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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 7/30/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
4609X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Friday, July 30, 1976
TIME:
9:30 a. m. to 11:00 a. m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
SALT
ESERVATION
Principals
The President
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
The Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
Acting Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency John Lehman
ORIGINAL RETIRED
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Other Attendees
White House:
Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
State:
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Defense:
Dr. James P. Wade
NSC Staff:
Col Richard T. Boverie
TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12368 Sec. 3.6
BERALD R. FORD FORD LIBRI
MR 98-39,# 59; NSC letter 2/10/99
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
let NARA, Date 5/25/99
TOPSECRE (SENSITIVE - XGDS
2
President Ford: This is the meeting that was to have been held last week.
I want to emphasize that it is decidedly in the national interest to proceed
to seek a good agreement for SALT TWO. There is no urgency to dictate
a bad agreement. But there is no reason to avoid negotiations for what I
take to be essential for the national interest.
We have proceeded since Vladivostok with a number of attempts and
several different formulas. However, we have not been able to move
because of the Backfire and cruise missile problems. We have to be
cognizant that we are moving closer to the deadline. If the US government
gets to that deadline with no action, serious consequences could result.
Regardless of any political problems, I think we should proceed affirmatively.
Henry, would you please review the alternatives that have been suggested.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, it would be helpful if we review
where the negotiations have been and what the Verification Panel has
Declassified Photocopy from
discussed.
Gerald R. Ford Library
Last September, we introduced the idea of treating sea-based cruise
missiles and Backfire as hybrid or gray areas. We proposed a common
limit of 300 hybrid systems on the two sides -- for the Soviets, Backfires
and SLCMs (submarine launched cruise missiles) up to 2000 kilometers
in range, and for us, FB-111s and SLCMs up to 2000 kilometers. The
effect would have been for the Soviets to forego cruise missiles if they
ORIGINAL
wanted a full complement of Backfire. That proposal also included a limit
of 300 heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs (air launched cruise missiles)
up to 2500 kilometers in range.
Brezhnev rejected that proposal in October. He rejected it with respect
to the numbers and with respect to treating Backfire as a hybrid.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Did he reject the concept of hybrid systems? Was
the concept of hybrid as we talk about it rejected?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. He used the word hybrid.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Did he reject hybrid or was he referring simply to
the Backfire?
is
ForD
TOP SECRET (SENSIAVE - XGDS
CERALO
ABUNGIT
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSHTVE - XGDS
3
Secretary Kissinger: They said that Backfire was not in SALT, and that
cruise missiles over 600 kilometers were to be covered. This was their
basic decision.
In January we proposed to them the following:
-- Counting all Backfire produced after October 1977 in the 2400
aggregate.
-- Counting heavy bombers with 600-2500 kilometer ALCMs in the
1320 MIR V ceiling.
-- Banning submarine SLCMs over 600 kilometers in range.
PRESERVATION
-- Banning land-based cruise missiles and surface-ship cruise
missiles over 2500 kilometers.
-- Counting each surface-ship armed with 600-2500 kilometer SLCMs
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
in the 1320 MIRV ceiling.
Brezhnev insisted that the Backfire was not a strategic bomber and supplied
some numbers to support his contention.
President Ford: Was this in Brezhnev's letter?
Secretary Kissinger: No. He said this in Moscow.
ORIGINAL
President Ford: And in Helsinki.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but more specifically in Moscow.
We then proposed a tougher version of the fallback you had approved.
President Ford: Was this in February?
Secretary Kissinger: No, this was in Moscow in January.
It included a five-year agreement limiting Backfire to 275 aircraft through
1982. The number of surface-ships equipped with 600-2500 kilometer SLCMs
would be limited to a ceiling of 25 within this same five year period. The
other provisions of the proposals were as we had originally proposed
except that we also proposed reductions to less than 2300 by 1982.
FORD
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
LISERVY GERALD FORD
LIBRANT
TORSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
4
Brezhnev did not reject our position but offered a counterproposal which
remains the present Soviet position:
-- He accepted our approach on the ALCMs -- to treat them as MIR Ved
vehicles with the exception of wanting to count the B-1 as three MIR Ved
vehicles. I am certain his proposal on the B-1 was not serious. He
accepted our proposal for defining a heavy missile on the basis of throw
weight. He offered to give a written commitment that Backfire would not
be given a capability against the US. He reiterated their position that all
SLCMs and land-launched cruise missiles should be limited to 600 kilometers.
