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Barry N. Roth Files
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Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. National Crime Information Center. (01/1967 - 02/1992)
Presidential campaign, 1976
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The original documents are located in Box 31, folder "Selection of Vice Presidential
Candidates (2)" of the Barry N. Roth Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 31 of the Barry N. Roth Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Report of the Study Group
on Vice-Presidential Selection
SCTORD
Institute of Politics
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
June 14, 1976
Report of the Study Group
on Vice-Presidential Selection
Institute of Politics
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
June 14, 1976
08018
of
074479
Table of Contents
Report
I.
Introduction
1
II.
Standards for Selection
6
III. Parties
8
IV.
Presidential Candidates
14
V.
Background Checks
17
VI.
Media
20
Appendix
A.
Description of Study Group
24
B.
List of Study Group Members
25
C.
Press Release of May 21, 1976
26
D.
Bibliography of Materials used by Study Group
28
E.
Partial list of Persons Contacted by Study Group
35
F.
Questions on Vice-Presidential Selection for Presidential Candidates
37
G.
Background Papers Prepared by Study Group
1) Background memorandum -- Brown
38
2) Party Options for change -- Goddard
44
3) Background Checks -- Greenleaf
51
H.
Selected Comment on Vice-Presidential Selection
60
NOTE: Summary Press Release of June 14 is inserted in the front of the report.
FORD
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&
075839
ares
I. Introduction
As the 1976 election approaches, a paradoxical feature of American
Presidential politics deserves our attention. On the one hand, we select
our Presidential nominees by a process of exposure and deliberation that
grows ever more tortuous and grueling. On the other hand, we continue to
leave the designation of the Vice-Presidential contender largely to the
personal judgment of the nominee, a judgment often exercised rapidly and
in confusion in the small hours of the morning after the endorsement of
the party convention.
Although this "system" of Vice-Presidential selection has not served
the nation badly, it has been too prone to error. Two facts stand out:
First, the Vice-Presidency today is a major avenue to the
Presidency itself. Of the 38 American Presidents, 13 (more
than a third) were Vice Presidents first. Of the 13 Presidents
in this century, six were first Vice President, and they have
been President for 34 of 76 years (45 per cent). The odds are now
about one to two that the Vice President will one day become
President.
Second, recent events in both parties -- specifically the
resignation of Senator Eagleton from the Democratic ticket in
1972 and the resignation of Vice President Agnew from office in
1973 -- suggest that present selection practices contain an
inherent and unacceptable degree of risk.
-2-
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The present method of handpicking running mates after nomination has
FORD
not always been the norm in the United States. The original system gave
is
the office to the candidate who ran second in the Presidential contest.
Each Presidential elector cast two ballots; the runner-up became Vice-
President. This system brought some excellent men to the Vice-Presidency --
Adams, Jefferson, and Burr. However, the top two contenders tended to be
political rivals before -- and after -- the election. In 1804, the 12th
Amendment changed the system by providing for separate balloting for President.
and Vice President. As political parties gained strength (especially after
1831, when nomination by party conventions replaced selection by Congressional
caucuses), Vice Presidents became genuine running mates. Although this system
has tended to produce Vice-Presidential nominees who are personally and
ideologically compatible with the head of the ticket, it has also caused an
emphasis on balancing and short-run electoral calculations, rather than on
the Presidential qualities of the Vice President.
Between 1972 and 1974 an intense and thorough exploration of alternative
methods of Vice-Presidential selection took place. At this time, members
of the press, television, academia, and the parties discussed in detail the
merits and limitations of such proposals as separate primaries (or even
separate elections) for Vice-Presidential candidates; announcement of
possible Vice-Presidential choices by Presidential contenders early in their
campaign for nomination; selection of Vice-Presidential nominees by the
party conventions themselves; selection by the conventions (or by "mini-
conventions" established by them) from lists submitted by Presidential
contenders or by the nominee; rearrangement of the convention's order of
business to allow more time for deliberation about the Vice-Presidential
choice; abolition of the Vice-Presidency itself; and more.
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For a time, alternative approaches to Vice-Presidential selection
received sustained and careful consideration. Hearings and discussions
were conducted by the Democratic Party's Commission on Vice-Presidential
Selection, chaired by Senator Humphrey, and by Subcommittee 2 of the Rule
29 Committee of the Republican National Committee. Unfortunately, interest
in the question has gradually subsided, and the momentum for change appears
to have been lost.
Democratic National Chairman Robert Strauss recently explained to
reporters that:
"We have a very poor system for choosing our Vice-Presidents.
FORD
I regret we didn't do something about it. We're not going to do a
">
damn thing to avoid it (another Eagleton affair) except a wing and
a prayer."
Similarly, Kent B. McGough, Chairman of the Rules Committee of the
Republican National Committee, said:
"We've received a large number of letters indicating concern
that changes in the selection process be made. And we intend to discuss
it fully. But it's going to be very difficult to make any changes for
this year. Maybe 1980.'
We do not believe that this state of affairs is inevitable. We take
the view that rational discussion and exploration of alternatives should be
continued, and that increased public attention to methods of Vice-Presidential
selection is itself a necessary first step toward improvement. This report
does not attempt a thorough evaluation of the pros and cons of the wide
range of proposals that have been endorsed in one quarter or another.
Instead, having considered these proposals in some detail and having inter-
viewed many experts and key actors, we set forth and defend those proposals
that we think most worthy of adoption, in hopes of influencing the way the
-4-
Vice-Presidential nominees are selected in 1976 and of improving the process
further before 1980. We explicitly avoid, at this stage, suggestions
involving constitutional amendment, change in the electoral system, or a
redefinition of the responsibilities of a Vice President.
Our general objective is to suggest a set of procedures more likely
than the present ones to assure selection of Vice Presidents competent
to assume the Presidency itself. Our point of departure is not that the
present approach has worked poorly on the whole, but rather that it is
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2001
inherently risky. We grant that no Presidential nominee would knowingly
choose a running mate unfit to hold the highest office. However, we are
skeptical that the present system is adequately self-correcting or that
we can simply trust future Presidential nominees to exercise "exquisite
care" in choosing running mates in the absence of procedural reform.
The key fact, we think, is that under present arrangements, information
about prospective running mates has been, and is likely to continue to be,
far too limited. By "information" we mean both factual details about the
background, activities, and pronouncements of contenders, and political
evaluations from the perspective of major elements of party and public.
The premise of our recommendations is that the volume of factual and political
information about potential Vice Presidents, and the opportunities available
to public, media, candidates, and parties to deliberate upon this
information, should be increased. Attaining this goal calls for procedural
and institutional change which goes beyond the Presidential nominees'
own exquisite care. In short, we believe that the selection of Vice Presidents
should receive a higher priority and should be more open and responsive to
the public. Such change will tend to counter the waning public confidence
in the political process and to affirm the belief of the American people
in their governmental leadership.
-5-
The recommendations advanced in this report are complementary and
mutually reinforcing, dependent upon various sets of participants in the
process fulfilling key roles on a largely voluntary basis by assuming
responsibilities which we believe are both sensible and feasible. We have
attempted to define the process as an integrated whole. No single mechanism
can be designed or imposed to rationalize the process of Vice-Presidential
selection by itself. No single organization or set of actors can complete
the task. We do not believe that radical changes are desirable or workable;
our analysis has led us to the conclusion that many proposals which look
attractive in the abstract upon close perusal add significant liabilities
to the process. We feel strongly, for instance, that the predominant role
of the Presidential candidate in the selection of a running mate should be
protected.
We address, therefore, the practical roles which the parties, the
candidates themselves, and the media can usefully and quickly play. Our
recommendations recognize the inherently pluralistic and democratic
character of the process, and we believe their non-dramatic nature makes
them more rather than less compelling.
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ones
AMERICA
II. Standards for Selection
President Ford said in May that 11 It is traditional in America that
the two parties try to balance a ticket for President and Vice President as
to geography, as to philosophy, as to personality," and he also stated the
need for "some personal compatibility, a comfortable relationship" in his
running mate. In March, Jimmy Carter included compatibility and balancing
in listing criteria for selecting his Vice-Presidential nominee, and
claimed the first and most important requirement "is who would be the best
person to lead this country if something should happen to me."
We suspect that most Americans would agree to both of two simple
propositions: 1) that the primary standard in selecting a Vice President
should be competence to be President; and 2) that the standard more often
employed in selection is some form of political balancing -- geographical,
religious, ideological, etc. Some would argue that because the first duty
of a politician is to get elected, competence in a Vice-Presidential
nominee is bound to be considered only within constraints imposed by short-
term electoral reality; and that the running mate is above all a political
instrument selected with the purpose of countering or avoiding potential
deficiencies in the ticket.
We believe that neither of these propositions is as straightforward
as it appears at first glance; nor do we find competence and electoral
utility as incompatible as is sometimes suggested. We recognize that
strong short-term political needs -- for regional balance, to heal party
divisions, to prevent the Presidential nominee from being upstaged, and
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the like -- may detract from competence as the main criterion.
However, the selection of a running mate with the purpose of maximizing
the popular vote, securing key blocs in the electoral college and creating
a sense of representation and legitimacy among various population elements --
therefore enabling an administration to govern effectively, is a valuable
aspect of the political process. We doubt, moreover, that close inspection
of recent cases of Vice-Presidential selection would support the contention
that "balancing" was determinative of the choice, and that considerations
of competence were set aside.
Recommendation:
1.
Competence in Vice-Presidential selection should be the primary
standard and balancing can be a secondary factor -- the two are
neither naturally exclusive nor naturally contradictory.
The universe of prominent American politicians is, like the American
population it represents, large and heterogeneous. It is implausible
that the dictates of short-term political balance are so compelling, and
the available set of high-quality political figures so limited, that a
Presidential nominee need be forced to sacrifice competency to campaign
victory in a possible successor. Moreover, the way in which a Presidential
nominee responds in naming a running mate will depend in. large part on
how the question is posed by the public, the media, and the parties. If
these participants insist on a concentration on competence, on extensive
information, and on careful deliberation by themselves and by the candidate --
and if they take procedural steps to secure this approach -- the political
utility of a concern with the Presidential qualifications of Vice-Presidential
nominees is bound to increase.
III. Parties
The political parties are capable of an essential role they are not
now filling in the reform of Vice-Presidential selection procedures. A set
of simple and practical changes in the nominating process could be made
by the parties which would strengthen the chances of informed and respon-
sible choice. By undertaking modest but useful reforms, the national
parties can not only improve Vice-Presidential selection, but also
strengthen their own relevance and influence in a period unhappily
marked by party decline.
As it is now, both parties treat Vice-Presidential selection as a
low-priority matter, an afterthought unworthy of serious preparation.
Both parties have considered ways to improve selection methods since the
1972 conventions, but neither has actually changed its procedures. Their
attitude now seems to be either that time has run out for 1976, or that
the need for change has subsided-- even though, as Senator Humphrey said
in
1973, " the interests of the people of the United States require
reform in this field by both parties before the 1976 conventions."
Two options for party change that we considered carefully but rejected
are proposals for an open convention, where the convention chooses the
nominee by itself, and a "partially open" convention, with the decision
made by the convention from a short list of preferred choices provided by
the nominee. Both of these proposals mean an increased role for the con-
vention delegates and a decreased role for the Presidential candidate.
Neither assures reduced risks of faulty selection. A selection by open
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convention does not mean that more care is spent in selection. Yet
there is a better chance that this method would choose a Vice President
incompatible with the Presidential nominee, and would increase party
factionalism rather than serve as a means of party unity. A "partially
open" convention avoids incompatibility, but limits the flexibility of
the nominee, invites party factionalism, and denies the convention full
freedom of choice. This is clearly the worst of both worlds.
Another device for selecting the Vice-Presidential nominee that has
received attention is for a "mini-convention", constituted by the National
Committee membership, to be held perhaps two weeks after the national
convention adjourns. The Democrats used this method in 1972 to designate
Sargent Shriver after the resignation of Senator Eagleton from the ticket,
and there are advantages to it. Delaying the choice provides plenty of
time for consultation, background checks, and priority deliberation. On
balance, however, we are more persuaded by the disadvantages of a mini-
convention approach. The choice has less legitimacy if it is ratified by
a smaller representative group; the function of the Vice-Presidential
nomination at the convention as a conciliatory and rallying point for
the various factions is diluted; and the ticket's chances might be hurt
by a delayed beginning and a decreased media impact for the campaign
itself.
The recommendations we are making require action by both parties at
the 1976 conventions. They involve 1) changes that can be made in time
to affect this year's choices, and 2) changes to be mandated this year
LIBRAN
FORD
BERALD
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to take effect in 1980. * In the first category, we propose procedural
changes to take effect at the 1976 conventions in the form of amend-
ments to the temporary rules of the convention: adoption of general
resolutions stating the importance of Vice-Presidential selection and
the necessity of change; amendments to the convention rules rearranging
the convention schedule to provide more time for selection; and formation
of an advisory group to contribute formally to the consultative process.
In the second category, we propose changes which would be mandated for
1980 by resolutions adopted at the 1976 conventions: the rearrangement
of the convention schedule and the establishment of a formal advisory
committee, again, and, in addition, the adoption of a resolution urging
specific action for Presidential candidates before the next convention.
Recommendations:
2. The conventions of both the Democratic and Republican Parties should
adopt resolutions which state the importance of Vice-Presidential
selection, encourage the candidates and parties to give the process
the time and care needed for responsible selection, and affirm an
intention to improve the selection process.
3. The parties should rearrange the convention schedule, placing Credentials
and Rules Committees' reports in the first session, Presidential nom-
ination in the second, consideration of the Platform in the third, and
Vice-Presidential nomination in the final session.
*
Under party rules the process for change--for 1976 and for 1980--begins
in the Rules Committees of their National Committees, which meet before
the conventions and make recommendations on the rules. In the Demo-
cratic Party, these recommendations are made directly to the Convention.
In the Republican Party, they are made to the National Committee, then
to the Convention Rules Committee, which then presents recommendations
to the Convention.
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The purpose of this change is to increase the time between the nomination
of the Presidential nominee and the selection of a Vice-Presidential choice.
More time would allow the nominees and their staffs to put more care and
deliberation into the final choice, with opportunity for more thorough
and extensive consultation.
Arguments against rearrangement of the convention schedule focus on
movement of the platform debates to the day following the Presidential
nomination. Some assert that the conciliatory function of the platform
decisions may be impaired if they occur after the Presidential nomination,
and that the platform might reflect the nominee more than the broad-based
party, conceivably making it more difficult for some factions to support.
On the other hand, equally plausible is the argument that the first instinct
of a successful candidate upon receiving the nomination is to move toward
unifying the party. By this logic the platform would become an instrument
of conciliation rather than of division, an effect which frequently occurs
when platform issues become a pre-nomination test of strength. Furthermore,
it might well be advantageous for the platform to be approved after the
nomination because it would better reflect the nominee's position and thus
be taken more seriously. The public tends to be skeptical of all platforms;
rearrangement might give the platform greater credibility.
It is also argued that this schedule change would be anti-climactic,
increasing the difficulty of retaining an interested television audience.
We do not feel that this argument is strong enough to outweigh the advantages
of a shift in schedule. Indeed, since the major thrust of our recommendations
is to place more emphasis upon Vice-Presidential selection, one concomitant
of rearranging the convention schedule could be the building of suspense
by the national media around the Vice-Presidential nomination.
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4. The parties should each establish a formal party consultative mechanism,
an advisory committee, to assist the party and the Presidential candidate
in the selection of the Vice-Presidential candidate.
The purposes of an advisory mechanism are to insure that there is
preparation and deliberation on the subject of Vice-Presidential choice
before the convention, to widen the process of consultation that the nominee
employs, and to provide information and advice on potential Vice-Presidential
candidates to the nominee. A consultative process conducted by a party
advisory committee can strengthen the party role while retaining the
Presidential nominee's dominance in selection. Such a committee would
be formed and begin meeting with appropriate staff and resources before
the convention. It would compile a list of possible Vice-Presidential
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candidates, and conduct research into backgrounds and issue positions.
FORD
After nomination of the Presidential candidate, the group would be avail-
able immediately to meet with the nominee and to share the results of its
work. Its advice would in no way be binding, but the participation of
a formal consultative group would increase discussion of Vice-Presidential
possibilities among representatives of major party elements.
5. The party advisory committees should request a list of preferred
Vice-Presidential running mates from serious contenders for the
Presidential nomination.
By combining the lists from several prospective nominees, the advisory
committee would generate an extensive group of potential Vice-Presidential
candidates, drawn from all segments of the party. The breadth of pre-
convention consideration undertaken by the advisory committee might pay
special dividends should the advance planning of the eventual nominee
prove to be inadequate or mooted by events at the convention itself. This
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recommendation also encourages the Presidential candidates to begin serious
staff work on Vice-Presidential selection before the conventions. To make
it effective, the parties should encourage their candidates to produce
a meaningful list and to make their final choice from it.
&
#301
GERRIC
R.
GHOS
IV. Presidential Candidates
Traditionally, the Presidential nominees make the actual designation
of a Vice-Presidential nominee. The nominees are the crucial factor in the
selection process; their choices may be brilliant or potentially disastrous,
not only for the political chances of the ticket, but for the country.
The Presidential candidates should therefore take the initiative for
procedural change, especially if effective action is to take place in the
short time before the 1976 conventions. The candidates are in the best
position to give the process the priority and care that it deserves, and
should be held accountable for the choice of a Vice-Presidential candidate.
In urging special responsibilities in Vice-Presidential selection on
the Presidential candidate, along with recommendations affecting other
participants in the process, we seek to strengthen and protect their role
rather than to diminish it. If their responsibility is to remain a
commanding one, however, it should be carried out with a greater commitment
of time and effort than has generally characterized past behavior, beginning
well before nomination rather than immediately following it.
Recommendations:
6.
The Presidential candidates should have their staffs begin work on
Vice-Presidential selection as early as possible in their campaigns
and no later than the final round of primaries: developing lists of
potential candidates, conducting background research, and consulting
broadly for suggestions.
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7.
The candidates should discuss publicly the criteria to be used in
the selection of a running mate, and are urged to emphasize competence
to be President as the primary factor.
8.
The candidates should make public a list of serious preferences for
the Vice-Presidency before the convention, in order to facilitate
BERRL
media and public examination; and they are encouraged to initiate
direct contact and staff liaison with potential running mates.
LIBRARY
FORD
The greatest weakness in the present system is the fact that whereas
the Presidential candidates go through months of exposure and arduous
campaign work before coming to the convention, the Vice-Presidential
candidate is often unknown, both to the public and to the nominee. When the
Vice-Presidential candidate happens to be chosen from the ranks of candidates
actively contesting the primaries, there is much less of a problem, but
this cannot be guaranteed. This recommendation is an attempt to correct
this weakness in the system without challenging the nominee's prerogative
to make the choice.
There are disadvantages to making up preferential lists prior to the
convention. Such a list is likely to involve tactical inconveniences for
the candidate, and to promote political balancing of an opportunistic sort
as names are included from various constituencies simply in order to
garner electoral support, not because they are likely to be chosen. List-
making before the convention can also limit flexibility by committing the
candidate to certain choices before the events of the convention unfold.
But we feel these difficulties do not compete with the benefits of opening
up the process to the public and the media.
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9.
The candidates should help develop party reform of Vice-Presidential
selection, be ready to support a party consultative process, and
recommend a change in the convention schedule.
GERALD
R.
FORD
V. Background Checks
The question of background checks on prospective Vice-Presidential
candidates is characterized by uncertainty and controversy. Many believe
that they would not be worth the risks involved, including possible
violation of privacy, abuse of confidential information, lack of credibility,
and misrepresentation.
The study group believes that a thorough examination of a Vice-Presidential
candidate's personal and political background, now lacking, is a desirable
component of the overall process. Informal research and exposure by the
press, advance investigation by the Presidential candidate's staff, and
the considerations of a party advisory committee prior to the convention
are all essential functions. But by themselves they do not insure adequate
efficiency and objectivity. The media may do a spotty job, or may be unable
to commit enough resources to insure thorough coverage of the candidate
eventually selected. As a practical matter the Presidential candidate's
staff may not have adequate time or freedom to penetrate deeply enough in
its investigation. A party consultative committee is likely at some point
to encounter doubts about how much potentially unflattering material it wants
to gather on leaders from within its own ranks. These difficulties lead
us to conclude that something more is needed.
The F.B.I. undertakes background investigations on a continuing basis
to provide information regarding Presidential appointments, and prior to
the granting of clearances to permit access by public officials to class-
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ified information. The F.B.I conducted background investigations for the
two Congressional Committees responsible under the XXV Amendment for
GERLL
recommending to the House and Senate the nominations of Gerald Ford and
Nelson Rockefeller to the Vice-Presidency. In these cases, controls were
set up to assure the confidentiality of the information gathered, which
proved effective. It may be that under the existing statutory authority a
system could be established for an F.B.I. background investigation of
potential Vice-Presidential candidates, similar to those completed for
hundreds of appointed public officials. Such information checks would
not involve screening, ranking or judgments of the candidates on the part
of the F.B.I. The results of the investigations could be made available
under careful controls to the Presidential nominee only. There are various
ways to design a workable system, assuming adequate lead-time, the willing-
ness of the prospective Presidential candidates to provide lists of
preferred running mates, the permission of the prospective Vice-Presidential
candidates themselves to be investigated, and the cooperation of the
President and/or the Attorney General. Thus, immediately after nomination,
the Presidential nominee could be provided with useful material to help in
selection.
Yet there are a number of legitimate questions about such an arrangement:
Isn't this too much of a "political " burden to be placed on the F.B.I.?
Should the F.B.I. be invited into the electoral process? Is there a
danger that too much might be expected of the F.B.I. check in terms of
"clearing" a potential candidate? Why shouldn't Presidential candidates
likewise be checked out? What real guarantees are there against abuse of
confidential information? These questions are valid, and any process of
background checks must be accomplished with a maximum of understanding,
support, and credibility. Otherwise the cost will be greater than the
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benefit, and we would be better off without it. It is this belief that
leads us to the conclusion that a systematic check for Vice-Presidential
candidates should not be undertaken by administrative action and loose
agreement among the interested parties, but only by way of the legislative
process. This would assure adequate deliberation -- solicitation of views
through public hearings, careful analysis by Committee staff, open debate
in both houses of Congress, and the chance for Presidential approval of a
new statute.
Recommendation:
10. The House and Senate bipartisan leadership should set as a high
priority consideration of legislation authorizing appropriate back-
ground investigations to be conducted by the F.B.I. on prospective
Vice-Presidential candidates, under timely and fair arrangements and
with effective controls against violations of privacy. and misuse of
sensitive information.
*
*One version of legislation seeking to accomplish these goals is S.2741,
originally introduced in the 93rd Congress, on November 26,1973, by
Senator William Brock (R-Tenn.)
BERALD
R.
FORD
AMVUSIN
VI. Media
If the Vice-Presidential selection process is awkward, fragile, and
perilous, to what extent can the media, in its various roles as reporter,
investigator, and opinion leader, improve this unsatisfactory situation?
In reporting and analyzing the words and actions of Vice-Presidential
candidates, the press in recent years has done a creditable job. Often it
has been a story in search of a reader, overshadowed by the excitement of
the Presidential race. There also has been a remarkable amount of attention
paid to Vice-Presidential selection reform. Understandably, much of this
coverage has surfaced in the aftermath of crisis. A number of stories and
at least one television documentary analyzing the hazards of the current
selection procedures appeared in the days following the resignation of
Senator Thomas Eagleton as Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate in 1972
and the resignation of Vice President Agnew in 1973, but such coverage
tends to be after the fact and to die out.
In 1976, coverage of national candidates has been the most comprehensive
ever. With a mindboggling 30 Presidential primaries and more than 20
candidates with a potential national constituency, more reporters have been
assigned, more television specials aired, and more money spent by news
organizations in following the races than ever before. That professional
and financial commitment will continue through the fall. But coverage of
the campaign itself -- the politics and personalities -- is not enough.
The press should earmark a substantial slice of its resources toward
calling attention to the inequities and foibles of the present selection
-20-
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BERALD R. FORD
system and toward covering prospective Vice-Presidential candidates.
The candidates and the political parties have the major responsibility
and power to effect the desired changes. But columnists and editorial
writers should recommend reforms, and call on the candidates themselves to
support the improvements.
As a practical matter, many of the needed reforms will take time to
carry out. The urgency of the ongoing campaigns and the uncertainty of the
outcome leaves the unfortunate possibility that, once again, the selection
of running mates will be a last-minute decision. In that event, it will be
more crucial than ever for reporters to dig deeply into the backgrounds
and public records of the candidates, acting as a supplement to a highly
imperfect selection procedure. To the extent that potential contenders for
the second slot can be identified and examined in advance, the process will
be improved.
Recommendations:
11. The press should remind the public of the past failings of the
Vice-Presidential selection process and encourage candidates and parties
to make changes.
12. The media should persistently question candidates about their plans
and preparation for selecting running mates, encouraging sufficient
advance work and discussion of the standards on which their choice
of a running mate will be based.
13. On the assumption that the Vice-Presidential candidates may again
result from a helter-skelter eleventh hour selection process, the
press should commit reporters, time, and funds to extensive coverage
-22-
and investigation of potential running mates before the convention,
including interviews plus in-depth reporting on issues and backgrounds.
14. The networks ought to prepare now for a "special" or series of
programs on "The Vice-Presidential Candidates, 1976".
15. The media should plan comprehensive coverage of the Vice-Presidential
nominees after the conventions.
Appendix
A.
Description of Study Group
24
B.
List of Study Group Members
25
C.
Press Release of May 21, 1976
26
D.
Bibliography of Materials used by Study Group
28
E.
Partial List of Persons contacted by Study Group
35
F.
Questions on Vice-Presidential Selection for Presidential Candidates
37
G.
Background Papers Prepared by Study Group
1) Background memorandum -- Brown
38
2) Party options for change -- Goddard
44
3) Background checks -- Greenleaf
51
H.
Selected Comment on Vice-Presidential Selection
60
FORD i LIBRARY BERALD
-23-
-24-
Appendix A
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
INSTITUTE OF POLITICS
78 Mount Auburn Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
617-495-5792
Description of
The Institute of Politics
Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection
Faculty Study Groups of the Institute of Politics, John Fitzgerald
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, are organized to examine
applied problems in government and politics. They are comprised both of
academic faculty and practitioners, and are designed to make their analysis
and recommendations available to public officials to whom such information
might be helpful.
The Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection was set up in February
of 1976 to examine process and standards in Vice-Presidential selection, in
order to develop recommendations for improvement affecting the decisions in
1976 and including changes to be put into effect for 1980. The group expli-
citly did not address long-term changes which would involve major electoral
reform or Constitutional amendment, nor did it study the nature of the job
of Vice President.
Four formal meetings were held, and research, interviewing, and
drafting assignments were undertaken individually and in smaller groups
throughout the four-month period. The group began its work by reviewing
and analyzing extensive literature on the subject including a wide range
of proposals for reform; continued by interviewing academic experts on the
subject, individuals with significant past experience, and principal actors
in current electoral effort; and concluded with the preparation of its own
analysis and recommendations.
The study group's report will be cistributed among the media, party and
campaign officials, and political scientists as an agent itself for higher
priority, public exposure, and constructive change in Vice-Presidential
selection.
June, 1976
SERVICE
-25-
Appendix B
Members of the Institute of Politics Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection
Christopher Arterton
Assistant Professor of Political Science,
Yale University
Timothy A. Barrow
Fellow, Institute of Politics; formerly
Major of Phoenix, Arizona
Lawrence D. Brown
Assistant Professor of Government,
Harvard University
Eugene Carlson
Fellow, Nieman Foundation, Harvard
University; formerly Economics
Reporter, U.P.I. Washington Bureau;
Vice-President Humphrey's 1968
Campaign Staff.
Barney Frank
State Representative,
Boston, Massachusetts
K. Dun Gifford
Vice President for Urban Affairs,
Cabot, Cabot and Forbes; formerly
Chairman of Common Cause/Massachusetts;
formerly Legislative Assistant to
Senator Edward Kennedy.
Elizabeth Goddard
Staff, Institute of Politics.
(Rapporteur of the Study Group)
Charles Greenleaf
MPA Program, John Fitzgerald
Kennedy School of Government;
formerly Legislative Assistant
to Governor Milliken of Michigan.
Ira Jackson
Special Assistant to the Director,
Institute of Politics; formerly
Administrative Assistant to
Major Kevin White of Boston
Jonathan Moore
Director, Institute of Politics
(Chairman of the Study Group)
FORD
LIBRARY
&
GERALD
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Appendix C
News Office
1976-71
Harvard University
Holyoke Center 1000
Cambridge, Ma. 02138
Tel. 617-495-1585
Mrs. Deane W. Lord, Director
May 18, 1976
FOR RELEASE: Friday, May 21, 1976
Harvard University's Institute of Politics announced today that ito Study Group
on Vice-Presidential Selection will release practical recommendations" for select-
ing this year's Vice-Presidential candidates shortly after the June 8 state primary
elections.
Jonathan Moore, Director of the Institute and Chairman of the Studv Group,
stated, "We will be making some formal proposals involving changes in party role
and convention rules affecting the 1976-80 period. The basic thrust of our work,
however, is to determine what can be done to encourage a more responsible process
in the selection of the Democratic and Republican Vice-Presidential candidates in
the current year."
Mr. Moore added., "The group was set up under the assumption that the current
system for choosing Vice-Presidents is not deliberate, reliable, or efficient
enough. It is too prone to error."
The project was announced on February 11. In addition to Mr. Moore, the group
includes: Christopher Arterton, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale
University; Timothy A. Barrow, Fellow, Institute of Politics, Formerly Mayor of
Phoenix, Arizona; Lawrence D. Brown, Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard
University: Eugene Carlson, Fellow, Nieman Foundation, Economics reporter, United
Press International; Barney Frank, Massachusetts State Representative; K. Dun
Gifford, Vice-President for Urban Affairs, Cabot, Cabot, & Forbes, formerly Chairman
fo Common Cause/Massachusetts and Legislative Assistant to Senator Edward Kennedy;
Charles Greenleaf, MPA Program, John Γ. Kennedy School of Government, formerly
Legislative Assistant to Governor Milliken of Michigan; Ira Jackson, Special Assist-
ant to the Institute Director, formerly Special Assistant to Mayor Kevin White of
Boston. Elizabeth Goddard, of the Institute staff, is the group's reporter.
The Study Group on Vice-Presidential selection reviewed and analyzed earlier
studies, recommendations, and other literature on the subject. Members of the
group interviewed numerous party officials, 1976 potential Presidential candidates,
and staff, political scientists, and media specialists in the course of their work.
"Despite the strong possibility that the Vice-President will scmeday become
President and the great need for him or her to be competent to fill the responsi-
bilities of the office, there is too little priority given to how we make the
choice," Mr. Moore said.
more
DO
-27-
"Yet workable alternatives to the present system are difficult to come by, and
many ideas for change carry greater costs than benefits. We have been concentrat-
ing on designing roles for the parties, for the candidates, and for the media.
Basically, we seek workable ways to improve the process, including greater
consultation and more thorough background information. At least at this stage,
our group is not examining the kind of long-term reform that would involve either
Constitutional or statutory change."
--end--
-28-
Appendix D
Bibliography of Materials Used by Study Group
Agnew, Spiro, "Veep on Veeps", New York Times, Aug. 23, 1972, p. 41.
Anderson, Jack, and Whitten, Les, "Change Suggested in Selecting No.
2", The Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1975.
Bailey, Stephen K., Statement to the Commission on Vice Presidential
Selection, Democratic National Committee, Nov. 7, 1973.
Barzman, Sol, Madmen and Genuises, (Chicago, Jollett Publishing
Company), 1974.
Broder, David, "Democrats Eye 2nd Convention for No. 2 Spot",
The Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1973.
Broder, David, "Democrats Scrap Plan to Pick VPs", The Washington
Post Feb. 15, 1974.
Broder, David, "The Problem of Picking No. 2," The Washington Post,
Oct. 21, 1973.
Brownfeld, Allan C., "Choosing a Vice President", Roll Call,
Nov. 1, 1973.
Canham, Erwin D., "Horse Sheds and Reforms", Christian Science
Monitor, Aug. 14, 1972. p. 14.
Cannon, Lou, "GOP to Shift on Selecting No. 2 Man", The Washington
Post, April 28, 1974.
Childs, Marquis, "Nation Needs a Better Way to Choose VP's",
The Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1973.
Coleman, William, Letter to Senator Hubert Humphrey, Aug. 23, 1973.
Cronin, Thomas, "Does the U.S. Really Need a Vice President?"
Center Report, VIII, Oct. 1975.
David, Paul T., Goldman, Ralph M., and Bain, Richard C., The
Politics of National Party Conventions (Washington, Brookings)
1960, pp. 56-59, 135-138, 433-435.
David, Paul T., Goldman, Ralph M., and Moos, Malcolm, The National
Story (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press) 1953, pp. 229-231.
-29-
FORD
LICENSE
8.
07VH39
Davis, James, W., National Conventions, (Woodbury, N. Y., Barron's
Educational Series) 1972.
Democratic National Committee, Commission on Vice Presidential
Selection, Excerpts from Hearing Book.
"Democratic Proposals for Choosing Vice Presidents", Congressional
Quarterly, December 15, 1973, p. 3290.
"Democrats Assay Vice-Presidency", New York Times, Dec. 15, 1973.
"Democrats Focus on Vice President", New York Times, Dec. 16, 1973.
DiSalle, Michael V., Second Choice (New York, Hawthorne Books Inc.,)
1966.
Donovan, Robert J., "There Must Be a Better Way to Pick Vice-Pres-
idents", Los Angeles Times, July 31, 1972.
Eizenstat, Stuart, "Memorandum on Alternative Possibilities of
Vice-Presidential Selection", Congressional Record, October
16, 1973.
Esch, Marvin, "Meaningful Reform", Congressional Record, Aug. 2, 1974.
Esch Plan: Name Field for V.P. Nominee Before Convention", Republican
Congressional Campaign Newsletter, March 11, 1974.
Etridge, John, "Nation's No. 2: Is He Always Second Best?", Los Angeles
Times, Oct. 28, 1973.
Friedman, Saul, "Talk about Reforms in V-P Pick Fizzles" Detroit Free
Press, March 21, 1976.
Fritchey, Clayton, "The Perpetual Whirl Over Veeps", Washington Post,
Aug. 5, 1972.
Gallup Poll, Method of Selection of Vice Presidents, 1972.
Gardner, John, Letter to Senator Hubert Humphrey, Sept. 14, 1973.
"G.O.P. Hopefuls Urged to List No. 2 Choices", New York Times, Aug.
13, 1972, p. 39.
Griffin, Robert, "A New Method for Selecting Vice Presidents",
Congressional Record, Oct. 23, 1973.
Griffin, Robert, "On Choosing Vice Presidents", Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 13, 1973.
-30-
"Griffin to Propose Halting Election of Vice Presidents", New York
Times, October 23, 1973.
Hamilton, Lee H., "Washington Report: Choosing Vice Presidents,"
Congressional Record, Dec. 12, 1973.
Hatch, Louis Clinton, A History of the Vice-Presidency of the United
States, (New York, The American Historical Society, Inc.) 1934.
Herzberg, Donald G., Statement before the Commission on Selection of
the Democratic Nominee for Vice President, Nov. 7, 1973.
Holmberg, David, "Taft Hits Vice President Selection Setup", Washington
Star, Aug. 4, 1972.
Hope, Paul, "Picking a Clean Candidate", Washington Star-News, Oct.
15, 1973.
"How to Choose a Veep", Washington Star, Aug. 18, 1972, p. A-16.
"How to Pick a Veep", National Review, September 15, 1972, pp. 994-995.
Humphrey, Hubert H., "Changes in the Vice Presidency", Current History,
Aug., 1974, p. 58.
Humphrey, Hubert H., "Hearings of the Vice Presidential Selection
Commission of the Democratic National Commission", Congressional
Record, Oct. 16, 1973.
Humphrey, Hubert H., "How Should We Select Our Vice Presidential
Nominees?", Congressional Record, Dec. 11, 1973.
Humphrey, Hubert H., "How the President Can Help Improve Vice Presidential
Selection", Congressional Record, Dec. 21, 1973.
Hyneman, Charles, Remarks before the Commission on Selection of Vice
Presidential Nominees, Democratic National Committee.
Keech, William R; Matthews, Donald R., The Party's Choice, (Washington,
D.C., The Brookings Institution), 1976.
Kohler, Saul, "Ford to let F.B.I. aid nominee" Boston Globe, May 30, 1976.
Lawrence, David, "The People's Voice In Picking a Vice-Presidential
Nominee", U.S. News and World Report, Aug. 14, 1972, p. 80.
-31-
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
Lincoln, Gould, "Selecting Vice Presidents", Washington Star, Nov. 3, 1973.
Linde, Hans, Letter to Joseph Califano, Sept. 7, 1973.
Linde, Hans, Letter to Nathan Polsby, July 13, 1973.
Linde, Hans, Memorandum to Oregon Democratic Party Officers, "Method
of Selecting the Democratic Vice Presidential Nominee".
Loeb, James I., "On Nominating a Vice President", The Washington Post,
Jan. 27, 1974.
McCarthy, Eugene J., "The Crown Prince", New York Times, Aug. 17,
1972, p. 35.
Meyer, Lawrence, "Making of the Vice President: A Process Without
Rules", Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1973.
Moe, Ronald C., "The Vice President as an American Crown Prince",
Washington Star, Aug. 20, 1972.
Naming Vice Presidents: Efforts to Improve System", Congressional
Quarterly, Jan. 12, 1974, p. 48.
"On Picking Vice Presidents", Chicago Tribune, Aug. 12, 1972, p. 1-10.
Otten, Alan L., "Sorting Out a Role for the Veep", Wall Street Journal,
Aug. 1, 1972.
Parris, Judith H., The Convention Problem, (Washington, D. C., The
Brookings Institution) 1972.
"Party Gets 2 Plans for Vice-President", New York Times, Dec. 4, 1973.
Peabody, Endicott, "Let People Pick Vice President", Chicago Tribune,
May 13, 1972.
Perry, James M., "At Last, a Better Way to Pick a Veep", Congressional
Record, November 15, 1973.
Polsby, Nelson W. and Wildavsky, Aaron B., Presidential Elections:
Strategies of American Electoral Politics, 2nd e. (New York,
Charles Scribner's Sons), 1968, pp. 103-108.
-32-
Pomper, Gerald, Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention
Choice (New York, W.W. Norton and Co., Inc.) 1966, pp. 174-181.
Pomper, Gerald, Letter to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Aug. 20, 1973.
Radway, Lawrence, Statement before the Commission of Vice Presidential
Selection, Democratic National Committee, New Hampshire hearing,
Sept. 25, 1973.
Rauh, Joseph L., Jr., "Choosing Vice Presidents: Something Is Amiss",
Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1974.
Reston, James, "All Due Reverent Speed", Washington Star News, Oct. 12,
1973.
"Revision Due in Vice Presidential Selection", Los Angeles Times, Aug.
7, 1972, p. II-6.
The Ripon Society, The Lessons of Victory (New York, The Dial Press)
1969.
"Role of the Vice Presidency: On Choosing a Vice President", tran-
script of CBS News Special Report, Aug. 6, 1972, reprinted in
Current, No. 144, Oct. 1972, pp. 49-52.
Rule 29 Committee Report, Republican National Committee. (excerpt, p. 22)
"Selecting a Veep", Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 9, 1972, p. 14.
Sheldon, Courtney R., "How to Pick Vice Presidents", Christian Science
Monitor, July 28, 1972, p. 1.
Sidney, Hugh, "The Horse-Shedding of Hubert Humphrey), Life, August
11, 1972, p. 12.
Slocum, Charles A., "Statement on Vice Presidential Selection,"
February 26, 1976.
Spero, Sterling D., "Three Ways to Reform the Booby Prize", New York
Times, Nov. 8, 1973.
Strout, Richard L., "America's Roulette", Christian Science Monitor,
Aug. 18, 1972, p. 14.
Summary of the Vice Presidential Selection Commission Executive
Committee Meeting, Democratic National Committee, July 23, 1973.
Summary of the Boston Hearing, Vice Presidential Selection Commission,
Democratic National Committee, Sept. 26, 1973.
-33-
ter Horst, Jerald "Let's try harder to fill No. 2 spot", Chicago Tribune,
March 21, 1976.
"There Must be a Better Way to Choose", Time, Aug. 7, 1972, p. 19.
"The Vice Presidency", Washington Star-News, Oct. 15, 1973.
Tompkins, Dorothy Campbell, Selection of the Vice President: Public
Policy Bibliography to Institute of Governmental Studies, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, 1974.
Ungar, Sanford J. F.B.I. (Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press) 1975.
"Vice President System is Supported by Agnew", New York Times,
August 3, 1972, p. 21.
"Vice Presidential Candidates", Washington Star, Dec. 31, 1973.
"Vice Presidential Reform", Chicago Tribune, Nov. 12, 1972, p. 24.
"Vice Presidential Selection: Looking for New Ways", Congressional
Quarterly June 23, 1973, p. 1631.
Viorst, Milton, "Challenge to Selection Procedures", Washington Star,
July 29, 1972.
Viorst, Milton, "Picking Vice-Presidents", Washington Star-News, Oct.
23, 1973.
Walters, Robert, "Democrats Eye Panel to Select Vice Presidency",
Washington Star-News, Dec. 14, 1973.
Weaver, Warren, "Eagleton Episode Stirs Reform Tide", Washington Star,
Aug. 7, 1972.
Weaver, Warren, "Reforms in Choosing Running Mate Sought", New York Times,
Aug. 7, 1972, p. 20.
Weisberger, Bernard A., "Accidental No. 2 Man", New York Times, Aug.
10, 1972, p. 35.
White, William S., "The Vice Presidency", Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1972.
William, Grover S., "Duties etc. relating to Vice Presidents", American
Law Division, Congressional Research Service, March 3, 1975.
Witcover, Jules, "Jimmy Carter: The Candidate on the Issues: An
Interview", Washington Post, March 21, 1976.
-34-
Williams, Irving G., "The American Vice-Presidency", Current History, June, 1974,
p. 254.
Young, Donald, American Roulette: The History and Dilemma of the Vice-Presidency,
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 1972, pp. 123-24, 373-75.
-35-
Appendix E
LIBRARY FORD BERALD
Partial List of Persons Contacted by Study Group
Professor Phillip E. Areeda (Harvard Law School)
Peter Bourne (Carter Campaign)
David S. Broder
Philip W. Buchen (The White House)
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
David Cohen (Common Cause)
Peter Curtin (Church Campaign)
John Elliff (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
Stephen B. Farber (National Governors' Conference)
James Farrington (Deputy Assistant Director, F.B.I.)
Saul Friedman (Knight Newspapers)
James L. George (Staff Assistant, Office of Senator William Brock)
Senator Barry Goldwater
Joseph Gorman (Congressional Resear ch Service)
Stephen H. Hess (Brookings. Institution)
John Hotis (Office of Legal Counsel, F.B.I.
Edward H. Mahe (Republican National Committee)
Colin Matthews (Udall Campaign)
Kent B. McGough (Chairman, Rules Committee, Republican National Committee)
Richard Moe (Administrative Assistant to Senator Mondale)
Sterling Munro (Administrative Assistant to Senator Jackson)
-36-
Professor Richard E. Neustadt (John F. Kennedy School of Government)
Dean Don K. Price (John F. Kennedy School of Government)
James H. Rowe, Jr.
Andrea Rosen (Democratic National Committee)
William D. Ruckelshaus
James Schoener (Senate Rules Committee)
John P. Sears (Reagan Campaign)
Mark A. Siegel (Democratic National Committee
Fredric W. Slight (Ford Campaign)
Sanford J. Ungar (author of FBI)
Ted VanDyk (former aide to Vice President Humphrey)
-37-
Appendix F
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
GERALD
INSTITUTE OF POLITICS
FORD
.y
78 Mount Auburn Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
617-495-5792
Questions on Vice-Presidential Selection for Presidential Candidates
1) Do you perceive a need for change in the Vice-Presidential selection
process?
2) How are you now approaching Vice-Presidential selection? Are you
developing lists of potential candidates? Is any background work on
potential running-mates being done now or is any planned? Do you antici-
pate communicating directly with the potential candidates, in advance of
the convention?
3) Would you agree that competency to be President should be the main criterion
in the selection of a running-mate? To what extent can competency be com-
bined with balancing factors (geographic, ideological, religious, political,
etc.) as criteria? Of these balancing factors, which are most important:
how would you prioritize them? How important do you think compatibility
between President and Vice-President (personality, issues orientation, etc.)
is as a criterion for choice of a running-mate?
4) What do you think of the following proposals for change:
a) Making public a list of potential Vice-Presidential candidates
before the convention.
b) Institution of a consultative process (such as by party committee)
to help in the development of a list of potential candidates, or
to give advice or screening of the candidates proposed by the
Presidential candidates.
c) A partially open convention procedure, with the convention
choosing the Vice-Presidential nominee from a list provided
by the Presidential nominee.
d) Background investigation of potential Vice-Presidential candi-
dates by the F.B.I., with an emphasis on the privacy rights of
the potential candidates (requiring their permission, and limiting
the availability of the report).
e) Rearrangement of the convention schedule (with Presidential nomina-
tion first, platform second, then Vice-Presidential nomination)
to provide more time for consideration of the choice for Vice
President.
f) Postponement of the selection of the Vice President to a time
after the convention; making the selection in a mini-convention
representative of the full convention.
-38-
Appendix G1
Lawrence D. Brown
BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM ON
VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
This memo briefly describes some problems with the open and
partially open convention approaches to Vice-Presidential selection
and sketches an outline of my own thinking on how we might proceed.
First, three definitions. By the "present system" I mean that the
Presidential nominee suggests his own choice for Vice-President, and
the party convention then accepts or rejects it. An "open convention"
means one in which delegates themselves nominate Vice-Presidential
candidates and the convention itself makes the decision, weighing the
Presidential nominee's preference as it sees fit. A "partially open
convention" means one in which the Presidential contenders narrow their
Vice-Presidential lists to a certain number (say five) either before
the convention or after it (in which case the nominee does the narrowing)
and the convention then selects the Vice-Presidential nominee from among
those listed.
We seem to agree that the main general objective of changes in the
system should be to move toward procedures more likely than the present
ones to assure selection of men who would make worthy Presidents should
that need arise. At a less general level, we also seem to agree that
new procedures should provide 1) more time for deliberation about
potential Vice-Presidents, and 2) more scope for deliberation (usually
referred to as "greater participation" by those seeking a larger role
for the convention itself, that is, the rank and file delegates, and
"more extensive consultation" by those favoring a larger role for prom-
inent party figures). Presumably, the greater the time allowed for
deliberation, the less important it Jecomes to deal explicitly with
the scope of participation, because, given time, opinions will out.
However, the reverse does not also hold. For example, chapter two of
the Ripon Society's The Lessons of Victory (New York: Dial Press,
Inc., 1969) describes the selection of Spiro Agnew, which consisted of
a rapid and superficial process of rather extensive consultation.
Nevertheless, the time dimension is much more troublesome than appears
at first glance. Every step toward preconvention specificity diminishes
the Presidential contenders' flexibility, and responsiveness to
emerging trends. Every step toward post convention delay violates the
candidate's (and the party's) desire to get a team together and off
and running.
-39-
To my mind, the major problem with the open and partially open
convention approach is that it does not directly address either of the
objectives mentioned above. Enlarging the convention role in Vice-
Presidential selection does not inherently extend or deepen the delib-
erative process, and thus does not go to the heart of the problem. To
the degree, then, that improved deliberation can be accomodated within
the present system, the advantages of this system, and the disadvantages
of the open convention approach, appear more compelling.
The best succinct discussion I know of the advantages and of the
open and partially open convention approach (and others) is contained
in a memo from Stu Eisenstat to the Democrats' Vice-Presidential Selection
Commission (the so-called "Humphrey Commission")*. What I have to say
here is nothing new, but let me list briefly, in no particular order,
what I consider to be the major disadvantages of the open and partially
open convention approaches.
1. An open convention could exacerbate party factionalism. Any appear-
ance of party unity might break down, and, depending upon the balance of
power within the convention, the Presidential nominee might get saddled
with a Vice-President who is incompatible. This would be offset by
partial openness (selection from the nominee's list) but this has its
problems too. If the change is billed as a step toward "openness" (as
it is bound to be), then explicit statements of preference from the
nominee will make it appear a mockery in some eyes. If, on the other
hand, the nominee is prevented from expressing his first choice (which
is practically impossible), he may either not get his man, or may list
his man and four throwaways. The point of making changes, it seems to
me, should be to equip the convention (or some subdivision of it) to
evaluate the mominee's choice in the context of other contenders, and
to provide information and advice to Presidential contenders (and the
nominee) as their decision-making processes unfold. "Openness" reforms
do not address this point straightforwardly.
2. Openness enhances the deliberative process only if the delegates
know the candidates' Vice-Presidential choices far enough in advance
of the convention to give them time to deliberate. But advance listing
(unless limited to one or two Vice-Presidential choices apiece) may lead
to extreme ticket-balancing, as the obligatory blacks, women, religious
and regional figures, and so forth appear on the lists to win factional
support. Even if the number of preconvention choices is limited (which
is probably infeasible), the prime concern will be short-term coalition-
building.
3. Openness could lead to complex and probably undesirable factional
patterns, as state delegations bargain support for A for President in
exchange for support for B for Vice-President. It's far from clear that
the result would be to accentuate quality.
*
This memo is reprinted in the Congressional Record, 16 October 1973.
-40-
4. Although it is true that the President is tortuously selected, and
that the Vice-President must be worthy to become President, it is probably
also true that there is strong sentiment among party and public for letting
the President name his man. There are many reasons for this. The first
is the need for flexibility. Granting that quality should come first, the
need to balance ideological, regional, and other appeals within the set of
high-quality contenders varies from one time and situation to another.
The nominee -- the party's leader -- can assuage party splits when in the
nature of the case a (split) convention cannot. The Vice-President is
bound to remain the nominee's major, short-term political instrument in
trying to do so.
Second, selection of a Vice-President is a Presidential nominee's
first and most prominent exercise of discretion and judgment. Taking the
choice away from him may diminish his public legitimacy (the top man is
supposed to be "responsible" add "accountable"). It may be too that
people like to think of the ticket as a "team", not a juxtaposition.
Third, as Hans Linde has pointed out, unless the President finds his
running-mate personally and ideologically compatible (which he alone can
decide), he may not keep him informed about and included in what's going
on. This would reduce the Vice-President's capacity to assume the
Presidency.
These points seem to me to argue rather strongly that the costs of
the open and partially open approaches are likely to outweigh the benefits.
Now I want to set down a few vague thoughts explaining the rudiments of
what I consider a sensible approach to procedural change.
As I said above, I think that the major emphasis should be on
Vice-Presidential quality. (By "quality" I mean selection of a Vice-
President whom large numbers of people other than the Presidential
nominee would be content to see occupy the highest office if the major
pertinent facts were known, and if the need arose.) In arguing the need
for change, there are basically two different approaches. One is to argue
that the present system (and the Vice-Presidents and Vice-Presidential
nominees it produces) are simply not very good. I am not convinced that
this is true. The second line of argument is that the system is basically
sound, but unacceptably risky. I believe that Vice-Presidents in general,
and Vice-Presidents who became President, have been, on the whole, of high
quality. I believe too that the system is to some degree self-correcting.
(As Stephen K. Bailey said it in a statement to the Humphrey Commission in
November 1973, after the Eagleton and Agnew affairs, nominees are likely
to exercise "exquisite care" in selecting running-mates even without
procedural changes. Nor do I believe that Presidential nominees do --
or would -- knowingly choose flawed men.
Having granted all this, however, the key fact remains that informa-
tion (broadly defined) has been and remains too limited. In selecting men
for high office, "political information (insights of knowledgeable politicians
and party notables about contender's style and performance) and "factual"
information (data about personal honesty, background, and the like) are
equally valuable and perhaps inextricable.
-41-
Moreover, the Eagleton and Agnew cases suggest that under some conditions,
the logic of party unity may lead not to nomination of major party figures
but rather to inoffensive and little-known individuals. These facts, it
seems to me, argue for explicit procedural change; it is not prudent to
leave the choice almost wholely to the personal judgment of the nominees'
and their top aides. In short: we should look to modest procedural
innovations which might reduce the risk of seriously flawed candidates
by enhancing the time and scope for deliberations.
If we accept this general orientation, then it seems to me that
we come down to three basic questions:
1. What should be the mechanics of deliberation? -- in particular,
do we want to argue for an institutionalized party role (beyond the
delegates themselves), or leave it mainly to contenders, press, and public?
2. What should be the timing of the deliberative process? -- in
particular, should it fall mainly before the convention or after it?
3. What should be the extent of the process? -- in particular, do
we want to leave it to the contenders and their staffs, the parties, the
press, and the public; or do we want to consider FBI checks?
These three questions comprise the heart of the matter, in my view. Let
me set down quickly my tentative thoughts on these three questions, and
suggest the implications of these thoughts.
1. I think that there should be some sort of institutionalized
party role in Vice-Presidential selection, beyond convention ratification
of the Presidential nominee's personal choice. I take this view for three
reasons. First, I share the position of many political scientists (some
of whom discussed this and related points before the Humphrey Commission)
that the apparent decline of national party organization is something to
worry over. I do not believe that we should encourage the increasingly
popular view that the candidate is everything and the party is nothing;
nor do I think that we should recommend changes that work in that direction.
If possible, I would like to see the institutional role of the parties
strengthened.
Second, I believe that some party role is needed to fill information
gaps that would inevitably remain if consultation were left mainly to the
contenders, their staffs, the press, and the public. The viewpoint of
party officials may be distinctive and valuable; it should be built into
the process.
Third, I agree with Charles Hyneman's observation to the Humphrey
Commission that "Proof that well known men and women are involved in the
selection and that deliberation is going on" would lend legitimacy to the
Vice-Presidential selection process and increase public confidence in it.
These "well known men and women" should come from the ranks of the parties.
-42-
2. I believe that a pre convention deliberative process is preferable
to a post convention process. As James I. Loeb remarked in reference to
arguments in favor of the 1972 Democratic "mini-convention" (held after the
convention itself had adjourned):
if it were adopted as a regular device, it
would mainly serve three purposes: to underscore
the indecisiveness of the presidential nominee
to weaken any semblance of party unity and to
establish an all-time record for anticlimax.*
Moreover, as Congressman Marvin Esch of Michigan has pointed out, a delayed
Vice-Presidential nomination would give an appearance of "smoke-filled-room-
politics," "secret deals" and "power brokers. " ** Also, might not unit-rule
problems in weighting delegate votes arise under such procedures? All
post-convention processes with which I am familiar run up against problems
such as these.
3. I would refrain from recommending new forms of FBI checks on
Vice-Presidential contenders. On the one hand, the possible costs of such
checks -- in terms of loosely-controlled investigations, violations of
privacy, abuse of confidential data, and others -- are unclear but potentially
great. On the other hand, I am not convinced that the benefits to be gained
from such checks are sizeable, let alone large enough to outweigh the
potential costs. I would want to think long and hard before endorsing an
expanded, institutionalized FBI role in electoral politics. To my mind,
a workable system of party consultation, and an expanded dialogue among
political actors -- party, candidates, press, and public -- ought to do
the job.
Following these observations where they seem to lead, I would incline
to favor a process something like this: the parties should establish some
sort of committee on Vice-Presidential selection, with appropriate staff,
which would go to work a month of two before the convention. The committee
should contact active Presidential candidates (somehow defined) and solicit
from them lists (of some reasonable length ) of persons whom they (the
contenders) think should be considered as potential Vice-Presidential
nominees. The committee would then compile and make public one general
list of contenders for Vice-President. "hose listed could remove themselves
from consideration if they wished. The committee would carry out staff work
and consult widely with various party elements about the respective merits
or limitations of those listed. Discussion would proceed among media and
public. The big problem is, how deep would the committee dig, and how public
would this "dossier" become? One report noted that the Democratic Commission
* Washington Post, 27 January 1974
Congressional Record, 2 August 1974
-43-
on Vice-Presiential Selection, faced with similar proposals, "was reluctant
to get into 'screening' r'digging up dirt', and made it clear the advisory
panel it recommended would compile publicly available information only."*
Even a consultation process limited in this way need not be superficial,
however. Such a panel might go a long way toward increasing the store of
factual information and considered opinion of which candidates and delegates
might avail themselves in reaching their decisions.
