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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 12/22/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
ON SALT OPTIONS
Monday, December 22, 1975
4:30 pm (90 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From: Brent Scowcroft B
I. PURPOSE
To review the status of the deliberations in the SALT Verification Panel
on possible options for resolving the cruise missile and Backfire issues.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: The Verification Panel has been reviewing alternative
approaches for resolving the major remaining issues in SALT II--
cruise missiles and Backfire. We now have three basic approaches
for dealing with cruise missiles and Backfire, each of which will be
presented to you and discussed at the meeting.
1. Deferral: This approach would defer the cruise missile and
Backfire issues to a later negotiation (either SALT III or a
separate negotiation on these two issues alone). This approach
would set aside the most controversial of the unresolved SALT
issues and codify the terms agreed at Vladivostok (equal aggre-
gates, MIRVed launcher limits, no forward-based system
limits, etc.
2. Comprehensive Solution: This approach would count Backfire
in the 2400 ceiling, but in return for extensive cruise missile
limits. In effect, the only strategic cruise missiles permitted
(over 600 km in range) would be on heavy bombers and ships.
In addition, the number of heavy bombers equipped with cruise
missiles up to 2500 km would count against the MIRV ceiling of
1320.
This requires a severe Soviet restraint, causing them to dismantle
over 300 ICBMs and SLBMs to deploy the Backfire. On the other
hand, we give up submarine launched cruise missiles and would
have to replace about 250-300 MIRVed missiles to deploy air
launched cruise missiles (ALCM) on our heavy bombers.
DECLASSIFIED
TORSECBET/SENSITIVE--XGDS(B)-3
E.O. 12356 NSC Sec, 2/19/99
Classified by: Brent Scowcroft
MR98-40, State letter 9/25/98
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
By let NARA, Date 10/21/98/7/21/99
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
- 2 -
3. Mixed Packages: In between these two approaches, there are
building blocks to construct various combinations of limits on
Backfire and cruise missiles:
Backfire could be limited in different ways: only through
assurances on its usage, in a separate numerical limit outside
the 2400 total, or it could be allowed to run free in return for
permitting cruise missile program as an offset.
Cruise Missile possibilities are: For ALCMs, limit to only
heavy bombers and count them in the MIRV total, while banning
on all other aircraft. For sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs),
allow them to go free as a counter to Backfire, ban them over
600 km range on submarines and either count them on ships or
count in a separate category with Backfire.
B. Participants (List at Tab A)
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will be
announced. There will be a White House photographer.
III. TALKING POINTS
At the opening of the meeting
1.
I understand that the Verification Panel reviewed some possible
options for resolving the cruise missile and Backfire issues.
2. Before we start, I want to emphasize that I consider a good SALT
agreement to be strongly in the U.S. interest, and that we have to
consider not only the terms of the present negotiations, but the long-
term impact of not reaching agreement.
3. We have no deadline, but in this period before the Soviet Party
Congress we may have some bargaining leverage.
4. Let's start with a rundown by Bill Colby of any new developments.
Bill, go ahead.
(Following Colby presentation)
5. Henry, as Chairman of the Verification Panel, why don't you describe
to us the options the Panel has developed.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
DOPSECREF/SENSITIVE/XGDS
TOPSECAET/SENSITIVE
- 3
(Following Kissinger presentation)
6. I would now like to hear the comments of each principal on the
options.
(Following the discussion)
7. I have found this meeting very useful. I want to think about the
various possibilities and I would like the search for ways of dealing
with these two different problems to continue.
8. I reiterate that I want everyone to devote their energies and to give
total support to the effort to produce a SALT treaty. We will meet
again after the holidays.
Attachment
Tab A - - List of Participants
TORSECKET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09201
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Talking Paper
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
NSC Meeting - SALT, Talking Points
CREATION DATE
12/22/1975
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200025
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 12/22/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
paritized 4/27/04
12-22-75
09201
NSC MEETING -- SALT
TALKING POINTS
Mr. President:
We have held two Verification Parel meetings to develop a range
of different approaches to the two key problems--the Backfire bomber
and cruise missiles limits.
We have the following discrete issues:
1. How to deal with the Soviet Backfire bombers in light of Soviet
insistence that it is outside the negotiations;
2. How to deal with cruise missiles of greater than 600 km deployed
on heavy bombers; and, in this connection, how to deal with the
same type of cruise missiles (over 600 km) on other aircraft;
3. How to deal with sea-launched cruise missiles of more than
600 km in range in submarines, and on surface ships;
4. Finally, we have the problem of land-based cruise missle: we
have presently agreed with the Soviets that they are permitted
5
up to intercontinental range (53.00 km), but our analysis suggests
that we could limit them to 2000-2500 km--which would ease our
verification problems, keep them from being used to circumvent
restraints on air and sea-based cruise missiles and possibly
prevent a Soviet break-out later.
DECLASSIFIED F.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
NSC in 2/19/99, OSO etr 4/27/04
MR 98.40, st 40; stetr 9/25/98
dal NARA, Date 2/8/05
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
- 2 -
We looked at five different Options; but they can be generalized into
three basic approaches:
A. The first basic approach is to defer any limits on both Backfire
and cruise missiles, and take them up in the next round of SALT
beginning in 1977:
-- The idea would be to consolidate what has been achieved at
Vladivostok, so that a new agreement would come into effect when
the Interim Agreement expires in October 1977, together with a
commitment to reach a follow-on agreement, including reductions,
by 1979-80.
Under this approach, we would maintain the momentum of the
negotiations, retain bargaining leverage with our cruise missile
program, and gain a commitment for reductions.
-- As an alternative under this approach, we might propose an
upper limit on Backfire through 1980--say 150--and agree to
regulate our cruise missile deployments accordingly.
One problem is that the Soviets would have to accept Backfire as
a legitimate system for the next round of negotiations, and would
therefore almost certainly counter with a demand to negotiate
about our forward based systems; moreover, we risk having
cruise missile appear as an obstacle to the negotiation and having
Congress force the U.S. to halt testing or deployment.
-- A serious drawback to this approach is the probability that it will
not be negotiable. The Soviets have indicated more than once that
they could not accept such a solution.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/KGDS
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
B. At the other end of the spectrum, we could adopt a comprehensive
approach that resolves all the issues by linking cruise missile
limits to counting of Backfire in the 2400 aggregate:
-- Thus, we would ban all cruise missiles of ranges greater
than 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers, and ban
cruise missiles over 600 km on submarines;
-- This would mean that the only strategic cruise missiles would
be those on heavy bombers and surface ships;
-- In turn, these would be limited to the same maximum range,
say 2500 km;
-- Finally, we would propose that air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs) on heavy bombers would count as a MIR Ved vehicle,
and be applied to the 1320 MIRV ceiling.
In this approach we would make two significant concessions
compared with our proposal of September: (1) to ban longer range
cruise missiles on submarines, and (2) to count ALCMs as MIRVs,
which would probably cost us 250 MIRVed missiles in the long run.
-- On the other hand, we would require the Soviets to reverse
their position that Backfire is outside the definition of strategic
vehicles, and to dismantle 300 or more ICBMs and SLBMs if
they wish to deploy Backfire under the 2400 limit.
-- This raises the obvious problem- that the Soviets will refuse
to negotiate on this basis.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 4 -
-- One reason is that Backfire has probably become a political
problem in the politburo; while the Soviet leaders may not
grasp the various technical arguments, they may now believe
that having given up our forward based systems, to be con-
fronted with a demand that they count Backfire is a test of
their resolve.
C. This leads to a third general approach, that falls between deferral
and a comprehensive solution.
Under this approach there are several building blocks that can
be grouped into packages:
1. Backfire
We could deal with Backfire through some negotiated
assurances on its use - for example, a prohibition on a separate
tanker force, a prohibition on basing in the Arctic, or training
in an intercontinental mode:
-- Such assurances are of some practical value in constraining
the Soviets, but would be regarded as marginal importance
since there would be no numerical upper limit, and in the
event of a termination of SALT, shifting to Arctic bases
would be no problem.
-- Alternatively, we could try for an upper limit: for example,
in our September proposal we grouped Backfire with sea-
based cruise missiles in a separate limit of 300;
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
- 5 -
-- Or we could propose lowering the ceiling to 2300-2200
and let Backfire go free which would cost the Soviets
in first strike capacity.
2. Cruise Missiles:
We have four separate deployment modes for cruise
missiles: on heavy bombers, on other aircraft, on sub-
marines, and on surface ships.
-- We also have the problem that in the negotiations thus far
we have discussed cruise missiles of over 600 km in range
as "strategic;" we have the problem of establishing a
upper range which for verification purposes ought to be
the same for the different deployment modes.
ACLMs
For air-launched, we have proposed that they be limited to
2500 km on heavy bombers and that they be limited to no more
than 300 heavy bombers;
-- We have also proposed that cruise missiles with a range
greater than 600 km be banned on other aircraft. Thus,
we could stick with this position.
Or,
We could take one more step and propose that ACLMs on
heavy bombers be counted against the 1320 MIRV ceiling.
-- The effect of this package is that the Soviets would be blocked
from any extensive cruise missile deployments unless they
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
- 6 -
gave up heavy throw-weight MIRVed missiles; they
would be barred from improving the Backfire through
a deployment of longer range cruise missiles;
-- We would be permitted to equip the
ACLMs
but at the expense of some
missiles.
SLCMs
Our current position is that SLCMs, on both submarines
and surface ships, with a range of between 600 km and 2000 km
would be grouped with the Backfire in a separate limit of 300
outside the 2400 ceiling.
-- Thus, each side is forced to choose between peripheral
systems--either medium range bombers such as Backfire,
or médium range SCLMs.
We have the alternative of dropping the separate category,
and dividing the sea-based systems for separate handling:
-- Thus, we could propose to ban all cruise missiles with a
range of more than 600 km on submarines, and letting
ship-based cruise missiles up to 2000 km run free;
In this case, we would regard the ship-based systems as
offsetting Backfire, regulating our deployments according
to Backfire deployment;
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
7
-- The problem is that we may not deploy for some years
and meanwhile Backfire would go forward, without an
upper limit.
Thus, we might go further and propose that each ship
equipped with SCLMs be counted if we can establish some
upper limit on the Backfire.
Conventional and Nuclear Armed Cruise Missile
In whatever limits we adopt, we have the final problem
that conventionally armed cruise missiles might be permitted,
since SALT has never dealt with conventional systems.
-- But distinguishing between a conventionally-armed cruise
missile that would be permitted on any aircraft or on sub-
marines, and a nuclear armed one, would be a nightmare;
-- We could raise this with the Soviet - - which might add a
massive complication--or remain silent for now, which is
probably preferable.
Land-Based Cruise Missiles
Finally, whatever we do on air and sea-based systems, we
may have to reopen the land-based cruise missiles problem.
-- As matters now stand, both sides could develop and deploy
5
a land-based cruise missile up to 5300 km in range, which
could be easily adapted for installation on aircraft or sea-
based system;
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 8 -
-- The problem is the Soviets probably want such a system
against China.
But for our part, we could accomplish any theater force
mission with a land-based missile - - in Europe with a range
of 2000-2500 km.
In sum, we have three basi c approaches:
1. To defer both Backfire and cruise missile limits to the next
negotiation in 1977;
2. To make a major effort to resolve them both by proposing
extensive cruise missile constraints in return for counting all
Backfire in the ceiling; or
3. To develop a mixed package, proposing some cruise missile
limits in order to nail down the Valdivostok accord, but leaving
some cruise missile development to match or offset Backfire.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09202
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Richard Boverie?
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 12/22/75
CREATION DATE
12/22/1975
VOLUME
32 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200025
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 12/22/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC letter 2/10/99
let 5/99
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
8476X
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Monday, December 22, 1975
TIME:
9:30 a. m. to 11:30 a. m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
SALT (and Angola)
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Other Attendees
White House:
Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
State:
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
CLA:
Mr. Carl Duckett
NSC Staff:
Colonel Richard T. Boverie
President Ford:
Before we get into the basic part of the meeting,
I want to take a minute to talk about Angola. The vote in the Senate on
Angola was, to say the least, mildly deplorable. I cannot believe it
represents a good policy for the U.S. and it is not fundamentally the
way the American people think.
FORD
I made a short but tough statement on television, and I reiterated my
-
position in an informal press conference Saturday. I find this the
LIBRAR
right thing for the U.S. to do. We should spend every dime legally
DECLASSIFIED
12958 Sec. 3.54
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)
With PORTIC
TED
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
E.O. 12958 Sec: (b) (i) ond(2)
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
3.4
MR 98-39, #41, NSL litter 2/10/99
By let NARA, Date 5/25/99
TOP SECRET 1 SENSITIVE XGDS
2
that we decided upon. We should spend every nickel and do
everything we can. Hopefully -- and Secretary Kissinger recommended
this option -- it will lead to some kind of negotiated settlement.
If we become chicken because of the Senate vote, prospects will be
bad. Every department should spend all it can legally -- do all we
can in that area.
Director Colby:
President Ford:
Brent Scowcroft:
Secretary Kissinger: If we keep going and the Soviets do not think
there is a terminal date on our efforts and we threaten them with the
loss of detente, we can have an effect.
Director Colby:
There has been some fluttering among the
Soviets. They have some trouble in their Foreign Ministry.
[Laughter]
President Ford:
Let S exploit this.
Secretary Kissinger:
Who is their top Pentagon official? [Laughter]
President Ford:
Let S explore the issues (SALT). We want
to have a position for Henry to take to Moscow in January. The
Verification Panel paper gives us some alternatives to look at.
Secretary Kissinger:
Bill [Colby], do you have a briefing for us?
Director Colby:
Yes. I will start. (Note: The charts used
in the briefing are attached at Tab A.)
As you know, Mr. President, the Intelligence Community has recently
completed a new estimate on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental
Conflict through the Mid-1980s. I would like to emphasize some of
the key conclusions of that estimate -- particularly as they relate to
a prospective SALT TWO agreement.
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
SERVEIT
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
3
First of all, I would remind you that the Estimate concluded that, in
regard to strategic offensive forces, the Soviets are continuing their
broad program of major improvements.
-- The trends are about as we had forecast in last year's
Estimate, but the diversity of the ballistic missile
submarine program and the potential hard-target
capabilities of the new Soviet ICBM systems are somewhat
greater than we anticipated.
-- This chart shows our projections of the combined size
of Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber forces in 1980 and
1985 under different assumptions. It compares our "Best
Estimate'of total delivery vehicles and MIRVed missile
launchers under the Vladivostok limits with alternative
forces the Soviets might build in the absence of such limits.
-- The chart illustrates some potential benefits to the U.S.
of the ceilings agreed at Vladivostok:
a small reduction in Soviet forces to get down to the
2, 400 ceiling;
limitation of the Soviet buildup in both total vehicles
and MIRVed launchers which would likely occur
without SALT TWO.
Secretary Kissinger: You show a substantial reduction in MIRVs --
400 MIRV vehicles, which is about 2,000 - 3,000 fewer warheads.
Director Colby:
The Soviet forces projected on this chart do
not include the Backfire bomber -- which, we believe, could be used
for strategic attack on the United States.
-- As this map shows, if staged f rom Arctic bases, the
Backfire -- with one aerial refueling -- could reach part of
the continental United States on a two-way mission.
-- Were the Backfire to fly on to Cuba, it could reach all
of the United States without staging or refueling.
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS
4
--
Despite these capabilities, however, we believe it is
likely that Backfires will be used for missions in Europe
and Asia, and for naval missions over the open seas. With
the exception of DIA, the Army, and the Air Force, we
think it is correspondingly unlikely that Backfires will be
specifically assigned to intercontinental missions.
Secretary Kissinger (to General Brown):
General Brown:
President Ford:
General Brown:
Director Colby:
General Brown:
but not now.
President Ford:
Director Colby:
Secretary Kissinger:
Mr. Duckett:
General Brown:
Director Colby:
This board shows our best estimate of Backfire
production and deployment. It assumes that the Soviets continue to
produce Backfire at a single facility, with somewhat increased
production rates. On this assumption, we would expect some 450 to
be in operational service by 1985, with total production of some 550
aircraft.
President Ford:
What is "LRA"?
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
5
Director Colby:
Long-range air force -- their SAC.
President Ford:
What is "SNA"?
Director Colby:
Soviet naval aviation.
Secretary Kissinger: All peripheral missions are conducted by the
LRA. This is not like SAC. Maybe the LRA has no strategic mission.
Director Colby:
Basically they use their missiles for the
strategic mission.
General Brown:
No one makes the case that their aircraft are
assigned missions against the U.S. They are designed and intended
for peripheral attack. The only question is their range; they have the
capability to attack the U.S.
Director Colby:
I found it interesting to learn that our B-52s
are planned for one-way missions.
Mr. Duckett:
The Badger is the largest weapon program ever
undertaken by the Soviets. It is part of the LRA.
President Ford:
What is its range?
Mr. Duckett:
It has a 1500 nm radius. It is for use against
Europe and China.
Director Colby:
Cruise missiles were also excluded from the
force projections I just showed. There is no firm evidence that the
Soviets are developing long-range strategic cruise missiles.
--
They have the design and development experience to
do so, however, and could begin by modifying present air
and sea-launched cruise missile systems to give them longer
ranges and increased accuracy. Such modifications could be
ready for deployment a year or two after flight testing began.
--
By about 1980 the Soviets could have a new generation
of large, long-range cruise missiles based on current
technology.
Small, highly accurate strategic cuirse missiles, for
either air or sea launching would require technology that we
do not believe the Soviets could attain until the 1980s.
The U.S. is about five years ahead of the Soviets in cruise
missiles.
CERALD
TQP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
TOP SENSITIVE - XGDS
6
Secretary Clements:
I think we are more like 8 - 10 years ahead.
General Brown:
Right. We have had the Hound Dog in the
inventory a long time.
Director Colby:
These next boards, reproduced from the
Estimate, illustrate that Soviet offensive strategic capabilities will
grow significantly between now and 1985.
The first chart shows that Soviet offensive forces
will exceed those programmed by the U.S. in numbers of
missile RVs. The second chart indicates considerable
gain relative to U.S. forces even when our bombers are
added to the equation, though the U.S. remains ahead in
all but the most extreme alternative.
SALT TWO limits will not prevent these trends. In
our best SALT-limited estimate, for example, we expect
Soviet missile RVs to exceed those of the U.S. by the
early 1980s.
--
You will note, however, that on both figures our
SALT-limited estimates are considerably below the
more extreme Soviet growth that would be possible if
there were no SALT TWO.
There is also the question of the effectiveness of the Soviet strategic
forces against hardened targets in the U.S. Soviet progress in this
area will depend on the quality of their missiles, and will be largely
independent of SALT TWO.
--
The figure on the left of this chart shows our
estimate of the number of U.S. silos that would survive
hypothetical attacks by the various alternative Soviet ICBM
forces we have projected. Our best estimate of Soviet
offensive force developments over the next ten years,
even under SALT TWO limitations, is that Soviet ICBM
forces will probably pose a major threat to U.S. Minuteman
silos in the early 1980s, assuming that the Soviets can
perfect techniques for precisely timed two-RV attacks on
a single target. Such calculations are affected more by
our large range of uncertainty about the accuracies and
yields of Soviet ICBMs than they are by the size of the
alternative forces. The figure on the right of the board
depicts the effect of these qualitative uncertainties. The
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
- FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOPSECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS
7
black line represents calculations using our best estimates
of accuracy and yield, whereas the blue area shows the
possible spread of uncertainty.
--
This next chart shows (on the left) our estimate of
the number of U.S. warheads -- both ICBMs and SLBMs --
that would survive a hypothetical Soviet surprise attack on
our silos, and (on the right) the number of Soviet warheads
that would be left over for other uses after such an attack.
Secretary Kissinger: You must be thinking of defecting. The CIA
knows how to do this.
[Laughter]
Director Colby:
The figure on the right shows the quality.
Secretary Kissinger: What accuracy are you assuming?
Mr. Duckett:
The accuracy is from . 25 nm to . 15 nm.
Secretary Kissinger: Under SALT conditions?
Mr. Duckett:
Yes.
Director Colby:
That is the high figure -- the most they could
do under SALT.
Mr. Duckett:
The Soviets have large warheads, and therefore
they have less uncertainty resulting from accuracy. Accuracy is more
important for us.
Secretary Kissinger: How many Americans would they kill if they
just attack Minuteman?
General Brown:
That would be a tough attack on the U.S. if
they tried to dig out Minuteman. It would be dirty.
Mr. Duckett:
The winds favor the Soviets. The winds in
the U.S. would take the fallout to the population.
Secretary Kissinger: How many would they kill?
Director Colby:
We don't know.
TOR SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD is LIBRARI GERALD
TQP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS
8
General Brown:
We are looking at this now in a red-on-blue
war game based upon discussions at the SIOP briefing on Saturday.
This should be interesting and you may wish to see the results,
Mr. President.
President Ford:
I would like to see what you come up with.
Secretary Kissinger: Your [CIA] figures are based on no
launch-on-warning by the U.S. Most of our SLBMs and bombers
would survive, plus any missiles launched on warning. Brezhnev
must keep that in mind. This would be the case, unless U.S. forces
ride out the attack. If he is wrong, they would be in trouble. In
any event, we would have 150 Minuteman missiles, which is not a
negligible force. He would be foolhardy in the extreme.
General Brown:
And we would have bombers that survive.
General Dougherty can put bombers on airborne alert if he thinks
they might be threatened. They are secure and can be used.
Secretary Kissinger: When people speak of the vulnerability of
Minuteman, they are speaking of a worst-case situation for us. They
do not take into account our SLBMs and bombers. The Soviets must
ask themselves where they would be if they do all these things.
General Brown:
These sorts of things give us confidence that
we have a deterrent force today.
Director Colby:
The figures show that in all cases the Soviet
residual force will grow and will come to exceed that of the U.S.;
but the number of surviving U.S. RVs -- largely on SLBMs at sea --
will remain quite large, that is, some 3 - 4,000 weapons not counting
bomber weapons; and importantly, the right-hand figure shows that
the more extreme possible Soviet advantage would be held in check by
SALT TWO limitations.
President Ford:
The right side is the residual Soviet missile
capability.
Secretary Kissinger: The chart does not count our forward-based
systems. If they hit our FBS first, it would provide adequate warning
to launch Minuteman. If they attack Minuteman first, then some of
our FBS would survive.
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Dr. Ikle:
A launch-on-warning posture could be an
accident-prone posture and be more dangerous.
Secretary Kissinger: There should be no public statements saying
we should have no launch-on-warning plans. We can fix our command
and control systems to guard against launch-on-warning if we like,
but there should be no public statements to this effect.
General Brown:
We have had a policy for years of giving them
[the Soviets] no assurances on this.
Secretary Kissinger: We should take no pain to give the Soviets an
impression that we have a launch-on-warning policy.
Brent Scowcroft:
It is not to our disadvantage if we appear
irrational to the Soviets in this regard.
Director Colby:
It could be a problem.
Secretary Kissinger:
There are two factors to be considered. First,
we would never launch without Presidential authority; we can fix our
command and control systems for this. Second, the Soviets must
never be able to calculate that you plan to rule out such an attack.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
That ambiguity must never be eliminated.
Secretary Kissinger:
There would be 80 million Soviet casualties if
they attack Minuteman. Therefore, our submarines are a deterrent.
Mr. Duckett:
The flat part of the curve (on the projected
number of surviving U.S. warheads) does not say "we don't need
SALT. " The chart is insensitive in this area.
Secretary Kissinger: There is no strategic need for extra surviving
warheads, but there is a perceived need--a political benefit.
Director Colby:
There is a perceived need. We have 4,000
left on our side, but 600 - 800 can kill their population. Therefore,
3,000 - 4,000 can certainly destroy their population.
Mr. Duckett:
The perception is important.
Director Colby:
In assessing Soviet strategic capabilities over
the next ten years, we have reexamined their very vigorous research
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and development programs. We have paid particular attention to
prospects for major advances in strategic defense, such as lasers
and submarine detection, that might seriously erode U.S. deterrent
capabilities.
In general, we concluded that the chances are small that the Soviets
can sharply alter the strategic balance through technological advance
in the next ten years, although by 1985 the Soviets will probably have
made the task of penetrating their air defenses by bombers much
more difficult than it is today.
President Ford:
You are discounting their lasers as a
serious threat?
Director Colby:
The chances are small that they would alter
the strategic balance.
To sum up, Mr. President, the most important judgments in this
year's Estimate are:
During the next ten years, the Soviets almost certainly will not have
a first-strike capability to prevent devastating retaliation by the
United States.
Short of this, however, Soviet strategic programs present what we
believe are real and more proximate dangers to the United States --
with or without a SALT TWO agreement. We think there will probably
be a continuation of rough strategic equality between the U.S. and
USSR, but in the qualitative competition the U.S. technological lead
will come under increasing challenge.
Assuming that the judgments of the Estimate are reasonably correct,
I believe that foreseeable Soviet strategic forces would not eliminate
the USSR's vulnerability to retaliation. Consequently, a crisis
resolution probably would not rest on the strategic weapons balance,
but rather would depend on other factors, such as the comparative
strengths and dispositions of U.S. and Soviet conventional forces.
It is relevant in this connection to note the steady increases
occurring in Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO, and in the Soviet
Navy.
Let me now turn to the future of Soviet politics, which could affect
the Soviet strategic posture fully as much as force projections or
FORD
progress in R&D. These future developments are best looked at in
three stages:
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-- At the present, in the two months before the Party
Congress, Brezhnev still is the dominant Soviet leader. His
authority seems to be in a slow decline, along with his
physical vigor. He is still interested in a SALT agreement,
but is clearly prepared to go into the Congress without one
if necessary. He doubtless recognizes that both sides have
to change their existing formal positions to reach a deal,
and he has some room for maneuver -- though not, we
believe, to the extent of agreeing to include Backfire in a
2, 400 aggregate.
-- In the months after the Congress, we will probably
have roughly the same Soviet leadership, and no major
change in SALT policy. But the gradual erosion of
Brezhnev's position will continue, as his colleagues begin
to cast their minds forward to the post-Brezhnev period.
The further this process goes, the more the individual
Politburo members will be inclined to avoid risky decisions
that might lay them open to attack at a later, more intense
phase of the succession competition.
More important in this period, however, will be
Soviet concern about the uncertainties of the U.S.
political process. They will be cautious about such
hazards as negotiating during an election year, when
the whole Soviet - American relations could be pushed
into the forefront of partisan debate. We do not
believe they will out-and-out refuse to continue
discussions, but they seem prepared to wait until 1977
if necessary.
In the third phase, over the next several years, the
Politburo will get deeply into what we expect to be a
prolonged succession process. Real factional struggles
might develop, with none of the aspirants for power wanting
to antagonize the military. Thus the preferences of the
marshals will probably be given greater weight in strategic
and arms control matters.
Finally, what can we say about the prospects for Soviet-U.S. relations
if there is no SALT TWO? We believe Moscow sees this as primarily
up to the Americans. The Soviets find detente too useful to want to
repudiate it, and would hope to continue on a pragmatic course,
FORD
governed by the opportunities and risks of specific situations, and
still call it detente.
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The chief consequences for Soviet foreign policy, therefore, of no SALT
agreement would lie more in the area of underlying attitudes than in
specific behavior on the international scene. Soviet uncertainty about
the future strategic balance would encourage darker interpretations of
U.S. intentions.
If the strategic dialogue ended, the beginnings of confidence-building
would be interrupted. In the absence of treaty limitations, the Soviet
military would be relieved of the healthy necessity to dismantle older
systems, and to divulge strategic facts to their chief opponents. All
this would clearly be damaging to the prospects for positive long-run
change in the Soviet system.
These effects would be magnified if the U.S. reaction to a SALT
failure was to discredit detente altogether from the Western side.
President Ford:
Thank you, Bill. Any comments?
Secretary Kissinger: I would like to comment. Looking back at the
seven years I have been here, we have never had to manage a crisis
under the current difficult conditions. In 1973, Admiral Zumwalt
did not tell us our Navy was vulnerable. We conducted ourselves on
the basis of naval superiority. The Soviets had no MIRVs at all --
only the single warhead SS-11 and SS-9. In one crisis, we had a 10-1
warhead superiority on the U.S. side -- and the Soviets caved. In
1962, we had a 100-1 advantage. Never were the Soviets conscious of
parity. In every confrontation under circumstances of U.S.
superiority, the Soviets caved inordinately rapidly.
We will not be in that position in the future, and we will have a crisis
management problem. Therefore we have to look at the Soviet threat
and capability over the next ten years. SALT may give us no strategic
benefits, but it would give us political benefits.
Our most glaring deficiency will be in dealing with regional conflicts.
No President has had to manage a crisis in such a situation where we
were not overwhelmingly superior in strategic forces. During the
Berlin crisis, the Soviets had no strategic capability. In 1962, they had
70 long-range missiles which took seven hours to fuel.
The situation is changed, and this will present a real strategic
problem, not only in a crisis, but in the way the Soviets throw their
weight around. This is one reason why Angola is so important; we
don't want to whet the Soviet appetite.
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Director Colby:
The Soviets may send a guided missile
destroyer to Angola.
President Ford:
Are we sending any ships?
General Brown:
None.
President Ford:
Should we?
General Brown:
Not now, based on projected military
scenarios. We must also think about the will of Congress.
President Ford:
That doesn't necessarily follow. They were
focusing on only one aspect. There was no indication we cannot
deploy naval vessels in the Atlantic which would affect Soviet
perceptions. The vote would not constrain that.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
There is no military basis for deploying ships.
President Ford:
I agree, but perceptions are sometimes more
important.
General Brown:
One beauty of naval forces is that they can
signal our intent.
Secretary Kissinger:
Our ships would not have to be right off Angola.
They could be 700 miles away and the Soviets would still see them.
Director Colby:
General Brown:
We have ships in the Mediterranean but none
in the South Atlantic.
Mr. Hyland:
The Soviet ships won't arrive until the sixth,
probably, if they go to Luanda.
President Ford:
Assume the worst if they go directly.
General Brown:
If we send a ship, people will point to this and
recall the Gulf of Tonkin affair which led to the Senate resolution to
deploy forces. Some will argue that we cannot get so involved. There
is no reason militarily for us to deploy ships.
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Director Colby:
Secretary Kissinger: They can't do anything with a guided missile
ship. However, our concern is that if the Soviets make substantial
military efforts and taste a local advantage, it would be a dangerous
situation. They must have had internal debate. This is an argument
for following them and observing them. There is no military need,
but there is a psychological benefit. We can send them a message
by doing this. They will think about this and say: "Why are we
there? 11 This is an argument for observing them within range of
their communications.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The reason I said what I said before was that
the point was not a military question. You [the President] were asking
General Brown about the matter and I was pointing out it was not a
military recommendation.
Secretary Kissinger:
You are making me the villain. [Laughter]
Brent Scowcroft:
If we send a ship in, we could announce it and
avoid the Tonkin syndrome.
Secretary Kissinger: It would be best to say nothing. This would
have the most effect. In the Jordanian crisis, we shut off all
communications. We shut down the State Department -- answered no
questions. We put our forces into the Mediterranean, and the
Soviets collapsed.
President Ford:
This is similar to Cuba.
Secretary Kissinger:
This was similar to Cienfuegos.
We could move into the South Atlantic on a routine mission. We could
say we are watching the Soviets, which is better than saying we are
watching Angola. If asked, we could say our ships are on routine
patrol.
President Ford:
Let's look into this, but I do not want to make
a decision this morning.
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Secretary Kissinger: The best way is this. We will call in
Dobrynin tomorrow and tell him that if he thinks he can keep detente
on track, he is crazy. The more signals back to Moscow, the better.
President Ford:
Let's don't ignore this. Let's think about it.
Secretary Kissinger: They have a game going in Angola. But it is
not the ultimate test yet. They might want it if they can pick it up at
a low price. Even if they don't pick it up, they will want to run
around Africa and Europe and say: "The Americans can't cut the
mustard. "
Director Colby:
Vietnam is in the back of the thought process
of the Soviets.
Secretary Clements: Cuban participation is highly vulnerable for the
Soviets and Cuba. This is a plus for our public side. You [the
President ] should keep this in mind.
President Ford:
I mentioned the combat forces in my press
conference Saturday. I did not neglect this.
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets will get many messages. We
have notes all over Africa. All our protests will be rejected, but they
will go to Moscow.
Secretary Clements:
We could watch the ships -- monitor the
Cubans.
Secretary Kissinger: They are going by air. But we can monitor
the Soviets. We should have an estimate from DOD and the Chiefs.
We should not be hysterical, but it should be geared to the Soviets so
that they would pick up our signals.
Now let's move into the SALT discussion.
Mr. President, we are not here to ask you for a decision. We simply
want to put the issues before you to give you a chance to think about
them when you are in Vail. When you come back, we will have a
more detailed discussion of the issues.
At Vladivostok, we agreed on the total number of vehicles and MIRVs.
We said that missiles with greater than 600 km range on bombers
would be counted. There is an ambiguity here as to whether these
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include cruise missiles or only ballistic missiles. We said they were
ballistic missiles; the Soviets said that all air-launched cruise missiles
on heavy bombers should be counted. Nothing was said about SLCMs --
submarine-launched or ship-launched.
The Soviets would perceive it as a concession on their part if we end
up counting anything less than all the cruise missiles. Nothing was
said at Vladivostok about the Backfire. This issue emerged afterwards.
Therefore, we have two hang-ups: one the Backfire and the other the
cruise missile situation. Our position had been that we should count
the Backfire. Their position has been that we should count cruise
missiles with ranges greater than 600 km on heavy bombers and ban
all other cruise missiles. Gromyko told me that SLCMs with a range
greater than 600 km were not negotiable.
Since Vladivostok, it is fair to say that the Soviets have made one
major concession: that is, they are using our counting rules for
MIRVs. The practical effect of this is to limit them to less than 1300
MIRVs unless they MIRV all SS-18s. So far, however, all of their
SS-18s have only single warheads. They apparently are planning no
more than 180 SS-18s with MIRVs. This would give them a total of
1,180 MIRV launchers rather than 1, 316. At 12 RVs each, this gives us
around 2, 200 warheads free. However, they have linked the MIRV
counting rule to the cruise missile issue.
This leaves us now with the following issues: First, how do we deal
with the Backfire in light of the forward based system problem and
the fact that this is a big issue in the Soviet mind? Second, what do
we do about cruise missiles with greater than 600 km range on heavy
bombers? Third, how do we deal with SLCMs with greater than 600
km range on submarines or ships? And fourth, what do we do about
land-based cruise missiles? The Soviets want to permit land-based
cruise missiles up to a 5, 500 km range. This is hard to understand;
we could cover the Soviet Union with deployments in Europe. This
would also be a disadvantage since the Soviets could use their
land-based cruise missile program to test all conceivable modes.
Our view is that we should limit land-based cruise missiles to a
2, 500 km range.
Six options were presented to the Verification Panel for consideration.
Don and I have narrowed these to three for purposes of simplification.
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The first option is one which would be preferred by the Joint Chiefs.
It would defer any limitation on Backfire and cruise missiles at this
time, but these would be taken up in the next round of SALT talks in
1977. The Chiefs would agree to a time limit on the negotiations --
for example, two years -- to settle the Backfire and cruise missile
issues.
This option would consolidate the gains made at Vladivostok which
would go into effect in October 1977. The follow-on agreement would
take effect in 1979 or 1980.
An advantage of this option is that it would use cruise missiles to
offset Backfire; therefore, both would run free.
I have said I have doubts about the negotiability of this option. First,
the Soviets have rejected counting Backfire in SALT as a matter of
principle. The Soviets would also feel that it would be bad for them
to let cruise missiles run free. They would feel they would be losing
in the process. They think our Backfire position is a trick anyway.
From the domestic point of view, I wonder whether there is a danger
in this option because all arms controllers will scream "fraud. " They
will say this will leave more cruise missiles uncontrolled than
ballistic missiles controlled. Therefore, the liberal Democrats will
be against us on our cruise missile programs and our request for
funds for cruise missiles.
I saw Muskie at the football game yesterday and Harriman at dinner
last night. They told me, "We will help you by cutting off funds for
the cruise missile. "
We will be driven by our own debate to limiting cruise missiles to the
Backfire numbers. Also, we will have a massive FBS problem.
President Ford:
We would be giving up what we gained in
Vladivostok.
Secretary Kissinger: Once we accept a unilateral construction, even
if the Soviets break it, we are going to have hellish ability to go ahead.
I cannot believe the Soviets will give us both the MIRV counting rule,
plus a throw weight limitation on the SS-19, plus cruise missiles.
We could only go back to a crude version of Vladivostok, if at all.
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However, the option does have these advantages. It is the least
contentious option; it would consolidate the Vladivostok gains; and it
would maintain momentum in SALT.
Secretary Rumsfeld: There is an opposite argument to the one
Henry made. In the event we agree on this option, it may improve
the position of the cruise missile in Congress. We would have an
argument similar to the one for MBFR troop levels in Europe -- the
last thing we want to do is reduce unilaterally. Therefore, this may
actually decrease Congressional leverage on the cruise missile.
Secretary Clements: I want to endorse what Don has said. I talked
to McIntyre about this and Don is right. They've gone along with us
on cruise missiles because it is part of our SALT negotiations. They
don't want us to constrain ourselves.
President Ford:
In the House they knocked out the Air Force
cruise missile, but kept the SLCM.
Secretary Clements: Well, the Congress did this, but not to help
our negotiations. The Air Force cruise missile is built by Boeing,
but the SLCM is built by LTV. Only one person, George Mahon,
wanted to eliminate the Air Force cruise missile, and he did this, in
my view, to help LTV and to eliminate the Air Force competition.
However, in conference, both programs were put back in. Mahon
has been the only one who had been fighting the Air Force program.
President Ford:
He was taking care of Dallas.
Secretary Clements:
And screwing Boeing.
Secretary Kissinger: In my opinion, there is only one chance in 20
that the Soviets would accept this option. They will not accept straight
deferral, in my judgment.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
The test is to find some language that does not
prejudge the matter at all, which could be the Soviet hang-up. We
ought to be able to find a way to find the right kind of language.
President Ford:
Doesn't deferral give them a free hand to let
them go ahead with their cruise missile program?
Secretary Rumsfeld: There is no question about it. However, this
option is not really the preferred option. It is useful only in that it
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would avoid not having any SALT agreement at all. What it does is
allow us to state that we have two problem areas which we have not
yet resolved.
President Ford:
I can see it from our point of view, but we
must face the reality of whether they would do it.
Director Colby:
The Soviets see the cruise missile as an
enormous problem to them. They have an enormous investment in
air defenses and they see the cruise missile as our way to get around
their air defenses.
Secretary Clements:
They will have an interest in cruise missile
programs but it will not be the same interest as ours. They do not
have the capability of air-launching cruise missiles.
Secretary Kissinger:
They won't see them coming.
Director Colby:
We have no air defenses on our side. The
Soviets have no urgent reason to develop air-launched cruise missiles.
Mr. Duckett:
Our last photography shows that the Soviets
have a new cruise missile at the test site. We have not determined
its characteristics yet.
Secretary Kissinger: They have no requirement for a cruise missile.
Therefore, we can constrain their optimum size, keeping good ones
for us and bad for them. We can make great strides.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
This is why we have some leverage with cruise
missiles.
Secretary Kissinger: Why must they answer cruise missiles with
cruise missiles? Maybe they would answer our cruise missile
programs with ballistic missiles.
President Ford:
Because they may want to take advantage of
their program.
Secretary Kissinger: Let's discuss another option. We could count
Backfire in the 2400 aggregate. We could count, within the 1320 MIRV
limit, those heavy bombers with cruise missiles of greater than 600 km
range. We could ban SLCMs above 600 km on submarines. SLCMs
with a 2500 km range or 2000 km range on surface ships would run
free.
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This would involve two significant concessions: we would ban
long-range cruise missiles on submarines and we would count heavy
bombers with ALCMs as MIRVs.
General Brown:
If we want all our bombers to carry ALCMs,
we would have to knock off that many MIRVed missiles.
President Ford:
Even if we pulled B-52s out of mothballs,
we would not get up to the 2400 level.
Brent Scowcroft:
The applicable ceiling here is the 1320 MIRV
limit.
Secretary Kissinger: This is a most creative approach. It will
interest the Soviets. However, its chief difficulty is whether the
Soviets would count Backfire. I do not believe they will count the
Backfire. If they have to count 400 Backfire, they will have to
dismantle some ICBMs. It will also cause an FBS problem and a
domestic political problem for the Soviets.
President Ford:
If the Backfire is counted as a strategic
weapon, and if they had developed a cruisemissile they could put
ALCMs on the Backfire.
Secretary Kissinger: Then it would count against the MIRV ceiling.
Without an ALCM, the Backfire would be counted in the 2400 level
alone. Or, if it carries an ALCM, it would count both against the
2400 level and the 1320 ceiling.
General Brown:
I think there was only one reason why they
would go to an ALCM for the Backfire. If they get the accuracy with
their ALCM, it is better than a gravity bomb.
Director Colby:
They could use a shorter range ALCM.
General Brown:
It goes back to the fact that we don't have any
air defenses to speak of.
Secretary Kissinger: This is worse than the October proposal which
they have already rejected. In this option, we would be letting SLCMs
go free and counting their Backfire. This is harder than the October
proposal where SLCMs and Backfires were outside the basic accords
in some kind of grey area. The October proposal was closer to
deferral. Their view of this option would be that they would be losing
a handle on SLCMs while having to count Backfire.
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Mr. President, we are not asking for a decision at this time. We
just want to present this for your consideration. The Verification
Panel must do more work before we could confidently sell this in
Moscow.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
One advantage of this option is that the
Soviets are already counting a heavy bomber, the Bison. From a
domestic standpoint, this has assisted somewhat.
A second point is that we must consider the world perception, as
Secretary Kissinger has mentioned. If the Backfire is not counted,
we must consider the perception here, in Europe, and elsewhere.
Statistically, the Backfire has a substantial capability.
The point I am making is that while we might lose at negotiability, it
would help us in selling it here and elsewhere. Whatever we come up
with must lend itself to public discussion.
Secretary Kissinger: I am arguing not just for negotiability. What we
have must be both negotiable and equitable from a strategic viewpoint.
Director Colby:
Could we reduce the land-based cruise missile
range to 2500 km as a counter to SLCMs? [No answer. ]
Secretary Kissinger: If these options are not saleable and acceptable,
then we have two issues: Negotiating tactics, and a decision on where
we go.
With respect to negotiating tactics, how do we present an option if
there is a 90 percent chance that it will be rejected? Also, what can
we table that will have a chance of acceptance?
There are two schools of thought on negotiating tactics. One is that
we should take a tough stance. The other is that we should make
"preemptive concessions, " as Don's predecessor phrased it. My view
is that this is the better negotiating tactic. We go ahead with some
concessions but we then stick hard on what we do have. The other
tactics may look tough, but they lose credibility. I think we should
get to our concession point fast, but then don't yield. Of course, we
must build some air into our proposal for retreat purposes.
With the Chinese, we give them our best judgment and if they agree,
they say "ok. " However, with the Soviets, if we hand their own proposal
to them, they must argue about it for nights and then take it to the
Politburo.
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Let's now look at the third option category. Basically, this looks for
a way of not counting the Backfire, plus it includes elements of the
second option counting heavy bombers with ALCMs as MIRVs.
There is a shopping list of elements in these packages.
To hang the Backfire on Soviet assurances would be dangerous.
Assurances are inherently soft. For example, if the Soviets staged
their bombers through Arctic bases in a crisis, would this result in
an abrogation of SALT?
What else could we do with the Backfire? There are several
possibilities.
First, we need not offer the Soviets the whole SLCM package. We
could go back to something like the October proposal. We could say
that all cruise missiles, with the exception of ship-launched cruise
missiles, would be limited. We could use the ship-launched SLCM
limit as an offset to the Backfire. If they increase their Backfire
deployments above a certain number, then our other cruise missile
limitations would be off.
As Fred [Ikle] has suggested, we can put all offset systems into a
separate Protocol addressing hybrid systems -- the grey area. We
could balance Backfire against the ship-launched SLCMs up to 1980 or
1981 in this Protocol.
Alternatively, we could ask the Soviets to agree to reducing the
aggregate to 2300, or even 2200. However, I do not think it would be
possible to get the Soviets to agree to a 2200 level. The 2300 level
would be a strain on the Soviets, but not on us. This would have the
effect of counting 100 Backfires.
No one recommends letting the Backfire run free on assurances alone.
Therefore, this would entail having some kind of trade-off such as
reducing the total aggregate level, or having a separate Protocol.
Dr. Ikle:
The theater balance is of concern to the Soviets. If we
use a separate Protocol, it may be more negotiable since no Backfires
would be in SALT. It would also limit the upgrading of cruise missiles.
Secretary Kissinger: This would be a compromise. We could have a
mixed option where some cruise missiles run free against their
Backfire. This hopefully avoids the FBS problem and gives the
FORD
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23
Soviets a way out. However, we wouldn't want an agreement on a
mixed option that takes Backfire out of the count that is not saleable
or in the strategic interests of the United States. The Chiefs and
others are now working on developing some kind of updated mixed
package.
Director Colby:
The Soviets will do nothing on Backfire without
raising the FBS issue.
General Brown:
If they raise the FBS issue, it automatically
brings the Backfire into the picture.
Secretary Kissinger:
We can consider various mixed packages. We
can have a Protocol as Fred [Ikle] has suggested. We can have a
unilateral U.S. statement that says, "When the Soviets produce
Backfire above a certain number, the deployment restraints on
SLCMs are off. 11
We can have a mixed package where the Soviets agree to reducing to
the 2300 aggregate level and we set off the SLCMs versus Backfire;
we can sell this as reducing the Backfire.
President Ford:
The perception associated with reducing the
aggregate from 2400 to 2300 would be very saleable.
Dr. Ikle:
As long as it is not considered a substitute
for follow-on reductions.
President Ford:
I want to compliment you all for taking a fresh
look and expanding the alternatives. There is some flexibility here.
Between now and the first week in January, I would like you to look
at something beyond the first two options and give me the prospects.
Perhaps we can come up with something which is in the best interests
of the United States and is saleable.
In the next two weeks, I would like you to finely tune your options and
give Henry an option in addition to the first two. Maybe this won't
work, but at least we will have made our best possible effort.
Mr. Duckett:
Mr. President, I'd like to take one minute on a
compliance issue.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
In developing a mixed package, we must consider
the acceptability in a strategic sense, its negotiability, and its
saleability at home. For any mixed package, we must ask also about
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24
its simplicity. We must ask whether it can be explained sensibly.
Dr. Ikle:
The verification problem of cruise missiles
is hard to explain. I believe we will be able to explain it only if we
have a separate Protocol. Otherwise, the verification problem is
almost impossible to explain for cruise missiles.
Secretary Kissinger: We must recall the elements to consider. We
have to consider the relationshi P of the FBS and Backfire issues. We
must understand the degree to which cruise missiles running free
offset Backfire. We must understand the degree to which not counting
Backfire is offset, for example, by its inability to carry long-range
cruise missiles.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
We must also remember the importance of
not using soft assurances.
Secretary Kissinger: Assurances are only frosting on the cake.
President Ford:
The kind of trust that has been built negates
the use of assurances. They won't be bought.
Mr. Duckett:
President Ford:
Director Colby:
Secretary Kissinger: This is a good example of the need to put this
kind of information in a temporary hold status.
Director Colby:
I agree.
President Ford:
Thank you very much. Have a good holiday.
FORD
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GLEREO FORD LIBRARY
LIBRARY
09315
A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09315
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Chart
CREATOR'S NAME
CIA
RECEIVER'S NAME
NSC
TITLE
Soviet capabilities
CREATION DATE
12/1975?
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200025
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS FILE
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 12/22/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
06/21/1999
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
Pages 1-3 (of 8 payes)
Sintizal 9/21/04
Projected Soviet Force Levels Under Varying Assumptions
(Total Delivery Vehicles)
High Estimate without SAL
Moderate Estimate without SAL
Best Estimate with SAL
2,808
2,561
2,394
DECLASSIFIED, wishportions exempt
ESTIMATED
Projected for 1980
DATE 12/13/07
As of 1 Nov 1975
2,528
1,462
958
1,098
AUTHORITY RAC 9/21/05
NLF,
3,226
2,750
2,390
BY loh
90
Projected for 1985
2,302
1,716
1,316
MIRVed Delivery Vehicles
SECRET
Entire page redacted.
BACKFIRE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT
NIE 11-3/8/75 FORCES 1 and 2
1975
1980
1985
TOTAL PRODUCTION
67
314
550
LRA
9
140
240
SNA
9
140
210
OTHER
(Training, Replacements, etc.)
49
34
100