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The original documents are located in Box 24, folder "Nuclear Policy Statement (9)" of the
James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
[10/21/1976]
Shere packagewel
MEMORANDUM
to Dane
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
8PM nuckar
October 19, 1976
JIM CANNON
f.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
JIM CONNOR
JIM MITCHELL
GLENN SCHLEEDE
FROM:
DAVID ELLIOTT D.E.
SUBJECT:
Latest Version of a Presidential
Nuclear Statement
Following up on the directions of yesterday, State has produced a
revised draft statement on nuclear policy. It is intended to take into
account the three themes discussed yesterday, viz:
-- more emphasis to our commitment to support the nuclear power
program in other nations,
-- more stress to the international rationale for the U.S.
demonstration reprocessing plant (possible foreign participation,
advanced consultations, safeguards test bid, and availability
of reprocessing services when required),
-- the need for supplier cooperation because our market position
does not permit us to dictate solutions.
State did feel, however, that we ought to pitch this primarily as the
President's response to his concern over the potential for proliferation,
and not as an upbeat view of the promise of nuclear power once the
proliferation problem is dealt with. Apparently after a brief scan of this
draft, Kissinger "liked" its approach.
FORD & LIBRARY QERALD
Digitized from Box 24 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
101918
NEXT TO FINAL
October 21, 1976
NUCLEAR POLICY
A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
We have known since the age of nuclear energy began
more than 30 years ago that this source of energy had the
potential for tremendous benefits for mankind and the po-
tential for destruction.
On the one hand, there is no doubt that nuclear energy
represents one of the best hopes for satisfying the rising
world demand for energy with minimum environmental impact
and with the potential for reducing dependence on uncertain
and diminishing world supplies of oil.
On the other hand, nuclear fuel, as it produces power
also produces plutonium, which can be chemically separated
from the spent fuel. The plutonium can be recycled and used
to generate additional nuclear power without the need for
additional energy resources. Unfortunately -- and this is the
root of the problem -- the same plutonium, when chemically
separated, is also a key ingredient of nuclear explosives.
The world community cannot afford to let potential
nuclear weapons material or the technology to produce it
proliferate uncontrolled over the globe. The world community
must ensure that when such material is produced and utilized
by any nation it is done so under the most stringent
security conditions and arrangements.
2
Developing the means to prevent proliferation while
preserving the enormous benefits of nuclear energy is one of
the major challenges facing all nations of the world today.
This is a problem of extraordinary complexity and
severity and the policies and programs we need to solve this
problem cannot be judged by standards applied to most domestic
and international activities. Our answers cannot be partially
successful. They will either work, in which case we shall
stop proliferation, or they will fail and nuclear proliferation
will accelerate as nations initially having no intention of
acquiring nuclear weapons conclude that they are forced to do
so by the actions of others. Should this happen, we would
face a world in which the security of all is imperiled.
Maintaining international stability in such an environment
would be incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of
regional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation would
be immeasurably increased -- if not through direct attack,
then through a process of ever expanding escalation.
3
The problem can be handled as long as we understand it
clearly and act wisely in concert with other nations. But we
are faced with a threat of
tragedy if we fail
to comprehend it or fail to take effective measures.
Thus, the seriousness and the complexity of the problem
places a special burden on those who propose ways to control
proliferation. They must avoid the temptation for rhetorical
gestures, empty threats or righteous posturing. They must
offer policies and programs which deal with the world as it
is, not as we might wish it. The goal is to prevent pro-
liferation, not simply to deplore it.
The first task in dealing with the problem of prolifer-
ation is to understand the world nuclear situation.
4
More than 30 nations have or plan to build nuclear
power plants to reap the benefits of nuclear energy. The
1973 energy crisis dramatically demonstrated to all nations
not only the dangers of excessive reliance on oil imports,
but also the reality that the world's supply of fossil fuels
inevitably is dwindling. As a result, nuclear energy is now
properly seen by many nations as an indispensable way to
satisfy rising energy demand without prematurely depleting
finite fossil fuel resources. We must understand the motives
which are leading these states to place even greater emphasis
than we do on nuclear power development. For unless we com-
prehend their real needs we cannot expect to find ways of
working with them to ensure that their legitimate concerns
and ours are both met.
However, several nations also have all the technology
needed to produce both the benefits and the destructive
potential of nuclear energy, and they have the capability
to supply such technology and facilities to other nations.
Thus no single nation, not even the United States, can
hope by itself to control effectively the spread of repro-
cessing technology and the resultant availability of pluto-
nium. The United States once was the predominant supplier
of worldwide nuclear material equipment and technology. While
5
we remain a leader in this field, today other suppliers have
come to share the international market -- with the U.S. now
supplying less than half of nuclear reactor exports.
In short, the U.S. no longer has a monopoly on nuclear
technology. Although our role is large, we are not able to
control worldwide nuclear development.
Action to control proliferation must be an international
cooperative effort involving many nations, including both
nuclear suppliers and customers. Common standards must be
developed and accepted by all parties. If this is not done,
unrestrained trade in sensitive nuclear technology and
materials will develop -- with no one in a position to stop
it.
We must recognize that interests in nuclear energy vary
widely among nations. We must recognize that some look to
nuclear energy because they have no acceptable energy alter-
native. We must be sure that our efforts to control pro-
liferation are not viewed by such nations as an act to
prevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear energy.
We must be sure that all nations recognize that the U.S. be-
lieves that non-proliferation objectives must take precedence
over economic and energy benefits if a choice must be made.
6
PREVIOUS ACTION
During the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the unquestioned
leader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits of nuclear
energy are made available widely while its destructive uses are
prevented. I have given special attention to these objectives
during the past two years, and we have made important new progress,
particularly in efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear
weapons capability among the nations of the world.
In 1974, soon after I assumed office, I proposed strengthening
and standardizing non-proliferation measures at the United Nations
General Assembly. In the fall of that year, I became concerned
that some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve com-
petitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports under
conditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. I expressed
this concern directly to my counterparts in key supplier and
recipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State to
emphasize multilateral action to limit this dangerous form of
competition.
6
PREVIOUS ACTION
During the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the unquestioned
leader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits of nuclear
energy are made available widely while its destructive uses are
prevented. I have given special attention to these objectives
during the past two years, and we have made important new progress,
particularly in efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear
weapons capability among the nations of the world.
In 1974, soon after I assumed office, I proposed strengthening
and standardizing non-proliferation measures at the United Nations
General Assembly. In the fall of that year, I became concerned
that some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve com-
petitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports under
conditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. I expressed
this concern directly to my counterparts in key supplier and
recipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State to
emphasize multilateral action to limit this dangerous form of
competition.
7
At our initiative, the first meeting of major nuclear suppliers
was convened in London in April 1975. And a series of meetings
and intensive bilateral consultations followed.
As a result of these meetings, we have significantly raised
international standards through progressive new guidelines to govern
nuclear exports. These involve both improved safeguards and controls
to prevent diversion, and physical protection against theft and
sabotage. The United States has adopted these guidelines as policy
for nuclear exports.
In addition, we have acted to deal with the special dangers
associated with plutonium.
We have prohibited export of reprocessing and other
nuclear technologies that could contribute to
proliferation.
We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea and
Taiwan. We welcome the decisions of those nations
to forego such activities; we will continue to
discourage national reprocessing in other locations
of particular concern.
We negotiated agreements for cooperation with Egypt
and Israel which contain the strictest reprocessing
provisions and other nuclear controls ever included
in the twenty-year history of our nuclear cooperation
program.
8
In addition, the United States recently offered to
place its civil nuclear facilities under the safeguards
of the International Atomic Energy Agency -- and the
IAEA has approved a proposed agreement for this purpose.
NEW INITIATIVES
Last summer, I directed that a thorough review be undertaken
of all our nuclear policies and options to determine what further
steps were needed. I have considered carefully the results of
that review, held discussions with Congressional leaders, and
benefited from consultations with leaders of other nations. On
the basis of those activities, I am today announcing an important
new U.S. policy that will:
--
strengthen commitment of the nations of the world
to the goal of non-proliferation and build an
effective system of international controls to
prevent proliferation.
--
change and strengthen U.S. domestic nuclear policies
and programs to contribute to our non-proliferation
goals.
--
by these actions, establish a sound foundation for
the continued and increased use of nuclear energy
in the U.S. and in the world in a safe and economic
manner.
9
The task we face calls for an international cooperative
venture of unprecedented dimensions. The U.S. is prepared
to work with all others.
PRINCIPAL POLICY DECISIONS
In forging my new nuclear policy initiatives, I have
proceeded in the conviction that avoidance of proliferation
must take precedence over economic interests.
As a result of my nuclear policy review, I have
concluded
that the reprocessing and recycling of
plutonium ought not proceed until there is confidence that
the world community can effectively overcome the associated
risks of proliferation. The review also confirmed the major
role that nuclear power must play in meeting both domestic
and foreign energy needs, regardless of whether plutonium is
eventually found to be acceptable as fuel. To reach this
fundamental judgment requires vigorous action on both the
international and domestic fronts.
--
Internationally, I have decided that the United
States will undertake diplomatic initiatives, in
conjunction with nuclear suppliers and consumers,
to control the spread of plutonium and technologies
for separating plutonium. I am, therfore, directing
the Secretary of State to seek the support of other
10
nations for strengthened non-proliferation approaches
including the coordination of restraints and assuring
reliable fuel supplies in ways which prevent these
from becoming elements of commercial competition.
This effort requires the cooperation and support of suppliers
and consumers alike. Indeed peaceful uses of nuclear energy
can only prosper within a credible international system which
reduces nuclear risks for all nations and enables legitimate
energy needs to be met. In pursuing global approaches to non-
proliferation, the United States recognizes the responsibility
to cooperate with other states in realizing the peaceful benefits
of nuclear energy. And we will do so with nations prepared to
dedicate themselves to non-proliferation.
Domestically, we must ensure that our programs and
policies are compatible with our international
position on reprocessing. I have therefore
determined that the United States should no longer
regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce
plutonium as a necessary additional step in the nuclear
fuel cycle, and that it should be pursued only if the
economic, and above all, nonproliferation uncertainties are
resolved. I am directing the Administrator of the
Energy Research and Development Administration to develop
programs to conform with this policy.
11
To implement these overall policy positions, I have decided
on a number of policy decisions that are necessary and appro-
priate to meet our non-proliferation and energy objectives.
--
First, I have concluded that Government policies must
be changed to conform to my decision on deferral of
commercial scale chemical reprocessing of nuclear
fuel which results in the separation of plutonium.
Second, I call upon all nations to join with us
in exercising maximum restraint in the transfer of
reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities
by avoiding or deferring such sensitive exports
for a period of at least three years.
Third, I have concluded that new cooperative steps
are needed to help assure
that all nations have an adequate and reliable supply
of energy for their needs. I believe, most importantly,
that nuclear supplier nations have a special obligation
to assure that customer nations have an adequate supply
of fuel for their nuclear power plants, if those customer
nations forego the acquisition of reprocessing and
uranium enrichment capabilities and accept effective
proliferation controls.
Fourth, I have concluded that the U.S. must maintain
its role as a major and reliable world supplier of
nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes.
Our strong position as a competitive supplier has
provided the principal basis for our influence
and leadership in worldwide non-proliferation efforts.
12
A strong position will be
equally important in the future. While reaffirming
this nation's intent to be a reliable supplier, the
U.S. seeks no competitive advantage by virtue of
the worldwide system of effective non-proliferation
controls that I am calling for today.
-- Fifth, I have concluded that new efforts must be made
to urge all nations to join in a full-scale inter-
national cooperative effort -- which I shall outline
in detail -- to develop a
system of effective
controls to prevent proliferation.
-- Sixth' I have concluded that the U.S. will take new
steps with respect to its own exports to control
proliferation, while seeking to improve multilateral
guidelines.
-- Seventh, I have concluded that the U.S. should continue
to increase its use of nuclear energy in the years
ahead. Even with strong efforts to conserve, we
will have increasing demands for energy for a growing
economy. To satisfy these needs, we must rely on
increased use of both nuclear energy and coal until
more acceptable alternatives are developed. We will
push ahead with work on all promising alternatives
technologies but it is clear that we cannot expect a
major contribution to our energy supply from any of
these alternatives until late in this century.
--
Eighth, I have decided that the U.S. will sponsor
a program to evaluate reprocessing in support of
the international policies I have adopted.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
13
Finally, I have concluded that new steps are needed
to assure that we have in place when needed, both
in the U.S. and around the world, the facilities for
the long-term storage or disposal of nuclear wastes.
ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT OUR NUCLEAR POLICIES
In order to implement the nuclear policies that I have
outlined, a major effort will be required within the United
States and by the many nations around the world with an interest
in nuclear energy. To move forward with that effort I am today
announcing a number of actions that I am taking and a number of
proposals that I am making to other nations.
I.
Change in U.S. Policy on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
First, with respect to nuclear fuel reprocessing, I am
directing agencies of the Executive Branch to implement my decision
to delay commercial-scale reprocessing activities in the U.S.
until significant economic uncertainties are resolved:
Specifically:
--
I am directing the Administrator of the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) to:
change his agency's policies and programs which,
heretofore have been based on the assumption that
reprocessing would proceed
14
encourage industry to proceed immediately with
the expansion of spent fuel storage facilities,
thus assuring utilities that they need not be
concerned about shut down of nuclear reactors
because of delays.
identify the research and development efforts
needed to investigate alternatives to reprocessing
to include means of recovering the energy value
from used nuclear fuel without separating out
plutonium.
