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October 5, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vuong Van Bac
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1552815
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October 5, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vuong Van Bac
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Foreign aid
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald R. Ford
Vuong Van Bac, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Vietnam
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President
Tran Kim Phuong, Ambassador of the Republic of
Vietnam
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Saturday, October 5, 1974
11:01 a. m. - 11:25 a. m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House
Kissinger: Minister Bac was in Paris keeping an eye on me during the
negotiation. Ambassador Phuong also.
[The press was admitted briefly to take photographs.]
President: We think you made a fine agreement.
Bac: It was mostly Dr. Kissinger. President Thieu and Madame Thieu send
their best wishes and their wishes for the recovery of Mrs. Ford.
[The press was ushered out. ]
President: I want to reassure you we will support President Thieu in every
way -- economically, politically, and diplomatically. Our problem is not us,
but on the Hill.
Bac: We are very grateful for your efforts and U.S. efforts and we hope they
can be kept at adequate levels.
R.
President Thieu has asked me to give you this letter. [Tab A]
GERALD
OHOP
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/NODIS
LISAARY
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
SECRET - XGDS (3)
By let , NARA, Date 1/18/00 CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEGRET/NODIS
-2-
President: Our people are not as enthusiastic about aid, but I will do my
best to get adequate levels. The attacks on aid are not just aimed at Vietnam,
but across the board. When I first came to Congress, the aid bill was $7 billion.
Kissinger: Which would be $15 billion now.
President: But there was strong support for it.
Kissinger: And it shows if you start strong you can taper off.
Bac: We are making that point too.
President: What is the current situation in Vietnam?
Bac: It is difficult, but not critical. The economy measures are difficult.
We have to cut down on our use of ammunition and so on, and that is costly in
terms of casualties. The most intense conflict is around Kontum and the
supply line.
Kissinger: The Vietnamese strategic problem is they must defend a 400-mile
border and the Communists can hit anywhere.
President: How is the military morale?
Bac: It is good in the regular forces, but has been affected in the regional
forces. What we don't know is whether we should use all we have now or be
cautious.
Kissinger: We will try to get you what you need. You know of the American
baseball manager, Leo Durocher, who said "Nice guys finish last."
President: How is the economy in Vietnam?
Bac: Our inflation is about 30 percent but it is not so catastrophic as the kind
in Africa and Italy. The country is basically rich in resources, and in a year
or two we should be self-sufficient in rice.
President: As you close now?
Phuong: Yes, and in some areas the Communists prohibit collection and try
to drain it off.
R.
Bac: There should be good crops this year, and our oil prospects are good. GERATO
OHO
SECRET/NODIS
TIBRAT
SECRET/NODIS
-3-
Kissinger: We may have to have a confrontation on oil prices! Negotiations
with the North Vietnamese in the morning and the South Vietnamese in the
afternoon is a wearing experience.
Bac: We should know soon whether oil is present in commercial quantaties.
The companies are sanguine, but that won't solve our current problems.
I'm trying to get increased aid now. I have visited Japan, and am going to
France and Germany. All together last year we got about $100 million. It
was substantial, but not compared to US levels.
President: We will do our best. We admire President Thieu and want to be
a good partner.
Bac: President Thieu just heard that you will visit Japan and Korea soon.
We would like to invite you to visit Vietnam on the way.
President: That is unfortunately not possible on this trip. Please don't
misinterpret this; it is only a time problem. Another time I will do it. We
will do our best.
Bac: We know you are very busy. Maybe you could visit President Thieu
along the way to Japan.
President: I will talk to Dr. Kissinger about it. But it is likely to be very
difficult.
[The meeting ended with warm handshakes and farewells. ]
R.
GERALD
FLOR
SECRET/NODIS
LIBRARY
"
GE LIBRA RALD R.
Saigon, September 19 , 1974
NGUYEN VAN THIEU
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Dear Mr. President,
About a month ago, I wrote to Your Excellency about
the situation facing the Republic of Viet-Nam as the Communist
side spurned all negotiations and stepped up their armed attacks
in complete disregard of the Paris Agreement.
Since then, the situation has become even more serious.
In fact, the prospects for the resumption of the talks between
the two South Vietnamese parties are bleaker than ever, while
the Communist generalized offensive continues unabated. Now
the leaders of the Hanoi regime openly declare their active
support for movements aimed at overthrowing the legal Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam while they intensify their
infiltrations and military action, thus baring their plans for a
forcible conquest of the whole South Viet-Nam.
