Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains material relating to a discussion of Brezhnev.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1552394
label
NSC Meeting, 8/9/75
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1552394
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
NSC Meeting, 8/9/75
description
This file contains material relating to a discussion of Brezhnev.
citationUrl
collections
National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
subjects
Israel
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Arms control
Middle East conflicts
Sinai Accord between Egypt and Israel, 1975
Helsinki Agreement, 1975
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1552394
coverageEndDate
day
9
logicalDate
1975-08-09
month
8
year
1975
coverageStartDate
day
9
logicalDate
1975-08-09
month
8
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
1935233f39d0e41d
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 8/9/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
VOP ASECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
ON SALT ISSUES
Saturday, August 9, 1975
9:45 a.m. (one hour)
The Cabinet Room
From: Henry A. Kissinger the
I. PURPOSE
To review the results of your meeting with General Secretary
Brezhnev in Helsinki and to agree on a work program for the
SALT Verification Panel pending the receipt of a considered
Soviet reply to our latest SALT proposals.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: I have prepared a detailed memorandum at
Tab A which summarizes where we stand on the full range
of outstanding issues. While the memo tells where we are,
there remains the question of how we move to conclusion of
an agreement for signature at the fall summit.
There also remains the problem of bringing the Geneva
negotiations more in line with the positions taken by the two
sides in the private channel. As you know, it was agreed at
Helsinki to move to the Geneva forum a number of issues on
which the two sides are in agreement.
In particular, it was agreed to ban:
-- Cruise missiles of greater than 600 km range
carried on aircraft other than heavy bombers.
DECLASSIFIED
-- Intercontinental cruise missiles (ICCMs).
E.O. 12356 NSL Sec. letter 3.4. 2/19/99
MR98-40, #33; State letter 9/25/98
By lit NARA, Date 10/21/98,7/11/99
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by the Authority of Henry A. Kissinger
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
2
-- Ballistic missiles above 600 km range on
surface ships.
-- Ballistic missiles on the seabeds and inland waters.
A fifth issue which was discussed at Helsinki, systems for
placing nuclear weapons in orbit, has already been taken
up in Geneva on the basis of the most recent NSDM.
To wrap up these issues I have enclosed at Tab B a draft
NSDM for your approval which instructs Alex Johnson to
agree to these positions.
The purpose of the meeting today is two-fold: to outline
your discussions with Brezhnev at Helsinki and to generate
some new approaches to the remaining problems of Backfire
and cruise missiles.
Following your opening remarks, I suggest you have me go
over the results of the Helsinki meeting.
B. Participants: (List at Tab C)
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will
be announced. There will be a White House photographer.
III. TALKING POINTS
At the Opening of the Meeting
1. The purpose of this meeting is to give you a readout on the
results of my meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.
We also need to take a serious look at how we might reformulate
our approach to the remaining serious problems -- the
Backfire bomber and cruise missiles.
At the Conclusion of the Meeting
2. It is apparent that we need some new thought on a solution to
the problem of Backfire and cruise missiles. I would like
Defense and the Verification Panel to examine what modification
we might be able to make in our positions on these issues.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
$ERALE CORD
TORSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
3
3. In the meantime, we can forward to Geneva appropriate
instructions on those issues on which there was agreement
in Helsinki.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09195
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Current Status of SALT Issues
DESCRIPTION
9
CREATION DATE
08/1975
VOLUME
9 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200023
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 8/9/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
pointized 6/19/03
8-9-75
DECLASSIFIED F.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
THE WHITE HOUSE
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)
WASHINGTON
MR 98-40, #34; DODetr 11/6/02
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS
By
dal NARA. Date 6/19/03
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Current Status of SALT Issues
In light of your meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev on SALT,
I have outlined below where the two sides stand on the range of issues
whichwntinue to divide the sides; the outline includes a brief description
of where the U.S. agencies can be expected to come out on the issues.
I have also enclosed a draft NSDM (Tab B) for your approval which in-
structs the Delegation to take up those issues which are either resolved
or sufficiently close to resolution to warrant shifting to Geneva.
MIRV Verification. Although the Soviets made a major move on this issue
by agreeing to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and single RVs as
MIRVed when deployed, they have linked this concession to U.S. acceptance
of their position on cruise missiles. In addition, a problem still remains
with respect to counting MIRVs on SLBMs. If MIRVs are deployed only
on part of a submarine class, we may not be able to verify that the re-
maining missiles on that class are not also MIRVed. Consequently,
our position has been that all SLBMs in a submarine class should count
when the first submarine in the class is equipped with a MIRVed missile.
Since the problem of counting SLBM MIRVs involves technical issues
which are probably best dealt with at the Delegation level, we proposed
in Helsinki to move the MIRV verification issue to the formal negotiations
in Geneva. The Soviets refused to accept this approach, stating that they
could not move any verification issue to Geneva until the cruise missile
issue is resolved.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)
CLASSIFIED BY THE AUTHORITY OF HENRY A. KISSINGER
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
FORD of GERALD LIBRARY
SECRET / SENSITIVE -
2
However, all agencies are concerned about the impact
in Congress if the agreement is weak on MIRV verification. With the
Soviet agreement to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and single
RVs as MIRVed when deployed, much of this concern has been alleviated.
However, the agencies still expect to achieve some variant of a rule
which counts SLBMs by submarine class. This issue could be a problem
with the Soviets unless they can accept a counting rule tied to the overhaul
schedule for submarines but which still counts all submarines in a class
as MIRVed after an agreed period.
Since the SLBM MIRV issue has not been taken up in your channel and
involves highly technical issues, we should probably attempt to resolve
this issue through the Delegation. Even though the Soviets refused in
Helsinki to refer verification issues to the Delegations, the issue is
of sufficient importance to try to make some headway in the formal
negotiations. Consequently, I recommend that we put forth in Geneva
a modification to our submarine class rule which ties the SLBM MIRV
count to an overhaul or conversion schedule. The draft NSDM indicates
your approval of this approach.
Cruise Missiles. There has been no change in the Soviet position on
cruise missiles since it was originally put forth at Geneva in early
February. The Soviets are continuing to insist that cruise missiles
of greater than 600 km range should be counted on heavy bombers and
banned on all other aircraft and on all sea-based platforms. Their
proposal on land-based cruise missiles is to ban all above intercon-
tinental range, i.e., 5500 km.
Although the formal U.S. position in Geneva is still that cruise missiles
were not discussed at Vladivostok and are outside the scope of this
agreement, the U.S. has made major concessions on cruise missiles
in your private channel:
-- We have agreed to ban air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)
with range greater than 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers.
SERALD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD
SERALD
You indicated to Brezhnev that we could accept a limit of
1500 km, and possibly as low as 1200 km, on sea-launched cruise missiles
(SLCMs). The remaining difference in the position of the two sides on
this issue (the Soviet position is a 600 km limit) is not significant since
the major Soviet concern, elimination of the U.S. strategic SLCM option,
is satisfied by almost any SLCM range below 3000 km.
There is a good chance the Soviets would agree to a SLCM limit
of around 1000 km.
-- We have agreed to ban land-based cruise missiles of inter -
continental range. Defense views this limitation as acceptable; they
feel it is advantageous to the U.S. since it gives us the option of deploying
long-range land-based cruise missiles in Europe.
This leaves only the ALCM limit as a major source of contention on
cruise missiles. We have insisted on a range limit of 2500-3000 km for
ALCMs on heavy bombers. As you know, the issue with respect to
ALCMs is the need to retain long-range ALCMs as a hedge against future
threats to bomber penetration, and in particular as a hedge against the
uncertainties regarding eventual B-1 deployment.
FORD A. GERATO LIBRARY
FORD
LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
4
On the other side of the argument is the question of how long-range
ALCMs would affect Soviet bomber capability. With a 2500-3000 km
ALCM, the Backfire and Bison can cover most of the more populated
regions of the U.S. and recover in the Soviet Union. On the other hand
on one-way missions complete coverage of the U.S. is possible, with
or without long-range cruise missiles. If Backfire is not classed as a
heavy bomber, a restriction on equipping aircraft other than heavy
bombers with ASMs of range in excess of 600 km will prevent extension
of Backfire capability through the deployment of long-range ASMs.
In sum, we should continue to insist on a 2500-3000 km limit on ALCMs
launched from heavy bombers and a 1200-1500 km limit on SLCMs.
There is wide bureaucratic support for this position, with Defense being
particularly adamant against accepting a lower range limit. Although
our position on cruise missiles results in different range limits for
cruise missiles launched from different platforms, we believe that the
attendant verification problems are tractable.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD LIBRARY P. FORD
FORD R. GERATO LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
5
The enclosed draft NSDM instructs Alex Johnson to put forth those
cruise missile issues which were resolved by you and General Secretary
Brezhnev in Helsinki. However, to avoid a potentially awkward
negotiating position in Geneva of having Alex maintai n that cruise
missiles on heavy bombers and sea-based platforms are unlimited
while intercontinental cruise missiles and cruise missiles on non-
bomber aircraft are banned, we should probably make some movement
on cruise missiles on all platforms. At the same time, we should
probably avoid making a major movement on cruise missiles
in the formal negotiations without insisting upon appropriate Soviet
concessions in other areas. Consequently, I recommend that we
have Alex tie the U.S. movement on cruise missiles on heavy bombers
and sea-based platforms to Soviet movement on the Backfire and heavy
ICBM definition issues. I have included such an approach in the
enclosed NSDM.
Mobile ICBMs. Although we withheld discussing this issue directly in
Helsinki, Gromyko indicated at my meeting in July that the Soviets were
prepared to ban the deployment of land-mobile ICBMs for the duration of
the new agreement. Coupled with their present formal position in Geneva
which effectively bans air-mobile ICBMs, the Soviet proposal amounts to
a combined ban on both air- and land-mobile ICBM systems (although a
limited air-mobile system might still be permitted.) We withheld dis-
cussing this issue directly in Geneva to permit time for analysis of the
Soviet proposal. In the formal talks in Geneva we have continued to
take the position that mobile ICBMs should be permitted and counted.
I believe we should wrap up the mobile ICBM issue once and for all and
agree to the Soviet proposal to ban the deployment of mobile ICBMs. As
you pointed out in the NSC, the mobile ICBM issue really boils down
to how best to obtain money from Congress for R&D programs for mobile
systems. We would probably be in a worse position regarding R&D funds
if we rejected the Soviet proposal and the Soviet proposal were leaked
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRART
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
6
to Congress. An additional impediment to R&D funding continues to be
the lack of a viable mobile deployment concept for either air- - or land-
mobile ICBMs; all concepts considered to date are either too expensive,
require too much land, or only offer marginal improvement in surviva-
bility over silo-based ICBMs.
Consequently, I recommend that you authorize the Delegation to agree
in principle to the Soviet proposal for a combined ban on land- - and air-
mobile ICBMs. The draft NSDM indicates your approval of this approach.
Backfire
The Soviets have continued to hold fast to their position that Backfire is
not a strategic bomber and consequently should not be included in the
2400 aggregate. Although our formal position in Geneva has been that
Backfire should be counted because it has capabilities comparable to
those aircraft which both sides have agreed to count as heavy bombers,
we proposed in Helsinki an arrangement under which:
A separate limit of 100 would be established for Backfire
aircraft deployed for peripheral or naval missions.
-- Backfire aircraft deployed in excess of 100 would be counted
in the 2400 aggregate.
-- A limit of 100 would also be established on the number of FB-111
aircraft.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
7
We have always realized that, if the Soviets could convince us that Backfire
is not to be used as an intercontinental bomber, we would be satisfied.
The problem is that we have not studied in detail what kind of assurances
we need from the Soviets or what our ability is to verify whether Soviet
actions are in conformance with their assurances.
We may still be able to nail down specific indicators or constraints which
would improve our confidence that Backfire was not being used for inter-
continental roles but which still permit the Soviets to exempt Backfire from
the 2400. However, even though there are some indications that the Soviets
may consider a tanker prohibition for Backfire operations (Gromyko did
not explicitly rule out such an approach when we met in Geneva), it is
unlikely that we could ever get the Soviets to go beyond a commitment on
tankers and a declaration not to use Backfire for intercontinental missions.
In any event, it is clear that we cannot accept the Soviet position that Back-
fire should be excluded from the 2400 aggregate without collateral constraints
or assurances regarding Backfire employment.
For the time being, in Geneva, we should probably not go beyond our formal
position that Backfire should be counted in the aggregate, other than to
indicate that some other solution may be possible. I have recommended
earlier that we tie our movement on ALCMs and SLCMs to Soviet acceptance
of our formal Backfire and heavy missile position. Even though the Soviets
are unlikely to agree to count all Backfire in the aggregate, we may gain
some negotiating leverage which could break loose some Soviet movement
on Backfire in your channels.
Heavy ICBM Definition. The Soviets made an important concession in
agreeing to include a heavy ICBM definition in the new agreement. However,
their proposal to define a heavy ICBM on the basis of missile gross weight
(or launching weight as they describe it) appears to permit too much potential
growth in capability. For example, with a heavy ICBM definition pegged
to the SS-19 gross weight, an advanced technology missile might have a
throw weight of 9, 000-12, 000 lbs as compared to the 7, 000 lb throw weight
of the current SS-19. If the throw weight could go as high as 12, 000 lbs,
it would clearly be unacceptable to have a definition based only on gross
weight.
GERALD ? FORD
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
8
The Verification Panel is making an effort to narrow the current
uncertainty in throw weight growth potential for a definition based on
missile gross weight. Because of this uncertainty, the note passed to
the Soviets just before the Helsinki Summit proposed that heavy ICBMs
be defined on the basis of both the gross weight and throw weight of the
SS-19. Until the Soviets respond, there appears to be no reason to modify
this position. In the interim, the Verification Panel is examining other
possible combinations of gross weight, throw weight, and volume for the
heavy ICBM definition.
Thus, the draft NSDM instructs
the Delegation to propose defining a heavy ICBM on the basis of both the
gross weight and the throw weight of the SS-19. As I mentioned earlier, I
also recommend that this issue be tied to U.S. movement on ALCMs and
SLCMs.
Silo Dimensions. The two sides are not far apart on an approach for
resolving this issue. The problem is the ambiguity of whether the 10-15
percent Interim Agreement limit on increases in silo dimensions permits
increases of 10-15 percent in one or both dimensions (depth and diameter)
of a silo. At our July meeting in Geneva, Gromyko proposed that in the
new agreement a 32 percent limit on volume increases should be substituted
for the 10-15 percent limit on increases in dimensions. However, since we
want to retain an independent 15 percent limit on depth increases, the note
passed to the Soviets before the Helsinki Summit proposed a compromise
wherein a 15 percent limit on increases in dimensions would be supplemented
by a 32 percent volume limit.
There is no agency disagreement on this approach, and I recommend that
we instruct Alex to propose such a compromise in the formal negotiations.
Effective Date of the 2400 Aggregate. While we have taken the position in
the formal talks that the 2400 aggregate limitation should be effective upon
entry-into-force of the new agreement, the Soviets have favored a delay
after entry-into-force to permit reduction to the 2400 level. Gromyko
indicated in Geneva that the period during which they will reduce to the
2400 level would not exceed 12 months.
The two sides are not far apart on this issue. We indicated in Helsinki
that we could accept a reasonable interval to achieve the 2400 aggregate
limitation, and we have already instructed Alex to put forth such an approach
at the formal negotiations.
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD ORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
9
Follow-On Negotiations. One final issue concerns follow-on negotiations.
The U.S. position has been that follow-on talks should begin no later than
one year after entry-into-force of the new agreement while the Soviets
had proposed that further negotiations should begin no later than 1980-81.
However, Gromyko indicated in July that the Soviets would be willing to
have follow-on negotiations begin "in the same year that the Vladivostok
agreement enters into force. " This essentially meets the U.S. position.
Non-Transfer. Although it did not come up in Helsinki or in my meeting
with Gromyko in Geneva, we can anticipate that the Soviets will insist
on inclusion of a non-transfer provision in the final agreement. Their
current proposal on this issue would ban the transfer of strategic
offensive arms, components, technical descriptions, and blueprints to
third countries. They have also proposed an additional commitment not
to assist in the development of strategic offensive arms by other states.
We have made no proposals on non-transfer and have told the Soviets that
we can not consider any non-transfer provision until the final shape of
an agreement is clear and we know which systems will be limited. As
a result, there has been no significant exchange on the non-transfer issue
in Geneva.
While we probably will have to accept some non-transfer provision in the
final agreement, it should be as general and non-restrictive as possible.
For the time being, we should probably continue to defer consideration of
this issue until the final shape of the agreement becomes clear.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize me to sign the NSDM at Tab B.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY 938470
FORD R. GERALD LIBRARY
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09196
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Roger Molander
RECEIVER'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 8/9/75
CREATION DATE
08/09/1975
VOLUME
22 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200023
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 8/9/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC letter 2/10/99
W 10/99
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET/SENSTTIVE - XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Saturday, August 9, 1975
TIME:
9:45 a.m. - 11:20 a.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
Middle East, SALT
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Under Secretary Joseph Sisco
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
CLA:
Mr. Carl Duckett
White House:
Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft
Roger Molander PM
BERALD R. FORD 020 LIBRARY
NSC:
-
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 304
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
Classified by Henry Kissinger
E.O. 12958 Sec. ins(b)(6) (6)
34
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
MR98-39,*35, NSeletter 2/10/99
By let NARA, Date 5/25/99
TOP SECRENSENSTTIVE XGDS
2
President Ford: While this meeting was called for the discussion of
SALT, Henry and I think that because of the situation in the negotiations
in the Middle East, maybe Henry at the outset for a limited time could
point out where we are and then there is one matter I would like your
advice on -- a very crucial matter.
Secretary Kissinger: The main point is that these negotiations have been
going on for several months now revolving around two issues, the Giddi
and the Mitla passes and the Abu Rodeis oil fields. The Egyptian position
is that the Israelis must get out of the passes and stop working the oil
fields. The Israelis have gone through contortions too long on these
issues to sense what really is possible. At one point they were willing
to give up one half of each of the passes. They even drew a line through
the Giddi pass to indicate where they would fall back to.
The negotiations are now at a point where it is possible to get an agree-
ment. The Israeli problem is that they will have to agree to get out of the
passes, although they will be permitted to keep the high ground in
between the passes.
We have pretty well negotiated three fourths of the corridor to Abu Rodeis
but there is still a little territory which has not been resolved. We
have come up with a possible solution but this has not as yet been put
into the negotiations.
There is also a dispute over the Israeli definition of the end of the
passes which differs from the Egyptian definition. The Israeli position
is that the pass ends at the end of the mountains.
President Ford: Plus the burial plot at Parker's Memorial. The
Israelis insist on retaining that.
Secretary Kissinger: No one had ever heard of this burial ground including
the Egyptians.
President Ford: We found it on an old map but the Israelis moved it.
Secretary Kissinger: Where the Israelis claim it is, is not where it is on
the only map we' found with it on.
The disputed issue is where the passes end. The disputes on the other
lines are fully agreed to. The Israelis have agreed that the UN zone
can go to the Egyptians. But the Egyptians feel that for symbolic reasons
they must get at least a few kilometers inside the current Israeli lines.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
3
The Israeli line is that they can't show their people that they have given
up any ground, even if it is only a few kilometers. The Israelis claim that
it is a matter of principle.
President Ford: I have got to see this few kilometers they won't give up.
Director Colby: It's very valuable -- two kilometers of dry sand. (laughter)
Secretary Kissinger: That's right, it's nothing but dry sand. Sadat says
he wants seven kilometers, but he will probably settle for two. The Israeli
hangup is that they want monitoring sites near both passes. They are
willing to accept Egyptian stations so long as they are managed by
Americans. The Israeli outposts would be manned by Israelis. The
Egyptians are opposed to the Israeli request for six American-manned
positions in the pass areas for tactical warning. They object to having
Americans man these positions; they say they have just kicked the Russians
out and if they permit Americans to man these positions, the Russians
will insist on returning. The Egyptians say they will not accept any
new posts in the passes but they may be willing to let Americans take
over existing posts.
Secretary Schlesinger: There's really nothing that six posts could do
that two or three couldn't do.
Secretary Kissinger: That's now where the negotiations stand; it revolves
around whether the Egyptians will permit Americans to manage their posts
in the passes.
President Ford: Bill.
Director Colby: Compliance with the agreement will be a problem at
those sites which are capable of providing intelligence information.
If we provide intelligence from these sites to the other side, it will be
the same as letting them poke into the other side's position. One solution is
that we would agree to only provide warning, etc. There may not be an
easy solution to this problem.
Secretary Schlesinger: Why is that? In 1967 the Israelis had outposts
behind the lines in Jordan. It's not a point of the Israelis never having had
such a capability.
Secretary Kissinger: I believe the Israelis may accept American operation
of these sites.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOR SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
4
Director Colby: The capability of these bases permits them to gather
information well into the other side's territories. For example, they
can observe aircraft well into Egypt. They are very sophisticated.
Beyond the question of manning there is the question of the capabilities
of these bases.
Secretary Kissinger: I think these problems can be solved. The big issue
is Egyptian acceptance of American stations for tactical warning and
how many. There is also the issue of selling this to Congress. We said we
wouldn't make any moves in the Middle East without consulting with the
Congress.
President Ford: The Egyptian station would also be managed by
Americans.
Secretary Kissinger: If the solution is that these stations are run by the
Israelis with an American flag and American management it may be
acceptable.
President Ford: Civilian management.
Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptians may claim that the military are
there somewhere in some unexplained manner.
President Ford: That's their problem.
Director Colby: It will be less of a problem if we limit the Americans
activity to simply managing the stations.
Secretary Kissinger: These are really two separate problems. Our
problem is to man the posts and make sure both sides carry on only what
is permitted.
President Ford: It is really symbolic. The total number of Americans
would only be 80 to 100.
Secretary Kissinger: It depends on how many stations we put there.
These two stations here (points to map) are only symbolic.
Director Colby: We will have little problem if we provide equal information to
the Egyptians.
Deputy Secretary Clements: We will use civilians?
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
SERALD
TOPSECRET (SENSITY
5
President Ford: Yes, in the zone where the UN now has the responsibility.
Secretary Kissinger: Next is the tactical warning stations which the Israelis
want. They want three in each pass. The check points would be about 10
km apart. Sadat keeps referring to having Americans protect the lines.
These are really second-line positions. They don't look like warning stations.
There is also the problem of the Russian reaction to Americans manning
these stations. If war starts, the stations couldn't possibly survive. The
Israeli demand for three stations in each pass is outrageous on substance.
There is no other part of the front with as many as six stations in so small
an area.
President Ford: If we did agree to man these stations, we would have
American hostages in an area which is one of the most volatile in the world.
Secretary Kissinger: We might obtain agreement to put one station in the
middle of the Giddi Pass which looks both ways. It might be more acceptable.
If the Israelis want to put in sensors, they could do it at their end of the
passes.
General Brown: Why not man the sensors from some perimeter post? This
would avoid the President's point of hostages.
Secretary Kissinger: We have not been able to generate interest in any
approach of that type. The Israelis insist that they want six stations. They
won't get it. The Israelis won't accept an agreement without some American
personnel manning these stations. Maybe if there were only two posts it
would be acceptable.
President Ford: Wherever Americans would be in the area, they would be
hostages. But we must forge ahead.
General Brown: We could monitor the sensors from any location.
President Ford: I must say the force would be symbolic. We did not try
and find a technical solution to this problem.
Secretary Kissinger: Golda Meir is concerned about American opinion if
there are Americans in the area. She thinks there will be a nasty debate in
America. The Israeli cabinet is also concerned about this problem.
Director Colby: If a war started, the posts wouldn't last for 10 minutes.
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
LIBRARY GERALD FORD
TOP \SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
6
President Ford: It's really a symbolic force. I agree with what you are
saying. In talking to Rabin, Sadat, and Dinitz, they all understand that it's
just a token force. I am more willing than Henry to put Americans into
these posts. Unless we are willing to take such a step, it is unlikely that
there will be an agreement. If, in the final crunch, if that's what is needed,
to put some Americans in a non-military context, then I think we should
do it. I've checked this out with a number of individuals in Congress. Their
reaction is that the Congress will go along.
Secretary Kissinger: We've gotten down to the issue of two positions and
Um Hashiva, and these 150 Americans.
President Ford:
Deputy Secretary Clements: Would we need that many people?
Secretary Kissinger: There would have to be three shifts per day with 15
men on each shift.
Deputy Secretary Clements: How big is the UN force?
Secretary Kissinger: About 8, 000 now.
Director Colby: But none are US.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Under a peace settlement, the UN force would
probably be drawn down.
Director Colby: But then again it might get larger.
Secretary Kissinger: This zone (points to map), a hundred miles long, would
not be under Egyptian control. It would be a UN zone. It's one of the wrinkles
the Egyptians have drawn up.
General Brown: What would be the US responsibility? Who would the
Americans report to?
President Ford: Our own government.
FURD
Secretary Kissinger: The US representatives would be unarmed.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERAED FORD LIBRARY
TOPSECRETVSENSITIVE XGDS
7
President Ford: We would handle violations just like they are handled
currently.
Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptians will not agree to having the Israelis
run the stations. They won't accept having an Israeli flag over the stations.
The Egyptians prefer the UN flag. The Israelis will not accept the UN
flag since then it could be raised in the Security Council or the General Assembly
and the posts removed.
Director Colby: There will be awfully sensitive material which people will
have access to at these stations.
Secretary Kissinger:
President Ford: Well, let's go on to SALT.
Deputy Secretary Clements: One question. With respect to the oil deal,
will the Israelis look to Iran for oil?
Secretary Kissinger: They'll look to us -- not to Iran.
President Ford: It will not come out of our own production.
Director Colby: Up to now, has Iran demonstrated any willingness to
provide oil?
Deputy Secretary Clements: This is a sticky point.
Secretary Kissinger: We have assured the Israelis of our help in storing
and buying oil.
Deputy Secretary Clements: The Shah is shaky on this. He is not as
strong politically as he has been. This gives the Israelis pause.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY BERALD
TOP SECREY/SENSITIVE XGDS
8
Secretary Kissinger:
Director Colby: The Israelis have increased their storage capability
already.
Secretary Schlesinger: Do American tankers go into Israel if there is
a war?
Secretary Kissinger: If there is a war, they will draw on their storage
facilities.
General Brown: What about having tankers with other flags pick up oil
and deliver it to the Israelis?
Secretary Kissinger: It is true, the Israelis are not asking that the oil be
delivered by American flag ships.
Director Colby: How long would the war last anyway?
Secretary Kissinger: Three weeks at the outside.
Mr. Sisco: If there is a war, the Israelis could take over the oil fields
anyway.
Secretary Schlesinger: They wouldn't find any oil producing facilities when
they got there.
President Ford: This is a crucial issue.
(End of discussion on the Middle East).
BERALD P. FORD
TQP SECRE /SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOPSECRET/SENSTTVE - XGDS
9
President Ford: The main reason for this meeting is to bring you all
up to date on where we are on SALT. We had two meetings with Brezhnev
in Helsinki. We made some progress but not a lot. Let me tell you what
we have agreed to and then we can talk about those issues which we are
still hung up on.
We have agreed to ban cruise missiles of range greater than 600 kilometers
on aircraft other than heavy bombers. We have also agreed to ban inter-
continental cruise missiles and ballistic missiles of greater than 600 kilo-
meters range on surface ships. We have also agreed to a ban on ballistic
missiles on the seabeds and inland waterways. We also discussed a fifth
issue related to weapons in orbit, but I understand that this has already
been taken up in Geneva. We thus come down to the problem of cruise missiles
air-launch cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles - and the
question of the Backfire. Henry, will you run through the details of where
we stand on these issues?
Secretary Kissinger: Without endorsing what the Soviets say, let me tell
you what Dobrynin told me in the meeting I had with him yesterday. He
indicated that they were having real problems with our position. They
figure that the ALCMs would give us 11, 000 free warheads which are not
counted under the aggregate. I assume that they are calculating something
like 32 missiles on each B-1 with 240 B-1s and 12 on each B-52 with 400
B-52s. This comes to about 11, 000. He indicated they don't know what
to do with this sort of situation. He claimed it is absolutely impossible to
agree to a situation where there are 8, 000 warheads limited in the aggregate
and 11, 000 warheads that run free.
The second point Dobrynin brought up is that they want to have a SALT
agreement in preparation for the next party Congress. They want to be
able to go to that Congress and ask for real reductions in military ex-
penditures. But with our cruise missile position, they say they'll have
to ask for additional expenditures in two areas. They say they will have to
spend additional money on increasing air defenses and then also deploy
cruise missiles themselves, neither one of which they had intended to do.
This presents a problem on cruise missiles which is unavoidable since we
want to deploy them.
With respect to Backfire -- this issue became rather heated at Helsinki
Brezhnev claimed that the Backfire has only half the capability of the
Bison and the President challenged him on this. This really became
acrimonious between the President and Brezhnev.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SEOR SENSITIVE XCDS
10
President Ford: I just quoted your figure, Bill.
Secretary Kissinger: They consider our position on Backfire to be cynical.
They just think we are just bargaining. They say we should know that the
Backfire is being deployed for use against Europe and China and not against
the United States. They claim that they gave up on FBS, which was the
same type of issue. They claim that if you count refueling, you have to
count all F-111's and F-4's too because with refueling they also can reach
the Soviet Union. They say our position on the Backfire gives them a
problem which is simply unmanageable.
In my conversation with Dobrynin I asked him if the Soviets really wanted
an agreement. Dobrynin said yes, that it had been in their program for
this year.
The question now is what to propose on these issues. These are the
arguments the Soviets give. I repeat I am not endorsing these arguments,
but these are the ones which Dobrynin put forth. Dobrynin got a summary
cable from Moscow on the Helsinki discussions which listed the unresolved
issues. He didn't mention the throw weight issue SO I asked him if the
summary cable had listed that. He said that it listed mobiles, cruise missiles,
and Backfire. I asked him what about throw weight? Dobrynin said it wasn't
listed. It's clearly not at the same level as these other problems. Also
we didn't get nearly as big a reaction with respect to throw weight as we
did on Backfire in Helsinki.
President Ford: Right.
Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev didn't explode over throw weight like he
did over Backfire.
President Ford: In discussing cruise missiles, we got into a discussion
about who was going to move their industrial complexes. We told them
they should move theirs closer to their borders to make the situation
comparable. We were kidding them about this.
Secretary Schlesinger: Kidding? That was the next proposal we were
going to make. (Laughter)
Secretary Kissinger: I thought you were becoming more conciliatory. I
said we would move all our cities inland.
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
FOR SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
11
President Ford: If we continue with our position of a 3, 000 kilometer
limit on ALCMs and a 1500 kilometer limit on SLCMs and if, in addition,
we make no movement on how we want to handle Backfire, then I don't
think there's going to be an agreement.
I previously had a conversation with Jim to try and resolve what our
course of action would be if it looked like there weren't going to be an
agreement. I asked what military appropriations Jim might come up with
for a FY 76 supplement plus a five year program. The figures are
astounding. George, I guess you've seen these, but I would just like to
run through them for you, Bill, and others.
In FY 76 -- this is in 1976 constant dollars -- the figure would be
206 million dollars. Then for the transitional quarter would be another
114 million. In 1977 two billion, five hundred; in 1978, 2 billion and seven;
in 1979, 4 billion and five; in 1989, 5 billion and eight; and 1981, 8 billion
and six. That's not a very good picture to have to go to the Hill with.
Secretary Kissinger: This is without additional money for ABM.
Secretary Schlesinger: We will be spending a lot of money on ABM R&D,
however, but no money for ABM deployment.
Secretary Kissinger: There's another column here that has the price increases
that would take place with a reasonable rate of inflation. For example, if
we take the last entry under 1981 and crank in an inflation figure, it would
be 11. 5 billion. In 1988 the 5.8 billion figure goes to 7.4 billion with
inflation dollars. This gives you some idea of the magnitude of what we
would be up against if there were no agreement.
I believe the choice is some modification to our current position or this
alternative which I have just described. Now I think it is important from
an internal point of view to get an agreement, an agreement that would not
sacrifice national security. I'm not talking about an agreement that's just
a one-way street, but I believe a two-way street agreement can be achieved
which will be in the national interest and in the world interest. I must
say my assessment is that if we don't get an agreement, we will be in
trouble on the Hill since we simply won't get the money we need. Getting
additional appropriations for defense won't be any less difficult, with or
without an agreement, and the figures we have just gone through are really
unbelieveable and unacceptable. When it comes to submitting this budget
is
1068
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
12
it won't be believed or accepted. We'll end up further behind. We need
an agreement to protect our national interest and the world interest as
well. What we have to do is find where we can make some modification in
the cruise missile and Backfire areas.
Secretary Kissinger: One other fact, anyone who has dealt with Brezhnev
recently must conclude that his life expectency is limited. It's not a question
of his political survival but after 45 minutes in our meetings he simply ran
out of steam. The Romanians whose dislike for the Russians is patho-
logical if Ceausescu keeps up the way he's going he might trigger some
action on the part of the Soviets. They feel only Brezhnev can put over a
SALT agreement with the Soviet military. Grechko is too encrusted and
couldn't do it. If the Soviets have a new leader, especially if it is Kirilenko,
he will have to play all the party factions. Thus it may be that we will have to worl
aggressively toward an agreement because of the time problem. Brezhnev
was like Pompidou was in Iceland when he met with Nixon. Brezhnev could only
bat the ball back with extreme mental slowness, things had to be explained
to him two or three times.
Director Colby: That's our assessment as well. He only has a short time.
After he dies or steps down he will probably be succeeded by a person of
collective acceptability who won't be aggressive in pursuing a SALT agreement.
The track record of the Soviet Union is that there is a transition period
of three to five years before a new leader can be aggressive in international
affairs. The question of who will be the successor, whether it will be someone
like Kirilenko or a military man like Grechko.
Secretary Kissinger: Everyone in Europe thinks it will be Kirilenko, but
it might work out that it's someone like Malenkov, who will only last
for a year.
President Ford: Let me ask a question. If there is no agreement and
Brezhnev is out and there is an interim period, their momentum figures
they will keep going in all areas -- aircraft, submarines, and ballistic
missiles. Everyone will probably try and line up the military on their
side. Once the momentum gets going it will become even more difficult
for whoever succeeds Brezhnev to stop it, just like with us.
Director Colby: We have been working out of a triad but now on cruise
missiles we're really talking about a quartet. We have the balance in
strategic forces that we need. If we have reductions it will mean
reductions for us not for them. The SALT limits which were agreed
assure a Soviet buildup. We would have problems with reductions.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP - XGDS
13
Within the next five years the only real danger is that fighting will break
out in a conventional war not a strategic war. We see no technical
developments that are likely to give them a strategic first strike against
us. If we continue the stalemate in strategic systems, it is likely that
their naval buildup and their buildup in conventional forces in Europe will
continue. This will form the basis for competition between us, along with
third world military aid. If we have to put money into strategic systems,
we'll have to also put money into conventional forces.
President Ford: We can't gamble on our national security. If a deal
can be worked which eliminates the Backfire and cruise missile problems,
then we should work toward it.
Secretary Kissinger: One thing Dobrynin said to me was why did we
introduce these new elements, cruise missiles and Backfire, into the
negotiations. I said we need cruise missiles for penetration of their
defenses. He said it was their own estimate that within three years our
bomber force would have an overwhelming problem getting into the
Soviet Union. He said if we deploy cruise missiles, they will have to
increase their air defenses.
President Ford: George?
General Brown: I don't share Bill's optimism with respect to the ten
year period. Ten years is too long a time. I am worried that the situation
might change dramatically through the application of lasers.
President Ford: If they run free.
Secretary Kissinger: They do anyway.
Director Colby: In the ten year period, the Soviets still could not develop
a first strike capability, but they could substantially improve their
offensive capability.
President Ford: Let me ask a question; assume we get an agreement,
laser development is free anyhow, is it not?
Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes.
JOHARY
President Ford: Are we proceeding with lasers of our own.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes, We have additional money in the current
budget. Right now we are spending all we reasonably can.
TOP SECRETYSENSITIVE - XGDS
SERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
14
Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviets have had a more aggressive program
in the past.
General Brown: The Soviets would have a motivation to work faster on
lasers without an agreement.
President Ford: Right, George.
Dr. Ikle: Without an agreement we will be diverted to work on numbers
for political reasons.
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, with respect to what's agreed,
what is meant by the term "other than heavy bombers" -- cruise missiles
on transports?
President Ford: Yes -- on transports.
