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Press Conference of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger on U.S. Relations with China
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Press Conference of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger on U.S. Relations with China
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Digitized from Box 18 of the White House Press Releases at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
DECEMBER 4, 1975
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Peking, China)
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
8:37 A.M. EST
MR. NESSEN: Secretary Kissinger is here to give
you substantive information about the meetings. I don't
know whether you really need to talk to the Secretary tonight.
But to fill in any small details you haven't gotten over the
past couple of days, we have the Secretary of State.
I think Henry will have a few things to say to you
in summary of the meetings and then we will respond to your
questions.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me summarize what has
gone on and let me draw some conclusions.
There are three aspects of our relationship. There
is the attitude of both the People's Republic and the United
States towards international affairs.
Secondly, there is the problem of the normalization
of relations.
Thirdly, there are the various bilateral arrangements
that exist in such fields as trade, culture and scientific
exchanges.
As has been pointed out in all of the toasts and
all of the public statements, the basic concern of both
sides, what has brought us together and what has sustained
the relationship is the perception of the international
environment and the greater part of our conversations here
concerned the international situation.
With respect to normalization, the Shanghai
Communique committed the United States to complete the
process of normalization. This has been reaffirmed by the
President here, both in public statements and towards the
leaders of China.
With respect to the bilateral relationships, we
have agreed to pursue them and we will be improving them and
they will be improved steadily in the channels appropriate for
them -- that is to say, trade channels and the others that
are appropriate.
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- 2 -
There has been a great deal of speculation that
relations between the People's Republic and the United
States have cooled. This is not the perception of the United
States and I am confident it is not the perception of the
Chinese leaders. We believe that the relations between the
United States and the People's Republic of China are good,
and we are confident that they will be improved steadily in the
months and years ahead.
We reviewed the global situation in considerable
detail, both in the talks between the President and the
Vice Premier, as well as in the talks, the rather searching
and detailed talks that took place between Chairman Mao
and the President.
While obviously there are some differences, there
are also many common approaches, and the talks were extremely
useful in enabling the leaders of both sides to understand
the perceptions of the other and to see where parallel
policies can be pursued.
With respect to the process of normalization, there
is really little to add to what has already been said in
the Shanghai Communique and to the fundamental statements
which were made there, except to confirm that direction again.
As for trade exchanges, as I have said, they will
be continued and developed in the forums that are appropriate
for them. We are very satisfied with the visit. We think
the talks have been constructive, the atmosphere has been
excellent.
I was sometimes shaken when I read some accounts
of the local residents, but I was reassured again when I
went to the meetings, though the atmosphere was good and
the talks were, as I said, extremely useful, and I think with
this I would rather get to your questions and see what I
can say that is more specific.
I would like to mention one thing. During the
course of the day today the Vice Premier, in the conversation
with the President this morning, responded to some requests
we had made to the People's Republic over a period of months
with respect to individuals that have been missing in action
in or near China over the last decade, and we received some
detailed information with respect to some of the requests
that have been made, and also information about the remains
of two missing in action. Obviously, we will want to notify
the next of kin but we appreciate very much this gesture by
the People's Republic.
Q Will any of them turn up alive, Dr. Kissinger?
Can you tell us?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, we are talking about
two parties and information about several others.
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- 3 -
Q
How many others?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the information
concerned about -- I think it was eight people altogether.
But as soon as all the families are notified we will relay
that information.
Q
How soon will they be notified?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Within the next 48 hours.
Q
Mr. Secretary, if the 1972 visit by President
Nixon was the week that changed the world, how would you
characterize this one?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: In 1972 we established a new
relationship and in 1975 the problem was to fit that relation-
ship and to elaborate that relationship in an existing
architecture. It therefore, obviously, by definition, could
not have the character of a new departure. But it is now
a more mature relationship in which one now does not discuss
how to begin but how in the present international environment
the United States and the People's Republic of China can
pursue parallel policies where their interests converge.
Q
Can you, Dr. Kissinger, give us any examples
to itemize this very last remark you made, sir?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is whether I
could give examples of where we have parallel policies.
I would think that the United States' perception and
the Chinese perception of the importance of European unity
and European cooperation and the European cooperation with
the United States would be one. I think the perception of
both countries about their relationship with Japan would be
very similar and in many other parts of the world there
would be, as I said, parallel conventions.
Q Mr. Secretary, will you reject the suggestion
that the parallel policies seem to be based primarily on a
mutual fear of what the Soviet Union might be doing?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say that the parallel
policies, or the parallel views consist of the perceptions
of what is needed to maintain world peace and equilibrium.
Q
Mr. Secretary, how much of the time did you
spend negotiating with the Chinese leaders, let's say, on the
subject of U.S.-Soviet detente, and could you give us some
consideration about what the Chinese were requesting of the
United States and how the United States responded?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, the Chinese
did not request anything of the United States with respect
to detente, and we didn't request anything of the People's
Republic of China.
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- 4 -
The Chinese, as is known from their public state-
ments -- actually cannot be avoided in the public statement --
has some very firm views of the nature of the threat that
they believe that the world faces. We are not as convinced
of the inevitability of war. But should the Chinese
interpretation be correct, and should there be military
expansion, I believe that the United States would see the
problem quite similarly.
The United States is opposed to military expansion
and were it to happen the United States, as a whole record
in the post-war period makes clear for 30 years, would resist
it. We believe that we have an obligation to our people,
to our allies to seek to improve international relations,
but we have always made clear that we will not do so at the
cost of vital interests or that we will not buy time by
sacrificing other countries. So I think we can let the
future determine whose prediction was right.
Not much time was spent on this. The statements
of both sides have spoken for themselves. But it is not a
contingent issue and it is not one in which either side is
trying to convince the other to adopt its preferred policy.
Q
Mr. Secretary, could you specify what other
subjects the Chinese were interested in besides impressing
upon us the unwisdom of detente?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would have to say that in
the conversations that took place -- you all heard the toast
of the Vice Premier the first night. Beyond that statement,
there was no other formal statement of this point of view.
There were obviously discussions -- there had to
be discussions when you talk about the world situation --
about the Soviet role in various parts of the world. There
was a great deal of discussion, as I said, on Europe and
indeed on each area of the world, but the debate about
detente was not a central feature of the discussions.
Q
Did they discuss the new U.S. grain deal with
the Soviet Union?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was mentioned in passing.
Q
Were they critical of it?
Q
Question, please.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question was whether
the Chinese were critical of the grain deal with the Soviet
Union.
I would suppose that if they were requested to sell
grain they might make a different decision, but since we are
not telling the Chinese how to conduct their relations with
the Soviet Union -- you should not believe that the major
thrust of these discussions is for either side to tell the
other how they should conduct their relations with some
third party -- so this was mentioned in passing as an
illustration but it was not a central feature,
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- 5 -
Q
How much time was spent on Angola?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was discussed.
Q To what extent?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was an analysis of the
situation.
Q Mr. Secretary, would that be an area that
this (inaudible) from parallel interests to be included in?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think it is not
appropriate for me to speak for the Chinese side but I think
Angola is a question and also a concern, yes.
Q
Mr. Secretary, how much of the time was spent
in discussion of the Taiwan issue?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was a review of the
Taiwan issue. The Chinese side explained again its well-known
position with respect to normalization. We made clear that
we remain committed to the principles of the Shanghai
Communique and it is clear that some time will be needed
to bring the process of normalization to a final conclusion,
but also that the problem will be continued to a final
conclusion.
Q
Mr. Secretary, we were told that you had
expected progress toward normalization. Just on this specific
point, particularly what progress was made, if any, toward
normalization and with particular reference to Taiwan?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, until normalization is
completed there is always some progress still to be made.
As I have said, I expect over the months to come our relations
will be improved in a number of areas. That improvement,
by definition, will be a step towards normalization.
The United States if you read the Shanghai
Communique in which we have stated certain expectations
about our actions in the area and tensions diminished with
respect to our troop levels, for example -- we will continue
that process. So I believe that the process of normalization
can be said to continue.
Q To what extent do the diplomatic positions
of the Chinese as expressed to you coincide with their
public published propaganda?
Q Question.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is, to what
extent do the private positions of the Chinese coincide with
their public propaganda? Of course, I don't follow the public
propaganda as much as those of you who are here and I am
more familiar with the private comments and, therefore, I am
not a good witness on this subject.
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- 6 -
Q
You are speaking in code words on the subject
of Taiwan. What does normalization mean? What do the
Chinese expect us to do? And what is necessary before that
issue can be normalized?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think the Chinese
have made clear that the general model that they want is
something similar to the Japanese model. I think we also
made clear that it will take time for this process to mature
and for certain circumstances to exist. We have pointed
out our interests in an ultimately peaceful solution to the
problem. We made that clear in the Shanghai Communique already.
Ω
Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion with
the Chinese about the possibility of possible U.S. assistance
to the Chinese in development of their off-shore isles?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Questions like this would be
discussed in the trade channels.
2
Mr. Secretary, did Korea come up at all?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Korea was discussed.
?
Can you tell us something about that?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I would say our views
on that subject are not identical but they are understood and
we hope that both sides will exercise restraint in the Korean
Peninsula.
Q
Mr. Secretary, were there policies before these
meetings (inaudible) converging that are now back on what you
call parallel tracks with the Soviet talks?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that even prior to
this meeting there was a perhaps excessive emphasis on
certain parallel statements so I have never subscribed to
some of the interpretations that were made even prior to
the meeting.
But I would say whatever may have been the situation
prior to the meeting I maintain my position, and it is my
firm impression that this is shared by our Chinese hosts;
that our relations are good and that in certain areas we
will be pursuing parallel courses.
Q
Mr. Secretary, can you sense any concern on
the part of the Chinese about the ability of the American
Executive Branch to carry out its foreign policy as planned
by you?
Q
Question.
MORE
- 7 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is whether I
noticed any concern on the part of our Chinese hosts in our
ability to carry out our policy, or our declared policy.
I think you all will agree with me that our Chinese
hosts are extremely polite and they wouldn't express such
thoughts.
Q
Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that so
little seems to have happened here, could you explain the
secretiveness over the past four days?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Peter, it depends on your
definition of "little."
Q
Even if a good deal happened, could you explain
the secretiveness on our part over the past four days?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Being as it is, they are our
Chinese hosts, and we have intended to follow these matters
with the practices of the hosts -- that the briefing should
take place only at the end of the visit and this was
appropriate because the discussions were in great detail
and on a rather broad scope, and we couldn't have said more
at the end of every day than I am saying tonight, and I think
tonight we are in a better position to draw the results of it.
Q Mr. Secretary, were there any agreements
reached with the Chinese or positive actions in any deal
on trade or international policy?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think when the leaders of
two countries review the international situation and approach
a clearer understanding of what parallel interests they have,
that this is bound to have practical results.
With respect to the specific issues like trade,
as I pointed out there was agreement reached to pursue possible
intensification in the existing channels.
Q
If you could clarify one point, please. When
you talked about the Chinese making clear the Japanese Dosition
via-a-vis Taiwan, you said we made it clear that possibly
detente (inaudible)
Would that suggest that there was some sort of a
calendar when the United States would link diplomatic
relations with Taiwan?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, there is no agreed
calendar.
Q Mr. Secretary, did our side, the American side,
say anything about the fact that domestic politics and the
developments over the next year may have some delaying
effect on this process?
MORE
- 8 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, all of these
matters have domestic components on both sides and both sides
have to be sensitive to the necessities of the other.
Q
This is the end of the fourth five-year plan.
Did they speak about the next five-year plan and what it
would consist of?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not in my hearing.
Q
Can you tell us, when the decision was taken not
to have a communique, was it there or in Washington?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The decision was taken in a
preliminary way at the end of my last visit, and it was
confirmed on the first day in my discussions with the Foreign
Minister.
Q
(Inaudible)
SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, we had both
said it in the various toasts. Secondly --
Q
We can't hear.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is, why was it
decided to have no communique?
One reason, not necessarily in order of importance,
was that the substance of what I have said here has already
been said in various public statements. Secondly, we did not
want to spend the time that is needed to prepare such a
communique but, most importantly, since on the basic principles,
especially on Taiwan, there really isn't much that can be
added to what was said in the Shanghai Communique as to the
direction, it did not seem appropriate or worthwhile to
try to find some new answers on that particular issue.
Q
Secretary Kissinger, when you decided you needed
to prepare some change on the Taiwan issue, how can you say
that there is hope that the relationships will in fact be
fully normalized?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have said that this is our
intention which we have repeatedly reaffirmed in public
statements and that we will work out the modalities over
time.
Q
Are you saying that you would advise we are
willing to change?
MORE
- 9 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I said we will want to work
this out over time.
Q
Dr. Kissinger, did President Ford extend any
invitation to the Chinese leaders in talking with them?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: They have a standing invitation
and they have reaffirmed a standing obstacle.
Q What is the obstacle?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is the obstacle? That
they don't want to visit Washington until full normalization
has been achieved.
Q Mr. Secretary, can you elaborate on the Korean
question? Was there any implicit request that the United
States withdraw forces from South Korea?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that the Chinese
position on Korea has been stated repeatedly. I think it is
clear that in the present international context any exacerbation
of the situation by either side would not serve common
purposes, and we think that this is understood by both sides.
Q
In discussing the Korean question, was there
a suggestion that China and the United States had a cooperative
role in perhaps restraining their respective friends in the
North and the South?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think I have pointed
it out that our perceptions on Korea are not identical. What
conclusion each side should draw from the need for restraint
I think is for each side to determine.
Q
Dr. Kissinger, no matter how valuable
and what an exchange of the views might mean, would you say
that this meeting amounted to an exchange of views and
nothing more than that?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I would say that this
meeting amounted to a very detailed, to a very substantial
and, in many areas, very concrete discussions that went
beyond an exchange of views but, given the scope of it, it
is not necessarily something that can be encompassed in one
document.
Q Mr. Secretary, has the decision in fact been
made now that when there will be normalization between Peking
and Washington, they will be conducted on the basis of the
Japanese model?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that will have to be
decided when the normalization in fact takes place.
MORE
- 10 -
Q
You suggested that before.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I suggested that it is the
Chinese position, which we understand.
Q
What do we do about the defense treaties?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think China has made clear
its view and, obviously, if we were prepared to answer all
these questions now we could have settled the issue right now.
Q
Dr. Kissinger, did the President indicate to
the Chinese leaders if he is still in office in 1977 that the
timing would be better toward making specific progress toward
normalization?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The discussion did not reach
that degree of concern with specific events in our domestic
calendar. But, as I said, both sides have to be sensitive
to the domestic requirements of the other.
Q
Why did the United States disagree with the
Chinese position on the inevitability of war?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because we believe that war
can be avoided by a combination of firmness, preparedness
and willingness to settle outstanding issues, and that is
our policy.
Q
What is the date on which you are going to
Moscow?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The decision about going to
Moscow has not yet finally been made, but it will be
decided within the next week or so, There is a good chance
that I will go.
Q
(Inaudible)
but some improvement in
the relations between the two countries in the months to
come, and you mentioned broad areas like trade and cultural
exchanges. Can you be a little more specific as to what
kind of things can we expect?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Those things will still have
to be worked out in detail.
Q
Mr. Secretary, (Inaudible)
MORE
- 11 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, for those who understand
the entire Chinese context, requirements of the Chinese
situation and their method of expressing themselves, I
believe it expressed what I have stated of the Chinese
commitment to good relations to the United States, and I
am confident that our Chinese hosts, if you are in contact
with them, will confirm this.
Q
(Inaudible)
There is only one sentence in that toast in
which he devoted himself to the talk, and that was --
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I hadn't counted the number
of sentences that the President devoted to the talks, and
I haven't analyzed what Mr. Teng said with that care. I
can only tell you what our impression is -- an impression
which we took obviously since we are briefing here in China.
We took some care to check with our Chinese hosts
and I am confident in that what I have said here reflects
a view that will not be disputed.
MR. NESSEN: Let's have the last question from Bob.
Q Before the trip you said that Soviet-American
relations were not a bar to better relations with China.
Do you still feel that way?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I still feel that way, yes.
When we are in Moscow we do not discuss our relations
with China, but I would maintain what I have said.
Q
Is there anything more that you can tell us
about the friendly Ford meeting with Chairman Mao that
has been of substance, and do you know whether he, himself,
made any expression of China's position on detente?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: This was the fifth meeting
with Chairman Mao that I have had an opportunity to attend.
I would describe the atmosphere as friendly and cordial.
The discussions did not concern detente except in a very
minimal way -- in a really minimal way. Of course, I had had
the benefit of the Chairman's thinking on that subject a
few weeks earlier.
The overwhelming part of the conversation concerned
a review of the world situation but not of American detente
policy which played a very minimal role in the discussions.
Q
Can you give us an idea of what the substantive
areas were discussed in that meeting?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was a general review of
the world situation in almost every part of the world.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END
(AT 9:13 A.M. EST)