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7341719
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Press Conference of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
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7341719
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Press Conference of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
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White House Press Releases (Ford Administration)
Press Releases
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1975-11-28
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1975
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Digitized from Box 18 of the White House Press Releases at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 28, 1975
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
450 EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
3:38 P.M. EST
Q
Dr. Kissinger, who was your recommendation for
the Supreme Court?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I wanted to say my
recommendation was that it should be somebody who had a mind
uncluttered by legal knowledge -- political scientist with a
foreign perspective. (Laughter)
Q
Have you volunteered?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: That was one of the obstacles
I had. (Laughter)
Q
Can you give us your expectation and not your
hope of the chances for an extension of the UN towards a
mandate on the Golan Heights issue?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Security Council is
meeting today. I don't know whether it has formally met yet
but there are intensive consultations. The Secretary General
has reported about his trip to the Middle East and I want
to take this occasion to pay tribute to his untiring efforts
and to his effective role. I think progress is being made
and the chances are much better than they looked earlier this
week.
There are still one or two problems that have to
be ironed out, but I am more optimistic than I was earlier
this week.
Q
Mr. Kissinger, the President said at his
press conference that he hoped the Soviet Union would get
the message from this country on the intervention in Angola,
a sentiment that you indicated you shared when you were in
Detroit. Do you have any sign that they have gotten the
message? Have you had any response from them?
MORE
- 2 -
Q
Question?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is whether the
Soviet Union has gotten the message about Angola.
We have not yet had a conclusive reply. We have
had a preliminary exchange.
Q
Mr. Secretary, I was going to ask you if you
feel thoroughly comfortable now with Mr. Moynihan?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have always felt thoroughly
comfortable with Mr. Moynihan. I don't know how often I can
repeat it. Mr. Moynihan has been a good friend of mine
whom I recommended for every diplomatic position he has held
in this and in the previous Administration. Give or take an
adjective, I have agreed with what he has done and said in
New York. It is my responsibility, as Secretary of State,
to relate what happens in New York to other aspects of our
foreign policy so I inevitably have to think of the broader
canvas.
On Ambassador Moynihan's role in New York, I was
comfortable with him before, I am comfortable with him now;
he was a good friend of mine before, he is a good friend of
mine now; he had my full support and he continues to have my
full support.
Q Mr. Secretary, in the confirmation hearings
you testified the United States played only a minor part
in the 1970 election in Chile. Since then we have had the
Senate report where Director Helms testified about the
September 15, 1970, meeting which you attended where
President Nixon ordered the CIA to help stage a military
coup to block Allende from taking power.
Now do you think those two statements that the
U.S. played a minor role in the events listed in the Senate
report can be reconciled?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The essential elements of the
report, when all the mass of detail is stripped away from it,
are that the President asked that they look into the possibility
of a coup and that this was turned off on October 15 and that
the group which did it was not the group with which they looked
into it. Those are the essential elements, and this is in the
report.
If you strip away all the phrases and all this
massive documentation, those are the key facts and those are
absolutely consistent with what was said.
Q
May I follow that up? The CIA was not turned
off. Why weren't you supervising the CIA so it did get turned
off?
MORE
- 3 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I stick by what I have said.
What was done on October 22 was not what was done by the CIA.
Q
What about all the CIA activities after
October 15 when you said they were turned off?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have made the essential point
that can be reconciled that is in the report, and beyond that
I do not want to go now.
Q
Mr. Secretary, back to Angola for a moment.
Can you foresee any set of circumstances under which the
United States might intervene militarily in Angola?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has no plans
to intervene militarily in Angola.
Q
That is either by direct or sending military
arms there by MAP?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I said the United States cannot
be indifferent to what is going on but the United States will
not intervene militarily in Angola.
Q
Mr. Secretary, on that, some of us at the
President's news conference the other night sensed a certain
hardening of the U.S. position towards the Soviet Union from
this reaction to the question on Angola and also his reaction
on a possible Ford-Brezhnev meeting, saying there will be no
meeting until progress is made. Is the United States more
unhappy now with the Soviet Union because of the Angola
situation and has there been a hardening of the U.S. attitude
toward Moscow?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have never liked characterizing
foreign policy in terms of soft or hard. The United States
objects to what the Soviet Union is doing in Angola. The
United States believes that the relaxed policy of relaxation
of tensions with the Soviet Union is essential for our two
countries and for the peace of the world. We have seen no
viable alternative that anybody has put up to the policy of
relaxation of tensions except rhetoric. We will, therefore,
pursue it.
We believe that the limitation of strategic arms
is essential. We are prepared to modify our position if the
Soviet Union is prepared to modify its own and we will make a
serious effort to bring about a limitation of strategic arms.
The relationship between us and the Soviet Union
must clearly be based on reciprocity. It cannot be done by
one country alone. When we take the effort seriously, we will
resist unilateral efforts and unilateral measures by the Soviets
and we will not make the unilateral concessions in SALT but
the basis for a relaxation of tensions exists and we will pursue
it with great seriousness of purpose.
MORE
- 4 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, what is your view on the alleged
help given by South Africa to one of the factions in Angola?
Do you see that as seriously as you do the Soviet alleged
intervention in Angola?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: To the best of my knowledge,
the South Africans are not engaged officially; that is,
they are not engaged with their own military forces, but we
would prefer all outside forces, all outside intervention
to cease.
Q
Is each side seemingly ready to change its
proposal on SALT, and are you going to Moscow?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are discussing the possibility
of a trip to Moscow, and if I go, you can assume that it is on
the basis that both sides will modify their position. It does
not mean that the modified position necessarily will lead to
an agreement but at least we will not be talking on either side
on the basis of the old proposals.
Q
Mr. Secretary, may I ask one more question on
Chile? Were you saying that the CIA was out of control when
they shipped three submachine guns by diplomatic pouch?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have said the essence of
this, I have said what is in the report. I do not think it
is appropriate for me to get into any further questions and
I have stated the essence of the issue in relation to your
first question.
Q
Mr. Secretary, what are the chances of your
going to Moscow to discuss SALT in the near future?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The possibility exists.
THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
END
(AT 3:47 P.M. EST)