Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file includes material relating to an oral note to Brezhnev.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1552384
label
NSC Meeting, 4/24/75
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1552384
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
NSC Meeting, 4/24/75
description
This file includes material relating to an oral note to Brezhnev.
citationUrl
collections
National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
subjects
Soviet Union
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1552384
coverageEndDate
day
25
logicalDate
1975-04-25
month
4
year
1975
coverageStartDate
day
25
logicalDate
1975-04-25
month
4
year
1975
itemCount
1
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
6d82d1c589be64ba
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 4/24/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SACRETSENSITIVE (XGDS)
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Thursday, April 24, 1975
4:30 p.m. -5:00 p.m. (30 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From:Henry A. Kissinger HC
ORIGINAL
I.
PURPOSE
To discuss the evacuation of Americans from South Vietnam and
insure understanding and support of our evacuation strategy.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: In light of the deteriorating situation around
Saigon and of the imminent danger of North Vietnamese
attacks on the city and on its principal airport, there has
been strong pressure from a number of quarters to evacuate
Americans as rapidly as possible without regard to other
considerations.
The evacuation of Americans has been proceeding at a
ORGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
measured pace. About 1, 600 Americans remained as of
Wednesday morning, Washington time. Ambassador Martin
says that he expects to have the total of the American
community down to 1, 090 as of Friday night. - -
With respect to the Vietnamese, we have been evacuating
principally those Vietnamese who are relatives of American
citizens and whose evacuation is necessary to persuade those
American citizens to leave Vietnam. We have now started to
pull out Vietnamese who have a particularly high risk of
assassimation or torture by the Communists, as we are
pledged to do, but we have not yet begun a large-scale effort.
The House-Senate Conference Committee, meeting this after-
noon,is to reconcile the differences between their differing
DECLASSIFIED
STGMST/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Authority Previously declassified items per NSC
By let
NLF Date 6/12/98
GERALD ?
LIBRARY CHGERALD
FORD is LIDRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
2
versions of a humanitarian assistance and evacuation bill.
Both bills provide authority for evacuation of Vietnamese,
but not for the use of American forces to support that evacua-
tion beyond their support for the evacuation of Americans.
B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will
be announced. There will be a White House photographer.
ORIGINAL
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
U.R.D.
LIBRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FORD is DERALD LIBRARY
(MCDS
SECRET
TION
III. TALKING POINTS
--
I have asked you here to review where we are regarding
evacuation and to explain my thinking as to what it is we are
trying to accomplish. It is absolutely essential at this critical
time that we all understand each other and that we all work
together toward a common goal.
-- It has been my objective to reduce the American community and
its dependents, and high-risk Vietnamese, at a rapid rate.
ORIGINAL
At the same time, I considered it essential that this rate not
be so fast as to run the risk of inducing panic.
-- This has been a difficult balancing operation between these
two competing goals. It is also essential that we
do whatever we can to depart with dignity and salvage
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
whatever is possible from the Vietnam tragedy. To that end,
as most of you know, we have undertaken soundings with a
view toward a ceasefire and political discussions.
--
I do not know whether we will be successful. We have few
bargaining chips. It is important, however, to utilize those
we do have. One of those is the maintenance of a calm and
self-assured posture as we reduce our Embassy to the
minimum essential strength. If we project the impression of
pell-mell evacuation, we certainly reduce any incentive for
discussion.
--
We are also doing what we can to insure a degree of stability
in the Saigon Government. If the DRV thinks it can unravel
the government until it gets one of the complexion it wants
without any action on its part, its incentive to talk is minimal.
--
It is for all these reasons that I have tried to project an image
of steadiness in our draw-down and in the other moves we
have made. I have today ordered Graham Martin to reduce
Americans to 1090 by Friday evening Saigon time. I have in
addition ordered that by Saturday evening Saigon time all but
the very essential personnel in the U.S. contractor and
unofficial American category be eliminated. That should put
us at a level where we can evacuate quickly on a moment's notice
R.
FORD
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
GERALD
SECRET
SECRET
-- I do not want to complete the evacuation before it is necessary
because it would destroy the last chance there may be for
Gerald R. Ford Library remoriginal RETIRE INVATION
the South Vietnamese to put something together that can keep
them free at least for a time, and keep Saigon from being
overrun. I will not, however, risk a single American life
by delaying an evacuation on that account. I intend to order
final evacuation before I think Americans are in actual danger.
In the meantime I expect your total support in implementing
the strategy which I have outlined.
Declassified Photocopy from
[-- You may wish to make a few comments on the Middle East
and our posture during the reassessment. If so, I believe
you know best what you would wish to say. ]
:
FORD
A
GERALD
SECRET
GREAT
LIBRARY
SECRET
4/24/75
2745X
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/XGDS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:
NATIONAL SECURIT Y COUNCIL MEETING
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence,
William Colby
Deputy Secretary of State,
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRED PRESERVATION
Robert Ingersoll
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
William Clements
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, April 24, 1975
4:35 p.m.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
The White House
SUBJECT:
Vietnam Evacuation
President: As you know, before we got into the Phnom Penh evacuation, we
had a meeting. I wanted to know what our plans were. It took place at the
right time and in the best of circumstances.
I have kept in daily contact with Henry and Brent on where things stood
in Vietnam. I know the Congress has been on us on this, to get it off their
GERALOR FORD LIBRARY
SECRET/XCDS
CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
DECLARSE DECLASSIFIED
With E.O. 12356, Sec. 34,
MR 92 11,420 NSC Hr. 5/19/93
FORD & LIBRARY CERALO
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1,3)
Dy, let NARA Date 10/22/93
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SEGRET/XGDS
-2-
back. I think it is very important to stay there as long as we can contribute,
to evacuate in a way that will not promote panic, and to contribute as much
as possible to a peaceful solution.
Now, I understand we are down from 6000 to about 1600.
Schlesinger: It has gone up to 1700.
President: I have ordered a reduction by Friday night of to 1090.
Schlesinger: That is a lot in one day.
President: That is what I ordered. There will be another order that by
Sunday non-essential non-governmental personnel must be out of there.
The group that is left will stay until the order is issued to take them all
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
out.
We just got a reply from the Sovets to a request we made. Henry,
give us the background and the message.
Kissinger: At the President's request, I contacted Dobrynin Saturday
to request their assistance to permit a ife_evacuation and the beginning
of political discussions and asked them to help create the conditions
where this would be possible. [See U.S. oral note at Tab A]. We also
told him specifically on Monday that we would take a serious view of an
attack on Tan Son Nhut. We have received the following reply.
[He reads from the Soviet message at Tab B.]
This means, in effect, that if we keep the dialogues going we have an
assurance against military action as we pull our people out. On the
political side, the tripartite arrangement gives us the hope of a coalition
solution which can be better than surrender. We will go back to the Soviets
to find out what they mean by implementation of the Paris Accords and to
say we will cooperate. We will say we won't take precipitate action and
we assume they won't.
President: My interpretation is that the lull which we have is a result of
this. You could assume they weren't yet ready and would move when they
are ready. This looks like they are willing for an agreement within the
framework of the Paris Accords and that w e can keep our people there,
and reduce them until such time as we decide to remove them.
SECRET/XGDS
GESALE FORD
GERALD R. FORD LIBRAPY
SECRET/XGDS
-3-
We have been through a difficult time. It was a risk and a gamble
but it was my responsibility and I didn't want to do anything to risk the
situation. I think I was right, and I will continue to act that way.
Every one should be guided by the 1090 and the further removal
of non-essential, non-governmental people. These are Americans, not
Vietnamese dependents, who I assume are adding to the list everyday,
in a ratio of about four to one.
Brown: About 15 to 1 in the last few days.
Kissinger: You asked the Soviets about American and South Vietnamese
evacuation and they only answered about American citizens.
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
Vice President: How do you read that?
Declassified Photocopy from
Kissinger: I read that as they are tacticly saying "Get them out" but
Gerald R. Ford Library
they can't give us approval.
President: I take it to mean we can't use force.
Schlesinger: We are delighted with such restraint.
President: But I want to do whatever is needed to secure the American
evacuation George, would you review the plan for us?
Brown: The first stage we are in now. In the second stage we would send
two companies in just to keep order. If we lost the airfield we would go
to helos. We have tworlanding zones -- one at old MACV compound and
one at the Embassy. We can put about six helos down at once. We would
put 1100 Marines in with the first wave. The helos would come in and
evacuate the 1100 people in an hour and 15 minutes. Then they would go
back for the Marines.
President: Then the total is about 2 1/2 hours.
Kissinger: Graham [Martin] said he had a deal with the airborne
commander and he would keep order.
President: .How about the typhoon?
SECRET/XCDS
GERALD R. FORD LIBRART
SECRET/XGDS
-4-
Kissinger: There is no danger now.
President: I think these orders to Martin will get us within the 1100
required.
Clements: How many Vietnamese are we talking about?
Kissinger: We don't know.
Colby: I think we should move a soon as possible for the high-risk people.
Kissinger: We told him yesterday and today to get moving on the high-risk
people.
Brown: I think we should keep mixing the loads Americans and
Vietnamese -- so we don't get criticized for leaving American personnel
there as hostages.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Schlesinger: Henry's message is a source of reassurance, but there are
some sources of concern. Their control might be limited; there are
reports of sappers going in; and reports of attempts to stir up unrest:
and there are some risks of attempts to goafter Americans. In light of
Henry's message, that appears manageable. A more difficult problem
is population control, especially in conditions where they might have to
ORIGINAL RETAL
fire on Vietnamese. You know we have favored going down to minimum
levels. We should consider what we do if Americans are held hostage.
We could say no ships will go into Hanoi until the hostages are released.
So we should reduce as low as possible.
Colby: We have some people who are prisoners now.
Schlesinger: Just missionaries.
Colby: No. Also some advisors.
President; I understand the risk. It is mine and I am doing it. But let's
make sure we carry out the orders.
Vice President: You can't insure the interests of America without risks.
President: With God's help.
Vice President: It takes real courage to do what is right in these conditions
SECRET/XGDS
SERALD LIBRARY ? FORD
SERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
SECRET
A
ORAL NOTE
The President wishes the following brought to the
urgent attention of General Secretary Brezhnev.
For the past three years Soviet-American relations have
proceeded from the Basic Principles of May 1972, and above all
from the principle of restraint. The situation in Viet-Nam has
now reached a point, that the United States and the USSR must
consider the long term consequences [of further developments there
for Soviet-American relations and for the international situation as
a whole. There is little to be gained from a debate over the origins
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
of the present situation or over which parties must be held responsible.
Under present circumstances our overriding concern
is to achieve controlled conditions, which will save lives and
permit the continued evacuation of American citizens and those
South Vietnamese to whom we have a direct and special obligation.
This can only be achieved through a temporary cease fire.
We urgently request that the Government of the USSR
use its good offices to achieve a temporary halt to the fighting. In
this connection, we are prepared to discuss the special political
circumstances that could make this possible. We request the
R.
most expeditious answer.
FORD
BERALD
GERALD
I
LIBRATA
CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1,3) (1,3)
>>
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SECRET
Talking Points
-- We are not going to the Chinese or any other intermediary;
nor are we willing to approach the DRV.
-- We are going to Moscow because it is in our long
term mutual interest that the situation be brought to its conclusion
in a manner that does not jeopardize Soviet-American relations,
or affect the attitude of the American people toward other international
problems.
-- If there is a temporary cease fire, we would be
Declassified Photocopy from
PRESERVATION
prepared to convene the Paris Conference immediately, or we
Gerald R. Ford Library
can consider alternatives that the Soviet Union might work out
with Hanoi.
-- During the period of a temporary cease fire we would
be willing to halt military supplies.
ORIGINAL
-- But we are concerned that there will be attacks
on the airfields, that will make it impossible to continue an
orderly reduction in American citizens.
-- Moreover, we have detected Soviet surface-to-air
missiles within 50 miles of Saigon; any attack on passenger
aircraft would create a most dangerous situation.
QERALD R. FORD
-- In light of the developing military situation, we
need to know now whether there is a chance for a temporary halt
in the fighting that might permit a political process to start.
[-- The Soviets' answer will have a significant bearing
on our relations.
are
SECRET
B
Delivered to the Secretary at State Dept.
400 pm, april 24, 1975
As it has already been said to the President
immediately after the mssage of the President of April 19 was
received by L. E. Brezhnev we took appropriate steps :to get
in touch with the Vietnamese side in this connection.
As the result of those contacts now we can inform
the President about the following: the position of the
Vietnamese side on the question of evacuation of American
citizens from South Vietnam is definitely positive. The
have
Vietnamese stated that they/no intention to put any obstacles
in the course of military actions to evacuation of American
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
citizens from South Vietnam and that now in fact favorable
conditions have been established for such an evacuation.
At the same time it was emphasized that in the struggle
for achieving a political settlement the Vietnamese side
ORIGINAL
will proceed from the Paris Agreement. We were also told
that the Vietnamese do not intend to damage the prestige
of the United States.
Informing the President of the above in a confidential
manner L. E. Brezhnev expresses his hope that the President
will duly appreciate such a position of the Vietnamese
side and will not allow any actions on the United States
part which would be fraught with a new exacerbation of
the situation in Indochina.
GERALD R.
FORD
CLASSIFIED BY Hinry A. KISSINGS
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
BERALD R. FORD
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXCEPTION CATEGORY 5 13 (1)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.