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This file includes comments on his relationship with Nelson Rockefeller, the Ronald Reagan challenge for the Republican nomination, and the appointment of Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense and George Bush as head of the CIA.
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Rumsfeld, Donald - Interview, 1/25/78
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1510072
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Rumsfeld, Donald - Interview, 1/25/78
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This file includes comments on his relationship with Nelson Rockefeller, the Ronald Reagan challenge for the Republican nomination, and the appointment of Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense and George Bush as head of the CIA.
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A. James Reichley Interview Transcripts
Ford Administration White House Staff Interviews
subjects
President (1974-1977 : Ford). White House Administrative Office. (08/09/1974 - 01/20/1977)
Office of Management and Budget. (07/01/1970 - )
Office of Economic Opportunity. (1964 - 1981)
Presidential appointments
Poverty programs
Energy policy
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1510072
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1977-01-31
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1
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1977
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1969-01-01
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1969
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1
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder "Rumsfeld, Donald - Interview,
1/25/78" of the A. James Reichley Interview Transcripts at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. A. James Reichley donated to the
United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives
collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in
the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are
presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject
to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Interview with Donald Rumsfeld, Jan. 25, 1978.
Rumsfeld said that in his view there had been almost no thread between
Nx
FORD
Frd
the Nixon and Ford and administrations. It was true that both were Republicano
under
administrations but the circumstances iw/which they came into office were so
GERALD
LIBRARY
different that there was little to relate them. Every three to five years,
and problems)
Rumsfeld says, there seems to be a complete change in the situation of the
government, and new problems and new policies are developed to meet these problems.
7nL Thes
After all, between the beginning of the Nixon administration beginning of the
Ford administration, there had been the Vietnam War had wound down, the Watergate
had XXX occurred, the economy had changed radically, the energy problem had ariseny
there was such a difference between 1969 and 1974 that Rumsfeld feels that it WW
feels
very difficult to compare the two administrations. It was even difficult to compare
began
172 with 74 because of She Nixon his second term on the basis of his
enormous election victory. Rumsfeld saw very little continuity between the two
administrations, kitte even little similarity. It's true, Rumsfeld says, that
both administrations were more conservative than their predecessors or their
was worked("
CASE.
successors, and Rumsfeld says he thinks this was a good thing. It
Week
to
the
benefit of the country that they should be more conservative.
Rumsfeld first joined the Nixon administrationin 1969 as director of the
Office of Economic Opportunity. He said that he had several times decided not
to do this, that he preferred to R remain in the House of Representatives, but
OED
was)
******* finally he agreed to make the switch The said about a 51 to 49 decision
on his part with the decision to go to OEO coming down on the 51 side at the
time he decided to move. He said that he did have an interest in the work of OEO,
He Thoughr That he might be able
and the difficulties that the agency was encountering an agency to deal with 1. it into ma.
the problems of human beings, rather than simply a theoretical operation. On the
other side. it seemed to him that he might not be the right person for OEO,
or at least not the perfect person. He said the way in which the agency had been
XX operated had created a great deal of cynicism and hostility among the poor
Not only the poor themselves, but also the mayors and local government officials
was
were disillusioned with the operation of OEO. It Rumsfeld's objective at OEO
- 2 -
it was
to develop activities that would merit a degree of support. He said with his
aim that would do things that would help people rat-her than to hire a lot of people
the approach that had previously, he felt, had been taken. Rumsfeld that he found
at OEO that achieving results took a lot of time, and even then it was hard to measure
the results of his effort. He said that thought he had discovered
no magic wand, but he had thought he had been able to develop some procedures that
helped the poor or at least they had stopped doing things that hurt the poor.
They had stopped doing things that didn't work that had been shown not to work.
Rumsfeld said that the OEO was far outside the XXX mainstream of the Nixon
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
administration, after all, Nixon had campaigned against OEO. When he became President
he found that he had the agency. and the question was what was he going to do with
it? Rumsfeld said that he took the job with the understanding that X he would be
able to proceed in a sensible way. He said that he set out trying to strengthen
the parts of the agency that seemed to be having some effect. Rumsfeld xi said that
directing OEO was not a high morale activity that the job tends toimprison the
person who has to do it but he had tried to operate the as agency in a sensible
and
humane way, following policies that he thought wouldbe these that would be
Avoved
public, you could
wanted by the if you were able to drop a plumb line through the country
whether
and measure popular opinion. He said that he didn't have any clear perception
If
Nixon shared his values on this matter ne said that he very rarely talk to
the President about such matters. He said that he had received very helpful advise
from Moynihan and Burns in the operation of the agency. Moving to his service
under President Ford, I asked Rumsfeld if he felt that he had had enough authority
Fad.
when he was the President's six chief of staff to operate the White House effectively?