II. RESTRAINT IN THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
AND FACILITIES
Despite the gains that have been made, the dangers posed by
reprocessing and the prospect of uncontrolled plutonium demand
further, decisive international action. There is, in addition,
the parallel risk of spreading uranium enrichment technology
which must continue to be effectively controlled, and is included
in the concepts proposed throughout this statement.
To meet these dangers I propose the following comprehensive
international program which flows directly from the fundamental
policy decisions I have announded today:
--
I call upon all nations to join with us in exercising
maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and enrich-
ment technology and facilities by avoiding or deferring such
sensitive exports for a period of at least three years.
-15
This will allow suppliers and consumers to work together
to establish reliable means for meeting nuclear needs with
minimum risk, as we assess carefully the wisdom of plutonium
use. As we proceed in these efforts, we must not be influenced
by pressures to approve the export of these sensitive facilities.
III. ASSURING AN ADEQUATE ENERGY SUPPLY FOR CUSTOMER NATIONS
--
I urge nuclear suppliers to provide nuclear consumers
with nuclear fuel services, in place of sensitive nuclear
technology.
Nations accepting effective nonproliferation restraints
have a right to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear
reactors and associated, nonsensitive fuel.
All such nations would share in the benefits of an assured
supply of nuclear fuel, even though the number and location of
sensitive facilities to generate this fuel is limited to meet
nonproliferation goals. The availability of diverse fuel cycle
services is several different nations can provide ample assurance
to consumers of a continuing and stable source of supply.
It is also desirable to continue studying the idea of a few
suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle centers to serve
regional needs, when effectively safeguarded and economically
warranted. Through these and related means, we can minimize
incentives for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.
16
--
The United States stands ready to take action, in
cooperation with other concerned nations, to assure
reliable supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable prices
to any country accepting responsible restraints on its
nuclear power program with regard to reprocessing,
plutonium disposition, and enrichment technology.
At my direction, the Secretary of State will initiate consul-
tations to explore arrangements for coordinating fuel service
supply resources and for developing other means of ensuring
that suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers will be
able to receive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of low-
enriched uranium fuel and fuel services. These discussions will
address ways to ensure against economic disadvantage to
cooperating nations and to remove any sources of competition
which could undermine our common nonproliferation efforts.
To contribute to this initiative, with regard to current
U.S. recipients, and in new agreements for cooperation, the
U.S. will offer binding letters of intent for the supply of
nuclear fuel to countries willing to accept such responsible
restraints.
In addition, the United States is prepared to enter
into negotiations or arrangements for mutual agreement
on disposition of spent fuel with consumer nations
that adopt responsible restraints.
17
Where appropriate and where it can demonstrably foster
our common and cooperative nonproliferation objectives, in
return for mutually agreed on disposition of spent fuel, the
United States will provide consumer nations with either fresh,
low-enriched uranium fuel of equivalent energy value or reim-
bursement. The United States seeks no commercial advantage
in pursuing options for fuel disposition and assured fuel
supplies.
--
Finally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative
efforts with other countries in developing their
indigenous energy resources.
The U.S., in its world leadership role, has proposed the
establishment of an International Energy Institute, specifically
designed to help developing countries match the most economic
and readily available sources of energy to their power needs.
In many cases, this source will be nonnuclear. Through this
Institute and other appropriate means, we will offer technological
assistance in the development of indigenous energy resources.
IV
Strengthening the U.S. Role as a Reliable Supplier.
If the U. S. is to continue its leadership role in world-
wide non-proliferation efforts, it must be a reliable and
competitive supplier of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful
purposes. There are two principal actions we can take to
contribute to this objective:
18
--
I will submit to the new Congress, proposed
legislation that will permit the expansion of
capacity in the United States to produce enriched
uranium, including the authority needed for ex-
pansion of the Government-owned plant at Portsmouth,
Ohio and authority to enter into cooperate agree-
ments with private firms that are prepared to
finance, build, own and operate enrichment plants.
U.S. capacity has been fully committed since mid-1974
with the result that no new orders could be signed. The Congress
did not act on my full proposal and provided only limited and
temporary authority for proceeding with the Portsmouth plant.
We must have additional authority to proceed with the expansion
of capacity without further delay.
--
I will work closely with the Congress to assure that
the legislation referred to above for improving our
export controls results in a system that provides
maximum assurance that the U.S. will be a reliable
supplier to other nations for the full period of
agreements.
One of the principal concerns of opponents of export
legislation was the fear that foreign customers could be
subjected to arbitrary new controls imposed well after a
long-term agreement for nuclear power plants and fuel had
been signed. In the case of nuclear plants and fuel, reliable
long-term agreements are essential and we must adopt export
19
controls that provide realiability while meeting non-proliferation
objectives.
V.
International Controls Against Proliferation
To reinforce the foregoing policies, we must develop means
to establish international restraints over the accumulation of
plutonium itself, whether in separated form or in unprocessed
spent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under national
control is a major destabilizing influence and, as such, a
primary proliferation risk.
---
The United States will, in the immediate future,
pursue discussions aimed at the establishment of
a new international regime to provide for storage
of excess civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel.
I am directing that we vigorously pursue this proposal
which we made to the International Atomic Energy Agency and
other interested nations last spring.
Creation of such a regime will greatly strengthen world
confidence that the growing accumulation of excess plutonium
and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending reentry into the
nuclear fuel cycle or other safe disposition. I urge the IAEA,
which is empowered to establish such a depository, to give
prompt implementation to this concept.
20
Once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in
operation, we are prepared to place our own excess civil plu-
tonium and spent fuel under its control. Moreover, we are
prepared to consider providing a site for international storage
under IAEA auspices.
The inspection system of the IAEA remains a key element
in our entire nonproliferation strategy. The world community
must make sure that the Agency has the technical and human
resources needed to keep pace with its expanding responsibili-
ties. At my direction, we have recently committed substantial
additional resources to help upgrade the IAEA's technical
safeguards capabilities, and I believe we must strengthen
further the safeguards functions of the IAEA.
--
I am directing that a major international effort
be undertaken to ensure that adequate resources for
this purpose are made available, and that we mobilize
our best scientific talent to support that Agency.
Two of our principal national laboratories have been
directed to provide assistance, on a continuing basis,
to the IAEA Secretariat.
The terrible increase in violence and terrorism throughout
the world has sharpened our awareness of the need to assure
rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear materials and equip-
ment. Fortunately, the need to cope with this problem is now
broadly recognized. Many nations have responded to the initiatives
21
which I have taken in this area by materially strengthening
their physical security and by cooperating in the development
of international guidelines by the IAEA. As a result of con-
sultations among the major suppliers, provision for adequate
physical security is becoming a normal condition of supply.
Steps are still urgently needed, however, to upgrade international
prent high U.S. staudards,
physical security systems to meet international norms, and to
assure timely international collaboration in the recovery of
lost or stolen materials.
---
I have directed that the United States vigorously
address the problem of physical security at both
bilateral and multilateral levels, including explora-
tion of a possible international convention.
The United States is prepared to embark with all its
resources on development of the system of international controls
that I have here outlined. Even when complete, however, no
system of controls is likely to be effective, if a potential
violator judges that his acquisition of a nuclear explosive
will be received with indifference by the international
community.
DERALO FORD LIBRARY
22
Any material violation of a nuclear safeguards agreement
-- especially the diversion of nuclear material for use in
making explosives -- must be universally judged to be an
extremely serious affront to the world community, calling
for the immediate imposition of drastic sanctions.
-- I serve notice today that the United States
will respond to violation by any nation of any safe-
guards agreement to which we are a party with, at a
minimum. immediate cut off of our supply of nuclear
fuel and cooperation to that nation.
We would consider further steps, not necessarily confined
to the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator
nation. Nor will our actions be limited to violations of
agreements in which we are directly involved. In the event
of material violation of any safeguards agreement, particularly
agreements with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate consulta-
tions with all interested nations.
Universal recognition of the total unacceptability of
the abrogation or violation of any nonproliferation agreements
is one of the most important steps which can be taken to pre-
vent further proliferation. We invite all concerned govern-
ments to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear wrong-
doing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms of in-
ternational behavior, which would set in motion strong and
immediate countermeasures.
23
VI CHANGES IN U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES
During the past two years, the United States has
strengthened its own national nuclear export policies. Our
interests, however, are not limited to controls alone. The
United States has a special responsibility to share the
benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with other countries.
We have sought to serve other nations as a reliable Supplier
of nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice between
economic benefits and progress toward our nonproliferation
goals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to
nonproliferation. But there should be no incompatibility
between nonproliferation and assistign other nations in en-
joying the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, if all supplier
countries pursue common nuclear export policies. There is
need, however, for even more rigorous controls than those
now commonly accepted, and for policies that favor nations
accepting responsible nonproliferation limitations.
-- I have decided that we will henceforth
apply new criteria in judging whether to
enter into new or expanded nuclear coopera-
tion with a nonnuclear weapon state:
Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
will be a strong positive factor favoring
cooperation.
Nations that have not yet adhered to the
Non-proliferation Treaty will receive posi-
tive recognition if they are prepared to
24
submit to full fuel cycle safeguard, pending
adherence.
Recipient nations prepared to forego, or
postpone for a substantial period, the
establishment of national reprocessing or
enrichment activities or, in certain cases,
prepared to shape and schedule their re-
processing and enriching facilities to foster
nonproliferation needs, will be favored.
Positive recognition will also be given to
nations prepared to participate in an inter-
national storage regime, under which excess
fuel and any separated plutonium would be
placed pending use.
Exceptional cases may occur in which nonproliferation
will best be served by cooperating with states not yet meeting
these tests. However, new agreements which are exceptions to
these criteria will require my personal approval prior to
their submission to the Congress
.
With respect to countries that are current recipients of
US Nuclear supply, I am directing the Secretary of State to
enter into negotiations with the objective of conforming these
agreements to established international guidelines, and to
seek through diplomatic initiatives to obtain their acceptance
of our new criteria.
- 25 -
We must recognize the need for effective multilateral
approaches to nonproliferation and prevent nuclear export
controls from becoming an element of commercial competition.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to
intensify discussions with other nuclear
suppliers aimed at expanding common guide-
lines for peaceful cooperative agreements
so that they conform with these criteria.
In this regard, the United States would discuss ways of
developing incentives that can lead to acceptance of these
criteria, such as assuring reliable fuel supplies for nations
accepting new restraints.
- 26 -
The reliability of American assurances to other nations
is an asset that few, if any. nations of the world can match.
It must not be eroded in the nuclear, or any other, area.
Indeed, nothing could more prejudice our efforts to strengthen
our existing nonproliferation understandings that arbitrary
suspension or unwarranted delays in meeting supply commitments
to countries which are dealing with us in good faith regarding
effective safeguards and restraints.
Despite intensive personal efforts on my part, the 94th
Congress adjourned without passing nuclear export legislation
which would have strengthened our effectiveness in dealing
with other nations on nuclear matters. In the absence of
such legislation, I am directing the Secretary of State to
work closely with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure
proper emphasis on nonproliferation concerns in the nuclear
export licensing process.
I will continue to work with Congress to achieve improve-
ments in our nuclear export laws, with due account for the
need for broad-based nultilateral support. I will work to
develop bipartisan support for new legislation in their field
during the next session of Congress.
27
VII. INCREASED USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
I believe that we must increase the use of nuclear energy
in the United States in the years ahead. Even with strong
efforts to conserve, energy demands will increase in response
to the needs of a growing economy. The only alternative over
the next 15 to 20 years to increased use of both nuclear
energy and coal is greater reliance on imported oil which
will jeopardize our nation's strength and welfare.
We now have 62 nuclear plants licensed to operate in the
United States providing about 9 percent of our electrical
energy. By 1985, we will have about 150 plants, supplying
about 20 percent of the Nation's electricity.
In most cases, electricity from nuclear plants is cheaper
than that produced from either oil or coal-fired plants. My
environmental advisers believe that nuclear energy is pre-
ferable from an environmental point-of-view to other
principal ways of generating electricity.
Commercial nuclear power has an excellent safety record,
with nearly 200 plant years of experience (over 18 years)
without a single death from a nuclear accident. I have acted
to assure that the record continues in the years ahead. I
increased funds for the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion and for the Energy Research and Development Administration
for reactor safety R&D.
The decisions I have announced today to do not effect
the U.S. program of research and development on the breeder
reactor. That program assumes that no decision on the
28
commercial operations of breeder reactors, which require
plutonium fuel, will be made before 1986. Nor will my
decision on reprocessing affect our ability to use nuclear
power in the U.S.
I believe that, with the changes I am announcing today,
we are on the right track with our nuclear power program in
America.
VIII. Reprocessing Evaluation Program
The world community requires an aggressive program
to build the international controls and cooperative regimes
I have just outlined. I am prepared to mount such a program
in the United States.
--- I am directing the Administrator of
ERDA to:
-- Begin immediately to define a repro-
cessing and recycle program aimed at
meeting our international objectives.
This program should complement the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
ongoing considerations of safety safe-
guards and environmental requirements
for reprecessing and recycling activities,
particularly its Generic Environmental
Statement on Mixed Oxide Fuels.
29
-- Investigate the feasibility of re-
covering the energy value from used
nuclear fuel without separating out
plutonium.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State
to invite other nations and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to participate in designing and carrying
out ERDA's reprocessing and recycle
program, in order to ensure that inter-
national energy cooperation and non-
proliferation objectives are met.
I will direct that activities carried out
in the U.S. in connection with this program
are subject to full IAEA safeguards and
inspections.
30
IX. Nuclear Waste Management
There is one area of our domestic nuclear program that,
in the past, did not receive the attention it warranted. That
is the area of long-term management of nuclear wastes from
our commercial nuclear power plants. This is an area that has
concerned me as it has others. In my 1977 Budget, I proposed
a four-fold increase in funding for this program, which involves
the activities of several Federal agencies, to see what addi-
tional actions might be needed to assure that a Federally-owned
and managed repository for long-term nuclear wastes would be
available in the mid-1980's, well before significant wastes
begin to accumulate.
I have now been assured that the technology for long-term
management or disposal of nuclear wastes is available but
demonstrations are needed.
--
I have directed the Administrator of ERDA to take
the necessary action to speed up this program so as
to demonstrate all components of waste management
technology by 1978 and to demonstrate a complete
repository for such wastes by 1985.
--
I have further directed that the first demonstration
depository which will be owned by the Government be
submitted for licensing by the independent NRC to
assure its safety and acceptability to the public.
31
In view of the decisions announced today, I have also
directed the Administrator of ERDA to assure that the waste
repository will be able to handle spent fuel elements
as well as the separated and solidified waste that would
result if we proceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing.
The United States continues to provide world leadership
in nuclear waste management. I am inviting other nations to
participate in and learn from our programs. I am also
directing the Secretary of State to discuss with other
nations and the IAEA the possibility of centrally located
multinationally controlled nuclear waste repositories so
that the number of sites that are needed can be limited.
I do not underestimate the challenge represented in the
creation of a world-wide program that will permit capturing
the benefits of nuclear energy while protecting against nuclear
proliferation. The challenge is one that can be managed
only partially and temporarily by technical measures.
It can be managed fully if the task is faced realistically
with determination and foresight of leaders who will resist
perceived short-term advantages in favor of fundamental long-
term gains. We call upon all leaders to recognize that their
individual and collective interests are best served by inter-
nationally assured and safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services
and storage. We ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear
capabilities which are of doubtful economic value and have
ominous implications for nuclear proliferation and instability
in the world.
32
The record to date is not perfect. The broad consensus
against the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of
encouragement, but it is certainly not a basis for complacency.
I do not underestimate the scope and complexity of the
challenge and the program I have just put forward to meet it.
Success depends on an extraordinary coordination of the
policies of all nations toward the common good. The U.S. is
prepared to lead, but we cannot succeed alone. If nations can
work together constructively and cooperatively to manage our
common nuclear problems we will enhance our collective security.
And we will be better able to concentrate our energies and our
resources on the great tasks of construction rather than
consume them in increasingly dangerous rivalry.
THE WHITE HOUSE
REQUEST
WASHINGTON
October 21, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
FROM:
GLENN Sleen SCHLEEDE
SUBJECT:
NON-PROLIFERATION STATEMENT
Attached at TAB A is a copy of the State-Fri draft marked
up to include OMB comments and those that I considered
most critical in order to limit damage. You should be
aware, however, that this marked up draft does not:
Reflect changes to the extremely negative tone at
the beginnong of the statement.
Balance the treatment of international and domestic
matters (because that requires major structural changes).
Include a desirable description of domestic actions (we
sought only to remove inaccuracies).
Attached at TAB B is the version that I understand Dave
Elliott sent to Brent Scowcroft. I have not had time to
compare the two to see how many changes it includes. I
understand from OMB that it does not deal with some of
the problems that Jim Mitchell feels are important but
which Dave Elliott told him he would have to take up with
the State Department (those discussions are unknown).
In case it has been lost in confusion over the last two
days, I would like to take this opportunity to summarize
my principal concerns about the State-Fri draft:
It is unnecessarily negative in tone. I believe an
effective system of proliferation controls can exist
along side a program of expanded domestic use of
nuclear energy.
I believe it is unbalanced in its treatment of inter-
national concerns compared to domestic policies, programs
and actions.
BERALD FORD VIBRARY
102104
-2-
I believe its tone will lend support to passage of
the 6-7 nuclear initiatives that are on the State
ballots for November 2.
I believe the negative tone -- particularly when
contrasted to past Presidential statements about
nuclear energy -- will now make it impossible for
all but the most sophisticated to distinguish between
the positions of the two candidates.
There are statements in the unchanged State-Fri draft
that would make it difficult for any nuclear power
plants to be built in the State of California, given
laws recently passed in that State.
The process used in developing the statement has
precluded the normal consultation with heads of
domestic agencies concerned or their designated
representatives. Only Bob Fri and perhaps one NRC
staffer has seen or participated in developing the
State-Fri draft.
Attachments.
TAB A
to
FINAL OMB
A STATEMENT BY PR
FIDENT
ORD
Today the peoples of the world face a threat unlike
any in history. It is the threat of nuclear weapons
donetes
proliferation, the threat that nuclear explosives will
new
new regions of the world,
spread -- to large nations, to small nations and even
to terrorists. who have no natior at all It is a threat
that is the more formidable because it arises from the
promise of nuclear power as a realistic alternative to
continuing dependence on diminishing and uncertain
supplies of imported oil.
If we fail to comprehend and contain this. threat,
the result, inevitably, will be tragedy. But we can --
and we will -- end this danger by understanding it
clearly and acting wisely in concert with other responsible
nations. 91 For a world in which the possession of nuclear
arms becomes increasingly widespread would be a world
in which the security of all is imperiled. Maintaining
international stability in such an environment would be
incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of
regional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation
would be immeasurably increased -- if not through direct
attack, then through a process of ever expanding escalation.
Nor can we ignore the perils of theft or seizure which
VERALD VUBIT FORD
- 2 -
increased availability of nuclear weapons must entail.
The problem of nuclear proliferation has been a
major concern of my Administration since I first took
office. Last summer I directed that our efforts be
.
brought to their culmination by a complete review of
our nuclear policies. I received the results of this
review before Labor Day, and have since deliberated
with great care on its recommendations.
Today, I am announcing an important new American polices
policy based on those recommendations. We have
approached the major supplier countries to begin
discussion of these policiés, and I am convinced that
our new policy will benefit not only the national
interest of the United States, but also the welfare
of all nations for generations to come.
My policy deals with the world as it is, not as
we might wish it; it is a policy that reconciles legitimate
national interests in nuclear power with non-
proliferation imperatives. Indeed, developing the
policies and the programs to prevent proliferation
without eliminating the enormous benefit of nuclear
energy is one of the major challenges facing all the
nations of the world today.
FORD is LIBRARY OFRALD
- 3 -
-- There are legitimate interests in nuclear
power. The 1973 energy crisis dramatically demon-
strated to all nations not only the dangers of
excessive reliance on oil imports, but also the
reality that their and} the world's supply of fossil
fuels inevitably is dwindling. As a result, nuclear
energy is now seen by many nations as an indispensable
way to satisfy rising energy demands without prematurely.
depleting finite fossil fuel resources. Nuclear energy
can lessen their deepening dependence on foreign energy
sources, and diminish the world economy's vulnerability
to fluctuations in the supply of oil. And for nations
with no fossil fuel reserves of their own, nuclear
power can be central to their economic well being.
We must understand the motives which are leading these
even
states to place greater emphasis than we do on nuclear
A
power development. For unless we comprehend their real
needs we cannot expect to find ways of working with
them to ensure that their legitimate concerns and ours
are both met.
-- Yet the peaceful application of nuclear energy
confronts us with a dilemma. Nuclear fuel, once it has
been burned to produce power, contains plutonium, which
can be chemically separated from the spent fuel. That
FORD i LIBRARY 038470
- 4 -
plutonium can then be used to help generate additional
power. Unfortunately -- and this is the root of the
problem --- plutonium is a key ingredient of nuclear
explosives. The world community simply cannot afford
to let this dangerous material and or the its technics related reparted melded to
technology spread uncontrolled over the globe. We
it Reor
wast
should not permit it to be produced and utilized unless
and until the most stringent conditions and arrangements
and advised to
for avoiding proliferation are developed, and observed.
-- But no single nation, not even the United States,
can hope by itself to control effectively the spread of
ansthe revel availability
plutonium and reprocessing technology. The United States
meterialsonef
once was the predominant supplier of. worldwide nuclear
technology energy
givenent fultrences
While we remainia leader in this field, today
other suppliers have come to share the international
market --- with the US now supplying about (half of
the international market. We cannot impose our preferences.
Therefore it is essential that we exercise our leadership
through catalyzing cooperative international action,
not through futile attempts to impose our preferences
on suppliers and consumers. We must avoid the temptation
for rhetorical gestures, empty threats or righteous
posturing.
From the outset of the nuclear age, the United
States has recognized the dangers of proliferation. And
GERALD
- 5 -
we have been a leader in efforts to bring them under
control. We took steps to share the benefits of the
peaceful atom, while acting to control its spread for
military purposes when President Eisenhower proposed
establishment of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. We took the leading role in negotiating the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Since according type privity to non-putiferstion
Non proliferation has been 2 top priority concern
shortly after
of my Administration since I took office in 1974, Since
then we have made considerable progress in reducing the
possibility that of increasingly widespread possession of
which could
tone
atomic weapons would eventually spark the holocaust that
all mankind fears.
But the urgency of our task has become even more
pressing. We and other nations now face critical
nuclear policy decisions.
In forging my new nuclear policy initiatives, I
have proceeded in the conviction that anvironmental:
safety and avoidance of proliferation must take precedence
as
over economic and commercial interests. Great though
are
the economic benefits of nuclear energy Rray be, they
15
cannot justify the dangers that may threaten a world
Mo
faced with the uncontrolled availability of plutonium
and other nuclear explosive capabilities.
FORD & LIBRARY 938470
- 6 -
As a result of my nuclear policy review, I have
Too neg
believe strongly
therefore concluded that the reprocessing and recycling
of plutonium onght should not proceed until we are confident
thereis confidence
that the world community can effectively overcome the
isach this
associated risks of proliferation, To implement my
fundamental secision judgement requires vigorous dusert action on both
the international and domestic fronts.
Internationally, I have decided that, (while continuing
energy
to assure the availability of efficiently produced and
accepted
and safecuardable nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes
clitibing
our
the United States, will undertake a major diplomatic
cortio
effort to reduce the worldwide risks of plutonium access,
and associated technology. Indeed, peaceful nuclear
cooperation can. only prosper within a credible international
system which reduces nuclear risks for all nations and
X
enables legitimate energy needs to be met. This effort
X
requires the cooperation and support of suppliers and
InsertB
consumers alike.
H
am directing the Secretary of State
to, seek the support of other nations for strengthened
non proliferation approaches and for preventing controls
from becoming elements of commercial competition
In
pursuing global approaches to non-proliferation, the
United States recognizes the responsibility to cooperate
with other states in realizing the peaceful benefits
of nuclear energy.. And we will do so with all nations
FORD
i LIBRARY 9ERALD
South west edering commercial
competition goals. Whick can undermine all
Insert A - page 6
The review also confirmed the major role that nuclear
power must play in mating pe both domestic and foreign energy
needs regardless of whether plutonium is to be separated
and used as more fuel.
Internationally, I have decided that the United States
additional
will undertake a major acceleration of our efforts to
control the spread of plutonium and technologies for
separating plutonium with a view toward reducing
commercial competition which can undermine our non-
proliferation goals.
FORD it LIBRARY 078870
dnsertB
Page 6: Third sentence after the underlined portion change to read
as follows:
"I am directing the Secretary of State to seek the support of other
nations for strengthened nonproliferation [approaches] actions, including
the coordination of export restraints and assuring reliable fuel supplies
in ways which prevent these from becoming elements of commercial competition."
DERALD FORD LIBRARY
prepared to dedicate the elves to non-proliferation.
Domestically, we
ensure that our programs
and policies are compatible with our international
position on reprocessing. I have therefore determined
that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing
of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a justifiable
$)
necessary additional step in the nuclear fuel cycle,
and should be sursued only if the
economic, envirommental and above all non-proliferation
A
uncertainties are can ba successfull resolved. On the
contrary Before we decide whether to apply this
technology for commercial purposes, we must be convinced
that our course is not only technically sound but that
28 supports our vital non-proliferation objectives.
I am directing the Administrator of the Energy Research
and Development Administration to develop scordent energy
programs programs to conform with this policy.
the
We are committed to construct a new era of global
in nuclear
cooperation founded on strong US support. From this
basis, Dasis, I am authorizing puposing a nuclear policy to deal:
specifically with the three major areas, of concern:
coordinated WF international action; strengthened my national
export policies; and ffective domestic programs reprocessing needs is
diveloping slimpen
First, I am directing new and accelerated-international
initiatives to;
complement there
FORD & LIBRA 076870
+ -1 8
-- persuade other supplier nations to join us in
-
exercising maximum restraint in the transfer of
reprocessing and enrichment technology and equipment;
ordisadvantal
Coolder the the
persuade suppliers to offer, and consumers to
without
accept, Anuclear fuel services instead of sensitive
Earl
technology, so that countries accepting responsible
restraints in connection with US nuclear assistance
1
will have an assured supply of nuclear fuel;
--- assume responsibility for accepting the spent
fuel of consuming nations, as appropriate, in return
91 pursui the stathsburent of
international regime for the 5 things of
excess civil platonium and spent
for financial reimbursement or fresh reactor fuel of
equivalent energy value;
to, explore arrangements for coordinating the
resources of suppliers SO, that they can offer assured
and economical fuel services without commercial.
advantage or disadvantage;
reactorsfull;
--- urge a major- commitment of financial and scientific
resources to strengthen the sefeguards capabilities of
the International Atomic- Energy Agency and to vigorously
pursue cooperative international efforts to upgrade
physical security standards; and
--.- set a firm policy of international penalties -yen
for safeguards violations.
Second, in recognition of the continuing need to
exercise leadership in our own national export policies,
FORD & GERALD LIBRARI
InsutA
Page 8: Combine the second and fourth bullets, as follows
-- Explore arrangements for coordinating the resources of suppliers
so that they can offer to countries accepting responsible restraints
assured nuclear fuel services, instead of sensitive technology, at
equitable prices without commercial advantage or disadvantage.
FORD is GERALD LIBRARI
reway I
wear - 9 - alvadymede $15 to supply
am directing that the United States take into account
the edu following new criteria for coo perative agreements expeaceful
nuclear cooporation with non-nuclear-weapon states:
-- whether technologies recipients are parties to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty or are prepared to accept IAEA
safeguards on all nuclear facilities;
-- whether they are prepared to forego or postpone
national reprocessing and sensitive enrichment activities;
and
-- whether recipients are willing to participate
in an international spent fuel and plutonium storage
regime.
consideration that would
Third, to support our overriding non-proliferation
programs, I authorizing ERPA ah to developprograms experimental forwy
objectives, and in consultation with other interested
expanded
states, taking full account of their policies and
no
LO assess the feasibility, benefits, and safety
of commercial reprocessing and waste disposal,
--
to develop and test new safeguards approaches;
and
by pursue technology alternatives to reprocessing.
These are the foundations of our new approach, and
the three areas which our policy will address. Let me
now turn in more detail to these three central areas of
concern.
sumin increase am understanding fand helpts umove
LARD FORD LIBRARY
remaining uncertainties with,
the economics, safequards and energy benefits
of recycle (Flese would
complement NPr! X evaluations the necessity lot
Insert A pq
Page 9: Rewrite the first half of the paga, 35 follows:
[Fix 2: Refer to spacific criteria]
I am directing that the Secretary of State urgently pursue negotiations
with other supplier nations to expand the common nonproliferation criteria
to be applied to agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with non-
expanded
should
nuclear weapon states. These criteria include the following:
-- Whether recipients are parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty
or are prepared to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities;
-- Whether they are prepared to forego or postpone national reprocessing
and sensitive enrichment activities; and
-- Whether recipients are willing to participate in an international
spent fuel and plutonium storage regime.
These criteria [ when agreed upon for addition to the common supplier OPTion OP
guidelines will be applied by the United States to all agreements to
export peaceful nuclear materials, and I will submit to the Congress
legislation to give these criteria the force of law.
GERALD R. FORD
-
International Initiative
A successful policy of reducing the worldwide
risks associated with plutonium will require the
support and cooperation of both supplier and consumer
countries. To secure such support and cooperation,
we must demonstrate to other nations that concurrence
with the initiatives I am launching today will not
harm their legitimate economic interests, while
enhancing the future safety of all nations and all
peoples. We will work at solving economic problems
with all nations that join us in giving precedence
to non-proliferation and environmenta goals.
A
unilateral decision by the United States to
defer commitment to reprocessing would serve no
useful purpose if other nuclear supplier nations
plunged ahead with the export of reprocessing technology.
My second major decision today -- to undertake a major
should
diplomatic effort to reduce the worldwide risks of
access to plutonium and sensitive technology
-- therefore flows directly from the first.
FORD & LIBRARY 07V839
During the past two years, I have vigorously
pursuednon-proliferation through multilateral cooperation
with other nations. Because of the growth of nuclear
capabilities among several potential supplier nations,
I have rejected highly publicized or unilateral
approaches, which not only would be futile, but also
could easily alienate both supplier and consumer nations
whose cooperation is essential to the success .of our
non-proliferation efforts.
My most immediate concern has been to improve
international safeguards and controls. In 1974, soon
after I assumed office, we proposed strengthening and
standardizing non-proliferation measures at the United
Nations General Assembly.
In the fall of 1974, I became concerned that some
nuclear supplier countries appeared to be prepared to
offer nuclear exports under conditions less rigorous
than we believed prudent, in order to achieve
competitive advantage. I communicated these concerns
directly to my counterparts in key supplier and
recipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State
to explore ways of emphasizing multilateral action
FORD i 078830 LIBRAR
- 12 -
x
to limit this dangerous form of competition.
At our initiative, the first meeting of major
nuclear suppliers was convened in London in April,
1975. Additional meetings and intensive bilateral
consultations followed.
As a result of these meetings, we have developed
applied
to govern nuclear exports --
involving both improved safeguards and controls to
prevent diversion, and physical protection against
theft and sabotage. This achievement has significantly
raised international norms. The United States has
adopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear exports.
In addition, we have acted to deal with the
special dangers associated with plutonium. Even prior
to today's decisions, the United States took the
following steps:
-- We have prohibited export of reprocessing and
other nuclear technologies that could contribute to
proliferation.
-- We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea
and Taiwan. We welcome their significant decisions
to forego such activities and we will continue our
efforts to discourage national reprocessing
From
area
Exconeern
GERALD FORD
- 13 -
-- We have negotiated agreements for cooperation
with Egypt and Israel which contain the strictest
reprocessing provisions and other nuclear controls
ever included in the twenty-year history of our
nuclear cooperation program.
Other important gains in the effort against
proliferation have been made during the two years of
my Administration. Last year, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, and other European states completed
ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
This
year, Japan also ratified the Treaty
step after many years of serious debate
In addition, last month, at my direction, we
proposed to the International Atomic Energy Agency
an agreement placing US civil nuclear facilities under
the safeguards of the IAEA, following extensive negotiations.
This has now been approved by that Agency.
Despite the gains that have been made, the dangers
the passpect of
posed by reprocessing and n uncontrolled plutonium demand
further, decisive international action. There is, in
addition, the parallel risk of spreading uranium
cl
enrichment technology which must continue to be
effectively controlled
To meet these dangers I propose the following
comprehensive international program which flows directly
DERALD FORD LEDRAS
- 14
from the fundamental policy decisions I have announced
today:
I call upon all nations to join with us in
exercising maximum restraint in the transfer of
reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities
by avoiding or deferring such sensitive exports for a
period of at least three years. This will allow
suppliers and consumers to find reliable ways of
meeting nuclear needs with minimum risk, as we assess
carefully the wisdom of plutonium use. As we proceed
in these efforts, we must not be influenced by
pressures to approve the export of these sensitive
facilities.
In addition, I urge nuclear suppliers to provide
nuclear consumers with nuclear fuel services in place
of sensitive nuclear technology. Nations accepting
effective non-proliferation restraints have a right
to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear
reactors and associated, non-sensitive fuel.
All such nations should share in the benefits of
an assured supply of nuclear fuel, even though the
number and location of sensitive facilities to
generate this fuel is limited to meet non-proliferation
goals. The availability of diverse fuel cycle services
A. work tagether to address adminity
approceding will
FORD i LIBRAR 076880
15 -
in several different nations can provide ample
assurance to consumers of a continuing and stable
source of supply.
It is also desirable to continue studying the
idea of a few suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle
centers to serve regional needs, when effectively --
dount A
safeguarded and economically warranted. Through
these and related means, we can minimize incentives
for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.
The United States will do its part to ensure
that any country accepting responsible restraints
on its nuclear power program with regard to enrichment,
reprocessing and plutonium disposition will have an
assured supply of nuclear fuel. To this end, I have
directed the Secretary of State with regard to current
US recipients, and in new agreements for cooperation,
to offer binding letters of intent for the supply of
nuclear fuel to countires willing to accept such
responsible restraints. These would be fulfilled
either by new government capacity or by private
suppliers, at our discretion.
The United States is now
prepared to enter into negotiations or arrangements
that adopt responsible
with consumer nations, adapting restraints under which
LX winld matually agree on
they would accord us rights of disposition over their
spent fuel, where appropriate and where it can demonstrably
foster our non-proliferation objectives. In return,
IRALD FORD
KnoertA
Page 15 and top of Page 16 (through "supply of nonsensitive nuclear
fuel "): Refocus, starting with first underlined sentence, as
follows:
The United States stands ready to take action, in cooperation with
other concerned nations, to assure reliable supplies of nuclear fuel
at equitable prices to any country accepting responsible restraints
on its nuclear power program. At my direction, the Secretary of State
will initiate consultations to explore arrangements for coordinating
fuel service supply resources and for developing other means of ensuring
that suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers will be able to
receive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of low-enriched uranium
fuel and fuel services. These discussions will address ways to remove
any sources of competition which could undermine our common nonproliferation
efforts.
In addition, the United States, in cooperation with other supplier
nations, is prepared to enter into negotiations or arrangements with
consumer nations that adopt responsible restraints to buy-back spent
nuclear fuel. Where appropriate and where it can demonstrably foster
our nonproliferation objectives, in return for mutually agreed on disposition
of spent fuel, the United States will provide consumer nations with either
fresh, low-enriched ùranium fuel of equivalent energy value or reimbursement.
In pursuing a program of assured fuel supply and fuel exchange, the
United States seeks the cooperation of all nations in coordinating provision
of these services. The United States seeks no commercial advantage.
FORDO is GERALD LIBRARY
- 16 -
these nations would be assured
of either reimbursement or fresh, low-enriched fuel
of equivalent energy value. In any such arrangement, our
objective will be to ensure against any economic
disadvantage to the cooperating nation.
In pursuing a program of assured fuel supply
and fuel exchange, the United States seeks no commercial
advantage over other suppliers. The program can and
will be administered in a way which avoids unfair
advantage in the sale of reactors or related services.
in
the
SCIC
At my direction, the Secretary of State will initiate
stion,
consultations to explore arrangements for coordinating
such resources and developing other means of ensuring
nots
that suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers
will be able to receive an interrupted and economical
De
to
supply of non-sensitive nuclear fuel and fuel services.
non
To reinforce these policies, we must develop means
einforce
restrients
accumitation of
to establish international control over the plutonium
ish
itself, whether in separated form or in unprocessed
spent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under national
1.
The
accumulation
control is a major destabilizing influence and, as such,
a
a primary proliferation risk.
The United States will, in the immediate future,
pursue discussions aimed at the establishment of a new
international regime to provide for storage of excess
civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel. I am directing
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
- 17 -
that we vigorously pursue this proposal which we made
to the International Atomic Energy Agency and other
interested nations last spring.
Creation of such a regime will greatly strengthen
world confidence that the growing accumulation of excess
plutonium and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending
reentry into the nuclear fuel cycle or other safe dis-
position. I urge the IAEA, which is empowered to
establish such a depository, to give prompt implementation
to this concept.
Once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime
is in operation, we are prepared to place our own excess
civil plutonium and spent fuel under its control.
Moreover, we are prepared to consider providing a site
for international storage under IAEA auspices.
The inspection system of the IAEA remains a key
element in our entire non-proliferation strategy. The
world community must make sure that the Agency has the
technical and human resources needed to keep pace with
its expanding responsibilities
I therefore DL have directed & major commitment of
additions esources to the TABA, and assuated
a mobilization of our best scientific talent to support
the Agency. Two of our principal national laboratories
nitho fearetary gettoleto initiate evlichwill discussions seek with the
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
AE to expernatheir
and have
- 18 -
have been directed to provide assistance, on a continuing
basis, to the IAEA Secretariat.
The terrible increase in violence and terrorism
throughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the
need to assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear
materials and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope
with this problem is now broadly recognized. Many
nations have responded to the initiatives which I have
taken in this area by materially strengtening their
physical security and by cooperating in the dévelopment
of international guidelines by the IAEA. As a result
of consultations among the major suppliers, provision
for adequate physical security is becoming a normal
condition of supply.
Steps are still urgently needed, however, to up-
grade physical security systems to meet international
norms, and to assure timely international collaboration
in the recovery of lost or stolen materials. On the
basis of my review of nuclear policies, I have directed
that the United States vigorously address the problem
of physical security at both bilateral and multilateral
levels, including exploration of a possible international
convention.
- 19 -
The United States is prepared to embark with all
its resources on development of the system of inter-
national controls that I have here outlined. Even
when complete, however, no system of controls is
likely to be effective, if a potential violator judges
that his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be
received with indifference by the international
community.
Any material violation of a nutlear safeguards
agreement -- especially the diversion of nuclear
material for use in making explosives -- must be
universally judged. to be. an extremely serious affront
to the world community, calling for the immediate
imposition of drastic sanctions. I serve notice
today that the United States will respond to violation
by any nation of any safeguards agreement to which we
are a party with, at a minimum, immediate cut off of
our supply of nuclear fuel and cooperation to that
nation. We would consider further steps, not necessarily
confined to the area of nuclear cooperation, against
the violator nation. Nor will our actions be limited
to violations of agreements in which we are directly
involved. In the event of material violation of any
safeguards agreement, particularly agreements with the
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
- 20 -
IAEA, we will initiate immediate consultations with
all interested nations.
Universal recognition of the total unacceptability
of the abrogation or violation of any non-proliferation
agreements is one of the most important steps which
can be taken to prevent further proliferation. We
invite all concerned governments to affirm publicly
that they will regard nuclear wrongdoing as an intoler-
able violation of acceptable norms of international
behavior, which would set in motion strong and immediate
counter-measures. thell pursue is expane cooperative
Finally we sure that nuclear power is
effortain must make their indidenous refored Cuerty
not adopted unnecessarily in cases where alternative
sweet
sources of energy would serve just as well
To this
end, the United States is placing increased emphasis
on the development of non nuclear sources of power.
We have proposed the establishment of an International
in its Bodership role has
Energy Institute, specifically designed to help develop-
Astrias
ing countries match the most economic and readily avail-
able sources of energy to their power needs. In many
cases, this source will be non-nuclear. Through this
Institute and other appropriate means, we will offer
technological assistance in the development of
indigenous energy resources as an alternative to nuclear
power
R. FORD NOT
LIBRARY GERALD
Insert, page 20
Finally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative
efforts with other countries in developing their indigenous
energy resources.
Pages 21/22/23: Rewrite as follows:
National Export Policy
During the past two years, the United States has strengthened its
own national nuclear export policies. Our interests, however, are not
limited to controls alone. The nuclear weapons states, including the
United States, have a special responsibility under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy
with non-nuclear countries. We have sought to serve other nations as
a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice
between commercial benefits and progress toward our non-proliferation
goals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to non-pro-
liferation. But there should be no incompatibility between non-pro-
liferation and assisting other nations in enjoying the benefits of peaceful
nuclear power, if all supplier countries pursue common nuclear export
poli
There is need, however, for even more rigorous controls than
those now commonly accepted, and for policies that favor nations accepting
responsible non-proliferation limitations.
On the basis of my recently completed study of nuclear policies,
I have decided to direct the Secretary of State to urgently pursue
negotiations with other supplier nations to broaden our common guide-
lines for nonproliferation criteria required for the export of peaceful
nuclear materials and facilities. These criteria should include the
following:
-- Whether recipients are parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty
or are prepared to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities;
DERALD FORD LIBRARY
-- Whether they are prepared to forego or postpone national
reprocessing and sensitive enrichment activities; and
-- Whether recipients are willing to participate in an international
spent fuel and plutonium storage regime.]
With respect to countries that are current recipients of U.S. nuclear
supply, I am directing the Secretary of State to enter into negotiations
with the objective of conforming these agreements to agreed international
guidelines, and to seek through diplomatic initiatives to obtain their
acceptance of the new criteria.
These criteria, when agreed upon for addition to The
COMMON supplier guidelines, will be applied by The
United States to aLL agreements to export
peaceful Nuclear materials, and I will submit to
The Congress legislation to give these criteria the
force of law.
Exceptional cases may occur in which NON-
proliberation will Best be served By cooperating
with states NOT yet meating theme Tests. Howowar, New agason
which are exceptions to these criteria will require my personal
approval prior to Their submission X The Congress.
FORD is 03RALD LIBRARY
- 21
National Export Policy
During the past two years, the United States
has strengthened its own national nuclear export
policies. Our interests, however, are not limited
weakens title includence
to controls alone. The United States has a special
responsibility tas as one of our obligations have under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] to share the
STET
benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with non-nuclear
countries. We have sought to serve other nations as
a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment.
Given the choice between commercial benefits and
progress toward our non-proliferation goals, we have
given, and will continue to give, priority to non-
proliferation. But there should be no incompatibility
assisting other notions in
between non-proliferation and a vigorous export trade
At
enjoying the becausets of placeful nuclear person,
if all, supplier countries pursue common nuclear export
policy. need, however, for even more rigerous
that all There effective is Vn controlling nuclear proferation
controls, and for policies that favor nations accepting
responsible non-proliferation limitations. The United
States will move in this direction.
On the basis of my recently completed study of
nuclear policies, I have decided that we will henceforth
apply new criteria in judging whether to enter into new
or expanded nuclear cooperation with a non-nuclear
weapon state
Co
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
- 22 -
These new criteria are:
-- Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will
be a strong positive factor favoring cooperation.
Nations that have not yet adhered to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty will receive positive recognition
if they are prepared to submit to full fuel cycle
safeguards, pending adherence.
-- Recipient nations prepared to forego, or post-
pone for 2 substantial period, the establishment of
STET
national reprocessing or enrichment activities or, in
certain cases, prepared to shape and schedule their
reprocessing and enriching facilities to foster non-
proliferation needs, will be favored.
-- Positive recognition will also be given to
nations prepared to participate in an international
storage regime, under which excess fuel and any
separated plutonium would be placed pending use.
Exceptional cases may occur in which non-proliferation
will best be served by cooperating with states not yet
meeting these tests. However, I have decided to go
beyond the requirement in present law which requires
Presidential approval of all new agreements for nuclear
cooperation with other nations. Henceforth, negotiation
of any new agreement with a nation which does not now
Lakallnot recommend FORD to
the congress
LISTRE GERALD
- 23 -
meet these strict standards will not even be initiated
without my personal approval in advance
The above criteria would provide the norm in
negotiating all new or amended Agreements for Cooperation.
out
I have also directed the Secretary of State to continue open
discussions with the other nuclear suppliers nowaimed to shape texpanding
common guidelines so that they conform with these
principles. With respect to countries that are current
recipients of US nuclear supply, I am directing the
the
Secretary of State to enter into negotiations with the
objective of conforming these agreements to agreed
international guidelines, and to seek through diplomatic
initiatives to obtain their acceptance of our new
criteria
The reliability of American assurances to other
nations is an asset that few, if any, nations of the
world can match. It must not be eroded in the nuclear,
or any other, area. Indeed, nothing could more
prejudice our efforts to strengthen our existing non-
proliferation understandings than arbitrary suspension
or unwarrantéd delays in meeting supply commitments to
countries which are dealing with us in good faith
regarding effective safeguards and restraints. The
importance of this principle requires that final
authority over the licensing of nuclear exports be
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
- 24:-
returned to the President.
Despite intensive personal efforts on my part,
the 94th Congress adjourned without passing nuclear
export legislation which would have strengthened
our effectiveness in dealing with other nations on
nuclear matters. In the absence of such Name legislation,
I am directing the Secretary of State to work closely
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure increase proper
emphasis on non-proliferation concerns in the nuclear
export licensing process.
I will continue to work with Congress to achieve
improvements in our nuclear export laws, with due
account for the need for broad-based multilateral
support. I welcome in particular the constructive
proposals made by Senator Pastore, Congressmen Anderson
and Price, and their colleagues on the Joint Commission
for Atomic Energy. On the basis of their suggestions
and my initiatives, I will work to develop bipartisan
support for new legislation in this field during the
next session of Congress.
Implications for Domestic Policy
We must not underestimating
increasetic make the mistake use of of
serve
the current importance of nuclear energy to our own
national well-being. If there are scourity risks
and this can be done safely
GERALD FORD CLORARY
25 -
associated with the use of nuclear energy Tunere there would
be risks almost as grave in abandoning this new energy
source.
Our dependence on imported oil has risen 20 percent
since 1973, largely due to the failure of Congress to
act on my Administration's energy program. The dangers
in this situation are obvious.
We must conservation, and
continuemplasing achieve ing more effective eneagh
digerously pursue development of solar energy and other
new non-nuclear energy sources. Under my Administration,
conservation research has more than quadrupled. Solar
from $ Bmillionto716 million
energy research has increased 700 percent, and research
on other non-nuclear resources has A correspondingly
also been substantially
raised. £ I am now recommending that we de even more
But we must recognize that these new energy sources are
in their infancy. No responsible scientific authority
holds that they can significantly contribute to meeting
2000
our energy needs before 1990, at the very earliest.
Nuclear energy must fill much of the gap that
Landcoal as wellos further levelopment
remains.
The key question that remains 2n development
weare now addressing
our domestic nuclear energy program is whether we can
safely allow plutonium to be separated from used nuclear
fuel on a commercially exploitable scale. The development
in the U.S. regardless of whether plutonium @ eaple
nuclear power can and must continued to expand
do approved now.
ERALD FORD LIBRAN
Insert, page 25
In light of this, we cannot think of abandoning
nuclear energy. We are relying on nuclear energy to
help us meet our domestic energy needs at least through
the end of this century.
- 26- -
of nuclear energy is approaching a point at which
this question must be definitively answered. We
must no. the-answer to be reached by default.
Equally important, we must, formulate a national
nuclear policy
fir thes which is exponsional responsive to nuclear our non- power
proliferation concerns and is not driven by narrow
perceptions of domestic needs. If we are to play
a leading role in influencing global plutonium
decisions, we must examine objectively the crucial
and and seek to
issues related to reprocessing and seek to resolved
resolve the uncertainties associated with it.
the many certainties Only by so doing can we
This is
keep faith not just with future generations of
consistent
American, but with our friends and partners aborad without
request
who will look to us to provide a credible justification other
if asked to refrain from reprocessing 3
I am any
therefore citiesting FRP authorizing A to develop experimental Herograming
program to determine answers to the following questions
of interest to the United States and all nations pursuing
nuelear
aimsdatismoung Whether power/ programs. safe means of Alsmoining reprocessing uncertainties used nuclear
fuel and
disposing desarding 00 the the remaining economics waste sofiety be and
X
developed, refeguarding of upwerssing andocycle facilita
whether means can be developed to provide
adequate safeguards against the use of plutonium to
manufacture nuclear weapons;
:
GERALD FORD Creater
27
-- whether technological alternatives to
and to explore the feasibility R
dest
reprocessing can be found
Consistent with asking other supplier and consumer
nations to join us in avoiding export of reprocessing
technology, we will explore means to include appropriate
participation by other nations in this experimental
program, in such a manner as to support our non-proliferation
objectives. To ensure that this program serves non-
proliferation objectives, taking into account the
nuclear programs and policies of other, I have directed
the Secretary of State and the Administrator of ERDA
to consult with the IAEA and with interested states
in before defining we finalize the scapeand the nature and of
precise scope nature of our
experimental effort.
The experimental program will fit into the frame-
work of our recently approved safeguard arrangement
with the IAEA, serving as a testing ground for the
development and demonstration of techniques to provide
safeguards against diversion of pure plutonium for
use in nuclear weapons. In this connection, we will
urge the IAEA to test and apply the most vigorous
possible safeguards to the experimental program Secility itself
s
Finally, this experimental program will serve to
effectively complement the ongoing Nuclear Regulatory
Commission proceedings concerning the wide-scale use
of mixed oxide fuel in nuclear reactors.
GERALD LIBRAR FORD
effect the M.H program 28 af
In light of the decisions I have made today, I am
able to confirm my Administration's earlier assessment permit
that we can defer for ten years any decision toplace on
to be stared in commercial
breeder reactors, which would require plutonium fuel,
in commercial operation. We know from experience that
the lead time for the development of complex technologies
in the nuclear field is prolonged. The experimental
l
program that I am authorizing will provide the
make
knowledge of reprocessing that will be needed to go
a second decision to
ahead with the breeder if the responsible authorities
6 proper Find in the of
should decide then years from now to do so
10/77
Budget
on the basis of the study of nuclear policy recently
conducted my Adminis Trations have quadrupled the
budget for our program to dispose of nuclear waste.
We expect to demonstrate a complete depository for such
waste by 1985. I have recently directed, however,
a speed-up of the program to demonstrate the components
of waste disposal technology by the end of 1978. I
have also directed that the first demonstration
depository be submitted for licensing by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to assure its safety and
acceptability to the public.
Amy wastes shedaly to assore
of thit sourd long term moved disposed
Personizing they cutiol importance
DERALD R. FORD LIBRARA of
this to provide and in cxn my effectives FY 1977 program have
Insert p28
The decision I have made today does not effect the U.S.
program of research and development on the breeder reactor.
That program assumes that no decision on the commercial
operations of breeder reactors, which require plutonium
fuel, will be made before 1986.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
29
Consistent with my decision that reprocessing is no
longer to be viewed as inevitable, I am directing today
that the waste disposal program include careful study
of the feasibility of long-term storage of spent fuel
that has not been reprocessed.
The challenge of nuclear proliferation demands
candor. It can perhaps be managed -- but only
partially and temporarily by technical measures. It
can only be solved, however, if all of us face the
problem realistically. These realities are fundamentally
political, relating to the determination and foresight
of leaders in resisting perceived short-term advantages
in favor of fundamental long-term gains. We ask all
leaders to urognize SCG that their individual and collective
interests are best served by internationally assured
and safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services and
storage. We ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear
capabilities which are of doubtful economic value and
have ominous implications for nuclear proliferation
and instability in the world.
The record to date is not perfect. The broad
consensus against the acquisition of nuclear weapons
is a source of encouragement, but it is certainly
not a basis for complacency.
DERALO FORD LIBRAR
- 30
I do not underestimate the scope and complexity
of the challenge and the program I have just put forward
to meet it. Success depends on an extraordinary
coordination of the policies of all nations toward the
common good. The US is prepared to lead, but we cannot
succeed alone. If nations can work together constructively
and cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems
we will enhance our collective security. And we will
be better able to concentrate our energies and our
resources on the great tasks of construction rather than
consume them in increasingly destructive rivalry.
TAB
n
MEMORANDUM
ACTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Statement on Nuclear Policy
The Question at Hand
A draft statement has been prepared by State and Bob Fri for release that
would lay out your new policies and implementing actions, domestic and
international, to control the risk of nuclear proliferation. Although not
intended to do so, by giving heavy acknowledgement to the risks of
proliferation, the statement may be construed by some as being "anti
nuclear", and conceivably could affect the nuclear moratoria votes in
seven states on November 2. On the other hand, the media and Governor
Carter have been making an issue over the lack of public action on the
Administration's part in this area, and Carter might be expected again
to play on this theme in Friday night's debate. Also, there have been
a series of leaks and follow up stories misrepresenting your new policy
position by implying that you intend a $1 billion bail-out of the consortium
owning the incomplete reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina.
Your decision is needed on whether or not to release the nuclear statement
now (before the third debate) or to wait and rewrite the statement.
Background
As you recall, Bob Fri's report to you on nuclear non-proliferation,
reprocessing, and waste disposal was submitted in early September.
Based on your decisions, the following actions were to be taken:
-- a new statement on U.S. nuclear policy would be made by you,
-- we will indicate our continuing support of nuclear power abroad, while
taking specific new actions to control the sensitive aspects of the
nuclear fuel cycle in other countries,
FORD & LIBRARY 938870
2
we will reorient our own approach to reprocessing, mainly because
of the international risk of proliferation connected with a business-
as-usual attitude toward reprocessing and the diffusion of reprocessing
technology,
rerpocessing in the U.S. would only proceed if the economics warrant it
and if the proliferation risks can be demonstrably controlled,
the government will assist in a domestic commercial scale reprocessing
demonstration -- possibly with foreign participation and under IAEA
safeguards to test the questions of economic viability and safe-
guardability, and
the government will undertake the responsibility for long-term
storage of radioactive wastes, and will construct a demonstration
facility to demonstrate the waste disposal system.
Following your decision, State contacted the foreign ministers of the other
major nuclear suppliers (France, UK, FRG, Canada, Japan, and the USSR)
to notify them of your basic decisions, to outline the several specific inter-
national actions that we would propose to achieve greater nuclear restraints
and controls, and to solicit their comments and a general indication of support.
Although guarded in their responses, these states will not object to our in-
itiatives and can be expected to support many after there is a fuller under-
standing of our proposals. Where there were specific sensitivities, State
has worded the draft statement to avoid an adverse reaction abroad.
Draft Statement on Nuclear Policy
A draft statement has been prepared to enunciate your decisions and the
implementing actions (Tab A). It has been approved by State (Kissinger)
and ERDA (Fri). Based on the perception that our major problem with
nuclear power, at least at this time, is concern over the proliferation risks,
the statement deals primarily with your attack on that problem. Your
decision to support U.S. reprocessing, including the possibility of
demonstration, must be carefully handled because it can be perceived as
in conflict with our international thrust against reprocessing and because
of public speculation that it is a "bail-out" for Barnwell. Domestic re-
processing activities are mainly explained in the statement as a response to
the proliferation concerns, and not as a step by the government to facilitate
the development of the domestic nuclear fuel cycle. The non-proliferation
emphasis of the statement is also in recognition of the fact that the current
political focus is on non-proliferation, as evidenced by Congress' pre-
occupation with the subject during the latter part of the session.
3
By emphasizing the non-proliferation risks, you may be perceived by the
nuclear industry as undercutting nuclear power's future in the U.S.
Although your statement is intended to support nuclear power, per se, and only
express grave reservations about reprocessing, the atmospherics may seem
"anti nuclear". Unfortunately, some ambivalence is inherent in trying to
deal in the same paper with the different problems we have domestically and
internationally.
Your Options
1. Go ahead now with the statement as is.
Pros
-- This will get you on record with a series of firm steps addressing
non-proliferation.
It will make clear that you are not committed to any specific
reprocessing demonstration and halt the extreme statements about
your planned bail-out of the AGNS plant owners.
- Through leaks here and official approaches abroad, the stage is set
for your statement. To delay will possibly raise public questions
about your commitment, and be anticlimatic when released later.
Cons
-- Although some rewording can improve the anti nuclear ring to the
statement, any statement giving credence to a palpable proliferation
risk will be misrepresented by some to show that the U.S. cannot
safely proceed with nuclear power.
The arms control community, which favors no reprocessing, will
criticize any forward movement on domestic reprocessing.
There will be some who interpret any implied commitment to
proceed with reprocessing activities as a secret intention to bail-
out AGNS plant.
-- The proposals in the draft statement will not be easy for
untutored readers to distinguish from those put forward by
Carter. This presents the opportunity for a charge of (a) me
tooism or (b) flip-flopon your support of nuclear energy. These
charges might be made, however, if a statement is made anytime
before the election.
4
2.
Rewrite statement so as to deal in the most balanced possible way with
both domestic and international concerns. Issue it after the debate,
if possible.
Pros
-- Mitigates somewhat the risk of having your position confused with that
of Governor Carter.
-- You have a good record which you can discuss in debate even
without a statement.
-- Another rewrite might permit bringing balance into the statement,
although State believes we cannot go very far in that direction
without undercutting the strength of the non-proliferation com-
mitment.
Cons
-- You will not be on record at the time of the debate.
-- You may find it difficult to justify the delay in issuing a statement.
-- There may not be time to deal with the statement next week,
meaning that a delay until after the election is a virtual certainty.
3. Postpone issuing the statement, probably until after the election.
Pros
-- This will allow more time to try balancing the statement with more
focus on the actions to support the domestic nuclear power,
although major changes in that direction may run the risk of
making the statement seem weaker as a non-proliferation
commitment.
-- The nuclear non-proliferation issue may not arise again in the
campaign. If your statement were badly received (which we do not
expect), you would be bringing the issue back to life to your own
detriment.
-- Postponement will avoid any possible negative impact the statement
might have on the nuclear moratoria votes in seven states on
November 2.
5
-- You would avoid charges of me-tooism and possibly seeming to
change your position on the support of nuclear power.
Cons
- If the non-proliferation issue fires up again in the debate or
during the campaign, you will be able to point only to past
diplomatic actions and to studies underway -- - not to a recently
enunciated, comprehensive action plan.
Since this statement has been so prominently foreshadowed in the
press, further delay may be interpreted by some as a falling back
in your commitment.
- State believes this statement will have a very positive effect
abroad and will allow us to initiate a new international regime
for controlling proliferation. They are therefore anxious to have
the statement issued.
4.
Rewrite the statement to make the focus entirely on non-proliferation,
and issue a second statement regarding domestic nuclear power problems.
This would exclude the purely domestic actions from the current
dialogue, thereby be less likely to be seen as biasing our domestic
nuclear program.
Pros
- This would put the focus where the concerns that were most
prominently discussed in Congress and the press lie. Hopefully
it would avoid tarring the domestic program in the process.
It would permit subsequent analysis before the commitment to a
U.S. supported reprocessing plant and waste disposal facility.
We could put the new policies regarding radioactive waste
disposal into a separate statement, but the domestic and
international implications of the reprocessing decision
are entwined. We could not address international reprocessing
meaningfully without stating at least the key parts of our position
on domestic reprocessing.
It would not counter media criticism that the U.S. plans to
"bail-out" the AGNS plant.
6
Your Decision
1. Release the nuclear statement now.
APPROVE
2.
Alternatively, hold it for further rework, but release it before the
election.
APPROVE
3.
Alternatively, hold it for further rework and release after the election.
APPROVE
4.
Or alternatively, turn it into a non-proliferation statement by
removing the separable parts dealing with our domestic nuclear
program, and release before the debate.
APPROVE
NUCLEAR POLICY
they Debicete
A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
Today the peoples of the world face a threat unlike
other
any A in history. It is the threat of nuclear weapons
proliferation, the threat that nuclear explosives will
onew
new regions of the world,
spread -- to large nations, to small nations and even
to terrorists. who have no nation at all It is a threat
that is the more formidable because it arises from the
promise of nuclear power as a realistic alternative to
continuing dependence on diminishing and uncertain
supplies of imported oil.
If we fail to comprehend and contain this threat,
the result, inevitably, will be tragedy. But we can ---
and we will -- end this danger by understanding it
clearly and acting wisely in concert with other responsible
nations. 91 For a world in which the possession of nuclear
arms becomes increasingly widespread would be a world
in which the security of all is imperiled. Maintaining
international stability in such an environment would be
incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of
regional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation
would be immeasurably increased - not through direct
attack, then through a process of ever expanding escalation
Nor can we ignore the perils of theft or seizure which
FORD i LIBRARY OERALD
NUCLEAR POLICY
A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
Today the peoples of the world face a threat unlike
other
any in history. It is the threat of nuclear weapons
A
proliferation, the threat that nuclear explosives will
new
new regions of the world,
spread -- to large nations, to small nations ^ and even
to terrorists. who have no nation at all It is a threat
that is the more formidable because it arises from the
promise of nuclear power as a realistic alternative to
continuing dependence on diminishing and uncertain
supplies of imported oil.
If we fail to comprehend and contain this threat,
the result, inevitably, will be tragedy. But we can ---
and we will --- end this danger by understanding it
clearly and acting wisely in concert with other responsible
nations. 91 For a world in which the possession of nuclear
arms becomes increasingly widespread would be a world
in which the security of all is imperiled. Maintaining
international stability in such an environment would be
incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of
regional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation
would be immeasurably increased
if not through direct
attack, then through a process of ever expanding escalation
Nor can we ignore the perils of theft or seizure which
FORD & LIBRARY 07VW30
- 2 -
increased availability of nuclear weapons must entail.
The problem of nuclear proliferation has been a
major concern of my Administration since I first took
office. Last summer I directed that our efforts be
thorough
brought to their culmination by a complete review of
That study has been completed
our nuclear policies. I received the results of this
I
review before Labor Day and A have since deliberated
with great care on its recommendations.
Today I am announcing an important new American policies
policy based on those recommendations. We have
approached the major supplier countries to begin
discussion of these policiés, and I am convinced that
our new policy will benefit not only the national
interest of the United States, but also the welfare
of all nations for generations to come.
My policy deals with the world as it is, not as
we might wish it; it is a policy that reconciles legitimate
national interests in nuclear power with non-
proliferation imperatives. Indeed, developing the
policies and the programs to prevent proliferation
without eliminating the enormous benefit of nuclear
energy is one of the major challenges facing all the
nations of the world today.
GERALD FORD CIBRAST
- 3 --
-- There are legitimate interests in nuclear
power. The 1973 energy crisis dramatically demon-
strated to all nations not only the dangers of
excessive reliance on oil imports, but also the
reality that their and the world's supply of fossil
fuels inevitably is dwindling. As a result, nuclear
energy is now seen by many nations as an indispensable
way to satisfy rising energy demands without prematurely
depleting finite fossil fuel resources. Nuclear energy
can lessen their deepening dependence on foreign energy
sources, and diminish the world economy's vulnerability
to fluctuations in the supply of oil. And for nations
with no fossil fuel reserves of their own, nuclear
power can be central to their economic well being.
some
We must understand the motives which are leading these
even
states to place greater emphasis than we do on nuclear
power development. For unless we comprehend their real
needs we cannot expect to find ways of working with
them to ensure that their legitimate concerns and ours
are both met.
- Yet the peaceful application of nuclear energy
confronts us with a dilemma. Nuclear fuel, once it has
been burned to produce power, contains plutonium, which
can be chemically separated from the spent fuel. That
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
- 4 -
plutonium can then be used to help generate additional
power. Unfortunately -- and this is the root of the
problem --- plutonium is a key ingredient of nuclear
explosives. The world community simply cannot afford
the
to let this dangerous material and its related
G to produce it from reactor wasted
technolos spread uncontrolled over the globe. We
should not permit it to be produced and utilized unless
and until the most stringent conditions and arrangements
for avoiding proliferation are developed and observed. 2 Moreever
adhered to.
-- But no single nation, not even the United States,
can hope by itself to control effectively the spread of
plutonium and reprocessing technology. The United States
once was the predominant supplier of worldwide nuclear
materials and technology.
energy. While we remain a leader in this field, today
other suppliers have come to share the international
less than half of the
market -- with the US now supplying about (no) of
nuclear reator exports.
the international market. We cannot impose our preferences.
Therefore it is essential that we exercise our leadership
through catalyzing cooperative international action,
not through futile attempts to impose our preferences
on suppliers and consumers. We must avoid the temptation
for rhetorical gestures, empty threats or righteous
posturing.
From the outset of the nuclear age, the United
States has recognized the dangers of proliferation. And
technology for producing muchan fuel - uranium anrichment -
FORD
Can be trurned to the production of highly enriched uranium
which, like plestonnim, can les used to make mucher wrapons
- 5 -
we have been a leader in efforts to bring them under
control. We took steps to share the benefits of the
peaceful atom, while acting to control its spread for
military purposes when President Eisenhower proposed
establishment of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. We took the leading role in negotiating the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
There To
Non proliferation has been a top priority concern
Stat
/
Since
of my Administration since I took office in 1974 6
Since
then
then we have made considerable progress in reducing the
of
possibility that increasingly widespread possession of
which could
atomic weapons would eventually spark the holocaust that
all mankind fears.
But the urgency of our task has become even more
pressing. We and other nations now face critical
nuclear policy decisions.
In forging my new nuclear policy initiatives, I
have proceeded in the conviction that
revisonmental
safety and avoidance of proliferation must take precedence
over economic and commercial interests. Great though
Though there may be
to
represencing
the a economic benefits of nuclear energy stay beig they
may
cannot justify the dangers that would threaten a world
is
faced with the uncontrolled availability of plutonium
and other nuclear explosive capabilities.
FORD & LIBRARY 07VU30
- 6 -
As a result of my nuclear policy review, I have
therefore concluded that the reprocessing and recycling
believe stimply
there is
of plutonium onget should not proceed until we are confidence
that the world community can effectively overcome the
associated risks of proliferation. To implement Carding out my this
fundamental Recision jerdsment requires vigorous action on both
the international and domestic fronts.
The review also confirmed the major role that nuclear
power must play in mating ee both domestic and foreign energy
needs regardless of whether plutonium is to be separated
and used as more fuel.
Internationally, I have decided that the United States
additional
will undertake a.major acceleration of our efforts to
control the spread of plutonium and technologies for
separating plutonium and with to a view toward reducing that
commercial competition which can undermine our non-
proliferation goals.
Indeed, peaceful nuclear
cooperation can only prosper within a credible international
system which reduces nuclear risks for all nations and
enables legitimate energy needs to be met. This effort
requires the cooperation and support of suppliers and
consumers alike. I am directing the Secretary of State
to seek the support of other nations for strengthened
GERALD FORD
non-proliferation approaches and for preventing controls
from becoming elements of commercial competition. In
pursuing global approaches to non-proliferation, the
United States recognizes the responsibility to cooperate
with other states in realizing the peaceful benefits
of nuclear energy. And we will do so with all nations
GERALD R. FORD
- 7 -
prepared to dedicate themselves to non-proliferation.
Domestically, we must ensure that our programs
and policies are compatible with our international
position on reprocessing. I have therefore determined
that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing
of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a justifiable
as a
^
additional step in the nuclear fuel cycle, unless and
pursued only if the
economic environmental and above all non-proliferation
are
uncertainties can be successfully resolved. [- the
Harry, before decide whether to upply this
technology for commercial purposes, vernust does convinced
that own.course is nationly technically sound but that
it suppor Isvear vital non proliferation objectives
ACCORDINGLY,
a I am directing the Administrator of the Energy Research
develop
and Development Administration to
our
programs to conform with this policy.
We are committed to construct a new era of global
we muclear accergy
cooperation founded on strong US support. From this
A
basis, I am authorizing proposing a nuclear policy to deal
a
specifically with the three major areas of concern:
coordinated international action; strengthened national
export policies; and effective domestic programs meeded to
complament these.
First, I am directing new and accelerated international
initiatives to:
FORD & 03RALD LIBRARY
- 8 -
-- persuade other supplier nations to join us in
exercising maximum restraint in the transfer of
facilities by avoidina
reprocessing and enrichment technology and
or deferring such sensitive exports for & period of at least three year
-- persuade suppliers to offer, and consumers to
accept, nuclear fuel services instead of sensitive
technology, so that countries accepting responsible
restraints
will have an assured supply of nuclear fuel; and also R
-- assume responsibility for accepting the spent
fuel of consuming nations, as appropriate, in return
for financial reimbursement or fresh reactor fuel of
equivalent energy value;
suess and
explore arrangements for coordinating the
resources of suppliers so. that they can offer assured
and economical fuel services without commercial
the
advantage or disadvantage;
X
-- urge a major commitment of financial and scientific
resources to strengthen the safeguards capabilities of
the International Atomic Energy Agency and to vigorously
pursue cooperative international efforts to upgrade
physical security standards; and
-- set a firm policy of international penalties
for safeguards violations.
Second, in recognition of the continuing need to
exercise leadership in our own national export policies,
LIBRERY GERALD R. FORD
- 9 -
I am directing that the United States take into account
the following - criteria in conjunction with peaceful
nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states:
-- whether recipients are parties to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty or are prepared to accept IAEA
safeguards on all nuclear facilities;
-- whether they are prepared to forego or postpone
national reprocessing and sensitive enrichment activities;
and
-- whether recipients are willing to participate
in an international spent fuel and plutonium storage
regime.
Third, to support our overriding non-proliferation
objectives and in consultation with other interested
I have duristed then administrator of ERDA to
dauclob Williaming expended knowness for mm that
states,
would:
investigate the accurances, salaqueds, ands
the safety
of commercial reprocessing and-waste disposal lepository
- - provide asafe, long - term waste dispondy ley 1985;
--- to develop and test new safeguards approaches;
and
-- 4 pursue technology alternatives to reprocessing.
These are the foundations of our new approach, and
the three areas which our policy will address. Let me
now turn in more detail to these three central areas of
concern.
FORD & LIBRARY BERALD
- 10 -
International Initiatives
(^i)
($)
A successful policy of]reducing the worldwide
risks associated with plutonium will require the
support and cooperation of both supplier and consumer
countries. To secure such support and cooperation, (
come
only is
012 confident that
we must demonstrate to other nations that concurrence
respect
with
the in tiatives I am launching today will not
and
harm their legitimate economic interests while
e
enhancing the future safety of all nations and [a11]
I cun service
peoples.
We will work at solving economic problems
those
with all nations that join us in giving precedence
to non-proliferation and environmental goals not X will stand
ready to corport
k]
7
unilateral decision by the United States to
with them
defer commit tment to reprocessing would serve no
5 JING
problems which
useful purpose if other nuclear supplier nations
arise from
effort
plunged ahead with the export of reprocessing technology.
My second major decision today -- to undertake a major
diplomatic effort to reduce the worldwide risks of
access to plutonium and sensitive technology
-- therefore flows directly from the first.
n
LIBRARY GERALD FORD
- 11 --
During the past two years, I have vigorously
pursucdnon-proliferation through multilateral cooperation
with other nations. Because of the growth of nuclear
IN a world of
capabilities among several potential supplier nations,
I have rejected highly publicized or unilateral
would be futile they could do well
approaches which not only would be futile, but also
could easily alienate both supplier and consumer nations
whose cooperation is essential to the success of our
non-proliferation efforts. I therefre have rejected such approaches
My most immediate concern has been to improve
international safeguards and controls. of In 1974, soon
cooperation to strention
after I assumed office, we proposed strengthening and
standardizing non-proliferation measures at the United
Nations General Assembly
that
In the fall of 1974, I became concerned that some
were
nuclear supplier countries appeared to be prepared to
offer nuclear exports under conditions less rigorous
than we believed prudent in order to achieve
expresed
9
competitive advantage. I communicated these concerns
directly to my counterparts in key supplier and
recipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State
to explore ways of emphasizing multilateral action
GERALD FORD
- 12 -
to limit this dangerous form of competition.
At our initiative, the first meeting of major
nuclear suppliers was convened in London in April,
and 3 Jeris B
1975. Additional meetings and intensive bilateral
consultations followed.
sumperity natiod
As a result of these meetings, we have developed
international
standard
mog essive
tight new guidelines to govern nuclear exports
Through
These involving both improved safeguards and controls to
which are
prevent diversion, and physical protection against now being
theft and sabotage.
This achievement has significantly afflied.
raised international norms.
The United States has
adopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear exports.
In addition, we have acted to deal with the
special dangers associated with plutonium. Even prior
to today's decisions, the United States took the
following steps:
-- We have prohibited export of reprocessing and
other nuclear technologies that could contribute to
proliferation.
--- We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea
and Taiwan. We welcome their significant decisions of those nations
to forego such activities: and we will continue (our
efforts to discourage national reprocessing in other locations
areas of concern.
particular
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
- 12 -
--
We
have negotiated agreements for cooperation
with Egypt and Israel which contain the strictest
reprocessing provisions and other nuclear controls
ever included in the twenty-year history of our
nuclear cooperation program.
Andthere have been
Other important gains in the effort against
proliferation have been made during the two years of
my Administcation. Last year, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, and other European states completed
fond
ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
This
year, Japan also ratified the Treaty -- a significant
step after many years of serious debate. within Japan.
The United States
In addition, last month, at my direction,
We
to piace is
proposed to the International Atomic Energy Agency
an agreement placing US civil nuclear facilities under
the IAEA has approved a proposed agreement for the purper
the safeguards of the IAEA This has now been approved
by that Agency.
Put Despite the gains, that have been made
the dangers
The prospect of
stockpiles
posed by reprocessing and uncontrolled plutonium demand
further, decisive international action. There is, in
addition, the parallel risk of spreading uranium
This too must be
enrichment technology, which must continue to be
effectively controlled, and in today included in the concepts proposed
am
is
a
To meet these dangers I propose the following
comprehensive international program. which flows directly
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
- 14 -
from the fundamental policy decisions I have announced
today:
I call upon all nations to join with us in
exercising maximum restraint in the transfer of
reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities
by avoiding or deferring such sensitive exports for a
period of at least three years. This will allow
work together to a astablish
suppliers and consumers to find click
reliable incaus for
meeting nuclear needs with minimumi risk, as we assess
carefully the wisdom of plutonium use. As we proceed
in these efforts, we must not be influenced by
pressures to approve the export of these sensitive
facilities.
In addition,
I urge nuclear suppliers to provide
nuclear: consumers with nuclear fuel services in place
of sensitive nuclear technology. Nations accepting
effective non-proliferation restraints have a right
to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear
reactors and associated, non-sensitive fuel
All such nations should share in the benefits of
an assured supply of nuclear fuel,
even though the
number and location of sensitive facilities to
mustle
generate this fuel is limited to meet non-proliferation
goals. The availability of diverse fuel cycle services
FORD i 938870 LIBRARY
- 15 -
in several different nations can provide ample
assurance to consumers of a continuing and stable
source of supply.
It is also desirable to continue studying the
idea of a few suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle
centers to serve regional needs, when
effectively
may also save
safeguarded and economically warranted
Through
these and related means, we can minimize incentives
for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities. We must
continue to study this possibility
The United States will do its part to ensure
that any country accepting responsible restraints
on its nuclear power program with regard to enrichment,
reprocessing and plutonium disposition will have an
assured supply of nuclear fuel. To this end, I have
directed the Secretary of State
with regard to current
US recipients, and in new agreements for cooperation,
to offer binding letters of intent for the supply of
current 0.2. well as pies pertive recepients
nuclear fuel to countires willing to accept such
responsible restraints. These would be fulfilled Suchsupply
reg wel be met
either by new government capacity or by private
suppliers, at-our-discretion HS may b. termined
The United States is now
prepared tc enter into negotiations or arrangements
Hut adopt responsible
with consumer nations, adapting restraints under which
we would maturity agree on the
of
they would-aceord accord 1:3 rights of disposition (over) their
spent fuel where appropriate and where it can demonstrably
foster our non-proliferation objectives. In return,
GERALD ₹
- 16 -
these nations would be assured
of
either reimbursement or fresh, lcw-enriched fuel
to
primary
of equivalent energy value. In any such arrangement, [our
objective will be to ensure against any economic
disadvantage to the cooperating nation.
In pursuing a program of assured fuel supply
and fuel exchange, the United States seeks no commercial
advantage
over other suppliers
The program can and
will be adm: nistered in a way which avoids unfair
advantage in the sale of reactors or related services.
At my direction, the Secretary of State will initiate
consultations; to explore arrangements for coordinating
+2
such resources and developing other means of ensurang)
that suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers CIN
will be able to receive an interrupted and economical
supply of non-sensitive nuclear fuel and fuel services.
be reintered by
To reinforce these policies, we must develop means
restrints
of
to establish
international control over the plutonium
itself,
whether in separated form or
in]
unprocessed
spent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under national
F
control is a major destabilizing influence and, as such,
a primary proliferation risk. Than,
The United States will, in the immediate future,
pursue discussions aimed at the establishment of a new
international regime to provide for storage of excess
civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel. I am directing
FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
- 17 -
that we viçorously pursue this proposal which we made
to the International Atomic Energy Agency and other
interested nations last spring. be vigatorsly purened.
Creation of such a regime will greatly strengthen
world confidence that the growing accumulation of excess
plutonium and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending
reentry into the nuclear fuel cycle or other safe dis-
position. I urge the IAEA, which is empowered to
urient consideration to two,
establish such a depository, to give prompt implementation
to this concept.
Once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime
the llinted States will
is in operation, (we are prepared to place our own excess
civil plutonium and spent fuel under its control.
Moreover, we are prepared to consider providing a site
for international storage under IAEA auspices.
The inspection system of the IAEA remains a key
element in our [entire] non-proliferation strategy. The
world community must make sure that the Agency has the
technical and human resources needed to keep pace with
its expanding responsibilities.
I therefore have directed a major commitment of
for this purpose,
additional resources to the IAEA, and also
America.
a mobilization of our best scientific talent to support
the Agency. Two of our principal national laboratories
I have instructed
the leartony of state to institute discussions with the
USA with a view to supending their safaguards
capabilities. is am prepared to make
RALD V8/017 FORD
- 18 -
have been directed to provide assistance, on a continuing
basis, to the IAEA Secretariat.
The terrible increase in violence and terrorism
throughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the
need to assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear
materials and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope
with this problem is now broadly recognized. Many
nations have responded to the initiatives which I have
taken in this area by materially strengtening their
physical security and by cooperating in the development
trensancitive suchear materials
of international guidelines by the IAEA. As a result.
of consultations among the major suppliers, provision
for adequate physical security is becoming a normal
condition of supply.
Steps are still urgently needed, however, to up-
grade physical security systems to meet international
norms, and to assure timely international collaboration b
as a result,
as
a
in the recovery of lost or stolen materials. On the
basis of my review of nuclear policies,
I have directed
will
that the United States vigorously address the problem
of physical security at both bilateral and multilateral
levels, including exploration of a possible international
convention.
GERALD FORD LIBRABA
- 19 --
+
to
make
this
system
The United States is prepared 1.0 embark with all
its resources on development of the system of inter-
walk,
But
national controls that I have here outlined
Even
when complete, however, no system of controls is can
Fully
likely to be effective, if a potential violator judges
that his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be.
received with indifference by the irternational
community.
Thus
Any material violation of a nuclear safeguards
agreement --- especially the diversion of nuclear
material for use in making explosives --- must be
universally judged to be an extremely serious affront
to the world community, calling for the immediate
imposition of drastic sanctions. I serve notice
today that the United States will respond to violation
by any nation of any safeguards agreement to which we
are a party with, at a minimum immediate cut off of
any in that violate
our supply of nuclear fuel and cooperation to that
3
asaferciand,
And
limover,
nation
We would consider further steps, not necessarily to which
vx are
confined to the area of nuclear cooperation, against
a
party
the violator nation. Nor will our actions be limited
to violations of agreements in which we are directly
involved. In the event of material violation of any
safeguards agreement, particularly agreements with the
FORD is 038870 LIBRARY
- 20 -
IAEA, we will initiate immediate consultations with
all interested nations arived appropriate and convincing
witer action.
Universal recognition of the total unacceptability
of the abrogation or violation of any non-proliferation
agreements .s one of the most important steps which
can be taken to prevent further proliferation. We callupon
invite all concerned governments to affirm publicly
that they w:.11 regard nuclear wrongdoing as an intoler-
able violation of acceptable norms of international
audone
behavior, which would set in motion strong and immediate
counter-measures.
Finally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative
efforts with other countries in developing their indigenous
energy resources.
end, the United States is placing increased amphasis
on the development of nower.
The us in is would rose,
We have proposed the establishment of an International
Energy Institute, specifically designed to help develop-
ing countries match the most economic and readily avail-
able sources of energy to their power needs. In many
cases, this source will be non-nuclear. Through this
Institute and other appropriate means, we will offer
technological assistance in the development of
indigenous energy resources. at an atternative
power
FORD i 07V830 LIBRARY
- 21 -
National Export Policy
cop
During the past two years, the United States
has strengthened its own national nuclear export
policies. Our interests, however, are not limited
9
to controls alone.
The United States has a special
responsibility as one of our obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
tc share the
benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with non-nuclear
countries.
We have sought to serve other nations as
a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment.
Given the choice between commercial benefits and
progress toward our non-proliferation goals, we have
given, and will continue to give, priority to non-
proliferation. But there should be no incompatibility
assisting this notions in
between non-proliferation and a vigerous export trade
enjoying the haspital plactful number perver,
if all supplier countries pursue common nuclear export
policy.
There is need, however for even more rigorous
But we one aware, U well, of The need
controls, and for policies that favor nations accepting
responsible non-proliferation limitations.
The United
States will move in this direction.
Thus,
On the basis of my recently completed study of
to inted States
nuclear policies
I have decided that we will henceforth
apply new criteria in judging whether to enter into new
or expanded nuclear cooperation with a non-nuclear
weapon state.
FORD & LIBRARY ORRALD
22 I I
These new criteria are:
-- Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will
be
a
strong lyand positive factor favoring cooperation.
-- Nations that have not yet adhered to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty will receive positive recognition
if they are prepared to submit to full fuel cycle
safeguards pending adherence.
which undertake to
Recipient nations prepared to forego, or post-
We will
pone / for a substantial period, the establishment of
national reprocessing or enrichment activities or
Fish
certain cases, prepared to shape and schedule their
reprocessing and enriching facilities to foster non-
proliferation needs will be favored.
Positive recognition will also be given to
We
will
Paver
nations prepared to lparticipate in an international
which
wake to take
storage regime, under which excess fuel and any
separated plutonium would be placed pending use.
On
some
Exceptional cases may occur in which non-proliferation NN
will
best be served by cooperating with states not yet
meeting these tests. However, I have decided to go
beyond the requirement in present law which requires
Presidential approval of all new agreements for nuclear
cooperation with other nations. Henceforth, negotiation
of any new agreement with a nation which does not now
FORD s LIBRARY 07VU38
- 23 -
meet these strict standards will not even be initiated
without my personal approval in advance.
The above criteria would provide the norm in
negotiating all new or amended Agreements for Cooperation
I have also directed the Secretary cf State to open
discussions with the other nuclear suppliers to shape
common guidelines so that they conform with these cutena
principles
With respect to countries that are current
recipients of US nüclear supply I am directing the
ained at
Secretary of State to enter into negotiations with the
objective of conforming these agreements to agreed
international guidelines, and to seek through diplematic
initiatives to obtain their acceptance of These our new
criteria.
The reliability of American assurances to other
nations is an asset that few, if any, nations of the
will
world can match. It must not be eroded in the nuclear
I
or any other, area. Indeed, nothing could more
prejudice ourlefforts to strengthen our existing non-
non- proliferation understandings than arbitrary suspension
or unwarranted delays in meeting supply commitments to
countries which are dealing with us in good faith and employing
regarding
effective safeguards and restraints. There we question
that cannot
importance of this principle requires that
final
subject to
authority over the licensing of nuclear exports be
to processing
dobbyny between
Special intere
FORD & LIBRARY 07V930
CL causes
- 24 -
must be
returned to the President.
Despite intensive personal efforts on my part,
responsible
the 94th Congress adjourned without passing nuclear
export legislation which would have strengthened
our effectiveness in dealing with other nations on
Missin
nuclear matters. In the absence of such A legislation,
I am directing the Secretary of State to work closely
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure increase proper
emphasis on non-proliferation concerns in the nuclear
export licensing process.
I will continue to work with Congress to achieve
improvements in our nuclear export laws, with due
account for the need for broad-based multilateral
support. I welcome in particula the constructive
preposals made by Senator Partore, Congressment Anderson
and Price, and their colleagues on the Joint Commission
fo Atomic Energy On the basis of their suggestions
and my initiatives, I will work to develop bipartisan
support for new legislation in this field during the
next session of Congress.
Implications for Domestic Policy
caps
We must net make the whe of underestimating
the ourrent importanoe [es] of I energy to our
GERALD LISBURY ? FORD
Stional well being. If there [ ecurity]
We must vicrease the use of muclear Fower to
serve our our material such havig, and this
Can lee done safely.
- 25 -
associated with the use of nuclear unergy, there would
be risks almost as grave in abandon. mg this new energy
source!
Our dependence on imported oil has risen 20 percent
since 1973, largely due to the failure of Congress to
act on my Administration's energy program. The dangers
in this situation are obvious.
continue emphasizes every
we must
We must achieve more offective conservation; and/
vigorously pursue development of solar energy and other
new non-nuclear energy sources. Under my Administration,
conservation research has more than quadrupled. Solar
from 415 million to & 116million,
energy research has increased 700 percent A and research
also
on other non-nuclear resources has been correopendingly.
substantrially
raised. I-em now -seecumending that We as even-mene.
But we must recognize that these new energy sources are
in their infancy. No responsible scientific authority
of
holds that they can significantly contribute to meeting
2000,
our energy needs before 1000; at the very earliest.
ges
Thus,
to
Nuclear energy must fill much of the gap that
t and coal, as well as further
remains.
or
The key question that remains in development of
The has amountion LASS are new addissing,
our dome the miclear energy program CIS whether we can
safely allow plutonium to be separated from used nuclear
fuel on a commercially exploitable scale. The development
mwentheless, nuclear power canany must continue to expand in theM.
regardlessof whether platonium recycle is approved now.
BERMLO FORD LIBRARY
- 26 -
of nuelear energy is approaching a point at which
this question must be definitively answered? ive
must not allow the answer to he reached by default.
Equally important, we must formulate a national
nuclear policy responsive our
this which is expansion nuclear to (hon- sower
proliferation concerns and is not dr driven by narrow
perceptions OI domestic needs. If we are to play
a leading role in influencing global plutonium
decisions, we must examine objectively the crucial
issues related to reprocessing and seek to resolve
the many uncertainties)/ (Sirly by 63 loing can we
keep faith not just with future generations of
American, but with our Triends and partners abored
who [wi] look to to WE revide credible justification jus
This consistent without request toothers
111 "Coketr to refrain from reprocessing,
reliecting the administrator of ERDA
I am therefore antherizing
programs;
program to anowers to the following questions
of interest to the United States and all nations pursuing
nuclear power programs
is
Whether safe means of reprecessing used nuclear
Tuel and disposing of the remaining waste can be
developed;
whether means can be developed to provide
adequate safeguards against the use of plut anima to
manufacture nuslear
- - to investigate weapons; and remove remaining uncertisities regarding
FORD if LIBRARY GERALD
the economics salute and suffecuarding of aprolessing
-
- to and provide recycle from pacilities the demonstrated technologies nowavalable
a full scale by 1985
27
and technological alternatives to
reprocessing can be found.
Consistent with asking other supplier and consumer
nations to join us in avoiding export: of reprocessing
technology, we will explore means to include appropriate
participation by other nations in this experimental
trained
program, in such a manner as to support our non-proliferation
objectives.
To ensure that this program serves non-
proliferation objectives, taking into account the
nuclear programs and policies of other I have directed
the Secretary of State and the Administrator of ERDA
to consult with the IAEA and with interested states 5.2
indefening the
before we finalize the L scope and nature of our
experimental effort.
contribute to
The experimental program will fit into the frame-
work of our recently approved safeguard arrangement
with the IAEA, serving as a testing ground for the
development and demonstration of techniques to provide
0
safeguards against diversion of pure plutonium for
,
use in nuclear weapons. In this connection we will
urge the IAEA to test and apply the most vigorous
possible safeguards to the experimental Lucility program itself
Finally, this experimental program will serve to
effectively complement the ongoing Nuclear Regulatory
Commission proceedings concerning the wide-scale use
of mixed oxide fuel in nuclear reactors.
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- 28 -
need
1
The decision I have made today does not effect the U.S.
program of research and development on the breeder reactor.
That program assumes that no decision on the commercial
operations of breeder reactors, which require plutonium
fuel, will be made before 1986.
the lead time for the development of complex technologies
[in In the nuclwar field is prolonged The experimental
ERDA develop
program tha: I am- will provide the
smoke
knowledge of reprocessing that will be needed to go-
a second decision
vactoss Thead with the brooder, if the weepons the authorities ties
and proper time in 11. future.
should decisio from moreto 004
Orr the basis of the study of nuclear policy recently
conducted by my Administration I have quadrupled the
budget for our program to dispose of nuclear waste.
We expect to demonstrate a complete depository for such
waste by 1985. I have recently directed, however,
a speed-up of the program to demonstrate the components
of waste disposal technology by the end of 1978. .I
have also directed that the first demonstration
depository be submitted for licensing by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to assure its safety and
acceptability to the public.
Recognizing the critical importance of environmentally round
administration has already moved to provide con effective
sound long term disposal of radioactive wastes my
program to assurethis and my FY 1977 Budger
GERALD FORD LIBRIBI
- 29 -
Consistent with my decision tha+ reprocessing is no
longer to be viewed as inevitable, I am directing today
that the waste disposal program include careful study
of the feasibility of long-term storage of spent fuel
that has not been reprocessed.
The challenge of nuclear proliferation demands
candor. It can perhaps be managed -- but only
partially and temporarily by technical measures. It
can only be solved, however, if all of us face the
And
problem realistically. These realities are fundamentally
They
require
political; relating to the determination and foresight
of leaders in resisting perceived short-term advantages
callupon
you
in favor of fundamental long-term gains. We ask all
uccopned
leaders to see that their individual and collective
interests are best served by internationally assured
and safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services and
storage. We ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear
capabilities which are of doubtful economic value and
have ominous implications for nuclear proliferation
and instability in the world.
S
The record to date is not perfect. The broad
consensus against the acquisition of nuclear weapons
is a source of encouragement, but it is certainly
not a basis for complacency.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
- 30 -
I do not underestimate the scope and complexity
of the challenge and the program I have just put forward
to meet it. Success depends on an e> traordinary
coordination of the policies of all rations toward the
common good. The US is prepared to lead, but we cannot
succeed alone. If nations can work :ogether constructively
and cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems
we will enhance our collective security. And we will
be better able to concentrate our energies and our
resources on the great tasks of construction rather than
dauserons
consume them in increasingly destructive rivalry.
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