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This file contains mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
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1552564
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March 3, 1973 - Kissinger, Elliot Richardson
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1552564
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March 3, 1973 - Kissinger, Elliot Richardson
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This file contains mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Europe
China
Vietnam (Republic)
Arms control
Arms transfers
Foreign aid
National security
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United States-Soviet relations
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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1973-03-03
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1973
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1973-03-03
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3
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1973
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Secretary Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Daniel Murphy, Military Assistant to
Secretary Richardson
DATE AND TIME:
Saturday, March 3, 1973
8:30 a. m. - (Breakfast)
PLACE:
The Pentagon
SUBJECTS:
Richardson testimony; NSSM's; MBFR; SALT;
China; Vietnam
Richardson: What about my testimony?
Kissinger: You don't have to orate on the State of the World. Just say
you will review the DOD business.
Youcanput out a purely defense report.
Richardson: I have to testify March 20 to Mahon.
NSC Br.Cula MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Deview 3/8/04
Kissinger: We will give you our views by the middle of next week.
Richardson: What about NSSM's? We do a lot of studies.
NARA, DATE 3/30/04
Kissinger: The fact that there is a DOD study can't preclude a NSC study.
Richardson: I just wanted to demonstrate that I was getting things going.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
CLASSIFIED BY
Henry Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
GERILD R FORD LIBHARY
SCHEDULE OF ENFOUTIVE ORDER 11652
FT
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 5 Imp to Det
EXEMPT ION CATECORY
B (3)
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 2 -
Kissinger: We are now free to put out NSSMs?
Richardson: We are not interested in Systems Acquisition and Man-
power; but we will go on Security Assistance, etc.
Kissinger: I will show the draft NSSMs to Murphy. Keep it among
the four of US.
The Europeans are sabotaging MBFR on the grounds that we have a
private deal with the Soviet Union. Our deal was only on the timing.
I think it's better to have Hungary out than Italy in.
We need some DOD proposals on how to handle the substance.
The military's proposals will be formalistic. Symmetrical cuts all
leave us weaker. Asymmetrical cuts are better, we in the areas they
fear most and vice versa.
We need to develop some concrete proposals. We need a comprehensive
study on what our alternatives area. Not a vague set of platitudes.
There are incongruities in NATO which we can't continue to live with-
for example, the level of supplies, both in US internal levels and within
NATO.
(Long discussion)
We should use MBFR to educate the Europeans.
I will put high priority on MBFR. We must be careful in articulating
to Europe. McNamara just scared them with raising doubts about using
nuclear weapons.
Some of the SALT proposals are childish. The Soviet Union will demand
a quid pro quo. We must be serious about what we are willing to give up.
We could go to a 2500 ceiling. That would just ratify the present -- which
may be what we want.
Richardson: The big problem is what we want more.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
3
The objective of forestalling MIRV might jeopardize a longer-range
solution on numbers and throw weight which could include big
missiles on our side.
One option is to freeze at the current equivalencies--ou MIRV
advantage and their throw weight advantage.
But from here it is harder to see how you would move from here to
reductions on both sides.
Kissinger: The question is that with MIRV, a first strike has tremendous
advantage.
You don't ease the problem by leeting warheads run free and hoping for
reductions. The real problem is the gap between first and second strike
capability.
Richardson: The key question is where to move. What is it we most
want restricted? It would be to our advantage if the Soviet big missiles
were not MIRVed. But what could we realistically pay? Nothing except
that ten years ago each side took its own path of development and we now
are equivalent and should stop there.
This is the Rush position.
Kissinger: There are many possibilities. Rush wants a freeze while
something else is being negotiated. The Soviet Union won't go that route--
we have to give up something. I can believe in a position which would
balance off throw weight and MIRVs. The Soviet Union might do this,
but they won't buy this plus unrestricted US technological development
while they are frozen. We couldn't go on to Trident, etc., while they
are frozen.
Richardson: There are two courses. This freeze, and one which would
establish a limit on numbers and throw weight, with phased reductions
over time.
The disadvantage is it ratifies the Soviet advantage in throw weight and
permits them to MIRV. Congress wouldn't let us catch up.
But over the long term, it would keep the balance within limit, and let
us over the long term determine which are the better systems.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4
Kissinger: I don't follow. Freedom to mix could go with any option.
It is a separate question.
Richardson: But freedom to mix would permit us to retire one bomber
and build a big missile.
Kissinger: This makes sense only if we have decided this switch is
desirable on other grounds.
Even if we go this route, it could be dangerous because it could give
a first strike advantage.
If both sides have one invulnerable element, what difference does
it make if you have a vulnerable element?
We haven't even analyzed what it is about Minuteman vulnerability which
bothers us.
Richardson: We must also consider what Congress would let us do.
Kissinger: Without ABM and MIRV we would be dead in SALT. The
military told us they couldn't produce a new sub before 1979, so we had
nothing but a bluff base.
Unless we have some programs to offer, we are at a big disadvantage.
It has become axiomatic that we must be calm, cool, and collected.
It's true, perhaps with the Soviet Union, but it's not true about the
Chinese.
In June I went to China and Chou started talking about Laird talking
about force improvements. I started to apologize, and he said Laird
was great in this respect. He said this last time that he was sorry
Laird left because he understood.
If McGovern had won, the Chinese would have been wild opponents. Chou
wanted me to take care of Japan, visit them on an equal basis for face,
and not make them mad.
So remember when you make a defense statement, the Chinese have a
vested interest in our strength.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
5
They don't want us out of Asia. They will give us problems only if
they think we are on the run. They can play with us or capture the left
wing of the world Communist movement and force the Soviet Union into
a contest against us.
The Chinese have a vested interest in a strong US defense posture.
Vietnam: (Discussion of infiltration and how to stop it. )
Richardson: You sent a draft State/Defense cable to me to protest
some of the GVN violations.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
Seey Ribardson 3 mare
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
sat, 3 mar 13
8:30 AM
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we will crimer DOD
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R we not interested me Sy aug
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DECLARCIFIED
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, E.O. 12968, STATE SEC. DEPT. 3.5 GUIDELINES state liview 3/8/04
BY. Cala
, NARA, DATE 3/30/04
& FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MBFR.
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on generals are have apriate dial N/SC.
Due dial and only on tring.
Better $ hand Hunga on ant Than
state in.
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in areas - thing from mosts his was
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Fille wed to divelop some consult
perponals. Zhele imprehensive stridg on
what own attention are. hrt a
congui nit of platitude
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
K- Then are encongointes in NATO
which and can't apritive to him w/
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US internal livels liveloper/in NATO
& hong Tack
K we should we MBFR K elercati
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2 anice pnt togh priorts OWBER
or 1 must lu careful in articipating
A E enry- - inchomance just
Iconed then w/dnuts atmt
using mico
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SALT
Sour SA withish . Ther
we section allows artent we are
SU most will to demand pand fri gue.
we cauld go 25000 easy - that
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raty what me the wont present- which may he
R-Bij proten is what wy want more.
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proferding larger sange substion
on # F than winght which could
instruct big mussib nom side.
R-O-O- option is to freeze at excent
Cam MIRU aimitary
Their then enight
But prom here it ishander 5 see
how you would more from here
to realn time on both siles
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
K- Question is that w/mirv,a
pirt stube has Tremindors
advantages.
you clant the C problem by letty
worling rum free + hoping for reductions
The capability. mal firtherse ise gy hit 1+2 + shike
R- Kiy granstion 11 where & invoice inve
what is it me most want restricted
Would be & am advantage if Soo big
missike were them not MIR val. But
what could me realistically you?
northing except that 10 yes ago each
hide look its own poth of dipot &
we woware a should
stop their.
BERATO
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
RR- This Rush posets
K- These are wrong possibility Rush
contents a fruize while something
else thing wgohnt So writgo that
inite - and have & find up something
your I corn behave in a position which
could balance off & MIRVO
Su any dectio, ant They writ my this
phis mistributed us tab disput while
they che program. we couldn't given at
to Frident, etc, while They are frager.
R- There are 2 emerges. This + one
which crimid astablish limit on
# + theme anight w/ phould
reductions own trink
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
R-T he is it ratifies
Sow alwantage m chrm and The
& punnits their to FNICKV, cargoles
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separate prestin
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whis misile one hower + build a ling
K This makes sends only if me have
devised THE This switch is
discraple an other grounds.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
K. From E-wn if me go This
site, it cauld he Greenal
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K- If buth siles home owe invelvested
element, what difference class it
note element if you have at vululvable
are handwrt am men what it
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R- w We verst also crusider what Camples
crimid let no do.
K- w/o ABMLY MIRV one would he
diad in SALT
the they envident product
a nin- side, types 79, -21 are,
had nothing but a Huff here.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
(Anders Line hand 78ml programs
to offer, and are at tig
-
K-91 has become axionsic That
and must he calm Carl,
True, purchases w/su, we - that
about Chrise.
in June 2 went 5 China + Chon
started taking atmt haird talking
almot improvement D started
&
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apring vze, he said hand was
lest time jury hand left becomes
he in instruction
if me Green had won, Chinse
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
comed ham hun wild of points.
Chan wanted me to take call of
Japan, insit then in lpad
basis meck. for face, q not make then
so when you make
a defener statement, the Chince
art have a restrol interest in our
strength.
They and arount us ant of asia.
they will give us problems only
if They Think and are an c sern.
They can play w/w or expture
C left wing & Great novement
+ the SU into contist of must
us.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Changel have a wathout interest
in a strong us defense posture,
VN
- Discussire of + hm
to stry it.
R- - sent a State/Dep CAME me for to
parther some & fe & UN G instations