At the convention the order of business might well be changed to
place platform adoption between the selection of the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential nominees. This suggestion would seem to run counter to
the concern for party prerogatives expressed above, but several consider-
ations persuade me that this is not the case. A platform adopted after,
and guided by, the Presidential nominee would enjoy a closer link in the
public's mind with the head of the ticket. A platform, after all, is not
only a declaration of general party position, but also -- even more so
a statement of goals a new administration would attempt to pursue. Nor
would rearrangement of the schedule necessarily impair the platform's
role as party unifier; the nominee's need to unite the party behind him and
to heal convention wounds would probably lead him to
strengthen the platform's traditional reconciliation functions.
After the nominee had been selected, and while the platform was under
consideration, the nominee would consult with the advisory committee about
his preferred choices, would avail himself of the information and opinions
compiled, and would then name one individual. The convention would then
vote. The nominee would retain the option of naming a running mate not on
the committee's list, but if he did so, it might be agreed that the convention
adjourn and vote by "mini-convention" a week or so later in order to allow
time for research and consultation.
This approach strikes me as a fairly sensible extrapolation from
the observations presented above. Whether it is feasible in practice is
another matter however.
*
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 January 1974, pg. 49
-44-
Appendix G2
Elizabeth Goddard
PARTY OPTIONS FOR CHANGE OF VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCEDURES
Technically it is possible for the parties to make changes this
year which would affect Vice-Presidential selection. These, for
reasons of time, would probably be procedural changes, such as a
rearrangement of the order of business. It would be very difficult
at this point to enact changes which would influence the behavior
of the potential candidates, such as requiring them to provide
lists of potential running-mates, although it would be possible
to institute some form of consultative process on a short notice.
Realistically, it is not likely that a sitting convention is
going to make changes which would take effect immediately. We
should make recommendations for immediate action at this con-
vention, but realizing that changes will probably not be made
for 1976, we should stress two things: 1) the importance
and priority that should be given to Vice-Presidential selection,
2) the necessity for making the rule changes in this convention
for effect in 1980 (not the formation of more committees to study
the question, but the actual enactment of the changes themselves).
Selective Listing of Party Options for Change
1) Rearrangement of convention schedule (Presidential nomination,
platform, then Vice-Presidential nomination).
2) Institution of a formal consultative process (party committee
to be a screening committee, or simply an advisory group).
3) Open convention - choice left entirely up to delegates.
4) Presidential nominee makes public a list of potential running-
mates after nomination, and the convention chooses from this list.
5) The Presidential candidates make public lists of potential
running-mates before the nomination;
-45-
a) the convention chooses from the list (allowing for inclusion
of names of defeated Presidential candidates.
b) the Presidential nominee indicates a preference before the
convention selects the Vice-Presidential nominee, (allowing
for the inclusion of names of defeated Presidential candidates).
6) Convention chooses Vice-Presidential nominee from a list provided
by a party committee, or other criteria.
7) Post-convention choice of the Vice-Presidential nominee:
a) by committee, or mini-convention
b) by the Presidential candidate
Analysis of Selected Options
1) If other reforms in the Vice-Presidential selection process have
been made, such as a pre-convention listing of potential running-mates,
a provision for background investigation and institution of a consultative
process, then the proposal for a rearrangement of the convention schedule
is not as important, because these measures would mean that care and
deliberation in the choice were taking place even before the convention.
But in the situation that will probably exist this year, with none of these
reforms taking place, the rearrangement of the convention schedule becomes
an important and necessary change. It would provide time, which is crucial,
for the nominees and their staffs to regroup and proceed in some orderly
fashion, and for a more extensive consultative process to insure party.
acceptance, and to do the checking that is needed.
2) Consultative process. The institution of a consultative process
is an important reform, as it is a way to increase input into the selection
process while retaining the candidate's dominance in the choice. A con-
sultative mechanism could begin at this convention although there would
be logistical problems, mainly of time, since the consulting would probably
be taking place at the convention rather than before. This is a process
that should be suggested for 1976 but recommended strongly for 1980. The
best proposal seems to be for a consultative committee, or advisory group,
which meets before the convention (and possibly holds hearings) discusses
and does research into potential Vice-Presidential prospects; then at the
convention, is available to the nominee in an advisory capacity.
3) Open convention. This is the most readily available option since
it already exists in fact though not in practice. There are merits to
such a system, but it does not guarantee an improvement in the Vice-
Presidential selection process, and is not the best vehicle for change.
-46-
4) Presidential nominee makes public a list after nomination, and the
convention chooses from this list. This is not an ideal solution, as it
does nothing to insure that time has been spent in the choice, and it does
not provide time for checking of the choices.
5) Presidential candidates make available lists before the convention.
This option is the most promising. It provides for several things which
are desireable:
1) It insures that the Presidential candidates begin thinking
about, and actively working on, Vice-Presidential selection
before the convention.
2) It makes the potential candidates known and available for
public and media exposure, background checking, etc.
3) It retains candidate control over the process (especially
if the nominee makes a preference known) while allowing
more participation from public and party.
It is not very likely that such a system could be instituted this year,
unless done voluntarily by the candidates. It should be strongly recommended
as a change to be made for 1980, however. The party could make it a require-
ment for candidates with a certain number of delegates or whatever. There
are potential problems however, such as the possibility of a drafted nominee
who would not have made a list public.
Recommendations
1) That the parties adopt general resolutions stating that Vice-
Presidential selection deserves more care than it presently receives, and
urging that, especially this year, the Presidential candidates do their
homework before the convention, and give Vice-Presidential selection priority.
2) For 1976, changes be made in the rules to allow:
A) rearrangement of the convention schedule
B) consultative mechanism
3) For 1980: At this convention changes be made in the rules to
require in 1980:
A) That the candidates announce a list of potential running-mates
before the convention (allowing the candidate to make preference
known at the convention)
B) That a party advisory group be formed to serve in a consultative
capacity.
-47-
FORD
074879
C) That the convention schedule be rearranged (to allow time
for the candidate to choose from the list and from the
unsuccessful Presidential candidates, and time for con-
sultations with party elements to take place.
A Resolution to be adopted, which recommends the careful use of FBI back-
ground investigation, stressing the need to respect the individual's privacy
and the need to have the individual's permission.
Description of Rules Committee Procedures
FOR THE DEMOCRATS:
The Rules Committee of the National Committee meets before the Convention
(June 19, 20, and possibly the 21st). Only the members of the committee are
present. Any member of the Committee can bring up any resolution for change.
The Rules Committee then makes its recommendations to the Convention directly
(each delegate receives a copy of their report), and the Convention votes
on the recommendations.
Possible Means of Change in the Rules For 1976 = Amendment to Rules
At the Rules Committee meeting, it will be moved to adopt the temporary
Rules in the Convention Call as the Permanent Rules. At this point, there
will be attempts to amend these rules, rule by rule. Vice-Presidential
selection amendments could be proposed at this time, by a member of the
committee.
Other Ways
The Convention can enact changes that have not been accepted by the
Rules Committee:
1) By minority report of the Rules Committee (25%)
2) By suspension of the Rules of the Convention
3) Also any delegate can request a special order of business
(the Rules Committee has to agree before this is done)
Changes for 1980
These would come up at a different time in the Rules Committee meeting.
They could be proposed as a simple resolution, or as a charter amendment.
-48-
FOR THE REPUBLICANS
The Rules Committee of the Republican National Committee meets before
the convention. It makes recommendations to the National Committee, which
makes recommendations to the Convention Rules Committee, which begins
meeting several days before the convention. The Convention Rules Committee
makes recommendations to the full Convention.
The Chairman of the Rules Committee of the National Committee, Kent
B. McGough, has indicated that input from interested parties is welcome.
The best time for this would be the June 24 meeting of the Rules Committee,
at which time they will hold a hearing on Vice-Presidential selection.
Attachments to Party Options Paper: Summary of Republican Party Actions
on Vice-Presidential Selection
Summary of Democraitc Party Actions
on Vice-Presidential Selection
-49-
REPUBLICAN PARTY ACTIONS
ON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
Subcommittee 2 of the Republican National Committee's reform group,
the Rule 29 Committee, considered the question of changes in Vice-
Presidentail selection methods. They held hearings and solicited recom-
mendations in the spring of 1974.
The preliminary report of the Rule 29 Committee was submitted
to the Republican National Committee by June 30, 1974. The final
report was presented by January 1, 1975. The Republican National
Committee acted upon this report on March 5-6, 1975.
There is one section in the Rule 29 Committee report which deals
with Vice-Presidential selection. It is a resolution which
recommends that the Republican National Committee continue to review
proposals to improve the Vice-Presidential nominating process at the
national convention, emphasizing the need for more time for the selec-
tion of the nominee.
Before the 1976 convention, the Rules Committee of the Republican
National Committee will meet and consider the recommendations of the
Rule 29 Committee. The Rules Committee then makes recommendations
to the Convention Rules Committee, which makes recommendations to the
convention as a whole. On June 24, the Rules Committee of the Republican
National Committee will hold a hearing to consider further proposals
regarding Vice-Presidential selection. In the words of the Chairman
of the Republican National Committee, Mary Louise Smith, "Because
of the great amount of interest in this subject, our pre-convention
Rules Committee will devote considerable time to the matter during
its June meeting.
For the convention this year, the Republican National Committee
has no plans to make changes in their Vice-Presidential selection process;
the actions of the Rules Committee are aimed at the 1980 convention.
-50-
DEMOCRATIC PARTY ACTIONS
ON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
At the miniconvention to select a Vice-Presidential nominee in
August, 1972, the Democratic National Committee established a commission
to study Vice-Presidential selection with the purpose of recommending
changes in the selection procedures of the party convention. Under
rules adopted in 1972, the commission had until January 1, 1974, to make
a report to the National Committee.
The first meeting of the Vice-Presidential Selection Commission was
held June 20, 1973, in Washington, D.C. The chairman of the Commission
was Senator Hubert Humphrey. At this meeting, the full commission of
seventy-five people established an eighteen person executive committee,
which then scheduled a meeting in Washington on July 23-24 to discuss
means of gathering information and suggestions.
The executive committee held hearings in the fall of 1973 and solicited
written opinions on the subject of Vice-Presidential selection.
Several recommendations were produced by the executive committee,
which, after slight alteration, were accepted on December 13, 1973, by
the full commission. The proposals called for the formation of a
screening committee, the lengthening of the convention by one day,
and the option of postponing the choice of a Vice-President to a mini-
convention twenty-one days after the national convention.
The proposals of the Commission on Vice-Presidential Selection
were presented to the Democratic National Committee. The Committee
removed the section suggesting the formation of a screening committee,
but took no further action on the proposals. None of the proposals were
included in the Charter which was adopted at the 1974 miniconvention
in Kansas City.
As it stands now, the Democratic National Committee has no plans to
change the Vice-Presidential selection process, and they have no plans for
any action on the Report of the Vice-Presidential Selection Commission.
-51-
Appendix G3
Charles Greenleaf
Background Checks of Possible Vice-Presidential Nominees
This paper preliminarily reviews the major considerations in conduct-
ing a background investigation of possible Vice-Presidential candidates
and outlines proposals for consideration by the study group.