Secretary Kissinger: Cruise missiles of greater than 600 kilometer range
would be banned on transports.
Secretary Schlesinger: Tactical cruise missiles carried by tactical
aircraft are not limited?
President Ford: Right.
Secretary Schlesinger: So we're talking about strategic nuclear-armed
missiles.
As for the points of issue -- as for Backfire. We may be unable to suck
out of anybody on the Soviet side what they think about this.
However, we could be wrong about Backfire capability since we still have
no measure of fuel capacity. It's very complicated, but we always come
up with the same 3000 mile figure plus or minus five to ten percent off.
We have set up a development advisory group on Backfire. It may be that
our estimates are too high; however, the report is not completed. Never-
theless, the Soviets claim that the Backfire range is one half that of
the Bison is very unlikely.
Secretary Kissinger: They said in capability.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD is LIBRARY
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
15
General Brown: We agree that it is probably designed for peripheral missions.
Secretary Schlesinger: If Backfire can only attack by overflying the US
on a one-way mission, it is less important substantively versus politically
terms. Critics on the Hill will argue that if the aggregate is 2400 and the
Backfire is free, they will be able to do more than us.
If the Soviets can give us assurances on the Backfire, the political problem
will be alleviated. The question is what will they provide.
President Ford: I believe we should not be adamant on this issue; never-
theless, we should take a firm position. We can challenge them as to what
proof they have.
Director Colby: The intelligence community differs on this issue -- not
the numbers but on Backfire employment.
President Ford: Jim is right. If the range is 3000 miles, political
opponents will say the aircraft has a one-way capability to strike the United
States.
Secretary Kissinger: So does the F-111 against the Soviet Union.
Director Colby: But the Backfire is not a first strike weapon. Compared
to ballistic missiles, slow flying aircraft are not useful for first strike.
Dr. Ikle: We seem to have made some progress on throw weight.
Secretary Kissinger: All they did on throw weight was to not reject our
proposal. I'm not sure what their position is. Throw weight was not
included in the reporting cables sent to Dobrynin as one of the unsolved
issues. There's no explanation for this. Brezhnev was not very fast on
his feet on this issue. He asked me what we meant by our position. I told
him we wanted a definition based on launching weight and throw weight. He
asked for what missile. I said for the SS-19, and he didn't reject this.
Dr. Ikle: With progress on the throw weight issue, we will be able to halt
the expansion of Soviet first-strike capability.
President Ford: Jim, what are your observations on the cruise missile
problem.
Secretary Schlesinger: There is more give on SLCMs; they have a role
in sub-SIOP missions. SLCMs are one way to do other missions. ALCMs
1)
TOR SECRE/T/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALS
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
16
are a more difficult subject. From the point of view of numbers of
weapons which the Soviets raised, we could also substantially increase
the number of bombs as well as the number of missiles. Because of
decisions made while McNamara was Secretary of Defense we have the
current number of bombs on the B-52s. The B-1 carries
We could increase the number of bombs to
General Brown: We currently have a clip on which there are
weapons. We have the capability to deploy
Secretary Schlesinger: We can probably estimate a numerical limit of
five to six thousand ALCMs by 1985. This is far less than the potential
number of bombs. For reasons relating to maintaining our desire to
continue to be able to penetrate, we are developing ALCMs. The Soviets
don't need ALCMs to penetrate our air defenses. Our interests should be
in controlling warheads, not missiles. We need a better fix on the para-
meters of discussion before we reach a solution.
Secretary Kissinger: Like what?
Secretary Schlesinger: For example, the Soviet argument that we are
expanding the number of warheads is a characteristic of bombs not just
missiles. We are not limited
A constraint
on the number of ALCMs could be sufficient to satisfy their concerns on
this issue.
President Ford: Let me ask you this. Put us in their shoes -- if we limit
the number of cruise missiles on the B-52 and the B-1, how will they
know if we have not modified these aircraft to carry more missiles without
verification.
Secretary Schlesinger: Verification is an important issue.
President Ford: It goes both ways.
Secretary Kissinger: If we say 5000 to 6000 cruise missiles as a limit
it will get a horrible reaction from the Soviets. Better to limit the number
of planes with cruise missiles. Maybe we could bring this into relation
with the Backfire. We could still end up with a reasonable cruise missile
force.
is
FORD
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
17
Secretary Schlesinger: The B-52 is not worth making into a penetrating
bomber in the time frame of interest. Comparing the B-52 vs the B-1,
the B-52 will be dependent on ALCMs for penetration.
Secretary Kissinger: If we put a 6, 000 limit on cruise missiles, it will put
a real burden on verification. If only X planes carried cruise missiles,
it would be much better.
Director Colby: This will be hard to monitor.
Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviets will argue that we will put 24 on each
bomber.
Secretary Schlesinger: They can get all the information they need from
Aviation Week. Dobrynin will claim that we will carry them in the body
as well as under the wings.
Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe we can arrange to have Aviation Week visit
the Backfire factory.
Deputy Secretary Clements: We will only carry them internally on the B-1.
They will be carried in pods on the B-52.
Director Colby: For once verification is on our side. We should send
them a subscription to Aviation Week. (Laughter)
Dr. Ikle: The shoe will be on their foot.
Secretary Kissinger: How many can we carry inside?
General Brown:
Dr. Ikle: We have concerns about the way they do some things, and they
have concerns about the way we do things. Perhaps this will make them
more forthcoming in the future at the SCC.
President Ford: If we limit the number of aircraft, perhaps they will
make some concessions on Backfire.
Secretary Kissinger: If we could get SLCMs down to their position and
ALCMs down from 3000 kilometers and then limit the number of cruise
missiles carrying aircraft, we could get a hearing. There would be a
FORD & LIBRARY
wierd aspect in that these limits would mean next to nothing in terms of
verification. Both sides would be free to test cruise missiles up to
5000 kilometer range. Perhaps we could go to 2000 kilometers on ALCMs.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERRTO 6060
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
18
The only difference between 2000 and 3000 is with respect to fuel.
We could test to the 2000 kilometer limit from aircraft and use
land-based missiles to test to longer ranges. Even the SLCM limit
is not that significant. You could juggle fuel and payload there too.
Even if cruise missiles above 600 kilometers are banned on ships
and above 2000 kilometers on aircraft, if I understand this technology,
you can still do what you want. It is easy to go from 2000 to 3000
kilometers.
President Ford: Just put in a lighter warhead and add more fuel.
Secretary Kissinger: Unless I misunderstand the problem, we could
come down in distance on the cruise missiles. Perhaps a package
where we go way down on SLCMs, a little on air-launched cruise
missiles, and then limit the number of aircraft equipped with cruise
missiles. This will give them something to study. They are stuck
on what to do on this issue.
President Ford: I agree.
Secretary Kissinger: You saw Gromyko jumping up and down to talk
to Brezhnev when we were discussing this question.
President Ford: George, you had something you wanted to say.
General Brown: Yes. We could trade fuel for weight, download fuel
to decrease range.
President Ford: And we wouldn't have to test to longer ranges to have
the capability.
Deputy Secretary Clements: We are constantly developing more exotic
fuels which will drastically increase range.
Dr. Ikle: We have to be careful or maybe we will get into a trap and
end up fighting among ourselves whether we or they have viloated these
limits. We need to nail down a definition of cruise missile range.
Secretary Kissinger: We haven't agreed to take cruise missiles to Geneva.
Dr. Ikle: Except for intercontinental cruise missiles. Definitions will be
a difficult problem.
President Ford: I think we understand where we are and the dilemma we
face on this issue. It is far better for us to look at a package which contains
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
AMERIT SERALD P. FORD
EVERARY
TQP /SENSITIVE - XGDS
19
legitimate proposals in the cruise missile and Backfire areas. If
we're not careful we could end up with nothing. I don't want to
compromise our national security, none of us do. We need to come
up with some modification to our current position.
Secretary Schlesinger: The Russians need to be more forthcoming on
Backfire information. SLCMs are not of direct concern as a strategic
system. We might want 50 or 60 SLCMs for peripheral missions, a
small number.
Secretary Kissinger: 50 to 60? There's no objection if they're under
600 kilometers.
Secretary Schlesinger: We are interested in the possibility of sub-SIOP
missions. such as in Iran. It's part of deterrence in areas where we have
no base structure. It's a secure way to deliver nuclear weapons. The
real problem is massive deployment of cruise missiles, so a cruise
missile solution is probably workable. On ALCMs we don't know yet
what kind of numerical limits we could accept. But we can't back off to
the point where bombers cant penetrate.
General Brown: We are looking at some form of limit such as those
suggested by Henry, but we have not found a way to work this out yet.
We need to work Backfire in if we modify our position. In any case
the Soviets probably will raise the FB-111 issue.
President Ford: Well what is the time frame we ought to establish
for something for us to come up with bearing in mind Brezhnev's health
problem.
Secretary Kissinger: We should try and have something in about ten days.
Secretary Schlesinger: We should have something ready when the President
returns.
Secretary Kissinger: That's on the 25th.
President Ford: Why not say by the 25th we'll have something. Henry
will be here to see how things are evolving.
Secretary Kissinger: Maybe we can talk before then.
Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe by the end of next week we'll have something.
TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
20
President Ford: When you come to see me, Henry, you can bring me
up to date on where we are.
Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first issue, if the only way
the Israelis will accept an agreement is to have Americans stationed in
the Sinai, how do you think this will be viewed by the American people.
(End of discussion of SALT)
President Ford: As I indicated, I am more willing than Henry to commit
Americans to man these stations. Jim, what's your reaction.
Secretary Schlesinger: If this is the only way to obtain an agreement,
then we should and must be willing to use American personnel. As
I understand it, this is the only way to impart the required momentum
to obtaining the agreement. As I understand it there will be two kinds
of stations, both the Egyptian and Israeli stations would be manned by
Americans. Each station would look one way into Egypt and into
Israeli territory. In addition, there would be three stations in the passes
which would look both ways. We must be careful not to provide a de facto
guarantee of American intervention should war start.
President Ford: I agree.
Secretary Schlesinger: The Israeli stations would be manned by Americans.
Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.
General Brown: I have the same concern. We discussed the question
earlier of who the Americans would report to. We want to avoid the
problem of this being an adjunct to the UN force.
President Ford: That's also the Israeli fear. The Israelis want them
separate from the UN force. If they are UN manned, there is the problem
of keeping them there.
Secretary Kissinger: Clearly there would be a problem if we brought the
UN in.
President Ford: Bill, what do you think?
FORD is LIBRARY
TOPSECRET/SENSTTIVE - XGDS
FORD ALL BIBRARY MERALD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
21
Deputy Secretary Clements: It's a real dilemma. We have a sense of
responsibility here, part of our own accountability. We can't walk away
from the situation -- it's not the national interest to do that. Congress-
men I have discussed this with think Congress will accept this and that the
American public will accept this. This degree of involvement is a
practical real world requirement, but it's not without accompanying issues.
For example, the Russian problem.
General Brown: I agree. Implications of war in the Middle East are
far more important than simply having American personnel there.
President Ford: You've put your finger on it. Our involvement
could be much more massive. With no settlement there could be a
situation in which the Soviets intervene or whatever, and it could be
far more serious than the problems of getting some reasonable number of
Americans manning these posts.
Director Colby: This is more than a defensive move -- it's an opportunity
for positive movement to get in there and establish peace. We are really
friends of both countries.
Under Secretary Sisco: We should play this as an extension of our
own responsibility in seeing to it that there is a settlement in this area.
President Ford: I agree.
Secretary Kissinger: There's also the question of the legal setup.
On the warning stations this has not yet been agreed. If it is set up
as an agreement between Israel, Egypt and the United States with no
removal without the agreement of Egypt and Israel, then I see no
unilateral problem. However, if in three year's from now one party
says it wants out, we'll be in a hell of a fix. Or if Egypt decides to cut
off the water, since it is on Egyptian territory, or if the Egyptians
simply say get out, we'll have a hell of a decision to make.
President Ford: We should try and tie this down as strongly as possible
in legal terms. If they tell us and the UN to get out, they will trigger
a war just as in 1967.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORG i GERALD LISKARY
TOR SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS
22
Dr. Ikle: I think it will be ideal if this is couched as a peace-keeping
mission. It will have wide appeal in this country.
President Ford: Just a first step in a real peace-keeping effort.
Thank you all for your comments.
FORD
FORD
TOR SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
LIBRARY