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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 1/23/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Thursday, January 23, 1975
10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. (60 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From: Henry A. Kissinger
I. PURPOSE
To review the background and status of the Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction (MBFR) talks and consider alternative modifica-
tions which might be made to the present Alliance position.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: After a long history of Soviet proposals for a
European security conference to bless the postwar boundaries,
NATO proposed force reduction talks in June of 1968. The
Soviets were not interested at that time, fearing that they
might be accused of freeing up U.S. troops for Vietnam. As
the war wound down and it became clear that the proposed
security conference would not get off the ground without
parallel discussions on military issues, the Warsaw Pact
ministers announced their interest in troop reductions in
June 1970. During my trip to Moscow in 1972, we reached
an understanding that the security conference (CSCE) and a
discussion of European force reductions (MBFR) would proceed
in parallel.
Our proposal to hold force reduction talks was originally con-
ceived as (1) a response to the Soviet CSCE proposal, and
(2) a vehicle for containing Congressional pressures for
unilateral U.S. reductions. However, once the talks became
a reality, we concluded that our position should be based on
NATO's security requirements, not just political factors.
CORD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, NSC Sec, use 34. 7/21/99
LIBRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
MR98-40, State lifer 9/25/98
By let NARA Date 10/20/98,7/21/99 7/21/99
GERALD FORD HERART
2
The U.S. approach to MBFR was derived from detailed
military studies conducted over a period of three years. It
was first presented to NATO in May 1973, and it has re⁴
mained the basis for the Alliance position in MBFR up to
the present time. It calls for two phases of reductions,
beginning with U.S. and Soviet withdrawals of 29,000 and
68, 000 troops, respectively. The Soviet forces would be
in the form of a "tank army", including 1700 of the Pact's
16,000 tanks. The second phase would focus on countries
other than the U.S. and USSR. An additional 157, 000 Pact
and 48, 000 NATO troops would be reduced in order to reach
a common ceiling of 700, 000.
Within a few weeks after the MBFR talks began in October
1973, the Soviets tabled a draft agreement calling for equal
percentage reductions on both sides. All states and all force
elements -- ground, air, and nuclear would participate in
the reductions from the outset. Reductions of each country's
forces would be in proportion to the relative size of its
forces, and national ceilings would be established for each
country.
Recognizing that the NATO demands for a Soviet tank army
and significantly larger Pact troop reductions would be difficult
to achieve without further NATO concessions, the U.S. told
the Alliance in June 1973 that NATO should be prepared
eventually to offer to reduce its nuclear forces in order to
achieve the Pact "tank army" reductions. However, this move
has never been made by the Alliance.
In summary, after a year of debate, each side has offered only
minor modifications to its original position, and the talks have
reached a stalemate. There is disagreement on three
fundamental issues:
-- Whose forces should be reduced? -- We say that U.S.
and Soviet withdrawals should come before those of our
Allies; the Pact says that all direct participants should
commit themselves to specific reductions from the outset.
-- What type of forces should be reduced? -- Our present
position calls for reductions in ground forces only, but
NATO is studying the possible inclusion of air forces;
the Pact says that all types of forces -- ground, air, and
nuclear -- must be reduced.
CERALD FORD
SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
WE
3
What ratio of NATO to Warsaw Pact forces should
be reduced? We say that because of existing
disparities, the Pact should reduce significantly more
than NATO, leading toward a common ceiling; the Pact
insists on equal numerical or equal percentage re-
ductions based on total forces in the area.
Various alternatives for breaking the stalemate have been
considered by the Verification Panel. In general, there are
three categories of adjustments which could be made to the
Allied position:
The Allies could move ahead on the earlier U.S.
suggestion of reducing nuclear forces (warheads, F-4
aircraft, and Pershing missiles). NATO has an ad-
vantage over the Pact in nuclear forces, so this re-
duction would be presented as an offset to the asymmetrical
reduction of Pact tanks and manpower included in the
Allied proposal.
-- German forces could be included in the NATO reduction,
meeting the major Soviet objective of getting control of
the German army.
-- We could move toward the Pact concept of equal per-
centage reductions, essentially abandoning our goal of
reaching a common ceiling.
Of these approaches, there is a general consensus in the Verifi-
cation Panel that nuclear elements continue to be the best. Both
of the other alternatives would be strongly opposed by our
Allies, and including German forces would be counterproductive
to our efforts to shift the burden of European defense to the
Europeans. Furthermore, there are good military reasons
for restructuring our European nuclear stockpile, and in any
event, we are under Congressional pressure to do SO.
In summary, the major issue to be decided now is whether this
is an appropriate time to modify the Alliance MBFR position.
A failure to do so will inevitably prolong the stalemate, but
hasty movement may be wasted if the Soviet leadership is not
in a position to offer corresponding concessions on their side.
If we do modify our position, there is generalconsensus that it
should be done by adding an offer to reduce NATO nuclear forces,
in return for a heavy reduction of Pact tanks and manpower.
FORD
SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
SACRAT/SENSITIVE
4
Director Colby is prepared to give a briefing on the military
balance in Europe. Secretary Schlesinger might also wish
to make some remarks on that subject.
After your opening remarks, I suggest that you ask Bill Colby
for his briefing, then ask me to review the status of the
negotiations and the issues to be decided.
B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will
be announced. White House photographer only.
III. TALKING POINTS
A. At the Opening of the Meeting
1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the status of the
force reduction talks and consider the options for possible
modifications to the Alliance position. With the Vienna talks
at a stalemate, we should take a hard look at our MBFR
objectives and our negotiating stance to see if there is cause
to change either.
