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August 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Joint Chiefs
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1552747
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August 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Joint Chiefs
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory)
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017633
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME
Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Scowcroft
CREATION DATE
08/13/1974
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400185
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
4
FOLDER TITLE
August 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger,
Schlesinger, Joint Chiefs
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/31/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
REDACTED
9/3/10
MEMORANDUM
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
THE WHITE HOUSE
E.O. 12958 (sa amended) SEC 3.3
WASHINGTON
MR # 08-03- #32
OSD letter 9/3/10
TOP SECRET/XGDS
dal NARA, Date 10/12/10
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Gen. George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, USA
Adm. James L. Holloway, III, CNO
Gen. David C. Jones, USAF
Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
DATE & TIME:
Tuesday, August 13, 1974
3:00 p. m.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
The White House
President: I gave a real pitch to McClellan. He was sympathetic but
scared of floor action. There are some pretty hard noses to crack on the
Committee -- Case, for example.
Number one, it is nice to see you, George [Brown], and your associates.
I have had wonderful experience in the 12 years on the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee where we had tough problems to solve and a chance to know,
love and admire our military. I hope that message gets out to the forces.
If we are to make headway in meeting our responsibilities for defense, we
must keep the leadership and money. I am worried about the money. A
$5. 5 billion cut is too deep. I would hope the cuts would be different from
the House so we could get a $1 billion restoration. Anything we can do ought
to be a major effort.
Schlesinger: We expect to get back to about $4.2 billion.
LERARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/XGDS
TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
TOP SECRET/XGDS
-2-
President: Let's do better than that. My comments about being Commander-
in-Chief were not said routinely but people expect to hear it.
As for the workings of the NSC or the system. If you object to actions of
the JCS, the Secretary, or a Service Secretary, you have the right to come
to me. I affirm that, but the best way is through the Secretary and the NSC
to me. If that breaks down, exercise your legal right. But I reemphasize
the system ought to work. How about a rundown on where we are?
Gen. Brown (Chairman, JCS): We appreciate your thoughts. The openness
and communication in the Department is the best in 15 years, so your
contingency shouldn't arise. [He takes out charts on US military forces:]
Chart number 1: We have 2. 1 million men in uniform or in support of these
units.
Chart number 2 shows 1.5 people in the reserves.
Chart number 3: Forces divided into US commands.
Chart number 4 shows foreign forces.
President: What is our strength in Korea?
Schlesinger: 38, 000.
President: Are there any plans to change it? There have been changes in
the situation there and you will want to examine the whole situation in Korea --
the political problems.
Gen. Brown: The current plan in Thailand is to draw down from 30, 000 to
7, 000 forces in two years.
Chart Number 5 shows 191, 000 personnel in Central Europe.
FORD
TOP SECRET/XGDS
GERALDR.
TOP SECRET/XGDS
-3-
Kissinger: How about the other divisions?
Gen. Abrams (Army): Any of the seven can be moved in 18 hours.
President: But we don't have the airlift.
Gen. Abrams: Navy, MAC, and TAC have been working with the divisions
very well over the last year to try to improve our lift ability. We have
reduced lift tonnage by ten percent.
Kissinger: How long would it take to move one division to the Middle East?
Gen. Abrams: It depends on basing. I can't give you a specific answer.
Some of our Minutemen are being modernized to carry.
warheads and
Polaris are being converted to Poseidon.
Chair Number 9 shows four submarines in the Pacific Command; 149 bombers;
11 subs in the Atlantic Command and four in CINCEUR,
Adm. Holloway (CNO): The Navy is flexible, mobile and multi-purpose.
LIBRAT GERALD
Chart number 11 shows Naval postures and contingencies for limited war
and general war (either with general-purpose forces or nuclear). All our
major ships can operate either conventionally or nuclear.
TOP SECRET/XGDS
TOP SECRET/XGDS
-4-
Chart number 13: To support our Asian allies and national tasking. Since
World War II, the 7th Fleet has been combat ten years.
One nuclear sub is on reconnaissance off Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk. There
is a Persian Gulf Task Force. We now know we can stay in Bahrain.
Chart number 14 shows our augmentation capability. Since October we have
put a major force into the Indian Ocean for three or four quarters. It is
difficult to support.
Kissinger: The Chinese are a great supporter of this deployment.
Adm. Holloway: It is difficult to do; that is why we want to see Diego Garcia
upgraded.
President: Did the authorization knock out the limitation?
Scowcroft: Stennis put in $14. 8 million which put it in the door.
President: But the authorization didn't prevent it?
Scowcroft: No.
Kissinger: This Indian Ocean deployment is crucial for our foreign policy.
President: Is the harbor adequate?
Adm. Holloway: No. Even with dredging it could take only the oiler. We have
only carrier ports like Mombasa. But we have a force going in in November
for bilateral operations with the Iranian Navy. We go around South
Africa once a year.
Chart number 15 shows the payoff in a crisis.
GERALD
Chart number 16: If we want to give more we could immediately deploy
75 percent of our ships.
Chart number 17 shows the decline. It's growing again now, but slowly.
Chart number 18: As we decline, Soviet strength grows, especially their
capacity for blue-water operations.
President: What is the range of ship missiles?
TOP SECRET/XGDS
TOP SECRET /XGDS
-5-
Adm. Holloway: Early missiles were 350 miles, now about only 70-75. Our
big concern is the 25-mile missile, because of the problem of detection time.
Cushman: To complement the Navy are the Marines -- 196, 000 of them.
Chart number 20 shows three balanced Division-Wing teams.
President: What strength is a Marine Division?
Gen. Cushman (USMC): 17,000 about. The East Coast team is earmarked
for NATO. There is a reinforced battalion in the Mediterranean. One
Division-Wing Team in Okinawa. A Third Division team on the West Coast --
for any contingency.
Chart number 21: Our sea projection force.
We have fought with the Army twice in twenty years. Our logistics services
can meld with either the Navy or the Army.
President: How long would it be to mobilize the 4th Division?
Gen. Cushman: Sixty days to get to the West Coast to train.
President: Do you have any trouble recruiting for the reserves?
Gen. Cushman: Yes. There are a few incentives.
GERALD .FORD LIBRER
President: Are you up to strength?
Gen. Cushman: We are down about 10, 000. It will get worse not better.
Gen. Abrams: Chart number 24 shows four and a third divisions in Europe.
It was torn up during the Vietnam war. It has turned around now. The
General now is Davison. Discipline and leadership are back.
The Jackson-Nunn Amendment wants us to take out support and replace
it with combat. We are working on it and are in favor of it. I think we can
do it.
The emphasis now is on anti-tank capability. We are trying to improve that.
President: Is the problem a shortage of tanks?
TOP SECRET/XGDS
TOP SECRET/XGDS
-6-
Gen. Abrams: I'd like to come back to that.
Chart number 25: Japan was probably what the Korean war was fought
about, and what we do there [in Korea] relates to Japan.
The Division there has about 2, 500 Koreans in it, but it is an elite, well-
led Division.
President: What uniforms do those Korean forces wear?
Gen. Abrams: Ours. They are identical except for pay.
President: I don't want to take the time now, but do they stay 20 years?
Gen. Abrams: Only three years, because the Korean Government wants
to process the maximum through that Division.
Chart number 26: We have a brigade in Panama. We are cutting Headquarters.
Chart number 27: Eight reserve Divisions not shown.
We are after 875, 000 in end-strength and bring it from 13-to 16-division
force.
President: Can you do that?
Gen. Abrams: Yes. I can do it.
LIBRARY GERALD
President: Where will you put them?
Gen. Abrams: Ord, Polk, Stuart. There is no population pressure except
at Ord.
President: It gives you more flexibility.
Gen. Jones (USAF): I'd like to concentrate on two issues: strategic forces
and NATO.
Adm. Moorer left SAC in good shape and we are unmatched.
President: Who is the Commander in Chief?
Gen. Jones: Dougherty. We are trying to expand the mission, like in the
maritime area. We are trying to give you more options and more flexibility.
The Minuteman is kept open. With improved RV's.
TOP SECRET/XGDS
TOP SECRET/XGDS
-7-
President: Is that CRAF?
Gen. Jones: Yes, but we want to expand cooperation.
President: How quickly can you commandeer it?
Gen. Jones: On an agreed basis, within 24 hours.
President: Did you use it in the Middle East?
Gen. Jones: No. The airlines were worried about Arab retaliation.
LERANT GERALD
Gen. Brown: We had an arrangement for them to take up the slack around
the world while we did the Israeli bit.
Gen. Jones: The lightweight fighter. We are working for standardization
with the allies. In NATO, no one service or country can solve the problem.
NATO air has balance, but with each going his own way, we can't exploit it.
It is an inefficient operation which hurts. There is much to be done.
TOP SECRET/XGDS
TOP SECRET/XGDS
- -8-
Gen. Brown: We are all mindful of the great pressures of inflation and
manpower, and we have got to modernize.
President: We have to get you enough money. Anything I can do, I will.
Thank you, and I reiterate that you can come to me on anything through
Jim and the NSC if they stop it.
GERALD R.FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/XGDS
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017634
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Scowcroft's notes from August 13, 1974
meeting with Ford, Kissinger,
Schlesinger, and Joint Chiefs of
Staff
CREATION DATE
08/13/1974
VOLUME
7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400185
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
4
FOLDER TITLE
August 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger,
Schlesinger, Joint Chiefs
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/31/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG