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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Panama Canal Treaties (1977)
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 7/23/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
SECRET XGDS
Outside the System
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING ON THE PANAMA CANAL
The Oval Office
Date: Wednesday, July 23 4.30 p.m.
From: Henry A. Kissinger
I. PURPOSE
To consider our strategy in negotiations with Panama over the Canal.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background
Proposals
Following the NSC meeting of May 14, the Defense Department
developed its suggestion to protract the Canal negotiations in a
proposal which is contained at Tab A. It reaffirms the need to
continue the negotiations, based on the Agreement of Principles
of February 1974, but expresses the desirability of avoiding
conclusion of a new treaty before the 1976 Presidential election.
In order to do so it proposes that you
-- invite General Torrijos to Washington to explain
our political problem,
-- convince him of our good faith in the effort to
negotiate a treaty to be signed in early 1977,
-- point out to him the importance of avoiding
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR 00-11 #28; NSC etr 4/27/00
By NARA, Date 4/4/01
violence, and
-- propose a number of negotiating positions and
some unilateral actions we could take to
accommodate Panamanian concerns in the interim.
On the negotiations, Defense suggests that you propose
-- a "differential concept" for treaty duration,
separating operation (for at least 25 years) from
defense (for between 40 and 50 years);
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
LISBARY GERALD A. FORD
SECRET - XGDS
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET - XGDS
2
-- Panamanian participation in Canal defense through a
U.S.-Panama combined defense board; and,
-- Panamanian-U.S. agreement on a mutual defense
assistance accord for the post-treaty period.
On the unilateral steps, Defense proposes that we
-- increase Panama's revenue from the Canal,
-- expand the display of Panamanian flags,
-- offer to use Panamanian license plates on vehicles
in the Zone,
-- scale down the United States Southern Command
establishment,
-- offer to lease certain land areas,
-- increase employment of Panamanians, and
-- turn over certain private and commercial
activities to the Panamanians.
A second memo from Bill Clements to you (Tab B) underlines the
rock-bottom nature of 40 years' duration and the present lands and
waters proposal from Defense's point of view. It also emphasizes
Defense's concern about the reliability of the Torrijos Government as
a partner in Canal operation.
The State Department and Ambassador Bunker believe Defense's
proposal would fail to avoid confrontation and damage our ability to
satisfy our operational and defense requirements in an ultimate
treaty. It is their view that we can get the most satisfactory treaty
now. But an agreement will become increasingly costly and difficult
as time goes on. They are convinced, as is the CIA, that time is
running out on Torrijos in terms of how long he can control
nationalist groups pressing for action, without some kind of
concrete manifestation of U.S. willingness to conclude a Canal
agreement. They doubt that domestic political forces would permit
him to accept a promise by this Administration for performance by a
U.S. administration to be elected in 1976.
SECRET - XGDS
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET - XGDS
3
In the memorandum at Tab C, the State Department asserts that
-- Torrijos would recognize the purpose of the
invitation and therefore refuse it;
-- even if he came, he would reject the proposals
because he cannot accept such a lengthy delay in
reaching agreement on basic guidelines and
because the proposals which would be offered are
unsatisfactory to him, most of them having already
been turned down by the Panamanians;
-- even if he were to agree to the proposals, he
would not be able to. persuade political forces in
Panama to accept them;
any private understanding with him of the kind
proposed would quickly become known and
stimulate suspicion in the U.S., opening you to
exaggerated charges, as well as subjecting
Torrijos to accusations in Panama of "selling out";
the proposal would not succeed in avoiding
discussion of the issue domestically or
internationally.
Ambassador Bunker contends, in a memo at Tab D, that the only
way to avoid confrontation with Panama over this issue is to modify
his negotiating instructions sufficiently to enable him to conclude a
"conceptual agreement" rapidly, then either follow-up promptly
with a signed (but not ratified) agreement, or try to postpone
signature until 1976. By "conceptual agreement" he means an ad
referendum understanding on the general lines of the remaining
issues of a new treaty; issues that include duration, lands and
waters, compensation to Panama for use of the Canal, and U.S.
rights in case of Canal expansion. Informal, ad referendum
agreements have already been concluded on other subjects
including jurisdiction and operation. Together all these would
constitute the basis on which treaty language would be drafted.
The House vote in support of the Snyder amendment to the State
Department appropriation bill which would deny funds for
"negotiating the surrender or relinquishment of any U.S. rights in
the Canal Zone" brought to a head need for action in this matter.
SECRET XGDS
SECRET - XGDS
4
The Panamanians had been disturbed by the Thurmond Resolution
opposing a treaty (signed by 37 Senators) and by our three and a
half month delay in negotiations. The 246 to 164 vote on the
Snyder Amendment and a subsequent Miami Herald story that the
White House had abandoned plans to conclude an agreement this
year shook them further. The Senate may get to the bill anytime
though possibly not until after the August recess. Were it to pass
the amendment, our continuation of the negotiations would be
difficult and Panamanian reaction would be strong. Even a vote of
over one-third in favor of it would create a difficult problem, and
the Panamanians would look to you to indicate your intentions with
regard to continuation of negotiations. Without a clear statement
from you on this matter, there would be a deterioration in our
relations leading to possible abandonment of negotiations in favor
of confrontation by the Panamanians.
B. Participants
See list of participants at Tab E.
C. Press Arrangements
None. The meeting will not be announced.
III. TALKING POINTS
1. Henry, would you please outline for us the issues and options
as you see them at this stage?
2.
First, with regard to the Snyder Amendment and its handling
in the Senate: it must be defeated if the negotiations are to
continue. Can this be done?
3. On the longer-term strategy: as I understand it, we all agree
that we must keep the negotiations going and that we need to
demonstrate to the Panamanians our willingness to do so without
delay. Is this correct?
4.
Isn't it possible for State and Defense to get together and agree
on what would be an adequate offer to make in terms of these
unilateral concessions?
SECRET - XGDS
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
SECRET - XGDS
5
5.
Let's get the paperwork done promptly to amend the negotiating
instructions so that Ambassador Bunker can get back down to
Panama right away to demonstrate to Torrijos that we are
serious about continuing the negotiations. Then later I can
take a look at what is worked out between the two Departments
on accommodations.
Attachments:
Tab A: Defense Department Memorandum
Tab B: Memorandum from Bill Clements
Tab C: Memorandum from State Department
Tab D: Memorandum from Ambassador Bunker
Tab E: List of participants
SECRET - XGDS
FORDO & GERALD LIBRARY
SECRET - XGDS
TALKING POINTS
09189
1. There are two questions to consider, the tactical one of how we
treat the Snyder Amendment denying funds for further Canal
negotiations, when it reaches the Senate this week, and the broad
strategic question of how we handle our continuing negotiations
with the Panamanians over the Canal itself.
Snyder Amendment
2. If we are to continue the negotiations, and no one I know has
suggested that we abandon them, this Amendment must be defeated in
the Senate. Besides this, of course, it has a broader implication of
interfering with the President's constitutional responsibility to
negotiate treaties with foreign governments. We have been told by our
friends in the Senate that the Amendment has a chance of passing
unless it is opposed by the Executive as a whole. That means a
clear signal from you, Mr. President, and from the Defense Department.
This should be forthcoming within the week.
3. Defeat of the Snyder Amendment in the Senate would permit us to
continue the negotiations. It would not prejudice the substance of
an ultimate agreement, or the timing of conclusion of such an agreement.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR 00-11 #29 NSC ltr 4/27/00
FORD i LIBRARY BERALD
SECRET - XGDS
By dal NARA, Date 4/6/01
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
2
SECRET - XGDS
Options
4. We have three options available to us in pursuing the negotiations.
(1) Continue the negotiations at a slow and deliberate pace,
modifying the negotiating instructions only a little bit at a time
in an effort to drag the process out as long as possible. Initial
a "conceptual agreement" at the negotiators' level at the latest
possible date which would still avoid confrontation--probably
during early 1976.
This option would have the advantage of delay. Furthermore, it
does not propose making any unilateral concessions which
inevitably detract from our bargaining leverage in an ultimate
treaty. It does not involve optics of a visit in either direction.
However, it probably does not give the Panamanians enough to
get them to agree to draw out the negotiations to the end of 1976
and thus avoid confrontation.
(2) Continue the negotiations but attempt to get an understanding
from Torrijos to postpone signature of a treaty until early 1977,
modifying negotiating instructions to make new proposals and
offers of unilateral accommodation as well as some optics in the
form of visits. I see two variants under this option.
(A) The first was proposed by Bill Clements and the Defense
Department. It involves a visit by Gen. Torrijos and a
number of revenue producing and land leasing proposals.
SECRET - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET - XGDS
3
This variant is based on the assumption that Torrijos
can derive political capital from a visit to Washington and
that he would accept our offers of accommodation in the
place of conclusion of a treaty before 1977. The State
Department does not believe that he can afford such a visit
politically or that the accommodations proposed are sufficient
to get his acquiescence.
(B) Another variant along the same lines would be to amend
the negotiating instructions so as to permit Ambassador
Bunker to return to Panama at the earliest possible date to
assure the Panamanians that the negotiations are continuing.
He would have to make some proposals on duration and Canal
expansion. In the meantime, our experts could begin work
on an agreed position between State and Defense on some
meaningful accommodations in areas like military presence,
jurisdiction and revenue. Bunker would indicate that we
are reviewing the matter and expect to have some proposals
by September. Then either Bunker would present them as
needed, along with an explanation of our need to protract
the negotiations until 1977, or we could send down a special
emissary. The point of such a visit would be to reassure
Torrijos that the highest levels of the government are
committed to negotiating an agreement by 1977.
This variant might be acceptable to the Panamanians
SECRET - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET - XGDS
4
It of course has the disadvantage of making some unilateral
concessions which could not then be used in the treaty
negotiations themselves.
(3) Conclude a "conceptual agreement" shortly which would require a
modification of Presidential instructions both on our duration and
our lands and waters proposal. Then, either
(a) Proceed rapidly to translate this into a treaty text for
signature and publication; or
(b) Protract negotiations on a treaty text as long as possible,
which would probably be about the Spring of 1976, when we
would have to explain to the Panamanians our dilemma and
seek their cooperation in protracting it further until 1977.
This would provide Torrijos with what he claims is the minimum he
can accept, i.e., a firm agreement on the Canal. As an ad referendum
understanding, its provisions would not have to be made public. No
agreement would be submitted to the Senate. However, its existence
would have to be announced and pressure to make its provisions public
would be difficult to withstand, raising all the attendant problems.
Discussion
5.
These three options and their variants have a number of points
in common:
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET - XGDS
SECRET - XGDS
5
-- They are all based on continuation of the negotiations, now
ten years old, recognizing that to suspend them would
precipitate a confrontation which could seriously damage our
interests.
-- All options require a modification of currently existing
Presidential instructions. In order to get a conceptual
agreement, State feels that duration for defense purposes
must be less than forty years. Defense does not believe
our security interests can be adequately protected with
anything less than forty. Present instructions are to seek
fifty years for both operation and defense.
-- Finally, options two and three, supported by State and
Defense, are in agreement that we must have some kind of
an understanding with Torrijos, whether an informal kind,
as proposed in the second option; or the more formal
conceptual agreement proposed in option three.
6.
It might be helpful to view the negotiations as a continuum which
began in 1964 and extend through a concluded agreement sometime
in the future. We moved some distance from their inception with
the 1967 agreements and further along when we signed the
Statement of Principles in 1974. The question we face is how
much farther we want to get in the next year and a half.
SECRET - XGDS
GERALD
SECRET - XGDS
6
7. The governor on this progress and its speed is the degree to which
you modify the Presidential instructions. We are virtually certain
that the Panamanians will reject 25 years for operation, 40 for
defense and no change in our lands and waters proposal. If you
give Ambassador Bunker only this much flexibility, he will have to
come back to you shortly and ask for further relaxation in
instructions, in order to keep the negotiations going. On the other
hand, if you were to give more, we might make some further progress
towards an agreement and assure the Panamanians of the seriousness
of our purpose in continuing to pursue the negotiations.
SECRET - XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09190
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Stephen Low?
