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October 2, 1973 - Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer
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October 2, 1973 - Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer
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This file contains mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
AUTHORITY ISCAP Paul 2009-018;01
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
BY del NARA, DATE 1/5/11
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William Colby, Director Central Intelligence
Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, October 2, 1973
1:15 - 2:55 p.m. [Luncheon]
PLACE:
The Secretary's Office
Department of State
Kissinger: The purpose of this meeting is to talk candidly. I will tell you
what I plan -- I hope you will do likewise. We will use the machinery, but
it is useful to exchange views. Anyone here has the option of saying some-
thing here only and it won't go to the State Department. Otherwise, I may
tell Rush and you can tell Clements.
Schlesinger: We can't have people telling Congress how we are handling it.
Kissinger: Maybe you should begin.
Schlesinger: We can move 20-50 thousand tons from Laos. We have MASF
there. We are moving forces out and we will discuss ammunition in excess
of Laos needs.
There is money in the Air Force to fund F-5As which was cut from the
budget. Stennis will get that restored in conference -- that is free money.
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 56 1-3
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. TO dET.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
The Thais want OV-10s. The Thais have ammunition. We can swap,
but we need a swap arrangement.
Kissinger: I would like to interrupt for a minute. Give Brent a list of
any complaints you have about the State Department. One of the utilities
of my dual position is to bring this whole thing together. I basically am
on your side.
Schlesinger: So we can keep the ammunition flowing a long time but we
need facade.
The reason I don't tell Tarr is that there are things in the law, but if we
talk about it, they will be eliminated.
Kissinger: But they have to have money to shoot people up.
Schlesinger: If I can just get through the conference on F-5A, that will
help. It should happen in a few days.
Kissinger: This has been a big item though. If we suddenly go quiet, some-
one will get to the Congress. Give me a cover story and write me a memo
I can show.
Keep discipline in your shop, Tom. How about equipment?
Schlesinger: If we get this Air Force money back, we can handle this.
Moorer: We have a million or so of spares in addition to ammunition.
Kissinger: On the diplomatic side -- for you alone -- in June I had the
Chinese lined up for a 60-day Cambodian ceasefire and settlement. We
had a ceasefire in place and a Laos-type government. The Chinese said
they would recommend it to Sihanouk when he returned. That is when we
passed the bomb halt, and then the Chinese said the situation had changed.
Moorer: The reason the Communists tried to take Phnom Penh before
August 15 was they were afraid it would be solved before August 15 and
they would be left out. Of course they were dumb in the way they went at
it.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3
Kissinger: Now I will send a message to Le Duc Tho that we are pre- -
pared to discuss Cambodia along the lines we discussed in June. I will
tell the Chinese that if Sihanouk has anything to say -- we won't use
Mansfield -- we will listen to what he has to say. We shouldn't go to
the Embassy in Phnom Penh and upset the Cambodians but sit tight. I
don't plan any contact with Sihanouk.
Moorer: I would be wary of dealing with Sihanouk. I am not sure he can
deliver.
Kissinger: There is a 90 percent chance I won't see him.
Colby: Sihanouk can't deal with the Lon Nol group.
Kissinger: I don't see a negotiation coming.
Colby: We don't need it if we can stall along.
The critical factor is the Phnom Penh leadership.
Kissinger: We have no compulsion to get into this negotiation.
Let's have our next meeting Wednesday. Brent will be the focal point for
items to discuss.
Schlesinger: On Cambodian ammunition, there will be no paperwork. It
will just be done.
Kissinger: But give me something I can tell Tarr. It is important we
get weapons in. Can I count on that being done?
Schlesinger: Yes.
Kissinger: I am going to London the 14-16 of October. I will see Scheel,
Moro, and Home. On the 22nd I will go to China. I will spend two days
in Japan for the Chiefs of Mission Conference. I am debating about spend-
ing a day in Korea. It depends on whether we cut Korean MAP. Should I
stop there?
Moorer: I think it would be useful. It would make a big impact.
FORD LIBIRATED
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4
Colby: We have to handle the Kim problem.
Moorer: That will be over.
Kissinger: Then I leave on the evening of the 21st.
Schlesinger: I go to Europe on the 6-7 of November. I go to Germany
first, then Amsterdam for the NPG. By the time the DPC comes, I am
thinking of going to Paris, because France doesn't belong to the DPC.
Kissinger: I notice the French made an offer over FRELOC.
Schlesinger: They agreed on a joint group to study how much FRELOC is
worth. $50 million is the down payment. If we get $100 million, it is a
good deal.
Kissinger: I had a good talk with Jobert. We have to keep our military and
diplomatic talks in Tandem. They promised cooperation on a NATO declara-
tion. I think they want to be cooperative.
The decision for us is whether to push the declaration through this year or
next. Our problem was cooperation last summer.
Colby: Are the British coming around?
Kissinger: They really are. They make noises in European forums, but
they never say it was a terrible mistake. Don't let them up for air too
fast, but relax a little.
On the PRC, we have a concern about a Soviet attack.
Colby: I have a study on this. I would say it's a one in ten chance.
Right now the Chinese have a tremendous threat potential.
Kissinger: That is different from your assessment, Tom.
Moorer: By 1976 they will have moved.
Colby: They may already have lost their chance.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
5
Schlesinger: If the Soviets move, we have to offset the psychological
impression of the Soviet moves. Perhaps we move into Austria.
Kissinger: They would fight. They are neutral -- they have nothing to
gain. Eight years ago they were trying to figure out how to defend against
attack from the East.
Schlesinger: They aren't bad. But under circumstances of Soviet nuclear
attack on the PRC, they might think differently.
Kissinger: Under those circumstances, the impact on Japan would be
tremendous. On Europe also. Therefore we must do something. This
stuff about we can't stay apart from China is crap. I am just trying to get
us into a position where we can do something but I don't know what to do.
Colby: There is a fine line between helping China and the Soviets knowing
we do that and scaring them into an attack.
Kissinger: Right, but suppose they attack anyway?
Colby: You could draw a line across China -- this far and no further.
[A discussion takes place about an attack on China. ]
We have to make them important.
An attack could mobilize the kooks in this country.
Schlesinger: What can we do in Europe? Tell them we will not attack if
they evacuate East Germany.
Kissinger: What if they say no?
Colby: Keep the fight in China.
Kissinger: What if they just take out the nuclear facilities?
Colby: They can fire their few remaining missiles one at a time.
Schlesinger and Kissinger: That is not likely.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
6
Schlesinger: Why can't we divide China?
Kissinger: Is there anything we can do militarily?
Colby: We could move into the Middle East to protect the oil.
Kissinger: If we divide China we lost Europe -- because it looks like a
condominum. It looks like if things get tough, we grab what we can.
Moorer: The degree of success of a Soviet attack would depend on the
action Europe took.
Colby: I agree. We must show strength somewhere other than China.
Kissinger: What about Japan? Would they follow?
Colby: They would follow Europe.
Moorer: They would rearm.
Kissinger: If the Soviets do this, we have to go to brutal big power diplo-
macy - - no more nonaligned.
Schlesinger: Yes. It would show them that nothing but power which counts.
Colby: Tell them to get out of the Mediterranean.
Kissinger: There is some merit to this. Kick them out of the Middle East
and the Mediterranean.
Schlesinger: If we move into Austria, tell them we want Bohemia and East
Germany while they dispose of the PRC.
Kissinger: If we do that, we are haggling. I think we have to keep a moral
position. The Europeans are soft -- the Japanese are basically tough.
Schlesinger: The French are tough.
Kissinger: Yes.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
7
Colby: The Germans are basically tough, but they have to change their
form of government.
This assessment is military. I will have a political one following along.
Schlesinger: What is your perception on deployment of forces in the Far
East?
Kissinger: If not for the need for a presence, I would withdraw slowly from
Korea -- cut them in half.
Schlesinger: Five thousand a year?
Kissinger: Yes.
Schlesinger: Leave the Marines in Okinawa?
Kissinger: Yes. A visible presence is good.
Schlesinger: In Thailand are we going down to 32, 000?
Kissinger: I guess, but where is the pressure coming from.
Schlesinger and Moorer: All from Unger.
Kissinger: I couldn't tell from Chatchai, because Unger was sitting there.
My instinct would be to go to 32, 000.
Schlesinger: How about the B-52s in Guam? If we don't, Congress will say
we don't need them for SIOP.
Kissinger: Why not give us a plan for withdrawal of the excess B-52s?
The last time I saw Mao he said he hoped we would keepour forces in Asia.
Schlesinger: We need to trickle the B-52s back through refit to put new wings
back on.
Kissinger: I would like to keep 42 in Thailand [out of 50]. Will the Thais
let us keep them there?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
8
Moorer: I think SO. Utapao was built for them.
I think we should take a few from each base and keep the bases open. We
can get the B-52s back.
Kissinger: You now have 175 out there. You want to pull 75 back over a
period of time. Don't start too actively before I get back from China.
Moorer: On carriers. We have three carriers. One is anchored to the
Tonkin Gulf. I would like more flexibility for this one.
Kissinger: Tho complained about carrierstoo close to the coast. Brent, tell
Tom [Moorer] what the change is.
Moorer: I would like to give the carrier 48 hours leeway.
Kissinger: Okay.
Schlesinger: A squadron of the A-7 is being rotated. If we are going to
withdraw them, why rotate them?
On the MBFR we have to squash the Germans' wish for indigenous force cuts.
The German level of effort now is not that impressive. There is a great
difference between stationed and indigenous forces. Then it's the Germans
against Czechoslovakia and our forces disappear.
On offset, the Treasury is being obstinate. The Germans will give burden
sharing.
Kissinger: Shultz says all you want is loans.
Schlesinger: The Germans are prepared to give hard offset. For tele-
phones, etc. It isn't in the United States budget so Shultz says it's no good.
Kissinger: How do we move? Let's get a NSSM.
Schlesinger: Loans are only after we have all the offset we can get. I was
thinking of 50-year bonds, with interest on 18 months.
The idea that if it's not in the U.S. budget, it doesn't count is fallacious.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
9
Kissinger: On MBFR, your idea of the Soviet position is right. Five per-
cent stationed, five percent indigenous. We can't buy so little.
Moorer: It can't be verified.
Schlesinger: Shultz says the Bundesbank can't buy long-term loans. That
is their problem which they can work out.
Kissinger: On the Yugoslav trip: If it is worked out, I would refuse to see
the Foreign Minister. If not, I wouldn't go.
Schlesinger: It's not set, so I won't go.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
zot 73
Colly / morer
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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LIVERSE DATE
DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY ISCAP Paull 2009-0181 #1
BY doe NARA, DATE 1/5/11
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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