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Press Conference of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
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Press Conference of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
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Digitized from Box 5 of the White House Press Releases at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 20, 1974
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Tokyo, Japan)
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
HOTEL OKURA
5:25 P.M.
(JAPAN TIME)
MR. NESSEN: Ladies and gentlemen, as we
promised for the report on today's meeting with the
Prime Minister and the President and on the final
communique which has been issued, we have Dr. Kissinger.
And there is a dinner tonight at the Akasaka Palace
which Dr. Kissinger has to go and prepare for, so
he would like to stay with you about a maximum of
30 minutes.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen,
let me sum up the communique, the meeting of the President
with the Prime Minister this morning, and the meeting
between the Foreign Minister and myself this afternoon
because they all cover similar topics.
First of all, let me take this occasion on
behalf of everybody on the American delegation to
thank the Japanese Government for the excellence of
the arrangements, cordiality, the hospitality with
which we have been received, and for the meticulousness
of the planning.
Secondly, before I get into any of the
specifics, I would like to say that perhaps the most
important result of the visit-beyond any of the specifics
that were discussed--has been the frankness, cordiality
and completeness of our exchanges. And the reference in
the communique to the fact that this first visit by
the Incumbent President will add a new page to the
history of amity between the two countries was put into
practice in the discussions.
MORE
(OVER)
- 2 -
The discussions today concentrated primarily
in the morning on an elaboration of the review of the
international situation that was begun yesterday
which is based on the premise that Japan and the United
States must understand each other's purposes and
harmonize them in the common interest of the two countries
and of world peace.
There was a review of Chinese relationships,
Soviet relationships, and indeed a review of the whole
world situation. There were discussions of the Middle
East. Foreign Minister Kimura told us about his meetings
with the Egyptian leaders on his recent trip and we
exchanged views as to the prospects of peace in the
Middle East. And we believe that there are possibilities
for hopeful negotiations.
But there was a general understanding that
security in the present age cannot be confined to
military matters, but that the cooperation between
Japan and the United States in the field of energy, in
the field of food, represent a new and positive
dimension of the security which must be added to this
already established military security--traditional
security -- relationship.
There was, as I have pointed out, an exchange
of views in which the Japanese told us about develop-
ments in the latest exchanges in September on the occasion
of the United Nations General Assembly and Japanese and
Chinese relationships, and we did the same with respect
to U.S.-Chinese relationships.
Of course, as you know, at the request of
the President, Iam returning here after the trip to
Vladivostok and after my visit to Peking to brief
the Japanese leaders about those developments.
MORE
- 3 -
We consider the exchanges here to have been of
an extraordinarily useful and important character and
they lay the basis for a new era of partnership between
Japan and the United States.
Now, I will be glad to answer your questions.
Q
Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the
results of the visit exceeded the expectations of the
President, and if so, in what specific ways?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say that the
results of the visit achieved perhaps the optimum of what
one had hoped for. We have always attached the greatest
importance to the friendship between Japan and the United
States.
One can never, in advance of any visit or any
exchange of views, predict how intense and how far-ranging
the exchange will actually be. But I would say this
exchange has been as candid, as frank and as constructive
as any I have attended since I have been in Washington and
has had the most positive results.
Q
Are there any specific results you can cite?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that the approach
that was taken to the question of energy, the question of
food, to the realization of the interdependence of the
present world economy and world political structure was
of very considerable scope.
Q
Mr. Secretary, were your meetings with
officials other than the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister -- specifically the International Trade Minister
and Mr. Ohira - designed to determine in any way whether
Japanese policy would continue as it is regardless of
what happened?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The meeting with Finance
Minister Ohira and Minister Nakasone were at the request
of those two Ministers and they were not initiated by us.
They were, however, natural requests. The Finance
Minister, as you know, was Foreign Minister until
August, and I worked closely with him until that time.
We established a very close working relationship
and, of course, the problem of energy and food has impli-
cations also for finance.
Minister Nakasone was a student of mine at
Harvard and I have never been in Japan without having
seen him and it would have been unnatural for me to refuse
to see him when he suggested a meeting.
MORE
- 4 -
In other words, the meetings were in no way
designed to deal with the Japanese domestic situation
or to gain any particular reassurances. We believe the
Japanese policy is likely to remain stable.
Peter?
Q
Was the Japanese Foreign Minister sanguine
about the prospects of a peaceful negotiation in the Middle
East?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the Japanese
Foreign Minister ought to speak for himself and he, of
course, visited in the Middle East only Cairo.
As far as I am concerned, I don't know if
sanguine is exactly the right word. I have indicated that
I believe there are possibilities for a step-by-step
approach. I recognize that the situation in the Middle
East is extremely complicated and that there are many
issues involved.
I do believe, however, that with the determination
and the good will, there are possibilities for progress
in the Middle East and I think the Japanese Foreign Minister
should speak for himself, though I did not have the
impression that he disagreed with my views.
Q
Mr. Secretary, did you seek a specific commit-
ment from the Japanese Government to participate
in the financial safety net and, if so, what was the
Government's reaction?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We did not go into the
detail of every individual measure that I have proposed.
We discussed, in general terms, the importance of consumer
cooperation along the lines of my speech and of a dialogue
that would grow out of this with the producers.
We will have further discussions on the individual
measures and on the implementation of the program, but
I had the impression that there was a general sympathy
to the approach.
Q
Mr. Secretary, was there anything in Section
3 of the Communique dealing with nuclear weapons control
that should be interpreted as referring to the question
of transit of nuclear weapons in Japan?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I discussed that subject
yesterday.
MORE
- 5 -
Q
I understand, but the Communique did not
refer to that.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not beyond anything I
have said since yesterday.
Q
As specifically as you can, were any
assurances given Japan about pooling of energy resources
by the United States should there be another oil squeeze?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I must say, beginning a
question as specifically as you have wounds me deeply. It
is also against my professorial training.
Q
As generally as you would like.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The sharing of oil supplies
is part of the emergency program that was ratified last
week and that will be formally adopted this week. There
were no additional commitments made.
However, the United States has made it clear that
it believes that consumer solidarity is an important element
in overcoming the difficulties produced by the energy crisis
and that it will work closely with the Japanese Government
and other interested governments in dealing with this issue
on the basis of consumer solidarity and I repeat, I believe
we had very fruitful and constructive exchanges on that
range of issues.
Q
Were there any additional agreements?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was no discussion
on going beyond the emergency program that has just been
adopted three or four days ago, so there was no reason
to reach any additional agreements.
Q
You said the United States is prepared to
maintain a stable food supply to Japan. Do you contemplate
being able to increase the level of supply to meet the increas-
ing demand in Japan?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me explain the United
States basic approach to the food problem which we reviewed
again today in some detail in my meeting with the Foreign
Minister, and on which I believe there is a general
agreement.
And it is an approach that got overshadowed by the
debate on food aid. The United States believes that the
basic problem of world food supply requires some structural
adjustment. There is now in the underdeveloped countries
a food shortage of about 25 million tons which will increase,
may increase, to as much as 85 million tons over a decade.
MORE
- 6 -
We, therefore, believe that it is important to
increase agricultural production in the underdeveloped
countries and to provide food reserves to cushion against
emergencies.
In both of these efforts, we believe that the
Japanese Government will cooperate with us, especially
with respect to the underdeveloped countries which is
a problem of technology. And we will have some exchanges
on that subjects
To the degree that food production rises in
those countries, more food supplies will also become
available in the United States. To andwer your question
specifically, we will give special attention to the
needs of Japan. We will, in planning our own export,
also try to do this on a more long-term basis than has
been the case in the past and we will have intense consul-
tations with Japan on what can be done to assure their
needs.
Q
Mr. Secretary, Japanese officials were
basically sympathetic to your oil proposal. What have
they learned since last Friday when they were basically
unsympathetic?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was not here last Friday
so I don't know what they said last Friday. I can only say
what they said this week.
Q
Mr. Secretary, have you had any requests for
a meeting by either Mr. Fukuda or Mr. Miki, and in
particular, Mr. Shina? If so, have you met them, or have you
talked with them any other way?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not had a request for
a meeting. I have run into Mr. Fukuda at social functions
as I have also with Mr. Miki, but just to exchange a few
words and neither of them requested a meeting.
Q
Were there any discussions on Korea?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was just a very
brief discussion about the relationship between Korean
security and the security of Japan, but there was no
detailed, further discussions.
Helen?
Q
Do you have any plans to see Le Duc Tho
in Peking?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.
MORE
-6-A-
Q
When you are traveling there?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.
Q
In Moscow?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no plans to see Le Duc
Tho anywhere.
Q Never?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Never is a very long time,
but I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho on his current
trip, which I understand is to last two weeks. I read
that in the newspapers. But I have no plans to meet
Le Duc Tho.
Q
Mr. Secretary, the President seems to spend
a lot of his time in ceremonial activities here. Wasn't
it an unusual sort of program?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the President spent
a considerable amount of time on the bilateral talks. In
addition, he spent some time on ceremonial activities
which, as I explained before we came here, constitute an
important element in the symbolism of the relationship
and in the mood which is such an important attribute
in which decisions tend to be made in this country.
Q
Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why Mr. Rums-
feld is accompanying you to China?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: When we were flying
across the Pacific, Mr. Rumsfeld suggested that maybe on
my next trip to China I would take him along. I then
said, "Well, as long as you are here this time, why don't
we see whether we can still arrange it?"
I asked the President what he thought about it
and the President thought it would be a good idea if his
Chief of Staff had some exposure to China. The explanation
is as simple as this: It was an off-the-cuff idea that
occurred to us as we were crossing the Pacific. I believe
it will be helpful to have the President's Chief of Staff
have some exposure to China but it has no profound significance
beyond this.
MORE
- 7 -
Q
On the nuclear issue, what kind of
further understandings came out between you and the
President and the Japanese leaders?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mentioned yesterday
the discussions and, of course, there are always
discussions within the framework -- the mutual security
treaty that permits issues to be raised -- and, as I have
said, we will take into account the very special
sensitivities of the Japanese people with respect to
nuclear weapons.
Q
Mr. Secretary, did you talk about U.S.
and Japan's general approach to Siberian development
planning?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Japanese side
explained to us the general approach to Siberian develop-
ment planning. We are in no position to make any judgments
until the trade bill and the export-import bank bill
have been passed by our Congress. And therefore we will
have to defer any decision and consideration of these
issues until that time.
Q
Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions with
Japanese officials and former officials, have you made
any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't made any
inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics.
It is impossible to have lunch with press people without
being told certain things, but you must be as familiar
with those as I am.
Q
Mr. Secretary, the answer that the
President gave in Phoenix on the subject of the PLO
was a bit confusing. At one point he referred to the
desirability of Israel negotiating with the parties,
and another time he was saying negotiations among nations. Could
you say whether the United States favors negotiations
with Israel and the PLO?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think I went into that
issue in detail at my press conference on Friday before
we left Washington. I made clear then that the United
States is not urging anybody to negotiate with anybody
else, and any negotiation is, of course, up to the
parties concerned. And it is our understanding that
Israel has refused to negotiate with the PLO.
Q
What was meant when the President
said today at the Press Club, "We will not compete
with our friends for their markets or for their resources."
Is there a carving up of sections of the world into
Japanese markets and into American markets?
MORE
- 8 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think what the President
had in mind is we do not look at our relationship with
Japan in terms of competition but that the relationship
between the industrial nations and especially between
Japan and the United States in the Pacific area should
be on the basis of cooperation, and that in an expanding
world economy, there is sufficient place for both of
us.
There is no carving up of markets that was
discussed or is contemplated.
Q
Mr. Secretary, do you think the next time
an American President visits Japan, visits Tokyo, he
could do it without having 25,000 police mobilized for
his visit?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the security
arrangements for the visit of any President are, of
course, up to the host government, and it is natural
that they would tend to over-insure his safety.
Q
Dr. Kissinger, I would like to say
further, your statement yesterday about the United
States position on industrial oil consumers and their
cooperation seems milder than the tone of your speech in
Chicago just before you left.
Is that a correct interpretation, and if so, has
the position softened as a result of talks with the
Japanese?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our position is unchanged.
Our position is that the industrial oil consumers have
to cooperate and establish some basic principles before
there can be a productive dialogue with the producers.
This position has not softened. It is not a position of
confrontation either, because we believe that the ultimate
solution must be found on a cooperative basis.
In developing cooperation among the consumers,
obviously consideration has to be given to the special
circumstances of individual countries in applying these
various measures that were proposed. This is what I
intended to point out yesterday. But the position remains
as I outlined it on Thursday.
Q
Mr. Secretary, there has been renewed
speculation -- I know you answered this last Friday --
but there has been renewed speculation that the fact
that you and the President are meeting Mr. Brezhnev.
in Vladivostok has been a source of irritation in
Peking. Is there any substance to that?
MORE
- 9 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have had no indication
whatever from Peking directly or indirectly through any
sources that have reached us that it is a source of
irritation to Peking. I repeat, we have had opportunity
to obtain Peking's views.
Q
Mr. Secretary, on your Chicago speech,
you said you had the impression the Japanese Government
was sympathetic to the approach spelled out in that
speech. When do you anticipate seeing some concrete
evidence of that?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that over the
next month concrete exchanges will begin on the implementa-
tion of these ideas with various consuming countries
and I think that my statement will then be proved
correct.
Q
Dr. Kissinger, in view of the
Japanese expression yesterday of their difficulty with
reducing their energy consumption by the standards
you outlined in Chicago, did you give them any refine-
ment, especially for Japan to think about over the
next month or so?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is very
important to separate two things -- the basic approach
and individual technical applications of it on a
Presidential trip with the relatively limited amount
of time that is available.
The conversations have to concentrate on the
basic approach. They cannot go into the details of all
the technical matters.
Secondly, as I pointed out yesterday, we
did not say consumption had to be reduced by 10 percent
in every country. We said that over a period of ten
years, imports should be kept level by the whole group
on the basis of consumption restraints and the develop-
ment of new sources of energy.
The precise apportionment within the group
of either consumption restraints or the bringing into
being of new sources of energy has to be discussed.
I would like to remind you the same problems
existed when the emergency sharing program was first
proposed last February and it took about three or
four months to work out all the details. This is
a technically highly complex issue, but we are on
the whole encouraged by the talks that took place
here.
MORE
- 10 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, how does the President feel
about his first big foreign trip?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think he feels ex-
tremely good about it.
Q
Did he talk to you about it and say why?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: He talked to me about it
in the two minutes from the South Wing of the Okura to
the main building and, therefore, I don't think he
could give me all the refinements of his judgement in that
period.
Q
Mr. Secretary, now that we are going to leave
Japan and go to Korea, can you tell us whether the President
is going to express any degree of dissatisfaction with
the degree of political oppression in South Korea?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have stated the importance
that we attach to the security of South Korea. We have
also, I believe, made clear our general view with respect
to the form of domestic conduct we prefer but I do not
want to predict now what the President will discuss in
his private talks with President Park.
Q
Mr. Secretary, there has been considerable
talk in the Defense Department over the last few years
about reducing the size of U.S. troops in South Korea.
Are we about to do that now, has the decision been made
to do that? Is that why you are going to Korea?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are not going to South
Korea in order to discuss--much less to announce any
reduction of forces. We are going to South Korea for
the reason that I indicated before. It is an ally. It
is a country whose security is important not only to the
United States but also to Japan and it would have created
all the wrong impressions for the President to be in
Japan Korea. and not pay the visit over such a short distance to
Q
Mr. Secretary, did the President and Tanaka
discuss the implications of the India nuclear explosion?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not in my presence, and
I was present at all the meetings.
Q
Dr. Kissinger, I believe you did not answer
the last question, which was: Are we going to reduce the
troops in South Korea?
Your answer was, "We are not going to discuss, much
less announce it."
But are we going to reduce?
MORE
- 11 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know of no plans. There
are no plans to reduce troops in Korea.
I will take two more questions.
Q Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding
that Israel is refusing to negotiate with PLO, Palestinians
in general, or only those Palestinians who want a separate
Palestinian state?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't had an opportunity
to learn all the refinements of the Israeli position on
that point. My understanding is that they will not nego-
tiate with the PLO and I am not familiar with any other
group that labels itself Palestinian that has come forward
as a candidate for negotiations.
Last question.
Q
Have you received any explanation why the
Japanese Parliament hasn't yet been presented with a bill
to ratify the nuclear non-proliferation treat and are you
satisfied with the explanations?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Since we have not received
such an explanation on this trip, I can't, obviously, ex-
press any satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it. The
United States favors the ratification of the non-prolifera-
tion treat.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END (AT 5:08 P.M. Japan Time)