Whitts
He said, that every President defines that job himself defines the amount
of authority that he wants to put into it and the person who takes the job must
IF
conform to what the President wants and he doesn't feel comfortable with that he
shouldn't take the job in the first place. Rumsfeld said that few people grasp
the difficulty of operating a White House staff, particularly under the x circumstances
(time To the
1
that faced Ford when Ford came into office. It was a very difficult job and it was
- 3 -
difficult for the President. He said he felt that Ford deserved very high
marks for doing as well as he had done. Rumsfeld said that he thought the
question was, why had Ford done so well? He said that the public perception
of £ Ford's task was nowhere ** near the reality, particularly during the
first six or eight months that It was an extemely difficult time for the
country and for the president. White Ford had the qualities that were most
needed in the presidency at this particular time, Rumsfeld felt. He had
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
the personal qualities the was able to bring a tempo, a manner, an approach
Frd.
to the office that gradually won the confidence of the country the felt
comfortable with the job, felt comfortable with himself, and that began to
give off signals to the public, and the public began to feel greater confidencex
nce Ford k felt comfortable with himself, the public began to feel comfortable
with Ford. PP When Ford entered office, executive xt authority had to a great
extent disintegrated with in the government. Rumsfeld said that the things
(had reached 2 stare n which,
174
had reached a situation in which people within the government if someone said
"
ood morning to them they'd begin to think, What does he really mean by that.
Under such circumstances communication becomes impossible. This ad attitude
of doubt and suspicion had infected the entire country. Not only the
White House, but the Congress and the judiciary were ffected. The attitude
of cyncism had deveoped 1 momentum and inertia, of their OWN The question
was, Rumsfeld said, how do you change it? you can't just say the sky is
(You)
ed
blue and people begin believing it againy you/have to figure out ways to
develop communication, to send out the signals to the country that things are
secure once more. Under our system, Rumsfeld said, the president cannot
commandy de said that the country responds like a "wet noodle" if the
president tries to command the United States. You have to introduce
There has
consultation, you have to be an evolutionary adjustment. The problem was that
the people wore not focusing on what was going on in Washington or rather
they were focusing their disbelief, the most basic kind of trust had been
- 4
upsetx this, Rumsfeld said, ffects everything. Fortunately, Ford was
the sort of man who likes peoplex The likes to reach out to peoplev We likes
to encourage as much participationas possible, and he did reach out and people
began to respond. With a president who did not have Ford's qualities, Rumsfeld
saids
so
thaT the country Would not have healed nearly as/quickly. But Ford was
unselfconscious, he didn't fretx he didn't worry about things, the lived n
in the present and the future ne did not anguish over the past. By sending
FORD
out signals of security and confidence he began to affect those who were
working with him. Ford was a man who enjoyed discussion, debate, argument
GERALD
LIBRARY
over issues and policiesy he was remarkably aware of everything that was
going on in the government. Anyone can send a one-dimensional memo to
to bring in)
the President, Rumsfeld said but Ford like the third dimension of the intensity
He
of feeling S the subtleties of personal reaction and therefore likes to deal
face-to-face with people. Through his service in la the House, Ford had come
to understand the things that make the country go. It's true that this
seek
Cuna
congressional experience had led him to think a synthesis of opinon but
exp.
Rumsfeld feels that this is the proper way for the President behave under our
system of government.
That
Ford
was sought a product that was representative
of the country The had respect for the genius of the systemy ne had tolerance
and respect for people working for him and for Congress. Rumsfeld said that in
the Congress, Ford had been aware that every guy there was there for a reason
and If if you find out the reason why he's there then you get to know something
about America. Rumsfeld said that some people curl up their lips at Congress
Consi
and at congressmen) that they have a low opinion of the intelligence and
pvs.
integrity of congressmenx but that this grows out of the disrespect for
BUT
individuals Rumsfeld said that Ford understood that under out system all
the XX marbles are not given to the President, that the system depends on a
fruitful mix of the efforts of the Congress and the President, that each
is
given its own responsibilities. Ford understood that the President has things
- 5 -
that he's given to do, and things that he is not permitted to do. Ford had
an inate consciousness of how this interaction works. Rumsfeld disagreed
that there is any particular difference between executive and legislative
leadership. He said, that both kinds of leadership are aimed at bringing
fruition.
XX matters to Rumsfeld said that gettingocongressional staff to function,
or
a
congressional committee to function, requires leadership of people in much
direction or The
the same way that an executive) requires leadership. Rumsfeld said that
branchI
Ford had taken a more collegial approach to the presidency than had been done
recently, but that Rumsfeld thinks this is the way it should be done.
It
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Nx.
It was a great problem for Ford as to whether or not to clean the Nixon
tups
TOE
people out, Rumsfeld said. He was subjected to two tongues, that one tongue
ppli
told him that it would be XX better for his standing if the Nixon people seemed
to be gone but on the other hand, he recognized that these were decent human
beings they had never done anything wrong and In In addition to that they were W
skilled people the needed their skills to operate the administration. His great
la rmcy
problem was that the administration under Nixon had come to be regarded as both
externally and internally illegitimate and here was a need to restore XX a
a great need
sense of legitimacy to govern. There was a need for continuity but alsolfor
change or a sense of change What was necessary Ford decided was to remove the
of Nixon people
critical mass that was would allow the government to become legitimate again>
he
He
therefore xx decided to make a minimal number of changes.
did not try to
made
change everybody but he wanted to make sufficient changes to achieve legitimacy.
His aim was to create a Ford presidency rather than a Nx Nixon presidency over
which Ford was now presiding. When Ford first came in he felt that he was
presiding over something that was not his and it was necessary to change this,
both internally and externally so that Ford would be seen to merit trust. At
such change
remained
dearler, the same time this would have a cleansing effect on those who were named API asked
had
Rumsfeld if he and Ford/felt the need to move things out to the departments
"
that
Rumsfeld said, they did not feel the need, but they did feel/it was desirable.
- 6 -
that
Rumsfeld said/both I he and Ford felt that one problem faced by the
executive branch is that Congress is not properly organizedy it's very difficult
therefore for the executive to fit its activities into the committee structure
of Congress. Rumsfeld xx said that he and Ford do not believe in the concept
of an all-powerful White House they did not believe that it was necessary to
draw out all the threads through a single needle head. He said that he and Ford
that
recognized the people in the departments and the agencies must deal with
(thercture)
Congress and the public that they are somewhat less insulated from interaction
with the people than the White House. People inthe White House tend to be
less experienced, to have less interaction with the public than the department
heads. For this reason Ford decided toplace great reliance on his cabinet.
(thing
Ford hast selected a very credible cabinet, Rumsfeld feels. One
4
Rumsfeld detected during the transition period was that there was a great
tha FORD LIBRARY
OMB
sense of hostility between the Treasury and OMB and from other agencies **
toward OMB. The hostility was more directed toward OMB than toward toward
the White House from the agencies. What had happened, Rumsfeld says, was that
Nixon was so busy with Watergate that OMB had begun running "a hell of a 1otx"
this had caused considerable K frustration in the departmentSx Rumsfeld,
limitarion
therefore, recommended some on the authority of OMB. It is not really
sprmarl,
a matter of pulling in and pushing out authority, Rumsfeld saidy the President
Strevi
can never give total authority to cabinet officers, but X at the same time
Ford was determined not to delegate authority to the White House staff. The
the
problems they faced was that so many issues did not fe fit into neat compartments
ser UP
that are dealt with th by the federal governmenty and When there are several
departments and agencies involved inevitably decision of must pass up to the
White House.
- 7 -
Rumsfeld said that he did not comment on the choice of Rockefeller
Rok.
for Vice President, Ford told him at the beginning of the administration
that he was considering three possibilities for vice presidenty Rumsfeld,
(did
Rockefeller, (The') and Bush, Rumsfeld x very deliberately not got involved
in
selection process. Rumsfeld said that he is aware that Rockefeller
felt that he had a problem Rocketelle with the White House staffy Rumsfeld said that
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
he feld badly that felt that way. He said that he respected the way
Rockefeller had pitched in and helped the President. He said that the hostility
that had grown up between himself and Rockefeller need not have happened, he
thought, but he wasn't sure how X he could have avoided it. He said that
Rockefeller xxxx became angry when he circulated Rockfeller's proposal for an
Insependence
En.
energy
and
agency. He said that Rockfeller had said, that he was trying
Ind.
to sandbag the idea for the agency. But Rumsfeld had said that the President
Agucy.
had asked him to do this and of course he carried out the President's instructions,
that he wanted to get many different points of view onthe agency. He said that
he himself had been against the agency, but he had not really tried to
(iex)
undercut) be said that it seemed only reasonable to him that the people
I
2nd
that had to budget for such an agency would have to testify XX before Congress should
be given the opportunity to comment on it before it was proposed by the President.
propos
for
rne
Independence
He said that the President did finally send up the energy agency proposalt but
Zzency,
that he had never supported (did it. Rumsfeld then quickly added least as
far as know the President had not support it."
Rennxt Rumsfeld said
purposely
that he had purposefully tried not to inject himself into the relationship
between the President and the Vice President.
Rumsfeld said that he felt Rockefeller and others who had disagreed with
the President had directed their ag anger at him. He said that he understood this
thought that his proper function in part was to serve as a lightening rod for
the President. He said that people tend not to blame the President when things
273inst their wishess
(Rumsteld
go they like to x blame the people around him instead and he was satisfield
enough with this. Rumsfeld said off the record, that. frankly, 'one of his major
- 8 -
Independence
reasons for not supporting the energy and dependence agency was that he did not
(WIN)
think that Ford could not stand X another
fiasco.
Rumsfeld said that he
him to
had strongly disagreed with the President's decision to send into/ the Pentagon
Sohk, in place of James Schlesingerk he said that the felt that it was too late for the
President to change his cabinet, ne had had his cabinet and that he should
"Runsteld Ford
support it.
he
thought (had passed the point when cabinet changes were
FORD & LIBRARY
appropriate XX the felt it was not the president's interest to X make changes
the President
in his cabinet. but he found to be very stubborn would not move on it.
Rumsteld
particularly had objected to placing himself and Bush in positions where they
could not participate in the campaign. He said that he and Bush were both men WI
who had a background in politics and they should be able to be helpful during
the
****** campaign but by placing them at the CIA and Defense it effectively
took them out of politics. He said that putting Bush at the CIA effectively ruled
said he
him out of consideration for the vice-presidency, and Rumsfeld, thought this was a
mistake, too X the thought the President should preserve his options on the
(he thought
vice presidency. He said that the decision to bring back Elliot Richardson to
Commerce he was a wise decision, this placed Richardson in a position
where he could be selected for the vice-presidency, and also could be helpful in a
political year. I asked Rumsfeld if had felt when he went to the Defense Department
that the defense budget should be increased? He said, that he had opinions
Sns, through his work at NATO and through having worked on the xxxx defense budget and
bdar
participated in National Security Council meetings, but he did not have convinctions.
After a short period at Defense in which he did almost nothing but review budget
matters of the Defense Depar tment and receive intelligence briefings, ecept for
some time devoted to SALT and after going through all this information, it was
That
absolutely clear to him ) there was no doubt in his mind the United States was falling
behind the Soviet Union unless it increased its budget substantially in order to
preserve an effective defense system.
Ran.
Rumsfeld said he did not think the administration had been slow in taking the
Reagen threat seriously. that it always regarded Reagen's entry as a serious possibility
- 9 -
But, he said, there were various ways to deal with the challenge. ONe he said Throuzh (Through would
be to confront it directly. and the other would be to deal with it indirectly from
the President's incumbency. He said that both he and the President had agreed
that the best way to deal with the problem was both from the country's
standpoint and From the President's political standpoint ) was for the President to carry
R7k.
out his incumbency and not deal with the problem directly. They had decided to
take the indirect route, to take advantage of the President 1/1 incumbency. Rumsfeld
the
said that it was true that Reagen's challenge had some effect on be policies
he said,
of the administrationy but of course so does the weather, so does the way the
President feels and he said that this is all part of the political interaction to through
whichthe system operates.
the President interacts with Congress, he
interacts with his opponents within his own party this is the way issues
are raised, and the way they are dealt with through our system. He said that he
didn't think Reagen's challenge had ffected the policies of the Defense Department
in any way.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD