Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
4525928
label
Wake Forest College, Winston-Salem, NC, April 25, 1966
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
4525928
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Wake Forest College, Winston-Salem, NC, April 25, 1966
citationUrl
collections
Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers
Speeches
subjects
Europe
France
China
United Nations
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (4/4/1949 - )
Foreign aid
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
4525928
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1966-04-30
month
4
year
1966
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1966-04-01
month
4
year
1966
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
eac1425eaab79660
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box D20, folder "Wake Forest College, Winston-
Salem, NC, April 25, 1966" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech
File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Wake Forest college
Winston-Salem, Winston Salem, n.c.
4/25/66
FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH
I am by nature an optimist. I would like to be hopeful tonight--
hopeful about prospects for peace in a free Vietnam--peace in that
unfortunate little country where thousands of fine young American men
have lost their lives in the cause of freedom--breathed their last in
the steaming jungles and rice paddies where world communism has chosen
to make its latest assault against the free world.
I would like to be hopeful, but I cannot.
I am a lover of peace, just as you are. I desperately want the
240,000 men we now have in our ground forces in Vietnam to come home,
just as you do. But they can't come home--not for a long time yet. We
are fighting for something big in Vietnam--something so big that it is
completely unrealistic to dismiss the conflict there as "that dirty
little war" and to say that Vietnam is not important to us. We must stay
in Vietnam as long as necessary. We must stay there to avoid the ultimate
trampling under of all men's rights, the extinguishing of the torch of
freedom wherever it now burns.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
(MORE)
Digitized from Box D20 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
-2-
Foreign Policy Speech
I would like to tell you that I think the Vietnam war will end soon.
I cannot because I do not believe this.
I would like to tell you I think that the current civil unrest in
Vietnam will produce a constituent government which will move forward
with great vigor on both the military and social progress fronts in
Vietnam. I cannot because I have great doubts that this will come to pass.
The present domestic political troubles in Vietnam may well bring
into being a government in which the Viet Cong will bestrongly represented.
The result of the promised elections in Vietnam may well be to hand that
country over to Ho Chih Minh without his achieving a military victory.
***
How would the promised elections be supervised? Who is to determine
whether a man who presents himself to cast his vote is eligible? What
will the rules of eligibility be? In view of the ease with which the
North Vietnamese have infiltrated South Vietnam to make war against the
legitimate government of South Vietnam, what is to prevent them from
posing as South Vietnamese and voting in the so-called constituent election?
All of the recent developments on Vietnam's domestic political scene
(MORE)
-3-
Foreign Policy Speech
seem to me to flow from the celebrated conference between President
Johnson and South Vietnamese Premier Ky last February at Honolulu.
Mr. Johnson denies this, but the evidence leads inevitably to that
conclusion in the minds of thinking men.
Up to this point, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration has been talking
about free, supervised elections after a peace settlement at the conference
table.
Vice-President Humphrey castigated a proposal by Sen. Robert F. Kennedy,
D-N.Y., that the Viet Cong be admitted to a coalition government as a
price for peace. He said this was like putting a fox in the chicken coop
with the chickens.
I say that the same consequences may result from elections conducted
while Vietnam still is at war.
The new government may just "invite us out," as the saying goes--and
Ho Chih Minh will have taken over in South Vietnam, the Communists will
have gained another victory that diminishes the forces of freedom
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
throughout the world.
If this happens, it will be as an indirect result of the Honolulu
conference.
(MORE)
-4-
Foreign Policy Speech
Reports from reliable and highly respected newsmen in Saigon indicate
clearly that when President Johnson made a big fuss over Premier Ky at
Honolulu the Buddhist leaders in Saigon began calling Ky "an American
puppet."
Observers on the Saigon scene also agree that if the conference had
never been held, Ky never would have felt strong and secure enough to
fire Lt. Gen. Thi, the commander of the South Vietnamese 1st Corps at Danang.
And it was the firing of Gen. Thi that touched off all the civil
disorder which plagued Vietnam for more than five weeks and which is still
continuing. There is, in fact, still danger of civil war in Vietnam
despite the Ky government's promise of a constituent election next fall.
The Johnson-Humphrey Administration would have everyone believe that
actually this civil unrest in Vietnam was a good thing--that from it will
emerge a more unified country.
I would like to remind the administration that the results may well
be disastrous--in fact, the danger far outweighs the possible benefits.
I would also like to remind the administration that the Ky government
was doing a good job of running the war until the civil disorders broke out,
(MORE)
-5-
Foreign Policy Speech
and that during the turmoil the war effort was disrupted and slowed down.
I would also like to remind the administration of a report that the
recent political trouble in Saigon made it easier for Communist guerrillas
to attack an air base near Saigon on April 13. In that raid on Tansonnhut
Air Base, seven U. S. servicemen were killed and 155 American and South
Vietnamese servicemen were wounded.
A high-ranking South Vietnamese security officer later stated that
"security around the air base was relaxed because of the political situation."
He explained that some of the troops that normally would have patrolled
the outside perimeter of the base were confined to quarters because of the
civil unrest while others were sent to help keep down civil disorder.
Following on the political turmoil in Vietnam and Premier Ky's promise
of elections next fall, Senate Majority Leader Mansfield has called for a
confrontation at the conference table somewhere in Asia between Red China,
North Vietnam and the Viet Cong on the one side, and South Vietnam and the
United States on the other.
Meantime we have bombed missile sites near North Vietnam's capital of
Hanoi and a power plant near the North Vietnam port of Haiphong.
(MORE)
-6-
Foreign Policy Speech
It strikes me this is the same pattern that was followed late last
year just before the long bombing lull ordered by the President.
At that time, too, we bombed missile sites near Hanoi and knocked
out the power plant near Haiphong.
At that time, too, we launched a peace offensive--only that time it
was a direct administration peace effort and not a trial balloon released
by the Senate Majority Leader.
As I said at the outset, I am an optimist by nature and I would like
to believe that the current peace move will lead to good solid negotiations.
But I doubt it.
I doubt it because, as I noted previously, the present political turmoil
in Vietnam may in time mean that Ho Chih Minh will take over without his
paying a high military price. Why should Ho be more inclined to respond
to a peace feeler at this time than he was last December?
The only difference in the peace proposal itself, between now and late
last year, is the suggestion the conference table be set up somewhere in
Asia--in Burma or Japan, for instance--instead of in Geneva.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
(MORE)
-7-
Foreign Policy Speech
This would indicate that the administration might well have advanced
the peace proposal through U Thant of Burma, Secretary General of the
United Nations, instead of through a high-ranking American politician.
The administration again appears to have ignored the good offices of
U Thant, who has previously had occasion to feel spurned and ignored in
the matter of Vietnam peace negotiations.
Let me turn now to Europe to call to your attention a matter which
is being generally overlooked in the preoccupation of the American people
with Vietnam.
Something which is little realized by the American people is that
there has been a continuous shift of men and material from Europe to
Vietnam over a period of more than 18 months. As a result of this, our
readiness in Europe currently is at a lower level than at any time since
before the Berlin crisis of 1961.
Clearly, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration was not ready in
February, 1965, to make the tremendous step-up in war aid that we have
since given South Vietnam.
GENALD FORD FIBRARY
(MORE)
-8-
Foreign Policy Speech
The consequence has been an imperilling of our position and that
of our allies in Europe vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We are now in a
weakened position, accentuated by France's impending withdrawal from
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Returning to the Vietnam situation, I would like to emphasize that
the war there must be fought vigorously on two fronts--the military and
the social. The military struggle cannot really be won unless the basic
economic and social needs of the people are met.
The military and economic struggle in Vietnam is, of course, only
a piece of the overall collision throughout the globe of the Free World
and World Communism. That never-ending conflict is a ceaseless one only
because the big Communist powers will it so.
How can the Free World win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese
peasants and of emerging peoples elsewhere in the world?
Our best hope is a program which is the target of constant criticism
but which I have consistently supported--foreign aid. I have voted for
cuts in the program from time to time but I have never voted to abandon it.
(MORE)
-9-
Foreign Policy Speech
The program we now are carrying out on the civil front in Vietnam
is a part of our overall foreign aid program. It is helping in Vietnam,
but it is not good enough.
I have seen films depicting the efforts of our people in Vietnam to
work with the South Vietnamese in harvesting rice crops and promoting
good health and sanitation programs. Many of our people are doing an
excellent job, but the total effort falls far short of the mark.
This is particularly true in the area of health and medicine. I can
tell you on the basis of a first-hand report to me by an American surgeon
recently returned from voluntary duty in Vietnam that the medical facilities
there for Vietnamese civilians are sorely inadequate.
I urge that the Johnson Administration take immediate steps to
provide adequate medical treatment for Vietnamese civilians and meet other
basic social and economic needs of thepopulation.
I have deliberately talked first about a specific in the Foreign Aid
Program--VIETNAM. Let us now look at the aid program in the aggregate.
Republicans support the basic objective of the Foreign Aid Program,
but we have long felt it is improperly administered.
GERALD ORD LIBRARY
(MORE)
-10-
Foreign Policy Speech
The U. S. government now provides about 60 per cent of the total aid
given to other nations by the governments of the Free World. Republicans
believe other nations should carry more of the load.
One answer is to increase the number of multi-lateral aid agencies
and to place more and more emphasis on loans rather than grants. The
Asian Development Bank, recently launched, is the best example of this
approach. It is a regional movement without heavy U. S. participation.
Republicans in Congress look upon this kind of multi-country lending
establishment as a healthy new trend in assisting underdeveloped nations.
There have been improvements in admimistration of our foreign aid
program under AID Administrator David Bell, but these forward steps have
been too tiny.
We Republicans want the entire Aid Program revamped so that it is
focused on clearly defined and attainable objectives.
We Republicans also believe administration of the Aid Program can
be considerably tightened, with all due respect to Mr. Bell. Instances
of continuing waste in the program are spelled out clearly in reports
(MORE)
-11-
Foreign Policy Speech
from the Government Accounting Office, Congress's watchdog over Executive
Branch spending.
The underlying thrust of the Foreign Aid Program must be, as a House
Republican Task Force recently stated: "To guide the revolution of
rising expectations in a peaceful course toward political stability and
economic prosperity."
If we do not succeed in this endeavor, we will be drawn repeatedly
into "wars of national liberation" in far quarters of the globe or become
a Fortress America in a world where the torch of freedom is constantly
threatened with extinction.
To help other governments help satisfy the rising expectations of
their people, we must:
1. Lay down criteria for recipients of U. S. aid, making sure they
are interested in serving the needs of their people and in meeting those
needs efficiently.
2. Give special attention to training persons in aid-receiving
countries in government administration and political science.
(MORE)
-12-
Foreign Policy Speech
3. Give increased emphasis to agricultural development of those
nations through a more positive food aid program and assistance in
agricultural technology.
4. Promote greater use of private U. S. investment and multi-lateral
aid institutions like the new Asian Development Bank to finance purely
economic development projects.
5. Use greater selectivity in choosing aid recipients, with special
emphasis on Asia and Latin America.
6. Arrange for American business firms with foreign branches to
provide technical and management training for qualified persons in aid-
recipient nations.
As the House GOP Task Force has said: "If there is an undeniable
lesson from the history of Vietnam, it is that the same thing can happen
in any country where Communist promises have appeal because rising
expectations have been inadequately fulfilled. U. S. foreign aid must
place new emphasis on building the capacity of governments to administer
development. Unless we do so, most foreign aid funds will be wasted
and worse, the revolution of rising expections, inflamed by Communist
QERALD FORD
promises, will turn violent."
(MORE)
-13-
Foreign Policy Speech
We have talked about military and social problems in Vietnam and
the U. S. foreign aid program. Let us turn now to that brooding communistic
giant that keeps tossing belligerent imprecations at us and constantly
engages in a hate-America campaign while feuding with the Soviet Union.
Red China in recent days has been under special scrutiny by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Some witnesses before that committee
have advised trying to open up China to the world.
Vice President Humphrey has said that our policy toward Red China
should be one of containment but not isolation.
Secretary ofState Rusk has stated flatly that Red China's isolation
is self-imposed. He has implied that there really is little or nothing
to talk about in considering a possible U. S. policy change involving
Red China because the Red Chinese insist on being shut off from the rest
of the world.
Since that time our ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg,
has said the United States is willing to have Red China admitted to the
UN if--among other things--Peking would withdraw its demand that Nationalist
China be expelled from the UN.
(MORE)
-14-
Foreign Policy Speech
The other conditions are that Red China stop demanding that the UN
brand the United States role in the Korean War as that of an aggressor,
that Red China drop its demand that the UN be reorganized and certain
unnamed "lackeys" of the U. S. be expelled, and--on a positive note--that
Red China promise to live up to the UN Charter which was written
theoretically as a group of bylaws to be followed by peace-loving nations.
The administration also has urged an exchange of newsmen, scientists and
scholars with China in an attempt to draw China into the world.
I agree heartily with the exchange program suggestion. But with
regard to Red China's admission to the UN, I can only conclude that the
Johnson-Humphrey Administration suddenly has become naive or is playing
a little game. I am inclined to believe it is the latter.
I think the Administration is simply trying to place the burden of
proof on Red China.
I'm convinced the administration is making this offer to Red China
in the belief that Red China will never accept it.
Wouldn't it be an ironic twist if the Red Chinese rulers did agree
FORD LIBRAR.
(MORE)
-15-
Foreign Policy Speech
to drop all of their absurd conditions for entering the UN-joining
the world of nations--and agreed to the points raised by Goldberg?
I assume admission of Red China to the UN would mean making her a
member of the Security Council where she would enjoy a veto along with
the Soviet Union. That would be a very interesting situation, indeed.
The Republican view of Red China is that we must continue to contain
her and to frustrate by various means all her attempts to extend her
sphere of influence in Asia. When I say "by various means," I am saying
that open warfare is not necessarily the tool that must be employed. War
is always the last resort of a peace-loving nation like ours.
Of course, it would be desirable for Red China to become an active
member of the world community. But how does one make a law-abiding citizen
out of an international renegade?
How does Red China react to gestures of conciliation? If past history
is any guide, the Red Chinese will slap the hand that is offered them in
friendship. Gen. George C. Marshall attempted conciliation in 1947 and
was rebuffed. He publicly admitted the failure of that policy. There is
no more reason to believe it would work now than then.
(MORE)
-16-
Foreign Policy Speech
Some people appear to believe that granting diplomatic recognition
to Red China would in itself effect a kind of miracle in U.S.-Red Chinese
relations. England recognized Red China in 1950. France gave Red China
the official nod two years ago. There is no evidence that either England
or France has benefited by this action.
It may seem to some that there is no basis for believing mainland
China someday will be rid of Communist rule. History shows us that other
despotic regimes have fallen although they looked unshakable.
To recognize Red China simply because she exists would be like giving
a gangster a medal.
To admit her to the UN would be to strengthen the hand of the Soviet
Union and all those forces engaged in the never-ending conflict between
world communism and the Free World.
Let's take a look at theoretical peaceful co-existence with Red China,
again relying on a lesson from history.
Prime Minister Nehru of India recognized Red China in 1950 and worked
out "Five Principles of Co-existence" with Chou En-lai. Red China
ultimately invaded India and proved that Nehru's policy of peaceful
(MORE)
-17-
Foreign Policy Speech
co-existence with her was a foolish dream.
***
Let us turn now from Asia to Europe and what is happening to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NATO has been thrown into crisis by French President Charles deGaulle's
ultimatum that U. S. and allied bases must be removed from France by
April 1, 1967, with France to withdraw from NATO by July 1. We are insisting
on two years' time to remove our bases.
There can be a NATO without France, but France's withdrawal is a
serious blow to the morale of other members of the alliance and to free
nations everywhere.
French soil was the ideal location for NATO's bases. DeGaulle's
insistence that we move them out places the Alliance in a less favorable
military position from the standpoint of dispersal of our bases and their
distance from the potential enemy.
Loss of France as a military partner also makes cooperation among
the Atlantic Treaty nations more difficult in non-military fields because
(MORE)
LIBRARY
-18-
Foreign Policy Speech
such an action based on apparent suspicion and hostility infects relations
in all fields.
Whether deGaulle could have been influenced to act otherwise, it is
impossible to say with certainty. But there's no question the Administra-
tion has not made the effort to conciliate him that it has made to lure
North Vietnam to the conference table.
Prior to the current NATO crisis, Republicans repeatedly urged that
President Johnson seek a face-to-face meeting with deGaulle in an attempt
to keep France in NATO. His failure to do so is a clear indication of
his refusal to meet NATO problems head on.
It is obvious that relationswith our European allies have not had
high priority in this administration. By contrast, NATO's problems
received closest consideration in the Eisenhower Administration.
The Kennedy-Johnson Administration cannot be held blameless in the
split with deGaulle. It and our other NATO allies failed, notably in
1962, to consult with deGaulle on decisions of great importance.
The Nassau Conference in December of 1962 between the late President
Kennedy and former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was taken
(MORE)
-19-
Foreign Policy Speech
by deGaulle as a rebuff when he was neither informed nor consulted about
a major change in military arrangements agreed upon there.
Again in 1962, the U. S. shifted its strategy without consulting
deGaulle. This occurred when we adopted our policy of a "flexible response."
Sen. Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations recently reported that "the shift (in strategy) was explained
in terms which...caused doubt and confusion about what kind of counterblows
the United States might be planning in the event of a Soviet attack on
Europe. To some in Europe it looked as though the United States would
rather switch than fight."
Our shift in strategy caused our allies to change their military
doctrines as well and made it painfully clear to them how little influence
they have on U. S. policies. Yet, as the Jackson Subcommittee pointed out,
these U. S. policies are "of life and death importance to them."
The subcommittee added: "The difficulties thereby created have not
yet been overcome, especially in relations with France, whose president,
like most chiefs of state, does not accept short-shift easily."
GERNLD FORD VIERARA
It is natural for Americans simply to charge deGaulle with being a
(MORE)
-20-
Foreign Policy Speech
fanatical nationalist, but the fact remains that the Kennedy-Johnson
Administration has not dealt very adroitly with deGaulle and has also
confused other members of NATO.
In future, any change in U. S. strategy or policy which affects
NATO should be made only after full consultation with all of our NATO
allies.
Within the working mechanism of NATO itself, there should be set
up close communication between the key people in all of the governments
involved.
In addition, allied military officers--and by that I mean top-ranking
officers in the 13 NATO nations apart from France--should be involved
with our own military people in devising plans for the common defense
of Europe and the United States.
What I am saying is that NATO should truly be a partnership--not
something drawn up on paper.
There should be no more palliatives like the multilateral nuclear
force to give the outward appearance of nuclear sharing. This plan was
unworkable from the beginning and never should have been proposed. It
(MORE)
-21-
Foreign Policy Speech
was just a poultice hastily slapped on a sore that has been festering
for years.
Our attitude toward NATO relates directly to our posture toward
the Soviet Union.
We Republicans do not believe the U. S. should relax its vigilance
concerning the Soviet Union and its aims for one moment.
Pictures of Soviet intermediate range missiles in Cuba should remain
forever imprinted on the minds of the American people.
While relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are
considerably less frigid than in the Stalin era, Russia's aims have not
changed a whit. Her goals are basically those of Red China--a world in
which all nations live under Communist rule.
We Republicans believe Communist nations with expansionist aims
understand only firmness and will respect the United States only so long
as she maintains a military establishment second to none.
This superior military machine is one of the cornerstones of U. S.
foreign policy, along with our NATO and SEATO mutual assistance pacts
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
(MORE)
-22-
Foreign Policy Speech
and economic aid aimed at helping satisfy the rising expectations of
impoverished peoples.
At the same time, we must seek to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons. We must succeed in limiting membership in the nuclear club.
It is only reasonable to assume that the more numerous the nations
possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of a nuclear holocaust.
Under current circumstances, it is futile to talk of general
disarmament, and I will spend no time on that.
We turn finally to that force for peace which always drew strong
support from President Eisenhower--the United Nations.
We Republicans believe the United Nations has been a great force
for peace. We also believe it should be and could be strengthened.
The key problem is that of financing the UN. Failure of the Johnson
Administration to achieve a definitive solution for this problem continues
to threaten the very existence of the UN.
It is a crippling weakness indeed when a member of an international
peace-keeping organization can--with impunity--withhold payment of its
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
(MORE)
-23-
Foreign Policy Speech
assessments for a peace-keeping operation in some part of the world
because it disagrees with action taken by the UN majority.
There must be a way of erasing this deficiency, this flaw in the
functioning of the UN.
The UN also would be strengthened if its peace-keeping actions were
coordinated closely with those taken on a regional basis by, for instance,
the Organization of American States.
In the Dominican crisis in 1965 the Administration pursued an
ambiguous policy by voting to have both OAS and UN missions go to Santo
Domingo. There was no coordination. OAS actions were simply reported to
the UN.
In any discussion of the UN, it again is appropriate to emphasize
that Red China does not qualify for UN membership under that organization's
charter because it is not a peace-loving nation.
It would seem inconsistent that Red China should be excluded from
the UN while Soviet Russia is a member. The answer is that Russia was
admitted to the UN at the time of its founding. This was a time when
GERAL FORD LIBRARY
(MORE)
-24-
Foreign Policy Speech
Soviet Union pretended to be peace-loving and fully willing to cooperate
with other nations in the interest of world peace.
A political news analyst recently wrote that Secretary of State
Dean Rusk is becoming more like the late John Foster Dulles every day.
That may be, but we Republicans firmly believe that we could run the
foreign affairs of this nation more effectively than the present
administration. If we didn't think so, we would have no right to count
ourselves a major political party and to seek the right to become the
policy makers of the nation.
# # #
SEART GERALD
FILE copy
Wake Forest College
Winston Salem, n.c.
april 25, 1966 (Evening)
FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH
I am by nature an optimist. I would like to be hopeful tonight--
hopeful about prospects for peace in a free Vietnam--peace in that
unfortunate little country where thousands of fine young American men
have lost their lives in the cause of freedom--breathed their last in
the steaming jungles and rice paddies where world communism has chosen
to make its latest assault against the free world.
I would like to be hopeful, but I cannot.
I am a lover of peace, just as you are. I desperately want the
240,000 men we now have in our ground forces in Vietnam to come home,
just as you do. But they can't come home-not for a long time yet. We
are fighting for something big in Vietnam--something so big that it is
completely unrealistic to dismiss the conflict there as "that dirty
little war" and to say that Vietnam is not important to us. We must stay
in Vietnam as long as necessary. We must stay there to avoid the ultimate
trampling under of all ments rights, the extinguishing of the torch of
freedom wherever it now burns.
GERNED
(MORE)
-2-
Foreign Policy Speech
I would like to tell you that I think the Vietnam war will and soon.
I cannot because I do not believe this.
I would like to tell you I think that the current civil unrest in
Vietnam will produce a constituent government which will move forward
with great vigor on both the military and social progress fronts in
Vietnam. I cannot because I have great doubts that this will come to pass.
The present domestic political troubles in Vietnam may well bring
into being a government in which the Viet Cong will bestrongly represented.
The result of the promised elections in Vietnam may well be to hand that
country over to Ho Chih Minh without his achieving a military victory.
* *
How would the promised elections be supervised? Who is to determine
whether a man who presents himself to cast his vote is eligible? What
will the rules of eligibility be? In view of the case with which the
North Vietnamese have infiltrated South Vietnam to make war against the
legitimate government of South Vietnam, what is to prevent them from
posing as South Vietnamese and voting in the so-called constituent election?
All of the recent developments on Vietnam's domestic political scene
(MORE)
-3-
Foreign Policy Speech
seem to me to flow from the celebrated conference between President
Johnson and South Vietnamese Premier Ky last February at Homolulu.
Mr. Johnson denies this, but the evidence leads inevitably to that
conclusion in the minds of thinking men.
Up to this point, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration has been talking
about free, supervised elections after a peace settlement at the conference
table.
Vice-President Numphrey castigated a proposal by Sen. Robert F. Kennedy,
D-M.Y., that the Viet Cong be admitted to a coalition government as a
price for peace. He said this was like putting a fox in the chicken coop
with the chickens.
I say that the same consequences may result from elections conducted
while Vietnam still is at war.
The new government may just "invite us out," as the saying goes--and
Ho Chih Minh will have taken over in South Vietnam, the Communists will
have gained another victory that diminishes the forces of freedom
throughout the world.
If this happens, it will be as an indirect result of the Homolulu
conference.
(MORE)
-4-
Foreign Policy Speech
Reports from reliable and highly respected newsmen in Saigon indicate
clearly that when President Johnson made a big fuss over Premier Ky at
Honolulu the Buddhist leaders in Saigon began calling Ky "an American
puppet."
servers on the Saigon scene also agree that if the conference had
never been held, Ky never would have felt strong and secure enough to
fire Lt. Gen. Thi, the commander of the South Vietnamese 1st Corps at Danang.
And it was the firing of Gen. Thi that touched off all the civil
disorder which plagued Vietnam for more than five weeks and which is still
continuing. There is, in fact, still danger of civil war in Vietnam
despite the Ky government's promise of a constituent election next fall.
The Johnson-Numphrey Administration would have everyone believe that
actually this civil unrest in Vietnam was a good thing--that from it will
emerge a more unified country.
I would like to remind the administration that the results may well
be disastrous--in fact, the danger far outweight the possible benefits.
FORD LIBRARY
I would also like to remind the administration that the Ky government
was doing a good job of running the war until the civil disorders broke out,
(MORE)
-5-
Foreign Policy Speech
and that during the turmoil the war effort was disrupted and slowed down.
I would also like to remind the administration of a report that the
recent political trouble in Saigon made it easier for Communist guerrillas
to attack an air base near Saigon on April 13. In that raid on Tansonnhut
Air Base, seven U. S. servicemen were killed and 155 American and South
Vietnamese servicemen were wounded.
A high-ranking South Vietnamese security officer later stated that
"security around the air base was relaxed because of the political situation."
He explained that some of the troops that normally would have patrolled
the outside perimeter of the base were confined to quarters because of the
civil unrest while others were sent to help keep down civil disorder.
Following on the political turmoil in Vietnam and Premier Ky's promise
of elections next fall, Senate Majority Leader Mansfield has called for a
confrontation at the conference table somewhere in Asia between Red China,
North Vietnam and the Viet Cong on the one side, and South Vietnam and the
United States on the other.
Meantime we have bombed missile sites near North Vietnam's capital of
Hanoi and a power plant near the North Vietnam port of Maiphong.
(MORE)
-6-
Foreign Policy Speech
It strikes me this is the same pattern that was followed late last
year just before the long bombing lull ordered by the President.
At that time, too, we bombed missile sites near Hanoi and knocked
out the power plant near Haiphong.
At that time, $00, we launched a peace offensive-only that time it
was a direct administration passe effort and not a trial balloon released
by the Senate Majority Leader.
As I said at the outset, I am an optimist by nature and I would like
to believe that the current peace move will lead to good solid negotiations.
But I doubt it.
I doubt it because, as I noted previously, the present political turmoil
in Vietnam may in time mean that Ho Chih Minh will take over without his
paying a high military price. Why should Ho be more inclined to respond
to a peace feeler at this time than he was last December?
The only difference in the peace proposal itself, between now and late
last year, is the suggestion the conference table be set up somewhere in
Asia--in Burma or Japan, for instance--instead of in Geneva.
(MORE)
-7-
Foreign Policy Speech
This would indicate that the administration might well have advanced
the peace proposal through U Thant of Burma, Secretary General of the
United Nations, instead of through a high-ranking American politician.
The administration again appears to have ignored the good offices of
U Thant, who has previously had occasion to feel spurned and ignored in
the matter of Vietnam peace negotiations.
Let me turn now to Europe to call to your attention a matter which
is being generally overlooked in the preoccupation of the American people
with Vietnam.
Something which is lettle realized by the American people is that
there has been a continuous shift of men and material from Europe to
Vietnam over a period of more than 18 months. As a result of this, our
readiness in Europe currently is at a lower level than at any time since
before the Berlin crisis of 1961.
Clearly, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration was not ready in
February, 1965, to make the tremendous step-upin war aid that we have
since given South Vietnam.
(MORE)
÷
Foreign Policy Speech
The consequence has been an impurilling of our position and that
of our allies in Europe vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We are now in a
weakened position, accentuated by France's impending withdrawal from
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Returning to the Vietnam situation, I would like to emphasise that
the war there must be fought vigorously on two fronts-the military and
the social. The military struggle cannot really be won unless the basic
economic and social needs of the people are met.
The military and economic struggle in Vietnam is, of course, only
a piece of the overall collision throughout the globe of the Free World
and World Communism. That never-ending conflict is a ceaseless one only
because the big Communist powers will it so.
How can the Free World win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese
peasants and of emerging peoples elsewhere in the world?
Our best hope is a program which is the target of constant criticism
but which I have consistently supported--foreign aid. I have voted for
cuts in the program from time to time but I have never voted to abandon it.
(MORE)
-9-
Foreign Policy Speech
The program we now are carrying out on the civil front in Vietnam
is a part of our overall foreign aid program. It is helping in Vietnam,
but it is not good enough.
I have seen films depicting the efforts of our people in Vietnam to
work with the South Vietnamesein harvesting rice crops and promoting
good health and samitation programs. Many of our people are doing an
excellent job, but the total effortfalls far short of the mark.
This is particularly true in the area of health and medicine. I can
tell you on the basis of a first-hand report to me by an American surgeon
recently returned from voluntary duty in Vietnam that the medical facilities
there for Vietnamese civilians are sorely inadequate.
I urge that the Johnson Administration take immediate steps to
provide adequate medical treatment for Vietnamese civilians and meet other
basic social and economic needs of thepopulation.
I have deliberately talked first about a specific in the Foreign Aid
Program-VIKINAM, Let us now look at the aid program in the aggregate.
Republicans support the basic objective of the Foreign Aid Program,
but we have long felt it is improperly administered.
GERAL
LIBRARY
(MORE)
-10-
Foreign Policy Speech
60
The U. S. government now provides about per cent of the total aid
given to other nations by the governments of the Free World. Republicans
believe other nations should carry more of the load.
One answer is to increase the number of multi-lateral add agencies
and to place more and more emphasis on loads rather than grants. The
Asian Development Bank, recently lawnehed, is the best example of this
approach. It is a regional movement without heavy U. s. participation.
Republicans in Congress look upon this kind of multi-country lending
establishment as a healthy new trend in assisting underdeveloped nations.
There have been improvements in administration of our foreign aid
program under AID Administrator David Bell, but these forward steps have
been too tiny.
We Republicans want the entire Aid Program revamped so that it is
focused on clearly defined and attainable objectives.
We Republicans also believe administration of the Aid Program can
be considerably tightened, with all due respect to Mr. Bell. Instances
of continuing waste in the program are spelled out clearly in reports
(MORE)
-11-
Foreign Policy Speech
from the Government Accounting Office, Congress's watchdog over Executive
Branch spending.
The underlying thrust of the Foreign Aid Program must be, as a House
Republican Task Force recently stated: "To guide the revolution of
rising expectations insa peaceful course toward political stability and
economic prosperity."
If we do not succeed in this endeavor, we will be drawn repeatedly
into "ware of national liberation" in far quarters of the globe or become
a Fortress America in a world there the torch of freedom is constantly
threatened with extinction.
To help other governments help satisfy the rising expectations of
their people, we must:
1. Lay down criteria for recipiends of U. s. aid, making sure they
are interested in serving the needs of their people and in meeting those
needs efficiently.
2. Give special attention to training persons in aid-receiving
countries in government administration and political science.
(MORE)
-12-
Foreign Policy Speech
3. Give increased emphasis to agricultural development of those
nations through a more positive food aid program and assistance in
agricultural technology.
4. Promote greater use of private U. S. investment and multi-lateral
aid institutions like the new Asian Development Bank to finance purely
economic development projects.
2. Use greater selectivity in choosing aid recipients, with special
emphasis on Asia and Latin America.
6. Arrange for American business firms with foreign branches to
provide technical and management training for qualified persons in aid-
recipient nations.
As the House GOP Task Force has said: "If there is an undemiable
lesson from the history of Vietnam, it is that the same thing can happen
in any country where Communist promises have appeal because rising
expectations have been inadequately fulfilled. U. s. foreign aid must
place new emphasis on building the capacity of governments to administer
development. Unless we do so, most foreign aid funds will be wested-----
and worse, the revolution of rising expections, inflamed by Communist
LIBRARY
promises, will turn violent."
(MORE)
-13-
Foreign Policy Speech
We have talked about military and social problems in Vietnam and
the U. S. foreign aid program. Let us turn now to that brooding communistic
giant that keeps tossing belligerent impresations at us and constantly
engages in a hate-America campaign while fouding with the Soviet Union.
Red China in recent days has been under special serutiny by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Some witnesses before that committee
have advised trying to open up China to the world.
Vice President Humphryp has said that our policy toward Red China
should be one of containment but not isolation.
Secretary of Shte Rusk has stated flatly that Red China's isolation
is self-imposed. He has implied that there really is little or nothing
to talk about in considering a possible U. S. policy change involving
Red China because the Red Chinese insist on being shut off from the rest
of the world.
Since that time our ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg,
has said the United States is willing to have Red China admitted to the
UN if--among other things--Peking would withdraw its demand that Nationalist
China be expelled from the UM.
GERALD FORD LIBRAR)
(MORE)
-14-
Foreign Policy Speech
The other conditions are that Red Chana stop demanding that the UN
brand the United States role in the Korean War as that of an aggressor,
that Red China drop its demand that the UN be reorganized and certain
unnamed "lackeys" of the U. 8. be expelled, and--on a positive note-that
Red China promise to live up to the UN Charter which was writtene
theoretically as a group of bylaws to be followed by peace-loving nations.
The Administration also has urged an exchange of newsmen, scientists and
scholars with China in an attempt to draw China into the world.
I agree heartily with the exchange program suggestion. But with
regard to Red China's admission to the UM, I can only conclude that the
Johnson-Numphrey Administration suddenly has become naive or is playing
a little game. I am inclined to believe it is the latter.
I think the Administration is simply trying to place the burden of
proof on Red China.
I'm convinced the administration is making this offer to Red China
in the belief that Red China will never accept it.
Wouldn't it be an ironic twist if the Red Chinese rulers did agree
(MORE)
-15-
Foreign Policy Speech
to drop all of their absurd conditions for entering the UN-joining
the world of nations--and agreed to the points raised by Goldberg?
I assume admission of Red China to the UN would mean making her a
member of the Security Council where she-would enjoy a vato along with
the Soviet Union. That would be a very interesting situation, indeed.
The Republican view of Red China is that we must continue to contain
her and to frustrate by various means all her attempts to extend her
sphere of influence in Asia. When I say "by važéous means," I am saying
that open warfare is not necessarily the tool that must be employed. War
is always the last resort of a peace-loving nation like ours.
Of course, it would be desirable for Red China to become an active
member of the world community. But how does one make a law-abiding citizen
out of an international renegade?
How does Red China react to gestures of conciliation? If past history
is any guide, the Red Chinese will slap the hand that is offered them in
friendship. Gen. George c. Marshall attempted conciliation in 1947 and
was rebuffed. He publicly admitted the failure of that policy. There is
no more reason to believe it would work now than then.
(MORE)
-16-
Foreign Policy Speech
Some people appear to believe that granting diplomatic recognition
to Red China would in itself effect a kind of miracle in U.S.-Red Chinese
relations. England recognized Red China in 1950. France gave Red China
the official nod two years ago. There is no evidence that either Magland
or France has benefited by this action.
It may seem to some that there is no basis for believing mainland
China someday will be rid of Communist rule. Mistory shows us that other
despotic regimes have fallen although they looked unshakable.
To recognise Red China simply because she exists would be like giving
a gangster a medal.
To admit her to the UN would be to strengthen the hand of the Soviet
Union and all those forces engaged in the never-ending conflict between
world communism and the Free World.
Let's take a look at theoretical pesseful co-existence with Red China,
again relying on a lesson from history.
Prime Minister Nehru of India recognized Red China in 1950 and worked
out "Five Principles of Co-existence" with Chou In-lai. Red China
ultimately invaded India and proved that Nehru's policy of peaceful
(MORE)
-17-
Foreign Policy Speech
co-existence with her was a foolish dream.
* * *
Let us turn now from Asia to Europe and what is happening to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
NATO has been thrown into crisis by French President Charles deGaulle's
ultimatum that U. S. and allied bases must be removed from France by
April 1, 1967, with France to withdraw from NATO by July 1. We are insisting
on two years' time to remove our bases.
There can be a NATO without France, but France's withdrawal is a
serious blow to the morale of other members of the alliance and to free
nations everywhere.
French soil was the ideal location for NATO's bases. DeGaulle's
insistence that we move them out places the Alliance in a less favorable
military position from the standpoint of dispersal of our bases and their
distance from the potential enemy.
Loss of France as a military partner also makes cooperation among
the Atlantic Treaty nations more difficult in non-military fields because
(MORE)
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
-18-
Foreign Policy Speech
such an action based on apparent suspicion and hostility infects relations
in all fields.
Whether deGaulle sould have been influenced to act otherwise, it is
impossible to say with certainty. But there's no question the Administra-
tion has not made the effort to conciliate him that it has made to lure
North Vietnam to the conference table.
Prior to the current NATO crisis, Republicans repeatedly urged that
President Johnson seek a face-to-face meeting with deGaulle in an attempt
to keep France in NATO. His failure to do so is a clear indication of
his refusal to meet NATO problems head on.
It is obvious that relationswith our European allies have not had
high priority in this administration. By contrast, NATO's problems
received closest consideration in the Eisenhower Administration.
The Kennedy-Johnson Administration cannot be held blameless in the
split with deGaulle. It and our other NATO allies failed, notably in
1962, to consult with deGaulle on decisions of great importance.
LIBRARY
The Massau Conference in December of 1962 between the late President
Kennedy and former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was taken
(MORE)
-19-
Foreign Policy Speech
by deGaulle as a rebuff when he was neither informed nor consulted about
a major change in military arrangements agreed upon there.
Again in 1962, the U. S. shifted its strategy without consulting
deGaulle. This occurred when we adopted our policy of a "flexible response."
Sen. Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations recently reported that Ethe shift (in strategy) was explained
in terms which...caused doubt and confusion about what kind of counterblows
the United States might be planning in the event of a Soviet attack on
Europe. To some in Europe it looked as though the United States would
rather switch than fight."
Our shift in strategy caused our allies to change their military
doctrines as well and made it painfully clear to them how little influence
they have on U. S. policies. Yet, as the Jackson Subcommittee pointed out,
these U. S. policies are "of life and death importance to them."
The subcommittee added: "The difficulties thereby created have not
yet been overcome, especially in relations with France, whose president,
like most chiefs of state, does not accept short-shift easily."
It is natural for Americans simply to charge deGaulle with being a
(MORE)
-20-
Foreign Policy Speech
fanatical nationalist, but the fact remains that the Kennedy-Johnson
Administration has not dealt very adroitly with deGaulle and has also
confused other members of NATO.
In future, any change in U. S. strategy or policy which affects
NATO should be made only after full consultation with all of our NATO
allies.
Within the working mechanism of NATO itself, there should be set
up close communication between the key people in all of the governments
involved.
In addition, allied military officers--and by that I mean top-ranking
officers in the 13 NATO nations apart from France--should be involved
with our own military people in devising plans for the common defense
of Europe and the United States.
What I am saying is that NATO should truly be a partnership--net
something drawn up on paper.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
There should be no more palliatives like the multilateral nuclear
force to give the outward appearance of nuclear sharing. This plan was
unworkable from the beginning and never should have been proposed. It
(MORK)
-21-
Foreign Policy Speech
was just a poultice hastily slapped on a sore that has been festering
for years.
Our attitude toward NATO relates directly to our posture toward
the Soviet Union.
We Republicans do not believe the U. S. should relax its vigilance
concerning the Soviet Union and its aims for one moment.
Pictures of Somiet intermediate range missiles in Cuba should remain
forever imprinted on the minds of the American people.
While relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are
considerably less frigid than in the Stalin era, Russia's aims have not
changed a whit. Her goals are basically those of Red China--a world in
which all nations live under Communist rule.
We Republicans believe Communist nations with expansionist aims
understand only firmness and will respect the United States only so long
as she maintains a military establishment second to none.
This superior military machine is one of the cornerstones of U. S.
foreign policy, along with our NATO and SEATO mutual assistance pacts
GERALD FORD VIBRARY
(MORE)
-22-
Foreign Policy Speech
and economic aid aimed at helping satisfy the rising expectations of
impoverished peoples.
At the same time, we must seek to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons. We must succeed in limiting membership in the nuclear club.
It is only reasonable to assume that the more numerous the nations
possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of a nuclear holocaust.
Under current circumstances, it is futile to talk of general
disarmament, and I will spend no time on that.
We turn finally to that force for peace which always drew strong
support from President Kisenhower--the United Nations.
We Republicans believe the United Nations has been a great force
for peace. We also believe it should be and could be strengthened.
The key problem is that of financing the UN. Failure of the Johnson
Administration to achieve a definitive solution for this problem continues
to threaten the very existence of the UM.
It is a erippling weakness indeed when a member of an international
peace-keeping organization can-with impunity--withhold payment of its
(MORE)
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-23-
Foreign Policy Speech
assessments for a peace-keeping operation in some part of the world
because it dieagrees with action taken by the UN majority.
There must be a way of erasing this deficiency, this flaw in the
functioning of the UN.
The UN also would be strengthened if its peace-keeping actions were
coordinated closely with those taken on a regional basis by, for instance,
the Organization of American States.
In the Dominican crisis in 1965 the Administration pursued an
ambiguous policy by voting to have both OAS and UN missions go to Santo
Domingo. There was no coordination. OAS actions were simply reported to
the UN.
In any discussion of the UN, it again is appropriate to emphasise
that Red China does not qualify for UN membership under that organization's
charter because it is not a peace-loving nation.
It would seem inconsistent that Red China should be excluded from
the UN while Soviet Russia is a member. The answer is that Russia was
admitted to the UN at the time of its founding. This was a time when
BERAL the FORD LIBRARY
(MORE)
-24-
Foreign Policy Speech
Soviet Union pretended to be peace-loving and fully willing to cooperate
with other nations in the interest of world peace.
A political news analyst recently wrote that Secretary of State
Dean Rusk is becoming more like the late John Foster Dulles every day.
That may be, but we Republicans firmly believe that we could run the
foreign affairs of this nation more effectively than the present
administration. If we didn't think so, we would have no right to count
ourselves a major political party and to seek the right to become the
policy makers of the nation.
# # #