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Background Briefing at the White House with U.S. Officials on the Upcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, Finland [Press Conference]
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Background Briefing at the White House with U.S. Officials on the Upcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, Finland [Press Conference]
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White House Press Releases (Ford Administration)
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1976
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Digitized from Box 29 of the White House Press Releases at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
This Copy For
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
AT THE WHITE HOUSE
WITH U.S. OFFICIALS
AT 3:10 P.M. EDT
JULY 23, 1975
MR. NESSEN: The briefing is for use on a back-
ground basis. You should refer to these gentlemen in
your copies as U.S. officials.
QUESTION: Is there going to be a transcript?
MR. NESSEN: I am not sure.
THERE SHOULD BE NO DIRECT QUOTATION, but only
paraphrase what the gentlemen say. After the briefing,
if there is some particular quote you would like to use,
you can check with them or with Bob Funseth at the State
Department.
There is no embargo on this. You can use tape
recorders, but only for the purposes of your own notes
and not for broadcast.
The thought was that this would be limited to
the CSCE. You can see how this goes, and if at the end
perhaps there are other questions, there might be time
for that.
MORE
- 2 -
I think I have covered it all about the ground
rules. With that I will turn you over to the U.S.
officials.
QUESTION: Can I ask a question about the ground
rules? On the ticker we have, we have in our office,
this morning the names of these gentlemen appeared on the
UPI ticker, and it is not going to be any great mystery
to anybody who is conducting this briefing.
MR. NESSEN: That was a notice to correspondents.
I am talking about the use of attribution to U.S. officials
in your written stories. Hopefully, this briefing will
be more for your own background and understanding of the
trip than for printing stories, but if you do write stories,
you should attribute it to U.S. officials.
One other item. We gave out this morning a
briefing paper on the CSCE. We are getting additional
printed material on this trip. I would hope that by the
end of the day tomorrow we would have the actual document
to be signed.
Don't hold me to that. It may be early Friday
morning as opposed to late tomorrow afternoon, and we
will be having other printed materials so you can brief
yourselves up on the trip.
U.S. OFFICIAL: I would like to keep this as brief as
possible because I know you have questions, and we would
like to give you as much opportunity as possible to raise
those.
I will make some general introductory comments,
and my colleague will review the contents of the
document that is to be signed in Helsinki.
I am sorry you don't have the full text yet, but
the final, corrected version with commas in place is
just coming on an airplane from Geneva today, I think, and
we will get it to you as quickly as possible.
MORE
- 3 -
You do have a fact sheet, I believe.
As many of you know, the idea of a European
conference, European Security Conference, an all-European
security system, whatever it was called, goes back to
the period 1953 to 1954 when the Soviet Union advanced
proposals on the general subject in the context of the
entry into NATO of the German Federal Republic.
At that time, the stated Soviet purpose was
to prevent that entry of the Federal Republic into NATO,
and indeed todissolve NATO and substitute in its place
a so-called all-European security system or security
pact.
It got nowhere at the time, obviously. It was
one-sided and of no interest to any Western country.
That general proposal for all-European
security arrangements continued to be reiterated from
time to time over the next several years, with no
particular echo in the Western countries.
At that time, there also was no particular
place in the proposal for neutrals or nonaligned countries
in Europe. There was a revival of it in a somewhat
different form in the mid-sixties, and at that time, the
chief objective seemed to be, on the part of the Soviets
and some of the other East Europeans, to find a
substitute for the peace treaty ending World War II.
That approach also had no appeal in the West,
although in some West European countries there began to
develop a bit more interest in having some sort of an
all-European meeting. Nevertheless, nothing came of those
proposals.
Then later still, in 1969, the proposals were
revived by the Eastern side and were considered by NATO,
which at that time -- I am talking about 1969-1970 --
concluded that there were many concrete issues in Europe
between East and West, which would be much better dealt
with in normal bilateral negotiations and that any conference
that might be called between East and West, as well as for
Europe generally, should be very carefully prepared with
the issues carefully delineated and moved on to as concrete
a plan as possible.
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- 4 -
The Soviets, and the Eastern countries, in
making their proposals, at that time seemed to be
principally interested still in such matters as recog-
nition of frontiers and issues that would have normally
been associated with a peace treaty. As you know, what
happened after that was that the negotiations on Berlin
went forward and eventually were completed in 1971.
The Federal Republic of Germany proceeded to
negotiations with the Soviet Union and Poland in that
period, also -- and later on with the German Democratic
Republic -- and settled various outstanding issues
between itself and those countries. It was only after
those matters had been resolved that the Western countries
agreed to proceed to an exploration of what a Security
Conference might do.
It was always clear on the Western side that
there would be no interest in merely having certain
declarations concerning borders and things of that kind,
but that any conference dealing with the improvement of
East-West relations in Europe, with a stabilization of
East-West relations in Europe, had to take into account
the human aspects of the problem, the division of Europe,
and all sorts of more specific potential areas of
cooperation.
It was a Western view from the beginning,
shared widely also among neutrals in Europe, as well as
among some of the smaller countries in Eastern Europe,
that there was no purpose in having a conference at all
if it was simply to produce some general principles
duplicating what was already essentially embodied in
the UN charter or in bilateral agreements that had been
previously reached between various West European countries
and East European countries.
Also, as this process of preparations got
underway, the Western countries stipulated that it had
to be brought into some kind of parallelism with nego-
tiations on forced reductions in central Europe. As you
may recall, the actual agreement on the date in 1973
to proceed with the first stage of the European Security
Conference, was tied to an agreement to begin the talks
on troop productions in Europe -- the so-called MBFR
negotiations.
MORE
- 5 -
So, the original concepts or purposes that
seemed to underlie the Soviet proposals for this con-
ference were substantially modified as a result of
events, as well as as a result of Western insistence.
I may say here, from our standpoint, one of
the gratifying aspects of this whole operation from
1969, when we discussed it in detail here at a NATO
meeting, you may recall, in April of 1969, through the
present, has been the very substantial measure of agree-
ment that has existed between the NATO allies in how to
handle this conference.
This is of some importance because various
allies did not necessarily approach this project from
the same standpoint and with the same interests. For
us, this particular venture in multilateral diplomacy
has never had the significance that it has had for
some of our allies, particularly the smaller countries,
or for that matter for some of the countries in Eastern
Europe.
We have had our own contacts with the Soviets
and with some of the other East Europeans. We have had
major negotiations that we have had over the years on
arms control and other issues. So this has never been,
for us, as crucial a vehicle for doing business with the
East as it has for some of the other countries that don't
have the channels or the issues to talk about that
the United States has.
Nevertheless, despite these somewhat different
vantage points, it has proved possible for the NATO members
to stay very close to each other on all the issues and
on tactics, as well as on strategy, in dealing with
this conference. The mechanism that we devised
for carrying on this coordination both in Brussels and
in Geneva, and before that in Helsinki, at the site of
the Conference, in some respects are pioneering in
their efforts to harmonize Western positions in this
rather unique exercise in multilateral diplomacy.
I think that is something that ought not to
be overlooked, particularly when questions are raised
about this or that unilateral American action with
respect to this conference. Everything that we have done
in this conference and about this conference has been
in consultation and in harmony with our allies and the
President is going to Helsinki as a result of consultation
and very close coordination with every one of our allies.
MORE
- 6 -
This is really quite an important achievement.
Just a couple of words and then we
will go on with some more details. The results of
this conference are embodied in a document that you will
be getting, called the final act. It is very long. It
is a negotiated document. When you get 35 countries
as varied in size and history and with as divergent
or at least different interests as these, it is obviously
going to be negotiated and there are going to be compro-
mises and there are going to be formulations that are
not ideal from this or that country's standpoint. That
is the nature of a diplomatic effort.
So that is one thing to bear in mind in
looking at this and in finding this or that imperfection
that you may find as you look at the text.
Secondly, it was always understood that this
was not going to be a treaty or a jurisdictional instrument
but rather an outcome essentially of political significance.
That is to say an effort to set certain political guide-
lines for East-West relations in the period ahead, to set
certain political standards for this period against
which conduct can be measured; to provide political
incentives for restrained, and wherever possible coopera-
tive conduct in the further evolution of East-West relations.
Since this is essentially a document of political
significance, it cannot -- and as explicitly stated does not
-- affect anyone's legal position or legal views of
the situation with respect to Europe. As you know, there
are different views concerning certain aspects, legal
aspects of frontiers and so on in Europe, but none of
these things are affected or changed by this document; nor,
equally important, are, for example, such things as our
Western rights with respect to Berlin, with respect to
Germany as a whole, affected by this particular document
and by the outcome of this conference.
The proof of the pudding in this is going to
be in the eating, if I can coin a phrase. (Laughter)
In other words, in some sense this is a pioneering
effort of setting forth a comprehensive set of political
objectives, political standards, political rules of the
road among these 35 participants and they are going to have
to be implemented in practice and at least, however, there
will be some standards against which to measure that
implementation.
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- 7 -
I think that will be of some importance in
judging people's performance over the future. It also
imposes certain obligations on this. It is not as
though all the obligations in Basket 3 -- the ones that
deal with human contacts and freedom of information, and
so on -- as if all of those are going to have to be
implemented by one side.
Those aspects of this document that can be
readily translated into concrete action -- which is
mostly the material in Basket 2 and Basket 3 -- will
have to be implemented over a period of time by all the
participants.
In many instances, countries will find it highly
desirable to follow these general guidelines with specific
negotiated agreements that will, in fact, carry legal
commitments. This one does not but you can take this
as a basis and begin to negotiate additional bilateral
agreements in which you translate the political terms
of this document into more binding reciprocal terms
and arrangements in this or that field, and that applies
very largely to the economic and technological and so on
provisions in Basket 2, and these other ones on movement
of people and freedom of information and human rights
in Basket 3.
So it would be, I think, inaccurate to see
this document as drawing a line under a period, as
terminating a period, but it should be seen rather as
a takeoff point in which behavior can be more explicitly
measured, performance can be more explicitly measured
against the understandings reached here.
So if you can think about this operation in
those terms, I think perhaps you might avoid some of the
pitfalls of interpretation that I have encountered in
my reading in recent weeks on this, and to assist you
further in that direction I will turn this over now to
another U.S. official to go through the Baskets.
MORE
- 8 -
U.S. OFFICIAL: I will do this very briefly because
I think it is easier to answer your questions and see
where the difficulties lie on the basis of specifics.
You have a fact sheet which describes the four
parts of the document. The first part is the statement
of principles and it is really that statement of principles
that is the part that has been of greatest interest to
the East, to the Soviet Union, in the early consideration
of this kind of conference.
However, what has happened in the statement of
principles is that rather than focusing on the kind of
principles that could be directly related to something
approaching a peace treaty which would fix borders and
fix political status for all time, in achieving balance
and in achieving what the West wanted to put into this
document, the Soviets accepted other principles which
give some balance to the document.
For example, there has been much talk about
the principle on the inviolability of frontiers and that
one, I may say, is one of the examples of less fortunate
language. It comes out in English that people are going
to refrain from assaulting frontiers or borders. But
against the inviolability of frontiers you have principles
that deal with sovereign equality and in the principle
on sovereign equality there is a provision for peaceful
change of frontiers.
You have a principle on self-determination which
again relates to the question of frontiers indirectly, and
aspects of these principles that might relate to a peace
treaty.
I can list through the principles -- sovereign
equality, nonuse of force, inviolability of frontiers,
territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes.
This is something that is of interest to some of the
smaller states.
MORE
- 9 -
The Swiss, for example, have come up with a
charter which would provide for the special handling
of disputes. Some of the Eastern European countries,
for example, have been very interested in the nonuse
of force. The Romanians have pushed the nonuse of force
opinion very strongly.
In addition to the principles in the first
part of this agreement, of this text, are certain modest
confidence-building measures in the security field.
