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The original documents are located in Box D20, folder "Wagner College, April 2, 1966" of
the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Better "Wold
Old myths & new Realites
new myths & Old Rialities
FORD SPEECH FOR PRESENTATION AT WAGNER COLLEGE, SATURDAY, APRIL 2, 1966
VIETNAM--mere mention of that unfortunate country immediately evokes a grim
picture of death, destruction, and desolation.
(VI-ET-NAM)
VIETNAM VIETNAMA-t the uttering of those three syllables immediately focuses
attention on the problems that lie at the heart of United States foreign
policy--how best to meet the ever-pressing challenge of world communism and
help satisfy the rising expectations of long-suffering peoples.
The struggle in Vietnam is, of course, twofold. It is a war that must
be fought on two broad fronts-the military and the social. The military
struggle cannot really be won unless the basic economic and social needs of
the people can be met.
Republe
of agree with the avowed objectives of the Administration on
Vietnam--to thwart Communist aggression so the South Vietnamese can live in
freedom and independence. & agree with efforts to achieve this kind of a
a
settlement at the conference table. agree, too, that we must accept the
results of any free, supervised South Vietnamese elections following a settlement
at the conference table--whatever those results might be. However, I emphasize
that the elections must be free and carefully supervised.
Jam
firmly opposed to any proposal that representatives of
the National Liberation Front--which is just that, a front--be given seats in
a coalition government to be imposed on the South Vietnamese.
I
can't understand why President Johnson has not repudiated this type of
settlement, as Vice President Numplifey has done.
BERALD FORD
(MORE)
Digitized from Box D20 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
-2-
WAGNER COLLEGE SPEECH FOREIGN POLICY
While supporting the President generally on Vietnam, Republicans
feel it our duty as the loyal opposition to point to weak spots in Administration
handling of that situation:
A. We are continuing to pour more and more men into Vietnam and yet we
are not making fully effective use of our conventional air and sea power. There
are plans in the Pentagon to increase our troop commitment in Vietnam to as
240,000.
much as 300,000 or 400,000 from the present 235,000. There is danger that if
we try to match the enemy on a purely manpower basis, we will be drawn into
a
huge land war in Asia with Red China as the ultimate opponent. The most men
we/had in Korea at the height of the war there was 325,000.
1.
The Administration has made many mistakes on the political scene in
Vietnam, and the unrest that has followed has interfered greatly with proper
Househ
prosecution of the war by the Vietnamese government. Itelieve be that President
Johnson's quickie conference with Prime Minister Ky at Honolulu was instrumental
in fomenting the troubles that currently are shaking the Ky government.
2. We are critical, too, of the constant attempts by President Johnson
to lay the Vietnam war at the door of his two predecessors in office--President
Blame
Eisenhower and the late President Kennedy. We all know that President Johnson
has made decisions while in office that have greatly magnified the United
we Vietnam recently had have
States presence in South until now "Yankee Go Home" demonstrations
there. I am not saying American help should have been withheld. I am simply
saying the President should own up to the fact that this is an undeclared war
which HE is runningx as the elected commander-in-chief.
(MORE)
-3-
WAGNER COLLEGE SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY
I might also point out that U. S. forces now are
spread-shin in the
world because of our heavy involvement in Vietnam. Yet Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara contends that divisions which have been depleted by
deployment of men to Vietnam are stronger than ever. I find that kind of
statement difficult to fathom.
There also has been a continuous shift of men and materiel from Europe to
We must thwar Communist aggression in Vieta Republica believe
Vietnam over a period of more than 18 months. As a result, our combat readiness
in Europe currently is at a lower level than at any time since before the Berlin
that ground ave dispatched there, the President should
crisis of 1961.
to advice bis Chiefs of Staff. would
Clearly, we were not ready in February, 1965, to make the tremendous stepup
and reducentive enemyle
in aid that we have since given South Vietnam.
The
consequence has been an
ability fight. The follow-on result would be that fewer Americans would have
imperiling of our positionix in Europe, XEXXXXXX accentuated by France's impending
be seat to Vietham and ordered into
withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Let me talk now about the foreign aid program because, as I mentioned
earlier, a campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese
is vital in our continuing struggle with world communism. Let me interject
here, too, that our struggle with world communism is a ceaseless one only
because the big Communist powers will it so.
I have seen films depicting the efforts of our people in Vietnam to
work with the South Vietnamese in harvesting rice crops and promoting good
health and sanitation programs. Many of our people are doing an excellent
job, but the total effort falls far short of the mark.
This is particularly true in the area of health and medicine. I can
tell you on the basis of a first-hand report to me by an American surgeon
who recently completed a voluntary tour of duty among South Vietnamese
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
(MORE)
-7-
WAGNER COLLEGE SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY
about in considering a possible U. S. policy change involving Red China because
the Red Chinese insist on being shut off from the rest of the world.
It may be that exchange programs, carefully screened for jokers and
against one-sidedness, would be useful in acquainting Red China with the
Free World in general and with America in particular.
But if Humphrey is talking about diplomatic recognition of Red China in
the near future and for admission of Red China to the United Nations, then
he is pursuing a sadly mistaken course.
What is involved in trying to get Red China to adopt settement the kind
of "peaceful co-existence" policy theoretically being pursued by the Soviet
Union in its relations with the U. S.?
If we can believe the Red Chinese rulers, they don't want U. S. recognition
or admission to the UN unless Taiwan's membership in the UN is withdrawn, the
U. S. is branded by the UN as the aggressor in the Korean War, U. S. protection
is withdrawn from Formosa (Taiwan), and Formosa is surrendered to Red China.
The Republican view of Red China is that we must continue to contain her
and to frustrate by various means all her attempts to extend her sphere of
influence in Asia. When I say "by various means," I am saying that open warfare
is not necessarily the tool that must be employed. War is always the last
resort of a peace-loving nation like ours.
It is ridiculous to talk about U. S. recognition of Red China or admission
of Red China to the UN because we certainly are not going to meet the
aforementioned conditions laid down by the Red Chinese. We are not going to
abandon Formosa to them.
(MORE)
hat x N Betty World.
2
Old myths of new Realthes
new myth & OM Realthes
BORD SPEECH FOR PRESENTATION AT MAGNER COLLEGE, SATURDAY, APRIL 2, 1966
1
VIETNAM--mere sention of that unfortumate country immediately evokes 6 grim
picture of death, destruction, and desclation.
VIETMAM--the uttering of those three syllables immediately fecuses
attention on the problems that lie at the heart of United States foreign
pplicy-how best to meet the ever-pressing challenge of world communism and
help satisfy the rising expectations of long-suffering peoples.
The struggle in Vistman is, of course, twefold. It is a war that anot
be fought on two broad fronts-the military and the social. The milizery
struggle cannot really be von unless the basic economic and social needs of
the people can be net.
Republisons agree with the avowed objectives of the Administration on
Vistnam-to thwart Communist aggression so the South Vietnamese can live is
freedom and independence. We agree with efforts to achieve this kind of a
settlement at the comference table. We agree, 100, that we must sccept the
results of any free, supervised South Vistnamess elections following a settlement
at the comference table--whatever these results might be. However, I emphasize
that the elections must be free and carefully supervised.
Republicans are firaly opposed to any proposal that representatives of
the National Liberation Front--which is just that, a front--be given seats in
a coalition government to be imposed on the South Vietnamese.
I can't understand why President Johnson has not repudiated this type
BERALO FORD FIBRARY
settlement, as Vice President Numphrey has done.
(MORE)
-2-
WAGNER COLLEGE SPEECH - POREIGN POLICY
While supporting the President generally on Vietnam, we Republicans
feel it our duty as the loyal opposition to point to weak spots in Administration
handling of that situation:
1. We are continuing to pour more and more men into Vietnam and yet we
med Way
was
are not making fully effective use of our conventional air and sea power. There
are plans in the Pentagon to increase our troop commitment in Vietnam to as
much as 300,000 or 400,000 from the present 235,000. There is danger that if
we try to match the enemy on a purely manpower basis, we will be drawn into a
huge land war in Asia with Red China as the'ultimate opponent. The most men
we had in Kores at the height of the war there was 125,000.
1. The Administration has made many mistakes on the polítical scene in
Vietnam, and the unrest that has followed has interfered greatly with proper
matular
prosecution of the war by the Vietnamese government. 10 may be that President
Johnson's quickie conference with Prime Minister Ky at Homolulu was instrumental
in fomenting the troubles that currently are shaking the Ky government.
2. We are critical, too, of the constant attempts by President Johnson
to lay the Vietnam war at the door of his two predecessors in office--President
and
Kisenhower and the late President Kennedy. We all know that President Johnson
has made decisions while in office that have greatly magnified the United
States presence in South Vietnam until now we have "Yankee Go Home" demonstrations
there. I am not saying American help should have been withheld. I am simply
sayang the President should own up to the fact that this is an undeclared war
which HE is runningx as the elected commander-in-chief.
BERALOR FORD LIBRARY
(MORE)
+3-
WAGNER COLLEGE SPEECH FOREIGN POLICY
I might also point out that U. S. forces now are spread this in the
world because of our heavy involvement in Vietnam. Yet Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara contends that divisions which have been depleted by
deployment of men to Vietnam are stronger than ever. I find that kind of
statement difficult to fathom.
There also has been a continuous shift of men and materiel from Europe to
we wort aggression in Victura We Repobt
Vietnam over a period of more than 18 months. As a result our combat readiness
in Buscope currently is at a lower level than at any time since before the Berlin
that belies ground forces 400 disparated chows, the President /
crisis of 1961.
pay steeer hood on aduses / Johns Chicks of Statt, 1 advice would
Clearly, we were not ready in Fabruary, 1965, to make the tremendous stepup
in air and respower workhich 1
in aid that we have since given South Vietnam. The sensequence has been an
w Hgire: The Pottow ew result would to chas Lever HOUL4
imperiling of our positionix in Europe, accentuated by France's impending
and ordered into Battley
withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Let me talk now about the foreign aid program because, as I mentioned
earlier, a campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese
is vital in our continuing struggle with world communism. Let me interject
here, too, that our struggle with world communism is a ceaseless one only
because the big powers will it so.
I have seen films depicting the efforts of our people in Vietnam to
work with the South Vietnamese in harvesting rice crops and promoting good
health and sanitation programs. Many of our people are doing an excellent
job, but the total effort falls far short of the mark.
This is particularly true in the area of health and medicine. I can
tell you on the basis of a first-hand report DO me by an American surgeon
who recently completed & voluntary tour of duty among South Vietnamese
(MORE)
7.
WAGNER COLLEGE SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY
about in considering a possible U. S. policy change involving Red China because
the Red Chinese insist on being shut off from the rest of the world.
It may be that exchange programs, carefully screened for jokers and
against one-sidedness, would be useful in acquainting Red China with the
Free World in general and with America in particular.
But if Humphrey is talking about diplomatic recognition of Red China in
the near future and for admission of Red China to the United Nations, then
he is pursuing a sadly mistaken course.
what is involved in trying to get Red China to adopt somewhat the kind
of "peaceful co-existence" policy theoretically being pursued by the Soviet
Ucion in its relations with the U. S.7
If we can believe the Red Chinese rulers, they don't want U. S. recognition
or admission to the UN unless Taivan's membership in the UN is withdrawn, the
U. S. is branded by the UN as the aggressor in the Korean War, U. S. protection
10 withdrawn from Formosa (Taiwan), and Formosa is surrendered to Red China.
The Republican view of Red China is that we must continue to contain her
and to frustrate by various means all her attempts to extend her sphere of
influence in Asia. When I say by various means," I am saying that open warfare
is not necessarily the tool that must be employed. War is always the last
resort of & peace-loving nation like ours.
It 18 ridiculous to talk about U. S. recognition of Red China or admission
of Red China to the UN because we certainly are not going to meet the
aforementioned conditions laid down by the Red Chinese. we are not going to
abandon Formosa to them.
GERALD LIBRARY
(MORE)