He offered to consider reductions to a level even below 2300, if there were
a satisfactory solution to the cruise missile issue. All of their concessions
SERVATION
on MIR V counting and throw weight are dependent upon resolution of the
cruise missile issue. These are not independent concessions.
We considered the Brezhnev position in February and we came up with a
proposal using a different approach -- more like last September. It
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
includes:
-- All provisions relating to Vladivostok agreed to this far in Geneva
plus other agreed joint draft text provisions.
-- Agreement that any missile whose booster has been tested with
MIR Vs will consider to be MIR Ved.
ORIGI
-- Ceiling on the throw weight and launch weight of heavy and non-
heavy ICBMs.
-- Ban on ALCMs with range over 2500 kilometers, restrict ALCMs
over 600 kilometers to deployment only on heavy bombers, count heavy
bombers equipped with 600-2500 kilometer ALCMs in the 1320 total.
-- Reduction in the aggregate to some level below 2400.
Some of these provisions had been discussed in January. In addition,
we proposed an interim agreement to last to January 1979:
-- Limit testing of SLCMs (on surface-ships and submarines) and
LLCMs (land-launched cruise missiles) to a maximum of 2500 kilometers.
-- Ban deployment of SLCMs and LLCMs over 600 kilometers.
FORD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD + LIBRARY OERALD
CARNED
LIDRANA
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
5
-- Prohibit acceleration of Backfire production beyond the current
and agreed rate.
-- Ban on improvements in Backfire capability.
-- Commitment to resolve the Backfire and cruise missile issues
as soon as possible.
In March, this approach was also rejected by Brezhnev. He characterized
the US proposal as moving backward from our position in January; in
particular, he criticized the withdrawal of our proposal for a 600 kilometer
limit on submarine SLCMs. He claimed it was unrealistic to think it
would be easier to ban long-range cruise missiles after they had been
RESERVATION
tested and even produced.
Since then, in effect, there have been no communications between us.
Dobrynin has asked us if in principle we are ready to continue negotiations.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
We said yes. Also Alex (Johnson) has been negotiating in Geneva on
technical issues. But there has been no momentum on the fundamental
proposals.
The Verification Panel has been looking at alternatives and has come up with
two basic approaches.
The first approach is to maintain the February position. We could do this
ORIGIN
in two ways: either by saying nothing, or by writing Brezhnev a letter,
which is a more formal approach. The argument for maintaining the
February position is that the Soviets will not give it serious consideration
unless we stick to our position.
The second approach would be to maintain our February position but add
some variations to make the concept more attractive.
For example, we could extend the ban on ALCMs over 2500 kilometers in
the Vladivostok agreement to cover all cruise missiles in the permanent
agreement. This would assure the Soviets that regardless of the outcome
of the follow-on negotiations, there would be a ban on SLCMs and land-
launched cruise missiles over 2500 kilometers. An argument against this
is that it might reduce our leverage in follow-on negotiations. If we don't
add a ban, it would leave Backfire and most cruise missiles out altogether
and save them for SALT THREE.
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
FORD is LIBRARY
TOP.SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
6
Another variation is to extend the period of the Interim Agreement which
now goes to January 1979. It is unlikely any agreement would be ratified
until March 1977. Therefore, an Interim Agreement to January 1979
would not be extraordinarily meaningful. So we could extend it to
October 1980, which would be a period of three years after the entry
into force of the Vladivostok Agreement to negotiate follow-on limitations
on Backfire and sea- and land-launched cruise missiles.
This would have more of an impact on the US SLCM program since initial
deployment is currently scheduled for early 1980.
The argument against this variation is that once we have any kind of ban,
it tends to become permanent. We might find the SLCM in Congress to be
in the same situation as the B-1.
President Ford: This one item -- including a ban on all cruise missiles
greater than 2500 kilometers -- how does that differ from the February
Declassified Photocopy from
proposal?
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Kissinger: The February proposal included a ban only on ALCMs
over 2500 kilometers. Here we have added the ban to all cruise missiles.
It might make it more serious if we stick to the concept since it is an
elaboration of the concept. It leaves open whether SLCMs from 600 to
2500 kilometers could be deployed. They could not be deployed up to the
limit of the Interim Agreement.
ORIGINAL
Secretary Rumsfeld: Which variation on the February proposal are you
talking about?
Secretary Kissinger: Variation 1 of the February proposal.
Secretary Rumsfeld: But that puts it into a permanent limit.
Secretary Kissinger: In the Interim Agreement nothing can be deployed
beyond 600 kilometers until day X. At the end of the Interim Agreement,
600-2500 kilometer SLCMs can be deployed.
Ambassador Johnson: The Interim Agreement went to 1979.
Secretary Kissinger: In the February proposal, there would be a permanent
agreement on agreed items, and an Interim Agreement on those not agreed.
TORSECRET/SENSHITIVE - XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
FORD LIBRARY
TOP\SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
7
What this adds is whatever happens after the Interim Agreement, we could
not deploy cruise missiles beyond 2500 kilometers.
President Ford: Maybe I don't understand this, but if we go with this,
we go from 600 to 2500 kilometers on SLCMs. How would that be a benefit
to the Soviets?
Secretary Kissinger: We won't go beyond 2500 kilometers for any purpose.
If we go the reductions route, or any or all of the modifications, we have
to consider what happens at the end of the Interim Agreement.
Ambassador Johnson: May I point out Mr. President, that we do have an
agreement in Geneva that provides for follow-on negotiations in 1977.
Secretary Kissinger: That's why we would drop the Interim Agreement.
We would settle what we can settle and then go into follow-on negotiations.
If we have an Interim Agreement, we might have trouble funding our systems.
And once the Interim Agreement lapses, we would be back to where we were.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Our other principal option would be to go for reductions. This alternative
would give us the opportunity to build on where the negotiations left off in
mid January. We would propose to include reductions to 2150 by 1982, and
to include reduction of 100 SS-9s on the Soviet side.
If they reduced heavy missiles, we would fall off our demand for strict
numerical limits on Backfire; however, there would be a letter from
ORIGINAL
Brezhnev to you on what their program is.
We would also take Brezhnev up on his offer to give us assurances that
Backfire would not be given an intercontinental capability and we might
also seek other collateral constraints.
The cruise missile limitations would be similar to our January discussion.
SLCMs over 600 kilometers on submarines are banned, but permitted on
surface-ships and land up to 2500 kilometers in range; ALCMs on heavy
bombers are counted as MIRV and banned on other aircraft.
We would also like to get a freeze on SS-18 deployment so that all of their
permitted heavy missiles would not be MIR Ved. If the freeze were effective
as of the end of this year, after a reduction of 100 they would be left with
about 134 SS-18s and about 92 SS-9s, but in the more likely case of a freeze
in October 1977 they would have about 188 SS-18s and about 20 SS-9s.
TOP SE - XGDS
GERALD FORD LIBRART
GERALD
ADDRESS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
8
The practical difference between the reductions option and the February
proposal is that if we add a 2500 kilometer test and deployment ban, under
February there would be an unlimited number of SLCMs greater than 600
kilometers -- but no constraints on Backfire and no reductions beyond 2400.
Summing up, we have to consider where we would be in either of the two
approaches as well as the case of no agreement:
-- If we stick with the last proposal, we would thereby be betting that
after five months of deadlock, Brezhnev will switch his position. If we
want to string out the negotiations, then this probably guarantees it.
It has the virtue of displaying our refusal to budge; if the talks collapse
we could defend it; if we add the 2500 kilometer range limit for all cruise
missiles, particularly through 1980, we have to compare whether this out-
come is better than the reductions option.
In the reductions option, we could deploy longer range ship-based missiles
but in the Interim Agreement approach we could not; Backfire would reach
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
270 by October 1980, while running free in the reductions proposal, but
the total Backfire in 1980 would be about the same, because production will
not increase until late in 1980.
In short, the Interim Agreement may not buy us much. Thus we could con-
sider dropping it altogether -- but this approach is likely to be strongly
resisted by the Soviets; Backfire runs free, but all we obtain compared to
the reductions option is the freedom to deploy SLCMs on submarines.
ORIGINAL
The reductions option has what most critics have wanted for SALT THREE,
namely low level reductions, and throw weight reductions.
Our forces would not be severely affected at the 2150 level, but the Soviets
would have to take down over 400 missiles and bombers; CIA estimates
they would reduct about 225 ICBMs, 128 SLCMs, and 70 bombers. To be
realistic, however, we should recognize that the Soviets might accept
reductions, but will resist specific reductions of heavy missiles. They
will not let us specify the category of reductions.
These are the principal options. However, none will emerge pure from
negotiations.
President Ford: Alex (Johnson), where are you on the technical discussions?
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOPSECRET/SENSTTIVE-XGDS
9
Ambassador Johnson: We have reached substantial agreement on heavy
missiles. We have reached substantial agreement on a cap on heavy
missiles. We have reached substantial agreement on throw weight.
We have spent much time on MIR.V verification. As a quick word, the
issue is not so much whether a missile tested as a MIR V is a MIRV.
The issue now raised by the Soviets is how to count launchers. Their
view is that we count these on a one-by-one basis. Our view is that
this is impractical and we say that all launchers must be counted.
Secretary Kissinger: They have already agreed to the MIR V counting
rule.
Ambassador Johnson: They have agreed that once a missile is tested
as a MIRV, it will be counted as a MIRV. But the problem is to construct
a bridge from the missile to the launcher in the field.
Declassified Photocopy from
President Ford: My understanding was that where they were to have 300
Gerald R. Ford Library
SS-18s, they had planned to MIRV only 120, but they would count all SS-18s
as MIR Ved.
Ambassador Johnson: If SS-18s are there in the launchers. The problem
is the bridge to count all launchers as containing SS-18 missiles. We
formerly thought that they agreed to a group/complex rule, but they have
ORIGINAL
walked away from that.
Secretary Kissinger: They can deploy the SS-18 without modifying the silo.
Ambassador Johnson: The SS-18 is not as much an issue as is the SS-19.
Secretary Kissinger: They can't put unMIR Ved SS-19s in SS-18 launchers
and count them as unMIRVed. In any event, the MIRV counting rule depends
upon resolution of the cruise missile issue.
Secretary Kissinger: If they say they have an SS-11 in a hole, and if they
admit it is an SS-19 hole, they cannot claim it as a single RV.
Ambassado Johnson: If they say they have an SS-11 in an SS-19 hole, they
want to say that it is not counted as a MIRV launcher.
Secretary Kissinger: My instinct is that if we settle the cruise missile issue,
the counting rule will be settled.
TOPSECRET/SENSITIV - XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY BERALD
GERALD
LEVESIT
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
10
Ambassador Johnson: The Soviets have also shown a willingness to talk
about the data base. I believe this will be manageable.
President Ford: Don?
Secretary Rumsfeld: What are people's views on going to Geneva with
the mobile ICBM issue? We have agreed that the land mobile is not to
be banned, but it has not been to Geneva yet.
Ambassador Johnson: Not yet. The draft treaty says it is okay to have
land mobile missiles. Their position is to ban ICBMs on aircraft other
than bombers -- that is air-mobile ICBMs. Their position is silent on
land-mobile missiles. They have not rejected them, but they have not
accepted them either.
Secretary Rumsfeld: It will take time to settle this. At some point we
should tell them our views. We should also address another issue: cruise
missile definition -- unarmed, nuclear armed, armed.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
President Ford: What is your point?
ORIGINAL RETIRED
Secretary Rumsfeld: We here have a definition. The issue is: when is
it appropriate to get work going in Geneva on this, since it will take time
to resolve. It is best to get working on this.
Ambassador Johnson: With regard to mobile missiles, we will encounter
some resistance on air-mobile ICBMs.
Secretary Kissinger: If we introduce these issues without answering the
basic questions, they will just stall. I've never understood the point on
cruise missiles: why do we want conventional cruise missiles over 2500
kilometers? I don't understand the point.
General Brown: 600 kilometers.
Secretary Kissinger: 2500 on aircraft. If we open up possible evasions of
specifications and propose calling missiles conventional and then put nuclear
warheads on them, we will have problems. The NSC should consider this
more carefully. Why start a brawl on that before we settle the other more
fundamental issues?
