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The original documents are located in Box 31, folder "10/13/75 HJR683 United States
Participation in a Sinai Early-warning System" of the White House Records Office:
Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Exact duplicates within this folder were not digitized.
Signed
APPROVED75 OCT 13
10/13
ACTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
Last Day: October 22
WASHINGTON
October 10, 1975
FOR
THE PRESIDENT
&
FROM:
JIM CANNON
SUBJECT:
H.J. Res. 683 - United States
Participation in a Sinai Early-warning
10/14/75
System
Attached for your consideration is H.J. Res. 683, sponsored
by Representatives Morgan and Broomfield, which authorizes
the President to implement the United States proposal for
an early-warning system in Sinai involving the assignment
of up to 200 United States civilian personnel to Sinai
to carry out certain noncombat functions.
A discussion of the resolution is provided in OMB's enrolled
bill report at Tab A.
OMB, NSC, Max Friedersdorf, Counsel's Office (Chapman) and
I recommend approval of the resolution.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign H.J. Res. 683 at Tab B.
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
Digitized from Box 31 of the White House Records Office Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Sves
RESIDENT
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE
ORIGINO
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
SERVICE
STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
OCT 10 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Enrolled Resolution H.J. Res. 683 - United
States participation in a Sinai early-
warning system
Sponsor - Rep. Morgan (D) Pa. and Rep. Broom-
field (R) Mich.
Purpose
Authorizes the President to implement the United States
proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai involving
the assignment of up to 200 United States civilian per-
sonnel to Sinai to carry out certain noncombat functions
in connection with the proposal.
Agency Recommendations
Office of Management and Budget
Approval
Department of State
Approval (Informally)
National Security Council
Approval (Informally)
Department of Defense
Defers to State (Informally)
Discussion
On September 4, 1975, Egypt and Israel signed a basic
agreement in which both parties pledged, among other
things, to resolve the conflict between them and in the
Middle East not by military force but by peaceful means.
An integral factor in the conclusion of the agreement was
the United States proposal to participate in an early-
warning system in Sinai. The agreement will not take
effect until Congress approves the United States role in
connection with surveillance and observation functions
under the early-warning system.
H.J. Res. 683 provides the requisite congressional approval
contemplated by the agreement for the President to imple-
ment the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning
System in Sinai." The authority is subject to the condi-
RD
tions that any United States civilian personnel assigned
2
to Sinai under the proposal shall be removed immediately
(1) in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between
Egypt and Israel or (2) if Congress by concurrent resolu-
tion determines that the safety of such personnel is jeop-
ardized or that continuation of their role is no longer
necessary. Am amendment added on the House floor further
states:
"Nothing contained in this resolution shall
be construed as granting any authority to
the President with respect to the introduc-
tion of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations wherein in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances which authority he would
not have had in the absence of this joint
resolution."
This language, which is identical to a provision in the War
Powers Act (P.L. 93-148), is apparently intended to assure
that H.J.Res. 683 does not grant any additional war powers
authority to the President beyond that which he has now
under existing law.
Although the House International Relations Committee's
report on H. Res. 683 indicates that State Department
witnesses testified before the Committee that the executive
branch did not object to the first two provisos noted
above, Justice has typically opposed the inclusion of simi-
lar concurrent resolution provisions in law on the grounds
they circumvent the President's constitutional role in the
legislative process. We would point out, however, that
current laws, including the War Powers Act, contain such
provisions.
The enrolled joint resolution stipulates that United States
civilian personnel assigned to Sinai must be volunteers.
In its report, the House International Relations Committee
stated that, " it is the expectation of this committee
that none of the Americans serving in such a capacity in the
Sinai will be an employee of any foreign intelligence
gathering agency of the U.S. Government." The Committee
report further notes that executive branch witnesses testi-
fied that they did not intend to employ as civilian techni-
cians anyone presently employed by the Central Intelligence
Agency or any other foreign intelligence gathering agencies.
3
H.J.Res. 683 also requires the President to submit written
reports to Congress at least once every six months for as
long as United States civilian personnel continue to par-
ticipate in the early-warning system. The reports are to
cover the status, scope, and anticipated duration of the
participation of such personnel and the feasibility of
ending or reducing their participation as soon as possible
by substituting foreign nationals or by making technologi-
cal changes.
The final section of H.J.Res. 683 states that the authority
in the joint resolution to implement United States partici-
pation in the early-warning system does not signify con-
gressional approval of any other agreement, understanding,
or commitment made by the executive branch. In further
elaboration of this disclaimer, the report of the House
International Relations Committee states:
"It is intended to make clear that the au-
thority contained in this joint resolution
to implement the 'United States Proposal for
the Early-Warning System in Sinai' does not,
and shall not in any way be construed to,
constitute congressional approval, acceptance,
or endorsement (1) of any other oral or writ-
ten commitment, understanding, assurance,
promise, or agreement, whether expressed or
implied, or any other expression, oral or
written, by any official of the United States
which Israel, Egypt, or any other nation or
organization might construe or interpret as a
basis on which it could rely or act; or (2)
of any characterization of any such commit-
ment, understanding, assurance, promise, or
agreement, or other expression, as constitut-
ing a 'codification' of existing, congres-
sionally approved, U.S. policy."
In this connection, prior to the issuance of the Committee's
report, you said in your letter of September 30, 1975, to
several Members of Congress:
"The issue before the Congress now is whether
the Congress will approve acceptance by the
United States of the role that has been pro-
posed for it. There are other issues which
4
the Congress must eventually consider in
connection with our continuing relations,
policies, and programs in the Middle East--
particularly our programs of military and
economic assistance there. The Congress
will want to consider those carefully at
the appropriate time, but they are not in-
tegral to the implementation of the Agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel. Voting in
favor of the U.S. role in the Early-Warning
System will not commit anyone to take a
position one way or another on these issues."
James m. Frey
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
Enclosures
FORD is 878020 LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION MEMORANDUM
WASHINGTON
LOG NO.:
639
Date: Octobe#10, 1975
Time: 500pm
FOR ACTION: NSC/S on
CC (for information): Jack Marsh oh
Max Friedersdorf oh
Robert Hartmann
Ken Lazarus oh
Jim Cavanaugh
Warren Hendriks
FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY
DUE: Date: October 10
Time: 600pm
SUBJECT:
H.J. Res. 683 - U.S. participation in a Sinai early-warning
system
ACTION REQUESTED:
For Necessary Action
For Your Recommendations
Prepare Agenda and Brief
Draft Reply
X
For Your Comments
Draft Remarks
REMARKS:
Please return to Judy Johnston, Ground Floor West Wing
The Staff Secretary's office has asked that this bill
be ready for the President when he returns tonight.
FORD is LIBRARY
PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any questions or if you anticipate a
delay in submitting the required material, please
KI in ChaManiSugh
telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.
For the President
WHITE HOUSE
ACTION MEMORANDU
WASHINGTON
LOG NO.:
639
Date: October10,
Time: 500pm
FOR ACTION: NSC/S
CC (for information): Jack Marsh
Max Friedersdorf m6.
Robert Hartmann
Ken Lazarus
Jim Cavanaugh
Warren Hendriks
FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY
DUE: Date: October 10
Time: 600pm
SUBJECT:
H.J. Res. 683 - U.S. participation in a Sinai early-warning
system
ACTION REQUESTED:
For Necessary Action
For Your Recommendations
Prepare Agenda and Brief
Draft Reply
X
For Your Comments
Draft Remarks
REMARKS:
Please return to Judy Johnston, Ground Floor West Wing
The Staff Secretary's office has asked that this bill
be ready for the President when he returns tonight.
FORD is 07V330 LIBRARY
PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any questions or if you anticipate a
delay in submitting the required material, please
Jim Cavanaugh
telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.
94TH CONGRESS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DOCUMENT
1st Session
No. 94-262
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST EARLY
WARNING SYSTEM
COMMUNICATION
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
URGING ACTION ON THE PROPOSED UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENTS
SIGNED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON
SEPTEMBER 4 IN GENEVA
SEPTEMBER 30, 1975.-Referred to the Committee on International Relations
and ordered to be printed
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 29, 1975.
The Honorable the SPEAKER OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I am writing to emphasize the importance of
a Congressional decision in the coming week on U.S. participation
in the Early Warning System which is an integral part of the Agree-
ment signed between the Governments of Egypt and Israel on Septem-
ber 4 in Geneva.
Over the past two years, our Government has played an essential
role in helping defuse the tensions in the Middle East. We have chosen
this course because we recognized, as has every American Administra-
tion over the past 30 years, that the issues involved in that troubled
area are central to the American national interest.
The September 4 agreement, like the two preceding disengagement
agreements, was negotiated with the assistance of the United States.
The parties themselves have described it as a significant step towards
peace in the Middle East. It will reduce the risks of war, create new
opportunities for negotiating peace, and help provide a stable environ-
ment in which global economic dislocations can be avoided. This Agree
ment is in the overall national interest of the United States.
There would have been no Agreement without provision for Ameri-
can participation in the Early Warning System. That System is de-
signed to reduce the danger of surprise attack, and the parties to the
LIBRARY
57-011
2
Agreement were able to agree to entrust the System only to the United
States. The special American role was the only one in which both sides
had adequate confidence.
I want to be certain that the leaders of the Congress fully under-
stand the consequences of further delay in acting on this important
matter.
The first step in the implementation of the basic Agreement under
the timetable negotiated and agreed to by Egypt and Israel in Geneva
on September 22 is scheduled to be taken October 5. This process will
not begin, however, until the Congress has acted on the proposed
United States role in the Early Warning System. Delay in Congres-
sional action will, therefore, delay implementation of the basic Agree-
ment. It will risk causing the lengthy and difficult negotiations on the
entire five-month implementing timetable to be reopened. It will pre-
vent a lessening of the risks of war. If for any reason the agreement
should fail, the responsibility would be heavy indeed.
The issue before the Congress now is whether the Congress will ap-
prove acceptance by the United States of the role that has been pro-
posed for it. There are other issues which the Congress must eventually
consider in connection with our continuing relations, policies, and
programs in the Middle East-particularly our programs of military
and economic assistance there. The Congress will want to consider
those carefully at the appropriate time, but they are not integral to
the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Vot-
ing in favor of the U.S. role in the Early Warning System will not
commit anyone to take a position one way or another on these issues.
In summary, I met with the leadership three weeks ago to describe
what was involved in the new Agreement between Egypt and Israel
and to request urgent approval of U.S. participation in its imple-
mentation. This question has been under intensive discussion in the
Congress for nearly three weeks. All relevant papers and all U.S.
commitments related to the Agreement have been submitted to the
appropriate committees of the Congress. If action is not completed
in the coming week, the United States will be in the position of holding
up implementation of an Agreement which two key Middle Eastern
countries have signed as a significant step towards peace. The Middle
East is an area where American policy has long had broad bipartisan
support. The issue presently before the Congress offers an opportunity
to reaffirm that tradition and to demonstrate how the Executive and
Legislative branches can work together on a foreign policy matter of
high importance to the national interest and for the benefit of world
peace. I, therefore, urge strongly that action be completed as early as
possible and no later than Friday, October 3.
Sincerely,
GERALD R. FORD.
O
H.D. 262
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6835
October 10, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CAVANAUGH
FROM:
Jeanne W. Dav m
SUBJECT:
H.J. Res. 683
To confirm my telephone conversation today, the NSC staff
concurs in H.J. Res. 683 - U.S. participation in a Sinai early-
warning system.
FORD
LIBRARY
19/10/15 Covernangh
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
4
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
OCT 10 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Enrolled Resolution H.J. Res. 683 - United
States participation in a Sinai early-
warning system
Sponsor - Rep. Morgan (D) Pa. and Rep. Broom-
field (R) Mich.
Purpose
Authorizes the President to implement the United States
proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai involving
the assignment of up to 200 United States civilian per-
sonnel to Sinai to carry out certain noncombat functions
in connection with the proposal.
Agency Recommendations
Office of Management and Budget
Approval
Department of State
Approval
(Informally)
National Security Council
Approval
(Informally)
Department of Defense
Defers to State (Informally)
Discussion
On September 4, 1975, Egypt and Israel signed a basic
agreement in which both parties pledged, among other
things, to resolve the conflict between them and in the
Middle East not by military force but by peaceful means.
An integral factor in the conclusion of the agreement was
the United States proposal to participate in an early-
warning system in Sinai. The agreement will not take
effect until Congress approves the United States role in
connection with surveillance and observation functions
FORD
under the early-warning system.
H.J. Res. 683 provides the requisite congressional approval
LIBRARY
contemplated by the agreement for the President to imple-
ment the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning
System in Sinai." The authority is subject to the condi-
tions that any United States civilian personnel assigned
2
to Sinai under the proposal shall be removed immediately
(1) in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between
Egypt and Israel or (2) if Congress by concurrent resolu-
tion determines that the safety of such personnel is jeop-
ardized or that continuation of their role is no longer
necessary. Am amendment added on the House floor further
states:
"Nothing contained in this resolution shall
be construed as granting any authority to
the President with respect to the introduc-
tion of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations wherein in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances which authority he would
not have had in the absence of this joint
resolution.
"
This language, which is identical to a provision in the War
Powers Act (P.L. 93-148), is apparently intended to assure
that H.J.Res. 683 does not grant any additional war powers
authority to the President beyond that which he has now
under existing law.
Although the House International Relations Committee's
report on H. J. Res. 683 indicates that State Department
witnesses testified before the Committee that the executive
branch did not object to the first two provisos noted
above, Justice has typically opposed the inclusion of simi-
lar concurrent resolution provisions in law on the grounds
they circumvent the President's constitutional role in the
legislative process. We would point out, however, that
current laws, including the War Powers Act, contain such
provisions.
The enrolled joint resolution stipulates that United States
civilian personnel assigned to Sinai must be volunteers.
In its report, the House International Relations Committee
stated that,
"
it is the expectation of this committee
that none of the Americans serving in such a capacity in the
Sinai will be an employee of any foreign intelligence
gathering agency of the U.S. Government." The Committee
report further notes that executive branch witnesses testi-
fied that they did not intend to employ as civilian techni-
cians anyone presently employed by the Central Intelligence
Agency or any other foreign intelligence gathering agencies.
3
J. Res. 683 also requires the President to submit written
reports to Congress at least once every six months for as
long as United States civilian personnel continue to par-
ticipate in the early-warning system. The reports are to
cover the status, scope, and anticipated duration of the
participation of such personnel and the feasibility of
ending or reducing their participation as soon as possible
by substituting foreign nationals or by making technologi-
cal changes.
The final section of H.J.Res. 683 states that the authority
in the joint resolution to implement United States partici-
pation in the early-warning system does not signify con-
gressional approval of any other agreement, understanding,
or commitment made by the executive branch. In further
elaboration of this disclaimer, the report of the House
International Relations Committee states:
"It is intended to make clear that the au-
thority contained in this joint resolution
to implement the 'United States Proposal for
the Early-Warning System in Sinai' does not,
and shall not in any way be construed to,
constitute congressional approval, acceptance,
or endorsement (1) of any other oral or writ-
ten commitment, understanding, assurance,
promise, or agreement, whether expressed or
implied, or any other expression, oral or
written, by any official of the United States
which Israel, Egypt, or any other nation or
organization might construe or interpret as a
basis on which it could rely or act; or (2)
of any characterization of any such commit-
ment, understanding, assurance, promise, or
agreement, or other expression, as constitut-
ing a 'codification" of existing, congres-
sionally approved, U.S. policy."
In this connection, prior to the issuance of the Committee
FORD
report, you said in your letter of September 30, 1975
to
several Members of Congress:
"The issue before the Congress now is whether
the Congress will approve acceptance by the
United States of the role that has been pro-
posed for it. There are other issues which
4
the Congress must eventually consider in
connection with our continuing relations,
policies, and programs in the Middle East--
particularly our programs of military and
economic assistance there. The Congress
will want to consider those carefully at
the appropriate time, but they are not in-
tegral to the implementation of the Agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel. Voting in
favor of the U.S. role in the Early-Warning
System will not commit anyone to take a
position one way or another on these issues."
(Signed) James M. Frey
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
Enclosures
FORDO & 87007 LIBRA
94TH CONGRESS
1st Session
}
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
{
REPORT
No. 94-532
TO IMPLEMENT THE UNITED STATES
PROPOSAL FOR THE EARLY-WARNING
SYSTEM IN SINAI
REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
TOGETHER WITH
SUPPLEMENTAL AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
ON
House Joint Resolution 683
OCTOBER 6, 1975.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
FORD w LIBRA 02830 the
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
59-525 o
WASHINGTON : 1975
CONTENTS
Page
Principal purpose of the resolution
1
Committee action
1
Committee recommendations.
2
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Role of the United States in Middle East negotiations
4
Chronology of events in the Middle East
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman
1974
4
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
1975
5
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
Provisions of the basic agreements
9
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
Effects of the basic agreements
10
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama
Disengagement agreement
11
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
Zone of limited armaments
12
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware
Egyptian commitments
12
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
Warning stations
12
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
EDWARD G. BIESTER, JR., Pennsylvania
Buffer zones
13
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LARRY WINN, JB., Kansas
The American presence
13
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
Costs of technicians to the United States
13
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
Cost estimate
15
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
Statements required by rule IX (1) (3) of House rules
15
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
A. Oversight findings and recommendations
15
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
B. Budget authority
15
LEO J. RYAN, California
C. Congressional Budget Office estimate and comparison
15
CHARLES WILSON, Texas
D. Committee on Government Operations summary
15
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan
Inflationary impact statement
15
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
Section-by-section analysis:
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
Prefatory clauses
15
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
Clause 1
15
DON BONKER, Washington
Clause 2
16
Clause 3
16
Clause 4
16
Resolved clauses
16
MARIAN A. CZARNECKI, Chief of Staff
Section 1-Implementation
16
JOHN H. SULLIVAN, Senior Staff Consultant
Section 2-Concurrent resolution "privilege"
16
ROBERT K. BOYER, Staff Consultant
Section 3-Volunteers
17
JAMES T. SCHOLLAERT, Staff Consultant
Section 4-Reporting requirements
17
HELEN C. MATTAS, Staff Consultant
Section 5-Interpretation of resolution
19
SANDRA P. REINHARDT, Staff Assistant
Appendix: Texts of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the
annex to the Egypt-Israel agreement
21
(II)
Supplemental views of Hon. Clement J. Zablocki
25
Additional views of Hon. Clement J. Zablocki and Hon. Paul Findley
29
Additional views of Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
31
Additional views of Hon. Stephen J. Solarz, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal,
and Hon. Charles Wilson
39
Additional views of Hon. William S. Broomfield
41
(III)
94TH CONGRESS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT
1st Session
No. 94-532
TO IMPLEMENT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR
THE EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM IN SINAI
OCTOBER 6, 1975.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on International Relations,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
SUPPLEMENTAL AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.J. Res. 683]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 683) to implement the United States
proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai, having considered the
same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend
that the joint resolution do pass.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION
The principal purpose of this resolution is to give congressional
authorization to the President to implement the United States pro-
posal for an early-warning system in the Sinai Peninsula.
That proposal provides that up to 200 civilian technicians of U.S.
citizenship may be assigned to early-warning facilities in the Mitla
and Giddi Passes region of the Sinai, to help insure compliance with
an agreement between the Government of Egypt and the Government
of Israel.
COMMITTEE ACTION
On September 1, 1975, the President transmitted to the govern-
ments of Egypt and Israel identical proposals for U.S. participation in
an early-warning system. As a result of that proposal, those govern-
(1)
2
3
ments signed an agreement with each other on September 4, 1975. The
Both parties-Egypt and Israel-are willing to place their
text of the U.S. proposal subsequently was submitted to the Congress
trust in the United States to monitor the peace agreement in a
for approval.
fair and impartial way, a role not sought by our Nation but one
On September 8, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger appeared
thrust upon it by circumstances.
before the House International Relations Committee in both open and
The role of the technicians will be far different from that
executive sessions to discuss the agreement. On September 11, 18, and
played by our U.S. combat advisory role in Vietnam our 200
23, testimony was heard from Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary
advisers in Sinai will have purely technical, not military, tasks to
of State for Political Affairs. On October 1, the committee took testi-
perform.
mony from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold H. Saunders
Recognizing the serious issues involved, and having no feasible
and technical experts from the Department of Defense. On Septem-
alternative, the only responsible course for the Congress is to
ber 25, the committee held public hearings, receiving testimony from
approve the implementation of the agreement, as requested by the
representatives of the Liberty Lobby and the American Friends Serv-
executive branch, but with adequate safeguards.
ice Committee.
There is a clear relationship between this resolution and the
On October 2, the committee met to mark up a draft resolution of
overall Egyptian-Israeli agreement. If we disapprove this reso-
approval proposed by Chairman Thomas E. Morgan and the ranking
lution, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement will likely be, voided and
minority member, Hon. William S. Broomfield. Four amendments
such an impasse immeasurably increases the possibility of the
were adopted and the chairman was instructed by the committee to
resumption of hositilities in the Middle East. This connection,
introduce the draft as a house joint resolution. That was accomplished
which is both implicit and explicit, makes it more important that
on October 2. The following day the committee met and by a vote of
Congress act immediately.
31 to 0, ordered the resolution, House Joint Resolution 683, favorably
Failure to act this week jeopardizes the Egyptian-Israeli agree-
reported to the House of Representatives.
ment, the implementation of which is geared to the calendar. The
agreement's implementation is meant to start this week and the
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress should not counter the timetable and wishes of the
parties by delaying action.
The House International Relations Committee has spent almost 1
We believe adequate safeguards are provided for in House Joint
month giving its consideration to the question of whether or not to
Resolution 683. Specifically, the resolution contains the following
approve the sending of up to 200 American civilian technicians to the
requirements:
Sinai Peninsula in order to implement an Egyptian-Israeli peace
The American technicians must be removed immediately if
settlement.
fighting breaks out, or if Congress through a veto-proof con-
The time was well spent. A variety of complex issues were involved
current resolution directs their removal.
in the approval which required thorough attention and discussion in
The technicians must be civilians who have voluntarily asked
the Congress. Further, there was a need to avoid the kind of haste
to be given this mission, not Federal employees assigned to the
which in times past sometimes accompanied congressional action in-
task.
volving national commitments: for example, the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution.
The President must report semi-annually to the Congress on
the status of the technician force, including on the possibility of
At an appropriate point, deliberation must give way to action. This
replacing the American presence with an alternative.
the committee did on October 3 when it voted by 31 to 0 to approve the
sending of the technicians.
The resolution of approval does not extend to any other agree-
It did so, on the basis of the following factors:
ments or commitments which may have been made in the larger
As the chronology included in this report makes clear, the
context of a Middle East peace settlement. The approval con-
United States has been intimately involved in seeking a Middle
tained in House Joint Resolution 683 relates only to the matter
East solution for a very long time, and most particularly since the
immediately at hand the sending of the technicians to Sinai.
October 1973 war.
In other words, the Congress will have the following future oppor-
This involvement follows from the vital United States interest
tunities with regard to the Sinai agreement if this resolution is passed:
in peace in the Middle East, interest reflected by basic U.S. sup-
To remove the technicians regardless of the view in the execu-
tive branch.
port for the independence and sovereignty of Israel. It is rein-
forced by concern over future disruptions in petroleum supplies
To review the status of the technicians closely every 6 months
for the duration of their mission; and
which a new outbreak of hostilities in the region could provoke.
The October 1973 war proved expensive to the United States:
To give its approval or disapproval to other agreements which
$2.2 billion for resupply to Israel, an estimated $15-$20 billion
may be in the Middle East Settlement, for which the administra-
cost in the impact of the oil embargo, and billions more in indirect
tion will have to request authority or funds in the future.
costs to the Nation's economy from the recession which was caused
As a result of these many considerations, the committee urges the
at least in part by higher petroleum charges.
overwhelming approval of the House of Representatives for this joint
resolution.
4
5
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
May 31-The accords, achieved by Secretary Kissinger in his latest
The October 1973 war in the Middle East made it clear to all
round of "shuttle diplomacy," were signed in Geneva. Israel and
Americans that conflict in that part of the world entails considerable
Syria accepted a separation of forces, a U.N.-policed buffer zone
risks and costs to the United States.
between them and a gradual thinning out of forces.
There are risks of U.S. military involvement, including direct con-
June 4-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger briefed the Committee on
frontation with the Soviet Union and its attendant dangers of nuclear
Foreign Affairs on his peacemaking efforts between Syria and
Israel.
war.
There are costs which affect the lives of all Americans. The oil em-
June 14-Presidents Nixon and Sadat issued a joint statement outlin-
bargo of 1973-74 not only meant personal inconvenience to millions
ing plans for U.S. assistance to Egypt in nuclear technology, estab-
of Americans at the gasoline pumps, but it helped trigger the most
lishment of a Joint Cooperation Commission, and the setting up
of working groups to prepare concrete development programs.
severe recession the United States has experienced in 30 years.
June 17-President Nixon, in Jerusalem, promised to negotiate an
Because the safety and welfare of all Americans are directly in-
agreement with Israel to provide nuclear aid for peaceful purposes.
volved in what happens in the Middle East, it is a vital interest of the
June 23-Israel evacuated the last portion of Golan Heights territory
United States to ease tensions in that region.
occupied in the October 1973 war.
For that reason the United States, since October 1973, has made a
September 10-Israeli Prime Minister Rabin met in Washington with
major effort to obtain peaceful solutions to the longstanding disputes
of the Middle East, particularly those related to hostilities between
President Ford (sworn in Aug. 9), who said the United States
Israel and its Arab neighbors.
would remain "committed to Israel's survival and security."
A chronology of events related to these American initiatives follows:
September 13-In a press conference ending a 4-day visit to Washing-
ton, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that pledges of
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
nonbelligerency from Arab countries would have to accompany
any further Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories. (In the
1974
United States to seek expanded U.S. military aid to Israel in the
amount of $1.5 billion a year, Rabin told Jewish leaders that he
January 9-Egypt and Israel suspended the Geneva Conference on
was encouraged by his reception from President Ford and other
Troop Disengagement Along the Suez Front to await new media-
U.S. officials.)
tion by U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who arrived
September 30-State Department spokesman Robert Anderson said
in Egypt 2 days later.
that Secretary Kissinger would spend 5 days beginning October 9
anuary 11-17-Secretary Kissinger shuttled back and forth between
in visits to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel.
Egypt and Israel, conferring with Egyptian and Israeli officials
October 23.-The U.N. extended its peacekeeping force in the Sinai
regarding disengagement.
for 6 months.
anuary 18-Egypt and Israel signed an agreement to disengage their
November 6-Israel's Information Minister Aharon Yariv told news-
troops along the Suez Canal.
men that his country had received assurances from the United
anuary 25-Israeli forces began the Suez withdrawal.
States of "an important additional amount of arms," which would
anuary 28-The pullback lifted the siege of the city of Suez and
"get to Israel as soon as possible."
ended the isolation of the Egyptian III Corps on the east bank.
November 6-Secretary Kissinger received expressions of support
anuary 30-Prime Minister Meir said that Israel had no interest in
from President Sadat and King Faisal for continuing his step-
retaining territories occupied in October 1973; that disengagement
by-step personal diplomacy.
talks could not begin until Syria provided a list of POW's and
December 3-Israel's Foreign Minister Allon told Parliament that an
allowed Red Cross visits; and that no negotiations with Arab Ter-
unpublished section of the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement
rorist organizations would occur in Geneva.
signed in January called for Israel access to the Suez Canal once
February 28-The United States and Egypt renewed full diplomatic
it is reopened.
relations after a 7-year break.
December 5-Israel's Prime Minister Rabin told a Tel Aviv high
March 4-Disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli troops along the
school audience that, while Israel was willing to make territorial
Suez front was completed.
compromises, "under no circumstances" would there be a return
March 18-The United States joined in the international operation to
to the pre-1967 war boundaries.
clear obstructions in the Suez Canal, closed since the 1967 war.
pril 18-President Sadat said Egypt will not longer rely solely on
1975
the Soviet Union for arms.
May 29-Syria and Israel reached agreement, scheduled to be signed
January 15-17-Israeli Foreign Minister Allon concluded 3 days of
in Geneva May 31, on a cease-fire and disengagement of forces on
talks with American leaders in Washington and announced that
the Golan Heights.
Secretary of State Kissinger had agreed "in principle" to go to
Israel as soon as he could.
59-525 O 75 2
6
7
January 20-It was reported that Israel had asked the United States
for more than $2 billion in economic and military assistance for
March 30-Egyptian officials announced that Israeli bound cargo
the next fiscal year.
aboard ships of third nations, as well as Israeli ships, would be
anuary 22-Egyptian President Sadat criticized the Soviet Union
banned from using the Suez Canal when it is opened to inter-
national traffic.
for its "unfriendly attitude" toward Egypt and said he continued
March 31-Secretary Schlesinger said that the United States would
to have full confidence in the U.S.-sponsored step-by-step ap-
proach to a Middle East settlement.
be "reluctant" to enter into any new arms commitments to Israel
while the reassessment of American policy in the Middle East was
anuary 23-Defense Secretary Schlesinger said that he was confident
going on.
the United States could provide the resources to sustain Israeli
April 1-Egypt formally asked the United States and the Soviet
forces if there is another Middle East war, and affirmed the "mil-
Union to reconvene the Geneva peace conference on the Middle
itary feasibility" of intervention in Middle East oil areas to pre-
East.
vent national strangulation.
January 23-The administration informed Congress that it will sell
pril 6-Israel Defense Minister Peres said that Israel would make
"significant concessions" toward peace if Egypt opened the Suez
Israel about 200 Lance missiles, a short-range missile capable of
carrying nuclear warheads.
Canal as promised on June 5, 1975, although he did not spell out
what those concessions would be.
February 17-Secretary Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gro-
April 8-It was reported that Israel and Egypt had informed the
myko concluded talks in Geneva without any apparent resolution
United States of their interest in a new American mediation
of differences between Soviet demands for an immediate resump-
effort, but that Secretary Kissinger was wary of becoming in-
tion of the Geneva conference and Kissinger's "step-by-step"
volved again until he was convinced that an agreement was
approach to a disengagement in the Sinai.
certain.
February 18-Egypt confirmed it is getting Soviet arms, including
April 10-In his foreign policy speech to Congress, President Ford
Mig-23 fighters, from the Soviet Union for the first time since
said the United States was going ahead with reconvening the
the 1973 war, but Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy said the
Geneva Conference, but added that he and Secretary Kissinger
weapons do not replace losses of that war and that Egypt will not
"will move ahead on whatever course looks most promising, either
return to the Geneva Conference until they are replaced.
towards an overall settlement or interim agreements, should the
February 19-Secretary Kissinger, concluding his 10-day Middle East
parties desire them."
trip, reported "some progress" toward a framework for negotiat-
April 12-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said in an interview that
ing an Egyptian-Israeli accord on the Sinai.
U.S. mediation in the Middle East was no longer enough and that
March 8-In a new round of shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger sought fur-
the United States must state clearly that it wants Israel to with-
ther disengagement in the Sinai.
draw to its borders of 1967.
March 22-Kissinger suspended his efforts to draw Israel and Egypt
May 5-U.S. officials confirmed that the United States had agreed to
into new accords, calling the breakdown "a sad day for America."
supply Jordan with an air-defense system, including Hawk
Obstacles included the fate of Israeli-held Abu Rudeis oil fields,
ground-to-air missiles.
Mitla and Giddi passes and an Egyptian pledge and nonbeliger-
May 20-In Vienna, Secretary Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister
ency.
Gromyko, after 2 days of talks, agreed to postpone resumption of
March 23-Secretary Kissinger returned to Washington from the
the Geneva Conference on the Middle East until fall.
Middle East following the failure of his "shuttle diplomacy" to
June 2-President Ford and Egyptian President Sadat ended a 2-day
produce an Arab-Israeli accord. (This appeared to end Kissin-
meeting in Salzburg, Austria, with agreement on the urgent need
ger's "step-by-step" approach toward a Middle East settlement,
to break the diplomatic stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but
leaving a return to the Geneva peace talks likely.)
with uncertainty as to what course to take. (Ford said the United
March 24-President Ford ordered a total reexamination of U.S. pol-
States was prepared to provide Egypt with current assistance for
icy toward the Middle East following the collapse of Secretary
long-range economic development, and that he would "work with
Kissinger's efforts to attain a new agreement.
our Congress to give reality to this continuing pledge.")
March 25-King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated in Riyadh
June 4-Israel completed a unilateral withdrawal, announced on June
by a nephew reportedly suffering mental illness. In an orderly
2, of some of its forces from areas it occupied close to the Suez
transition, his brother, Crown Prince Khalid assumed the throne.
Canal.
March 27-In an interview, President Ford said that Middle East
June 5-Egypt officially reopened the Suez Canal to international
peace would have been better served had Israel been more flexible
shipping.
in the recent negotiations with Egypt.
June 12-Israeli Prime Minister Rabin concluded 2 days of talks in
March 29-Egyptian President Sadat announced that he would re-
Washington with President Ford and administrative officials, say-
open the Suez Canal to international shipping on June 5, 1975,
ing that he believed there was "a basis for negotiation" of a new
and that he would renew the mandate of the U.N. force in Sinai
agreement with Egypt, but many questions remained as to Egypt's
for 3 more months when its terms expired April 24, 1975.
readiness to meet some of Israel's demands.
8
9
June 18-Egyptian officials said Egypt had agreed in principle to re-
PROVISIONS OF THE BASIC AGREEMENTS
sume negotiations on an interim settlement. (The Israeli Cabinet
gave its approval for renewed diplomatic efforts on June 17.)
Those portions of the Middle East settlement which are involved
June 24-Israel proposed a new disengagement agreement with Egypt
in and affected by House Joint Resolution 683 are encompassed in
that would last 3-to-4 years and would include a land corridor to
three documents:
the Abu Rudeis oilfields and withdrawal of Israeli troops from
The Agreement betweenEgypt and Israel;
the western reaches of the Mitla and Giddi passes.
The Annex to the Egypt-Israel Agreement; and
June 30-Denying reports from Israel of a U.S. ultimatum, President
The United States Proposal for an Early-Warning System
Ford said the United States would have no choice but to suggest
in Sinai.
a reconvening of the Geneva Conference unless there was "a meet-
The texts of these agreements have been made public by mutual
ing of the minds" on an interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement.
agreement of the parties and have been provided by the executive
July 8-Egypt, Israel, and Secretary Kissinger denied world rumors
branch to the Congress.1 Only the U.S. proposal directly involves a
that new Sinai accords were imminent.
national commitment of the United States and it is specifically that
July 12-It was disclosed that, following a meeting between Secretary
document which would be approved by the passage of this resolution.
Kissinger and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Bonn, remaining
The text of the proposal follows; the texts of the Egypt-Israel agree-
differences to be resolved for a new interim agreement included:
ments may be found in the appendix.
(1) the precise location of a new cease-fire line; (2) Egyptian
access to the Abu Rudeis oilfield; and (3) corollary U.S. assur-
PROPOSAL
ances of economic, political, and military support for Israel. (Out-
standing issues concerned Israeli electronic surveillance stations
In connection with the Early Warning System referred to
monitoring approaches west of the Mitla and Giddi passes, pro-
in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel
tection of defense facilities at Bir Gilgafa, and access to Sharm
concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agree-
al Shaikh.)
ment, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the
July 15-Egypt avowed it would not renew the U.N. forces mandate
United States proposes the following:
in the Sinai unless progress toward peace is made, and accused
1. The Early Warning System to be established in accord-
Israel of exploiting the state of "no war, no peace" to perpetuate
ance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached
its Sinai occupation.
to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States.
July 24-U.N. Security Council approved a 3-month extension of
It shall have the following elements:
the emergency force in Sinai after Egypt dropped opposition to
a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide
renewal of the mission.
strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one
July 25-Rabin termed Egypt's new disengagement proposals "sub-
operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on
stantially not acceptable," but better than the one in March when
the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall
Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy collapsed.
be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative
August 17-Israeli cabinet endorsed Rabin stand on new Sinai nego-
personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and
tiations, paving the way for new direct negotiations by Kissinger.
electronic surveillance only within their stations.
Cairo also approved of new Kissinger mediation.
b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early
August 21-Secretary Kissinger arrived in Israel to begin a new
warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations
round of "shuttle diplomacy" aimed at reaching a new Israeli-
shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and
Egyptian interim agreement.
Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic
August 24-Israeli official said agreement reached on setting up early
Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States
warning installations, to be manned partly by American tech-
civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be
nicians, in the Sinai, thus clearing away one last major obstacle
established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both
to new accords.
ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station
September 1-In separate ceremonies in Jerusalem and Alexandria,
and the roads leading to and from those stations.
Israeli and Egyptian leaders initialed new Sinai pact. Israel
2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the
yielded to Egyptian demands that it withdraw from Sinai moun-
following duties in connection with the operation and mainte-
tain passes and return Abu Rudeis oilfields, and Egypt made sev-
nance of these stations:
eral political concessions. Kissinger initialed provisions for sta-
a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph
tioning of U.S. technicians in the Sinai. Ford asked that Congress
1a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the na-
approve the nw U.S. Middle East role.
September 4-New Sinai pact was formally signed by Israeli and
1 In addition to these public agreements, several other agreements and assurances were
made to Egypt and Israel by the United States which were provided to the Congress in
Egyptian representatives during brief ceremony in Geneva.
classified form by the executive branch. They have not been submitted to Congress for
approval at this time.
10
11
ture of the operations of the stations and all movement into
and out of each station and will immediately report any de-
tected divergency from its authorized role of visual and elec-
Line
Line E
Port
tronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and
Bor Pulad
Line
Line K
to the United Nations Emergency Force.
b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1b. above,
ISRAEL
the United States civilian personnel will immediately report
to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Na-
tions Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other
than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass
Buffer Zone 1
and any observed preparations for such movement.
c. The total number of United States civilian personnel as-
signed to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200.
Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under
this Proposal.
3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other fa-
Early Warning
System Area
cilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms re-
quired for their protection.
4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning
System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the
System.
5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to
have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to per-
SINAI
Line M
form their functions.
EGYPT
6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local
criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be ac-
Remain Forewn ares
corded any other specific privileges and immunities provided
for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of
Egypt-Israel Agreement
Watter Zonn-2A
September 1975
February 13, 1957.
Line E
The Egyptian line
7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform
1 mg J:
The Isreeli See
M
The fines E and J will extend 12
the functions described above for the duration of the Basic
nactical miles into the Maditerraness
Sea perpendicular to the direction of
Agreement.
the canst and the area between the
SAUDI
lines will be U.M. beffer zone
Belier Zone-
8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal,
Line K
The funit of the Israell area of
ARABIA
limited forces and armaments
Line
the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it con-
The limit of the Egyptian area of
limited forces and armaments
Line M
cludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of
The line separating the Israch-con-
trelled area from: the area south of
Sas E and west of Not #: and the
their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties
areas of buffer zones 2A and 2B
BIA
The buffer zone between lines E
to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order
and
J.
BZ-2A $
The buffer ZOROS stoog the Gulf of
to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrange-
82-28
Suer
X-
Read section for common use
ments. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the
E-1
Egyptian surveillance station
J-1
Israeli survaillance station
United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the
U.S.A.W.S.
U.S.A. watch stations 1,2,8 3
USA-ESF U.S.A. electranic sensor fields 1.2.3.
United States will consider such requests conclusive.
U.N. Posts in the Hamam Farsun area.
9. Technical problems including the location of the watch
stations will be worked out through consultation with the
United States.
HENRY A. KISSINGER,
DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT
Secretary of State.
At the beginning of the negotiations the Egyptian line was along
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC AGREEMENTS
Line E of the map, about 10 kilometers from the Suez Canal. The
Israeli line was about 20 kilometers from the Suez Canal, and there
As explained to the committee by the Secretary of State in his ap-
were small zones of limited armaments behind it. In the agreement
pearance September 8, the provisions and effects of these agreements
that has been negotiated, the Egyptian line will move forward to the
can best be seen by reference to a map of the Sinai area. (See map on
former Israeli line. The Israelis will withdraw on the central front a
facing page.)
distance of 30 to 50 kilometers. In the area along the Gulf of Suez, for
a distance of about 150 kilometers, Egyptian sovereignty will be re-
12
13
stored, but the area is to be without military forces, installations,
force and because both parties had confidence only in the United States
or fortifications. It is under Egyptian civilian administration, with
for manning these stations.
a United Nation presence to check on the military provisions of the
As a result, the agreement calls for American civilian technicians
agreement.
to operate three early-warning facilities of a tactical nature in the
The agreement relinquishes to the Egyptians the strategic Giddi and
United Nations-controlled buffer zone.
Mitla Passes, and the oil fields at Abu Rudeis and environs.
BUFFER ZONES
ZONE OF LIMITED ARMAMENTS
The agreement calls for the establishment of buffer zones which
On the central front where the major Israeli withdrawal has been
will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force.
agreed to, the military dispositions are designed to make a surprise
Buffer Zone 1 (see map), in which the American warning stations
attack difficult. Behind each line there is a zone of limited armaments
will be located, is from 30 to 50 kilometers deep. Buffer Zones 2A and
indicated by the dotted Line K and by the dotted Line F along the Suez
2B will be established along the Gulf of Suez.
Canal.
The buffer zones will contain about 5,000 troops of the United Na-
In the zone of limited armaments the total number of forces and
tions Forces, predominantly Finnish, Swedish and Canadian. Each of
weapons is 8,000 troops, 72 artillery pieces, 75 tanks. Further, no wea-
those contingents would be larger than the American group in that
area.
pon can be stationed in that area which can reach the front line of the
other party.
THE AMERICAN PRESENCE
Behind the zone of limited armaments each side has also agreed not
The American presence would be confined to two roads through
to station weapons that can reach the front line of the other. In other
the Mitla Pass and the Giddi Pass. The total number of Americans
words, neither side will station long-range artillery or rockets in such
assigned to the mission cannot, by the terms of the agreement, exceed
a position where it could fire on the front lines of the other.
200. Since they will operate in three shifts, the total number of Amer-
icans in the buffer zone at any one time would not exceed 75 and could
EGYPTIAN COMMITMENTS
be less. Americans not on duty will reside outside this area.
In return for the partial Israeli withdrawal, Egypt undertook a
The Americans in the civilian technician force will have no military
number of commitments to Israel, including:
function.
A pledge not to employ a military blockade against Israel;
They will be in the Sinai; in a peacekeeping role exactly the same
Permission for Israeli civilian ships to be given the right of
as that of the United Nations Force and of the 39 Americans who for
peaceful passage through the Suez Canal; and
some time have been serving in an observer status with the United
An agreement to settle the problems of the Middle East by
Nations in Sinai.
peaceful means.
The technicians will report to both parties and to the United Na-
WARNING STATIONS
tions about what they find.
Under the agreement the United States has the right to withdraw
The need for the American presence arose, according to Secretary
its civilian technicians at any time that it is believed their safety is
Kissinger's testimony, because Israel maintains a strategic warning
jeopardized.
station at the western approaches to the Giddi-Mitla Passes area (E-1
map). Israel insisted that it has to maintain at least the capability of
COSTS OF TECHNICIANS TO THE UNITED STATES
this warning, and offered Egypt an opportunity to establish a similar
warning station. Egypt finally agreed to locate on at J-1 on the map.
At the request of the committee, the Department of State has pro-
Both sides proposed to the United States that it assume the trustee-
vided preliminary cost estimates for sending and maintaining up to
ship over the stations. The U.S. refused to man these stations because
200 U.S. technicians in the Sinai.
they would have required the presence of large numbers of Americans.
According to testimony from Under Secretary Sisco on Septem-
The United States, however, did agree to supervise the fact that the
ber 23, the estimates are:
Startup costs:
Millions
stations would not be used for fortification and would not contain
Early warning equipment, sensors, radars
$2. 0
military equipment. The parties agreed.
Communications equipment
2.5
Israel further proposed that in addition to the two strategic warning
Construction, prefabricated buildings
2.0
stations the United States place tactical warning stations in this
Transportation
2.0
area. Israel insisted that it would not make the agreement unless the
Food, medicine and other supplies
0. 75
Vehicles, generators and other support equipment
0.75
United States agreed to man these warning stations. American par-
ticipation was required, the Secretary testified, because Israel was not
Total
10. 0
confident enough about some of the members in the United Nations
Annual operating costs:
Personnel, equipment, etc
10. 0
59-525 0 75 3
14
Costs, therefore, are estimated at $20 million for the first year of op-
COST ESTIMATE
eration, fiscal 1976, and $10 million annually thereafter.
This resolution does not authorize appropriations for U.S. partici-
As noted earlier, the executive branch on a preliminary basis esti-
pation in the Sinai early-warning system. The committee has been in-
mates the cost of recruiting and installing the technicians will be $10
formed that the executive branch intends to use funds made available
million with an additional $10 million cost for annual operations,
under section 903 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
equipment, and personnel. Thus the cost for fiscal 1976 would be an
(Middle East special requirements fund), to pay the costs of the U.S.
estimated $20 million, with a projected annual expense of $10 million
technicians and equipment for the Sinai. Under this provision of law,
for succeeding years.
the executive branch will be required to submit to Congress a report
It should be noted that the joint resolution does not contain any
of its plans for the obligation of funds and the Congress can disap-
authorization of appropriations. Funding for the technicians will be
prove those plans by adopting a concurrent resolution within 30 days
requested by the executive branch at a later time.
after the executive branch report is received. The committee believes
this is an appropriate use of the special requirement fund. The report-
STATEMENTS REQUIRED BY RULE XI(1) (3) OF HOUSE RULES
ing and review procedures described above will insure that Congress
will be kept informed and will be able to maintain oversight of the
A. Oversight Findings and Recommendations
implementation of the U.S. proposals approved by this resolution.
No oversight findings are possible since the activity involved in
the resolution is still in prospect. The committee did, however, insert
in the resolution a reporting requirement which will help insure
adequate review in the future.
B. Budget Authority
This resolution creates no new budget authority or tax expenditures.
C. Congressional Budget Office Estimate and Comparison
No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the committee.
D. Commitee on Government Operations Summary
No oversight findings and recommendations have been received
which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government
Operations under clause 2 (b) (2) of Rule X.
INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT
No funds are authorized to be appropriated by this resolution.
It does, however, give congressional approval to an activity which
will require dollar outlays. The estimate is for $20 million during the
current fiscal year and $10 million thereafter.
Because the amount involved is a very small fraction of Federal
outlays, and because a significant part of it is likely to be spent for
the support of, and by, the American technicians, its inflationary im-
pact should be miniscule.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
PREAMBLE
The joint resolution contains four prefatory ("whereas") clauses
which are designed to put the resolution in an appropriate context:
Clause 1 notes that the agreement signed on September 4 between
Egypt and Israel, when it enters into force, may constitute a significant
step toward peace in the Middle East.
(15)
17
16
Clause 2 states that the U.S. proposal calls for the United States
Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between
to assign up to 200 American civilian personnel to carry out specified
the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on
noncombat functions under agreed-on conditions and terms.
within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall
Clause 3 points out that the proposal would permit the United
otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall
be referred to the committee of the other House named in
is jeopardized or that their role is no longer necessary.
Clause 4 asserts that the implementation of the U.S. proposal for an
subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee
early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance
together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar
with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby pro-
days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such
House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days,
mote the cause of peace.
unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two
RESOLVED CLAUSES
Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution
The substantive or "resolved" clauses of the resolution are encom-
passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed
passed in five sections:
and the committee of conference shall make and file a report
with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar
Section 1-Implementation
days after the legislation is referred to the committee of con-
This provision authorizes the President to implement the "United
ference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concern-
States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai," subject to
ing the printing of conference reports in the Record or con-
the proviso that U.S. personnel assigned to Sinai under the pro-
cerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such
posal will be removed immediately under two specific contingen-
report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six
cies: (1) if there is an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and
calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event
Israel; or (2) if the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that
the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall
the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of
report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.
their role is no longer necessary.
Section 3-Volunteers
Department of State witnesses, in testimony before the committee,
asserted that the executive branch has no objection to the inclusion
This provision emphasizes that U.S. civilian personnel participat-
of such provisos.
ing in the early-warning system in Sinai should include only individ-
uals who have volunteered for such an assignment.
Section 2-Concurrent Resolution "Privilege"
During the hearings on the Sinai early-warning system, executive
This provision states that the concurrent resolution provided for in
branch witnesses testified that they did not intend to employ as civil-
section 1 should be privileged in the same manner and to the same
ian technicians anyone presently employed by the Central Intelligence
extent as a concurrent resolution described in section 5(c) of the War
Agency or any other foreign intelligence gathering agencies. To the
Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148) is privileged under section 7
extent that this personnel policy would be fully in keeping with the
of that law. Following are the two sections:
civilian character of this undertaking and the peacekeeping purposes
SEC. 5. (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time
which the technicians are supposed to serve, it is the expectation of
that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities
this committee that none of the Americans serving in such a capacity
outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and
in the Sinai will be an employee of any foreign intelligence gathering
territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory
agency of the U.S. Government.
authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President
Section 4-Reporting Requirement
if the Congress SO directs by concurrent resolution.
This section contains a reporting requirement obligating the Presi-
dent to submit a written report to Congress whenever American civil-
SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant
ian technicians, pursuant to this congressional authorization, partici-
to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign
pate in any early-warning system. The section stipulates the circum-
Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on
stances requiring such a report, prescribes its form, specifies the nature
Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one
of its contents, and states the timing of its submission. The reporting
such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such com-
requirement has two key purposes: first, to cause the President to
mittee together with its recommendations within fifteen cal-
review the participation of American civilian technicians; and second,
endar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by
to provide the Congress with information on which it can render judg-
the yeas and nays.
ment and exercise its prerogative of ordering the removal of such
(b) Any concurrent resolution SO reported shall become the
civilian technicians by concurrent resolution.
pending business of the House in question (in the case of the
19
18
The circumstances which would require a report are enumerated in
Section 5-Interpretation of Resolution
the resolution as follows: "Whenever American civilian technicians,
This provision makes clear that the authority contained in this joint
pursuant to this authorization, participate in an early-warning sys-
resolution does not signify approval of the Congress for any other
tem". This language applies to the participation of American civilian
agreement, understanding, or commitment which may have been made
technicians in the Sinai as long as they remain in that role.
by the executive branch, particularly any such which relate to a
The latter half of the section deals with the timing, form, and scope
settlement in the Middle East.
of the report submitted by the President.
It is intended to make clear that the authority contained in this joint
(1) Timing.-The language specifies that reports from the Presi-
resolution to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-
dent shall be submitted to the Congress "periodically, but no less fre-
Warning System in Sinai" does not, and shall not in any way be con-
quently than once every 6 months.' That time frame was determined
strued to, constitute congressional approval, acceptance, or endorse-
by the committee as adequate enough for events to be gathered and
ment (1) of any other oral or written commitment, understanding,
appropriately analyzed yet not constitute an undue administrative
assurance, promise, or agreement, whether expressed or implied, or
burden.
any other expression, oral or written, by any official of the United
(2) Form.-The report by the President is required to be in writing.
States which Israel, Egypt, or any other nation or organization might
Moreover, to the maximum extent possible, it is to be unclassified. If
construe or interpret as a basis on which it could rely or act; or (2)
classified information must be included the President is free to do SO.
of any characterization of any such commitment, understanding, as-
In keeping with established procedures of the Congress, the reports
surance, promise, or agreement, or other expression, as constituting a
would be submitted to the Speaker of the House and the President
"codification" of existing, congressionally approved, U.S. policy.
pro tempore of the Senate. In addition, appropriate committees should
promptly hold hearings on the reports and report their findings and
recommendations to the Congress.
3. Contents.-Three stipulations are made on the contents of the
report. They are:
(a) Status.-The intent of the committee here is that the report
include reference to the general welfare of the civilian technicians,
particularly with reference to their safety and security as threatened
by any hostile attacks or impairment of their function and purpose.
(b) Scope.-In this connection, the committee's intent is that the
report include specific reference to the nature of their activity, any
changes in that activity, and the freedom with which they are able
to conduct that activity effectively.
(c) Anticipated duration.-By this language the intent of the com-
mittee is that the report make precise and specific reference to the
estimated length of time the presence of such civilian technicians will
be necessary. In this context the view of the committee is that every
possible effort be exerted by all parties concerned to minimize that
period of presence. To that end the committee's intent is that the re-
port concentrate on two possible avenues of reducing the presence of
the civilian technicians:
(1) We recognize that prevailing political circumstances mili-
tate against an international monitoring arrangement. We appre-
ciate that both parties place great faith in the credibility of the
United States. Nonetheless, we would hope that over time an im-
proved political climate would permit some broadening of the
existing arrangement SO as to include nationals of other countries.
(2) The committee recognizes the parties' interest in an Ameri-
can physical presence in the Sinai. We are concerned, however,
that that presence be as limited and secure as possible. We are
interested in knowing, then, to what extent new or alternative
technological options might permit a reduction of our personnel
or their relocation to a somewhat less vulnerable spot.
APPENDIX
TEXTS OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, AND THE
ANNEX TO THE EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Govern-
ment of Israel have agreed that
Article I
The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be re-
solved by military force but by peaceful means.
The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within
the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step
towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Secu-
rity Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.
They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by
means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338,
this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.
Article II
The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of
force or military blockade against each other.
Article III
The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on
land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military
actions against each other.
The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex
and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this
Agreement.
Article IV
A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance
with the following principles:
(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated
as Lines J and M on the attached map.
(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated
as Line E on the attached map.
(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as
Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the at-
tached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.
(4) The limitations on armaments and forces in the areas described
by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached
Annex.
(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as
Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations
(21)
22
23
Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under
1. Definitions of Lines and Areas
the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.
(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as de-
The deployment lines, Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments,
fined in the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified
Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M,
in the attached Annex.
other designated areas, road sections for common use and other
B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the
features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indi-
forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial
cated on the attached map (1:100,000-U.S. Edition).
reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance in-
stallations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and
2. Buffer Zones
other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of
the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and
(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Na-
of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the
tions Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by
Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of
the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.
this Agreement.
(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the
forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party
Article V
The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall con-
may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between Lines E and
tinue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.
J on an agreed schedule.
(c) In the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J, there will be estab-
Article VI
lished under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning Sys-
The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of
tem entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a
this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Co-
separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.
ordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle
(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for
East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement
transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which
and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of
this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the
its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with
United Nations Emergency Force.
procedures established in the Protocol.
3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M
Article VII
Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be
(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure
permitted through the Suez Canal.
that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military
Article VIII
fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints
and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.
This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step
(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel
towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.
shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above
The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace
indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations
agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference
Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform
in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.
normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such
Article IX
numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided
This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol
for in the Protocol.
and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.
(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea,
shall be only through the United Nations Emergency Force check-
ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT
points. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish
checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with
Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement,
the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.
representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working
(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to
Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin
unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters
preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the
and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as
Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2
agreed by the Working Group.
weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and imple-
(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian
mentation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupu-
installations and infrastructures.
lous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement,
(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road
the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an
along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and
integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.
detailed in the Protocol.
22
23
Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under
1. Definitions of Lines and Areas
the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.
(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as de-
The deployment lines, Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments,
fined in the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified
Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M,
in the attached Annex.
other designated areas, road sections for common use and other
B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the
features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indi-
forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial
cated on the attached map (1:100,000-U.S. Edition).
reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance in-
stallations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and
2. Buffer Zones
other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of
the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and
(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Na-
of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the
tions Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by
Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of
the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.
this Agreement.
(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the
forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party
Article V
The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall con-
may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between Lines E and
tinue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.
J on an agreed schedule.
(c) In the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J, there will be estab-
Article VI
lished under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning Sys-
The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of
tem entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a
this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Co-
separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.
ordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle
(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for
East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement
transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which
and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of
this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the
its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with
United Nations Emergency Force.
procedures established in the Protocol.
3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M
Article VII
Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be
(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure
permitted through the Suez Canal.
that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military
fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints
Article VIII
and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.
This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step
(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel
towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.
shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above
The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace
indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations
agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference
Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform
in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.
normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such
Article IX
numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided
This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol
for in the Protocol.
and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.
(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea,
shall be only through the United Nations Emergency Force check-
ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT
points. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish
checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with
Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement,
the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.
representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working
(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to
Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin
unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters
preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the
and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as
Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2
agreed by the Working Group.
weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and imple-
(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian
mentation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupu-
installations and infrastructures.
lous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement,
(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road
the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an
along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and
integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.
detailed in the Protocol.
24
4. Aerial Surveillance
There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by
the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area
between Lines F and K), following the same procedures already in
practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency
of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Na-
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
tions Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The
United States Government will make the mission results available ex-
The Middle East has for too long been a source of conflict and
peditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United
threat to the peace of the world. While urgent social and economic
Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.
problems within the area remain unresolved, vast amounts of time,
money, and energy have been expended in the cause of war. This drain-
5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments
age of natural resources and continued confrontation has most re-
cently led to increased oil prices which have seriously undermined the
(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas
economy of the entire Western World and have been especially detri-
between Lines J and K and Lines E and F) the major limitations shall
mental to the underdeveloped countries. While the situation in the
be as follows:
Middle East is at best tenuous it could cause renewed abrasive rela-
(1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.
tions between the superpowers and errode efforts at détente.
(2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.
For all these reasons any effort which may lead to a lessening of ten-
(3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e.,
sions in this highly volatile area must be commended. Indeed, the Gov-
with caliber larger than 120 mm.), whose range shall not exceed twelve
ernment of the United States has exercised its good offices to bring
(12) km.
about such a defusing of the situation. I appreciate and approve of
(4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand
those efforts.
(8,000).
However, despite the continued dangers inherent in the area if
(5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons
peace does not prevail and despite the positive role played by the
which can reach the line of the other side.
United States, I am reluctantly compelled to register reservations to
(6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between Lines J and K, and
House Joint Resolution 683, the resolution approved by the House
between Line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18,
International Relations Committee-hurriedly drawn legislation
1974) and Line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installa-
which may buy today's "peace" but produce tomorrow's peril.
tions for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.
My basic concern centers on the extent to which the authorization
(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and
allowing participation by 200 American civilian technicians in the
Armaments will be:
early-warning system in the Sinai symbolizes a deepening involvement
(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from
of the American role in the Mideast. What that participation repre-
which they can reach the other line.
sents for the United States is a shift away from detached arbiter to
(2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area
that of active participant. With that change comes the serious pros-
of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.
pect and danger of involvement against which this resolution does not
(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections
sufficiently protect the national security of the United States.
in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within
From testimony received by the committee it would appear that
those areas.
the arrangement providing for 200 American civilian volunteer tech-
6. Process of Implementation
nicians was necessary in order to obtain agreement between Israel and
Egypt. In that connection, two concerns are particularly troubling.
The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of
First, I believe strongly that the civilian technician force should
forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the
have been multinational rather than exclusively American. Particu-
Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working
larly if and when these American technicians should come under hos-
Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the
tile attack the overwhelming temptation for the United States will be
phased movement of Egyptian troops to Line E and Israeli troops to
to commit military forces for their rescue. That prospect clearly car-
Line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installa-
ries with it the inherent danger for even deeper U.S. direct military
tions to Egypt. This process will begin within 2 weeks from the signa-
involvement. Such a possibility must be avoided at all costs.
ture of the Protocol and the introduction of the necessary technicians,
Second, we have been repeatedly assured by executive branch wit-
and it will be completed no later than 8 weeks after it begins. The de-
nesses that an international technician force was impossible because
tails of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.
both Egypt and Israel insisted upon American technicians. However,
Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5
that contention is contradicted by certain recent reports that it was
months after signature of the Protocol.
(25)
26
27
the American Government which promoted the idea of American per-
sonnel. One reason given was that the equipment was too technical
to file with the Congress the Executive Agreement Memorandum of
and of such an advanced type that a security factor had to be con-
Understanding of December 30, 1973 between Israel and the United
sidered. However, testimony received by the committee clearly demon-
States. The filing of such agreements within 60 days of their going into
force is required under the Case-Zablocki Act. What is significant in
strated that neither the security nor the complexity of the sensor
connection with the December 1973 agreement is that it is cited in the
equipment proposed for use in the Sinai precluded operation by other
than Americans. Indeed, we were advised that it will be the same type
current agreements. As of this moment, the December 1973 agreement
of equipment deployed in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese are now
still has not been filed with Congress.
Similarly, recent frustrating experiences with an executive branch
in possession of that equipment. Therefore, the national security issue
is not valid.
proclivity toward selective, evasive, and elusive interpretations of laws
Another concern relative to the deepening position into which this
passed by Congress prompted my second amendment, this one dealing
with "interpretation." It would have spelled out in precise and com-
arrangement on American civilian technicians is moving the United
States was expressed in The Washington Post editorial of October 1,
prehensive language Congress' exact understanding of what it was
doing in authorizing the use of civilian technicians. The amendment
1975. As seen by the Post-one of the major newspapers often privy
had two simple but important objectives: First, it would have made
to sensitive information-Israel needs the agreement as its ticket to
absolutely clear that in allowing the civilian technician participation
the billions in aid and the political partnership it seeks from Wash-
ington." Frankly, I am concerned. I submit the Congress and the
we were doing only that and nothing else. Thus, it would have pre-
cluded any inference that this action of Congress could be construed as
American people should be concerned relative to what commitments
approval for any other oral or written commitment, understanding or
were made in order to attain the Sinai agreement.
expression made by any U.S. official and on which any party could rely
Despite these strong reservations I will vote for the resolution au-
or act. Also, the amendment would make crystal clear that by approv-
thorizing the participation of 200 American civilian technicians. How-
ing the resolution we would not be codifying or otherwise approving
ever, I will do SO with the following understandings: First, that every
or endorsing in any way what has SO often and in SO many ways been
effort will be made to reduce U.S. participation as soon as possible
loosely and vaguely referred to as "U.S. policy."
through the substitution of other nationals and the full use of remote
This amendment was replaced by a shorter version offered by the
control equipment. Second, that the United States, acting in accord
gentleman from California, Mr. Lagomarsino. Although the language
with established arms control policies, will avoid supplying high so-
of my amendment appears in the body of the committee report, in elab-
phisticated arms to the area which would prove destabilizing. Indeed,
orating upon the meaning of Mr. Lagomarsino's substitute, for the sake
the ideal would be to discontinue all military assistance to the area.
of emphasis I believe it is desirable to repeat it here in complete form
Finally, in the interests of fairness and justice, it is important that in
providing economic aid the United States be balanced and prudent.
SEC. 2. The authority contained in this joint resolution to
Without adequate safeguards and control, the resolution approved
implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warn-
by the committee represents the danger of being a first step in the di-
ing System in Sinai" does not, and shall not in any way be
rection of added, direct involvement. It is the proverbial camel's nose
construed to, constitute congressional approval, acceptance,
under the tent.
or endorsement (1) of any other oral or written commitment,
In an effort to establish such safeguards and controls and thereby
understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, whether ex-
preclude or minimize that danger, during the markup of the legislation
pressed or implied, or any other expression, oral or written, by
I offered two amendments to the resolution. The first, much in the spirit
any official of the United States which Israel, Egypt, or any
of the War Powers Resolution, would have required the President to
other nation or organization might construe or interpret as a
consult with Congress prior to agreeing to any similar arrangement in
basis on which it could rely or act; or (2) of any characteri-
the future. Its purpose was to assure an opportunity for congressional
zation of any such commitment, understanding, assurance,
imput into significant commitments of this type. As it now stands,
promise, or agreement, or other expression, as constituting a
Congress is in the awkward position of having to act only on accom-
"codification" of existing congressionally approved, United
plished fact.
States policy.
Although the amendment was rejected, I should note in its defense
At the present time, and in approving the implementation of any
that it complemented the rising voice within Congress for a full and
other agreement in the future, the Congress must resist emotional pres-
meaningful opportunity to exercise our proper partnership role in for-
sures and insist that a prudent and balanced policy prevails if we are to
eign policy formulation. From bitter past experience I have come to
enhance peace in the area.
the reluctant conclusion that the executive branch is less than anxious
It is in this spirit that these supplemental views are presented.
to allow Congress that opportunity. Too often the executive branch
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI.
has been too reluctant to provide the Congress information which
would make possible our fuller and more effective participation in the
policy formulation process. As an example I cite the Executive's failure
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
AND HON. PAUL FINDLEY
THE MISSING SAFEGUARD-A 2-YEAR LIMITATION
As reported to the House, the resolution (H.J. Res. 683) stationing
technicians in the Sinai creates a U.S. obligation of substantial magni-
tude and risk. Our commitment is essentially open-ended, since, in
practical terms, we have left it up to Israel and Egypt to decide the
duration of our stay. Recent history and common sense argue against
such an approach.
We believe that this extensive conveyance of authority needs to be
more adequately safeguarded. Political instability and uncertainty in
the Middle East are entirely too great for us to proceed under this
kind of an arrangement.
Accordingly, we will support an amendment (to be offered on the
House floor) which will automatically terminate the authority for the
obligation after a two year period. This is the only effective way we
know of causing the entire 95th Congress to reevaluate systematically
the U.S. commitment in light of prevailing circumstances. If the
events and trends are promising, approval will no doubt be swift and
simple. The termination date is a safeguard and nothing more.
The pending resolution stands very much at odds with the spirit
and rationale of the War Powers Resolution. That legislation was the
distillate of an enormous national tragedy and of the sober reflections
that flowed therefrom. As the principal House authors of the War
Powers Resolution, we are troubled to see its prudent concepts dis-
regarded in this instance. We believe that the logic of War Powers
should guide us at this critical juncture.
It may be argued that the safeguard of a mandatory review after a
2-year period would disrupt a delicate situation and require a renego-
tiation of the entire agreement. We find such an argument unpersua-
sive. The Uited States proposal to the basic agreement, which has been
accepted by both Egypt and Israel, already states that the United
States may withdraw its personnel if it believes that "continuation
of their role is no longer necessary." Our amendment simply creates
a thoughtful and guaranteed process by which the Congress can evalu-
ate the necessity of our commitment after a reasonable period of time.
This amendment flows naturally from an already admitted reservation.
Moreover, it will help to give shape and focus to what might otherwise
be rather intermittent and desultory reviews.
Some may also suggest that we should be satisfied with the existing
provision that allows the Congress to end our commitment by con-
current resolution. We recall, however, that the Gulf of Tonkin Res-
olution was governed by an identical provision for termination. (Year
after year, the Congress simply declined to act, preferring to leave
hard decisions to others.) The manifest ineffectuality of such a provi-
sion will be recalled by all.
(29)
30
It is well for us to understand the following facts, all of which
argue in their own way for the kind of limitation which we envision.
First, the current wording of the commitment suggests extraordi-
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON
nary permanence. The basic agreement lasts until it is superseded by
another agreement. No one of course can perdict when this will occur.
In order to put House Joint Resolution 683 in perspective, I am en-
As Under Secretary of State Sisco conceded, even the outbreak of
closing for the interest of my colleagues a report by the Library of
hostilities can only interrupt-not terminate-the U.S. obligation.
Congress which gives a summary of the reported "Secret Agreements"
Second, the obligation entails undeniable risks. American personnel
between the United States and Israel and Egypt. This report is based
will be introduced into an area where hostilities are prospective, if not
on recent press accounts and not on official documents.
imminent. They will be placed on the line, as our committee inquiry
The Library of Congress report follows:
reveals, for largely political reasons rather than to perform some
genuinely useful and unique warning function. They will be a con-
A SUMMARY OF THE REPORTED "SECRET AGREEMENTS" BE-
tinuously tempting target for terrorists. And the need to remove them
TWEEN THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, AND EGYPT SUBSEQUENT
in the midst of another sudden and violent Middle East war could
TO THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT OF
well draw our military forces into the fighting at a most undesirable
1975 1
time and place.
Third, in this some connection, the resolution conveys a seemingly
(The following is based on current press accounts and not
unprecedented grant of authority to the President to evacuate the
on official documents.)
technicians. In effect, the existing language mandates the President
At the time of the signing of the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli Dis-
to take whatever steps are necessary to remove our personnel. More-
engagement Agreement of 1975 in Geneva on September 4,
over, it mandates him to do this "immediately."
1975, there was widespread press speculation to the effect that,
Finally, the perception of open-endedness that arises from this obli-
in addition to the Accord and Annex, which were made pub-
gation may significantly lower the incentives for any further and more
lic, and the U.S. proposal for the establishment of an early-
comprehensive settlement. Many states in the Middle East argue that
warning system in the buffer zone, the overall agreement also
the door has now been closed on any further negotiation. Surely, we
included secret understandings between the United States,
want to do what we can to minimize that perception. After all, we are
Israel, and Egypt which contained commitments with re-
willing to approve this risky commitment, because we believe that it
gard to foreign aid and other matters. On September 16 and
may be a necessary investment in a wider peace. And yet the connection
17, 1975, the Washington Post and the New York Times pub-
between our presence and the requirement for continued progress
lished the alleged texts of three such secret agreements. Ac-
toward a comprehensive settlement is insufficiently established by the
cording to the New York Times, the texts were made avail-
existing resolution.
able by columnist Jack Anderson and were authenticated by
Our goal is positive in its orientation. We seek to safeguard the na-
officials who have seen the originals. The first document is
tional interests of the United States while at the same time enhancing
entitled "Memorandum of Agreement Between Israel and the
the prospects for peace in the Middle East. We are willing to make
United States." The second is entitled "Assurances From the
a commitment for peace, but we insist upon doing SO in a prudent
United States Government to Israel," which augments the
manner. The administration itself at first strongly opposed the com-
first document's aid provisions. The third is entitled "Assur-
mitment of U.S. personnel. Surely, then, they cannot quarrel with the
ances from the United States Government to Egypt." Accord-
sort of minimal safeguard we are proposing now.
ing to press reports, there may be other such secret
The mandatory review contemplated by our amendment is a sensible
agreements.
check upon an uncertain situation. It enables those of us in the Con-
gress to exercise a greater degree of control. Without this, we shall
I. SUMMARY OF "MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
be like the ant roaring downstream on a log, believing all the while
UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL"
that he was steering.
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
1. The United States will make every effort to be respon-
PAUL FINDLEY.
sive to Israel's long-term defense, energy, and economic
needs, subject to congressional approval.
2. The United States and Israel will periodically consult
on Israel's long-term military supply needs; and beginning
with the 1976 request, the United States will view sympa-
thetically Israel's request for advanced weapons.
Sept. 25, 1975.
1 By Susan M. Mowle, Analyst in International Relations, Foreign Affairs Division,
(31)
32
33
3. In the event that Israel cannot meet her oil requirements
15. The Agreement will remain binding even if the U.N.
through normal procedures, the United States agrees that
forces are withdrawn without the prior agreement of Egypt,
for the next 5 years it will
Israel, and United States and even if no subsequent agree-
(a) Sell and help ship oil to Israel if U.S. reserves
ment has been reached.
permit; or
16. The Agreement will not take effect before the United
(b) If the United States itself faces an oil embargo, it
States Congress approves the U.S. role in connection with
will make oil available for purchase in accord with the
surveillance and observation functions.
International Energy Agency conservation and alloca-
tion formula, as applied by the United States Government.
II. SUMMARY OF "ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES
4. The administration will request Congress to:
GOVERNMENT TO ISRAEL"
(a) Take into account Israel's oil import requirements
in determining the overall Israeli aid figures;
The United States will continue to supply Israel with ad-
(b) In determining total aid to Israel, take into ac-
vanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft, and the
count Israel's extra expenditure to replace the oil derived
Administration agrees to undertake a joint study of sophis-
from the Sinai wells which are to be returned to Egypt;
ticated military items, including the Pershing ground-to-
and
ground missiles with conventional warheads, with a view to
(c) Make available funds for construction of storage
giving a positive response.
facilities to enable Israel to increase her supply of oil
reserves to 1 year's need within the next 4 years.
III. SUMMARY OF ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES
5. The United States will not expect Israel to implement the
GOVERNMENT TO EGYPT"
Agreement until Egype permits the passage of Israeli cargo
through the Suez Canal to and from Israeli ports.
1. The United States intends to make a serious effort to
6. The United States agrees that the next agreement with
bring about further negotiations between Syria and Israel.
Egypt should be a final peace agreement.
2. In the event of a violation of the Agreement by Israel,
7. The United States will consult with Israel on remedal
the United States will consult with Egypt about possible
action by the United States in the case of any Egyptian viola-
remedial action by the United States.
tion of any of the provisions of the Agreement.
3. The United States will provide technical assistance to
8. The United States will veto any Security Council resolu-
Egypt for the Egyptian early-warning station.
tion which would adversely affect the Agreement.
9. The United States will seek to prevent efforts by others
to consider proposals detrimental to Israeli interests.
[From the New York Times, Sept. 17, 1975]
10. In the event of a threat to Israel's security by a world
power "the United States will in the event of such threat
U.S. DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE SINAI ACCORD
consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect
(Special to the New York Times)
to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can
lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices."
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16.-Following are the texts of three
11. The United States and Israel will conclude the contin-
documents relating to the recent Sinai agreement between
gency plan for an emergency military supply operation, if
Israel and Egypt. The first is a memorandum of agreement
possible within 2 months of the signing of this document.
between Israel and the United States relating to American
12. It is the United States view that Egyptian commitments
aid to Israel and diplomatic actions in the Middle East; the
under the Egypt-Israeli Agreement are not conditional upon
second, entitled "Assurances From the United States Govern-
any developments between Arab States and Israel.
ment to Israel," augments the first document's and provisions;
13. The United States shares Israel's view that negotiations
the third is entitled "Assurances From the United States
with Jordan are to be directed toward an overall peace
Government to Egypt."
settlement.
14. The United States regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb
MEMORANDUM
and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways and
supports Israel's passage through the straits as well as free-
The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agree-
dom of flight over the straits and the Red Sea.
ment initialed on Sept. 1, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the
agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in
2 Agreement, when capitalized, refers to the Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agree-
Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part
ment of 1975 signed on Sept. 4, 1975, and included the Accord and Annex.
in the pursuit of final peace. That agreement has full United
States support.
34
35
(1) The United States Government will make every effort
(4) In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and as
to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and
part of the over-all annual figure in paragraph 1 above, the
Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-
United States agrees:
going and long-term basis, to Israel's military equipment and
(a) In determining the over-all annual figure which will
other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to
be requested from Congress, the United States Government
its economic needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3, and
will give special attention to Israel's oil import requirements
4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the
and, for a period as determined by Article 3 above, will take
annual total to be requested in fiscal year 1976 and later fiscal
into account in calculating that figure Israel's additional ex-
years.
penditures for the import of oil to replace that which would
(2) Israel's long-term military supply needs from the
have ordinarily come from Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar (4.5
United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations
million tons in 1975).
between representatives of the U.S. and Israeli defense estab-
(b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount
lishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be in-
to be determined by mutual agreement, to the Government
cluded in a separate U.S.-Israeli memorandum. To this end,
of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and
a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within
three weeks. In conducting this study, which will include
stocking of the oil reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing
Israel's 1976 needs, the United States will view Israel's re-
storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks, now standing at
quests sympathetically, including its request for advanced
approximately six months, up to one year's need at the time
of the completion of the project. The project will be imple-
and sophisticated weapons.
mented within four years. The construction, operation and
(3) Israel will make its own independent arrangements
financing and other relevant questions of the project will be
for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal pro-
cedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in
the subject of early and detailed talks between the two
Governments.
this way, the United States Government, upon notification of
(5) The United States Government will not expect Israel
this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for
five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate
to begin to implement the agreement before Egypt fulfills
this arrangement on one year's notice.
its undertaking under the January 1974, disengagement
(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal require-
agreement to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and
from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.
ments for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase
(6) The United States Government agrees with Israel that
in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on
the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its
the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace
agreement.
normal requirements, the United States Government will
promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet
(7) In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provi-
all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If
sions of the agreement, the United States Government is pre-
Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport
pared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the viola-
such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make
tion and possible remedial action by the United States
Government.
every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of
(8) The United States Government will vote against any
transport.
(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal require-
Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects or
alters adversely the agreement.
ments for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase
(9) The United States Government will not join in and
in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through
will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consid-
embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from
eration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental
procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United
to the interests of Israel.
States Government will promptly make oil available for pur-
(10) In view of the long-standing U.S. commitment to the
chase by Israel in accordance with the International Ener-
survival and security of Israel, the United States Government
gy Agency conservation and allocation formula as applied
will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security
by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's
or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective,
essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the neces-
the United States Government will in the event of such threat
sary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States
consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect
Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the
to what support diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can
necessary mean of transport.
lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.
Israeli and U.S. experts will meet annually or more fre-
(11) The United States Government and the Government
quently at the request of either party, to review Israeli's con-
of Israel will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible
tining oil requirement.
within two months after the signature of this document, con-
37
36
ASSURANCES TO EGYPT
clude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to
Israel in an emergency situation.
1. The United States intends to make a serious effort to
(12) It is the United States Government's position that
help bring about further negotiations between Syria and
Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel agreement,
Israel, in the first instance, through diplomatic channels.
its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional
2. In the event of an Israeli violation of the agreement,
upon any act or developments between the other Arab states
the United States is prepared to consult with Egypt as to the
and Israel. The United States Government regards the agree-
significance of the violation and possible remedial action by
ment as standing on its own.
the United States.
(13) The United States Government shares the Israeli
3. The United States will provide technical assistance to
position that under existing political circumstances negotia-
Egypt for the Egyptian early-warning station.
tions with Jordan will be directed toward an over-all peace
settlement.
ADDENDUM
(14) In accordance with the principle of freedom of navi-
gation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage
On September 18, 1975, the New York Times published the text of
through and over straits connecting international waters, the
an alleged United States-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement dealing
United States Government regards the Straits of Babel Man-
with the Geneva peace conference, bringing to a total of four the num-
deb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It
ber of reported "secret agreements" between the United States, Egypt,
will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage
and Israel which have been published in the press subsequent to the
through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government
Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1975.
recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red
Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exer-
SUMMARY OF "MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
cise of that right.
AND ISRAEL WITH REGARD TO THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE"
(15) In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force
or any other United Nations organ is withdrawn without the
1. The United States and Israel will coordinate on the timing of the
prior agreement of both parties to the Egypt-Israel agreement
reconvening of the Geneva peace conference.
and the United States before this agreement is superseded by
2. The United States will not recognize or negotiate with the Pales-
another agreement, it is the United States view that the
tinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as long as the PLO does not
agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.
recognize the right of Israel to exist, and the United States will not
(16) The United States and Israel agree that signature of
accept U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United
the protocol of the Egypt-Israel agreement and its full entry
States and Israel will seek to coordinate strategy and position on this
into effect shall not take place before approval by the United
issue, and with regard to the participation of any additional states
States Congress of the U.S. role in connection with the sur-
at the conference.
veillance and observation functions described in the agree-
3. The United States will seek to insure that all substantive negotia-
ment and its annex. The United States has informed the Gov-
tions at the conference be on a bilateral basis.
ernment of Israel that it has obtained the Government of
4. The United States will veto any Security Council resolution
Egypt agreement to the above.
which seeks to adversely alter the terms of reference of the Geneva
peace conference or any adverse changes in Resolutions 242 or 338.
ADDENDUM ON ARMS
5. The United States will seek to insure that the role of the co-
sponsors be consistent with the terms of the December 20, 1972, Mem-
On the question of military and economic assistance to
orandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel.
Israel, the following conveyed by the U.S. to Israel augments
6. The United States and Israel will plan action to insure that the
what the memorandum of agreement states.
conference be conducted in a manner directed toward the advance-
The United States is resolved to continue to maintain
ment of a negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors.
Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced
types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United
[From the New York Times, Sept. 18, 1975]
States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a
joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, in-
U.S.-ISRAEL PACT ON GENEVA
cluding the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conven-
(Special to The New York Times)
tional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response.
The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17-Following is the text of a pre-
by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic
viously unpublished memorandum of agreement between the
assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military
United States and Israel dealing with the Geneva peace
needs.
conference.
38
1. The Geneva peace conference will be reconvened at a
time coordinated between the United States and Israel.
2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present
policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization,
whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine
Liberation Organization SO long as the Palestine Liberation
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, HON.
Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, AND HON. CHARLES WILSON
does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
The United States Government will consult fully and seek
We support the presence of American technicians in the Sinai be-
to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva peace con-
cause we are convinced it is the cement which holds together the recent
ference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Simi-
agreement between Israel and Egypt.
larly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert
If Congress were to reject the resolution it would probably result
its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the par-
in the collapse of the understandings arrived at a short while ago and
ticipation of any other additional states. It is understood
that, we believe, would have potentially catastrophic consequences not
that the participation at a subsequent phase of the con-
only for Israel-our only reliable democratic ally in the Middle East-
ference of any possible additional state, group or organiza-
but for our own country as well.
tion will require the agreement of all the initial participants.
We do not believe that the recent agreement represents the mil-
3. The United States will make every effort to insure at the
lennium in the Middle East. Israel has made very tangible territorial
conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a
withdrawals in exchange for what are, in the final analysis, rather
bilateral basis.
intangible political concessions. The real test of the agreement is
4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote
whether it leads to a renewal of war or progress toward peace. But to
against any initiative in the Security Council to alter ad-
the extent it has resulted in a reduction of tensions and a period of
versely the terms of reference of the Geneva peace conference
peace in which both sides will have an opportunity to gain confidence
or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are in-
in the willingness of the other to implement such a settlement, we
compatible with their original purpose.
think we are presumptively better off with the accord than we would
5. The United States will seek to insure that the role of the
have been without it.
co-sponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the
The alternative to a second stage interim agreement between Israel
memorandum of understanding between the United States
and Egypt was, after all, not a grand settlement of all the outstanding
Government and the Government of Israel of Dec. 20, 1972.
issues dividing Israel from its Arab neighbors-issues which have
6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure
defied solution for over a quarter of a century now-but the very real
that the conference will be conducted in a manner consonant
probability of another round in the continuing conflict in the Middle
with the objectives of this document and with the declared
East. Such a war, if it broke out, would threaten to drag both of the
purpose of the conference, namely the advancement of a nego-
great superpowers into its vortex with all of the attendant possibili-
tiated peace between Israel and its neighbors.
ties for the outbreak of nuclear hostilities and the collapse of con-
LEE H. HAMILTON.
temporary civilization. Even if such a doomsday scenario never came
to pass, a fifth war in the Middle East could possibly produce another
embargo on Arab oil, thereby creating the most serious problems
imaginable, not only for our own economy, but for the economies of
almost all the other nations of the world as well.
There are some who contend that the brief "breathing spell" gen-
erated by the agreement will result in a stiffening of the Israeli position
with respect to such issues as the Golan Heights and the West Bank-
thereby decreasing rather than increasing the prospects for a lasting
peace in theMiddle East. We think such criticisms miss the point en-
tirely The real obstacle to peace in the Middle East lies in the massive
mistrust which has made more far-reaching agreements and direct ne-
gotiations impossible. What is needed, more than anything else, is the
kind of movement toward peace-represented by the Sinai settle-
ment-which will make it politically possible for additional agree-
ments to be arrived at in the future. It would, in our judgment, be the
height of naiveté to expect a dispute as bitter and longlasting as the
(39)
40
conflict between Israel and the Arabs to be settled overnight. Only if
each side can learn to have some confidence in the peaceful intentions
of the other will both sides be willing to make the kind of mutual con-
cessions which are a precondition for a just and lasting peace.
There are others who contend that the presence of our technicians in
the Passes will as surely draw us into an armed conflict in the Middle
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
East as the activity of our "advisers" drew us into a massive military
involvement in Vietnam. We would contend, however, that this analogy
I can see no compelling reason for Congress to delay further in
obscures rather than clarifies the fundamental distinctions between
approving American observers in the Sinai passes. The September 1
these two very different situations.
Disengagement Agreement is an important step toward peace in the
In Vietnam we were present at the request of one side. In the Middle
Middle East; it cannot become effective until Congress approves the
East we will be present at the behest of both sides.
stationing of American observers in the Sinai.
In Vietnam we had military advisers. In the Middle East we will
A contingent of American civilians manning early warning stations
have civilian technicians.
in the Sinai passes is in no way analogous to our early involvment in
In Vietnam our "advisers" were there to wage war. In the Middle
Vietnam, nor is the possibility of increased involvement similar to our
East our technicians will be there to preserve peace.
Southeast Asia experience. Up to 200 Americans will be interposed be-
In Vietnam we were there to protect what were, at best only marginal
tween Israeli and Egyptian forces at the behest of both parties. Their
American interests. In the Middle East we will be there to protect our
mission will be to serve the peace rather than the military objectives of
most vital national interests.
any nation. They can, and will, be removed by Congress or by the ad-
In any case, an American presence in the Passes will be neither new
ministration if hostilities are imminent or if they are otherwise
nor unprecedented. The fact is that 260 Americans have already served
endangered.
from time to time in the U.N. peacekeeping force in the Sinai. During
The American observers will be better insulated from possible terror-
that period of time there was not one reported incident of terrorist ac-
ist incidents than their compatriots living in Cairo and Tel Aviv. They
tivity directed at either them or any of the other nationals who com-
will be protected on both sides by military forces anxious to have them
pose the UNTSO force. Indeed, we dare say that the 200 technicians,
remain in place.
surrounded as they will be by the Israeli Army in the east and the
The question of related agreements, understandings, and commit-
Egyptian Army in the west, with 5,000 to 6,000 U.N. troops in the mid-
ments-oral or written, tacit or explicit, public or private-is irrele-
dle, will be far safer than they would be if we sent them instead out
vant to this legislation. Section 5 of the joint resolution establishes be-
onto the nighttime streets of any major metropolitan center in America.
yond any reasonable doubt that, in authorizing American observers in
It is, in this sense, probably not an exaggeration to suggest that they
the Sinai, Congress is not acceding to any other agreement, under-
will most likely face more of a danger from boredom than from
standing, or commitment made by the executive branch. We are
terrorists.
merely doing what is required of us to see that the agreement takes
Finally, we think it important to point out that a number of amend-
effect.
ments adopted in committee have made it extremely unlikely that the
By providing authority to send the observers, Congress does not
resolution will somehow result in American participation in another
imply endorsement of any military or economic assistance levels for
Middle East war. In addition to expressing the sense of Congress that
Israel or Egypt this fiscal year. These aid levels will be determined at
nothing in the Resolution should be construed as an endorsement of
an appropriate time, independent of the legislation before us.
any of the understandings entered into by the United States with Israel
Prompt approval of House Joint Resolution 683 is essential if we
and Egypt, the resolution was also changed to provide the Congress
are to maintain the momentum toward peace in the Middle East, and
with the ability-through the use of a privileged resolution-to re-
I strongly urge my colleagues to endorse this legislation without
quire the removal of the American technicians if it "determines that
further delay.
the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD.
role is no longer necessary."
(41)
In conclusion, we believe that the advantages of the resolution-and
of the agreement between Israel and Egypt which it will make pos-
O
sible-far outweigh its disadvantages and we urge its prompt and ex-
peditious enactment.
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ,
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
CHARLES WILSON.
Calendar No. 406
94TH CONGRESS
SENATE
REPORT
1st Session
No. 94-415
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN SINAI
OCTOBER 7 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 11), 1975.-Ordered to be printed
Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. J. Res. 138]
The Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under considera-
tion implementation of the United States proposal for the early-
warning system in Sinai, reports an original joint resolution and
recommends that it pass.
PURPOSE
The principal purpose of S. J. Res. 138 is to authorize the stationing
of up to 200 United States civilan technicians in the Sinai in connec-
tion with the disengagement agreement of September 4, 1975 between
Israel and Egypt.
COMMITTEE ACTION
The President sent to the Congress on September 2, 1975, a letter
enclosing a text of a proposal to be signed by the President of Egypt
and the Prime Minister of Israel regarding the terms under which
American civilian personnel could operate an early warning system
in the buffer zone between the Israeli and Egyptian forces in the
Sinai. The President said : "I intend to request formally that Congress
approve this document. I would appreciate your views on the form
which this approval should take." The text of the United States pro-
posal is appended to this report.
The executive branch also provided the text of an agreement between
Egypt and Israel and an annex to that agreement together with a map
showing the lines related to disengagement and the locations of the
surveillance and watch stations. This material is also appended.
59-688 O
2
3
At an executive hearing of the Committee on Thursday, Septem-
record. Mr. Yost suggested that the Congress should not take formal
ber 4, the Secretary of State provided certain classified materials
action in regard to the assurances and undertakings noting:
relating to United States assurances and understandings in regard
It would certainly be most unfortunate to disavow these
to the disengagement. The Committee held a further executive hearing
commitments at this stage because to do SO might vitiate the
on September 8 with Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco to review
underlying Israel-Egypt agreement. On the other hand, I
the materials, and later the same day the Chairman and ranking
should not like to see these commitments made any more
minority member reviewed the record of negotiations in order to
formal and binding than they already are, in connection with
ascertain whether there were further assurances and undertakings
a clearly partial and interim agreement.
involving the United States.
The Committee held additional executive sessions on September 24
Despite his reservations as to the Sinai disengagement accords, Mr.
and 25 and met first with Under Secretary Sisco and later with Secre-
Ball urged favorable action upon the Committee. He told the Com-
tary Kissinger to discuss the question of proper means of public dis-
mittee.
closure of United States assurances and undertakings and other mat-
I am not suggesting to you this morning that you should
ters related to the Sinai disengagement.
vote against the President's request on the narrow issue which
On September 30, the Committee approved a resolution offered by
is before you the supplying of American technicians to man
Senator Javits as follows:
warning system in the U.N. buffer area in the Sinai. The
Resolved, That the President is requested to inform the
Secretary of State has negotiated the whole complex of ar-
Committee on Foreign Relations of all the assurances and
rangements under dramatic circumstances, which have fo-
undertakings by the United States on which Israel and
cused world attention on his efforts. That process has required
Egypt are relying in entering into the Sinai agreement and
too large an investment of American prestige and authority
that there are no other assurances or undertakings.
for the United States Congress to reject the result at this
late date without damaging America's ability to play the cen-
Subsequently, the Committee received the following:
tral and essential role of leadership in international diplo-
macy, which our position of power and responsibility requires.
CERTIFICATION
Thus a rejection would prejudice, rather than advance, the
I hereby certify on behalf of the President and the Admin-
cause of peace in the Middle East.
istration that the documents on the Sinai disengagement
Professor Berger said that he fully concurred with Mr. Ball's
which we have provided to the Committee in connection with
judgment that the arrangements should not be rejected. However, he
the United States proposal for stationing technicians in the
expressed the view that:
Sinai, include all the undertakings, commitments, and assur-
The lesson I would draw from the Israel agreement is that
ances which the United States regards as legally binding or
the Senate needs to take steps to reclaim its constitutional
which will become legally binding upon signature of the
powers and rights in the domain of foreign relations, its right
two Memoranda of Agreement. It also includes all the under-
to full participation in the making of international agree-
takings, commitments, and assurances upon which either
ments.
Israel or Egypt is legally entitled to rely.
Senator Abourezk urged that the assurances and undertakings be
HENRY A. KISSINGER.
treated as a treaty noting:
OCTOBER 7, 1975.
The obligations undertaken by the United States are seri-
In the meantime, the Committee held additional meetings with the
ous enough for it to be debated as a treaty and approved as
Secretary of State in executive session on October 2 and 3. On the
one. I think we are required to consider it as such to conform
latter date, the Committee voted 12 to 2 to release documents related
to the constitutional processes of an open decision, openly
to United States assurances and undertakings as provided by the De-
arrived at.
partment of State. Voting yea were Senators Sparkman, Church,
Mr. Warnke urged the Congress to seek Presidential agreement that
McGee, McGovern, Humphrey, Clark, Biden, Case, Javits, Scott,
assurances and undertakings made by the United States in con-
Pearson, and Percy. Voting nay were Senators Pell and Griffin.
nection with the Sinai disengagement agreement do not represent
Public hearings were held on the matter October 6.
commitments but are "only good faith statements of present
Witnesses included: Senator James Abourezk, George Ball, Paul
intention
Warnke, Charles Yost, John Volkmar, Robert Bartell, Rabbi Kranz,
At a hearing on October 7, Senator Thomas F. Eagleton told the
William Perl, Rabbi Shlomo Thaler, William A. Small, Edmond
Members that the Committee should report out a resolution approving
Hower, James Zogby, Richard C. Shadyac and Robert Dreyfuss.
technicians for the Sinai. However, he questioned the constitutional
Raoul Berger of Harvard University submitted a statement for the
validity of the executive agreements made in connection with the
Sinai disengagement.
4
5
Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard School of Law told the
in some instances they are merely formal reaffirmations of
Committee that the assurances and undertakings should be considered
existing American policy. Other provisions refer to contin-
as treaties and should be treated by the Congress with that in mind.
gencies which may never arise and are related-sometimes
In public testimony October 7, Secretary of State Kissinger told the
explicitly-to present circumstances subject to rapid change.
Committee that the disengagement agreement is indespensible to the
Second, undertakings or assurances by the U.S. which are
process of peace noting:
conditional on existing or prior authorization and appro-
priation of the Congress or which fall within the consti-
I can state that the prospects for peace in the Middle East
tutional authority of the President to conduct the foreign
have been significantly advanced, and that good chances exist
relations of the United States.
for even further progress-if we have the wisdom and the
Thus to speak of Memoranda of Agreement as Executive
national will to seize the opportunity before us.
Agreements is by no means to say that each of their individual
Secretary Kissinger told the Members that the administration has
provisions is binding upon the United States. That depends
certified that the classified documents provided the Committee-
entirely upon the content of the specific provisions in ques-
include all of the assurances, undertakings, and commitments
tion. Moreover, nothing in these particular documents con-
strains Congressional action in any issue involving the future
which we consider to be legally binding upon the United
legislative process.
States. These documents also contain many provisions which
The fact that many provisions are not by any standard
are not considered legally binding; they were submitted be-
international commitments does not mean, of course, that the
cause they were contained in documents which include bind-
United States is morally or politically free to act as if they
ing clauses and which were initialed or signed by the
did not exist. On the contrary, they are important statements
United States and one of the parties.
of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United
Mr. Kissinger said that the executive branch also included ex-
States SO long as the circumstances that gave rise to them
cerpts from other classified documents "in the negotiating record
continue. But they are not binding commitments of the
which the Administration believes are legally binding assurances,
United States.
undertakings, or commitments. We have included in this category
The Committee met in executive session the afternoon of October 7
certain provisions which, although not regarded by the Administration
to consider the Sinai disengagement question and took as a working
as binding, might be so regarded by others."
document the text of H.J. Res. 686 although that resolution was not
The Secretary of State told the Members:
formally before it, not having passed the House. Section 5 of that
I am authorized on behalf of the President to state that
resolution, as reported by the House International Relations Commit-
there are no other assurances or undertakings, beyond those
tee, provided that:
already submitted to the Congress, which are binding upon
The authority contained in this joint resolution to imple-
the United States. We will make no contrary claim in the fu-
ment the United States Proposal for the Early Warning Sys-
ture; nor can any other government.
tem in Sinai does not signify approval of the Congress of any
The Secretary said further:
other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the
A vote in favor of the specific, limited U.S. role in the early
executive branch.
warning system will not thereby commit the Congress to a
On motion of Senator Church, the Committee amended that section
position on any other issue-whether it be the question of
to provide that the authority contained in the resolution "does not
undertakings and assurances to the parties involved; our
signify approval or disapproval by the Congress of any other assur-
continuing relations with various countries of the area; a
ance or undertaking". Subsequently, this action was reconsidered and
given level of budget support; or our policies and programs
S.J. Res. 138, as reported, follows the House committee text. Although
in the Middle East. Those are separate issues which you will
in normal circumstances the Committee would have preferred the
want to consider carefully at the appropriate time. Many will
language of the Church amendment, it feels that the exigencies of
come up in the normal authorization and appropriation proc-
the present situation are such that the delays involved in a conference
ess; they are not an integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli
with the House should be avoided if at all possible. These actions were
Agreement.
taken by voice vote.
Addressing the question of United States assurances and under-
By a note of 2 yeas to 10 nays, the Committee rejected the following
takings to Israel and Egypt, the Secretary said:
amendment by Senator Biden:
Not all provisions in these documents amount to binding
Section -. In taking action pursuant to this Resolution, the
undertakings. They include:
President agrees that any other assurances, pledges or under-
First, assurances by the U.S. of our political intentions.
takings, including but not limited to all the provisions of
These are often statements typical of diplomatic exchange;
memoranda of agreements E, F, G, and H, made on behalf of
the United States in connection with the agreement signed on
7
6
Clause 4 asserts that the implementation of the U.S. pro-
September 4, 1975 by the Government of the Arab Republic
posal for an early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the
of Egypt and the Government of Israel are only good faith
prospect of compliance with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli
statements of present intention of his, designed to promote the
agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace.
basic purpose of a just and stable peace in the Middle East;
and
RESOLVED CLAUSES
That any such other assurances, pledges or undertakings
do not preclude the United States from taking such action as
The substantive or "resolved" clauses of the resolution are encom-
from time to time it may determine to be necessary or useful
passed in five sections:
to advance the purpose of a just and stable peace in the Middle
East.
Section 1-Implementation
This provision authorizes the President to implement the "United
Voting yea were Senators McGovern, Clark, and Biden. Voting
States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai," subject to
nay were Senators Church, McGee, Humphrey, Case, Javits, Scott,
the proviso that U.S. personnel assigned to Sinai under the proposal
Pearson, Percy, Griffin, and Sparkman.
will be removed immediately under two specific contingencies: (1) if
Having once again reviewed documents related to the record of
there is an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel; or (2) if
negotiations, Senators Sparkman and Case told Committee Members:
the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of
Apart from certain assurances and undertakings which we
such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no
have been responsibly informed have been in effect since be-
longer necessary.
fore the beginning of the negotiations leading to the Israel-
The Secretary of State has informed the Committee that he does not
Egypt Agreement of September 4, 1975, the documents shown
object to the inclusion of these provisions.
to us disclose no assurances or undertakings by the United
Section 2-Concurrent Resolution "Privilege"
States which differ significantly from those which have been
presented to the full Committee.
This provision states that the concurrent resolution provided for in
section 1 should be privileged in the same manner and to the same
The Committee then voted 14 to 2 to report House Joint Resolution
extent as a concurrent resolution described in section (c) of the War
683 as follows: Yeas: Senators Sparkman, Church, Symington, Pell,
Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148) is privileged under section 7
McGee, McGovern, Humphrey, Clark, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson,
of that law. Following are the two sections:
Percy, and Griffin. Nays: Senators Mansfield and Biden.
Senator Biden then moved that the Committee recommend to the
SEC. 5. (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time
Senate that a secret memorandum provided the Committee by the
that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities
Department of State Legal Advisor, Monroe Leigh, be declassified.
outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and
The Leigh memorandum gives his judgment as to which portions of
territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory
the assurances and undertakings are binding and which are not bind-
authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President
ing. Senator Biden's motion was rejected by a vote of 3 yeas and 10
if the Congress SO directs by concurrent resolution.
*
nays as follows: Yeas: Senators Church, Clark, and Biden. Nays:
Senators Pell, McGee, Humphrey, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy,
SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant
Griffin, and Sparkman.
to section 5 (c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one
such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such com-
PREAMBLE
mittee together with its recommendations within fifteen cal-
endar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by
The Joint Resolution contains four prefatory ("whereas") clauses
the yeas and nays.
designed to put the resolution in context:
(b) Any concurrent resolution SO reported shall become the
Clause 1 notes that the agreement signed between Egypt
pending business of the House in question (in the case of the
and Israel on September 4 may constitute, when it enters into
Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between
force, a significant step toward peace in the Middle East.
the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on
Clause 2 states that the U.S. proposal calls for the United
within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall
States to assign up to 200 American civilian personnel to
otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
carry out specified noncombat functions under agreed-on con-
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall
ditions and terms.
be referred to the committee of the other House named in
Clause 3 points out that the proposal would permit the
subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee
United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that
together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar
their safety is jeopardized or that their role is no longer
days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such
necessary.
8
9
House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days,
for annual operations, equipment and personnel. Thus the cost for
unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
fiscal 1976 would be an estimated $20 million, with a projected annual
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two
expense of $10 million for succeeding years.
Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution
It should be noted that the joint resolution does not contain any
passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed
authorization of appropriations. Funding for the technicians will be
and the committee of conference shall make and file a report
requested by the executive branch at a later time.
with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar
days after the legislation is referred to the committee of con-
COMMITTEE COMMENTS
ference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concern-
Most of the Committee's consideration of this matter has been
ing the printing of conference reports in the Record or con-
cerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such
centered on two questions: (1) the extent to which approval of the
report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six
200 technicians might commit the United States to a broader network
calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event
of assurances, undertakings, or agreements; and (2) the extent to
the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall
which the elements of this broader network were divulged to the
report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.
Committee, the Congress, and the country.
As indicated above, the Committeed is satisfied that it has been in-
Section 3-Volunteers
formed of all the relevant assurances and undertakings which are a
This provision emphasizes that U.S. civilian personnel participat-
part of the overall Sinai agreements.
ing in the early-warning system in Sinai should include only individ-
Further, the Committee has taken pains, both in the language of the
uals who have volunteered for such an assignment.
resolution before the Senate and in its legislative history, to nail
The Committee supports and endorses the intention of the executive
down the point that Congressional approval of the proposal to send
branch that the technicians be civilian volunteers who are not presently
200 technicians to the Sinai Peninsula is precisely that-no more, no
employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Committee was
less-and that it does not imply approval or disapproval of anything
further assured that the technicians will not operate under the control
else.
of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.
At the same time, the Committee recognizes that some of the ancil-
Section 4-Reporting Requirement
lary agreements will result in requests to Congress for authorizations
This section provides for written reports from the President to Con-
and appropriations. The point the Committee wishes to emphasize is
gress, at least semi-annually, as long as American technicians partici-
that by approving the limited proposal for technicians in the Sinai
pate in the early warning system. The reports are to cover the status,
the Congress does not in any way bind itself to any particular course
scope, and anticipated duration of such participation, and the feasi-
of action with respect to future proposals.
bility of reducing their participation by substituting nationals of
The Committee also wishes to underline the urgency of the situation.
other countries or by making technological changes. The appropriate
The basic agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed in Geneva
committees of Congress are to hold prompt hearings on each such
on September 4. Both sides requested American technicians, and the
Israelis have made it clear from the beginning that implementation of
report.
the agreement was dependent on Congressional approval of the tech-
Section 5-Interpretation of Resolution
nicians. Although the original Administration request for Congres-
This provision makes clear that the authority contained in this joint
sional action within two weeks was unrealistic, five weeks have now
resolution does not signify approval of the Congress for any other
passed-weeks in which the Foreign Relations Committee has devoted
agreement, understanding, or commitment which may have been made
itself to this question to the exclusion of almost all other business. It
by the executive branch, particularly any such which relate to a
has been time well spent, and the Committee has made a record which
settlement in the Middle East.
should serve to allay many of the concerns that were originally ex-
The Committee notes that failure to signify approval does not con-
pressed both in Congress and the general public. But in the meantime,
note disapproval. The Committee does not intend to pass judgment
Israel and Egypt have negotiated a timetable for implementation of
on any related assurances or undertakings made in connection with
the basic Agreement. The first step under that timetable was scheduled
the disengagement agreement. The Committee intends solely to recom-
to be taken October 5. It will not be taken until Congress acts on this
mend approval of the United States proposal for the stationing of
resolution. As the President wrote to the Chairman of the Foreign
American technicians in the Sinai in connection with the operation of
Relations Committee September 29:
surveillance stations by Israel and Egypt and to operate a three-
Delay in Congressional action will, therefore, delay imple-
station early-warning system.
mentation of the basic Agreement. It will risk causing the
lengthy and difficult negotiations on the entire five-month
COST ESTIMATE
implementing timetable to be reopened. It will prevent a
The executive branch estimates the cost of recruiting and installing
lessening of the risks of war. If for any reason the agreement
the technicians will be $10 million with an additional $10 million cost
should fail, the responsibility would be heavy indeed.
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL
I voted against publication by the Committee of the various state-
ments of intention and understanding received from the Executive
Branch because I believe that, except for those concerned with the oil
supply, most of the paragraphs in them are basically statements of
intention on the part of Dr. Kissinger and of the Administration. By
incorporating these statements into our official hearings, we are esca-
lating these statements of intent into a more concrete specific form
and they are more likely to bind this and future Administrations than
would otherwise be the case. What were intended as statements of
good faith effort and intent are, perhaps, being escalated into
agreements.
If the argument is advanced that Senators need the statements in
order to arrive at a decision on the Floor as to how to vote, all that is
needed would be to put a copy of the New York Times and Washing-
ton Post reprints on every Member's desk. And, from the viewpoint of
the American people, these statements are already known because they
have been reprinted in practically every paper across the length and
breadth of our land.
CLAIBORNE PELL.
(11)
APPENDIX
PROPOSAL
In connection with the early warning system referred to in Article
IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date
and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as
the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:
1. The early warning system to be established in accordance with
Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agree-
ment will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the follow-
ing elements:
A. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic
early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by
Israeli personnel. (Their locations are shown on the map attached
to the Basic Agreement.) Each station shall be manned by not
more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall
perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only
within their stations.
B. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warn-
ing and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be
established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes
as will be shown on the map attached to the agreement. These
stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In
support of these stations, there shall be established three un-
manned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in
the general vicinity of each station and the rods leading to and
from those stations.
2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following
duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these
stations.
A. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1A,
above, United States personnel will verify the nature of the op-
erations of the stations and all movement into and out of each
station and will immediately report any detected divergency from
its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the
Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations emer-
gency force.
B. At each watch station described in paragraph 1B, above,
the United States personnel will immediately report to the Parties
to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations emergency
force and movement of armed forces, other than the United
Nations emergency force, into either Pass and any observed prep-
arations for such movement.
C. The total number of United States civilian personnel as-
signed to functions under this proposal shall not exceed 200. Only
civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this
proposal.
(13)
14
15
3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities
The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex
covered by this proposal, except for small arms required for their
and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this
protection.
Agreement.
4. The United States personnel serving the early warning system
ARTICLE IV
shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the system.
5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such
A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance
support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their
with the following Principles:
functions.
(1) All Israeli Forces shall be deployed east of the lines desig-
6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal,
nated as lines JA and M on the attached map.
civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other
(2) All Egyption Forces shall be deployed west of the line
specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations
designated as Line E on the attached may.
emergency force agreement of February 13, 1957.
(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map
7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the
as lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the
functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.
attached map as lines J and KA shall be limited in armament and
8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this proposal, the United
forces.
States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety
(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas de-
is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary.
scribed by Paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in
In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed
the attached Annex.
in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative
(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map
arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the
as lines E and J, will be a Buffer Zone. In this zone the United Na-
United States to conclude its role under this proposal, the United
tions Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as
States will consider such requests conclusive.
under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.
9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations
(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as
will be worked out through consultation with the United States.
defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as
specified in the attached Annex.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the
The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Govern-
forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial
ment of Israel have agreed that:
reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance
installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and
other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the
ARTICLE I
Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of
The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be
the Protocol which is a result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex
resolved by military force but by peaceful means.
and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this
The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within
Agreement.
the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step
ARTICLE V
towards a just and durable peace according to the Provisions of Se-
curity Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.
The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue
They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by
its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.
means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338,
this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.
ARTICLE VI
The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration
ARTICLE II
of this Agreement. It will function under the Aegis of the Chief Co-
The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of
ordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle
force or military blockade against each other.
East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement
and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of
its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with
ARTICLE III
procedures established in the Protocol.
The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on
land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military
ARTICLE VII
actions against each other.
Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be
permitted through the Suez Canal.
16
17
ARTICLE VIII
entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate
proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.
This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step
(D) Authorized personnel shall have access to the buffer zone for
toward a just and lasting peace.
transit to and from the early warning system; the manner in which
It is not a final peace agreement.
this is carried out shall be worked out by the working group and the
The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace
United Nations emergency force.
agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in
accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.
3. AREA SOUTH OF LINE E AND WEST OF LINE M
ARTICLE IX
(A) In this area, the United Nations emergency force will assure
that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, mili-
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Proto-
tary fortifications and military installations; it will establish check-
col and remain in force until superseded by a new Agreement.
points and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:
function.
(B) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel
For the Government of Israel
shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above
indicated area, except for buffer zones 2A, and 2B and the United Na-
Witness:
tions posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to
perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in
such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be pro-
ANNEX TO EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT
vided for in the protocol.
Within five days after the signature of the Egypt-Israeli Agree-
(C) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall
ment, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the military
be only through United Nations emergency force checkpoints. The
working group of the Middle East peace conference at Geneva to
United Nations emergency force shall also establish checkpoints along
begin preparation of a detailed protocol for the implementation of the
the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise loca-
Agreement. The working group will complete the protocol within two
tions and number to be included in the protocol.
weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the protocol and implemen-
(D) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to
tation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaing the scrupulous
unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters
observance of the ceasefire and the elements of the Agreement, the two
and transport planes involved in the civilian activites of the area as
Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral
agreed by the working group.
part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the working group.
(E) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian
installations and infrastructures.
1. DEFINITIONS OF THE LINES AND AREAS
(F) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road
along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the working group and
The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, buffer
detailed in the protocol.
zones, the area south from line E and west from line M, other desig-
nated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred
4. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached
map.
There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by
2. BUFFER ZONES
the United States over the areas covered by the agreement (the area
between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in
(a) Access to the buffer zones will be controlled by the United Na-
practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of
tions emergency force, according to procedures to be worked out by
one mission every 7 to 10 days, with either party or the United Nations
the working group and the United Nations emergency force.
emergency force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United
(B) Aircraft of either party will be permitted to fly freely up to
States Government will make the mission results available expedi-
the forward line of that party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either party
tiously to Israel, Egypt and the chief coordinator of the United Na-
may fly up to the middle line of the buffer zone between E and J on
tions peacekeeping mission in the Middle East.
an agreed schedule.
(C) In the buffer zone, between line E and J there will be estab-
lished under Article IV of the Agreement an early warning system
18
19
5. LIMITATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
(A) Within the areas of limited forces and armaments (the areas
Line
Line
Port Fu'ld
Line J
Line K
between lines J and K and line E and F) the major limitations shall be
as follows:
(1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
ISRAEL
(2) Seventy-five (75) tanks
(3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mor-
tars (E. E. with caliber larger than 120 MM), whose range shall
not exceed twelve (12) KM.
Ismaile
Beffer Zame 1
+
(4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thou-
sand (8,000).
(5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area
weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
Pass
(6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K,
Libelter Zone
and between line A (Of the Disengagement Agreement of Janu-
ary 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications
Tawhig
or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.
(B) The major limitations beyond the areas of limited forces and
armament will be:
(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas
from which they can reach the other line.
SINAI
(2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an
Line
EGYPT
area of ten (10) kilometres each of line K and west of line F,
respectively.
U.N. Posts is the
Samam Faroun areao
(C) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections
in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within
Zanimah
Beffer Zene-2A
these areas.
Rudaya,
M
6. PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION
The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of
SAUDI
Buffer Zone
forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the
ARABIA
Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working
Sinai Peninsula
Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the
Disengagement Agreement
phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to
September 1975
line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installa-
tion to Egypt. This process will begin two weeks from the signature of
The summer read along the Gelf of Suaz
the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it
will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details
of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.
Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5
months after signature of the Protocol.
Miss
to
For the Government of the Arab Egyptian Republic:
For the Government of Israel
LINE E: The Egyptian line.
LINE J: The Israeli line, the lines E and J will extend 12 nautical
Witness:
miles into the Mediterranean Sea perpendicular to the direction of
the coast and the area between the lines will be a U.N. buffer zone.
LINE K: The limit of the Israeli area of limited forces and armaments.
LINE F: The limit of the Egyptian area of limited forces and arma-
ments.
20
LINE M: The line separating the Israeli-controlled area from; the
area south of line E and west of line M; and the areas of buffer
zones 2A and 2B.
B.Z-1: The buffer zone between lines E and J.
B.Z-2A: The buffer zones along the Gulf of Suez.
B.Z-2B : Road sections for common use.
E-1: Egyptian surveillance station.
J-1: Israeli surveillance station.
U.S.A.-W.S.: U.S.A. watch stations 1; 2; 3.
U.S.A.-E.S.F.: U.S.A. electronic sensor fields 1; 2; 3.
U.N. posts in the Hamam Faroun area.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 13, 1975
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
UPON SIGNING
H. J. RES. 683
THE OVAL OFFICE
2:00 P.M. EDT
I am deeply gratified today to sign this
important measure which was approved last week by an
overwhelming majority of both Houses of the Congress.
My signature reaffirms the commitment of the United States
to work toward a just and lasting peace for all nations
and all peoples in the Middle East.
The Sinai Agreement, which American civilians
will help support, is a significant step toward an overall
settlement in the Middle East. But neither the United
States nor Egypt, nor Israel see it as an end to itself.
The war in October 1973 brought home to Americans
just how dangerous another Arab-Israeli conflict would be,
not only for the people of the area but for the entire
world. It also brought home the pressing need for a just
settlement of the problems which underlie the tension
and instability in that part of the world.
As a result, for two years our Government, with
the government of the countries directly involved, has
been engaged in vigorous diplomatic efforts to promote
the prospects of peace on the basis of Security Council
Resolutions 338 and 242.
With the help and the negotiating skill of
Secretary of State Kissinger we have made great progress,
in good part because of the trust placed in the United
States by both Israel and its Arab neighbors. This
confidence must be maintained if there is to be further
FORD
progress and if the United States is to retain the mutually
beneficial relationships it has established with Israel
and the Arab states.
LIBRARY
We must continue our diplomatic efforts with the
parties in order to sustain the momentum towards peace
generated by the Sinai Agreement, and the United States
must accept the responsibilities which flow from our
stake in peace in the Middle East and from our bilateral
relationships which form the foundation for success in
our diplomatic efforts.
MORE
Page 2
I will soon consult Congress on what is required
to sustain these bilateral relationships, just as the
Administration has consulted Congress very fully over
the past month on the latest diplomatic step, including
the use of United States civilians to further the peace
process.
We anticipate the same support and understanding
by the Congress. The overall Middle East policy of the
United States is founded upon the most basic reasons of
national necessity as well as our desire to help bring
peace to a region whose peoples have suffered too much
already.
I reaffirm today that we will not accept stagnation
or stalemate in the Middle East. The participation of the
United States civilians in the Sinai early warning
system demonstrates that determination.
I appreciate very greatly the cooperation of the
Congress in this important contribution to stability and
peace.
Thank you very much.
END
(AT 2:03 P.M. EDT)
October 10, 1975
Dear Mr. Director:
The following bills were received at the White
House on October 10th:
H.J. Res. 683
H.R. 7706
H.R. 8240
Please let the President have reports and
recommendations as to the approval of these
bills as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
Robert Do Linder
Chief Executive Clerk
The Honorable James T. Lynn
Director
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D. C.
GERRED R. FORD LIBRARY
H.J. Res. 683
Ainety-fourth Congress of the United States of America
AT THE FIRST SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the fourteenth day of January,
one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five
RECEIVED
OCT 1 1975
711HM THE
Joint Resolution
To implement the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai.
Whereas an agreement signed on September 4, 1975, by the Govern-
ment of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel
may, when it enters into force, constitute a significant step toward
peace in the Middle East;
Whereas the President of the United States on September 1, 1975,
transmitted to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt
and to the Government of Israel identical proposals for United
States participation in an early-warning system, the text of which
has been submitted to the Congress, providing for the assignment
of no more than two hundred United States civilian personnel to
carry out certain specified noncombat functions and setting forth
the terms and conditions thereof;
Whereas that proposal would permit the Government of the United
States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety
is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer nec-
essary; and
Whereas the implementation of the United States proposal for the
early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compli-
ance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agree-
ments and thereby promote the cause of peace: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is
authorized to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early
Warning System in Sinai": Provided, however, That United States
civilian personnel assigned to Sinai under such proposal shall be
removed immediately in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between
Egypt and Israel or if the Congress by concurrent resolution deter-
mines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continu-
ation of their role is no longer necessary. Nothing contained in this
resolution shall be construed as granting any authority to the Presi-
dent with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not
have had in the absence of this joint resolution.
SEC. 2. Any concurrent resolution of the type described in the first
section of this resolution which is introduced in either House of Con-
gress shall be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as
a concurrent resolution of the type described in section 5(c) of Public
Law 93-148 is privileged under section 7 of such law.
SEC. 3. The United States civilian personnel participating in the
early warning system in Sinai shall include only individuals who have
volunteered to participate in such system.
SEC. 4. Whenever United States civilian personnel, pursuant to this
resolution, participate in an early warning system, the President shall,
SO long as the participation of such personnel continues, submit written
reports to the Congress periodically, but no less frequently than once
FORD is LIBRAR
H. J. Res. 683-2
every six months, on (1) the status, scope, and anticipated duration
of their participation, and (2) the feasibility of ending or reducing as
soon as possible their participation by substituting nationals of other
countries or by making technological changes. The appropriate com-
mittees of the Congress shall promptly hold hearings on each report
of the President and report to the Congress any findings, conclusions,
and recommendations.
SEC. 5. The authority contained in this joint resolution to imple-
ment the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in
Sinai" does not signify approval of the Congress of any other agree-
ment, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch.
Carlallert
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Mar ice
APPROVED
OCT 1 3 1975
Hevall R Ford Ford