2. Bill (Colby), would you give US a rundown on the current
military balance in Central Europe?
3. Henry, would you review the bidding for us in the negotiations
and lay out the options we should consider for modifying our
position?
B. At the Close of the Meeting
1. I believe we should get the talks moving again in MBFR.
Since there are several reasonable ways to go, I would like
to give this subject careful thought before making a decision.
2. Stan (Resor), we will get instructions to you and to NATO
within a few days.
FURO & LIBRARY BERALD
SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING
Thursday, January 23, 1975 -- - - 10:30 a. m.
-- Mr. President, the purpose of this meeting is to review the
background and status of the MBFR talks and go over alternative
modifications which might be made to the present Alliance MBFR
position.
-- Since this is the first NSC meeting on MBFR for you and the
Vice President, I would like to start my remarks with a brief sketch
of how we got to where we are in MBFR.
Genesis of MBFR
-- In the 1950's Moscow made proposals both for a conference
on European security and for withdrawals of foreign troops from
Germany. During the 60's, the Soviets lost interest in European force
reductions, lest they appear to free up troops for service in Vietnam.
But they continued their efforts to generate a conference on European
security as a way to gain international blessing of the post-war
GERAL
boundaries in Europe.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, 2/19/99
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
MR98-40, 13; State letter 9/25/98
CERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS By let NARA, Date 10/21/98, 7/21/99
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
2
-- We made it clear, for our part, that their long cherished
security conference would not get off the ground unless they agreed to
parallel discussions on military issues.
-- By my September 1972 trip to Moscow, we had reached an
understanding that the security conference (CSCE) and a discussion of
military issues (MBFR) would proceed in parallel.
-- Our original proposal to hold MBFR negotiations was largely
a political move in response to Soviet CSCE initiatives and a vehicle
for containing pressures for unilateral Western reductions.
-- Once the talks became a reality, we concluded that MBFR
should be based on real NATO military security requirements, not
simply on political factors. The U.S. approach presented to NATO
in May 1973 was based on detailed military analyses conducted over
a period of three years.
-- We were concerned that the negotiations might provide an
excuse for some of our Allies to slacken their defense efforts. So
our approach called for maintenance and improvement of Alliance
military capabilities while the negotiations proceeded, and adherence
to the principle that reductions would be made only as part of an agree-
ment with the Pact.
FORD & LIBRARY GENALD
CORD
CERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
3
TORRECKET / SENSITIVE
Evolution of the Alliance Position
-- The U.S. approach presented three alternatives, each con-
sidered to be militarily acceptable:
A common ceiling on ground force manpower to be reached
in two phases, ten percent withdrawals of stationed forces followed by
ten percent cuts of indigenous forces.
An equal percentage cut in U.S. and Soviet forces, which
would lead toward parity in total ground force manpower on the two sides.
Reduction of dissimilar threatening elements. This was
"Option Three", and it envisioned offering 1000 nuclear warheads,
36 Pershing launchers and 54 F-4 aircraft in exchange for about 20%
of the Soviet tanks in Central Europe.
-- The Allies agreed on an approach combining all three of these
options. We would seek a common ceiling on ground force manpower
to be achieved in two phases of negotiation:
A first phase, in which the U.S. and USSR would reduce
equal percentages of their ground manpower, with the Soviet cut in the
form of a tank army. This would amount to about 29,000 Americans,
68,000 Soviets, and 1700 Soviet tanks.
A second phase, to be negotiated separately, in which
all the participants on both sides would further reduce to a common
ceiling on ground forces of about 700,000. This would require a ratio
of Pact-to-NATO cuts in Phase Two of about three-to-one.
TORSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD
LIBRAR
4
TORATCRY / SENSITIVE
-- Nuclear elements up to the limits of Option Three were to be
withheld, to be available as additional leverage to achieve the tank
army objective. From the outset it was assumed that these elements
would have to be used, and that without them the Alliance proposal was
rather one-sided.
Status of the Negotiations
-- The MBFR talks began on October 30, 1973. NATO put forward
its agreed position while the Pact tabled a draft treaty calling for three
stages of reductions:
an initial "token" reduction of 20, 000 men per side
a further cut of 5% by each side in CY 1975
a third stage of 10% reductions by each side in CY 1976.
-- Under the Pact draft treaty:
all countries and all force elements, ground, air, and
nuclear manpower and equipment, would be included in each stage.
reductions would be equal for each side, divided among
all participants in proportion to the relative size of their forces.
each nation would sign the treaty individually, thereby
creating a ceiling on its forces.
-- The Soviet approach indicated a greater interest in getting
German reductions, and in placing limits on European forces and
flexibility, than in getting American troops off the continent.
hade Gamain for four part
BEHALD 3. 10.8)
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRART
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
5
-- Our earliest military analysis concluded that equal reductions
or equal percentage reductions of NATO and Pact forces would favor
the Pact by magnifying the effects of the existing armor and manpower
disparities. For this reason we have consistently rejected the Eastern
approach.
-- The Soviets have shown some flexibility in their proposal
regarding the makeup of the initial 20, 000 man reduction:
they have agreed that the reductions could be made up
largely of U.S. and Soviet forces.
they have hinted that air and nuclear elements might be
deferred to the second stage.
they have remained adamant, however, that the size of
the reductions for the two sides must be equal.
-- In the last round theEast proposed a freeze on each country's
forces while the negotiations continue. It came on the heels of our
announced intention to beef up our combat forces in Europe at the
expense of support forces, and seems a rather transparent attempt
to limit Alliance forces to existing levels and inhibit flexibility.
Major Issues in the Negotiations
-- NATO and the Pact still disagree on three fundamental issues:
Whose forces should be reduced and when. Our position
is that.reductions by the U.S. and USSR should precede any specific
FORD
380
LIBRARY
STENED
TOP SECREY/SENSITIVE XGDS
for SECAST/SENSITIVE
6
commitments by the other direct participants to reduce. The Soviets
insist that all direct participants should at least commit themselves
to the size and timing of reductions from the outset.
What should be the reduction ratio. Our position holds that
because of existing disparities in ground forces, reductions should be
asymmetrical and lead toward a common ceiling. The Pact insists on
equal numerical reductions, or at least equal percentage reductions
based on total NATO/Pact forces in the reductions area.
What forces should be reduced. The Allied position calls
for reductions in ground forces only. However, we have proposed a
freeze on air manpower levels between phases, and possible U.S. air
manpower reductions are currently under discussion in the Alliance.
The Pact has insisted from the outset that all types of forces -- - ground,
air, and nuclear -- should be reduced in units, with their armaments.
-- Against this background we need to take another hard look at
our objectives in MBFR and any developments that might cause us to
want to change them.
Our Negotiating Objectives
-- The SALT negotiations and the Vladivostok accord have
established the principle of overall parity between the strategic
forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Because of this development,
the current imbalance in conventional forces in Central Europe has
3)
emerged as an even more important source of potential FORD instability
between East and West.
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP STORET / SENSITIVE
7
-- From the very beginning we have pursued the common ceiling
concept because it would help to remove this imbalance, and enhance
stability by establishing the principle of approximate parity in the
conventional forces of the two sides. We have also sought the with-
drawal of a Soviet tank army a step toward altering the clearly
offensive orientation of Soviet armored formations and reducing the
very large advantage the Pact holds in numbers of tanks.
-- The Pact negotiators have consistently rejected the Allied
proposal as too favorable to the West, and as an attempt to gain
unilateral military advantage. This is true to the extent that our
proposal seeks parity of outcome, requiring disproportionate reduc-
tions from the other side, yet offers the East nothing to offset their
larger reductions.
-- MBFR has been accorded a relatively low priority by the
Soviet leadership and there is little incentive for them to move the
negotiations forward. The current stalemate is likely to continue
unless the Western position is modified.
Modifications to the Alliance Position
A. Changing what is asked from the other side.
-- We could modify the Alliance proposal by changing what is
asked of the other side. Specifically we could reduce the asymmetry
in the proposed manpower reductions for Phase I (29,000 U.S. troops
GERALD FORD LIBRART
SERALD
FORD
for 68, 000 Soviet).
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
8
Any major modification (to an asymmetry of 2 to 1 or
less) would so increase the disparity in Phase II reductions required
to reach the common ceiling as to make Eastern agreement to the
concept very unlikely.
We might find it difficult to avoid an MBFR outcome that
effectively froze NATO/Pact forces at disparite levels and formalized
Pact superiority in Central Europe.
-- The twin Allied goals of manpower parity and reduction of
offensive elements continue to make both military and political sense.
Reducing the asymmetries in our Phase I proposal would undercut
our efforts to obtain these goals as outcomes for MBFR. What is
needed is an additional element which can be added to the Allied
position to serve as an offset for these asymmetries.
B. Adding elements to the current Alliance position.
-- We could modify our position on phasing and suggest European
reductions as part of Phase I.
Early European reductions (especially German) have
emerged as the prime Soviet desiderata in MBFR.
While parliamentary pressures for troop reductions have
increased European interest in MBFR, not one country has explicitly
asked to be included in Phase I reductions.
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
OF
3
LIBRARY
TRA/SACRET/SENSITIVE
9
It may not be in our interest to suggest such participation,
running counter to our efforts to get our NATO allies to improve their
conventional military capability and accept more of the burden of their
own defense.
-- Nuclear elements might serve as the basis of a trade of
substantial U.S. nuclear capability for a Soviet tank army (including
both the manpower asymmetry, and the tanks and associated armaments).
Introduction of these elements has been delayed because
they were also part of the FBS issue in SALT. With that issue resolved,
we can now consider introducing nuclear elements into MBFR.
Nuclear warhead reductions pose little difficulty. There
is general consensus within the executive that the warhead stockpiles
in Europe are too high. Congress shares this view and has begun
pressuring Defense for reductions.
The other two elements, F-4s and Pershings, raise
questions about the sorts of constraints that will result from reducing
these systems, and what limits should be sought on Soviet nuclear
systems.
There is consensus within the Verification Panel that
acceptable solutions to these problems can be devised in the context
of the negotiations, and that reduction of these elements in exchange
for a tank army remains a good trade.
is
OF
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
DERALD
TRRAST
10
TOV SACRET/SENSITIVE
C. Combine the addition of elements with a change in what is
asked from the other side.
-- We could add new elements to the negotiations while at the
same time altering what is asked from the other side. We might
introduce both nuclear elements and European reductions, while
reducing the asymmetry in our proposed manpower reductions.
-- This approach would leave the West very little to bargain.
with in seeking further asymmetrical reductions to a common ceiling
in the next phase of negotiations.
-- It would force the parties to resolve all the major issues
in the negotiations before even an initial agreement could be concluded.
This would complicate the process of obtaining internal agreement -
both within NATO and within the Soviet hierarchy without really
advancing our MBFR objectives.
-- We could still move to this approach after introducing nuclear
elements if the Allies began to press for early reductions, and we
would have the benefit of Soviet reaction to our nuclear proposal.
Approach to the Allies
-- Our NATO Allies will want extensive discussion on any proposal
to modify the current Alliance position. Coming forward with a single
proposal has the best chance of focusing this debate and obtaining timely
agreement.
