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1552602
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August 3, 1973 - Kissinger, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
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1552602
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document
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August 3, 1973 - Kissinger, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Europe
China
Israel
Japan
Soviet Union
Department of Justice. Watergate Special Prosecution Force. 5/25/1973-6/20/1977
Middle East conflicts
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1973-08-03
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1973
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3
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1973-08-03
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8
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1973
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
PFIAB
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DATE & TIME:
Friday, August 3, 1973
12:30 p.m. (Luncheon)
PLACE:
The Sequoia
Kissinger: Jack Anderson writes implying that not everything the Board
does goes to the President. Every report of the Board does go to the
President. Don't judge your influence by the frequency of meeting with
us.
*
I think what is going on is an unmitigated disaster in foreign policy. In
April our foreign policy was in excellent shape. The Chinese-Soviet
triangle was operating for us. Everyone wanted to be associated with
us. Now people are holding off. It is nothing bad yet, but sometimes
someone will make a run at us. We have established a reputation for
hard and unpredictable action,
There are two choices -- use force or don't. If we use it, use enough to
succeed. In the India crisis, we move things -- carriers -- around SO
NSC 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINE state 3/8/04
people would say "If they do this over Bangladesh, what would they do
over the Middle East?"
In 1970 we were to the brink of war over Jordan without a complaint from
NARA DATE 8/3/04
Congress.
It's in this way that Watergate is a disaster. Everything is a little harder
now and takes a little longer now -- Europe, China, etc. All but the USSR.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
It is a national obligation to get Watergate behind us so we can be seen as
an operating government. Nothing yet has really gone wrong -- I am talking
about the potential.
CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF ENECUTIVE ORDER 11652
5 (B) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det.
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
BY
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 2 -
We must get over Watergate. I speak without prejudice to the facts of
it.
Internationally, the big fact is the Sino-Soviet involvement. We have so
far pushed the Chinese as a sentimental thing, but let's not kid ourselves:
China wants us as a counte::weight to the Soviet Union. It is a pleasure to
do business with them. They are tough, they're our best NATO ally! But
if they think we are going through our cultural resolution, they won't even
run the ideological risk of being tied up with us. They are not sentimental.
A successful Soviet attack on China would overturn the world balance of
power. If it is a disarming attack to which we don't respond, if they
couple it with seizing Manchuria, the effect on Europe and Japan would
be disastrous. We will try to avert this.
It is alleged we have antagonized Japan by neglect, etc. It would be easy
if that were so, because we could correct it. They are hard to deal with.
They leak everything. You must assume that a country which (through
intelligence) fears the most diabolical things of others, must be capable
of diabolical things themselves. The Japanese are a potentially corrosive
role internationally. Take energy. They are international scavengers.
It is a narrow, cold-blooded, etc. But they are tuned to survival, so as
long as the international structure is favorable, they are okay. Only. if
things go wrong will they desert.
Europe: They accuse us of condominium, of hegemony, of weakening the
deterrent, of asking for their buildup.
The danger is that relations with adversaries become easy and those with
friends acrimonious.
Also the emergence of the EC is creating some problems. There is a
danger they'll push themselves into confrontation with the US.
The Middle East: Israel is so much stronger that the dilemma is on the
Arabs. Right now Israel is asking for their immediate surrender, and
the Arabs are asking for a miracle. We want to help, but we will not put
out a plan for both to shoot at. We are trying to get both sides, or one side,
to put out something which will get negotiations going.
A
: What is the Soviet attitude toward China?
Land: If we are out, would Japan jump to the Soviet Union or to China?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 3 -
Kissinger: A year ago I would have said China, now perhaps the Soviet
Union. It depends on the timing.
Teller: What will happen after August 15?
Kissinger: We had a negotiation going. The Chinese and Sihanouk must
be as upset with the bombing halt as we are. (Gave pitch on the situation.)
I came out in January thinking we had won the war. In June, it was very
different. We only had to keep Cambodia confused, so nothing could
crystallize.
If China does nothing after a Soviet surgical strike, China is irrelevant;
if they attack Russia, they will lose several armies.
I have given you the problems we face. On the other hand, we can make
it tough on the Soviet Union and make them hesitate on China. We are
pushing them in the Middle East; in Europe there may be confrontation
but it will come out all right.
A
: Why has Europe not supported us in the Middle East?
Kissinger: The maximum we can get out of Israel will be less than the
radical Arabs want, so we should make Syria sign it. Don't bring Saudi
Arabia in.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
call Reeton 8:30 HAKOVACE
laber front may enliss validian
THE WASHINGTON WHITE HOUSE HAKIPFIAB
2nty 3 any 73
K- Andman with english that not
anything bend closs gre tPrs.
Every sport of hand ders go 5PMs.
Dont with goodge befores by frequency my
Ittrich what is going on is inventigated
drester MFP
In april FPerax in epecident shays. PRC USSR
s crass schoting for no, every one wanted
K he associated us(no. how people and
someone which mumber me at Ms.
helding off- wothing food Let Unit dometime
we have istabhshes a irportation for hand &
impreshable active There and 2 choices - use
fored Rdmt, of use it, use enough
In India cwain, we more trings (earsing)
B-D, what would thrycle our ME
around 00 prink would sm if they do this can
In 1970 me more to - himh fivar own Curtomer
w/o complaint fromling.
is a with handle how Tabes a little longle
gi is thirapy watryati is disaster, Everything
now -E use for, Union, etc. all hat USSR
It is get waty wh behind
ns to me cm be sun on operating govt.
wrtning yet hrs really gone may- Ian
teching portntial.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 3/8/04
BY We
NAPA DATE 8/3/04
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
we must get am cv. a (w 2 speak w/o
preparties to C fatsfits
2nth, C big factions sho-sore involved
We have 20 for purshe I China 00 sentimental
thing, but dont kid- - China write no
or
Phose I do business them. They and
tomps one but A ATO ally etc.
But ifthing which we gon Then one
enotherl revelution, Chey and um
are not sention th
c into nick of they the by or/ us. They
a sectionsful Sclattack on PRC would
world BP. If disaring attack
teachish one dnit uspond, in emple it
of discribus, serzing merchinda, we W will upit on E nups form
they 5 - anot this
It is allerged w/ham antagonzed Jaym by
reglist, etc. Fory if that were so, comple
arkand donset Nt.
They one hand K dial w/they leak everything
you inst crossine that a county which (them
flors the must diatribul things
chimselves. forturs, wast be capable of chabolical Thing
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Jomere AM 6 potentially everyone make
brother inthy.
1
Tike energy they are world scarengly. It
is homan, and bloodhel, etr.
Bear they an has tuned h services, 20 as
long as intl structure is for in ok.
only if things wrong will they disert,
Europe - They accuse of washington, of
fr
beginning 1 making determs, of orking
Danager is that Wathon /adversams beeness
lary + there orl friends acriuming.
also everyence of EC is eventring tane
publics componition danger w/us
ME - Irral so much stronges that
is on arabs.
Regatemas Issuel asking for emendition
fraunds, + anaba asking univer
w - want to help, but not protent or plan
for both A short at.
w & Enging to get with or one to put ant
A. what SRO attitude toward China
which will get vegative giving
:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ant, cremit Japon jump to SUOLPRO
K- a year ago would have said FRO, uner
prohaps SU. organis on thing.
Teller- what will buygen often ,Jam,
K- & we had a Chinuse
Schmols unst he as upsit w/ tranking holt
as us
(Gence petson on setuation)
2 came and in Junuary thinking he had
we am c arm. In June, very different
onh had I by comberting so
writing would crystabil.
K- of Chaine dro withing Thra singlial strike,
will China virekout, if they attach Russia They
loss several overms armies.
Havezinemyon protections and force. on other
hand, the com mothit tough on sut
chan make them hasitate on China, are purshing
and why E mo not say part us in ME
unformation, - int will coome ant arthight
m ME; in E wege my be
R mary we cando Pr yst onth Issuel will he less
Them reduct anals wont so the should
unafor Syria sign it, dont hing Sanch in