Any serious measures in this area would probably come
in the MBFR talks, but it was clear the neutrals in some
of the smaller countries, particularly, were anxious
to have something in these texts that would give some
step toward dealing with the security problem that they
would participate in.
Well, the modest step was a notification on
a voluntary basis of maneuvers. Now the maneuvers are
set with rather large numbers -- 25,000 men, 250 kilometers.
Actually, what that means is it covers all of Europe
and it is 250 kilometers into the Soviet Union, and
21 days notification period.
Now it is also provided that smaller maneuvers
can be notified. The fact it is voluntary does not have
that much significance. All of these things have really
kind of moral obligation and it even looks to us as
though the Soviets are getting ahead of this because
about the time we were agreeing on this particular
provision they announced for the first time a major
maneuver in Western Russia.
There is also a provision for reciprocal exchange
of observers on maneuvers and a spoken desire that other
measures should be considered in the future, but I
think mainly this is a symbolic thing that they want
to try, and the smaller countries are very anxious to
have on the record.
MORE
- 10 -
The second major area is the one that relates
to economic relationships, science and technology and
environment. These statements are essentially statements
of desire to increase relations on the economic and
commercial side. Provisions are made for taking steps
to prevent exchanges from becoming a burden on relations;
that is, for cheap goods to be going too much into one
area. The safeguards concept, in other words, was
mentioned in there.
The fact that there 'are different trading
systems and that different ways of trading have to be
formulated is alluded to, and ways of studying the problem
to see how, for example, equality in trade can be worked
out between state trading systems and free market
economies.
There is also a provision for arbitration of
disputes, facilitating business contacts, and so forth,
"Science and technology, again, mainly increased cooperation.
Certain fields are identified where they would like
to see further work and progress.
There is a natural body for some of this work
to be done in the UN Commission, the ECE in Geneva, where
all the parties are members and much of this work can
proceed in that body.
There is then, not within any particular part
of this text but put in because it did not really fit
in any other place, a special reference to the
Mediterranean area. This was pressed by some of the
Mediterranean littoral states who wanted to have an acknow-
ledgement by the other states in Europe of the close
security and economic relationships of those states
to the mainland of Europe, and favoring greater economic
ties. This was pushed by the Maltese Prime Minister
and some of the others -- the Italians -- and it refers
also to the desirability of limiting arms in that area.
MORE
- 11 -
The third large area is the humanitarian
category, and there it is divided mainly into the
human contacts and exchanges and information. And
on the human contacts the effort here is to try and
get standards that are more concrete so that when we
go in or other Governments go in and say, "We have this list
of people who in our country are anxious to have family
reunification, are anxious 'to have relatives immigrate,"
that you can point to something which says that these
applications are to be looked at by the Governments.
They are to be in principle favorably received.
There are to be no measures put in the way
of this kind of family reunification or immigraation.
The standards are not specific down to what you can
take with you or how long you have to sell your property,
but it refers to these matters and it certainly makes it
possible for countries to then go on and have more
detailed bilateral agreements on these matters, and
this just sets out the overall standard. Also for increasing
travel and contact and tourism, and that kind of thing.
MORE
- 12 -
On the information side, again, hortatory
language, but with specifics in terms of the desirability
of increasing the flow of publications, newspapers,
periodicals, of 'cooperation in these exchanges: with
specific respect to journalists, we hope you are all
duly appreciative that there is something in there about
multiple entry visas that we used to have a lot of
complaints about that people could not be sure they could
get back in; eased travel conditions within the country
where the correspondent is accredited and a statement
about the no explusions for legitimate activities.
These are statements of policy,
and there is no court you are going to be able to take
anybody into to get these statements of policy enforced,
but they do give us this standard and they will enable
us, when occurrences happen -- and occurrences will be
inevitable -- to come in and say to the Government, "Now,
look, you signed on to this document, you accepted these
obligations. Now, why aren't you living up to them?"
The cultural exchanges are again specifically
referring to artists, musicians, works of art. The
French were very anxious to get some reference to their
language, desirability of studying languages, and spreading
national cultures, educational exchanges and so on.
The last area is the follow-up, and here the
only agreement reached -- because there were differing
views -- was that there would be a meeting in 1977
to examine the implementation of these policy statements
and to see whether further meetings should be held.
Originally, the Eastern countries wanted some
kind of institutionalized process, and the Western
countries, by and large, did not want to see that. They
wanted to see whether in practice these declarations were
going to lead to progress.
So, the compromise was that there would be this
meeting that would examine the situation without establishing
an institution that would specifically follow the imple-
mentation of the agreement.
MORE
- 13 -
I think we will take questions.
QUESTION: Can you tell us if this
changes the American position that they do not formally
recognize Soviet occupation of the Baltic?
ANSWER: No, it does not change the American
position. There is nothing in this text -- first, the
text is not a legal text. Secondly, there is nothing in
the text that deals with recognition of borders or
States. The inviolability principle talks about respect
for frontiers, but it is also coupled with the idea of
peaceful change and it is directed at the use of force
to upset frontiers.
The American position on the nonrecognition of
the incorporation of the Baltic States has not been
changed by this document.
QUESTION: Is there anything in this
agreement that you believe or that the Administration
believes would actually restrain the use of the present
doctrine in Eastern Europe?
ANSWER: Let me try and answer that. There is
nothing in there that in any sense, even in a political
sense, endorses it. Secondly, there are many formulations,
principles and statements in this document which, if
objectively read and interpreted, are contrary to anything
that has been in the past associated with the Brezhnev
doctrine.
Thirdly, the issue of the Brezhnev doctrine itself
was one -- as some of you may know who were in Geneva --
that was not far beneath the surface in the deliberations
of the conference.
While it obviously is not mentioned explicitly,
it is quite clear from the legislative history of the
outcome that, not only was there no thought of endorsing
it, but the whole thrust of what was being done was to
deny the validity of any such thing as has been called the
Brezhnev doctrine.
MORE
- 14 -
Whether it restrains the behavior of States
when they perceive interests to be at stake, I can't
tell you that for certain. But certainly the political
thrust, the moral thrust, the psychological thrust of every-
thing associated with this runs counter to the kinds of
behavior associated with what has been called the
Brezhnev doctrine.
QUESTION: Specifically, if I could follow
up, the principle on nonintervention in internal
affairs, do you regard that as counter to the Brezhnev
doctrine specifically?
ANSWER: Yes, the principle of nonintervention
in internal affairs of States. It goes even beyond that
because it has a formula that says you can't use any
present text to intervene.
I think Bob Froelich --
isn't that right -- there is a phrase like that.
So. I think the language is pretty clear.
Plus, I am reminded, of course, there is strong affirmation
of the principle of self-determination.
QUESTION: The last part of these nego-
tiations reminded some of us of the last days and the last
hours of the Illinois State Legislature. Could you
explain the unseemly haste?
ANSWER: If you had been in Geneva, I don't
think you would have had the sense of unseemly haste. I
think you would have thought you were on a slow boat to
China.
QUESTION: I am talking about the last days of
it, not the 22 months.
ANSWER: I think the last days of it had to do
with a very technical matter. The document was virtually
agreed. The problem was whether the last two phrases,
none of which were of major significance to the West or
the East, could be settled in time so that people could go
on vacation in August.
MORE
- 15 -
In other words, the choice was between
getting a conference in at the end of July or waiting
until some time in October. But the issues involved
were not issues of any consequence to us or, for that
matter, to the Soviets.
It had to do with a phrase the Maltese wanted
to put into the text, and three or four other things of
that kind. That was what the impatience was about, not
that there was unseemly haste in dealing with the gut
issues of this negotiation.
Wouldn't you say that?
ANSWER: Yes.
ANSWER: And we got propelled into that when
the Secretary was in Geneva. So, I don't think that is
a fair description as far as the major thrust of this whole
operation is concerned.
QUESTION: Have you very much lost sight of
the MBFR in connection with this?
ANSWER: Have we lost sight of this? In what
way?
QUESTION: The parallelism. When you first
began talking about it, there was a definite link, and
now that has been lost.
ANSWER: No, the parallelism was always between
the opening of these meetings. It was always known that the
MBFR issues were going to be extremely complicated and
technical, in some respects more so than in the case of
SALT, and that there was going to be a very difficult
negotiation, so the matter of having the outcomes in
terms of time simultaneously, I don't think that was ever
contemplated.
MORE
- 16 -
The MBFR negotiations are going forward.
They just recessed now for a few weeks, as they
periodically do. There is an active consultation going
on in NATO on them, so I don't think that the organic
link between political negotiations about the state of
relations in Europe and negotiations on the military
aspect -- that organic link has been maintained and
exists even though this particular exercise is now
going to come to its completion.
But I certainly would not say that the MBFR
negotiatons have been lost sight of.
QUESTION: To follow that up, if I may, how
then would you assess the future of MBFR now that we have
finished this?
ANSWER: It is speculative. Some people feel
it will move faster. But there are complex technical
issues and we will continue to make a very intense effort
to get those talks moving constructively, and we will have
to see. But certainly it is not going to be dropped,
and it won't be dropped by the allies.
QUESTION: According to you, do you gentlemen
feel that this will really hasten the progress on MBFR,
reaching this agreement?
ANSWER: I can't predict it, but if you look at
the amount of attention that has been given to CSCE by
foreign offices and Governments over the last several
months, the last year or two, for that matter, and NATO,
and every other place, that particular preoccupation will
be set aside and this will be the single major multi-
lateral negotiation about the center of Europe that is
going to be on the agenda right now, and I think that fact
alone may speed up that process, but I don't want to
underestimate the complexity of the problem.
QUESTION: Why do you think the Soviet Union
attaches so much importance to this document and the
signing of it?
MORE
- 17 -
ANSWER: Joe, I think it is speculative,
obviously, and I think their own view of that --
the exercise has changed over the years, as I was
trying to say in my introductory comments. I think
they have attached most recently a certain symbolic
significance to it.
I think it also figures in the general time-
table of events and activities that the Soviets would
like to see accomplished before the next party Congress,
which is the 25th, and that has some special significance
for them.
I think that the Soviets, as has been pointed
out, have always been more interested in the kinds of
things that were in Basket 1 than in the others. In fact,
one might even say their interests with respect to the
others has not been overwhelming.
So, I think that they have been interested in
the symbolic and the political significance of it.
But, obviously, everybody is going to have an interest
of some kind and the fact that one side has an interest
does not vitiate the fact that others might also have
an interest.
That is how you get a balance of interests and
ultimately an outcome.
MORE
- 18 -
QUESTION: I think you were being a little
defensive before about the Western concessions. You said
it is not a legal document and therefore it did not
accomplish everything. Both of you were, actually,
but you used the phrase "takeoff point".
Is there any real prospect for bilateral
negotiations with the Communists on these supposed
concessions they made that you know and we all know
are not binding?
ANSWER: In some respects, we are ahead of
other countries because we have a number of bilateral
agreements, not so much dealing with Basket 3 issues
but with Basket 2, although with some Basket 3 issues
as well. I think you are going to have to see what
happens.
The Canadians, I think -- I don't want to
speak for them -- but the Canadians have a great interest
in family unification because of the large Ukranian
population in Canada. I think they regard this --
insofar as anything in writing can be -- as a helpful
step forward that will make it possible for them to
deal with an issue that is of considerable human
emotional and political significance in Canada.
So I think that it varies, really, from country
to country, how and in what form these things may be
translated into further actions and further agreements.
But I think a presumption has been created, and I don't
think any country is going to feel itself free of some
of the pressures generated and presumptions generated
by this to push ahead into performance.
QUESTION: Is the Soviet involvement
Portugal now consistent with letter and spirit of this
final act?
QUESTION: What was the question?
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- 19 -
ANSWER: Whether Soviet involvement in Portugal
is consistent with the letter and spirit of this document.
Let me say first, I think the press and some
others have been somewhat more certain and specific in
their knowledge of what the Soviets are doing in Portugal
than we have been able to be, which is not to deny that
there is some Soviet involvement. I think that non-
intervention is clear, and we would certainly deplore
Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Portugal.
I think that in the end every government is
going to have to search its own conscience and practices
insofar as its fidelity to these principles is concerned.
We will all have to observe behavior and we will all have
to adjust behavior to conform ourselves to the political
principles and precepts set forth here. But there is
no question that we would deplore andobject to Soviet
intervention and interference in the internal evolution
in Portugal.
QUESTION: I don't read anything in there as
answering the question. Respectfully, does their inter-
vention in Portugal, to whatever extent it exists, violate
the letter and spirit of this agreement?
ANSWER: I just said that I have a little of
a problem with the question because you would have to
define "intervention," but I am perfectly plain, I hope,
in saying that if there is Soviet intervention and inter-
ference in the domestic processes of Portugal, then this
would have to be regarded as not compatible with the
principles contained in this document.
QUESTION: How much intervention is there now?
ANSWER: I don't want to discuss now the precise
forms of Soviet involvement or intervention -- because
I don't want to start splitting hairs -- we may regret
a Pravda article about Portugal and think it is unhelpful,
or unwise. I think there will be some question whether
that can be legitimately defined as intervention.
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There are other forms of intervention which
have been referred to by Senators and in the press, and
on that question, if it turns out that that is in fact
correct I would say that that would not be compatible
with the principle of non-intervention.
QUESTION: Are there several million dollars
going into --
ANSWER: I can't answer that question because
I personally cannot be that precise. I just can't.
QUESTION: I have a follow-up
on that. I just came from a luncheon addressed by Mr.
Vernon Walters, the Deputy Director of the CIA. He
confirms Senator Bentsen's charges saying that the
figure of $10 million being pumped into Portugal by the
Soviets is probably in the ballpark, that it is hard
to count because it is in cash. So the Soviet involvement
in Portugal is certainly beyond one Pravda article.
My question is: Have we raised this with
the Soviets, and if we have not raised it with them,
how can this be a document being solemnly signed having
considerable moral and political force?
ANSWER: It has not been signed yet, first of
all. The question of what we raise and what we don't
raise with the Soviets gets into the question of diplomatic
exchanges that I am not prepared to discuss today.
QUESTION: Can I ask, one the other side of
this, if the West Germans and the Swedes through their
social democratic party funnel money to the socialists
in Portugal, is that intervention?
ANSWER: I am not going to parse this, Bob.
First, we are not going to be the ones that sit in
judgment and make unilateral judgments, necessarily, on
this.
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I think countries are going to have to, as I
said before, search and examine their own practices and
consciences, if necessary, and we will be consulting
with our allies as this unfolds, and as we look at the
implementation and as we look at how people conduct
themselves once this thing has become part of the body
of international political standards -- and we will have
to address those problems as they arise.
The problem of non-intervention, definition
of aggression, have been problems that have been labored
over in the League of Nations in the United Nations
for years, for generations, with problems that many
of us are familiar with.
And so I am not going to stand up here this
afternoon and give you a simple, flat answer on that kind
of a contingency or any other, for that matter. I think
that the principle of one government -- and, under
whatever guise -- attempting to influence political
evolution in another country, to determine the outcome
of political struggles and conflict in another country,
to establish paramount interest of its own or whatever you
may want to say, I think could not be construed as
compatible with the kinds of principles enunciated here.
There are many gray areas and I just cannot go into that
in detail.
QUESTION: Did the United,
States acquiesce or agree or go along with what is being
done or will be done in Helsinki in order to further
along aspects of its detente with the Soviet Union, in
regards to, for instance, SALT? In other words, what
part did the detente, the U.S. bilateral relations with
the Soviet Union play in the U.S. agreement to go along
with this in Helsinki?
ANSWER: First, the agreement should not be
construed as one as between us and the Russians to go
to Helsinki. The agreement was a collective one that
we shared with our allies.
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QUESTION: But why a unilateral decision?
ANSWER: I think the whole CS CE exercise, and
now its consummation, is part of the process commonly
known as detente. That has many facets to it -- some
of bilateral negotiations, some of maintaining your own
defense strength. That is all part of the detente
process so this is one facet of it. And we would hope
it gives additional impetus to the more constructive
elements in East-West relations that have appeared.
Now whether it helps SALT or hinders SALT or
has no particular impact on SALT, it is very difficult
to say. SALT has many of its own complexities. On the
whole, I think if we take this Helsinki step now with
maturity and sobriety, and approach the future -- as
regards the implementation of this -- with no illusion
but with some reasonable hope, then I think it ought
to help the other hopeful aspects of the detente process.
QUESTION:
Can you give us any
guidance on President Ford's pace or the schedule when
he is in Helsinki? Do you anticipate he will have a
number of bilateral meetings or are they reserving
great chunks of time for meetings with Brezhnev?
ANSWER: Most of the time will be spent in the
conference session by the President, because I assume
all the leaders will want to show each other the courtesy
of listening to their remarks. There will be some
additional bilaterals, and I assume the White House
will be announcing those.
QUESTION: Will all 35 heads of state or
governments speak?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: Does the U.S. Administration feel
that this agreement is ready to make any noticeable
change, not in the principles but in the practice now
being applied in the Soviet Union and other East European
countries regarding exchange of ideas, freedom of movement,
entry of newspapers and so on? I am speaking now of
practice and not of principle.
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ANSWER: I think we have measured hopes it will
contribute to that, but we will have to see in practice.
QUESTION: There was some criticism, particularly
recently, that the United States yielded on the voluntary
part of the advance notification on troop maneuvers,
that we did it because we were in a hurry to get the
conference over with.
Was there at any time the thought here that
that could have been strengthened so there would have
been some requirement on the other side to give notification
of troop maneuvers?
ANSWER: I can answer that. As far as we
were concerned from the beginning -- because this is a
non-binding document, because this is not in any way
a treaty or agreement -- we had never thought that these
provisions with respect to the security and confidence-
building measures would be other than voluntary.
There may have been some states at the conference
who thought it should be more binding, particularly
some of the neutrals. But we have been proceeding on
the basis of agreed positions among the NATO countries,
and it was an agreed position that we all took with
respect to the voluntary nature of these notifications.
QUESTION: To avoid the pitfalls of what you
call interpretation, what do you say to the criticism
that the language of these documents is so ambiguous,
fuzzy, elastic, that any signatories can read into them
whatever it so chooses?
ANSWER: I think that is an excessively harsh
description of the language of these materials, these
documents. I think some of it is compromise and may
come close to meeting that description. Some of it, I
think when you read it, is surprisingly crisp and straight-
forward and not just the parts that you might think are
the ones desired by the other side.
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So I think that is not a fair description
of this in its totality. Now, of course, you do run
into the problem of interpretations. But I think if we
handle this thing well, then it ought to be possible
to avoid the most excessive interpretations of some of
the more ambiguous formulations that inevitably come
into a compromise document.
That is to say it ought to be possible to
marshal the force of opinion for a rational and reasonable
interpretation. I don't think we should take a defeatist
attitude about that.
QUESTION: Do you think this will help deter
the Soviet Union from another adventure such as the
Czechoslovakian engagement, and do you think this
document will also help liberalize Soviet Union immigration
policies?
ANSWER: I think, on the first question, it may
contribute to the general political climate in which
such events will not recur. I would hesitate to say
what nations will do when they see their interests
ultimately engaged, but I think that if it is implemented,
if it is followed by further actions in the bilateral
realm and in other areas, it should contribute, as I
say, to a general political climate in which that regret-
table and unfortunate and tragic kind of action will
not occur.
On the second question, I would hope that
in some of the areas specified in the documents, some of which
have been mentioned:
family unification, others
like that -- I would hope that it will make a contribution
in that area.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
MR. HUSHEN: Gentlemen, for those who came in
late, let me state a couple of things.
Secretary Kissinger's briefing at 11:00 on Friday
is available for live coverage, and Ron Nessen's
briefing will be delayed until after Secretary Kissinger's
briefing is over with.
END
(AT 4:05 P.M. EDT)