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President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Mayagüez Incident, 1975
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 5/12/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
3225-X
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TQPISECRET/SENSITIVE
May 12, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER &
SUBJECT:
NSC Meeting of May 12, 1975
Attached are the minutes of the National Security Council Meeting
held May 12, 1975.
Attachment
cc: General Scowcroft
SECRAT/SENSITIVE - XGDS
at 3/28/98
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09178
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
W.R. Smyser
RECEIVER'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 5/12/75
CREATION DATE
05/12/1975
VOLUME
15 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200015
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 5/12/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date:
Monday, May 12, 1975
Time:
12:05 p.m. to 12:50 p.m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, The White House
Subject;
Seizure of American Ship by Cambodian
Authorities
Principals
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
DOD:
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
WH:
Donald Rumsfeld
NSC:
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
W. R. Smyser
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12058 Sec. 1.5 (a)(b)(c)
NSC ltr. 3/19/96 MR 91-20 # /
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
By KBH NARA, Date 3/20/96
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
President:
Please date. go ahead, Bill, and bring us up-to-
Colby:
The US Seatrain container ship MAYAGUEZ
was seized by the Khmer Communists about
3:15 p.m. local time about seven or eight
miles from the Cambodian Island of Poulo
Wei in the Gulf of Thailand. The ship was able
to transmit at least two messages picked up
in Jakarta and Manila after the boarding but
communications from the ship were quickly
broken off.
The ship was enroute to a Thai port from
Hong Kong.
At last report the ship was being taken to
the port of Kompong Son, about sixty miles
away, under escort by a Khmer Communist
gun boat.
The Island of Pulou Wei has been claimed by
both Phnom Penh and Saigon although it has
long been occupied by the Cambodians.
the
Khmer Communists were planning to occupy
Cambodian offshore islands, probably to
reiterate the Cambodian claim vis-a-vis
the Vietnamese Communists. The occupa-
tion may provide an early test for future
relations between the Khmer and Vietnamese
Communists.
A major factor behind the territorial dispute
in the area is the potential of rich oil deposits
in this area at the Gulf.
The former governments in Saigon and Phnom
Penh clashed over oil exploration rights in
this area last fall.
We have no hard information on why the Khmer
Communists seized the ship as it was en route
from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD LIGHAR
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
The ship was some 60 miles southwest of
Kompong Som, but within 8 miles of the
island of Poulo Wei, claimed by the Khmer
Communists.
A Panamanian charter vessel was seized by
the Khmer Communists last week in roughly
the same area, but was subsequently released
President:
When?
Colby:
We are not sure.
There is
evidence that some forces landed on at least
one of these islands.
President:
What is the best estimate of where the ship
is now?
Colby:
It was proceeding under its own steam at
what we estimate to be about 10 miles an
hour. Considering when it was picked up,
it would be in or near the port now.
Schlesinger:
When I left the Pentagon, the ship was already
only about 10 miles out.
President:
What are our options?
Schlesinger:
We can have a passive stance or we can be
active. We can do such things as seizing
Cambodian assets. We can assemble forces.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
4
We could seize a small island as a hostage.
We might also consider a blockade.
All these options would have to be scrutinized
by the Congress because, while you have
inherent rights to protect American citizens,
you would soon run into the CRA.
We do not have much information on the actual
situation. Such information as we have indicates
that the main purpose of the Cambodian forces
in occupying the islands may have been to keep
them from their brethren in South Vietnam.
It could be a bureaucratic misjudgment
or a bi-product of an action against South
Vietnam.
The Cambodians have already seized three
ships: a Panamanian, a Philippine and now
an American. They did release the first
two ships. We do not know, in handling this
sort of thing, how good their communication
is.
Kissinger:
How far from the islands was the ship when
it was picked up?
Colby:
About 7 to 8 miles.
Schlesinger:
In some information we picked up, they appeared
to be claiming 30 miles.
Rumsfeld
Isn't this piracy?
Schlesinger:
Yes.
Kissinger:
As I see it, Mr. President, we have two
problems:
-- The first problem is how to get the ship
back.
-- The second problem is how the U.S.
appears at this time.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALE FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
5
we
Actions that/would take to deal with one of these
problems may not help to deal with the other.
For example, I think that if they can get us
into a negotiation, even if we get the ship
back, it is not to our advantage. I think we
should make a strong statement and give a
note to the Cambodians, via the Chinese,
so that we can get some credit if the boat is
released. I also suggest some show of force.
What do we have in the neighborhood of the
incident?
Schlesinger:
We have the CORAL SEA, which is now on
its way to Australia for ceremonies.
President:
How long would it take to get there?
Schlesinger:
About two to three days.
President:
Do we have anything at Subic?
General Jones:
We have the HANCOCK and other vessels,
but it would take about a day and a half at
least to get them down there.
Kissinger:
We may not be able to accomplish much by
seizing their assets, since they are already
blocked. Perhaps we can seize a Cambodian
ship on the high seas. But I think that what
we need for the next 48 hours is a strong
statement, a strong note and a show of force.
Schlesinger:
That would mean turning around the CORAL
SEA.
Kissinger:
Can we use any aircraft?
Schlesinger:
We will have aircraft over the island to see
what kind of forces there are.
Kissinger:
Can we find out where Cambodian ships are
around the world?
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
Clements:
Admiral Holloway says he is not sure there
are any.
Kissinger:
Are there any merchant ships?
Schlesinger:
We doubt it.
Colby:
They may have some coastal stuff, some
small vessels and the like. But that is it.
Clements:
We should not forget that there is a real
chance that this is an in-house spat. In that
area there have been two discovery wells,
drilled by Shell and Mobil. One made a
significant discovery. We are talking about
600-700 million barrels and perhaps even
1 or 1 1/2 million barrels. I think that is
what this fuss is all about.
President:
That is interesting, but it does not solve
our problem. I think we should have a
strong public statement and a strong note.
We should also issue orders to get the
carrier turned around.
Kissinger:
I think we should brief that this is an outrage.
Even if they quarrel with each other, they can-
not use us.
President:
We should get the demand and our objection
to what has happened out to the press before
they get the story from elsewhere.
Ingersoll:
They may want to hold the ship as a hostage
to our equipment.
Schlesinger:
That was our first thought, before we looked
into it further.
Kissinger:
Does the CORAL SEA have mines aboard?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TORSECRET/SENSITIVE
7
General Jones:
I do not believe it has any now, but we can
make arrangements to get them there.
Kissinger:
What is the minimum period for which mines
can be set? I recall during the bombing of
Haiphong mines were set for 30 days. But
I wonder if they can be set for shorter
periods.
Schlesinger:
We can get the mines in within 24 hours.
Kissinger:
Can we then have them set for a short time?
Schlesinger:
We can look into that.
President:
We should be prepared to do this, using the
HANCOCK. Do you believe the CORAL SEA
cannot do it?
General Jones:
I doubt it. Different types of equipment and
different types of mines are involved. I
suggest that we get our contingency plans
together as soon as possible and start
assembling a task force to go in that
direction.
Of course, we have other means. We have the
B-52's that could do it.
Schlesinger:
The mines are at Subic; the B-52's are in
Thailand.
President:
I think we should turn the CORAL SEA around.
We should get everything organized in Subic
Bay. We should make a strong statement at
once before the news hits from other sources.
We should also get a full photo run of the
island and of the harbor where the ship is.
Vice President:
May I say something?
President:
Please.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
8
Vice President:
I think this will be seen as a test case. I
think it will be judged in South Korea. I
remember the PUEBLO case. I think we
need something strong soon. Getting out
a message and getting people ready will not
do it.
I think a violent response is in order. The
world should know that we will act and that
we will act quickly. We should have an
immediate response in terms of action.
I do not know if we have any targets that
we can strike, but we should certainly con-
sider this. If they get any hostages, this
can go on forever.
Schlesinger:
They have 39.
Rumsfeld:
Americans?
Schlesinger:
We think so.
Vice President:
Now you can take action before you begin to
get protests. I believe the authorities there
only understand force. There is an old
Chinese saying about a dagger hitting steel
and withdrawing when it hits steel, and that
is the impression that we should convey.
President:
I think that that is what we will do. We will
turn around the CORAL SEA. We will get the
mining ready. We will take action.
Kissinger:
If it is not released by Wednesday, we will
mine.
Vice President:
Public opinion will be against it in order to
save lives. Is there anything we can do now?
Schlesinger:
We could sink the Cambodian Navy.
Clements:
We could hit the patrol ship.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
9
Vice President:
Or we could seize the island.
Rumsfeld:
When did we get word of this?
Ingersoll:
At 5:15 at the National Military Command
Center.
Kissinger:
I agree with the Vice President that we should
show a strong position. We should also know
what we are doing so that it does not look as
though we want to pop somebody. We could
mine their harbors. This will not get the
ship. Or we could take the ship, or we could
scuttle it.
Schlesinger:
They will have the ship already. It is like
the PUEBLO. Once it got to Wonsan it was
hard to bring it back.
Kissinger:
In Korea, some things might be possible, but
with this new group it is very uncertain what
will happen.
President:
How soon could we take the island?
General Jones:
We have helicopters in Thailand and we could
do it fairly quickly.
Kissinger:
We cannot do it from Thailand.
Schlesinger:
You know that the reconnaissance missions
are being flown from Thailand.
Kissinger
That we can get away with, but I do not believe
we can run military operations from there.
Vice President:
What if we had a series of escalating actions? Some
we would take now, others later. We have to show
that we will not tolerate this kind of thing.
It is a pattern. If we do not respond violently,
we will get nibbled to death. We can announce
these things to make clear what we are doing.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD is LIBRARY 07V839
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
10
Schlesinger:
The trouble with an announcement of future
steps is on the Hill. Anything that we
announce, Congress will need to be briefed.
President:
We have now looked at the options. We will issue
a statement and we will send a message. We
will turn around the CORAL SEA. We will get
a task force assembled at Subic and maybe get it
underway. Perhaps we will scramble a force
to take the island.
I would like to get something straight now.
Brent told me at 7:45 that the ship had been
seized, but there should be a quicker way to
let us know this.
Scowcroft:
I agree. That is when I heard of it.
Rumsfeld:
I also.
Kissinger:
I was not told until my regular staff meeting
this morning, and then it was mentioned as
an aside.
Schlesinger:
This is a bureaucratic issue. The NMCC
did not become alarmed because it was not
a U.S. Navy vessel.
President:
This would be alright in ordinary times but
not now.
Colby:
I will get a wrap-up of the sequence of
notification.
Rumsfeld:
Can we notify merchant ships of the danger?
General Jones:
We will see.
Rumsfeld:
I do not see the advantage of announcing the
warning. We could make a case on either
side. To the extent we want to be forceful,
we do not need to make it public.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
11
Vice President:
I do not think turning the carriers around is
action. Congress will get into the act. The
doves will start talking. But, unless the
Cambodians are hurt, this pattern will not
be broken.
Kissinger:
The main purpose of using a statement is that
we have no choice. We have to have a reaction.
But the statement should be very strong. It
should demand the immediate release of the
ship, and it should say that the failure to do
SO could have serious consequences.
President:
It should point out that this is a clear act of
piracy.
Kissinger:
Then we should get our military actions lined
up. My expectation is that we should do it
on a large scale. We should not look as though
we want to pop somebody, but we should give
the impression that we are not to be trifled
with.
If we say that it should be released, then we
can state that the release is in response to our
statement.
I would relate what we do to the ship, rather
than to seize an island.
Colby:
We may wish to point out that they released
other ships. This gives them a way out.
Rumsfeld:
They can figure out their own way out.
President:
But, if you take strong action, let us say
nothing first. I would like to get the DOD
options by this afternoon.
Schlesinger:
The actions should put them under pressure.
If we mine the harbor, they will simply sit.
We have got to do something that embarrasses
them.
Rumsfeld:
That is why I think we should look at other
options.
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
12
President:
We should have some options today.
Clements:
We should keep the oil in mind. That is
an asset.
Kissinger:
I see a lot of advantage in taking the island
rather than in mining the port. Let us find
out what is on the island, how big a battle
it would be, and other relevant factors.
Schlesinger:
We will have a reconnaissance report by
this evening. I am sure it would not take
a large force.
What kind of clarification would you want
us to use regarding the authority and your
relation with the Congress?
President:
There are two problems:
-- First, the provisions of summer, 1973.
-- Second, the war powers.
Regarding the military options, I would like
to know how they would be hamstrung and what
we want to do. I can assure you that, irre-
spective of the Congress, we will move.
Kissinger:
There are three things we need to know:
-- First, what force is required to take the
island.
-- Second, what force is required to take
Kompong Som, and to take the ship and the
people. On the whole, I would prefer this.
-- Third, what it would take to mine the
harbor.
Vice President:
Does it make sense to do this if the boat is
in it?
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD is LIBRARD 076838 &
FOPSECRET/SENSITIVE
13
Schlesinger:
You can perhaps accomplish the same thing
by quarantine as by mining.
Kissinger:
I doubt it. We learned in North Vietnam
that mines work better. With a quarantine,
you have a confrontation and a crisis
regarding every ship.
Schlesinger:
We would have to be tough in such confrontat ions.
Vice President:
I agree with Rumsfeld.
Why should we warn them? There must be
planes that we can use, out of Thailand.
Kissinger:
If we bomb out of Thailand, we would be out
of there within a month.
President:
Let us review it again. Within an hour or so,
there will be a public statement. Let us
make an announcement ahead of time, and a
tough one so that we get the initiative. Let
us not tell Congress that we will do anything
militarily since we have not decided. I think
that it is important to make a strong state-
ment publicly before the news gets out
otherwise.
Kissinger:
We will be pressed this afternoon.
Rumsfeld:
How about a statement that gives the facts,
states that this is an act of piracy, and says
that we expect the release. We will not say
that we demand the release, because that will
activate the Congress. I think you get the
same thing without speaking of a demand.
Moreover, to demand seems weaker.
Schles inger:
It is not weak to say that we demand the release.
Kissinger:
I would demand.
Rumsfeld:
Perhaps not publicly, but privately.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
14
Kissinger:
If Congress takes us on, I think we have a
good case.
President:
With the military appropriations bill coming
up, they would not want to give a picture of
running out.
Kissinger:
Then we should keep quiet. Let them explain
about the three ships.
Vice President:
How long does it take to get the carriers
there?
Schlesinger:
About 1 1/2 days.
Kissinger:
I would overfly with reconnaissance.
President:
It should be visible.
Kissinger:
That we can get away with, but not bombing.
Vice President:
Aren't those bases being closed anyway?
Kissinger:
Not necessarily.
President:
Alright. Let us get a message to the Chinese
Government as soon as possible.
Vice President:
Could we not ask Thai permission to use the
bases?
Kissinger:
No.
Schlesinger:
Only reconnaissance is possible, but if we
ask, they will refuse everything.
Kissinger:
Lee Kuan Yew has asked us to stay in Thailand
as long as possible to give him time to work
on getting the defenses of Malaysia ready.
Bombing from Thailand will get us out quickly.
President:
How far away is Subic?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
15
Kissinger:
To bomb, even from Clark, we would be in
trouble. This is a symptom of Vietnam.
We can bomb from Guam with B-52's or
from the carriers. But we should know
what we are doing. I am more in favor of
seizing something, be it the island, the
ship, or Kompong Som.
President:
This has been a useful discussion. Thank you.
I will look forward to seeing the options.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD ?
/