RECEIVER'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 7/23/1975
CREATION DATE
07/23/1975
VOLUME
9 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200021
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meetings, 7/23/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC letter 2/10/99
let 5/99
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
5130X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date:
Wednesday, July 23, 1975
Time:
4:50 to 5:45 p.m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, The White House
Subject:
Panama Canal Negotiations
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
WH:
Donald Rumsfeld
NSC:
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Stephen Low
XGDS - 3 B
DECLAS -
Date Impossible to Determine
BY AUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
FORD i LIBRAKY GERALD
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
E.O. 12958 Sec. 15(b) (b) (6)
3.4.
MR98-34*29; MR98-34 29 NSC WHY 2/10/99
By let , NARA, Date 5/25/99
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
2
President:
Henry, would you outline the options as you see them?
Kissinger:
As things now stand, negotiations are stalled and everyone
is getting itchy. We have not been able to let Bunker go
back to Panama since March because he has exhausted his
negotiating instructions. Unless we give him new
instructions, the stalemate continues. Torrijos is under
increasing pressure to take more vigorous action against
us. The other Latins are getting into the act. As I
pointed out to you this morning, you have a personal
letter from the President of Costa Rica, who said he and
the Presidents of Colombia and Venezuela together with
Torrijos would march arm-in-arm into the Canal Zone as
a symbol of Latin American solidarity if it is necessary.
It is not difficult to foresee that unless we begin the
negotiations again there will be increasing unrest and
eventually all Latin Americans will join in and we will
have a cause celebre on our hands.
As I see it, you have three strategic options to choose
from: first, to pronounce that we have reached an impasse
and see no point to continuing the negotiations; second,
tell Bunker to resume negotiations within the limits of his
existing instructions; this would lead simply to stalemate.
We can sweeten each of these two options by giving a
little more flexibility on lands and waters and duration--
that would have the advantage of making the situation
more tolerable, but it would have the disadvantage of
giving away things which we will need to bargain with
later on. The third option would be to return Bunker to
the negotiations with new negotiating instructions. We
would have to consider the political situation here in the
United States; in the first place, there is a strong feeling
in the Congress against a treaty, and second, there is
probably a feeling in the country in opposition to a
treaty. Wherever I go I get unfriendly questions on the
Panama Canal. We can handle the negotiations in such a
way that the political considerations are mitigated.
(Discussion was interrupted for a few minutes while the
President went out of the room.)
The question is, if you want a treaty, can we conduct
negotiations in such a way that they do not come to a
FOXD
TOR SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOR SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
3
conclusion before the end of 1976? I think we can do so.
We have to make some progress but not necessarily
conclude an agreement. We can get an understanding
with Panama that we reach certain conceptual agreements
on various items, but no final agreement. Our negotiations
would continue and progress during 1976 but they would
not be concluded. It will not be easy to do but we think
we can. If you want to go that route, it would be a
mistake to give away anything just to keep the lid on
things. The instructions have to be changed. As they
now stand Bunker is required to negotiate 50 years for
both operation and defense. We recommend a substantial
reduction for operations to 25 years and defense to 45;
then, as a fallback, to go not lower than 40 years for
defense and 20 years for operation. We're not insisting on
exact details. The questions are, first, do you want a
treaty? and do you want the negotiations to go forward?
Second, will you agree to change the instructions? Then,
third, what is the minimum beyond which we should not go?
President:
It is my feeling that yes, we want a treaty, if it is
something we have bargained for which will protect our
rights. We don't want a blow-up here in the United States
or down there, either. We want the situation under control
here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964
there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess.
I've looked over the papers you sent me, including
suggestions from the Defense Department. Jim, do you
have anything to add to this?
Schlesinger:
The important question you have to answer is, do you want
a treaty? In my judgment we would give away 85 percent
of what is most important to us in giving away sovereignty.
We will be out of the Canal in 15 years whether we get 40
or 35 years' duration. Our experience in the Philippines
is an example. In 1947 we got base rights for 99 years.
That was reduced to 55 years in 1966 and now they may
let us remain as their guests. That is the reality. I
sympathize with Ellsworth. If we want a treaty, we have
to be willing to give up a little more. The question is, do
you want a treaty?
is
FORD
President:
You say we don't want a treaty?
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
GERALO
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
4
Schlesinger:
I've tried to stay out of this but I'm reluctant to give up
sovereignty.
Kissinger:
Then none of these things we're talking about makes any
difference.
Schlesinger:
I tried to indicate that. The flexibility you're seeking
here is a moot point, because the length you stay in the
Canal will be determined by what the Panama Government
decides to do ten years from now. It will not be something
we can protect.
President:
Bill, what's your view?
Clements:
I don't feel as strongly as Jim. He is consistent in his
desire not to give up sovereignty. The world we live in
today is not the world of Teddy Roosevelt; those
circumstances just don't exist today. If we want to
maintain our relationships with South America, and they
are important, we need to have a more enlightened view
than that of trying to maintain our sovereignty over the
Panama Canal. If we work at it, and the Army will do so,
if we give them the right framework to work in, we can
maintain the right relationship. If we go down there and
apply ourselves and make it worth their while, give them
a stake in keeping the Canal going, then I think we can
look forward to long tenure and the betterment of our
position in Latin America.
President:
Then you feel we can achieve the two objectives- of keeping
an explosion from occurring in Panama, and the situation
under control here in the United States? If we can agree
on terms to protect our interests, we can proceed to an
understanding.
Clements:
Yes, sir. It won't be easy and it's complex, and will
require your help. You'll have to inject yourself in a
moderating sense; you'll have to say, "These things are
happening under my direction."
President:
If we show good faith, and they act in a sophisticated
way, we can achieve our purposes. We have a problem
with the Americans in that area. I have been involved
is
FORD
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FORD & SERVID LIBRARY
GERALD
downer
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
5
for a long time in this question from back in 1953 and
1954. They have a sinecure down there which they don't
want to give up. I'm not going to let them dictate
American policy. There is a long history of Americans
who have a good life down there. But they are not going
to decide this. Bill has indicated a reasonable approach,
and it coincides with Henry's view. Can it be handled,
Ellsworth?
Bunker:
Yes, we will need to reach some conceptual agreements
by
President:
The spring of '76?
Bunker:
I think by January of 1976, when they have the anniversary
of the riots. But there won't be any treaty writing. We
can complete the agreement in late 1976, early 1977, sign
it in December of 1976 or January of 1977. Torrijos would
go along. He understands our problems.
President:
George, what are your views?
Brown:
The Chiefs are agreed with the Clements paper which was
sent to you. We need 40 years-plus on defense. Personally,
I agree with Jim. We are committed, and you can't be
half-pregnant. We are committed through proposals that
have been made earlier. Everyone who has communicated
with us about this is dead-set against it, but we're already
started down the road and we can't back out now.
President:
Do you think 45 and 25 years is defensible?
Brown:
Yes, and the Chiefs do too. We've looked at lands and
waters this morning with Bill Clements and I looked at it
again this afternoon; this is key and we need to be
forthcoming. The management of defense at the turn of
the century required lands that we don't need now. But
we don't want to give any more than the Ambassador has
already been authorized.
Bunker:
But the Panamanians have turned that down.
Kissinger:
Have you offered them everything that the Chiefs have
authorized you to?
TOP SECRET X SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
6
Bunker:
I have offered everything and have been turned down.
Kissinger:
I have a suggestion: would it be possible, after you have
made a decision that you want to go ahead with this, to
see whether State and Defense can sit down to write up
where they agree and where they disagree and come to
you for the decision with pro's and con's. I have never
studied this thing really. On duration I agree with Jim--
once you decide you want a treaty of a determinate length,
a few years one way or another don't make much difference.
On lands and waters, I have not studied this myself and I
couldn't give you an opinion on whom I support; I don't
know the State or the Defense position. State and Defense
and the Joint Chiefs and the CIA could get together in a
week and have ready for you on your return the issues in
the negotiations. If there is agreement, we can submit it
to you by paper. If we disagree, then we can have
another meeting.
Clements:
I'd like to make one comment. Our attitude is as important
as anything else. There's a lot of cosmetics in a thing like
this.
President:
You said it the way I feel and better.
Clements:
There are a lot of things we can do down there to assist
Ellsworth.
Brown:
It's not the way the U.S. citizens are treated but the
Panamanian employees. Their schooling is different,
their treatment, their pay, the facilities available to them.
President:
Exactly--the same job but different pay. I know from my
experience on the committees that they can be very vocal
and have a disproportionate influence from their numbers.
Somewhat like the Greeks.
Kissinger:
Much greater.
Schlesinger:
There are only 17,000 Zonians.
President:
It's the Zonians who go on from one generation to
PORT is LIBRARY GREATO
another.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
THEID
(TOP SECRET X SENSITIVE (XGDS)
7
Kissinger:
My mail is 100 percent against a treaty.
President:
I think it's similar in the White House. This is a delicate
problem. It has to be handled with skill. Going back to
1954, when I think payment for the Canal was about
$456,000, and President Eisenhower increased it to several
million, there was a hullabaloo. That was first
modification of the treaty.
Bunker:
I believe there were amendments in 1936 and 1954.
President:
There was a real hullabaloo raised then. Most of the
objections came from the Zonians.
Schlesinger:
No one else really cares about the financial transactions.
President:
We all agree this is a very sensitive subject. Jim has a
different view, but I am sure we agree that this is very
sensitive. It is incumbent on us, with the sensitivity
that this problem has, that we keep our differences, if any,
to an absolute minimum, and certainly avoid public
differences. Any discussion of what we talk about here
could be misinterpreted. Since we all understand, it is
mandatory we keep it to the eight or nine who are here and
we work with Ellsworth.
Schlesinger:
There is a former Secretary of the Army who has some very
strong views--I'd like to make three points: first, you may
want to talk to Bo Callaway, your campaign manager, about
this; he has some very strong views, and he is supposed
to be supporting you. Second, a point of intelligence. I
don't agree with the general tendency of the intelligence
analyses of the Latins' attitudes on this.
Third,
on the matter of duration: whether it's 40 or 35 years, we
are creating a phantasm in that once they control operations,
then- they can stop the Canal. Defense would be moot. I'd
like to ask the Committee to see if 30 years for each would
not make more sense. Under those circumstances, we
might have rights but couldn't keep the Canal open.
is
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Colby:
On the intelligence point, I agree with you, Jim, when
you are talking about Ecuador, Peru and Chile, which
are directly affected by this. But there are many other
Latin Americans-- the Caribbean and elsewhere--who
are chiefly concerned about the political issues and are
not so directly involved.
Kissinger:
Schlesinger:
I agree that on the surface there is no support for the
U.S., but under the surface there is much more.
Colby:
Whatever deal we work out, 40 or 30 years, someone will
come around in ten years to raise the issue again. The
relationship between us is the important thing.
Kissinger:
I agree that when you give up sovereignty you move into a
new era. The question is whether you can hold on to it at
an acceptable cost. I think we probably could maintain our
sovereignty if we wanted to, but not at an acceptable cost.
It would become a major propaganda point; it would engulf
even the moderates and our friends. People like the
Brazilians at these conferences support the Panamanians
totally. In six years another President will face the same
problem again. I agree with the dangers which Jim has
outlined, but it would be a little more manageable if we
could get ahead of the curve.
Schlesinger:
You are in a difficult position, once President Johnson
decided to modernize our relationship. To go back on
that is difficult. The position of President Nixon was
tougher than the one in 1967.
Kissinger:
Even the position of Nixon didn't go to the heart of Jim's
point. It was tougher than LBJ's but 40 or 60 years are
not ultimately the question, as long as there is a limit.
President:
As I remember Bob Anderson talking to me in 1966 and
1967, what we talked about was more forthcoming than
what we are talking about now.
Schlesinger:
The present position is quite a bit tougher.
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Kissinger:
It's one of the liabilities we're working under, if you add
the ten years which have elapsed--our position
automatically becomes more difficult.
Schlesinger:
Mr. President, I think you're facing three choices: you
can acquiesce, you can recant, or you can procrastinate.
Clements:
Opportunity is another choice.
President:
We want to be sure that the method we select is the right
one.
Kissinger:
They should get together. We won't do anything until they
get together
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