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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 8/9/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09228
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
NSC Meeting, 8/6/76
CREATION DATE
08/06/1976
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200037
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 8/9/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09229
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Richard Boverie
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
NSC Meeting on Strategic Stockpile
Policy, 8/6/76
CREATION DATE
08/05/1976
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200037
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 8/9/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09230
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
List
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Meeting Points - Stockpile
CREATION DATE
08/09/1976
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200037
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 8/9/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
[cass/9/76]
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
6508X
SECRET XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Friday, August , 1976
TIME:
11:00 a. m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
Strategic Stockpile
ESERVATION
Principals
The President
Acting Secretary of the State Philip C. Habib
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
Secretary of the Interior Thomas Kleppe
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James L. Holloway
The Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
The Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency Major General
Leslie Bray
Other Attendees
ORIGIN
Treasury:
George H. Dixon, Deputy Secretary
Commerce:
Leonard Matthews, Assistant Secretary for Domestic
and International Business
OMB:
Donald G. Ogilvie, Associate Director of the Office of
Management and Budget
CIEP:
William F. Gorog, Deputy Assistant to the President
for Economic Affairs
FPA Staff:
Lawrence Goldberg
White House:
Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
NSC Staff:
Colonel Richard T. Boverie
Major Edward R. Jayne II
SECRET XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12368 Sec. 3.6
LEVERIT GERALD ?
MR98-39, # 60; NSC letter 2/10/99
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION By ut NARA, Date 5/25/99
LIBRARY SERALD ? FORD
SECRET XGDS
2
President Ford:
Congratulations to those who put together the
strategic stockpile study. It is well done, and lays out problems and choices
for us here today. I see that there is some difference of opinion, and
that is not unusual. We have got to come up with something better and
we cannot just drift; it would not be good for the country. What we need is
a solution that is justifiable before the Congress. Brent, you have over-
seen the stockpile study. Would you please lay out the background and
issues for us?
General Scowcroft:
For 30 years, the US has maintained a stockpile
of certain strategic materials necessary for defense production and other
economic needs and for which sources of supply might be cut off in wartime.
SERVATION
The 1946 law concerning the stockpile gives us some leeway as to the over-
all size but does require that the stockpile protect basic national security
and economic needs should supplies be disrupted. In 1973, President
Nixon issued new guidance which reduced stockpile objectives from the
then current $4. 6 billion dollar inventory to approximately $700 million.
Declassified Photocopy from
A significant element of this guidance was the decision to base stockpile
Gerald R. Ford Library
planning on only a one-year supply of wartime requirements. Key Congress-
men, particularly Charlie Bennett, whose House Subcommittee handles
stockpile legislation, felt that this policy could harm national security and
has refused to act on any legislation for disposal from the stockpile. For
three years, we have attempted to win interim approval from Congress to
dispose of those portions of the stockpile that have been deemed surplus
under even the most conservative criteria. In every instance, Bennett has
ORIGINAL
refused to consider our bills pending some Presidential revision of stock-
pile guidance away from the 1973 guidelines and toward more traditional
planning assumptions. Based upon this, Mr. President, you asked us
last year to conduct a comprehensive interagency review of stockpile policy.
That study effort has involved two parts: first, a review of our overall
strategic stockpile policy requirements and assumptions; and secondly,
procedures for the management of that stockpile to include the annual plan-
ning process for acquisitions and disposals of various materials. The 1946
stockpile law mandates that all acquisitions and disposals be made so as
not to cause market disruptions. Our study's review of the 93 commodities
involved in current stockpile planning concludes that none is in such a critical
state as to require disruption of the market in either acquisitions or disposals.
President Ford:
Six or eight years ago a program was developed to
get rid of aluminum phased over five years or so. Where is that now?
General Bray:
That is completed now and we reached agreement with
the producers as to appropriate stockpile levels.
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET XGDS
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
SECRET XGDS
3
President Ford:
Do we have a surplus of aluminum now? I see
deficits listed for a number of materials.
General Bray:
We could need aluminum and/or bauxite ore,
depending upon the options elected.
General Scowcroft:
The participating agencies have split in their
views on the kind of guidance which should frame a new strategic stock-
pile policy. There are three key assumptions which determine the general
stockpile level: (1) the type and scope of war postulated; (2) the number
of years worth of stockpile to be held; and (3) the extent which the stock-
pile provides for civilian economic needs in addition to military require-
ments. Additionally, we need to examine the impact of alternative
PRESERVATION
assumptions for mobilization warning time because these influence stock-
pile levels. Agency differences on these assumptions have led to develop-
ment of five options -- three of which seem relevant for our further
examination and discussion here.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
As we review these options, we should keep two things in mind: First,
we need to adopt realistic guidelines for a policy which provides for our
national security at acceptable cost. Secondly, our new policy must
abide by the statutes and at the same time, generate Congressional
cooperation for action on our backlog of stockpile legislation. We need
to get the Congress on board and proceed with implementing the new policy.
ORIGINAL
I would like to ask General Leslie Bray to briefly review for us the assump-
tions, values, and costs associated with the various options.
General Bray:
As the interagency group completed the stockpile
study, there were two major agreed conclusions. First, that the current
stockpile does not meet our needs under any options or assumptions con-
cerning future military and economic requirements. Over 95% of the
stockpile was purchased prior to 1960 and since that time, we have been
primarily in a disposal mode, selling off older materials as changing
technology and requirements have made them obsolete. The second major
conclusion is that the planning mechanism is too rigid. Since 1973, it is
apparent that stockpile requirements have changed and that the objectives
set at that time are in need of review and reassessment. In short, we
need a more dynamic planning process.
In the study, such a planning process is recommended. It includes a
Presidential review every four years or sooner, continual update of data,
as new information becomes available, and an annual material plan in
SECRET XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
rono COMPANY
SECTION XGDS
4
which all acquisitions and disposals will be developed based upon current
economic factors, political requirements, national security inputs, market
considerations, and other factors. These would be developed by an inter-
agency review group and forwarded to the President for inclusion in the
annual budget.
Let me now describe the three major issues and the alternatives developed
for each issue which make up the options before us today. The major issue
involves the type of war upon which planning assumptions are built. We
postulated two major war scenarios. The first is a major two-front war
in Europe and Asia or a major one-front war with significant forces rede-
ployed from elsewhere in the world to support that effort. We have called
this "Level I" mobilization. The second option involves a one-front war
on a smaller scale with no redeployment, and we call this "Level II"
mobilization. It is important to point out that neither of these options
constitutes an all-out World War II-type conflict in which we would build
everything we could produce in terms of military equipment.
For example, in both Level I and Level II mobilization, we plan to equip
Army divisions in much the same way as current divisions are equipped;
in other words, with a mix of infantry in armor rather than simply pro-
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
duce as many infantry divisions as possible. The total manpower involved
for either of these two levels of warfare is not the five, terl, or fifteen
million men under arms postulated in early stages of the stockpile study.
The balanced force concept, i. e., the idea of equipping forces in the same
mix of sophisticated support and armor equipment as found in the current
force structure, limits us to 4. 2 million men in Level I and 3.8 million
for Level II.
ORIGINAL
The second major issue over which there was disagreement in the stockpile
study and which significantly influences the nature of the stockpile, in-
volves the amount of warning time assumed for various war scenarios.
In other words, d oes M-Day -- the day on which mobilization starts --
occur simultaneously with the beginning of hostilities or does warning
allow mobilization to begin earlier. We used two cases -- a zero warning
and a one-year warning. The impact on stockpile levels works somewhat
differently than one might imagine. The one-year warning assumption is
the more conservative, as it increases the industrial base and stockpile
requirements. The zero warning situation is less conservative and derives
stockpile requirements based only upon the existing industrial capacity.
The third major issue involves the degree to which the stockpile pro-
vides for civilian economic requirements in addition to military ones.
Within the stockpile model, we have already imposed certain austerity
conditions. We have cut the basic standard of living by approximately
10%; we have reduced consumer durable production by 50% and housing
construction by 75%; and have increased investments in industry by
20%. Having introduced this level of austerity on the economy, we have
then calculated two categories of civilian economic requirement HSFORD
SECRET XGDS
LISEARY GERALD
SECRET XGDS
5
The first category, called the "Essential Civilian, " involves those
materials and products which are more directly relevant to the war
effort and which are less substitutable in their production by using non-
strategic materials. The "General Civilian" category includes items
which, while they are essential to the civilian economy, are less directly
relevant to the war effort and which can in certain cases be produced with
substitutable materials. These three factors significantly influence the
nature of the options which we have developed.
A fourth factor, involving how long a war we ought to plan for, was con-
sidered at some length. Planning assumptions in this area have varied
historically from five years to three years and now, under our 1973
NOILL
stockpile guidance, one year. Each of the options presented in the study
includes planning for a three-year supply of stockpile requirements.
[General Bray then presented a chart which displayed the options and
assumptions and gave the values in dollar terms for Options A, B, C,
D, and E. These range from a high of $10. 2 billion dollars for Option A
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
to a low $2. 5 billion dollars for Option E.]
President Ford:
What is the current value of the stockpile?
General Bray:
We currently have an inventory of about $7 billion
dollars. The increase from $4. 6 billion dollars to $7 billion dollars from
1973 to today is simply the influence of inflation and increases in the value
ORIGINAL
of various of materials.
President Ford:
Are those other prices at current cost also?
General Bray:
Yes. The $10. 2 billion, etc., equates to the current
$7 billion. But it should be remembered that for any option, what we
are talking about are long-term figures. For example, Opation A would
take over 15 years to acquire and all the variables, including cost, would
change.
[General Bray then presented a chart on shorter range implications over
the next five years for the various options. ]
General Bray:
This chart shows how portions of current inventories
apply to the various options' goals. It illustrates the potential acqusitions
and disposals for five years, using only the criteria of market impact in
deciding on these levels. In other words, this chart does not include any
SECRET XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET XGDS
6
fiscal constraint on annual acquisitions. It indicates the potential
inventory sizes and values which might be obtained after the first five
years of policy implementation. For any of the options, it would be a
better stockpile than what we have now one which would be more
responsive to national security needs.
For the first five years, you can see that there is not that much difference
between the five options. There are other considerations which are worth
noting and which we address indirectly in the stockpile study. The first
involves use of the stockpile as a hedge against future changes or supply
in requirements. We have not included assistance to our allies in our
planning, but is is apparent that the stockpile could be used for that purpose
and can be useful against any peacetime economic embargos of materials
contained in the stockpile. The presence of such supply could itself deter
nations from attempting such embargos.
Let me add a note about the Congress. I have tried to keep the Congress
abreast on the course of the study. I have briefed Congressman Bennett
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
on this. He thought the study was extremely good and asked me to tell
you, Mr. President, that he supported level I mobilization and the con-
cept of supplying both Essential and General Civilian requirements.
Since we have taken austerity steps, and since the law mandates that the
basic health of the economy may be maintained, Bennett also indicated
that he felt we needed three-years supply. Putting all of this together,
Bennett concluded that he could go with either Option A or B.
OR'GINAL
Secretary Kleppe:
In computing stockpile size, have you considered
the domestic production?
General Bray:
Yes, Sir.
Secretary Kleppe:
For example, we are going to get our own nickel
supplies, but now we import.
General Bray:
Yes. As soon as we get new sources, we include
changes to those objectives.
Secretary Kleppe:
Concerning Bennett's insistence on both the Essential
and General Civilian categories, is that basically necessary? Why?
General Bray:
I support that; it is not a pure guns and butter
economy. For example, the 10% reduction in standard of living and 50%
SECRET XGDS
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET XGDS
7
cut in consumer durables has a significant impact on automobiles. They
would be reduced under these two cuts to 45% of current production.
This 45% of current production falls in the General Civilian category,
while trucks and heavy vehicles are in the Defense and Essential Civilian
categories. Therefore, to cut General Civilian would include cutting out
all commercial automobile production.
Secretary Kleppe:
But everything in the auto is produced domestically.
Would these domestic things be affected by the Essential Civilian and
General Civilian categories?
General Bray:
No. Only in the first -- the austerity reductions.
The stockpile is only for shortfalls due to foreign cutoffs of supply.
Secretary Kleppe:
I'm trying to figure how to judge between $7. 3
billion and $4. 5 billion.
President Ford:
Autos average 10 million per year; 10% off that
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
gives 9; then a 50% shift from consumer military production would give
you four and a half million. Where do you get your trucks and other
vehicles?
General Bray:
These are all in the Essential Civilian category,
while passenger cars are all in the General Civilian. Passenger cars
would have much more substitution.
Mr. Ogilvie:
Did you take any case study like autos? Do we
know how many autos we could produce?
President Ford:
If you went with Option A, how close are we to
having the necessary legislation to go to the Congress?
General Bray:
We would convene immediately the first Annual
Materiel Plan to go into the FY 1978 budget, and we would consider
fiscal constraints, market impact, and other factors. This budget pro-
posal would be submitted in time to be included in this year's legislative
process.
President Ford:
Both for 1976 and 1977, did we recommend disposals?
SECRET XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
SECRETXGDS
8
General Bray:
These were primarily disposals with only minor
acquisitions. Bennett wants to be satisfied that we have a plan for new
acquisitions before he agrees to disposals. Bennett will not dispose of
any materials until he has our proposal for further acquisitions.
Secretary Clements:
My first experience goes back three years,
when OMB and Fred Malik were involved. Bennett has not changed one
bit, and that fundamental building block -- our policy as to what to do,
where to go, and how to get there on the stockpile -- must be changed.
It is clear to Bennett that a three-year stockpile also means supply and
resupply for that kind of war; that means ships. The basic premise of
the three-year supply supports this, and the rest are almost details once
the basic decision is made.
ESERVATION
President Ford:
What is now before the Congress?
General Bray:
We cannot by law dispose of anything without
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Congressional approval.
President Ford:
What items have we currently proposed?
General Bray:
Tin, antimony, silver, and a few other minor
items. Bennett agrees with this proposal but refuses to act without the
new guidance cited by Mr. Clements.
ORIGINAL
Mr. Ogilvie:
There were a series of options in last year's
budget which included the current disposal bill. Everyone felt that this
was a fairly rational approach at the time.
Secretary Clements:
Not me; we would have the same problems
with something around Option E.
General Bray:
He (Bennett) prefers A or B.
General Scowcroft:
The basic agency differences involved assump-
tions about mobilization and the question of whether to include only the
Essential Civilian category or the General Civilian category also. Most
agencies support Option A or, perhaps, B while others support E.
Secretary Clements:
Brent is right. The options make a difference
only in the long term. It just isn't going to happen that quickly and over the
SECRET XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY SERALD
SECRET XGDS
9
first five years, the impact just isn't that great. As you update as you
should, the program will change. I really don't attach that much difference
between the options now.
General Scowcroft:
I agree, and the Annual Material Plan lets us
keep track each year and modify our objectives when necessary.
Mr. Cheney:
What is the rationale for the one-year mobilization
warning?
General Bray:
In developing the stockpile model, we had to go
beyond three or six months to actually change the industrial base.
ESERVATION
Secretary Clements: Remember that warning would also bear on indica-
tors. We may have some general warning which would allow us to begin
to mobilize.
Mr. Gorog:
Stockpile planning ought to be compatible with our
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
other defense planning. How close are they?
Secretary Clements: We are taking a new hard look at our overall DOD
planning, and a serious issue within that relook is that of NATO warning
time and mobilization.
Mr. Ogilvie:
We have not looked at this issue since 1969 in
ORIGINA
NSSM 3. We are concerned in OMB that the new assumptions in the
Stockpile Study go opposite of our new look -- twelve months versus thirty
days warning, three-year war versus one year or less. General Hollingsworth
has recently argued that warning time will be much shorter. I see this
stockpile issue taking our policy in two different ways.
General Scowcroft:
Military planning and legislative realities have to
come together. All the options have three years supply, in response to
Bennett. He doesn't understand the current one-year supply assumption.
It is for the first year of a war; after that we can do other things.
President Ford:
Superficially, would it be hard to explain why
these are different? Admiral?
Admiral Holloway:
The 23-day warning is so firm that you are moving
troops, issuing ammunition, etc. This is operational warning. Warning
for a year implies a deteriorating international situation, where things are
coming apart. We start gearing up then, while the other shorter warning
(23/30 days) is really active pre-fighting.
SECRET XGDS
FORD i 03RALD LIBRARY
GENAL FORD LIBRARY
SECRET XGDS
10
Secretary Clements:
The three-year problem involves much
more -- scarcity, accessibility. Don (Ogilvie) is looking at the three
years differently.
Mr. Ogilvie:
But one year would let you do things regarding
deployment, like airlift and sealift and Guard and Reserve enhancement,
that we don't now plan to do. It's a problem of justification.
General Scowcroft:
We don't plan as to the length of time of a
war. Also, remember the embargo.
Secretary Kleppe:
Another factor is that an error concerning
the stockpile ought to be made on the side of a larger supply. While this
could be costly for other kinds of purchases, the opposite is true for the
stockpile it is increasing in value. There is no inconsistency, and it is
left up to DOD to show how these fit together.
President Ford:
Declassified Photocopy from
If we send A or B, would Bennett probably
Gerald R. Ford Library
approve it this year?
General Bray:
Yes, he does have a pet project, his stock-
pile revolving fund. He changed the bill last Friday to combine the four
materials, and called for all these specific receipts to be applied to
acquisitions. He wants to hold on to the aggregate value of the stockpile,
to ensure that it works toward a goal and principals with which he agrees.
ORIGINAL
Without agreement on the fundamentals, he will continue the impasse.
Secretary Clements:
Bennett points out the increased threat to
our sealanes, our lines of communication, This all makes the stockpile
more critical.
General Bray:
Our study has led us to use variable factors.
We use differing assumptions about shipping losses for the three categories
of Defense, Essential Civilian, and General Civilian needs. We used
variable assumptions. [Shows chart on tiers and priorities associated with
each of the options, and shows the similarity in short-term costs and trans-
actions for the various options.
Secretary Clements:
That's different from what you would need in
a war if it started.
FORD LIBRARY
SECRET XGDS
GERALD FORD Janast
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11
President Ford:
How different would an Option A or B Annual
Materiel Plan be from our current FY 1977 budget request?
General Bray:
Both would involve significant new acquisitions
and disposals for FY 1978, within market and budgetary constraints, but
these would differ from current plans because those options involve moving
toward new objectives.
President Ford:
Could you also provide for FY 1977 supplemental
acquisitions?
General Bray:
Yes.
Secretary Clements: Exactly. Bennett and others would look favorably on
that. A revolving fund would not help the budget problem.
President Ford:
Without making a final decision, we ought to pre-
Declassified Photocopy from
pare a proposed supplemental acquisitions package for FY 1977. If we can
Gerald R. Ford Library
talk him (Bennett) out of the trust fund
Mr. Ogilvie:
He is still on the trust fund, but only on a yearly
basis.
General Bray:
Bennett's concern is that there is no linkage between
acquisitions and disposals. The nature of the Appropriations Committee is
ORIGINAL
that there won't be support for acquisition appropirations, while he (Bennett)
can dispose. He doesn't want to fritter away the stockpile; that's why he
wants the fund, to tie the two. His staff sees possibilities to do it on a
yearly basis, with a refund to the Treasury if not used for acquisitions.
This would skirt the normal appropriations process.
President Ford:
They wouldn't like that in the Appropriations
Committees. If we go with options A or B, then it doesn't make any sense
to wait for 1978. We would need to do it now for FY 1977, which hasn't
even started yet. Let's concentrate on 1977 right now.
General Bray:
Should you decide to go forward, we could get the
agencies together this week, and could develop an FY 1977 acquisition
supplemental within ten days to two weeks.
Secretary Habib:
We continue to be concerned about possible market
disruption, particularly internationally.
SECRET XGDS
NUMFIT GERALD ? FORD
FORD is LIDRARY
SECRET XGDS
12
General Bray:
We can look at this year's disposals, add to them,
and as a matter of priority, work the acquisition first and other disposals
next.
President Ford:
We need to get some action this year.
General Bray:
We would have to look at it more closely on additional
disposals.
President Ford:
Let's do the acquisition first and the disposals second
and see if Bennett will cooperate.
General Bray:
Bennett and the Senate staff will hold hearings soon.
Secretary Clements:
This would be a good step forward.
ORIGINAL RETIRST RESERVATION
President Ford:
Thank you very much.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
SEMALE FORD LIBRARY
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6508X
SECRET/XGDS
December 15, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davi and
SUBJECT:
Minutes of the NSC Meeting
Held on August 9, 1976
Attached a re the minutes of the National Security Council meeting
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
held on August 9, 1976 to discuss Strategic Stockpile.
Attachment
ORIGINAL
cc: William G. Hyland
Gen. Richard Boverie
SECRET/XGDS (3)
let 2/98
OFFICE / LIBRARY 070030
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD