Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
16988105
label
Nuclear Policy Statement (12)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
16988105
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Nuclear Policy Statement (12)
citationUrl
collections
James M. Cannon Files (Ford Administration)
James Cannon's Issues Files
subjects
Exports
Nuclear energy
Presidential campaign, 1976
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
16988105
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1976-11-30
month
11
year
1976
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1976-06-01
month
6
year
1976
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
1ff841cbdfbacec5
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 24, folder "Nuclear Policy Statement (12)" of the
James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted
materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to
these materials.
Digitized from Box 24 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2:00 PM - NUCLEAR POLICY BRIEFING
Press Room
Thursday, October 28, 1976
Eu vitality 1 vlated
sowl posen 7 The
cause T In and -
and the safety
of The me
GERALD R. LIBRARY FORD
[10/28/76]
Let me just make a few opening comments about the
President's statement on nuclear policy which I believe
you all have.
Soon after President Ford became President in
1974, he became concerned about the way some countries
were exporting nuclear materials without proper controls.
State
That fall, the President directed that U.S. La of
representatives at the U.N. should propose strengthening
of non-proliferation measures.
ASM
the President's initiative the first meeting
of the major nuclear supply nations met in London in
April of 1975. And thereafter over a period of time
we began to raise the standards governing nuclear
exports and security. Early this year members of the
President's senior staff began informal discussions of
the importance of dealing comprehensively with the
whole issue of nuclear policy.
July/11
In only Sum
the President directed that a
thorough review be taken of all our nuclear policies
and that proposals be made to him for his decision on
what further steps might be needed.
Bob Fri, Deputy at ERDA was put in charge of this
effort. He put together a very comprehensive document.
It was reviewed by the related departments and agencies.
Breatist 28 15ⁿᵈ
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
[10/28/76]
The President made his basic decision on
and directed that a major policy statement by prepared
on the basis of his decisions.
When this document was completed several weeks
ago, the State Department began discussions with other
nations on this U.S. initiative.
When we reported two days ago that these discussions
were completed the President directed that his statement
on nuclear policy be made public.
To day to answer your questions on this policy
statement, we have Bob Fri, Deputy at ERDA and Charles
Robinson, Deputy at the State Department.
FORD is LIBRARY 07V839
[10/28/76]
Later today, I will be releasing a comprehensive
statement on nuclear policy, calling upon all nations
of the world to join in a cooperative effort to expand
the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy while
preventing nuclear proliferation.
The actions I am announcing are designed to:
strengthen the commitment of all nations to the
goal of non-proliferation,
change and strengthen U.S. domestic policies and
programs to support our non-proliferation goals, and
establish a stronger foundation for increasing the
use of nuclear energy in the U.S. and abroad.
The State of Ohio will have an important role to plan in
meeting these objectives. We must have new capacity to
provide fuel for nuclear power plants here and abroad.
The additional uranium enrichment plant that we are going
to build at Portsmouth, Ohio, is critical to that capacity.
Construction of the Portsmouth plant is now expected to
cost $4.4 billion and will mean 6,000 new jobs for
Southern Ohio. The Administrator of ERDA has assured me
that construction of that plant can begin early next year.
Construction of the plant at Portsmouth will assure a
central role for Ohio for years to come in providing fuel
needed for nuclear power plants in the United States and
around the world.
[10/28/76]
The President made his basic decision on
and directed that a major policy statement by prepared
on the basis of his decisions.
When this document was completed several weeks
ago, the State Department began discussions with other
nations on this U.S. initiative.
When we reported two days ago that these discussions
were completed the President directed that his statement
on nuclear policy be made public.
To day to answer your questions on this policy
statement, we have Bob Fri, Deputy at ERDA and Charles
Robinson, Deputy at the State Department.
[10/28/76]
Let me just make a few opening comments about the
President's statement on nuclear policy which I believe
you all have.
Soon after President Ford became President in
1974, he became concerned about the way some countries
were exporting nuclear materials without proper controls.
That fall, the President directed that U.S.
representatives at the U.N. should propose strengthening
of non-proliferation measures.
In the President's initiative the first meeting
of the major nuclear supply nations met in London in
April of 1975. And thereafter over a period of time
we began to raise the standards governing nuclear
exports and security. Early this year members of the
President's senior staff began informal discussions of
the importance of dealing comprehensively with the
whole issue of nuclear policy.
In
the President directed that a
thorough review be taken of all our nuclear policies
and that proposals be made to him for his decision on
what further steps might be needed.
Bob Fri, Deputy at ERDA was put in charge of this
effort. He put together a very comprehensive document.
It was reviewed by the related departments and agencies.
[10/28/76]
Later today, I will be releasing a comprehensive
statement on nuclear policy, calling upon all nations
of the world to join in a cooperative effort to expand
the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy while
preventing nuclear proliferation.
The actions I am announcing are designed to:
strengthen the commitment of all nations to the
goal of non-proliferation,
change and strengthen U.S. domestic policies and
programs to support our non-proliferation goals, and
establish a stronger foundation for increasing the
use of nuclear energy in the U.S. and abroad.
The State of Ohio will have an important role to plan
in
meeting these objectives. We must have new capacity to
provide fuel for nuclear power plants here and abroad.
The additional uranium enrichment plant that we are going
to build at Portsmouth, Ohio, is critical to that capacity.
Construction of the Portsmouth plant is now expected to
cost $4.4 billion and will mean 6,000 new jobs for
Southern Ohio. The Administrator of ERDA has assured me
that construction of that plant can begin early next year.
Construction of the plant at Portsmouth will assure a
central role for Ohio for years to come in providing fuel
needed for nuclear power plants in the United States and
around the world.
nuclear
Let me just make a few opening comments about the
President's statement on nuclear policy which I believe
you all have.
Soon after President Ford became President in
1974, he became concerned about the way some countries
were exporting nuclear materials without proper controls.
That fall, the President directed that U.S.
representatives at the U.N. should propose strengthening
of non-proliferation measures.
In the President's initiative the first meeting
of the major nuclear supply nations met in London in
April of 1975. And thereafter over a period of time
we began to raise the standards governing nuclear
exports and security. Early this year members of the
President's senior staff began informal discussions of
the importance of dealing comprehensively with the
whole issue of nuclear policy.
In
the President directed that a
thorough review be taken of all our nuclear policies
and that proposals be made to him for his decision on
what further steps might be needed.
Bob Fri, Deputy at ERDA was put in charge of this
effort. He put together a very comprehensive document.
It was reviewed by the related departments and agencies.
FORD 3 LIBRARY DERALD
The President made his basic decision on
and directed that a major policy statement by prepared
on the basis of his decisions.
When this document was completed several weeks
ago, the State Department began discussions with other
nations on this U.S. initiative.
When we reported two days ago that these discussions
were completed the President directed that his statement
on nuclear policy be made public.
To day to answer your questions on this policy
statement, we have Bob Fri, Deputy at ERDA and Charles
Robinson, Deputy at the State Department.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 28, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NUCLEAR POLICY
We have known since the age of nuclear energy began
more than 30 years ago that this source of energy had the
potential for tremendous benefits for mankind and the potential
for unparalleled destruction.
On the one hand, there is no doubt that nuclear energy
represents one of the best hopes for satisfying the rising
world demand for energy with minimum environmental impact and
with the potential for reducing dependence on uncertain and
diminishing world supplies of oil.
On the other hand, nuclear fuel, as it produces power
also produces plutonium, which can be chemically separated from
the spent fuel. The plutonium can be recycled and used to
generate additional nuclear power, thereby partially offsetting
the need for additional energy resources. Unfortunately -- and
this is the root of the problem -- the same plutonium produced
in nuclear power plants can, when chemically separated, also be
used to make nuclear explosives.
The world community cannot afford to let potential nuclear
weapons material or the technology to produce it proliferate
uncontrolled over the globe. The world community must ensure
that production and utilization of such material by any nation
is carried out under the most stringent security conditions
and arrangements.
Developing the enormous benefits of nuclear energy while
simultaneously developing the means to prevent proliferation
is one of the major challenges facing all nations of the world
today.
The standards we apply in judging most domestic and
international activities are not sufficiently rigorous to deal
with this extraordinarily complex problem. Our answers
cannot be partially successful. They will either work,
in which case we shall stop proliferation; or they will
fail and nuclear proliferation will accelerate as
nations initially having no intention of acquiring nuclear
weapons conclude that they are forced to do so by the actions
of others. Should this happen, we would face a world in which
the security of all is critically imperiled. Maintaining
international stability in such an environment would be
incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of regional
or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation would be
immeasurably increased -- if not through direct attack, then
through a process of ever expanding escalation.
The problem can be handled as long as we understand it
clearly and act wisely in concert with other nations. But we
are faced with a threat of tragedy if we fail to comprehend
it or to take effective measures.
more
2
Thus, the seriousness and complexity of the problem place
a special burden on those who propose ways to control prolifera-
tion. They must avoid the temptation for rhetorical gestures,
empty threats, or righteous posturing. They must offer policies
and programs which deal with the world as it is, not as we might
wish it to be. The goal is to prevent proliferation, not simply
to deplore it.
The first task in dealing with the problem of proliferation
is to understand the world nuclear situation.
More than 30 nations have or plan to build nuclear power
plants to reap the benefits of nuclear energy. The 1973
energy crisis dramatically demonstrated to all nations not
only the dangers of excessive reliance on oil imports, but
also the reality that the world's supply of fossil fuels is
running out. As a result, nuclear energy is now properly
seen by many nations as an indispensable way to satisfy rising
energy demand without prematurely depleting finite fossil fuel
resources. We must understand the motives which are leading
these nations, developed and developing, to place even greater
emphasis than we do on nuclear power development. For unless
we comprehend their real needs, we cannot expect to find ways
of working with them to ensure satisfaction of both our and
their legitimate concerns.
Moreover, several nations besides the United States have
the technology needed to produce both the benefits and the
destructive potential of nuclear energy. Nations with such
capabilities are able to export their technology and facilities.
Thus, no single nation, not even the United States, can
realistically hope -- by itself -- to control effectively the
spread of reprocessing technology and the resulting avail-
ability of plutonium.
The United States once was the dominant world supplier
of nuclear material equipment and technology. While we remain
a leader in this field, other suppliers have come to share the
international market -- with the U.S. now supplying less than
half of nuclear reactor exports.
In short, for nearly a decade the U.S. has not had a
monopoly on nuclear technology. Although our role is large,
we are not able to control worldwide nuclear development.
For these reasons, action to control proliferation must
be an international cooperative effort involving many nations,
including both nuclear suppliers and customers. Common standards
must be developed and accepted by all parties. If this is not
done, unrestrained trade in sensitive nuclear technology and
materials will develop -- with no one in a position to stop it.
We in the United States must recognize that interests in
nuclear energy vary widely among nations. We must recognize
that some nations look to nuclear energy because they have no
acceptable energy alternative. We must be sure that our efforts
to control proliferation are not viewed by such nations as an
act to prevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear
energy. We must be sure that all nations recognize that the
U.S. believes that non-proliferation objectives must take
precedence over economic and energy benefits if a choice must
be made.
more
3
PREVIOUS ACTION
During the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the unques-
tioned leader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits
of nuclear energy are made available widely while its destruc-
tive uses are prevented. I have given special attention to
these objectives during the past two years, and we have made
important new progress, particularly in efforts to control
the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among the
nations of the world.
In 1974, soon after I assumed office, I became concerned
that some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve
competitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports
under conditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. In
the fall of that year, at the United Nations General Assembly,
the United States proposed that non-proliferation measures be
strengthened materially. I also expressed my concern directly
to my counterparts in key supplier and recipient nations. I
directed the Secretary of State to emphasize multilateral
action to limit this dangerous form of competition.
At U.S. initiative, the first meeting of major nuclear
suppliers was convened in London in April 1975. A series of
meetings and intensive bilateral consultations followed.
As a result of these meetings, we have significantly
raised international standards through progressive new guide-
lines to govern nuclear exports. These involve both improved
safeguards and controls to prevent diversion of nuclear
materials and to guard against the misuse of nuclear technology
and physical protection against theft and sabotage. The
United States has adopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear
exports.
In addition, we have acted to deal with the special
dangers associated with plutonium.
-- We have prohibited export of reprocessing and other
nuclear technologies that could contribute to
proliferation.
-- We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea and
Taiwan. We welcome the decisions of those nations
to forego such activities. We will continue to
discourage national reprocessing in other locations
of particular concern.
-- We negotiated agreements for cooperation with Egypt
and Israel which contain the strictest reprocessing
provisions and other nuclear controls ever included
in the twenty-year history of our nuclear cooperation
program.
-- In addition, the United States recently completed
negotiations to place its civil nuclear facilities
under the safeguards of the International Atomic
Energy Agency -- and the IAEA has approved a proposed
agreement for this purpose.
more
4
NEW INITIATIVES
Last summer, I directed that a thorough review be under-
taken of all our nuclear policies and options to determine what
further steps were needed. I have considered carefully the
results of that review, held discussions with Congressional
leaders, and benefited from consultations with leaders of other
nations. I have decided that new steps are needed, building
upon the progress of the past two years. Today, I am announcing
a number of actions and proposals aimed at:
-- strengthening the commitment of the nations of the
world to the goal of non-proliferation and building an
effective system of international controls to prevent
proliferation;
-- changing and strengthening U.S. domestic nuclear
policies and programs to support our non-proliferation
goals; and
-- establishing, by these actions, a sound foundation
for the continued and increased use of nuclear
energy in the U.S. and in the world in a safe and
economic manner.
The task we face calls for an international cooperative
venture of unprecedented dimensions. The U.S. is prepared
to work with all other nations.
PRINCIPAL POLICY DECISIONS
I have concluded that the reprocessing and recycling of
plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound reason to
conclude that the world community can effectively overcome
the associated risks of proliferation. I believe that
avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over eco-
nomic interests. I have also concluded that the United States
and other nations can and should increase their use of nuclear
power for peaceful purposes even if reprocessing and recycling
of plutonium are found to be unacceptable.
Vigorous action is required domestically and internation-
ally to make these judgments effective.
-- I have decided that the United States should greatly
accelerate its diplomatic initiatives, in conjunction
with nuclear supplier and consumer nations, to control
the spread of plutonium and technologies for separating
plutonium.
Effective non-proliferation measures will require the
participation and support of nuclear suppliers and consumers.
There must be coordination in restraints so that an effective
non-proliferation system is achieved and there must be coopera-
tion in assuring reliable fuel supplies so that peaceful
energy needs are met.
-- I have decided that the United States should no
longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to
produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable
step in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that we should
pursue reprocessing and recycling in the future
only if they are found to be consistent with our
international objectives.
5
We must ensure that our domestic policies and programs
are compatible with our international position on reprocessing
and that we work closely with other nations in evaluating
nuclear fuel reprocessing.
-- The steps I am announcing today will assure that the
necessary increase in our use of nuclear energy will
be carried on with safety and without aggravating
the danger of proliferation.
Even with strong efforts to conserve, we will have in-
creasing demands for energy for a growing American economy.
To satisfy these needs, we must rely on increased use of both
nuclear energy and coal until more acceptable alternatives are
developed. We will continue pushing ahead with work on all
promising alternatives such as solar energy but now we must
count on the technology that works. We cannot expect a major
contribution to our energy supply from alternative technologies
until late in this century.
To implement my overall policy decisions, I have decided
on a number of policies that are necessary and appropriate to
meet our non-proliferation and energy objectives.
-- First, our domestic policies must be changed to
conform to my decision on deferral of the commercializa-
tion of chemical reprocessing of nuclear fuel which
results in the separation of plutonium.
-- Second, I call upon all nations to join us in exercising
maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and
enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such
sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at
least three years.
-- Third, new cooperative steps are needed to help assure
that all nations have an adequate and reliable supply
of energy for their needs. I believe, most importantly,
that nuclear supplier nations have a special obligation
to assure that customer nations have an adequate supply
of fuel for their nuclear power plants, if those
customer nations forego the acquisition of repro-
cessing and uranium enrichment capabilities and
accept effective proliferation controls.
-- Fourth, the U.S. must maintain its role as a major
and reliable world supplier of nuclear reactors and
fuel for peaceful purposes. Our strong position as
a supplier has provided the principal basis for our
influence and leadership in worldwide non-prolifera-
tion efforts. A strong position will be equally
important in the future. While reaffirming this
nation's intent to be a reliable supplier, the
U.S. seeks no competitive advantage by virtue of
the worldwide system of effective non-proliferation
controls that I am calling for today.
-- Fifth, new efforts must be made to urge all nations
to join in a full-scale international cooperative
effort -- which I shall outline in detail -- to
develop a system of effective controls to prevent
proliferation.
more
6
-- Sixth, the U.S. must take new steps with respect
to its own exports to control proliferation, while
seeking to improve multilateral guidelines.
-- Seventh, the U.S. must undertake a program to
evaluate reprocessing in support of the international
policies I have adopted.
-- Finally, I have concluded that new steps are needed
to assure that we have in place when needed, both
in the U.S. and around the world, the facilities for
the long-term storage or disposal of nuclear wastes.
ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT OUR NUCLEAR POLICIES
In order to implement the nuclear policies that I have
outlined, major efforts will be required within the United States
and by the many nations around the world with an interest in
nuclear energy. To move forward with these efforts, I am
today taking a number of actions and making a number of
proposals to other nations.
I. Change in U.S. Policy on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
With respect to nuclear fuel reprocessing, I am directing
agencies of the Executive Branch to implement my decision to
delay commercialization of reprocessing activities in the
U.S. until uncertainties are resolved. Specifically, I am:
-- Directing the Administrator of the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA) to:
o change ERDA policies and programs which heretofore
have been based on the assumption that reprocessing
would proceed;
encourage prompt action to expand spent fuel
storage facilities, thus assuring utilities that
they need not be concerned about shutdown of
nuclear reactors because of delays; and
identify the research and development efforts
needed to investigate the feasibility of re-
covering the energy value from used nuclear
fuel without separating plutonium.
II. Restraint in the Transfer of Sensitive Nuclear Technology
and Facilities
Despite the gains in controlling proliferation that have
been made, the dangers posed by reprocessing and the prospect
of uncontrolled availability of plutonium require further,
decisive international action. Effective control of the
parallel risk of spreading uranium enrichment technology is
also necessary. To meet these dangers:
-- I call upon all nations to join with us in exercising
maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and
enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such
sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at
least three years.
This will allow suppliers and consumers to work together
to establish reliable means for meeting nuclear needs with
minimum risk, as we assess carefully the wisdom of plutonium
use. As we proceed in these efforts, we must not be influenced
by pressures to approve the export of these sensitive facilities.
more
7
III. Assuring an Adequate Energy Supply for Customer Nations
-- I urge nuclear suppliers to provide nuclear consumers
with fuel services, instead of sensitive technology
or facilities.
Nations accepting effective nonproliferation restraints
have a right to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear
reactors and associated, nonsensitive fuel.
All such nations would share in the benefits of an assured
supply of nuclear fuel, even though the number and location of
sensitive facilities to generate this fuel is limited to meet
nonproliferation goals. The availability of fuel cycle
services in several different nations can provide ample
assurance to consumers of a continuing and stable source
of supply.
It is also desirable to continue studying the idea of a
few suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle centers to serve
regional needs, when effectively safeguarded and economically
warranted. Through these and related means, we can minimize
incentives for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.
The United States stands ready to take action, in
cooperation with other concerned nations, to assure reliable
supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable prices to any country
accepting responsible restraints on its nuclear power program
with regard to reprocessing, plutonium disposition, and
enrichment technology.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to initiate
consultations to explore with other nations arrange-
ments for coordinating fuel services and for
developing other means of ensuring that suppliers
will be able to offer, and consumers will be able to
receive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of
low-enriched uranium fuel and fuel services.
These discussions will address ways to ensure against
economic disadvantage to cooperating nations and to remove
any sources of competition which could undermine our common
nonproliferation efforts.
To contribute to this initiative, the U.S. will offer
binding letters of intent for the supply of nuclear fuel to
current and prospective customers willing to accept such
responsible restraints.
-- In addition, I am directing the Secretary of State
to enter into negotiations or arrangements for
mutual agreement on disposition of spent fuel with
consumer nations that adopt responsible restraints.
Where appropriate, the United States will provide
consumer nations with either fresh, low-enriched uranium
fuel or make other equitable arrangements in return for
mutual agreement on the disposition of spent fuel where such
disposition demonstrably fosters our common and cooperative
nonproliferation objectives. The United States seeks no
commercial advantage in pursuing options for fuel disposition
and assured fuel supplies.
-- Finally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative
efforts with other countries in developing their
indigenous non-nuclear energy resources.
more
8
The U.S. has proposed and continues to advocate the
establishment of an International Energy Institute, specifically
designed to help developing countries match the most economic
and readily available sources of energy to their power needs.
Through this Institute and other appropriate means, we will
offer technological assistance in the development of indigenous
energy resources.
IV. Strengthening the U.S. Role as a Reliable Supplier
If the U.S. is to continue its leadership role in world-
wide non-proliferation efforts, it must be a reliable supplier
of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes. There are
two principal actions we can take to contribute to this objective.
-- I will submit to the new Congress proposed legislation
that will permit the expansion of capacity in the
United States to produce enriched uranium, including
the authority needed for expansion of the Government-
owned plant at Portsmouth, Ohio. I will also work
with Congress to establish a framework for a private,
competitive industry to finance, build, own and
operate enrichment plants.
U.S. capacity has been fully committed since mid-1974
with the result that no new orders could be signed. The
Congress did not act on my full proposal and provided only
limited and temporary authority for proceeding with the
Portsmouth plant. We must have additional authority to
proceed with the expansion of capacity without further delay.
-- I will work closely with the Congress to ensure that
legislation for improving our export controls re-
sults in a system that provides maximum assurance
that the U.S. will be a reliable supplier to other
nations for the full period of agreements.
One of the principal concerns with export legislation
proposed in the last Congress was the fear that foreign
customers could be subjected to arbitrary new controls im-
posed well after a long-term agreement and specific contracts
for nuclear power plants and fuel had been signed. In the
case of nuclear plants and fuel, reliable long-term agreements
are essential and we must adopt export controls that provide
reliability while meeting non-proliferation objectives.
V. International Controls Against Proliferation
To reinforce the foregoing policies, we must develop
means to establish international restraints over the accumu-
lation of plutonium itself, whether in separated form or in
unprocessed spent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under
national control, especially in a separated form, is a primary
proliferation risk.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to pursue
vigorously discussions aimed at the establishment
of a new international regime to provide for storage
of civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel.
The United States made this proposal to the International
Atomic Energy Agency and other interested nations last spring.
more
9
Creation of such a regime will greatly strengthen world
confidence that the growing accumulation of excess plutonium
and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending reentry into the
nuclear fuel cycle or other safe disposition. I urge the IAEA,
which is empowered to establish plutonium depositories, to
give prompt implementation to this concept.
Once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in
operation, we are prepared to place our own excess civil plu-
tonium and spent fuel under its control. Moreover, we are
prepared to consider providing a site for international storage
under IAEA auspices.
The inspection system of the IAEA remains a key element
in our entire nonproliferation strategy. The world community
must make sure that the Agency has the technical and human
resources needed to keep pace with its expanding responsi-
bilities. At my direction, we have recently committed sub-
stantial additional resources to help upgrade the IAEA's
technical safeguards capabilities, and I believe we must
strengthen further the safeguard functions of the IAEA.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State and Administrator
of ERDA to undertake a major international effort to
ensure that adequate resources for this purpose are
made available, and that we mobilize our best scientific
talent to support that Agency. Our principal national
laboratories with expertise in this area have been
directed to provide assistance, on a continuing basis,
to the IAEA Secretariat.
The terrible increase in violence and terrorism
throughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the need
to assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear materials
and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope with this
problem is now broadly recognized. Many nations have re-
sponded to the initiatives which I have taken in this area
by materially strengthening their physical security and by
cooperating in the development of international guidelines
by the IAEA. As a result of consultations among the major
suppliers, provision for adequate physical security is be-
coming a normal condition of supply.
We have an effective physical security system in the
United States. But steps are needed to upgrade physical
security systems and to assure timely international col-
laboration in the recovery of lost or stolen materials.
-- I have directed the Secretary of State to address
vigorously the problem of physical security at
both bilateral and multilateral levels, including
exploration of a possible international convention.
The United States is committed to the development of
the system of international controls that I have here out-
lined. Even when complete, however, no system of controls
is likely to be effective if a potential violator judges
that his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be re-
ceived with indifference by the international community.
Any material violation of a nuclear safeguards agree-
ment -- especially the diversion of nuclear material for use
in making explosives -- must be universally judged to be an
extremely serious affront to the world community, calling
for the immediate imposition of drastic sanctions.
more
10
-- I serve notice today that the United States will,
at a minimum, respond to violation by any nation of
any safeguards agreement to which we are a party
with an immediate cutoff of our supply of nuclear
fuel and cooperation to that nation.
We would consider further steps, not necessarily confined
to the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator
nation. Nor will our actions be limited to violations of
agreements in which we are directly involved. In the event
of material violation of any safeguards agreement, particu-
larly agreements with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate
consultations with all interested nations to determine
appropriate action.
Universal recognition of the total unacceptability of
the abrogation or violation of any nonproliferation agree-
ments is one of the most important steps which can be taken
to prevent further proliferation. We invite all concerned
governments to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear
wrongdoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms
of international behavior, which would set in motion strong
and immediate countermeasures.
VI. U.S. Nuclear Export Policies
During the past two years, the United States has
strengthened its own national nuclear export policies.
Our interests, however, are not limited to controls alone.
The United States has a special responsibility to share the
benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with other countries.
We have sought to serve other nations as a reliable supplier
of nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice between
economic benefits and progress toward our nonproliferation
goals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to
nonproliferation. But there should be no incompatibility
between nonproliferation and assisting other nations in
enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, if all
supplier countries pursue common nuclear export policies.
There is need, however, for even more rigorous controls than
those now commonly employed, and for policies that favor
nations accepting responsible nonproliferation limitations.
-- I have decided that we will henceforth apply
new criteria in judging whether to enter into
new or expanded nuclear cooperation:
Adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty
will be a strong positive factor favoring
cooperation with a nonnuclear weapon state.
Nonnuclear weapons states that have not yet
adhered to the Non-proliferation Treaty will
receive positive recognition if they are
prepared to submit to full fuel cycle safeguards,
pending adherence.
We will favor recipient nations that are prepared
to forego, or postpone for a substantial period
the establishment of national reprocessing or
enrichment activities or, in certain cases, pre-
pared to shape and schedule their reprocessing
and enriching facilities to foster nonproliferation
needs.
more
11
Positive recognition will also be given to
nations prepared to participate in an inter-
national storage regime, under which spent
fuel and any separated plutonium would be
placed pending use.
Exceptional cases may occur in which nonproliferation will
be served best by cooperating with nations not yet meeting these
tests. However, I pledge that the Congress will not be asked
to approve any new or amended agreement not meeting these new
criteria unless I personally determine that the agreement is
fully supportive of our non-proliferation goals. In case of
such a determination, my reasons will be fully presented to the
Congress.
-- With respect to countries that are current recipients
of U.S. nuclear supply, I am directing the Secretary
of State to enter into negotiations with the objective
of conforming these agreements to established inter-
national guidelines, and to seek through diplomatic
initiatives and fuel supply incentives to obtain
their acceptance of our new criteria.
We must recognize the need for effective multilateral
approaches to nonproliferation and prevent nuclear export
controls from becoming an element of commercial competition.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to intensify
discussions with other nuclear suppliers aimed at
expanding common guidelines for peaceful cooperative
agreements so that they conform with these criteria.
In this regard, the United States would discuss ways of
developing incentives that can lead to acceptance of these
criteria, such as assuring reliable fuel supplies for nations
accepting new restraints.
The reliability of American assurances to other nations
is an asset that few, if any, nations of the world can match.
It must not be eroded. Indeed, nothing could more prejudice
our efforts to strengthen our existing nonproliferation under-
standings than arbitrary suspension or unwarranted delays in
meeting supply commitments to countries which are dealing with
us in good faith regarding effective safeguards and restraints.
Despite my personal efforts, the 94th Congress adjourned
without passing nuclear export legislation which would have
strengthened our effectiveness in dealing with other nations on
nuclear matters.
-- In the absence of such legislation, I am directing
the Secretary of State to work closely with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure proper
emphasis on nonproliferation concerns in the nuclear
export licensing process.
I will continue to work to develop bipartisan support in
Congress for improvements in our nuclear export laws.
VII. Reprocessing Evaluation Program
The world community requires an aggressive program to build
the international controls and cooperative regimes I have just
outlined. I am prepared to mount such a program in the
United States.
12
-- I am directing the Administrator of ERDA to:
Begin immediately to define a reprocessing
and recycle evaluation program consistent
with meeting our international objectives out-
lined earlier in this statement. This program
should complement the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC) ongoing considerations of
safety safeguards and environmental requirements
for reprocessing and recycling activities,
particularly its Generic Environmental Statement
on Mixed Oxide Fuels.
Investigate the feasibility of recovering the
energy value from used nuclear fuel without
separating our plutonium.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to invite
other nations to participate in designing and
carrying out ERDA's reprocessing and recycle
evaluation program, consistent with our inter-
national energy cooperation and non-proliferation
objectives. I will direct that activities carried
out in the U.S. in connection with this program
be subjected to full IAEA safeguards and
inspections.
VIII. Nuclear Waste Management
The area of our domesvic nuclear program dealing with
long-term management of nuclear wastes from our commercial
nuclear power plants has not in the past received sufficient
attention. In my 1977 Budget, I proposed a four-fold increase
in funding for this program, which involves the activities of
several Federal agencies. We recently completed a review to
determine what additional actions are needed to assure
availability in the mid-1980's of a Federally-owned and managed
repository for long-term nuclear wastes, well before significant
quantities of wastes begin to accumulate.
I have been assured that the technology for long-term
management or disposal of nuclear wastes is available but
demonstrations are needed.
I have directed the Administrator of ERDA to
take the necessary action to speed up this
program so as to demonstrate all components
of waste management technology by 1978 and to
demonstrate a complete repository for such
wastes by 1985.
--- I have further directed that the first demonstration
depository for high-level wastes which will be
owned by the Government be submitted for licensing
by the independent NRC to assure its safety and
acceptability to the public.
In view of the decisions announced today, I have also
directed the Administrator of ERDA to assure that the waste
repository will be able to handle spent fuel elements as well
as the separated and solidified waste that would result if we
proceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing.
more
13
The United States continues to provide world leadership
in nuclear waste management. I am inviting other nations to
participate in and learn from our programs.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to discuss
with other nations and the IAEA the possibility
of establishing centrally located, multinationally
controlled nuclear waste repositories so that the
number of sites that are needed can be limited.
INCREASED USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
Even with strong conservation efforts, energy demands in
the United States will continue to increase in response to the
needs of a growing economy. The only alternative over the next
15 to 20 years to increased use of both nuclear energy and coal
is greater reliance on imported oil which will jeopardize our
nation's strength and welfare.
We now have in the United States 62 licensed nuclear
plants, providing about 9 percent of our electrical energy.
By 1985 we will have from 145 to 160 plants, supplying
20 percent or more of the Nation's electricity.
In many cases, electricity from nuclear plants is
markedly cheaper than that produced from either oil or coal-
fired plants. Nuclear energy is environmentally preferable
in a number of respects to other principal ways of generating
electricity.
Commercial nuclear power has an excellent safety record,
with nearly 200 plant years of experience (compiled over 18
chronological years) without a single death from a nuclear
accident. I have acted to assure that this record is maintained
in the years ahead. For example, I have increased funds for
the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for the
Energy Research and Development Administration for reactor
safety research and development.
The decisions and actions I am announcing today will
help overcome the uncertainties that have served to delay the
expanded use of nuclear energy in the United States. While
the decision to delay reprocessing is significant, it will not
prevent us from increasing our use of nuclear energy. We are
on the right course with our nuclear power program in America.
The changes I am announcing today will ensure that we continue.
My decisions today do not affect the U.S. program of
research and development on the breeder reactor. That program
assumes that no decision on the commercial operations of
breeder reactors, which require plutonium fuel, will be made
before 1986.
CONCLUSION
I do not underestimate the challenge represented in the
creation of a world-wide program that will permit capturing
the benefits of nuclear energy while maintaining needed
protection against nuclear proliferation. The challenge is
one that can be managed only partially and temporarily by
technical measures.
more
14
It can be managed fully if the task is faced realistically
by nations prepared to forego perceived short-term advantages
in favor of fundamental long-term gains. We call upon all
nations to recognize that their individual and collective
interests are best served by internationally assured and
safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services and storage. We
ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear capabilities
which are of doubtful economic value and have ominous
implications for nuclear proliferation and instability in
the world.
The growing international consensus against the proliferation
of nuclear weapons is a source of encouragement. But it is
certainly not a basis for complacency.
Success in meeting the challenge now before us depends
on an extraordinary coordination of the policies of all nations
toward the common good. The U.S. is prepared to lead, but we
cannot succeed alone. If nations can work together construc-
tively and cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems
we will enhance our collective security. And we will be better
able to concentrate our energies and our resources on the great
tasks of construction rather than consume them in increasingly
dangerous rivalry.
#
#
#
#
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 28, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NUCLEAR POLICY
We have known since the age of nuclear energy began
more than 30 years ago that this source of energy had the
potential for tremendous benefits for mankind and the potential
for unparalleled destruction.
On the one hand, there is no doubt that nuclear energy
represents one of the best hopes for satisfying the rising
world demand for energy with minimum environmental impact and
with the potential for reducing dependence on uncertain and
diminishing world supplies of oil.
On the other hand, nuclear fuel, as it produces power
also produces plutonium, which can be chemically separated from
the spent fuel. The plutonium can be recycled and used to
generate additional nuclear power, thereby partially offsetting
the need for additional energy resources. Unfortunately -- and
this is the root of the problem -- the same plutonium produced
in nuclear power plants can, when chemically separated, also be
used to make nuclear explosives.
The world community cannot afford to let potential nuclear
weapons material or the technology to produce it proliferate
uncontrolled over the globe. The world community must ensure
that production and utilization of such material by any nation
is carried out under the most stringent security conditions
and arrangements.
Developing the enormous benefits of nuclear energy while
simultaneously developing the means to prevent proliferation
is one of the major challenges facing all nations of the world
today.
The standards we apply in judging most domestic and
international activities are not sufficiently rigorous to deal
with this extraordinarily complex problem. Our answers
cannot be partially successful. They will either work,
in which case we shall stop proliferation; or they will
fail and nuclear proliferation will accelerate as
nations initially having no intention of acquiring nuclear
weapons conclude that they are forced to do so by the actions
of others. Should this happen, we would face a world in which
the security of all is critically imperiled. Maintaining
international stability in such an environment would be
incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of regional
or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation would be
immeasurably increased -- if not through direct attack, then
through a process of ever expanding escalation.
The problem can be handled as long as we understand it
clearly and act wisely in concert with other nations. But we
are faced with a threat of tragedy if we fail to comprehend
it or to take effective measures.
more
2
Thus, the seriousness and complexity of the problem place
a special burden on those who propose ways to control prolifera-
tion. They must avoid the temptation for rhetorical gestures,
empty threats, or righteous posturing. They must offer policies
and programs which deal with the world as it is, not as we might
wish it to be. The goal is to prevent proliferation, not simply
to deplore it.
The first task in dealing with the problem of proliferation
is to understand the world nuclear situation.
More than 30 nations have or plan to build nuclear power
plants to reap the benefits of nuclear energy. The 1973
energy crisis dramatically demonstrated to all nations not
only the dangers of excessive reliance on oil imports, but
also the reality that the world's supply of fossil fuels is
running out. As a result, nuclear energy is now properly
seen by many nations as an indispensable way to satisfy rising
energy demand without prematurely depleting finite fossil fuel
resources. We must understand the motives which are leading
these nations, developed and developing, to place even greater
emphasis than we do on nuclear power development. For unless
we comprehend their real needs, we cannot expect to find ways
of working with them to ensure satisfaction of both our and
their legitimate concerns.
Moreover, several nations besides the United States have
the technology needed to produce both the benefits and the
destructive potential of nuclear energy. Nations with such
capabilities are able to export their technology and facilities.
Thus, no single nation, not even the United States, can
realistically hope -- by itself -- to control effectively the
spread of reprocessing technology and the resulting avail-
ability of plutonium.
The United States once was the dominant world supplier
of nuclear material equipment and technology. While we remain
a leader in this field, other suppliers have come to share the
international market -- with the U.S. now supplying less than
half of nuclear reactor exports.
In short, for nearly a decade the U.S. has not had a
monopoly on nuclear technology. Although our role is large,
we are not able to control worldwide nuclear development.
For these reasons, action to control proliferation must
be an international cooperative effort involving many nations,
including both nuclear suppliers and customers. Common standards
must be developed and accepted by all parties. If this is not
done, unrestrained trade in sensitive nuclear technology and
materials will develop -- with no one in a position to stop it.
We in the United States must recognize that interests in
nuclear energy vary widely among nations. We must recognize
that some nations look to nuclear energy because they have no
acceptable energy alternative. We must be sure that our efforts
to control proliferation are not viewed by such nations as an
act to prevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear
energy. We must be sure that all nations recognize that the
U.S. believes that non-proliferation objectives must take
precedence over economic and energy benefits if a choice must
be made.
more
3
PREVIOUS ACTION
During the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the unques-
tioned leader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits
of nuclear energy are made available widely while its destruc-
tive uses are prevented. I have given special attention to
these objectives during the past two years, and we have made
important new progress, particularly in efforts to control
the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among the
nations of the world.
In 1974, soon after I assumed office, I became concerned
that some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve
competitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports
under conditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. In
the fall of that year, at the United Nations General Assembly,
the United States proposed that non-proliferation measures be
strengthened materially. I also expressed my concern directly
to my counterparts in key supplier and recipient nations. I
directed the Secretary of State to emphasize multilateral
action to limit this dangerous form of competition.
At U.S. initiative, the first meeting of major nuclear
suppliers was convened in London in April 1975. A series of
meetings and intensive bilateral consultations followed.
As a result of these meetings, we have significantly
raised international standards through progressive new guide-
lines to govern nuclear exports. These involve both improved
safeguards and controls to prevent diversion of nuclear
materials and to guard against the misuse of nuclear technology
and physical protection against theft and sabotage. The
United States has adopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear
exports.
In addition, we have acted to deal with the special
dangers associated with plutonium.
-- We have prohibited export of reprocessing and other
nuclear technologies that could contribute to
proliferation.
-- We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea and
Taiwan. We welcome the decisions of those nations
to forego such activities. We will continue to
discourage national reprocessing in other locations
of particular concern.
We negotiated agreements for cooperation with Egypt
and Israel which contain the strictest reprocessing
provisions and other nuclear controls ever included
in the twenty-year history of our nuclear cooperation
program.
-- In addition, the United States recently completed
negotiations to place its civil nuclear facilities
under the safeguards of the International Atomic
Energy Agency -- and the IAEA has approved a proposed
agreement for this purpose.
more
4
NEW INITIATIVES
Last summer, I directed that a thorough review be under-
taken of all our nuclear policies and options to determine what
further steps were needed. I have considered carefully the
results of that review, held discussions with Congressional
leaders, and benefited from consultations with leaders of other
nations. I have decided that new steps are needed, building
upon the progress of the past two years. Today, I am announcing
a number of actions and proposals aimed at:
-- strengthening the commitment of the nations of the
world to the goal of non-proliferation and building an
effective system of international controls to prevent
proliferation;
-- changing and strengthening U.S. domestic nuclear
policies and programs to support our non-proliferation
goals; and
-- establishing, by these actions, a sound foundation
for the continued and increased use of nuclear
energy in the U.S. and in the world in a safe and
economic manner.
The task we face calls for an international cooperative
venture of unprecedented dimensions. The U.S. is prepared
to work with all other nations.
PRINCIPAL POLICY DECISIONS
I have concluded that the reprocessing and recycling of
plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound reason to
conclude that the world community can effectively overcome
the associated risks of proliferation. I believe that
avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over eco-
nomic interests. I have also concluded that the United States
and other nations can and should increase their use of nuclear
power for peaceful purposes even if reprocessing and recycling
of plutonium are found to be unacceptable.
Vigorous action is required domestically and internation-
ally to make these judgments effective.
-- I have decided that the United States should greatly
accelerate its diplomatic initiatives, in conjunction
with nuclear supplier and consumer nations, to control
the spread of plutonium and technologies for separating
plutonium.
Effective non-proliferation measures will require the
participation and support of nuclear suppliers and consumers.
There must be coordination in restraints so that an effective
non-proliferation system is achieved and there must be coopera-
tion in assuring reliable fuel supplies so that peaceful
energy needs are met.
-- I have decided that the United States should no
longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to
produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable
step in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that we should
pursue reprocessing and recycling in the future
only if they are found to be consistent with our
international objectives.
5
We must ensure that our domestic policies and programs
are compatible with our international position on reprocessing
and that we work closely with other nations in evaluating
nuclear fuel reprocessing.
-- The steps I am announcing today will assure that the
necessary increase in our use of nuclear energy will
be carried on with safety and without aggravating
the danger of proliferation.
Even with strong efforts to conserve, we will have in-
creasing demands for energy for a growing American economy.
To satisfy these needs, we must rely on increased use of both
nuclear energy and coal until more acceptable alternatives are
developed. We will continue pushing ahead with work on all
promising alternatives such as solar energy but now we must
count on the technology that works. We cannot expect a major
contribution to our energy supply from alternative technologies
until late in this century.
To implement my overall policy decisions, I have decided
on a number of policies that are necessary and appropriate to
meet our non-proliferation and energy objectives.
-- First, our domestic policies must be changed to
conform to my decision on deferral of the commercializa-
tion of chemical reprocessing of nuclear fuel which
results in the separation of plutonium.
-- Second, I call upon all nations to join us in exercising
maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and
enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such
sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at
least three years.
-- Third, new cooperative steps are needed to help assure
that all nations have an adequate and reliable supply
of energy for their needs. I believe, most importantly,
that nuclear supplier nations have a special obligation
to assure that customer nations have an adequate supply
of fuel for their nuclear power plants, if those
customer nations forego the acquisition of repro-
cessing and uranium enrichment capabilities and
accept effective proliferation controls.
-- Fourth, the U.S. must maintain its role as a major
and reliable world supplier of nuclear reactors and
fuel for peaceful purposes. Our strong position as
a supplier has provided the principal basis for our
influence and leadership in worldwide non-prolifera-
tion efforts. A strong position will be equally
important in the future. While reaffirming this
nation's intent to be a reliable supplier, the
U.S. seeks no competitive advantage by virtue of
the worldwide system of effective non-proliferation
controls that I am calling for today.
-- Fifth, new efforts must be made to urge all nations
to join in a full-scale international cooperative
effort -- which I shall outline in detail -- to
develop a system of effective controls to prevent
proliferation.
more
6
Sixth, the U.S. must take new steps with respect
to its own exports to control proliferation, while
seeking to improve multilateral guidelines.
-- Seventh, the U.S. must undertake a program to
evaluate reprocessing in support of the international
policies I have adopted.
-- Finally, I have concluded that new steps are needed
to assure that we have in place when needed, both
in the U.S. and around the world, the facilities for
the long-term storage or disposal of nuclear wastes.
ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT OUR NUCLEAR POLICIES
In order to implement the nuclear policies that I have
outlined, major efforts will be required within the United States
and by the many nations around the world with an interest in
nuclear energy. To move forward with these efforts, I am
today taking a number of actions and making a number of
proposals to other nations.
I. Change in U.S. Policy on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
With respect to nuclear fuel reprocessing, I am directing
agencies of the Executive Branch to implement my decision to
delay commercialization of reprocessing activities in the
U.S. until uncertainties are resolved. Specifically, I am:
-- Directing the Administrator of the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA) to:
change ERDA policies and programs which heretofore
have been based on the assumption that reprocessing
would proceed;
encourage prompt action to expand spent fuel
storage facilities, thus assuring utilities that
they need not be concerned about shutdown of
nuclear reactors because of delays; and
identify the research and development efforts
needed to investigate the feasibility of re-
covering the energy value from used nuclear
fuel without separating plutonium.
II. Restraint in the Transfer of Sensitive Nuclear Technology
and Facilities
Despite the gains in controlling proliferation that have
been made, the dangers posed by reprocessing and the prospect
of uncontrolled availability of plutonium require further,
decisive international action. Effective control of the
parallel risk of spreading uranium enrichment technology is
also necessary. To meet these dangers:
-- I call upon all nations to join with us in exercising
maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and
enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such
sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at
least three years.
This will allow suppliers and consumers to work together
to establish reliable means for meeting nuclear needs with
minimum risk, as we assess carefully the wisdom of plutonium
use. As we proceed in these efforts, we must not be influenced
by pressures to approve the export of these sensitive facilities.
more
7
III. Assuring an Adequate Energy Supply for Customer Nations
-- I urge nuclear suppliers to provide nuclear consumers
with fuel services, instead of sensitive technology
or facilities.
Nations accepting effective nonproliferation restraints
have a right to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear
reactors and associated, nonsensitive fuel.
All such nations would share in the benefits of an assured
supply of nuclear fuel, even though the number and location of
sensitive facilities to generate this fuel is limited to meet
nonproliferation goals. The availability of fuel cycle
services in several different nations can provide ample
assurance to consumers of a continuing and stable source
of supply.
It is also desirable to continue studying the idea of a
few suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle centers to serve
regional needs, when effectively safeguarded and economically
warranted. Through these and related means, we can minimize
incentives for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.
The United States stands ready to take action, in
cooperation with other concerned nations, to assure reliable
supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable prices to any country
accepting responsible restraints on its nuclear power program
with regard to reprocessing, plutonium disposition, and
enrichment technology.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to initiate
consultations to explore with other nations arrange-
ments for coordinating fuel services and for
developing other means of ensuring that suppliers
will be able to offer, and consumers will be able to
receive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of
low-enriched uranium fuel and fuel services.
These discussions will address ways to ensure against
economic disadvantage to cooperating nations and to remove
any sources of competition which could undermine our common
nonproliferation efforts.
To contribute to this initiative, the U.S. will offer
binding letters of intent for the supply of nuclear fuel to
current and prospective customers willing to accept such
responsible restraints.
-- In addition, I am directing the Secretary of State
to enter into negotiations or arrangements for
mutual agreement on disposition of spent fuel with
consumer nations that adopt responsible restraints.
Where appropriate, the United States will provide
consumer nations with either fresh, low-enriched uranium
fuel or make other equitable arrangements in return for
mutual agreement on the disposition of spent fuel where such
disposition demonstrably fosters our common and cooperative
nonproliferation objectives. The United States seeks no
commercial advantage in pursuing options for fuel disposition
and assured fuel supplies.
-- Finally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative
efforts with other countries in developing their
indigenous non-nuclear energy resources.
more
8
The U.S. has proposed and continues to advocate the
establishment of an International Energy Institute, specifically
designed to help developing countries match the most economic
and readily available sources of energy to their power needs.
Through this Institute and other appropriate means, we will
offer technological assistance in the development of indigenous
energy resources.
IV. Strengthening the U.S. Role as a Reliable Supplier
If the U.S. is to continue its leadership role in world-
wide non-proliferation efforts, it must be a reliable supplier
of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes. There are
two principal actions we can take to contribute to this objective.
-- I will submit to the new Congress proposed legislation
that will permit the expansion of capacity in the
United States to produce enriched uranium, including
the authority needed for expansion of the Government-
owned plant at Portsmouth, Ohio. I will also work
with Congress to establish a framework for a private,
competitive industry to finance, build, own and
operate enrichment plants.
U.S. capacity has been fully committed since mid-1974
with the result that no new orders could be signed. The
Congress did not act on my full proposal and provided only
limited and temporary authority for proceeding with the
Portsmouth plant. We must have additional authority to
proceed with the expansion of capacity without further delay.
-- I will work closely with the Congress to ensure that
legislation for improving our export controls re-
sults in a system that provides maximum assurance
that the U.S. will be a reliable supplier to other
nations for the full period of agreements.
One of the principal concerns with export legislation
proposed in the last Congress was the fear that foreign
customers could be subjected to arbitrary new controls im-
posed well after a long-term agreement and specific contracts
for nuclear power plants and fuel had been signed. In the
case of nuclear plants and fuel, reliable long-term agreements
are essential and we must adopt export controls that provide
reliability while meeting non-proliferation objectives.
V. International Controls Against Proliferation
To reinforce the foregoing policies, we must develop
means to establish international restraints over the accumu-
lation of plutonium itself, whether in separated form or in
unprocessed spent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under
national control, especially in a separated form, is a primary
proliferation risk.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to pursue
vigorously discussions aimed at the establishment
of a new international regime to provide for storage
of civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel.
The United States made this proposal to the International
Atomic Energy Agency and other interested nations last spring.
more
9
Creation of such a regime will greatly strengthen world
confidence that the growing accumulation of excess plutonium
and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending reentry into the
nuclear fuel cycle or other safe disposition. I urge the IAEA,
which is empowered to establish plutonium depositories, to
give prompt implementation to this concept.
Once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in
operation, we are prepared to place our own excess civil plu-
tonium and spent fuel under its control. Moreover, we are
prepared to consider providing a site for international storage
under IAEA auspices.
The inspection system of the IAEA remains a key element
in our entire nonproliferation strategy. The world community
must make sure that the Agency has the technical and human
resources needed to keep pace with its expanding responsi-
bilities. At my direction, we have recently committed sub-
stantial additional resources to help upgrade the IAEA's
technical safeguards capabilities, and I believe we must
strengthen further the safeguard functions of the IAEA.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State and Administrator
of ERDA to undertake a major international effort to
ensure that adequate resources for this purpose are
made available, and that we mobilize our best scientific
talent to support that Agency. Our principal national
laboratories with expertise in this area have been
directed to provide assistance, on a continuing basis,
to the IAEA Secretariat.
The terrible increase in violence and terrorism
throughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the need
to assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear materials
and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope with this
problem is now broadly recognized. Many nations have re-
sponded to the initiatives which I have taken in this area
by materially strengthening their physical security and by
cooperating in the development of international guidelines
by the IAEA. As a result of consultations among the major
suppliers, provision for adequate physical security is be-
coming a normal condition of supply.
We have an effective physical security system in the
United States. But steps are needed to upgrade physical
security systems and to assure timely international col-
laboration in the recovery of lost or stolen materials.
-- I have directed the Secretary of State to address
vigorously the problem of physical security at
both bilateral and multilateral levels, including
exploration of a possible international convention.
The United States is committed to the development of
the system of international controls that I have here out-
lined. Even when complete, however, no system of controls
is likely to be effective if a potential violator judges
that his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be re-
ceived with indifference by the international community.
Any material violation of a nuclear safeguards agree-
ment -- especially the diversion of nuclear material for use
in making explosives -- must be universally judged to be an
extremely serious affront to the world community, calling
for the immediate imposition of drastic sanctions.
more
10
-- I serve notice today that the United States will,
at a minimum, respond to violation by any nation of
any safeguards agreement to which we are a party
with an immediate cutoff of our supply of nuclear
fuel and cooperation to that nation.
We would consider further steps, not necessarily confined
to the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator
nation. Nor will our actions be limited to violations of
agreements in which we are directly involved. In the event
of material violation of any safeguards agreement, particu-
larly agreements with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate
consultations with all interested nations to determine
appropriate action.
Universal recognition of the total unacceptability of
the abrogation or violation of any nonproliferation agree-
ments is one of the most important steps which can be taken
to prevent further proliferation. We invite all concerned
governments to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear
wrongdoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms
of international behavior, which would set in motion strong
and immediate countermeasures.
VI. U.S. Nuclear Export Policies
During the past two years, the United States has
strengthened its own national nuclear export policies.
Our interests, however, are not limited to controls alone.
The United States has a special responsibility to share the
benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with other countries.
We have sought to serve other nations as a reliable supplier
of nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice between
economic benefits and progress toward our nonproliferation
goals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to
nonproliferation. But there should be no incompatibility
between nonproliferation and assisting other nations in
enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, if all
supplier countries pursue common nuclear export policies.
There is need, however, for even more rigorous controls than
those now commonly employed, and for policies that favor
nations accepting responsible nonproliferation limitations.
-- I have decided that we will henceforth apply
new criteria in judging whether to enter into
new or expanded nuclear cooperation:
Adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty
will be a strong positive factor favoring
cooperation with a nonnuclear weapon state.
Nonnuclear weapons states that have not yet
adhered to the Non-proliferation Treaty will
receive positive recognition if they are
prepared to submit to full fuel cycle safeguards,
pending adherence.
We will favor recipient nations that are prepared
to forego, or postpone for a substantial period
the establishment of national reprocessing or
enrichment activities or, in certain cases, pre-
pared to shape and schedule their reprocessing
and enriching facilities to foster nonproliferation
needs.
more
11
Positive recognition will also be given to
nations prepared to participate in an inter-
national storage regime, under which spent
fuel and any separated plutonium would be
placed pending use.
Exceptional cases may occur in which nonproliferation will
be served best by cooperating with nations not yet meeting these
tests. However, I pledge that the Congress will not be asked
to approve any new or amended agreement not meeting these new
criteria unless I personally determine that the agreement is
fully supportive of our non-proliferation goals. In case of
such a determination, my reasons will be fully presented to the
Congress.
-- With respect to countries that are current recipients
of U.S. nuclear supply, I am directing the Secretary
of State to enter into negotiations with the objective
of conforming these agreements to established inter-
national guidelines, and to seek through diplomatic
initiatives and fuel supply incentives to obtain
their acceptance of our new criteria.
We must recognize the need for effective multilateral
approaches to nonproliferation and prevent nuclear export
controls from becoming an element of commercial competition.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to intensify
discussions with other nuclear suppliers aimed at
expanding common guidelines for peaceful cooperative
agreements so that they conform with these criteria.
In this regard, the United States would discuss ways of
developing incentives that can lead to acceptance of these
criteria, such as assuring reliable fuel supplies for nations
accepting new restraints.
The reliability of American assurances to other nations
is an asset that few, if any, nations of the world can match.
It must not be eroded. Indeed, nothing could more prejudice
our efforts to strengthen our existing nonproliferation under-
standings than arbitrary suspension or unwarranted delays in
meeting supply commitments to countries which are dealing with
us in good faith regarding effective safeguards and restraints.
Despite my personal efforts, the 94th Congress adjourned
without passing nuclear export legislation which would have
strengthened our effectiveness in dealing with other nations on
nuclear matters.
-- In the absence of such legislation, I am directing
the Secretary of State to work closely with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure proper
emphasis on nonproliferation concerns in the nuclear
export licensing process.
I will continue to work to develop bipartisan support in
Congress for improvements in our nuclear export laws.
VII. Reprocessing Evaluation Program
The world community requires an aggressive program to build
the international controls and cooperative regimes I have just
outlined. I am prepared to mount such a program in the
United States.
12
-- I am directing the Administrator of ERDA to:
Begin immediately to define a reprocessing
and recycle evaluation program consistent
with meeting our international objectives out-
lined earlier in this statement. This program
should complement the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC) ongoing considerations of
safety safeguards and environmental requirements
for reprocessing and recycling activities,
particularly its Generic Environmental Statement
on Mixed Oxide Fuels.
Investigate the feasibility of recovering the
energy value from used nuclear fuel without
separating our plutonium.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to invite
other nations to participate in designing and
carrying out ERDA's reprocessing and recycle
evaluation program, consistent with our inter-
national energy cooperation and non-proliferation
objectives. I will direct that activities carried
out in the U.S. in connection with this program
be subjected to full IAEA safeguards and
inspections.
VIII. Nuclear Waste Management
The area of our domestic nuclear program dealing with
long-term management of nuclear wastes from our commercial
nuclear power plants has not in the past received sufficient
attention. In my 1977 Budget, I proposed a four-fold increase
in funding for this program, which involves the activities of
several Federal agencies. We recently completed a review to
determine what additional actions are needed to assure
availability in the mid-1980's of a Federally-owned and managed
repository for long-term nuclear wastes, well before significant
quantities of wastes begin to accumulate.
I have been assured that the technology for long-term
management or disposal of nuclear wastes is available but
demonstrations are needed.
-- I have directed the Administrator of ERDA to
take the necessary action to speed up this
program so as to demonstrate all components
of waste management technology by 1978 and to
demonstrate a complete repository for such
wastes by 1985.
-- I have further directed that the first demonstration
depository for high-level wastes which will be
owned by the Government be submitted for licensing
by the independent NRC to assure its safety and
acceptability to the public.
In view of the decisions announced today, I have also
directed the Administrator of ERDA to assure that the waste
repository will be able to handle spent fuel elements as well
as the separated and solidified waste that would result if we
proceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing.
more
13
The United States continues to provide world leadership
in nuclear waste management. I am inviting other nations to
participate in and learn from our programs.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to discuss
with other nations and the IAEA the possibility
of establishing centrally located, multinationally
controlled nuclear waste repositories so that the
number of sites that are needed can be limited.
INCREASED USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
Even with strong conservation efforts, energy demands in
the United States will continue to increase in response to the
needs of a growing economy. The only alternative over the next
15 to 20 years to increased use of both nuclear energy and coal
is greater reliance on imported oil which will jeopardize our
nation's strength and welfare.
We now have in the United States 62 licensed nuclear
plants, providing about 9 percent of our electrical energy.
By 1985 we will have from 145 to 160 plants, supplying
20 percent or more of the Nation's electricity.
In many cases, electricity from nuclear plants is
markedly cheaper than that produced from either oil or coal-
fired plants. Nuclear energy is environmentally preferable
in a number of respects to other principal ways of generating
electricity.
Commercial nuclear power has an excellent safety record,
with nearly 200 plant years of experience (compiled over 18
chronological years) without a single death from a nuclear
accident. I have acted to assure that this record is maintained
in the years ahead. For example, I have increased funds for
the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for the
Energy Research and Development Administration for reactor
safety research and development.
The decisions and actions I am announcing today will
help overcome the uncertainties that have served to delay the
expanded use of nuclear energy in the United States. While
the decision to delay reprocessing is significant, it will not
prevent us from increasing our use of nuclear energy. We are
on the right course with our nuclear power program in America.
The changes I am announcing today will ensure that we continue.
My decisions today do not affect the U.S. program of
research and development on the breeder reactor. That program
assumes that no decision on the commercial operations of
breeder reactors, which require plutonium fuel, will be made
before 1986.
CONCLUSION
I do not underestimate the challenge represented in the
creation of a world-wide program that will permit capturing
the benefits of nuclear energy while maintaining needed
protection against nuclear proliferation. The challenge is
one that can be managed only partially and temporarily by
technical measures.
more
14
It can be managed fully if the task is faced realistically
by nations prepared to forego perceived short-term advantages
in favor of fundamental long-term gains. We call upon all
nations to recognize that their individual and collective
interests are best served by internationally assured and
safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services and storage. We
ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear capabilities
which are of doubtful economic value and have ominous
implications for nuclear proliferation and instability in
the world.
The growing international consensus against the proliferation
of nuclear weapons is a source of encouragement. But it is
certainly not a basis for complacency.
Success in meeting the challenge now before us depends
on an extraordinary coordination of the policies of all nations
toward the common good. The U.S. is prepared to lead, but we
cannot succeed alone. If nations can work together construc-
tively and cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems
we will enhance our collective security. And we will be better
able to concentrate our energies and our resources on the great
tasks of construction rather than consume them in increasingly
dangerous rivalry.
#
#
#
#
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 28, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
FACT SHEET
PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN
As one part of his comprehensive statement on nuclear policy,
the President today announced new steps to assure that the
U.S. has in place when needed, the facilities for long-term
management of nuclear wastes from our commercial power plants.
BACKGROUND
--
In his 1977 Budget, the President proposed a four-fold
increase in the funding of the Energy Research and
Development Administration's program for dealing with
the long-term management of nuclear wastes.
In March 1976, a review of Federal nuclear waste management
activities was undertaken by an interagency task force.
The President's actions today were based on the findings
of that review.
THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
In one part of his comprehensive nuclear policy statement, the
President directed that actions be taken to speed up the pro-
gram to demonstrate all components of waste management technology
by 1978, and to demonstrate a complete respository by 1985. He
also directed that plans for the repository be submitted to the
NRC for licensing to assure its safety and acceptability.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND DETAILS OF THE PLAN
A.
Nuclear Waste Requiring Long-Term Management
U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors "burn" low
enriched uranium fuel and produce in spent fuel rods
a mixture of plutonium, low enriched uranium and waste
products. Certain of these waste products are highly
radioactive and could constitute a hazard for tens of
thousands of years if they escaped to the biosphere.
If spent fuel rods are reprocessed, the wastes
would be separated from the uranium and plutonium
(which could be saved and recycled as fuel), put
into solid form and encased in metal canisters,
and sent to a repository for disposal.
If there is no reprocessing, the spent fuel rods
themselves must be packaged and disposed of in a
repository.
Under either alternative, nuclear wastes must be isolated
from the environment for centuries and the President's plan
will accommodate both alternatives.
more
2
B.
The Nuclear Waste Problem and Alternatives for Dealing
With It That Have Been Considered.
The principle problem in safely managing the waste is
confining the radioactivity rather than finding enough
storage space. Recent calculations using realistic
assumptions regarding numbers of reactors and disposal
technology indicate the total volume of solidified
high-level wastes produced by commercial nuclear power
in the U.S. through 2000 will be equivalent to a cube
about 70 feet on each side.
Technology or means for nuclear waste disposal and manage-
ment have been developed and demonstrated on a small scale.
However, we do not yet have available a repository for
nuclear waste disposal. Most spent fuel rods are continuing
to be stored safely in temporary storage basins at reactor
sites.
A wide variety of methods for permanent disposal of these
wastes has been considered:
Experts have concluded that the most practical method
is geologic storage in repositories in stable formations
deep underground.
Other methods under study, but which do not seem practical
at present, are deep geologic disposal under the ocean
floor, transmutation, and launching them into space.
Considerable public concern has been expressed that the
Federal Government has not yet demonstrated that it can
fulfill its responsibility to provide a repository for
safe disposal of nuclear waste.
Tasks ahead include further demonstration of the technology,
selecting an acceptable site, and proceeding with a coordinate
program to assure that a facility will be available, when
needed, about 1985.
C.
The Federal Government's Waste Management Responsibility.
The Federal Government has assumed the responsibility for
long-term disposal of high-level wastes because of the
limited incentives for private parties to engage in
commercial storage of these wastes. Private industry
is responsible for packaging and delivering the waste
in a prescribed form to a Federal repository.
D.
Principal Actions Needed and the Status of Those Actions
1. Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS)
Because the program to build and operate a repository
will represent a major Federal action with potentially
significant environmental impact, the ERDA is required
to prepare a generic environmental impact statement
(GEIS) on its waste management program.
- The GEIS will examine the impacts of all the major
waste management alternatives.
- Statement will cover all types of nuclear wastes
from the light water reactor fuel cycle.
- Other environmental impact statements (EIS's) will
be required when (i) regulations are proposed, and
(ii) when construction funds are requested from
Congress.
more
3
Status - ERDA has been at work for some time on the
GEIS. No major problems are anticipated in completing
the statement by late 1977.
2. General Environmental Standards
The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, requires the EPA
to issue general environmental standards for releases
to the biosphere from nuclear facilities. These
standards will include a numerical limit to long-term
radiation releases outside the boundaries of the
repository -- above the natural background radiation.
The standards need to be available as early as possible
during the process of locating and constructing the
repository.
Status - EPA will propose the general standards covering
high level waste in 1977 and publish them in final form
by mid-1978, in time for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to issue its regulations and prior
to site selection and construction.
3. Licensing of Waste Repository
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 requires that
high-level commercial waste repositories be licensed
by the NRC prior to operation. The NRC is also
responsible for issuing the appropriate criteria
and standards to assure that the respository is
constructed and operated in a safe and environmentally
acceptable manner.
Status - ERDA has been directed to ask the NRC to
subject the repository to a licensing procedure before
the first commercial wastes are shipped. NRC will
produce criteria and standards by 1978 governing the
construction and operation of the repository prior to
the time the site is finally determined and construc-
tion begins.
4. Construction and Operation of a Repository
ERDA, supported by other Federal agencies, has the
responsibility to construct and operate the repository,
including:
- finding an acceptable site
- acquiring the land
- designing the repository
- constructing, operating, and sealing the repository
Status
- FY 1977 appropriations increased funding for this
program to $66 million, up from $12 million in
FY 1976.
- The President today directed the Administrator to
assure the small scale demonstration by 1978 of
the process technologies (such as waste solidifica-
tion, transuranic volume reduction, canister design,
etc.), and by 1985 to have the repository in operation.
more
4
E.
Timetable for Actions
The principle actions and dates for their accomplishment
are listed below.
1976 - ERDA issued for public review the Technical
Alternatives Document which explains the current
state of waste management technology.
1977 - ERDA issues draft generic environmental impact
statement on waste management no later than the
early part of the year and begins extensive
program to identify, test and select a site.
- EPA proposes draft generally applicable standards
for permanent storage of high-level wastes.
- NRC publishes draft standards for solidified
high-level wastes and draft siting, engineering
and operating criteria for repositories for high-
level wastes. Each element will include the
appropriate draft environmental impact statements.
1978 - ERDA will complete initial demonstration work on
canister design, waste solidification, and pre-
liminary repository design, and continue site
selection process.
- NRC finalizes proposed site selection criteria,
solidification criteria, waste definitions and
operating criteria and regulations.
- EPA issues final general ambient standards for
high level waste disposal.
1979 - ERDA selects a particular repository site, issues
a draft site specific EIS, and begins intensive
site and design work.
- NRC performs early site review of ERDA repository;
issues next phase of draft regulations for canister
design, transportation, etc.
1980 - ERDA completes site and design studies, submits
preliminary safety analysis and environmental
report to NRC in support of construction permit.
1981 - ERDA begins construction with approval of NRC.
1984 - Construction completed, repository tested with
"cold" wastes.
1985 - NRC issues repository license.
- Repository begins initial commercial-scale
operations.
F.
The Interagency Review of Nuclear Waste Management.
The review of nuclear waste management was completed by
an interagency Task Force led by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and including participants from the
agencies having a role in nuclear waste management.
Specifically: the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Geological
Survey (Interior Department), and the National Science
Foundation (NSF). The independent Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) participated as an observer.
#
#
#
#
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 28, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUMMARY FACT SHEET
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY
I.
THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION
The President today issued a major statement on nuclear
policy, calling upon all nations to join in a cooperative
effort to preserve the benefits of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy while preventing nuclear proliferation.
As a part of a comprehensive statement, he announced
decisions to:
accelerate U.S. diplomatic initiatives, in conjunction
with nuclear supplier and customer nations, to control
the spread of plutonium and the technologies for
separating plutonium from nuclear fuel.
change U.S. policy on reprocessing of nuclear fuel
to provide that the U.S. will not proceed with
reprocessing and recycle of plutonium unless there
is sound reason to determine that the world community
can effectively overcome the associated risks of
proliferation.
The President concluded that the U.S. and other nations
can and should increase their use of nuclear power for
peaceful purposes even if reprocessing and recycling
of plutonium are found to be unacceptable.
II. BACKGROUND
During the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the
unquestioned leader in worldwide efforts to assure
that the benefits of nuclear energy are available
while destructive uses are prevented.
During the past two years, President Ford has:
- stepped up efforts to strengthen controls against
proliferation abroad.
- acted to expand the use of nuclear energy in the U.S.
Last summer, the President directed that a thorough review
be undertaken of U.S. nuclear policies and options, with
particular attention to exports, reprocessing, waste
management and non-proliferation.
As a result of the policy review, discussions with
members of Congress, and consultations with other
nations, the President decided on the new policies
and actions announced today.
more
2
III. SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT
A. The problem to be solved: Prevent proliferation of
nuclear explosives capability abroad while (i) pre-
serving the benefits worldwide of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and (ii) reducing the uncertainties
that have delayed expanded use of nuclear energy in
the U.S. Specifically:
1. Nuclear fuel, as it produces power, also produces
plutonium which can be chemically separated from
spent fuel and used to generate additional power.
But the same plutonium produced in nuclear plants
can, when separated, also/be used as a key
ingredient of nuclear explosives.
2. As additional nations use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, there has been a tendency
abroad toward the spread of the technology and
facilities for chemically separating ("reprocessing")
spent fuel for producing other nuclear materials
useful in making explosives.
3. The U.S., acting alone or unilaterally, cannot
deal effectively with proliferation. International
cooperation -- involving both nuclear suppliers and
customers -- is essential because many nations are
expanding the use of nuclear power to meet energy
requirements; and several nations, in addition to
the U.S., are able to supply nuclear fuel and
technology (including sensitive technology). No
nation has a monopoly.
4. In the U.S., uncertainties about reprocessing and
long-term management of nuclear wastes have con-
tributed to delays in the expanded use of nuclear
power.
B. Objectives: The actions announced today are aimed at:
1. Strengthening the commitment of all nations to the
goal of non-proliferation and building an effective
system of international controls to prevent prolif-
eration of nuclear explosives capability.
2. Changing and strengthening U.S. domestic nuclear
policies and programs to contribute to our non-
proliferation goals.
3. Establishing, by these actions, a sound foundation
for the continued and increased use of nuclear
energy in the U.S. and abroad in a safe and
economic manner.
C. Principal Policy Decisions:
1. Reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should
not proceed unless there is sound reason to
conclude that the world community can overcome
effectively the associated risks of proliferation.
more
3
2. Avoidance of proliferation must take precedence
over economic interests.
3. U.S. and other nations can and should increase
their use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes
even if reprocessing and recycle of plutonium
are not found acceptable.
4. Specific decisions to implement the overall policy
positions include:
- Change domestic policies to conform with the
decision to defer commercialization of chemical
reprocessing.
- Call upon all nations to avoid transferring or
making commitments to transfer reprocessing
and uranium enrichment technology and facilities
for at least three years.
- Call upon supplier nations to take new cooperative
steps to help assure an adequate and reliable
supply of fuel for customer nations that forego
reprocessing and uranium enrichment capability
to accept strengthened and effective proliferation
controls.
- Maintain U.S. role as a major and reliable supplier
of nuclear reactors and fuel services (e.g., uranium
enrichment) for peaceful purposes.
- Take new steps to urge all nations to join in
a full-scale international cooperative effort
to develop effective proliferation controls.
- Take new steps with respect to U.S. exports, to
control proliferation while seeking to strengthen
multilateral guidelines.
- Sponsor a program to evaluate reprocessing in
support of the new international policies.
- Take new steps to assure that long-term nuclear
waste storage or disposal facilities are in place
when needed both in the U.S. and around the world.
D. Actions to Implement Our Nuclear Policies
The President announced a number of specific actions to
implement the nuclear policies outlined in the statement.
1. In accordance with the change in U.S. policies on
nuclear fuel reprocessing, the ERDA Administrator
is to:
-- Change his agency's policies and programs which
heretofore have been based on assumptions that
reprocessing would proceed.
-- Encourage prompt action by industry to e expand
spent fuel storage facilities.
more
4
-- Identify R&D efforts needed to investigate the
feasibility of recovering energy value from used
nuclear fuel without separating plutonium.
2. To avoid proliferation risk, all nations are asked
to join with the U.S. in exercising maximum restraints
in the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment
technology and facilities by avoiding such sensitive
exports or commitments for a period of at least three
years.
3. To assure an adequate energy supply for customer
nations:
-- Nuclear suppliers are urged to provide nuclear
customers with fuel services instead of sensi-
tive technology and facilities.
-- The Secretary of State is to explore with other
nations, arrangements for coordinating fuel
services to assure a reliable and economical
supply of low enriched uranium fuel and fuel
services.
-- The Secretary is also to enter into negotia-
tions on the disposition of spent fuel with
consumer nations that adopt responsible non-
proliferation controls.
-- The U.S. will continue cooperative efforts with
other countries to develop their indigenous
non-nuclear energy resources.
4. To strengthen the U.S. role as a reliable supplier
of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes,
the President will:
-- Submit to the new Congress proposed legislation
to permit expansion of capacity in the United
States to produce enriched uranium.
-- Work with the new Congress to improve our export
controls in a way that provides maximum assurances
that the U.S. will be a reliable supplier for the
full period of nuclear cooperative agreements.
5. To achieve effective international controls against
proliferation:
-- The Secretary of State is to pursue discussions
aimed at establishing a new international regime
to provide storage for excess civil plutonium
and spent reactor fuel.
-- The Secretary and the Administrator of ERDA are
to work with other nations in a major effort to
upgrade the International Atomic Energy Agency's
(IAEA) safeguards functions and capabilities.
more
5
-- The Secretary of State is to work with other
nations to develop and apply improved standards
of physical security at nuclear facilities,
including exploration of a possible international
convention.
-- The U.S. will respond to any violation of a
safeguards agreement to which it is a party
with at least an immediate cut off of our.
nuclear cooperation with that nation.
6. In the control of U.S. nuclear exports:
-- The U.S. will apply new criteria in judging
whether to enter into new or expanded agree-
ments for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
-- The Secretary of State is to enter into
negotiations to conform existing agreements
between the U.S. and cooperating nations with
established international guidelines and our
new criteria.
-- The Secretary is to intensify discussions with
nuclear suppliers aimed at expanding the common
international guidelines for cooperative agree-
ments to conform with the new criteria.
-- The Secretary is to work with the NRC to further
emphasize non-proliferation controls in the
nuclear export licensing process, pending passage
of new legislation.
7. In order to mount a program to evaluate reprocessing:
-- The Administrator of ERDA is to begin immediately
to define a reprocessing and recycle program
consistent with our international objectives
outlined earlier, which program should complement
the NRC's on-going evaluations of reprocessing
and recycle.
-- The Secretary of State is to invite other nations
to participate in designing and carrying out an
evaluation program, which program would be subject
to full IAEA safeguards and inspection.
8. To assure that nuclear waste management facilities
are available in the mid-1980's:
-- The Administrator of ERDA is to take necessary
action to speed up the program to demonstrate
all components of waste management technology
by 1978, and to demonstrate a complete reposi-
tory for commercial high-level nuclear wastes
by 1985. He is also to submit plans for the
repository to the NRC for licensing to assure
its safety and acceptability.
-- The Secretary of State is to discuss with other
nations the possibility of centrally located
multi-nationally controlled nuclear waste
repositories.
#
#
#
#
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 28, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
FACT SHEET
PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN
As one part of his comprehensive statement on nuclear policy,
the President today announced new steps to assure that the
U.S. has in place when needed, the facilities for long-term
management of nuclear wastes from our commercial power plants.
BACKGROUND
:
In his 1977 Budget, the President proposed a four-fold
increase in the funding of the Energy Research and
Development Administration's program for dealing with
the long-term management of nuclear wastes.
--
In March 1976, a review of Federal nuclear waste management
activities was undertaken by an interagency task force.
-- The President's actions today were based on the findings
of that review.
THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
In one part of his comprehensive nuclear policy statement, the
President directed that actions be taken to speed up the pro-
gram to demonstrate all components of waste management technology
by 1978, and to demonstrate a complete respository by 1985. He
also directed that plans for the repository be submitted to the
NRC for licensing to assure its safety and acceptability.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND DETAILS OF THE PLAN
A.
Nuclear Waste Requiring Long-Term Management
U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors "burn" low
enriched uranium fuel and produce in spent fuel rods
a mixture of plutonium, low enriched uranium and waste
products. Certain of these waste products are highly
radioactive and could constitute a hazard for tens of
thousands of years if they escaped to the biosphere.
If spent fuel rods are reprocessed, the wastes
would be separated from the uranium and plutonium
(which could be saved and recycled as fuel), put
into solid form and encased in metal canisters,
and sent to a repository for disposal.
If there is no reprocessing, the spent fuel rods
themselves must be packaged and disposed of in a
repository.
Under either alternative, nuclear wastes must be isolated
from the environment for centuries and the President's plan
will accommodate both alternatives.
more
2
B.
The Nuclear Waste Problem and Alternatives for Dealing
With It That Have Been Considered.
The principle problem in safely managing the waste is
confining the radioactivity rather than finding enough
storage space. Recent calculations using realistic
assumptions regarding numbers of reactors and disposal
technology indicate the total volume of solidified
high-level wastes produced by commercial nuclear power
in the U.S. through 2000 will be equivalent to a cube
about 70 feet on each side.
Technology or means for nuclear waste disposal and manage-
ment have been developed and demonstrated on a small scale.
However, we do not yet have available a repository for
nuclear waste disposal. Most spent fuel rods are continuing
to be stored safely in temporary storage basins at reactor
sites.
A wide variety of methods for permanent disposal of these
wastes has been considered:
Experts have concluded that the most practical method
is geologic storage in repositories in stable formations
deep underground.
Other methods under study, but which do not seem practical
at present, are deep geologic disposal under the ocean
floor, transmutation, and launching them into space.
Considerable public concern has been expressed that the
Federal Government has not yet demonstrated that it can
fulfill its responsibility to provide a repository for
safe disposal of nuclear waste.
Tasks ahead include further demonstration of the technology,
selecting an acceptable site, and proceeding with a coordinate
program to assure that a facility will be available, when
needed, about 1985.
C.
The Federal Government's Waste Management Responsibility.
The Federal Government has assumed the responsibility for
long-term disposal of high-level wastes because of the
limited incentives for private parties to engage in
commercial storage of these wastes. Private industry
is responsible for packaging and delivering the waste
in a prescribed form to a Federal repository.
D.
Principal Actions Needed and the Status of Those Actions
1. Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS)
Because the program to build and operate a repository
will represent a major Federal action with potentially
significant environmental impact, the ERDA is required
to prepare a generic environmental impact statement
(GEIS) on its waste management program.
- The GEIS will examine the impacts of all the major
waste management alternatives.
- Statement will cover all types of nuclear wastes
from the light water reactor fuel cycle.
- Other environmental impact statements (EIS's) will
be required when (i) regulations are proposed, and
(11) when construction funds are requested from
Congress.
more
3
Status - ERDA has been at work for some time on the
GEIS. No major problems are anticipated in completing
the statement by late 1977.
2. General Environmental Standards
The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, requires the EPA
to issue general environmental standards for releases
to the biosphere from nuclear facilities. These
standards will include a numerical limit to long-term
radiation releases outside the boundaries of the
repository -- above the natural background radiation.
The standards need to be available as early as possible
during the process of locating and constructing the
repository.
Status - EPA will propose the general standards covering
high level waste in 1977 and publish them in final form
by mid-1978, in time for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to issue its regulations and prior
to site selection and construction.
3. Licensing of Waste Repository
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 requires that
high-level commercial waste repositories be licensed
by the NRC prior to operation. The NRC is also
responsible for issuing the appropriate criteria
and standards to assure that the respository is
constructed and operated in a safe and environmentally
acceptable manner.
Status - ERDA has been directed to ask the NRC to
subject the repository to a licensing procedure before
the first commercial wastes are shipped. NRC will
produce criteria and standards by 1978 governing the
construction and operation of the repository prior to
the time the site is finally determined and construc-
tion begins.
4. Construction and Operation of a Repository
ERDA, supported by other Federal agencies, has the
responsibility to construct and operate the repository,
including:
- finding an acceptable site
- acquiring the land
- designing the repository
- constructing, operating, and sealing the repository
Status
- FY 1977 appropriations increased funding for this
program to $66 million, up from $12 million in
FY 1976.
- The President today directed the Administrator to
assure the small scale demonstration by 1978 of
the process technologies (such as waste solidifica-
tion, transuranic volume reduction, canister design,
etc.), and by 1985 to have the repository in operation.
more
4
E.
Timetable for Actions
The principle actions and dates for their accomplishment
are listed below.
1976 - ERDA issued for public review the Technical
Alternatives Document which explains the current
state of waste management technology.
1977 - ERDA issues draft generic environmental impact
statement on waste management no later than the
early part of the year and begins extensive
program to identify, test and select a site.
- EPA proposes draft generally applicable standards
for permanent storage of high-level wastes.
- NRC publishes draft standards for solidified
high-level wastes and draft siting, engineering
and operating criteria for repositories for high-
level wastes. Each element will include the
appropriate draft environmental impact statements.
1978 - ERDA will complete initial demonstration work on
canister design, waste solidification, and pre-
liminary repository design, and continue site
selection process.
- NRC finalizes proposed site selection criteria,
solidification criteria, waste definitions and
operating criteria and regulations.
- EPA issues final general ambient standards for
high level waste disposal.
1979 - ERDA selects a particular repository site, issues
a draft site specific EIS, and begins intensive
site and design work.
- NRC performs early site review of ERDA repository;
issues next phase of draft regulations for canister
design, transportation, etc.
1980 - ERDA completes site and design studies, submits
preliminary safety analysis and environmental
report to NRC in support of construction permit.
1981
- ERDA begins construction with approval of NRC.
1984
- Construction completed, repository tested with
"cold" wastes.
1985
- NRC issues repository license.
- Repository begins initial commercial-scale
operations.
F.
The Interagency Review of Nuclear Waste Management.
The review of nuclear waste management was completed by
an interagency Task Force led by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and including participants from the
agencies having a role in nuclear waste management.
Specifically: the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Geological
Survey (Interior Department), and the National Science
Foundation (NSF). The independent Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) participated as an observer.
#
#
#
#
file nuclear
THE WALL S
THE WHITE HOUSE
Ketchup
washington
10/38/76
A Politic
Gleen -
By KARE
JENKINTOWL
III, 38 years old
e
Save grocery sts;
e
press his campai
t
he approached
S
grabbed his are
S
hand. "Oh," she
A good editoril,
vertised on TV
Indeed she
Heins will hav
t
of his own mor
a
vision commer
it
bottle of his file
0
jar of its pick
and a food
to watch any
e
state and no
r
paign treasu
of
As a res
pount ure want
has a good
iam Green
gressman, is
GOP Sen. H
1-1
It wasn't
to watch.
0
gan, Mr. He
d
stacles: his
1.
paign aide ha
e-
rate contribu
is
earlier congi
n°
650,000-vote If
st
in Pennsylvai
Jun
1-
To compet
in
multimilliona
a
cessing empir
Is
started spend
that he's mad
le
most expensiv
&
process he ha
is
Gulf Oil scan
D-
some, young
dy
roads, farmers
ke
dren, and flood-
of
ceased to look If
in
"It's an outrs
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Heinz is trying
Nonsense, ret
his lavish spen
n-
come his oppos
ed
tage and to cle
es
sonal integrity.,
nt
audiences. "E-
Icies be changed to conform WILH
yet on proliferation, one or the rew
comes from an
deferral of the commercializa-
issues addressed by both candi-
any special inte
tion of chemical reprocessing. It
directs the Energy Research and
dates in the presidential cam-
But he is
Development Administration to
paign. We have often remarked on
Court. What's h.
prepare storage facilities consis-
the Ford administration's diffi-
vania illustrates
tent with the abandonment of re-
culty formulating coherent poli-
ruling last Janu
contributions ex.
processing, and 'to intensify re
cies on complicated foreign policy
himself. The coi
search on new reactor designs that
questions, but here it has shown an
son celling on
would extract residual energy
ability to" do so. It is occasion to
make to a cand
from spent fuel without separating
say a good word for Mr. Ford, and
the personal fun
the plutonium.
for Mr. Carter too, since he publi-
on his own behr
cized the proliferation question,
scrambles to or
Under the new policy some
and especially for the educational
Mr. Heinz simply
work on reprocessing will go for-
Value of political campaigns that
"The pickle be
ward. Even critics of past policy
do deal with real issues.
ceptively claimi,
that's been done
to challenge the
Green says. Outs
Mr. Green, whose
A Checkrein on Taxes
mortgaged his St
$75,000 to buy mo
THE WALL DI
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Ketchup
A Politics
A Proliferation Reversal?
The policy on nuclear prolifera-
recognize the wisdom of keeping
By KARE
tion President Ford announced
JENKINTOWL
open the option of reprocessing for
yesterday seems to us a major
III, 38 years old
the breeder reactor around the
Save grocery str
step forward over the tentative
year 2000. The actual extent of the
press his campa,
policies floated a few weeks ago.
"evaluation program" is not
he approached
If the rhetorical bones are fleshed
spelled out. Even as the policy was
grabbed his ar:
out in actual practice, it would
announced the bureaucracy was
hand. "Oh," she
be welcome evidence of an ability
pushing in two directions, with dif-
vertised on TV
by the administration to set wrong
ferent news sources offering dif-
Indeed she
policies right.
Heins will hav
ferent interpretations. No doubt
of his own mor
there will be efforts to make this a
The crucial decisions involve
vision commer
bailout for Barnwell after all, but
the reprocessing of spent fuel from
bottle of his f
current nuclear reactors., Repro-
a $1 billion program will be hard to
jar of its pick
cessing produces plutonium, which
sell given the language of the Dres-
to watch any
can be used for further power gen-
ident's statement. Indeed, the size
state and not
eration or for nuclear explosives,
of the administration's request for
paign treasu
such work will be the first test of
As a res
If the reprocessing technology
its own seriousness in the domestic
has a good
spreads, in a few years dozens of
iam Green
arena.
nations will be in position to pro-
gressman, is
copy shut to
THE WHITE HOUSE
ys.
WASHINGTON
file
November 5, 1976
MEMO TO: MR. CANNON
FROM:
CAMERON
SUBJECT: Telephone Message from Schleede
re: Nuclear Policy
ERDA needs guidance as to what the President may want
to propose in the way of legislation following up on
his Nuclear Message -- particularly dealing with the
uranium enrichment.
My assumption, which Jim Connor agrees with, is that
we should assume no legislative proposal from this
Administration. Whatever decisions are made would be
reflected in the budget only.
ERDA plans to go ahead with a proposal for construction
contract for the Portsmouth plant as soon as we say OK.
Neither Jim Connor nor I see any reason to hold them up.
Approve On
Disapprove
Jhot
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 28, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUMMARY FACT SHEET
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY
I.
THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION
The President today issued a major statement on nuclear
policy, calling upon all nations to join in a cooperative
effort to preserve the benefits of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy while preventing nuclear proliferation.
As a part of a comprehensive statement, he announced
decisions to:
accelerate U.S. diplomatic initiatives, in conjunction
with nuclear supplier and customer nations, to control
the spread of plutonium and the technologies for
separating plutonium from nuclear fuel.
change U.S. policy on reprocessing of nuclear fuel
to provide that the U.S. will not proceed with
reprocessing and recycle of plutonium unless there
1s sound reason to determine that the world community
can effectively overcome the associated risks of
proliferation.
The President concluded that the U.S. and other nations
can and should increase their use of nuclear power for
peaceful purposes even if reprocessing and recycling
of plutonium are found to be unacceptable.
II. BACKGROUND
During the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the
unquestioned leader in worldwide efforts to assure
that the benefits of nuclear energy are available
while destructive uses are prevented.
During the past two years, President Ford has:
- stepped up efforts to strengthen controls against
proliferation abroad.
- acted to expand the use of nuclear energy in the U.S.
Last summer, the President directed that a thorough review
be undertaken of U.S. nuclear policies and options, with
particular attention to exports, reprocessing, waste
management and non-proliferation.
As a result of the policy review, discussions with
members of Congress, and consultations with other
nations, the President decided on the new policies
and actions announced today.
more
2
III. SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT
A. The problem to be solved: Prevent proliferation of
nuclear explosives capability abroad while (i) pre-
serving the benefits worldwide of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and (i1) reducing the uncertainties
that have delayed expanded use of nuclear energy in
the U.S. Specifically:
1. Nuclear fuel, as it produces power, also produces
plutonium which can be chemically separated from
spent fuel and used to generate additional power.
But the same plutonium produced in nuclear plants
can, when separated, also be used as a key
ingredient of nuclear explosives.
2. As additional nations use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, there has been a tendency
abroad toward the spread of the technology and
facilities for chemically separating ("reprocessing")
spent fuel for producing other nuclear materials
useful in making explosives.
3. The U.S., acting alone or unilaterally, cannot
deal effectively with proliferation. International
cooperation -- involving both nuclear suppliers and
customers -- is essential because many nations are
expanding the use of nuclear power to meet energy
requirements; and several nations, in addition to
the U.S., are able to supply nuclear fuel and
technology (including sensitive technology). No
nation has a monopoly.
4. In the U.S., uncertainties about reprocessing and
long-term management of nuclear wastes have con-
tributed to delays in the expanded use of nuclear
power.
B. Objectives: The actions announced today are aimed at:
1. Strengthening the commitment of all nations to the
goal of non-proliferation and building an effective
system of international controls to prevent prolif-
eration of nuclear explosives capability.
2. Changing and strengthening U.S. domestic nuclear
policies and programs to contribute to our non-
proliferation goals.
3. Establishing, by these actions, a sound foundation
for the continued and increased use of nuclear
energy in the U.S. and abroad in a safe and
economic manner.
C. Principal Policy Decisions:
1. Reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should
not proceed unless there is sound reason to
conclude that the world community can overcome
effectively the associated risks of proliferation.
more
3
2. Avoidance of proliferation must take precedence
over economic interests.
3. U.S. and other nations can and should increase
their use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes
even if reprocessing and recycle of plutonium
are not found acceptable.
4. Specific decisions to implement the overall policy
positions include:
- Change domestic policies to conform with the
decision to defer commercialization of chemical
reprocessing.
- Call upon all nations to avoid transferring or
making commitments to transfer reprocessing
and uranium enrichment technology and facilities
for at least three years.
- Call upon supplier nations to take new cooperative
steps to help assure an adequate and reliable
supply of fuel for customer nations that forego
reprocessing and uranium enrichment capability
to accept strengthened and effective proliferation
controls.
- Maintain U.S. role as a major and reliable supplier
of nuclear reactors and fuel services (e.g., uranium
enrichment) for peaceful purposes.
- Take new steps to urge all nations to join in
a full-scale international cooperative effort
to develop effective proliferation controls.
- Take new steps with respect to U.S. exports, to
control proliferation while seeking to strengthen
multilateral guidelines.
- Sponsor a program to evaluate reprocessing in
support of the new international policies.
- Take new steps to assure that long-term nuclear
waste storage or disposal facilities are in place
when needed both in the U.S. and around the world.
D. Actions to Implement Our Nuclear Policies
The President announced a number of specific actions to
implement the nuclear policies outlined in the statement.
1. In accordance with the change in U.S. policies on
nuclear fuel reprocessing, the ERDA Administrator
is to:
-- Change his agency's policies and programs which
heretofore have been based on assumptions that
reprocessing would proceed.
-- Encourage prompt action by industry to expand
spent fuel storage facilities.
more
4
-- Identify R&D efforts needed to investigate the
feasibility of recovering energy value from used
nuclear fuel without separating plutonium.
2. To avoid proliferation risk, all nations are asked
to join with the U.S. in exercising maximum restraints
in the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment
technology and facilities by avoiding such sensitive
exports or commitments for a period of at least three
years.
3. To assure an adequate energy supply for customer
nations:
-- Nuclear suppliers are urged to provide nuclear
customers with fuel services instead of sensi-
tive technology and facilities.
-- The Secretary of State is to explore with other
nations, arrangements for coordinating fuel
services to assure a reliable and economical
supply of low enriched uranium fuel and fuel
services.
-- The Secretary is also to enter into negotia-
tions on the disposition of spent fuel with
consumer nations that adopt responsible non-
proliferation controls.
-- The U.S. will continue cooperative efforts with
other countries to develop their indigenous
non-nuclear energy resources.
4. To strengthen the U.S. role as a reliable supplier
of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes,
the President will:
-- Submit to the new Congress proposed legislation
to permit expansion of capacity in the United
States to produce enriched uranium.
-- Work with the new Congress to improve our export
controls in a way that provides maximum assurances
that the U.S. will be a reliable supplier for the
full period of nuclear cooperative agreements.
5. To achieve effective international controls against
proliferation:
-- The Secretary of State is to pursue discussions
aimed at establishing a new international regime
to provide storage for excess civil plutonium
and spent reactor fuel.
-- The Secretary and the Administrator of ERDA are
to work with other nations in a major effort to
upgrade the International Atomic Energy Agency's
(IAEA) safeguards functions and capabilities.
more
5
-- The Secretary of State is to work with other
nations to develop and apply improved standards
of physical security at nuclear facilities,
including exploration of a possible international
convention.
-- The U.S. will respond to any violation of a
safeguards agreement to which it is a party
with at least an immediate cut off of our.
nuclear cooperation with that nation.
6. In the control of U.S. nuclear exports:
-- The U.S. will apply new criteria in judging
whether to enter into new or expanded agree-
ments for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
-- The Secretary of State is to enter into
negotiations to conform existing agreements
between the U.S. and cooperating nations with
established international guidelines and our
new criteria.
-- The Secretary is to intensify discussions with
nuclear suppliers aimed at expanding the common
international guidelines for cooperative agree-
ments to conform with the new criteria.
-- The Secretary is to work with the NRC to further
emphasize non-proliferation controls in the
nuclear export licensing process, pending passage
of new legislation.
7. In order to mount a program to evaluate reprocessing:
-- The Administrator of ERDA is to begin immediately
to define a reprocessing and recycle program
consistent with our international objectives
outlined earlier, which program should complement
the NRC's on-going evaluations of reprocessing
and recycle.
-- The Secretary of State is to invite other nations
to participate in designing and carrying out an
evaluation program, which program would be subject
to full IAEA safeguards and inspection.
8. To assure that nuclear waste management facilities
are available in the mid-1980's:
-- The Administrator of ERDA is to take necessary
action to speed up the program to demonstrate
all components of waste management technology
by 1978, and to demonstrate a complete reposi-
tory for commercial high-level nuclear wastes
by 1985. He is also to submit plans for the
repository to the NRC for licensing to assure
its safety and acceptability.
-- The Secretary of State is to discuss with other
nations the possibility of centrally located
multi-nationally controlled nuclear waste
repositories.
#
#
#
#