His Excellency Mr. Gerald E. FORD
President of the United States of America
Washington D. C.
118444 GERALD R. FOR
- 2 -
I think that the main cause for the increasingly defiant
and bellicose attitude of the Communists resides in their
believing that the United States is now wavering in its dedica-
tion to our common goal, namely a South Viet-Nam capable
of defending itself and of deciding its own future. The utterly
inadequate amount of military and economic aid to the Republic
of Viet-Nam which has been voted by the U.S. Congress might
have induced the Communists to make such speculations.
This can in turn lead to very dangerous miscalculations
on the part of the Communists, as they might be tempted to
launch an all out offensive to complete their forcible conquest
of South Viet-Nam.
Therefore, it is essential that the United States unmist-
akably demonstrates once again its attachment to a serious
implementation of the Paris Agreement and its support for the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, if peace is to be
restored in South Viet-Nam and in South East Asia.
In this respect, I am most appreciative of your efforts
made on September 12th to persuade leaders of Congress to
restore the cuts in aid funds. I sincerely hope that Your
Excellency will succeed in bringing the amounts of military
and economic assistance up to the levels required by the new
realities of the situation and the need for South Viet-Nam to
achieve an economic takeoff.
FRAD
GOOM
GE
- 3 -
The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had
signed the Paris Agreement in good faith, under the double
assurance that, on the one hand, Russia and Red China will
exercise a restraining influence upon Hanoi and that, on the
other hand, all necessary military equipments and economic
assistance will be provided by the United States to the
Republic of Viet-Nam to maintain its capabilities of self
defense and to develop its national economy.
The first assumption turned out to be an empty pro-
mise, as Russia and Red China continue to give North Viet-
Nam all the ingredients to pursue an aggressive war in
South Viet-Nam,
But I am convinced that thanks to your generous efforts,
the second assumption will be borne out.
Our valiant soldiers by enduring daily sacrifices in
the battlefields have proved beyond doubt our will to resist
Communist aggression. It would be unfortunate indeed if
sufficient means could not be supplied to them because of the
lack of resolve and misconception on the part of our allies.
Beside providing us with an adequate amount of military
and economic assistance, the United States can also show its
support for the just cause of the Republic of Viet-Nam by
solemnly restating our common goals. In this regard, I hope
that some time in the near future, we can meet together
it
OUR
LIBRARY
- 4 -
to discuss about ways and means to achieve a genuine peace
in South Viet-Nam.
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my
lasting friendship and highest consideration.
a
LIBRAT FLOOR
THE WHITE HOUSE
4580
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEETING WITH VUONG VAN BAC
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Saturday, October 5, 1974
11:00 a.m. (15 minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Henry A. Kissinger
I. PURPOSE
To demonstrate the constancy of U. S. support for South Vietnam
and to convey to President Thieu assurances that we are making a
strong effort to secure adequate aid for his country.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A.
Background: Recent Congressional cuts in U.S. assistance to
South Vietnam undermine South Vietnamese confidence in
continued U.S. support and in South Vietnam's ability to resist
Communist pressures. Your meeting with Foreign Minister
Bac and your conveying through him assurances of our continued
support to President Thieu can help bolster South Vietnamese
confidence at a critical time. Bac is carrying a letter and verbal
message for you from President Thies. Bac will probably briefly
review South Vietnam's current economic and military problems
and press for higher aid levels.
B.
Participants: Foreign Minister Bac, Secretary Kissinger and
Republic of Vietnam Ambassador Phuong.
C.
Press Arrangements: Press photo session. Meeting to be
announced.
III.
TALKING POINTS
1.
I share your concern about recent Comgressional cuts in
Vietnam aid levels. We are fully aware of the impact these
cuts will have on South Vietnam.
a.
FORD
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State De G delines
By let
, NARA, Date 1/10/00
SECRET
-2-
2.
You may be assured that this Administration will do everything
possible to provide adequate military and economic aid to
South Vietnam.
3.
We believe it may be possible to raise aid levels, above
those so far established by Congress, and we will try our
best to accomplish this.
4.
Please convey to President Thieu my personal assurances
that this Administration remains steadfast in its support for the
Republic of Vietnam. President Thieu's efforts to defend
his country's independence and to promote its well being have
earned our profound respect and admiration. Please give him
my warmest personal regards.
SECRET
D.R.
FORD
10/16/74
P/ Phurong
477
Transcure PWR
500 1974
2001
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LIBRARY