FORD
GERALD R.
LIBRARY
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TQA SINCRE SENSITIVE
11
This approach would work well if the addition of nuclear
elements is suggested. The Allies have long been on notice of our
interest in introducing these elements, and would not feel this proposal
required a complete review of the Alliance position.
-- Any other modification would be much less expected and cause
a much more comprehensive review. In this case we might want to
submit a series of options for altering the Alliance position, without
indicating any specific preference.
-- This would be particularly useful if we were considering
European participation in Phase I, SO as to avoid any appearance
that the U.S. was pressuring its Allies into reductions.
-- Let me summarize the issues before us:
Should a modification be made to the current Alliance
position on MBFR?
Should that modification involve a change in what we ask
of the other side, the addition of new elements to the current Alliance
position -- either early European reductions or U.S. nuclear systems,
or a combination of these two approaches ?
How should such a modification be presented to our Allies,
as a single proposal or as one of a series of possible options to be the
of
basis for extensive Alliance review?
STREET
0867
TOD SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
MEMORANDUM
652X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
February 3, 1975
ATTACHMENTS
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis one
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting on
MBFR, January 23, 1975
Herewith, Jan Lodal's minutes of the NSC meeting on MBFR.
We are preparing a summary memorandum for your signature
to the Vice President.
Attachment
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE UT 2/95.
ATTACHMENTS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09166
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Jan Lodal
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 1/23/75
CREATION DATE
01/23/1975
VOLUME
24 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200008
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/23/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC letter 2/10/99
uts/99
652X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Thursday, January 23, 1975
TIME:
10:37 a.m. to 11:35 a.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
MBFR
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
Ambassador Stanley Resor
CIA:
Benjamin Rutherford
LIBRARY
White House:
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the
President
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
NSC:
Jan M. Lodal
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 364
FORD is LIBRARY CENALE
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
E.O. 12958 Sec. 15 3.4 (b) (i) and(w)
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
MR 98-39, MR 14; NSCULAR 2/10/99
By let NARA, Date 5/24/99
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
2
President Ford: Thank you all very much for coming. As you know, this
meeting is on the topic of MBFR. I would like to be updated on where we
stand. I'm familiar with our offer and the Soviets' counteroffer, and when
I was Vice President, I had an in depth briefing by Bruce Clarke. But I've
not had anything since then, except that I talked briefly to Stan last
September. Stan, you go back Sunday?
Ambassador Resor: Yes. Our first meeting with the other side will be
on January 30.
President Ford: Bill, do you have a briefing for us?
Mr. Colby: Mr. President, MBFR focuses on Central Europe, where the
largest and most critical elements of military strength on both sides are
located. However, the discussions exclude substantial military forces in
the flank states of both sides, even though they are important to the overall
military balance in Europe. Further, reinfor cements from France,
Britain, and the Soviet Union are close enough to Central Europe to alter
the balance there if time permits. But the reductions area would be the
decisive battleground. Should conflict erupt there suddenly, the forces
shown on this next board -- expanded, of course, by local mobilization
would be the principal combat elements immediately available to both sides.
These numbers are based on our most recent intelligence. There are
minor disagreements between these numbers and the agreed NATO numbers.
It is in Central Europe that the Pact has the greatest preponderance of ground
forces, and it is this imbalance that we are addressing in the MBFR nego-
tiations.
The national forces of both sides in Central Europe are approximately the
same size. The major disparity between NATO and the Pact strengths
stems from the Soviet forces stationed in the reductions area. These
constitute approximately half of the forces available to the Pact, and the
major part of the Pact's offensive power. Furthermore, Soviet forces
in the reduction area have been increased by about 100, 000 men in the
past 8 years and have significant strength in tanks -- while NATO
forces have not grown appreciably.
The withdrawal of a Soviet Army from Central Europe would reduce
Soviet offensive capability significantly. Just as importantly, it would
probably force the Soviets to change their plan of attack. I can illustrate
this briefly. We have good evidence that the Soviet generals believe their
forces in the reduction area are capable of undertaking major offensive
operations against NATO's center region without prior reinforcement
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD is LIBRARY 038830
LISBACE GERALD ? FORD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
3
from the USSR. Although they clearly expect reinforcement after a week
or so, exercises as far back as 1969 consistently indicate that they intend
to exploit their initial numerical superiority by a high-speed offensive
once hostilities begin. I would like to add, Mr. President, that
President Ford:
Mr. Colby:
Secretary Kissinger: Is that just your theory, or based on some informa-
tion?
Mr. Colby:
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, that is essentially the
Mr. Colby: It's more like a
Secretary Schlesinger:
President Ford:
Mr. Colby:
TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD
LISTREY GERALD :| FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITVE
4
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, the quality of U.S. tactical air
vastly exceeds the quality of Soviet air. On the overall balance, taking
quality into account, the air situation looks quite good. Looking only at
the numbers would lead you to be unduly pessimistic. This same analysis
does not apply to the tanks --
President Ford: The 2 to 1 aircraft advantage looks awesome.
Secretary Schlesinger: That also leaves out our reinforcement capability.
We could have an additional 1500 aircraft in Europe very quickly.
President Ford: From where?
Secretary Schlesinger: From the U.S. We can't reinforce quickly with
tanks, but we can with saircraft.
President Ford: But you saydthe quality of their tanks is different?
Secretary Schlesinger: Their tanks essentially match our capabilities.
President Ford: Incidentally, how are you coming with the expedited
MC-60 program?
Secretary Schlesinger: Very well. We will be up to 600 in June and up to
1,000 by 1976.
President Ford: Per year?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes sir.
Mr. Colby: They would also hope to
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President Ford: Are those IRBMs?
Mr. Colby: No -- Scuds and Frogs.
Secretary Schlesinger: This is only in the NATO guidelines area.
Mr. Colby: It is now less important than air delivery systems. However,
it certainly cannot be ignored.
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Some mention should be made of our Allies and their attitudes toward
MBFR. Britain, West Germany, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg are directly participating in the negotiations -- the other
Allies are observers. The West European Allies entered into MBFR re-
luctantly. They did not want to see the US military presence in Europe
reduced, and feared that the negotiations themselves would be divisive.
Now, because of economic and political pressures, the British, Dutch,
and Belgians would like to cut their own forces. The West Germans are
of course not feeling the economic pinch so much, but would expect to be
a part of any Western reductions.
Finally, the Soviets have an interest in some progress in MBFR, since
they probably see the negotiations as contributing to their overall objec-
tives in East-West detente. They need, at a minimum, to keep the talks
going in order to help maintain movement in the Conference on European
Security. But they also have real security interests in the MBFR
outcome -- especially their hope of at least constraining the growth
of, or, ideally, reducing West German military strength. With respect
to the US, they would like to see a reduction in our nuclear capability in
Europe -- but not at the expense of an increased West German capability.
In regard to their own forces, the Soviets can be expected to drive a hard
bargain. They will stress equality of reduction rather than equality of
remaining forces. In particular, they will focus on US nuclear strength
and the German military potential.
President Ford: Thank you very much Bill. Henry, would you like to
bring us up to date on where we stand --
Secretary Kissinger: I would like to sum up the history of the negotiations,
following on to what Bill Colby has said, and review the modifications which
might be made to the Alliance position now.
MBFR originated in the 1950s with Soviet proposals for both a European
security conference and for withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany.
During the 1960s, the Soviets lost interest in European force reductions,
lest they appear to release forcesfor service in Vietnam. But during the
late '60s, their interest seemed renewed for a variety of reasons. In the
end, we went along with MBFR for basically two reasons: First, as a
response to Soviet CSCE initiatives and second, for Congressional reasons,
as a counter to Mansfield Resolution pressures. The Europeans went along
for essentially the same reasons.
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As the talks started, we developed an interest in seeing if we could use
MBFR for rationalizing the analysis of NATO strategic issues. In NATO,
a serious discussion of these issues had not taken place, and we thought
MBFR might be helpful in getting one started.
So we went into MBFR with a mix of motives. It has to be seen in that
context.
The US developed essentially three concepts for the reductions. The first
was a common ceiling on ground force manpower to be reached in two
phases -- 10 percent withdrawals of stationed forces followed by 10 percent
cuts of indigenous forces.
The second was an equal percentage in US and Soviet forces which would
lead to a common ceiling on ground force manpower.
The third was a reduction of dissimilar threatening elements, including
1,000 nuclear warheads, 36 Pershings, and 54 F-4s. This led to a
discussion with George Brown where he's been able to change the size
of the squadrons to get the reduction he wants! (laughter) This is the
so-called nuclear option.
The Allies agreed on an approach combining all three of these options.
We would seek a common ceiling on ground force manpower to be
achieved in two phases of negotiation.
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There would be a first phase, in which the US and USSR would reduce
equal percentages of the ground force manpower, with the Soviet cut
being in the form of the tank army. We would take out manpower only,
29,000 troops, while the Soviets would take out 68, 000 troops and an
additional 1700 tanks.
President Ford: 68,000 would be included in the tank army?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes -- the 68, 000 represents the tank army.
Secretary Schlesinger: In addition, each side would take out 15% of its
manpower.
Secretary Kissinger: The percentage cut would be the same. We
figured out that the tank army would be 68, 000, and took the same
percentage cut for the US.
We have had trouble figuring out why Stan Resor has not been able to
convince the Soviets to accept this approach. It must be because he is
a Yale man (laughter).
We also proposed a second phase, in which both sides would reduce
further to a common ceiling of about 700,000. Again, this would require
a three to one ratio of Pact to NATO cuts in the second phase.
Predictably, the Soviets did not accept our proposal. They put forth a
proposal with several differences. Where we have stressed equal
percentage reductions, they stressed equal numbers. We said the US
and Soviets should reduce first, and the Soviets were more interested in
NATO and Warsaw Pact allied reductions. This is because the larger
the German slice they could get, the more they were able to trade good
German divisions for lousy East European divisions.
It is important to realize that the significance of cuts are two-fold: the
cut itself, but also that a cut establishes a ceiling. 54 F -4 aircraft is
not a large number but it does establish a ceiling on this type of aircraft.
This is why the Soviets were anxious on German reductions since even
a small cut would have the great advantage of establishing a ceiling on
all German forces.
The Soviets have shown some flexibility in their proposal. They have
proposed an inital reduction of 20, 000, made up largely of US and Soviet forces.
But even a reduction of 1, 000 Germans would have the additional effect
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of putting a ceiling on the Germans. They have hinted that their
nuclear reductions might be deferred to the second phase, but they
have remained adamant that the size of the reductions for the two
sides must be equal.
Initially, the Allies were content to let the US and the Soviets reduce
only their forces. They saw putting off their reductions to the second
phase as a device to keep their forces up. Leber and others stated that
if the reductions were in the second phase, they could go to their
parliaments and tell them that reductions were eventually coming, but after
by some time. But the domestic pressures have increased in Europe,
and the tendancy now is for the Europeans to want to be included in the
first phase.
Secretary Schlesinger: Except the Germans who have tended to move
in the opposite direction.
President Ford: To keep their forces up?
Secretary Schlesinger: Schmidt has moved in the opposite direction
as opposed to Brandt, who wanted to reduce.
Secretary Kissinger: They also don't want to give up a tremendous
bargaining chip, namely a ceiling on their forces.
President Ford: Does their changed attitude follow through to US reductions?
Secretary Schlesinger: No, they are prepared to see us reduce.
Secretary Kissinger: They view our reductions largely as a reaction to
Mansfield. The Europeans believe that reductions we take in MBFR would
be less than what we would take unilaterally.
NATO and the Pact still disagree on three fundamental issues. First,
whose forces should be reduced and when. We believe that the US and
the USSR should reduce first, but the Pact insists that all participants reduce
from the outset.
Second, what should be the reduction ratio? Our position is that reductions
should be asymmetrical and lead to a common ceiling. Our position is equal
percentages, but they believe the reduction should be equal numbers, a position
not supported by our figures.
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Finally, what forces should be reduced. Our position calls for reductions
in ground forces only, but we have proposed a freeze on air manpower,
and possible US reductions of air manpower. The Pact has insisted from
the outset that all types of forces -- ground, air, and nuclear -- should
be reduced in units with their armaments.
These disagreements are why we need to take another look at our objectives
in MBFR and in developments that might cause us to reconsider them.
The SALT negotiations at Vladivostok established the principal of equality
and gave us a good argument for equality in MBFR. Vladivostok also
adds urgency, since the movement to a balance in strategic forces. adds
urgency on the conventional front. Once strategic equality is accepted
around the world as a fact of life, conventional imbalances will be even
more important. So, as Bill Colby said, we have taken an approach
which attempts to enhance the defense and reduce the offensive capability.
So far, the Soviets have shown no major interest in MBFR. Nothing
they have said to you, Mr. President, or to me in our neogtiations shows
any great interest. They simply repeate to you or to me what they say
to Stan in Vienna. This means the Politburo has not yet engaged the issue.
We will have to see whether or not in the next six months the Soviets will
put this on the front burner. If they have a desire to keep detente going,
they will do SO.
Secretary Schlesinger: There is an embassy cable in indicating that
there might be some growth in their interest in MBFR.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. If that is true, some change in our position
is imperative if we are to make progress. No Soviet leader can go to
the Politburo and say he has traded 29, 000 Americans for a tank army
including 68, 000 Soviets.
President Ford: The tank army withdrawal would reduce tanks by how
many?
Secretary Schlesinger: 1700.
Secretary Kissinger: Intellectually, we have several ways of going:
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-- We could change what's asked from the other side. We could
bring the numbers closer together. This might make the first phase more
salable, but in the second phase, we will have to get even greater
asymmetries in the Pact cuts. This could push the common ceiling
indefinitely into the future.
-- Secondly, we could add elements to the current Alliance position.
For example, we could move up indigenous reductions, something of
great interest to the Soviets because of their concerns for Germany, or
we could add nuclear elements -- a thousand warheads, 54 F-4s, and 36
Pershing launchers. And finally, we could combine these approaches with
a slight reduction in the Pact withdrawals we propose and introduce some
nuclear forces.
I believe there was a consensus within the Verification Panel that we should
go no further at this time than to introduce the nuclear package _0 a thousand
warheads, 54 F-4s, and 36 Pershing launchers.
Secretary Schlesinger: We would like to increase that to 2, 000 warheads.
Secretary Kissinger: The nuclear package our Allies know about is a thousand
warheads, 54 aircraft, and 36 Pershings. Perhaps in June, after telling
them we have been restudying this, we could go to 2, 000.
President Ford: Out of 9, 000?
Secretary Kissinger: Seven thousand.
Secretary Schlesinger: Out of 5,000 in the NATO guidelines area.
Director Ikle: Forty percent of those in the area.
Secretary Kissinger: In addition, we have to look at the tactical question.
The only thing the Allies know about is 1,000 warheads. We could either
stick with the present package, or give up the 1, 000 additional immediately.
The worst thing would be to tell the Allies we want to reduce 2, 000, but only
put forth a reduction of 1, 000. The Russians will know we have something
else to offer and wait for it. If we want to hold back, we don't want to brief
the Allies on the additional 1, 000.
I believe there is a consensus that it is time to introduce the nuclear package.
Some modifications may be necessary as time goes on, but I believe it
would be premature to handle these now. We need to get the Soviet reaction
to the introduction of the nuclear package first.
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There has also been consideration given to introducing the nuclear
package piecemeal --
President Ford: Pershings, and then F-4s? --
Secretary Kissinger: Right. There is a consensus that we should introduce
it all at once. On the question of whether we should add a thousand warheads,
we have not had a full discussion. Jim just worked out the agreement that
we could get up to 2, 000.
Stan will need approval of some kind of approach, Mr. President, before
he leaves on Sunday.
President Ford: Jim, do you have anything to add?
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I have two comments. I recommend
that we stick with our objective of getting the tank army because our ability
to verify manpower reductions is minimal. The intelligence community
has increased the estimates by 70, 000 in the last year. Verifying the
movement of manpower is difficult without a series of collateral constraints
which will be almost impossible to negotiate. We have to have something
that we can verify.
Second, the Chiefs have recommended reduction of 1,600 warheads as
part of the readjustment of US tactical nuclear forces. In addition, we
have to give Congress a report on the Nunn Amendment. Personally, I
believe it is more likely that Congress will move on warhead reductions
than on the Mansfield approach.
President Ford: More likely than on manpower?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. Also, we can move warheads back in
rapidly in an emergency. Therefore, I would recommend the package
the Chiefs recommend, but add to the package enough to bring it up to
2, 000 warheads.
Henry referred to deficiencies in NATO's strategic discussions. But in
the last year, I think there has been much increased understanding in NATO.
They've accepted our flexible response strategy based on three legs of the
Triad. They are coming to understand the importance of conventional
defense. That is why it is important for us to emphasize our agreement
with the importance of conventional defense.
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The Soviets moved in 100, 000 men during the Czechoslovakian coup.
But the US had made many improvements. For example, the Seventh
Army was in poor shape during the Vietnam War, but is now back in
good condition.
President Ford: Our Seventh Army?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. And we have added two brigades by
converting support forces to combat forces. The Germans can field
1.2 million men in 48 hours. So the balance has probably improved
slightly to the advantage of the West in the last year. Over the last
six or seven years NATO has been retreating, but last year, it improved.
Our objectives on MBFR have been two. First, to improve security
in Western Europe. This had led us to concentrate on getting out the
tank army. And we have agreed not to be stampeded into movement that
does not serve our ultimate objective of improved security.
Second, we want to get the Allies to do more. If we place limits on
Western forces, we cannot get them to increase their manpower and
budgetary support.
It is important not to undermine these basic objectives by accepting some
short term possible deal held out by the Soviets.
The Soviet objectives are first to thwart movement toward European
unity.
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Second, their other objective is to get control of the Bundeswehr -- the
German Army. This, of course, conflicts directly with our own objective
of getting the Germans to do more.
We should keep in mind these two objectives. I think so far that the
negotiations have gone well.
Fin ally, I think the Congressional situation on the Mansfield resolution
has improved.
President Ford: Even with the new Congress?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes -- I have sat down with some of the new
Democrats. They are not Bella Abzugs;they want to make a serious
appraisal of defense needs, and not only react to Vietnam. I believe
we can hold the House, and the climate in the Senate is better than it
was a few months ago.
President Ford: I hope you are right, but my visceralreaction leads me
to the opposite conclusion.
Secretary Kissinger: I can't judge votes, but in meetings with them,
the new members seem somewhat less ideological, but I don't know how
they will vote.
Secretary Schlesinger: Brock Adams just gave a long speech on security
to the New York Delegation which was well received. Getting their
ideological mind-set out of Vietnam is very important.
President Ford: My analysis is predicated on two events. First,
Eddie Hebert was the leader of the anti-Mansfield forces. His being
thrown out will lead to less anti-Mansfield sentiment. Second, Phil Burton
has become to a considerable extent a force. His voting record, I
suspect, has been consistently in favor of Mansfield. I believe the
Speaker is on our side, although O'Neill is on the other side. Mel Price
has consistently supported Hebert's view, but he's not the hard tough
speaker and debator that Hebert has been. He will stand up -- he's a
good man, but he's not the tough leader Hebert was.
Secretary Schlesinger: Hebert's ouster had more to do with personality
than policy
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President Ford:
I hope you're right.
Secretary Schlesinger: Even in the press, the New York Times and
the Christian Science Monitor and other publications are now coming out
in favor of NATO.
Secretary Kissinger: They all wanted out of Vietnam, and now they will
work on getting out of NATO.
Secretary Schlesinger: I believe they are changing on NATO.
President Ford: This Congressional situation argues for two things --
first, a stronger positive public support for national defense OV Second,
a more realistic appraisal of our MBFR position.
George, do you have any comments?
General Brown: The chiefs recommended 1600 warheads. But with
some arm twisting, I got them to agree to accept 2000. They had
recently reviewed our deployment plans and concluded that we could
take out a total in NATO of 2200. If we took all these out of the NATO
guideline's area, this would bring the total to 2800. But I have been
working for some time to get our number down to a more defensible
level. The basis on which our requirements have been stated have been
indefensible. For example, a lot of it is based on target lists: which
includes things like each command post. Some of these are mobile,
and we don't have the intelligence to know where they are to hit them.
Secretary Kissinger: I think we should avoid loading the nuclear
reduction up too much. First, the Allies will think you made some
secret agreement in Vladivostok. Second, we have to look at this not
only in terms of the inherent capability of the forces, but from broader
political considerations. Third, I remember when Secretary McNamara
would present detailed analyses telling them how they should change their
forces. While he might have been right, although I disagreed with him
on many issues of substance, the issue with the Allies was the volatility
of the American position.
For example, withdrawal of nuclear
would have an
effect quite apart from the direct military implications. There would
be significant foreign policy consequences.
Idon't mind these withdrawals in the context of MBFR, but I'm worried
about any unilateral reductions. The timing would have to be very careful
of
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I would lean toward presenting only what the Allies heard before
Vladivostok, and saving the 600 to 1000 additional warheads for
later.
President Ford: These negotiations as I understand them do not
Ambassador Resor: That is correct.
Secretary Kissinger: It's somewhat the reverse of what I said in
the Verification Panel when I argued against bleeding out elements one
at a time, but I am worried that if we throw in the additional thousand
warheads, given the mentality of the Europeans, they will say what the
hell has happened So I recommend presenting the existing package
first, and then do some missionary work on them before adding the others.
President Ford: The thousand warheads, 36 Pershings, and 54 F-4's --
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, which they have heard before Vladivostok
and cannot say you made up only because of Vladivostok.
Ambassador Resor: This is the package Don presented to them in July
of 1973.
Secretary Kissinger: This is not an insignificant package, especially
when you consider that the Soviets also get ceilings on nuclear forces,
F -4's and Pershings. They cannot sluff this off. If we have an additional
thousand warheads, we can throw them in later.
Secretary Schlesinger: To some extent I believe I disagree with you.
Not with respect to diplomatic tactics,
But in the NATO guidelines area, the British support
substantial US reductions. In Germany, the SPD supports reductions and
the CDU has said in its conference that it is prepared to see a reduction
from 7000 warheads to 5000 warheads, although this is throughout
Europe as a whole. With this kind of change, even in the CDU, we can
move forward, so long as the US improves its nuclear capabilities.
President Ford: You mean our tactical nuclear capabilities?
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Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. And we would not touch the weapons given
to Germany
under our program of cooperation.
Also, I am not sure we can hold onto these warheads with Congress.
I would leave the tactics to Henry, but I believe the Allies are ready
for the introductions.
Dr. Ikle: I think we can gain a great deal by adding 600 or a 1000
warheads. This will make the Russians see that we are really in business.
On the other hand, it will be sensitive with the Allies. But if we sit on
these nuclear reductions, we may get blamed for holding up change for
reasons of MBFR.
President Ford: Stan, have you gotten any reaction on these nuclear
forces from the Soviets -- have you talked to them about these, or have
they negotiated only with our NATO Allies?
Ambassador Resor: Not even that really. In July of 1973, Don told the
Allies of our recommendation to put in Option III. NATO then got General
Goodpaster as SACEUR to do an estimate of the military implications,
and SACEUR found it reasonable. We had trilateral discussions with the
UK and FRG last spring, and the UK gave us a paper this fall that had
been coordinated with the Germans on the nuclear package. It took the
line that we couldn't move in MBFR without using it, that we would have
to put it in. But we have not had active discussions with the Allies since
last spring, and that was purely academic.
Mr. Rumsfeld: Although, it leaked into the newspapers so the Warsaw Pact
countries are not unaware of the proposal.
Ambassador Resor: Yes. The Pact must be wondering why we haven't
used it yet. Their recent tactic has been to propose a very small initial
step.
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President Ford: A small number of ground force reductions?
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Dr. Ikle: Given their knowledge of Option III, perhaps adding the extra
thousand warheads would be something new.
Secretary Kissinger: They haven't seen the package yet, so that must
indicate to them that there has been some problem with it. We've never
had any reaction from them on it. To sweeten it right away might give
them the wrong idea, particularly since they are in a state of flux them-
selves.
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President Ford: How long will it take them to react to a proposal such
as this?
Ambassador Resor: It is hard to say. It will probably be March 15
before we can get something through the Alliance and therefore March 27
before we can have it on the table. They will have to send it to Moscow,
and Henry has a better feel than I on how long it would take to react, but
it would be several weeks.
Secretary Kissinger: I believe it depends, Mr. President, on how they
want to gear it to Brezhnev's meeting with you. If they want to gear it
to the meeting, you will hear in your channels about it. That is why I
would hold the additional warheads until we get a response. It would
probably be a month at least.
This will be the first approach to BS reductions we will have ever
made. In that sense it should be seen as a major breakthrough. I don't
think they will accept the proposal but they can't ignore it.
President Ford: Anyone else? Before you go back Sunday Stan, we will
give you some guidelines. I do think we ought to find some solution. I
think your analysis in DOD has been very helpful. But I would tend
toward the lower figure. This is no final answer now, but I believe it
would be a better strategic approach. I will let you know by Sunday
morning.
Ambassador Resor: One final point -- I have seen several Congressmen
recently, and they always ask if we have a realistic position which may
initially succeed. I believe that if we can get this down, we will be in
a better position to convince them that we do.
President Ford: Thank you all once again.
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MISFR REDUCTION AREA
Greenland
Norwegian
Iceland
Sea
Sweden
?
Finland
Norway
North
&
2
a
Baltic
North
Sea
Atlantic
Denmark
Sea
U.S.S.R.
United
a
Iroland
Kingdom
East
Poland
Germany
Ocean
Enx. Wast
Czech.
Germany
Mustria
LIDER
Hungary
France
Switz
Romania
Black Sea
Italy
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Anderrs
Portugal
AID.
Turkey
Spain
Greece
I
a
Mediterranean
Sea
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco
Libya
Egypt
NATO
WARSAW PACT
LIBRAST GERALD ? FORD
594352
OFFENSIVE ORGANIZATION OF PACT FORCES IN NGA
Top Secret Sensitive
TORO
LIBRARY
is
GENALD
DEN.
TOTAL FORCE
27-Govist Divisions
29-East European Divisions
US
EAST GERMANY
NORTHERN FRONT
Polish Armies
NETHERLANDS
FEDERAL
CENTRAL FRONT
POLAND
5 Societ Armies
2 Eas German Armies
BELGIUM
REPUBLIC
LUX.
OF
SOUTHWEST FRONT
2 Czech Armies
FRANCE
1 Soviet Army CZECHOSLOVAHIA
GERMANY
BENALB FORD LIBRARY
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
HUNGARY
BULGANIA
54435
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
cTop Secret Sensitive
594354
774
LIBRADY
BLERED
URID 2.° FORD LIGRARY
FORD & LIBRARY OF
segret
594355
Major force elements in the reduction area
Bednet
Combat aircraft
Manpower
(Combat capable
(Hundred thousand)
aircraft assigned
Tanks
to combat units)
Total
Ground
Air
GERALD FORD
USA
ROLLIBRARY
LIBRARY
Secret
594356
Soviet strategic missiles targeted against Europe
Hard sites
Soft sites
Total
SS-5
SS-4
FORD i LIBRARY 034400
SS-11
FORD i LIBRARY
Top Secret Sensitive
594357