyghing
Yes
Yes
5. Reprocessing conditions
No reprocessing by
No national reprocessing
non-nuclear supplier
or if national facility
nations.
operated they must assul
(1)Little chance of dive
sion and (2)Advance non=
proliferation goals of C
couraging national repro
cessing and (3) Cooperate
providing services on a
priority basis to those
who give up national reç
cessing ventures.
6. No further stockpiling and if
stockpiles exist, put them under
NO
Yes
effective international
auspices. (Non-nuclear weapons
States)
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION
WASHINGTON
September 16, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CONNOR
SUBJECT:
French Decision to Build Large
Enrichment Plant -- Capitalizing
on US Delays
I suggest that you consider using the attached article from
the Paris newspaper Les Echos in your Friday meeting with
Senators Percy, Ribicoff, Glenn, Pastore and Javits.
Briefly, it says:
France has decided to "reap the benefits of nuclear
expansion" because the U.S has delayed enrichment plants
"due to the pre-election period. "
France will proceed very quickly because enriched uranium
is "in keen demand."
France wishes to take advantage of the American "wait and
see attitude. "
Enclosure
GERALD
LITERAL TRANSLATION OF SEPTEMBER 14, 1976, ARTICLE IN
LES ECHOS (PARIS)
FRANCE TO INVEST 5.5 BILLION FRENCH FRANCS
IN A NEW URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT
At a time U.S. projects are being held in abeyance due to
the pre-electoral period, France appears definitely decided
to proceed in order to reap the benefits of nuclear expansion.
Thus, COREDIF, 51 of which is held by EURODIF (1), 29 by
COGEMA, C.E.A.'s affliate and 20 by Iran, has decided to set
up a new gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant. Project
is estimated at about 11 billion French francs (1975 constant
francs) for an output of 10 million SWU (P.A.), which is
equivalent to the output of the EURODIF plant, now being built
on the Tricastin site (price: 9.6 billion French francs,
1974 constant francs). France will contribute about 5.5 billion
French francs.
The project being studied assumes initial start-up of the plant
in 1983 with an output of 5 million SWU whereas the EURODIF
plant will be in full operation in 1981. At the present time,
six sites have been selected, three of them being located in
France. The final choice will be made in early 1977, but the
executives of COREDIF are very cautious about divulging the
possible geographical areas.
From now on, they intend to proceed very quickly, because
enriched uranium is a fuel in keen demand. This is proven
by the fact that the order book of EURODIF (started up in 1973)
was saturated as early as March, 1974. In 1975, EURODIF had
to turn down several contracts, although in addition to its
shareholders, countries such as Japan, Germany and Switzerland
are applicants.
Therefore, confident in its technology, France wishes to take
advantage of the American wait and see attitude and the failure
of certain other undertakings. Presently, the only international
suppliers are the U.S.A. with a 17 million SWU capacity, the
U.S.S.R. (3 to 4 million SWU), France (10.8 million SWU in 1981)
and Germany, United Kingdom and Netherlands (2 million SWU in 1982).
To these figures should be added the U.S. intentions of increasing
the existing capacity to 27 million SWU in 1985.
-2-
But all this will not be enough, because the estimated demand
will be of 56 million SWU in 1985, 64 in 1986 and 92 million
in 1990. The shortage will be of 11 million in 1985, 19 in 1986
and perhaps 49 in 1990. Mr. George Besse, President of EURODIF,
feels confident that the banks and investors will look favorably
at the COREDIF project especially since the EURODIF job shows
satisfactory advancement, the shareholders of COREDIF will
supply about 20 of the necessary funds. The balance will be
borrowed through issuance of paper or from banks. Such funds -
why not ? - could be partially found in the U.S., which would
be the evident proof of the reliance given to French technology
and to French commercial opportunism.
(1) Italy, 23 - Spain, 11,1 - Belgium, 11.1 - COGEMA
(French AEC), 27.5 - SUFIDIF - 25
Urgent
FOR NOON
FRIDAY
MEETING
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
976 SEP AM I! 15
September 16, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
JIM CONNOR
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
JIM MITCHELL
FROM:
GLENN SCHLEEDE
SUBJECT:
Industry views on the
Non-proliferation bills
Attached is a copy of a letter which reflects
the strong concerns of the nuclear industry
about the non-proliferation bills -- including
the JCAE bill of last Tuesday which Administr-
ation people helped write (i.e., by getting
changes in an earlier, less acceptable bill).
The attached letter is signed by Craig Hosmer
but it was written by officials from the
top U.S. organizations selling abroad.
The JCAE bill may be the best possible compromise,
but I think you should be aware of the concerns
from this group. (Brent Scowcroft has a copy.)
CC: Bob Fri.
AMERICAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COUNCIL
1750 K STREET, N.W.
SUITE 300
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
(202) 295-4520
CRAIG HOSMER
PRESIDENT
September 16, 1976
Hon. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Administrator
U.S. Energy Research &
Development Administration
Washington, D.C. 20545
FORD is LIBRARY
Re: H.R. 15419 (Nuclear Exports)
Dear Bob:
I feel it essential to write you regarding industry concerns over the
bill "Nuclear Proliferation Control Act of 1976", H.R. 15419, as re-
ported by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on September 14,
1976, with the so-called technical amendments recommended by ERDA.
First, let me make clear that the nuclear industry perceives that
legislation addressed to the problem of nuclear non-proliferation is
desired by some people. We do not, however, feel that the public
generally is in that category, or if so, only mildly. Notwithstand-
ing, an orderly international nuclear commerce requires the world to
adopt common, effective measures which will meet the deep and genuine
concerns of the Administration, the Congress, the American people,
and of many other nations with similar views. So, legislation which
actually provides these measures can be helpful.
But let me add that, in the attempt to secure legislation in the
brief time before Congress adjourns, there has been no response to
industry's attempts to be heard on its informed views on this sub-
ject. We feel this is a serious omission, because this exceedingly
complicated, little understood and much amended bill is still inter-
mixed with adverse commercial and foreign policy implications. We
are writing you to be sure that ERDA understands, however, that our
concerns are not just commercial in nature. That is important, but
secondary. They are based on basic questions as to whether the pro-
posed measure really is effective to inhibit nuclear non-prolifera-
tion, or even may be counterproductive.
The focus of our concern is Section 14, which creates licensing
principles which would immediately apply to nuclear exports from the
United States. Defined principles are certainly desirable by which
NRC may exercise its judgement on nuclear exports. But the bill goes
further. It would abrogate provisions in existing bilateral agree-
ments with other countries. Most important, it would do so without
giving diplomatic efforts a chance to modify those agreements through
Hon. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
- 2 -
September 16, 1976
renegotiation.
In the meantime, and until renegotiation, the NRC must apply the
legally-defined principles to all exports, including those which stem
from existing contracts, already financed (in the most part) through
the Export-Import Bank. This is bound to create confusion in the minds
of customer nations as to the reliability of the U.S. as a supplier,
and to have a potentially damaging effect on U.S. nuclear exports, both
as to existing business and future sales.
We see the real risk that other supplier nations who have not yet adop-
ted similar export licensing criteria (and there are none) will simply
step in to replace U.S. suppliers. This is already happening in an
increasingly competitive market situation -- the effect of the bill in
adding a question mark as to the credibility of the U.S. as a reliable
supplier could put us at a decisive disadvantage in the international
market place. As our share of it shrinks, so shrinks American non-
proliferation clout.
No amount of protestation in the bill about the U.S. becoming a re-
liable supplier can overcome the fact that its competitors are taking
away its business because many countries are not convinced in this re-
spect. They are aware that no enriching contracts have been offered
since 1974, that Congress is balking at NFAA; that bills and amendments
to apply all kinds of nuclear exports proliferate in Congress; that
nuclear moratoria are pending in several states; and so on.
There is no need to re-emphasize that the consequence of this market
shift to other suppliers would neither serve non-proliferation object-
tives, nor do much to convince other supplier nations that they should
give back the competitive advantage which we have handed to them.
At stake is a backlog of perhaps $4 billion of overseas orders to
American industry (30,000 direct jobs), and another estimated $29 bil-
lion potential for U.S. sales and 200,000 jobs per year through 1981.
Perhaps only some of this potential business would be lost if the bill
passes. The industry would surely agree to accept that consequence in
exchange for the achievement of real and far-reaching non-proliferation
goals. But, we feel it would be a very high price to pay if the bill
falls short of its announced objectives. We feel that it does fall
short. We are not convinced that such unilateral action by the United
States on nuclear export controls witt, in the absence of similar
policy decisions and actions by other supplier states, accomplish the
important non-proliferation objectives being sought.
It is possible that the Congress may be having second thoughts on con-
sidering nuclear export legislation in the current session. If this
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
is so, perhaps ERDA can thereafter draft legislation which could, early
in the next session, be submitted to Congress and be exposed to the
deliberative hearing process which this complex and important subject
deserves.
Hon. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
- 3 -
September 16, 1976
I have only highlighted a few specific objections to the bill as now
written and amended. There are others, but I think that those re-
cited should be sufficient to indicate that a more deliberative
approach should be taken to this kind of legislation. And, there is
no emergency situation at hand that requires immediate action.
Cordially,
CRAIG CraigHtoemer HOSMER
President
CH:jh
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN., CHAIRMAN
JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.
LEE METCALF. MONT.
BILL BROCK, TENN.
JIMES B. ALLEN, ALA.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
LAWTON CHILES. FLA.
SAM NUNN, GA.
United States Senate
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
RICHARD A. WEGMAN
COMMITTEE ON
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
September 17, 1976
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
As you know, major legislation is awaiting Senate action on
the critical problem of nuclear proliferation. This legislation
is the product of nearly two years of work by the Government
Operations Committee, which held extensive hearings and
received 4,500 pages of testimony and background material from
Administration, industry, and other expert witnesses. Subsequent
extensive discussions among the Members and staff of the
Government Operations, Foreign Relations, and Joint Atomic
Energy Committees produced a compromise proposal which was
introduced by Senator Pastore, co-sponsored by key Members of
all three committees, and approved overwhelmingly by the Foreign
Relations Committee. That compromise will be offered as
substitute language for S. 1439, which has been on the Senate
calendar for several weeks.
In a separate action, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has
reported out a bill originating in the House. It is our deep
conviction that several provisions of that legislation are
unacceptable. The bill is not only substantially weaker than
the compromise proposal; it would seriously undermine existing
United-States export control procedures and condone dangerous
practices which have already heightened the risk of nuclear
proliferation. A memorandum is enclosed outlining our principal
objections to the provisions of H.R. 15419, as amended.
The United States can and must exert strong and creative
leadership in the effort to halt nuclear proliferation. We urge
you to pursue every avenue to convey the urgency of this problem
to the world community, including a' major. Presidential address
on proliferation before the United Nations or some other suitable
forum this Fall, and to assist us in every way possible to enact
a strong, constructive non-proliferation bill in this Congress.
September 17, 1976
Page 2
Specifically, we respectfully request that the "hold" placed
on S. 1439 at the request of the administration be removed so
that early next week the Senate can consider this legislation
under a reasonable time limitation agreement allowing for
adequate debate. After approval by the Senate, the House may
enact whatever it deems appropriate, permitting us in conference
to reach compromise on the final provisions of a bill that will
offer hope that we can achieve a more effective international
agreement placing strict controls on the transfer and use of
sensitive nuclear material and technology. Even if the House,
because of approaching sine die adjournment, cannot act, we
feel that passage of a strong and responsible Senate bill would
lend credibility to the Administration's efforts to reach
agreement at the nuclear suppliers' conference and to strengthen
the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Sincerely,
are
Abraham Ribicof
Marks Charles H. Percy H Parry
John Glenn Slem
Jacob K. Javits
CHP : fce
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
Paper
Major Differences Between Compromise
9/15/76
A
Substitute and Joint Committee Bills
7 pgs.
FILE LOCATION
James M. Cannon Files, Box 25
Nuclear RESTRICTION CODES Policy Statement - Meeting with the President and Congressmen,
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
September 17,1976
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82)