Secretary Rumsfeld: We can't predict how the Soviets will react. They
might consider it a positive sign, feeling that this is a signal that we are
seriously interested.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERRAD FORD LIBRARY
LIDRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
11
President Ford: I would like a paper, with pros and cons, on this issue.
I will decide whether to submit it to Geneva or not. When can you get
such a paper, Brent?
Brent Scowcroft: Early next week.
President Ford: George (Brown), I understand the Chiefs recommend
washing out all previous submissions other than February.
General Brown: Yes, sir. It is time for the Chiefs to be on record, since
the JCS have not done anything in writing for a year. Senator Jackson hit
me on this hard. There are three things:
-- We believe we should clean the slate of proposals prior to the
February proposal.
-- We be lieve we should capture the Backfire, with the cruise missile
Declassified Photocopy from
providing the necessary leverage. We think we should emphasize to the
Gerald R. Ford Library
Soviets that our approach to these negotiations has been through comprehen-
sive package proposals. They have been taking selected items from the
package, not the package itself.
-- We believe we should stay with the February proposal.
ORIGINAL
Listening to the discussions this morning, it could well be seen that
every time we reach a hard point we give something more to the Soviets.
But the February proposal was tougher than the January proposal.
President Ford: Why was February tougher than January?
General Brown: Since it had some constraints on Backfire -- but the
January fallback did not.
President Ford: But January had reductions from 2400 to 2150 or 2200.
General Brown: That was the fallback.
President Ford: I understand in the two proposals the only thing that
differs is the 2500 kilometer limit.
Secretary Kissinger: The major difference is that the February proposal
removes the 600 kilometer limit on submarine launched SLCMs. The
practical consequence of this is that after 1979 the Backfire, SLCM, and
LLCM run free.
FORD
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOPSECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP/SECRET/SENSETIVE - XGDS
12
President Ford: George (Brown), what is the significant difference fr om
a military point of view?
General Brown: The January proposal counts the SLCM on surface-ships in
the 1320 MIRV limit.
President Ford: But you have no real program to put SLCMs on surface-
ships.
General Brown: But we have a capability to achieve more than double
the 25 ships in the proposal.
President Ford: When?
Dr. Wade: Probably not until after 1985. We have no program for this.
President Ford: Do we have any shipbuilding program for this?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Rumsfeld: The Chiefs and Services have looked hard at this.
There had not been a specific IOC or doctrine.
President Ford: Is there a military desirability for that doctrine? If no
doctrine is developed, how can there be a significant difference?
Dr. Wade: In the shipbuilding study which we briefed you on earlier, we
ORIGINAL
identified this as an add-on to the heavy carrier force. It would be an
add-on for the capital ships, not the carriers themselves. We are looking
into their use in theater warfare, anti-ship warfare, and as augmentation
for tactical aircraft. We have requested R&D money for this and we are
now focusing on this.
President Ford: It seems like such a vague concept -- to say it is
significantly different. George says it is different. I hear a lot of words,
but I see nothing in writing -- no concept.
General Brown: But in the January fallback position, we were limited to
25 ships.
Mr. Hyland: It was proposed in January.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The President asked distinction between the January
and February proposal.
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
SERALD FORD
TOP SECR SENSITIVE - XGDS
13
Secretary Kissinger: It was part of the five year Interim Agreement. You
said there was no way to have more than 25 ships through 1982.
General Brown: We said we had no program.
Secretary Kissinger: We were talking about through 1982, not 1985.
Dr. Lehman: Dr. Ikle feels that the most important impact is not military
but the flexibility and leverage for future negotiations on grey area systems,
and the freedom for theater deployments.
President Ford: This is confusing. The Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency is arguing military strategy.
Dr. Lehman: No. We feel the whole grey area cannot be settled in an
asymmetrical way.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Rumsfeld: If we look at this incrementally, if our goal is to get
a grip on systems like these, and specifically the Backfire, the theory is
that we made a decision to count the bombers with ALCMs in the 1320 limit
in an attempt to get a hold on the Backfire. And we have made other attempts
to get a hold on the Backfire. But as we look at the charts, we see that
pieces of our leverage are moving away. They have dissipated. Incrementally,
not any one piece is significant, but the cumulative effect is.
ORIGINAL
Secretary Kissinger: We have three basic prospects over the next 10 years.
We can have no agreement and the race starts at 2580 for the Soviets and
2150 for us. Cruise missiles and Backfire go unconstrained.
We could also stick with the February proposal for an aggregate of 2400.
ALCMs would be limited to 2500 kilometers. After 1979, my prediction
will be that SLCMs and Backfire will be unconstrained.
Under a reductions agreement, the aggregate would be 2150 or 2200. Backfire
would be unconstrained, but we would have assurances regarding the Backfire
ceiling and upgrading. ALCMs would be limited to the same as under the
February proposal. SLCMs would be limited to 600 kilometers for sub-
marines; and there would be something to be negotiated for surface-ship
SLCMs that could have a range as great as 2500 kilometers.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
LIBRARY
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
The difference between the proposals is that there would be unconstrained
submarine SLCMs, higher ceilings, unconstrained Backfire, and the
advent of unconstrained submarine SLCMs.
Dr. Lehman: In the reductions agreement, cruise missiles on submarine
go free?
Mr. Hyland: No. They would be banned above 600 kilometers and free up
to 2500 kilometers on surface-ships.
Secretary Kissinger: That won't be saleable. What will be saleable is having
the platforms counted as MIRVs. Running totally free will not be saleable.
General Brown: Cruise missiles on submarines are no great leverage on
ORIGINAL RETIRED PRESERVATION
the Soviets.
Secretary Rumsfeld: It seems to me that one side of the coin is that if it is
Declassified Photocopy from
fuzzy -- and it is -- doesn't that mean that the difference is not greater or
Gerald R. Ford Library
as fuzzy? The answer is yes. There is another way to look at it. We
are looking at US technology where we have a lead -- costs, adequacy,
utility. Therefore because we have a lead -- and this represents explosive
potential -- capping is great leverage. We can look at the cup as half
full or half empty. We must be very careful; we have a great lead and
we may be giving up what we lead in.
President Ford: We must be realistic in two areas. Senator Humphrey
has been calling for a ban on all development and testing of cruise
missiles. If he prevails, this takes away our lead.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Not really. Some would like to abolish the whole
Department of Defense, but we must fight it.
Secretary Kissinger: None of the limitations give up much in the way of
technology -- either January or February.
Secretary Rumsfeld: I am addressing the idea of concern. On one side
we have no full doctrine but on the other side is technology.
Secretary Kissinger: You would just be giving a little range, that's all.
General Brown: The only way we can tell the range of cruise missiles
is from what we see in testing.
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President Ford: As I read the opposition to Defense, if I were in
uniform I would be scared. We might well have fewer dollars in some
areas. I assume what they (the opponents) say they mean.
Secretary Rumsfeld: But no one around here assumes they will come into
power.
President Ford: Yes, but if we look at the overall picture, we must put
that into the formula.
General Brown: We are calling this matter exactly the way we see it --
no matter who comes into office -- it's not a matter of outcome of the
SERVATION
election.
President Ford: But we cannot be oblivious to this. Plus there is this
fuzziness, since, as Jim Wade mentioned, there is no doctrine for cruise
missiles.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
General Brown: Like Jim Wade says, it is the potential of these weapons
that holds the attraction. We must protect the potential in the interest
of the country.
Secretary Rumsfeld: There is an analogy, albeit an imperfect analogy.
ORIGINAL
There are those who contend that miniaturization and the accuracy it
can produce is a revolution that is as dramatic as that of atomic weapons.
If you transfer back to the days when we were thinking about developing
atomic weapons, if we had limited the ability to develop atomic weapons,
where would we be today? You take a guy like Admiral Noel Gaylor --
he makes the case that overhead and underwater detection systems would
permit us to vector out our cruise missiles.
President Ford: To where?
Secretary Rumsfeld: Enemy ships or submarines.
Secretary Kissinger: I think it goes a little too far to talk about cruise
missiles as being the same as nuclear weapons. Ballistic missiles
are accurate also, but it is no great advantage if cruise missiles get
there in five hours rather than 20 minutes. But I don't want to argue
against cruise missiles. I would be against anything that limits cruise
missiles in all modes. I am just talking about some range limits.
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Secretary Rumsfeld: But what do we get in return for it?
Secretary Kissinger: Two to three years ago we had an elegant discussion
on how we could not possibly live with a perceived inequality where the
Soviets would have 2580 versus our 2150 baseline.
Between the two options we have the following:
-- The February proposal would give us each 2400 and let SLCMs
on surface-ships and submarines go free.
-- The January proposal would give us 2200 or 2150, with a 600 kilo-
PRESERVATION
meter limit on SLCMs on submarines.
We are considering only 12 aircraft carriers now. We could have 50
platforms with cruise missiles additionally.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Rumsfeld: We have a desire to disperse our standoff capability.
Secretary Kissinger: In our desire to modify our forces, we must ask if
it is worth it. There is not that huge a difference between the January and
February proposals. In fact there is only a marginal difference.
President Ford: Assume it is 1985. In the interim period, we have had
the opportunity to proceed with research and development on surface-ship
SLCMs. But in the interim we have limited the range. But at the end of
the agreement we can do what we want with the range. We have no ship-
building program -- the earliest we could get ships is 1982 to 85.
We could be testing. We could be developing the concept in the hardware
so that we can have a breakthrough at the end of the agreement.
General Brown: I agree. We will have no new ships for SLCMs. But
we could initially equip our fleet with SLCMs through modification of
existing ships, for example by pulling off ASROC launchers.
President Ford: Do you see a need for surface SLCMs greater than
2500 kilometers?
General Brown: Not in the near term.
President Ford: Therefore you have no real program for these.
CERALD
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General Brown: It is all a concept.
Secretary Rumsfeld: We can use existing ships.
President Ford: That's not what Admiral Holloway said earlier.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Clements and Holloway went back after that earlier
meeting to look into this -- as you will recall I was not at that meeting.
I do not want to say that cruise missiles can't be touched; they already
have been touched.
We have had the same four basic proposals since last year. We have the
IRESERVATION
February proposal on the table. We should look at the Backfire -- we have
the working group and the CIA looking at this.
President Ford: How soon will we have a report on the Backfire?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Director Bush: September, but we don't expect community agreement.
Secretary Rumsfeld: How big a difference is there between the CIA and
the Air Force on the Backfire.
Director Bush: There is a strong opinion on the part of General Keegan,
the Air Force Director of Intelligence.
ORIGINAL
Mr. Hyland: There is a study by FTD (the Air Force Foreign Technology
Division).
Secretary Rumsfeld: And we have information on the SS-X-20.
President Ford: Do we have any more information on the TU-160
Soviet bomber?
Director Bush: Nothing more.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Do we have a timetable on the SS-X-20?
Director Bush: We have nothing on Backfire flights to the Azores, and
can't confirm the newspaper reports to this effect.
R.
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Brent Scowcroft: If we want a SALT Agreement we ought to look at
this in terms of its negotiability. The Soviets have given no indication
of pursuing the February proposal. Maybe they are just stalling. But
we might end up with no SALT if we do not work on something else.
Secretary Rumsfeld: All of us want SALT and we should go back to them.
But the question is to go back to them with what.
Brent Scowcroft: The Soviets to date say that they are not interested in
the February proposal. If this is true, then the difference is between
no SALT or approaching them with something negotiable.
President Ford: The Soviets feel that the February proposal is unacceptable.
If we don't change, we must face the prospect of having no SALT agreement.
Therefore we must either decide to modify our proposal or abandon SALT.
Secretary Kissinger: They are working around us in the intellectual com-
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
munity saying we should give up the B-1 and the TRIDENT.
Brent Scowcroft: And they say they would give up the TYPHOON and
TU-160.
President Ford: Thank you all.
ORIGINAL
R.
GERALD
FORD
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DOC
RECD
LOG NUMBER
MO
DA
MO
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HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
8
13
8
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7604609X
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSIATE
Boveries
UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT
SCOWCROFT
N
SECDEF
LOU
NO. FORN
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EYES ONLY
EXDIS
DAVIS
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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
STATE EXSEC
CODEWORD
OTHER
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SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: Menutes of the NSC mtg
30 Jul 1976
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION.
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
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DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS).
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA / UN
DATE
FROM
ORIGINAL
8/13
Suft
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STATUS
DUE,
CY TO
X
Oeciare SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
8/20
8/24
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
SERALD R. FORD
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IF
CRT ID:
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SPECIAL INDEXING:
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WH SA FP
CLOSE
PA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022