Pro-Con
Virtually everyone admits that the Presidential candidates should have
more information about the potential running mates then has been available
in the past. The choice of Thomas Eagleton in 1972 and of Spiro Agnew
in 1968 are illustrations of the need for more information.
However, there are strong arguments that background checks by the FBI
are an invasion of privacy. Furthermore, any screening process or infor-
mation gathering effort by a political party will be criticized as an
attempt at "backroom" influence of the selection process.
Major Considerations
Who should conduct the background checks and political screening?
The FBI is the only organization equipped to do an extensive personal
background investigation. Outside the government, investigative journal-
ists, such as Jack Anderson, will conduct inquiries without much encourage-
ment.
Political screening of a Vice-Presidential prospect's public record
could be done by the Presidential candidates or by the party organizations.
The press and various interest groups will also have a major role in
publicizing the record of leading Vice-Presidential contenders.
What should be checked?
An FBI check, if authorized, would probably be in the nature of a
"full field investigation," not as massively detailed as the checks of
Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller when they were Vice-Presidential
nominees.
Aside from an FBI check of personal information, there should be a
review of the public record of the potential Vice-Presidents. Positions
taken throughout his political career should be documented. Material on
-52-
Congressional service is relatively easy to collect, compared with infor-
mation about a person's record at the state or local level.
When should the checks be made?
The information should be collected prior to the nominating
conventions. Sanford Ungar's recent book, The FBI, indicates that it
normally takes fifteen days to investigate a Presidential appointment.
The background check on Nelson Rockefeller used 350 agents and took a total
of 1,400 interviews. A pre-nomination investigation of several possible
candidates would not be as extensive, but it would require a week or two
at least.
A comprehensive review of the political record of possible nominees
would take longer, whether done by the staff of a Presidential candidate
or by a political party committee.
Action by the Study Group
I submit two proposals for consideration by the study group: 1) an
FBI check mechanism and 2) a research process by the party organizations.
1) FBI Check. Any study group recommendaion for FBI background
checks depends upon further study by us of existing practices and
authorities. If statutory authorization is not required for an investiga-
tion, the President could ask the FBI to conduct a "top secret" security
clearance for potential Vice-Presidential choices in the following manner:
*Presidential candidates with a reasonable chance of getting the
nomination would be allowed to submit to the FBI up to 10 possibilities
for Vice-President.
*The Presidential candidates should inform their choices of the pending
background check and give them a chance to decline being investigated.
*The results of the FBI check would be available only to the winner of
the nomination. Unused data would be destroyed.
(This concept is similar to the bill introduced in 1973 by Senator
William Brock. The bill has not been introduced in the current Congress,
nor has any bill pertaining to FBI checks of Vice-Presidential candidates.)
2) Research on Candidates by the Party Organizations. One would hope
that Presidential candidates would direct campaign staffers to scrutinize
the public records of possible Vice-Presidential nominees, but it is
unlikely that the candidates have the money or the time to accomplish this
project adequately, particulary when the pre-convention campaigns are
closely contested.
Instead of just relying upon Presidential candidates to do research
about their choices for running-mate, the party organizations should help
do the job of screening in a formal role.
-53-
In 1973 the Humphrey Commission proposed that the Democratic
National Committee establish an Advisory Committee on the Vice-Presidential
nomination. The Advisory Committee of 7-10 members could be selected
after consultation with all Presidential candidates in the party. The
Committee would collect information from public records about all potential
Vice-Presidential nominees. Its work would not in any way be binding,
the Committee should make no recommendations whatsoever, and it should
submit its information to the nominee at the convention.
These two proposals, the FBI checks and the candidate research by the
party, are examples of specific actions that the study group must produce,
if we are to have any impact on reforming the Vice-Presidential selection
process.
Attachments: excerpt from the Congressional Record, November 26, 1973
a bill, S.2741, 93d Congress, November 26, 1973
-54-
Congressional Record
United States
of America
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
Vol. 119
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1973
No. 181
Senate
By Mr. BROCK:
S. 2741. A bill to provide for an in-
leased only to the winner of the Presi-
vestigation of the character and past ac-
dential nomination and only with the
tivities of potential Vice-Presidential
written consent of the person investi-
nominees by the Federal Bureau of In-
gated. Also, only the Presidential candi-
vestigation. Referred to the Committee
date himself and one other staff member
on the Judiciary.
chosen by the Presidential candidate may
Mr. BROCK Mr. President, as every-
view the records at all times.
one knows, we will soon be voting on the
An FBI agent would serve as custodian
confirmation of a new Vice President.
of the records. After the selection of the
Events of the past 15 months amply
Vice President by the party convention,
demonstrate the need to take a hard look
all investigation reports including the in-
at the methods by which a Vice President
vestigation of the Vice-Presidential can-
is chosen.
didate shall be destroyed. It will be a
When we examine both history and
Federal offense of up to 5 years im-
current events, we see that there is a vast
prisonment and a $50,000 fine for un-
difference between the scrutiny that a
lawful disclosure of the results of any
potential President and a potential Vice
investigation.
President receives. Normally, a man who
Mr. President, this bill I am introduc-
desires the office of President of the
ing will provide the means to prevent the
United States must receive a great deal
recurrence of events such as the ones of
of publicity if he hopes to even have a
this past 15 months. The investigations
chance of being elected. During the time
provided for by this bill should determine
period between a potential President's
the fitness of the man who, if elected.
name being mentioned as a possible can-
would be a heartbeat away from the
didate and his actual nomination, the
Presidency. At the same time, this bill
candidate is subjected to intense exam-
forbids the leaking of information about
ination by the press and the general
the people being investigated, and thus
public. This examination keeps a Presi-
it safeguards their rights of privacy.
dential candidate constantly in the pub-
SALIENT POINTS OF BILL
lic eye. Such scrutiny has often resulted
First. At the conclusion of the final
in a candidate's withdrawing from the
Presidential primary of final nomi-
Presidential race.
nating convention, but in any case at
This is not true of a potential Vice
least 1 month prior to the party con-
President, however. Under the present
vention, those candidates with at least
method of choosing the Vice President,
10 percent committed delegates at that
the candidate who is selected is more
time, or the top three contenders, shall
often than not relatively unknown to the
have the right to submit to the FBI the
public. This means that a Vice-Presi-
names of not more than 10 persons to
dential candidate virtually never re-
be investigated for the office of Vice
ceives the scrutiny that a Presidential
President.
candidate receives. Often, less than 24
Second. The investigation shall con-
hours passes between the time of a Pres-
sist of the normal procedures used for
idential candidate's nomination and a
a top secret clearance.
Vice-Presidential candidate's nomina-
Third. These investigations shall be
tion. Adequate investigation is impossible
released only to the winner of the Presi-
under such circumstances.
dential nomination, and only with the
Today, I would like to introduce a bill
written consent of the person investi-
which will eliminate many of the prob-
gated. Also, only the Presidential candi-
lems created by the present system of
date himself and one other staff member
choosing the Vice President. This bill
chosen by the Presidential candidate
would allow, but not require, Presidential
may view the records. and at all times,
candidates with a reasonable chance of
there shall be an FBI agent present as
winning the nomination to submit the
custodian of records.
names of up to 10 possibilities for Vice
GERAED
Fourth. After selection of the Vice
President to the FBI. Reasonable chance
President by the party convention, all in-
of winning means that a candidate ei-
FORD
vestigation reports including the investi-
ther has 10 percent of the delegate votes,
gation on the Vice-Presidential candi-
or is among the top three contenders.
date shall be destroyed.
The investigation of the contenders
shall consist of the normal procedures
LIBRAR
Fifth. It shall be a Federal offense of
up to 5 years imprisonment and a $50,000
used for a top-secret clearance. The re-
fine for unlawful disclosure.
sults of the investigations shall be re-
-55-
93n CONGRESS
1sT SESSION
S. 2741
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
NOVEMBER 26, 1973
Mr. BROCK introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary
A
BILL
To provide for an investigation of the character and past
activities of potential Vice-Presidential nominees by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
1
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That, for purposes of this Act, the term-
4
(1) "Presidential primary" means any election
5
held for the expression of a preference by the voters of
6
a State for the nomination of a candidate for election
7
to the office of President;
8
(2) "political party" means any political party
9
whose candidate for election to the office of President in
10
the most recently conducted Presidential election received
II
-56-
2
1
more than 10 per centum of the total number of votes
2
cast throughout the United States for all such candidates,
3
treating votes cast for the election of Presidential and
4
Vice-Presidential electors who are affiliated with a
5
political party as votes cast for the Presidential candidate
6
of that party;
7
(3) "national nominating convention" means a
8
convention held by a political party for the purpose of
9
nominating the candidate of that party for the office of
10
President; and
11
(4) "Presidential candidate" means an individual
12
who—
13
(A) is qualified under the Constitution to serve
14
as President if elected to that office, and
15
(B) files with the Attorney General, not later
16
than thirty days before the date on which the na-
17
tional nominating convention of a political party is
18
scheduled to begin-
19
(i) a statement in writing personally
20
signed by him stating that he is a candidate for
21
the nomination of that party for election to the
22
office of President; and
23
(ii) statements in writing personally
24
signed by a substantial number of delegates who
25
are entitled to vote in such convention for the
-57-
BEARALD
3
1
selection of the candidate of that party for elec-
FURD
2
tion to the office of President stating that they
3
intend to vote for the nomination of that individ-
4
ual as the candidate of that party for election to
5
the office of President when the convention is
6
held.
7
For purposes of clause (ii), an individual shall be
8
considered to have furnished statements from a sub-
9
stantial number of delegates to the national nomi-
10
nating convention of a political party if he has fur-
11
nished the greatest, next greatest, or third greatest
12
number of statements from such delegates, or if he
13
has furnished statements from 10 per centum of
14
such delegates.
15
SEC. 2. (a) The Attorney General upon receiving a
0
16
written request from a Presidential candidate shall conduct
17
an investigation through the Federal Bureau of Investigation
18 of not more than ten individuals listed in that request by the
19 Presidential candidate as potential Vice-Presidential nom-
20 inees. The investigation shall be of the same nature, extent,
21 and scope as an investigation conducted by the Federal
22 Bureau of Investigation in connection with the granting of
23 a top secret security clearance to any individual employed
24 by the United States.
-58-
4
1
(b) No evidence or information obtained by an investi-
2 gation conducted under subsection (a) shall be released to
3 any person without the written consent of the individual who
4 is the subject of the investigation.
5
(c) If an individual investigated under subsection (a)
6 consents in writing under subsection (b) to the disclosure of
7 the evidence and information obtained in- that investigation,
8 the Attorney General shall permit inspection of such evi-
9 dence and information by the Presidential candidate who re-
10 quested the investigation together with one other person des-
11 ignated by the candidate, if such candidate has been nomi-
12 nated by the national nominating convention of the political
13 party with which he is affiliated. Any such inspection shall
14 be carried out on premises designated by the Attorney Gen-
15 eral in the presence of an employee of the Federal Bureau
16 of Investigation, who shall be custodian of such evidence
17 and information. No copy, record, or memorandum of any
18 matter contained in such evidence and information shall be
19 made by the candidate or the person designated by the candi-
20 date to inspect the evidence and information with him, and no
21 piece of such evidence or information shall be removed from
22 the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
23
SEC. 3. Upon the nomination a candidate for election
24 to the office of Vice President by the national nominating
25 convention of a political party all evidence and information
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GERALD
R.
5
1 obtained under section 2 relating to potential Vice-Presi-
2 dential nominees of that party shall be destroyed and no
3 memorandum, copy, or other record of such evidence or
4 information shall be retained.
5
SEC. 4. No evidence or information obtained under or in
6 connection with an investigation carried out under this Act
7 shall be admissible in any proceeding before any court of the
8 United States or of any State.
9
SEC. 5. The disclosure, release, or retention of evidence
10 or information in violation of the provisions of this Act shall
11 be punishable by a fine not to exceed $50,000, imprison-
12 ment for not to exceed five years, or both.
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Appendix H
SELECTED COMMENT ON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
Each Presidential election year brings, with measured regularity,
a rising chorus of complaints about how Vice Presidents are selected.
Solemn pledges "to do something" about the selection process ring through
political party caucuses, and the heavy artillery of the political pundits
thunders in at just the right moment, for effect.
It was all well said in 1906 by Finley Peter Dunne:
"It's sthrange about th' vice prisidincy," said Mr. Dooley.
"The prisidincy is th' highest office in th' gift iv th' people.
Th' vice prisidincy is th' next highest an' th' lowest. It isn't a
crime exactly. Ye can't be sint to jail f'r it, but it's a kind iv
a disgrace. It's like writin' anonymous letters. At a convintion
nearly all th' dillygates lave as soon as they've nomynated th'
prisidint f'r fear wan iv them will be nomynated f'r vice prisidint."
Mr. Dooley would, however, be suprised at the recent history of
Vice-Presidential selection, during which the Vice Presidency has
become more and more of a sought-after prize. Being Vice President is
inescapably the best way to become President.
Of the 38 American Presidents, 13 (or more than a third) were
Vice Presidents first. These 13 have been President for more than
a third of the nation's 200 years. The figures for this century are
even more startling. Of the 13 Twentieth Century American Presidents,
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6 were first Vice President, and they have been President for 34 of the
76 years (45 per cent). Putting it another way, in this century the
odds are about one to two that the Vice President will one day become
President.
Whether or not changing the way Vice Presidents are selected is
an idea whose time has finally arrived is a good question. It may
simply be that the Vice Presidency is like the weather: everyone
complains about it, but no one can change it.
The following excerpts from editorials, columns, and so forth
are illustrative of the thousands of pages written on this subject---
and they reveal the near-unanimity of judgement that it is, indeed,
time for a change in how we select Vice Presidents.
-- K. Dun Gifford
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Endicott Peabody, Chicago Tribune, May 13, 1972
We cannot have a Vice President, a potential President,
who has been chosen by anything less than a deliberative and
collective decision by a free and open convention.
Milton Viorst, Washington Star, July 24, 1972
I am convinced that one of the reforms both parties should
have high on the agenda for 1976 is a procedure for choosing
the vice presidential candidate as openly as the Democrats this
year chose their presidential candidate.
Courtenay R. Sheldon, Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1972
A simple switch in the order of business at political
conventions could help avoid another "agony over Eagleton".
The Democrats are already thinking about such a plan, says
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., general counsel of the Democratic
National Committee.
Clayton Fritchey, Washington Post, August 5, 1972
Every four years there is a new round of hand wringing
over the way American Vice Presidents are chosen. The only
difference is that, in the wake of the Eagleton crisis, the
wails are even louder.
Admittedly, our hit-and-miss way of selecting vice-
presidential nominees leaves a great deal to be desired, but
in practice it hasn't worked too badly.
Erwin D. Canham, Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 1972
The Eagleton mess could easily have been avoided. But
total reform of the process by which vice-presidential can-
didates are chosen is more complicated. It ought to be done.
To have the vice-presidential candidate designated by a
weary presidential nominee, under the worst of circumstances,
is an intolerable risk.
Alan L. Otten, Wall Street Journal, August 17, 1972
At the moment all public attention is still focused on
better methods for picking a vice presidential nominee. The
Democratic disaster over the dropping of Senator Eagleton and
the embarrassingly prolonged pursuit of a substitute has
touched off an avalanche of proposals for improving the process.
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Richard L. Strout, Christian Science Monitor, August 18, 1972
Vice presidents can be fun. Without them how could we
idle away the time agreeing that there ought to be a better
way of picking vice presidents? Then we go on to something else.
Five presidents in office since 1900 were at one time or
another targets of assasins. In all, eight vice presidents
have filled vacancies. Six of these eight were chosen without
much more thought of their qualities than a city political
machine gives to picking a candidate for coroner.
Editorial, Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1972
The selection process used by both parties in respect to
vice presidential candidates is out of date and defective
there must be a more responsible way than the present system.
The parties won't face the problem again until 1976. That
should be enough time to find an alternative.
Editorial, Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1972
The traumatic problems which Democratic presidential
candidate George McGovern has just undergone in choosing a
running mate have sharply spotlighted the weaknesses in the
American system of selecting and electing a vice president.
Any new system that is worked out should at the least
allow for a broader and more representative group of selectors
for the nominee, and aim to bring in the strongest possible
candidate on the basis of merit.
Editorial, Chicago Tribune, August 12, 1972
What the authors of these and other proposals overlook is
that the present system is workable and is probably the most
sensible in sight. It occasionally flounders because the
delegates have traditionally voted for the man chosen by the
Presidential nominee, and that Presidential nominee can
sometimes be an amateurish bumbler.
Such was the case in the Eagleton affair. The reformers'
complaint is not with the system, but with the bad judgement
of one George S. McGovern.
Editorial, Washington Star, August 18, 1972
The short sojourn of Senator Thomas Eagleton on the
Democratic national ticket ought to have the one salutary
effect of getting people to think about how we choose vice
presidential cnadidates. There must be a better way.
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Editorial, Chicago Tribune, November 12, 1972
In anyevent, we see no reason to junk the present system
and resort to experimentation. What is needed is to let the
system work as intended.
New York Times, December 15, 1972
Spurred by memories of the 1972 Eagleton case, a Democratic
party commission has proposed creation of a screening committee to
check the background of future Vice Presidential possibilities.
New York Times, December 16, 1972
A Democratic party commission has agreed on a series of
proposals to provide more careful selection of Vice Presidential
nominees. The commission recommended creation of an advisory
commission to check the backgrounds of possible nominees
It also adopted a procedure that would insure at least 48 hours
between the selection of the Presidential and Vice Presidential
nominees.
Theodore H. White, "The Making of the President 1972"
The way Americans choose vice presidents has always been
absurd, but never quite so absurd as in the Democratic exercise
of 1972 No one had been assigned to do any kind of background
check (on Eagleton).
(In contrast), Nixon thought that Agnew's speech nominating
Nixon was the best. Nixon was enormously impressed by the man
with the square-cut jaw, the athletic frame, the commanding
presence on the screen
James Reston, New York Times, October 12, 1973
The Agnew Affair, following on the Eagleton Affair, suggests
again that the normal procedures for selecting vice presidential
candidates in America have been almost criminally negligent,
so maybe they should be examined before President Nixon picks a
successor for Spiro Agnew.
Lawrence Meyer, Washington Post, October 13, 1973
One of the obvious pitfalls in selecting a vice presidential
candidate--made painfully obvious by events over the last 15 months--
is how a hastily made choice of running mate can come back to haunt
the presidential nominee.
Paul Hope, Washington Star, October 15, 1973
Most other presidential candidates probably have used equally
slipshod procedures in selecting their running mates, but the cases
of Eagleton and Agnew make a pressing case for finding a better way.
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GENALD
R.
David S. Broder, Washington Post, October 21, 1973
FORD
(The parties) pick their vice presidential candidates overnight
in a frantic, disorganized and essentially closed series of meetings
with an exhausted, distracted presidential nominee.
New York Times, November 8, 1973
Two top Democrats (Hubert H. Humphrey and Robert S. Strauss)
indicated support today for a proposal to remove the selection of
future Vice Presidential nominees from the Presidential nominating
conventions.
Marquis Childs, Washington Post, November 13, 1973
One good thing that can come out of all this grisly business
is some hard thinking about how we choose our Vice Presidents.
This has been a form of political Russian roulette with luck
more often than not against the first party pulling the trigger.
Surely never again can a weary political convention allow
the presidential candidate to pick an unknown, out of the hat.
David S. Broder, Washington Post, December 14, 1973
A Democratic Party commission yesterday recommended
giving future presidential nominees better information and
more time to pick their running mates
The Commission recom-
mended that an advisory panel of party "wise men" assemble all
available information about prospective vice presidential
candidates
Editorial, Washington Star, October 15, 1973
The Republican and Democratic parties should give serious
consideration to the matter before the 1976 conventions. At
the very least, more time for investigation and contemplation
should be given between the time the presidential nominee
is selected and the deadline for his choosing a running mate.
Editorial, Washington Star, December 31, 1973
It appears that the Democratic party might be getting
around to changing the haphazard and hazardous method of
choosing vice presidential nominees. It's high time.
Lou Cannon, Washington Post, April 28, 1974
Strong Republican sentiment for changing the way in which
the GOP chooses its vice presidential nominee became apparent
yesterday at a meeting of the party's reform committee.
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Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., letter to the Editor, Washington Post, December 3, 1974
Recent events have evoked considerable agreement that
something is amiss with the existing methods of choosing Vice
Presidents
The (Democratic) party conference this weekend
should explore ways to moving in the direction of a more
democratic selection of the Vice President.
James Reston, New York Times, May 19, 1976
Reporter are usually accused of being too nosey in
their questions to Presidential candidates
but on the
problem of picking Vice Presidents, they have probably
been too casual and even indifferent.
We need to take a hard look at the problem of selection
now, and at least between the end of the primaries in early
June and the opening of the conventions in July, insist on
asking the leaders not only where they are going but who's
going with them.
John Adams, first American Vice President
My country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most
insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived
or his imagination conceived.
I am vice president. In this I am nothing, but I may be
everything.
Daniel Webster, in rejecting the Vice Presidential nomination in 1848
No, thank you. I do not propose to be buried until I am
really dead and in my coffin.
Harry Truman
Look at all the Vice Presidents in history. Where are
they? They were about as useful as a cow's fifth teat.
John Nance Garner, to Lyndon B. Johnson at the 1960 Convention
I'll tell you, Lyndon, the vice presidency isn't worth
a pitcher of warm spit.
Richard M. Nixon, before being elected President
(The Vice Presidency is a) hollow shell--the most ill-
conceived, poorly defined position in the American political
system.
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Spiro T. Agnew, New York Times, August 23, 1972
The very nature of the democratic system in itself precludes
any guarantee that a Vice Presidential nominee will conform to
some platonic idea of who is "perfect" for the job. It is also
the fact that, whatever its imperfections, our present system
has passed the pragmatic test time and again. By this standard
alone, it is immeasurably superior to the retrogressive "reform"
proposals which some critics are now advancing.
Presidential nominee Richard Monckton (a fictional character in
John Erlichman's novel, The Company), talking about his running mate
to an aide just after having received the nomination:
"Having him spend his television time doing a lead into my
taking the stage here. What do you think of that?"
"That's great, if he'll do it," said Flaherty.
Monckton compressed his lips in anger. "Why the hell
shouldn't he do it, if we tell him to?"
"He's a pretty proud man; a former Governor and all that.
He may want to do his own statement."
"Wait, Frank. Let's settle that one thing right now. He's
Vice-President for only one reason: I picked him and put him
there. Doesn't he know that, Frank?"
"Yes, sir, I'm sure he does."
"Then there should be no problem. Just tell him that's
what I've decided, Frank. Cold turkey. He'd better begin to get
used to instructions. Right?"
"Yes, sir."